05000266/FIN-2008002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures Resulted in Inadvertent Draining of Unit 1 SI Accumulator |
| Description | A self-revealed finding and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, having very low safety significance (Green), was identified for the licenses failure to implement procedures associated with conduct of operations for plant systems. Specifically, on January 4, 2008, control room operators responded to a Unit 1 A Safety Injection Accumulator Level High Alarm and initiated actions to drain the accumulator, without utilizing the redundant or backup indication for the draining evolution required by plant procedure. This resulted in the inadvertent draining and inoperability of the accumulator with respect to the minimum Technical Specification required accumulator pressure, because the level accumulator channel used to drain the accumulator had failed in the as-is position, causing the initial alarm. The licensee took immediate corrective actions which included restoration of the Unit 1 Safety Injection (SI) accumulator to an operable status, repair of the level indicator, and establishment of a new conduct of operations procedure. In addition, the licensee completed an apparent cause evaluation and developed additional corrective actions to correct this performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve a design or qualification deficiency, there was no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time, and no risk due to external events. The inspectors also determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance. Specifically, human error prevention techniques were not utilized following the receipt of the accumulator level alarm and during the draindown evolution (H.4(a)). (Section 4OA3.1 |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2008002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Ruiz J Neurauter M Kunowski R Krsek D Betancourt K Barclay |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2008Q1
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