05000263/FIN-2014002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure for RCS Operability Determination |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to ensure that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with Fleet Procedure FPOPOL01, in that, on August 9, 2013, and January 3, 4, 7, and 17, 2014, the site failed to ensure that the operability determination for leakage into reactor building closed-cooling water (RBCCW) was sufficient to address the capability of a structure, system, and component (SSC) to perform its specified safety function and, as a result, the site failed to properly classify leakage from the recirculation system as reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. Following NRC questions and actions by the site to confirm the location of the leakage, the site revised the operability determination and classified the leakage as reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage. This issue was entered into their corrective action program; a root cause evaluation was performed; and additional corrective actions were in development at the time of this report. The inspectors determined that the failure to properly classify RCS pressure boundary leakage in accordance with the fleet operability determination process was a performance deficiency requiring evaluation. The inspectors determined the issue was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to perform a thorough operability evaluation for conditions where potential RCPB leakage exists could lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors assessed the significance of this finding in accordance with IMC 0609 under the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and determined that it was of very low safety significance. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Conservative Bias area, because of the licensees failure to use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable, and a failure to ensure that proposed actions are determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2014002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Jose C Zoia J Beavers J Corujo Sandin K Riemer K Walton M Bielby M Jones M Ziolkowski P Voss P Zurawski S Bell A Shaikh |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2014002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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