05000263/FIN-2013004-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inappropriate Emergency Shutdown of Both EDGs During a LONOP Event |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, occurred on June 13, 2013, due to the licensees failure to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, operators failed to utilize B.09.08-05.E.1/2, Emergency Diesel Generators [EDGs]System Operation, 11/12 Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, when verifying proper operation of both EDGs following their auto-start during a loss of normal offsite power event. This resulted in an inappropriate emergency shutdown of both EDGs when circumstances did not warrant the action, making them inoperable during an event that could have resulted in the necessity of their use. In addition, this action unnecessarily challenged future reliability of the EDGs due to the bypassing of the normal engine cool-down period. The licensee took immediate action to restore the EDGs to operable status once the inappropriate action was identified, performed a site clock reset, and improved training and associated procedures. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In addition, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failing to utilize necessary procedures when verifying proper operation of important safety-related equipment during an event, could lead to unnecessary unavailability or inoperability of additional systems. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix G, and determined the finding had very low safety significance because it did not adversely affect core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity guidelines. The inspectors concluded that this issue was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, resources area, because the licensee failed to make available complete, accurate, and up-to-date response procedures. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop K Riemer T Bilik C Brown K Stoedter P Voss J Corujo-Sandin S Bell D Oliver M Ziolkowski |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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