05000263/FIN-2013005-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | SBLC Discharge Pressure Procedural Limits Exceed |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to abide by procedural requirements for pump discharge pressure limitations contained in Procedure 0255-02-III, SBLC Quarterly Pump and Valve Tests, when they imprecisely controlled the 11 standby liquid control (SBLC) flow control valve during the test. This led to the halting of the SBLC test while the equipment condition was evaluated and resulted in the validity of the inservice test (IST) data being brought in to question. The licensee re-performed the test for the 11 SBLC pump; stood down the workers involved; increased operational oversight of the test; evaluated the condition of the equipment; performed a human performance event review; and included communication of the error as part of a site-wide stand down. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP 1401816). The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to abide by SBLC procedural limitations was a performance deficiency, because it was the result of the failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V; the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; and should have been prevented. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency per Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, and determined that the issue was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if pressure limitations had been further exceeded, the discharge relief valve would have lifted, which could result in inoperability of the 11 SBLC pump until repair or replacement of the relief valve. In addition, inadequately performing the SBLC surveillance and IST testing could have the potential to mask degraded conditions associated with the pump. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, to this finding. The inspectors utilized Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating Systems, to screen the finding. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the inspectors answered No to all four questions. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having work practices components, and involving aspects associated with using human error prevention techniques during performance of work activities. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2013005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Moore J Laughlin K Riemer M Bielby M Learn P Voss P Zurawski S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2013005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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