05000261/LER-2013-001, Regarding Non-Environmentally-Qualified Splice Rendered Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Channel Inoperable
| ML14015A309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/2013 |
| From: | William Gideon Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RNP-RA/13-0118 LER 13-001-00 | |
| Download: ML14015A309 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2612013001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
~"-) DUKE
~ ENERGY Serial: RNP-RA/13-0118 DEC 0 5 2013 Attn: Document Control Desk United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261/RENEWED LICENSE NO. DPR-23 W. R. Gideon H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 SUe VIce President Duke Enetyy Progress 3581 West Entrance Road HartsVIlle, SC 29550 0: 843 857 1701 F: 843 8571319 Randj,Gideon@.duke-ellerKJ*.con 10 CFR 50.73 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2013-001-00 NON-ENVIRONMENTALLY-QUALIFIED SPLICE RENDERED POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL INOPERABLE Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, Duke Energy Progress, Inc. is submitting the attached Licensee Event Report. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. R. Hightower, Supervisor-Licensing/Regulatory Programs at (843) 857-1329.
This document contains no new Regulatory Commitments.
WRG/jmw Attachment c:
V. McCree, NRC, Region II Siva Lingam, NRC, NRR NRC Resident Inspector
- to W. R. Gideon Site Vice President H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2
US NRC Document Control Desk Attachment to Serial: RNP-RA/13-0118 4 pages (including this cover page)
H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2013-001-00 NON-ENVIRONMENTALLY-QUALIFIED SPLICE RENDERED POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL INOPERABLE
NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10131/2013 (10*2010)
,lhe NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 05000 261 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Non-Environmentally-Qualified Splice Rendered Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Channel Inoperable
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR !SEQUENTIAL! REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 06 2013 2013 -
1 -
0 12 05 2013 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
Defueled 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203{8)(3)(1) 0 50.73(a)(2)(1)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(11) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203{a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203{a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 000 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73{a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71{a)
0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
IZJ 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73{a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in CAUSAL FACTORS/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The initial investigation into the cause of this event indicates this was an isolated human performance event in which the air-operated valve (AOV) technician failed to use the proper (Raychem) heat shrink insulators identified for the task per the work order instructions and the procedure (CM-309) directing the task.
A review of work orders (WO) for CVC-2048 was performed to identify a date for installation of the non-EQ butt-splice. In May 1992, under WO 90AMPA2-CM, limit switch CVC-2048-LS-C was disconnected and reconnected with no documentation of the proper heat shrink insulators being installed for the six butt-splices performed; one of which is presumed to be the origin of the non-EQ butt-splice. The same technician, which performed the improper butt-splice, performed similar splices properly less than two weeks later under a different WO, 92AESI1. The completed work documentation for this WO clearly documents the splices were performed per CM-309 using non-insulated butt-splices insulated with the proper heat shrink insulators as required per EQ guidelines. The technician's accurate performance of the butt-splices in the latter WO, and the WO in which the improper splice was performed, illustrates an established understanding of the EQ requirements for this component, the capability of the technician to satisfactorily perform CM-309, and the isolated nature of this event.
Immediate corrective actions taken were the removal of the non-EQ splice and subsequent installation of an EQ splice under WO 2066875-01, which returned the component to operable condition.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
There are three plausible events in which CVC-2048-LS-C failure would be important to safety. First, the spurious closure of the isolation valve CVC-2048 could lead to loss ofCVCS given failure of Volume Control Tank (VCT) (TK) makeup from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)[TK). The spurious closure of CVC-204B has a low probability of occurrence and the resulting loss of closure indication would not prevent the VCT level indications from providing sufficient information to operations to take action in mitigating the event. Second, failure to isolate CVC-2048 would only be important if the other isolation valve were to fail. Third, a break in the letdown line in pipe alley would be mitigated by the automatic closure of containment isolation valves LCV -460A&B, which are upstream of CVC-204B.
The mitigation of these events would not be impacted by the loss of closure indication for CVC-204B, and would not prevent valve CVC-2048 from functioning as intended; therefore, the risk significance is low.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
An Internal Operating Experience search for related events at HBRSEP Unit No. 2 was conducted. No similar events were identified.