05000255/FIN-2015008-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Correctly Assess the Suppression System in the Cable Spreading Room in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for NFPA 805 |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance, and an associated NCV of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.48(c), and National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Section 2.4.3.3 for the licensees failure to correctly model the as-built plant in the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Specifically, the licensee credited the suppression system located in the cable spreading room in the PRA to suppress type 2 fire scenarios, whereas the actual room contained numerous obstructions due to the stacked cable trays located near the ceiling that interfered with the water spray pattern discharged from the sprinklers. These obstructions could have prevented the suppression system from providing an adequate water density pattern to suppress a fire below the cable trays in areas which contained electrical panels. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program, and already had compensatory measures in place in the cable spreading room, including hourly fire tours and a standing order for an immediate call out for the fire brigade for a fire alarm in the room. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensees failure to correctly model/analyze the as-built condition of the suppression system located in the cable spreading room in the PRA could potentially affect the risk associated with a fire in the room, and could result in inappropriately screening out the effects of other changes associated with the fire area. Appendix M was used because the existing SDP Appendices do not adequately address the risk of performance deficiencies associated with licensees PRAs. The Senior Reactor Analyst concluded that the finding was of very-low safety significance (Green) because while there may be a change to the plants baseline risk as a result of this issue, there is no delta plant risk due to a deficiency in the licensees PRA model/analysis. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with Team Work because the licensee did not communicate and coordinate activities between the PRA and the fire protection groups. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2015008 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur D Passehl D Szwarc R Daley R Winter |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.48 |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2015008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palisades) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
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