05000255/FIN-2014008-10
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Finding | |
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| Title | Lack of Analysis for Electrical Containment Penetration Protection |
| Description | The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) regarding lack of an analysis to demonstrate that circuit breakers and fuses provide adequate protection against short circuits and overloads for electrical containment penetrations, as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.63. Resolution of this issue will be based on clarification of Palisades licensing basis by NRC staff. As part of the review of power supplies to components inside containment, the inspectors requested to review the analysis that demonstrates protection of the electrical penetrations against short circuits and overloads. The licensee responded that such an analysis does not exist, and stated their position that it is not required by their design and licensing bases. Electrical protection of containment penetrations was the subject of the Palisades Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic VIII-4. A letter from Dennis M. Crutchfield, NRC, to David P. Hoffman, Consumers Power Company, SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment, dated March 26, 1981, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8104080152) included an enclosure entitled Position on Protection of Containment Electrical Penetrations against Failures Caused by Fault and Overload Currents for SEP Plants. This position document states: ...the staff requires compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.63 or an acceptable alternative method. For each containment electrical penetration, the protective systems provide primary and backup protection devices to prevent a single failure in conjunction with a circuit overload from impairing containment integrity. The licensee responded in a letter from Robert A. Vincent, Consumers Power Company, to Dennis M. Crutchfield, NRC, SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment, dated June 15, 1981, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8106180170), in which they stated: The secondary (backup) interrupt devices (...) would fail to trip prior to the penetration reaching its limiting temperature of 302 C with the postulated combination of faults and failure of the primary interrupters. The licensee committed to perform more detailed evaluations of the capabilities of the protective devices, as well as An evaluation of the adequacy of the Palisades Plant overcurrent protection surveillance testing program. In the following subsequent letters, the licensee reported on the progress of their further evaluations: Letter from Robert A. Vincent, Consumers Power Company, to Dennis M. Crutchfield, NRC, SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment, dated November 16, 1981, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8111200805); Letter from Kerry A. Toner, Consumers Power Company, to Dennis M. Crutchfield, NRC, SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment, dated October 12, 1982, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8210190459); and letter from Kerry A. Toner, Consumers Power Company, to Dennis M. Crutchfield, NRC, SEP Topic VIII-4, Status Update of Program to Evaluate the Adequacy of Penetration Protection from Overload and Short-Circuit Conditions, dated February 11, 1983, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8302240273). The NRC issued their Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report on this SEP Topic in Letter from Thomas V. Wambach, NRC, to David J. VandeWalle, Consumers Power Company, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) Section 4.26, Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment Palisades Plant, dated June 10, 1983, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8306160396). This IPSAR stated, The staff has evaluated this issue for other plants... and concluded that no further action was required for these plants. Based upon the information contained in the licensees letters dated June 15, 1981, October 12, 1982, and February 11, 1983, the staff concludes that the design of the Palisades electrical penetrations are similar to other SEP plants, that the probability of electrical failure is low and that any leakage path due to penetration failure would be small. Therefore, we consider this issue to have been completed satisfactorily and further action by the licensee is not required. This conclusion was reiterated in NUREG 0820, Supplement 1, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program, Palisades Plant, Final Report, dated November 1983, (ADAMS Accession No. ML8311290133). The inspectors requested that the licensee discuss their lack of an analysis for electrical penetration protection in light of Palisades FSAR Section 8.5.1.2, which states: 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criterion 50, as implemented by Regulatory Guide 1.63 and IEEE Standard 317-1972, requires that electrical penetrations be designed so that the containment structure can accommodate, without exceeding the design leakage rate, the calculated pressure, temperature and other environmental conditions resulting from any Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The licensee responded by initiating corrective action CR-PLP-2014-04450, which states the licensees position that Palisades is not committed to the electrical circuit protection requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.63. Due to complexity of establishing the appropriate design and licensing bases for this issue, the concern will be resolved using the NRCs Task Interface Agreement (TIA) process. Pending resolution, this item will be tracked as an unresolved item. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
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| Report | IR 05000255/2014008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Stone C Baron C Brown C Zoia H Leake J Corujo-Sandin L Rodriguez S Sheldona Nguyenj Boettcher K Pusateri B Bartlett B Bergeon J Cassidy J Ellegood R Fernandes C Khan C Myers E Duncan |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2014008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palisades) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
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