Text

Proposed Tech Specs Revising Current Boron Dilution Analyses
	ML20113H779
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, Braidwood
Issue date:	07/28/1992
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20113H773	List: ML20113H771; ML20113H779;
References
	NUDOCS 9208050276
	Download: ML20113H779 (30)
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A AITACliMENT_B P110EOSED_CHANGESIO_AEEENQlKA TECHNICALSEEGIEICATIONSf_OB EACILIIY_OPERAllNGLIGENSES NEE-7 RAND _NPF-77 Revised Pagos tr.dex IV 3/4 1-3 3/41 13a

' 3/41-13b -

3/4 3 2 3/4 3-5 3/4 3 9 3/4 3-12 3/4 312a B3/4 1-1 B3/41-3

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ZNLD/2038/14 ZER R88 M Zi8?8 6 P PDR

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LIMITING CONDITIONS- FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION -

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3/4.0 APPLICABILITY........... ................................. 3/4 0-1 w, 3/4.1- REACT!VITf CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1'.1 BORATICH CONTROL -

Shutdown Margin - T,,9 > 100*F............................ 3/4 1-1 Shut 4cwn Margin - T,,9 5 200*F........................... 3/4 1-3 Moderstor Temperature Coefficient................. ...... 3/4 1-4 Minimum Temperature for Criticality...............

. . .. 3/4 1-6 3/4.1.2 BORATION' SYSTEMS Flow Path - Shutdown...-................................. 3/4 1-7 .

~

Flow Paths:- Operating......,.......... / .... . . 3/4 1-8 Charging Pump 1- Shutdown................................. 3/4-1-9 Cha rging Pumps - Opera ti ng. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .-. . . . . ....... 3/4 1-10 4 Borated. Water Source - Shutdown................ ......... 3/4 1 i. rate Water rces . - Operating. . 3/4 1-12 3/4-1~3 e amm n.

ABLE CONTROL A5}gedes g m .. .... .... ....... ..

p g.y'

. tMBLIES l Group: Height........................ .................... 3/4 1 14

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L : TABLE 13.1-1 -ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING. REEVALUATION IN THE EVENT OF:AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH R00........ . ... 3/4 1 16 Pos i tion Indication Systems - Operat ing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-17 Position Indication ~ System - Shutdown................ ... 3/4 1 18

, Rod Drop Time............................ ...... ....... 3/4 1-19.

Shutdown Roc Insertion Limit.................. .......... 3/4 1-20 Control Roc Insertion Limits............. .......... .... 3/4: 1-21 FIGURE 3.1-1. R00 BANX INSERTION LIMIT 5 'VERSUS THERMAL

POWE R FOU R LOO P 0 P E RA T I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 3/4 1-22 l --

i' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 IV

2 ~ -, . . _,

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.g . -- - .- . . - . - - - - . .

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REACTI'VITY CONTROL SYSTEMS -l

' SHUTDOWN MARGIN

T,,, 1 200*F LLIMITINGLCONDITION f0R-^."E98JiGN __ ,

35

,3.i1.1.2 The SHU100WN MARGIN' stall be greater than or equal to /k ak/k. I:*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

ACTION:

h M.b -With th; SMUT 00E" "."ROIN hss-than-l%-6kMemedi-ately initiate-enE contiws- _

, -Q y ber;;i:n et-getette-then-ee-equa+-to-30-gpm-ef-a-SMution-conteieimete4++-

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th:n Or ;;:1 t0 7000 ppe-boron-ce-equivalentwntil-the-required-$ HUT 00WN--

f[{}jss(521 * \ "An0!" i; r::ter;t#

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 > The- SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or. equal

t.,L'Lak'L.

a. Within'1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable control: rod (s) and at-

. least once per 12' hours thereaf ter while the rod (s) is ; inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod (s) is immovable:or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall-be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the-immovable or untrippable

. control rod (s);: and b .- At'least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the-following factors: .;

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, Control rod position.-

2).

4

3) Reactor' Coolant System average temperature, 4)_ Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, i'

5) Xenon concentration, and

'6)- Samarium concentration.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2- 3/4 1-3 i

i 1

1

' I h BEACTMILY_C_ONIBOLSYRIEMS B_QBORDJLI.LTJOREBOIECl10RS1SIEM LIMlI!NG_CDND1T10REQELOEEBAIlOB 3.1.2.7 Two independent Boron Dilution Protectica System (BDPS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE.*

AEELIGABILLIX: MODES 3,4, and 5.

ACIlRN

a. With one BDPS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or within the next hour, and at least once every 31 days thereafter, verify valves CV-111B, CV-8428, CV-8439, CV-8441, and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position."

b. With both BDPS subsystems inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter:

1. Verify valves CV-111B, CV-8428, CV-8439, CV-8441, and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position", and

2. Verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.e, as applicable.

The BDPS Flux Doubling signals may be blocked during reactor startup.

These valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control when required to support plant evolutions.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/41-13a AMENDMENT NO.

ZNLD/2038/15

lhBEACIIVLTlY COf1TBOLSYSIEMS SURVElLLANCEBEQtilBEMENIS __ _

4.1.2.7 Each BDPS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

1. Verifying that its associated nuclear instrumentation sour 9 range detector is OPERABLE and indicating greater than or equal to 10 counts per second,

2. Verifyinn that all reactor coolant loop stop isolation valves a, apen,and

3. Verifying that at least one reactor coolant pump is in operation.

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual,

. power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

At least once per 92 days by verifying that the BDPS Alarm Setpoint is less than or equal to an increase of twice the count rate within a 10-minute period.

d. At least once per 18 months when shutdown by verifying that on a simulated BDPS Flux Doubling test signal valves CV-112D and CV-112E open and valves CV-112B and CV-112C close in less than or equal to 30 seconds.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/41-13b AMENDMENT NO.

ZNLD/2038/16

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- . 'TA8LE 3.3-1 3 -

2o ' REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM thiTRtMENTATION

.6 o HINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHAhMELS APPLICA8tE' e FUNCTIONAL UNI.T Of CHANNELS TO TRIP-

- OPERABLE MODES ' ACTION-x ,

1. Manual. Reactor Trip 2 1 2 1, 2 1 -

w 2' 1 2 3*, 4*, 5* 10

2. Power Range, Neutron flux n

a. High Setpoint 4 2 3

b. Low 5etpoint 1, 2 28.

4 '2 3 16##, 2 2#

3. Power Range, Neutron Flux 4 2 3 1, 2 High Positive Rate 2#

!:* 4. Power Range, Heutron Flux,

4 2 3 ~ 1, 2 2f High Negative Rate T

5. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux 2 1 7 Iff#, 2 3

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux -

a. Startup 2 1 2 2f -

i ;

4- I

b. Shutdown 2 1 2 3,4,5 5 !

i

7. Overternperature ai 4 2 3 1, 2 .6#

8. Overpower AT 4 2 3 1, 2. 68

9. Pressurlier Pressure-tow'

-(Above P-7) , 4 2 3 1 68***

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4 mm TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS "With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive Sy* tem capable of rod withdrawal.

^ ^ Tim uvi vo dHulivo :iu, doubling signah-1ney-be biceked during rh Lui

--Maf+vpr

- - These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Action Statement for the channels in Table 3.3-3 is more conservative and, there. ore, controlling.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

1. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

1. 1. Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

@Whenever the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are racked in and closed for by- C:

passing a Reactor Trip Breaker. ~ [)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Mini' mum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; ncwever, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1; and

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or ecual to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the-Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with tne THERMAL POWER level;

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint; and

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint but beinw 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-5 AmendmentNojf[

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, TABLE 4.3-1 .p

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o. ' REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION'5URVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS' f5' g TRIP

' ANALOG ACTUATING MODES FOR CHANNEL: DEVICE WHICH E CHANNEL ' CHANNEL OPERATIONAL' OPERATIONAL-- ACTUATION. 5URVEILLANCE

] FUNCTIONAL' UNIT . CHECK. CALIBRATION TEST ~ T EST - LOGIC- TEST 15 REQdIRED

[ 1. Manual.' Reactor Trip' N. A. N.A. 1,2,.3*,f4*,5*h-N. A. R(14) N.A.

" ' 2. Power Range, Neutron flux

! a. liigh Setpoint 5. D(2,4), 'Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 l M(3,4) . b

, Q(4, 6),

R(4, '. Sa )#

b. Low Setpoint 5 R(4)# N.A.

s Q N.A. 1N#, 2.

3. Power Range, Neutron flux, N.A. R(4)# N.A. N.A.

{ High Positive Rate- Q 1, 2

4. Power Range, Neutron Ilux, '. N. A. R(Of Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 High Negative Rate 5 Intermediate' Range. S. R(4 Sa)#- Q N.A. N.A. IN#, 2 -

Neutron Ilux-

6. Source. Range, Neutron ilux 'S R(4, 5b,.4f)# Q(9) N.A. N. A. 2##, 3, 4, 5 g

7. Overtemperature of S R(13)# N.A.

Q N.A. 1, 2

8. Overpower AT

{ 5 R# Q N. A. N.A. 1, 2 h 9. Pressurizer Pressure-low 5 R# Q** N. A. N.A.

g (Above P-1) I

, -f 10. Pressurizer Pressure-liigh 5 -R# Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2

11. Pressurizer Wat er l evel-liigh 5 R#. Q N.A. N.A.

(Above'P-/)

t '9

= TABLE 4.3-1-(Continued)-

TABLE NOTATIONS

With thel Reactor Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod yithdrawal.

- These. channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Operational. Test frequency for'these: channels in-Table 4.3-2 is more conservative and, therefore, controlling.-

The specified 18 month: interval may be extended to 32 months for cycle 1 '

t only.-

.##Below P-6 (Intennediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

1. 1. Below P-10.(Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

L(1) If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2)~_ Comp'arison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if. absolute.di_fference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Speci-fication-4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1- .

(3)?'Singl_epoint-comparisor.ofLincoretoexcoreAXIAL'FLUXDIFFERENCEabove

-15% of RATc0 THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater'than-or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are

not applicable. for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

l(4) Neutron; detectors!may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(Sa)_ Initial plateau = curves shall'be measured for each detector. Subsequent plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial

-curves. For' the Intermediate Range and_ Power Range Neutron Flux channels

~

' the provisions of Specification 4 0._4 are not applicable for entry into-MODE 2 or 1.

(5b) With-the high voltige setting. varied as recommended by the manufacturer,.ar.

initial' discriminator bias curve .shall be measured for each detector. Suc-sequent' discriminator bias ' curves shall- be obtained, evaluated and comparec -

to the initial curves.

-(6)' Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provi-

- sions .of Specificatior_4.0,4 are not applicable for entry into' H0DE 2 or 1.

(7) Each: train shall be tested at-least every 62 days on a STAGGERED _ TEST BASIS.

-(8) With powe'r greater than or eg'ual to the interlock Setpoint the'reouired

' ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of verifying that the inter-

-lock?is in' the required state by_ observing tne permissive annunciator.winco..

(9) - Surveillance in MODES 3*, 4*, and 5* shall also include verification that-

permissives~P-6 and P-10 are;in_their required state for existing plant conditions-by-observation of_the permissive annunciator window. t rvei

-loncc';hol' 'nc4ude verifiteti;n of the Soren Oilutica Alera Seccint

. . c f l e ; ; t h o n - ee-eque4-to-e n i n'c reate-o f-tMee-t he c o u n twat e w i t h i n e 40" nute perici (10) Setpoint verification is not; applicable.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12 Amendment No.

, . - - - - . . , v .w..., c.< , ye u

4 z .

.a TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (11) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall be performed such that each train is tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS and following maintenance or adjustment of the Reactor Trip Breakers and shall include independent verification of the OPERABILITY of the Undervoltage D

and Shut Trip Attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

% )

M A w ,e 4 .

(12) At least once per la acoths-dtte4cg-thtst4 car, vcrify-that-on-a-+4mtdete-Bc ro n - D i h t4en-Oout44ng-test-+4<jnal-GVGS-vaheH12t%and-E-open-end 11GB-end-G-cic;c v44.hin-30-seconds, (13) CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

l (14) Verify that the appropriate signals reach the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip - -

relays, for both the Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers from the Manual Trip Switches. Initial performance of this surveillance requirement is to be completed prior to the Startup following the Unit 1 Cycle 1 Refuel Outage.

N (15) Manual Shunt Trip prior to the Reactor Trip sypass Breaker being racked in and closed by bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker, (16) A:tomatic undervoltage trip. Initial performance of this surveillance requirement is to be completed prior to the startup tollowing the Unit 1 Cycle 1 Refuel Outage, '

j BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12a Amendment No.

. _~ - . . ,, . .--

g' 3

't g 1 i- .. 3

, }

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.,2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients asso-ciated with postulated accident conditions-are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T,,g.- The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T,,9 at no load operating temperature,' and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncon-trolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum 5HUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient.

Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement'is based upon this limiting C&ndit1Gn arf is cousistent =ltAFSAR safety -analys h assumptiuns. With"T less than 200*F, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steam

, line break cooldown are minim;! and a 1% Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate

.Q9 protectiog. l

-]76

'h; hPERASILI"' ;f-- the fette-tharging-pump-svetica ,61w e s enssis ece bete-

-e:pabity f;r n g:t h; r:4et4*44y Sscrtien t: ;revent - t+ees4ent-eavsto-by--

the uncentr:ll:d dilut4en-ef-th; RCC. Th; function'ng of ;N .ei,c3 p re c-hedet-1.he necessity ef ;ptretor eetfen-to-prevent-furthee-di49t4on4y-teeminat4ng-f40 -

' to-the-charging-pumps-ffem-pos54ble-unberated--watee-seueces and ini14et4ng-fhw-fcom-the-RWST. A;tiens-teken-ty-the =ieropeece;sor i Mhe-eettt+ee-ce-tot-M* -

h-devMed w i -1 1 - p eeven t-cettree-to -c r i t4ce Mty-in-t hes e-MGOM- ,

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to

' ensure that- the value of this coef ficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient' analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are apoliccole to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly,-verificatiers of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to these conditions in order to pereit an accurate cornparison.

8 3/^ 1-1 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2

I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORAV10H SYSTEMS (Continued)

A Boric Acid Storage System level of 40% ensures that thers is a volume of greater than or equal to 15,780 gallons available. A RWST level of 89% ensures that there is a volume of greater than or equal to 395,000 es11ons available.

With the RCS temperature be10w 350*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inope able below 330'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORY or an RHR Suction valve.

The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHLfTDOWN MARGIN of 1% auk af ter xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140*F. This condition requires either 2,652 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the beric acid storage tanks or 11.B40 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). A Boric Acid Storage System level of 7% ensures there is a volume of greator than or equal to 2652 gallons available. An RWST level of 9% ensures there is a volume of greater than or equal to 3B,740 gallons available.

The contained water volume limits include *11m -1 for water not available because of discharge line location and other r%5ied garacteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the FNST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 fo* the solution rer' ~ulated within containment af ter a LOCA. This pH band r'inimizes the evoluti ' of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systens and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUEL!HG enau.cs that this system is available for reactivity control while in K)DE 6.

( W r> L C U i 7

3 b 3/4.1.3 >0VABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specificetdons of this section ensure _that: (1) acceptable power distrilsution limits are maintained, (2) the minimurt SHUTDOWN MAREN is main-tained, and (3) the :otential ef fects 4 f rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to deterwine control rod positions and thereby ansure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion 'inits. Verir cation that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the deot nded posi' ion within 112 steps at 24, 4B,120, and 228 steps withdrawn for the Coratrol Banks and BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-3

L Insett.#1 Specification 311,2 (Eage 3/41-3)

a. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.3% Ak/k declare both Boron Dilution Protection System subsystems inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.2.7.b.

b. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1% Ak/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 ppm of a solution containing areater than or equa' to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the SHUTDOWN JAARGIN is restored to greater than or equal to 1% Ak/k.

Insert.#2 Bases _for. Specifications 3/4.111_an13/A<112_(Eage B.3/4 hi) -

3rovided that boration dilution paths are isolated. A 1.3% Ak/k SHUTDOWN

'AARGIN lo rec uired to ensure the OPERABILITY of the automatic Boron Dilutlun Protection Sys< em I.nsett1/3 D ase s_foLSpecification _3/A12.(Ea g eR3L4.h3)

The OPERABILITY of the automatic Boron Dilution Protection System ensures adequale ca pability ior negative reactivity insertion to prevent a transient caused by the uncontrolled dilution of the RCS in MODES 3,4, and 5. The functioning of the system 3recludes the necessity of operator action to 3revent further dilution by terminaLing flow to the charging pump (s) from possib e unborated water sources and initiating flow from the RWST. The rnost restrictive condition occurs shortly after beginning of life when the critical boron concentration is highest, and a 205 gpm dilution flowrate provides the maximum positive roactivity addition rate. One reactor coolant pump in operation with all reactor coolant loop stop isolation valves open reduces the reactivity addition rate by mixing the dilution through all four reactor coolant loops. A minimum count rate of ten counts por second minimizes the impact of the uncertaintles asociated with the source range nuclear instrumentation. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient.

Actions taken by the microprocessor if the neutron count rate is doubled will prevent return to criticality n these MODES.

ZNLD/2038/19

g~ .

i- LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.. SECTIO _N PAGE 1

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY............................................... 3/4 0 1 l, I

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL t S hutdown M'a rg i n - T,y, > 200'F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 . . . 1-1 Shutdown Margin _ T,y, 1 200*F..................*........ 3/4 1 3 j Moderator Temperature Coefficient........................ 3/4 1-4 .

Minimus _ Temperature f or Criticality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 3/4 1-6

3/4.1.2 80 RATION SYSTEMS -!

Flow Path - Shutdown.....................................-

3/4 1-7 Flow Paths - 0perating................................... 3/4 1-8 i

-Charging Pump - Shutdown................................. 3/4 1-9 !

Charging Pumps - 0perating............................... 3/4 1-10 Borated Water Source - Shutdown............'..............! 3/4 1 ,

< 8 crated Water Sources -- 0perating. . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-12 r

3/4.1,3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEM8 LIEF g

Group Height............................................. 3/4 1-14 TABLE 3.1-1 ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION IN THE EV ENT OF AN IN0PERA8LE FULL-LENGTH R00. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-16 Posi tion Indication Systems - Operating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-17

' Position Indication System - Shutdown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-18 5 Rod' Drop Time;........................................... '

3/4 1-19 Shutdown' Rod Insertion Limit............................. 3/4 1-20 1

Control Rod Insertion Limits............................. .

3/4 1-21 FMURE 3.1-3. ROD BANK INSCRTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL q " POWER FOUR LOOP CP ERAT I0N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-22

_._ w m MuAsp hm...... . . . - - '/4 l-13 ' !

~

BYRON - UNITS-1 & 2 IV s,E,.= ++--ee-, r-,r-.-+ - -1e w :e r.g+ re~+ g v a- e-tyqww.-*--r- 3- 3 g=.g%-T r- y w + v$ ~rw y- rw ce , y r- g- y-- y

.m.

k REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T,yg 5 200*F 1

LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I i.i 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to -1% Ak/k. i A i APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

ACTION:

p ' ,' W44h-t he-6 HUTOOWN-MARGI N-l es s-t ha n-LFok/h-imedia t ely-4 ni ti e te-e nd-cont 4ttre--

boration-et greater-than-or-equel-to-30 gpm-of-a-solution-conteining1reater--

l n g. f. t then-et-tqual-to-7000 ppm-boron-or-equivalent-ent44-the-eequired--SHUT 00WN

-HARGIN-is-restorede SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 The SHUTD0hH MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1% ak/k:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable control r.od(s) and at least'once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the rod (s) is inoptrable.

If the inoperable control rod (s) is imovable or untrippable, the SHUTD0hH HARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the imovable or untrippable control rod (s); and

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following factors:

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)- Control rod position,

3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5) Xenon concentration, and

6) Samarium coacentration.

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-3

f .

l .

AREACTIVITlY_CONIBOkSYSTEMS UQRON OlLU.lloitPBOTECIloN_ SYSTEM LIMITING CoilOlTION FOB.OPERAT.lON___ __.. _ . . _ _ _ _ . - _

3.1.2.7 Two independent Doron Dilution Protection System (BOPS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICADILITX: MODES 3,4, and 5.

ACTION:

a. With one BDPS subsystem inoperable, rostore We inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or within the reext hour, and at least once overy 31 days thereafter, verify valves CV 111B, CV 8428, CV 8439, CV-8441, and CV 8435 are closed and secured in position."

b. With both BDPS subsystems inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and at least once overy 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter:

1. Verify valves CV 111B, CV-8428, CV 8439, CV 8441, and CV 8435 are closed and secured in position", and

2. Verify compliance with the SHUT DOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicab'e.

s

' The B6PS Flux Doubling signals may be blocked during reactor stariup.

" These valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control when required to support plant evolutions.

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/41-13a AMENDMENT NO.

ZNLD/2038/17

h REACIIVlTlY_ CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _ . _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _

4.1.2.7 Each DDPS subsystem shall bo demonstrated OPERADLE:

a. At least once por 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

1. Verifying that its associated nuclear instrumentation source rango detector is OPERABLE and indicating greator than or equal to 10 counts por second,

2. Verifying that all reactor coolant loop stop Isolation valves are open, and

2. Verifying that at least one reactor coolant pump is in operation,

b. At least onco per 31 days by verifying that each valvo (manual, In the flow path that is not locked, coaled, or power otherwiseoperated, secured inorposition, automatic)is in its correct position.

c. At least once por 92 days by verifying that the BDPS Alarm Sotpoint is less than or equal to an increase of twice the count rate within a 10 minuto period.

d. At least onco por 18 months when shutdown by verifying that on a simulated DDPS Flux Doubling test signal valves CV 112D and CV 112E open and valves CV 1128 and CV 112C close in less than or equal to 30 seconds.

1 i

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-13b AMENDMENT NO.

ZNLD/2038/18 1

1

.. ~

ia t

S TA8tE 3.3-1 ,

E' yj REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

.a; i .* MINIMUM e- c TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICA8LE

-y.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERA 8tE- MODES ACTION l .- 1. : Manual. Reactor Trip 2 1 2. 1, 2 1

e. 2 1 2 3*, 4*, 5* 10

{_ m i 2.. Power Range, Neutron Flux i

a. High Setpoint 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

b.- Low Setpoint' 4 2 3 1###, 2 2#

i. 3. . Power Range, Neutron Flux 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

.Algh Pg31tlya Fate

! ~

! t 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

l [ High Negative Rate

! 5. Intermediale Range, Neutron Flux' 2 1 2 1###, 2 3

! 6. Source. Range, Neutron Flux

a. 'Startup

b. Shutdown 2 1 2 2fM 4 l l 2 1 2 3,4,5 5 l

7. Overtemperature AT 4 2 3 1, 2 6#

8. Overpower AT 4 2 3 - 1., 2 6.7 2

9. Pressurizer 'ressure-Low l (Above P-7) 4 2 3 1 6#***

. ~

h

$ 9

=

r .

/ I 'o i ..

_, _ . - . . . . . _ _ - - . - -~ . - _

4 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

' ~ ~ * ~ YABLINOTAT)6NS

With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.

- -The-boron-diiuti o n-flurdouhli ng-s igna l s-fn sy-b e-b loc ked-d uri ng-re a ctor-st-artupr-

- - These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Action Statement for the channels in Table 3.3-3 is more conservative and, therefore, controlling. .

The provisions of Spectfication 3.0.4 are not applicable.

1. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

1. 1. Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint. o

@Whonever the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are racked in and closed for bypass- 0 ing a Reactor Trip Breaker. P ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hou.'s.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification

. 4.3.1.1; and

c. Either, THERMAL. POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRAHT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABi.E one less than the Minimum Cl.ennels OPERABLE require. ant and with the THERMAL POWlR levol:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Pange Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint, restore the -inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setooint; and

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to-0PERABLE status prior to fncreasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-5 AmendmentNo,h

o.

, TABLE 4.3-1 y E

z REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM i::STRUtiENTATION SURJEILLAEE REQUIREMENTS TRIP i E ANALOG ACTUATING MODES F0F l

Z CHANNEL DEVICE WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATICNAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE

'~' FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS REQUIRED r .

"1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. N.A. R(14) N.A. 1,2,3*,4*,5([

2. Power Range, Heitron Flux i a. High Setpoint S D(2, 4), Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 l M(3,4),

l Q(4,6),

R(4,g5a)#

b. Low Setpoint 5 R(4) Q N.A. H.A. 1###, 2 E

3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, N.A. R(4)# Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 Y High Positive Ratt l u>

4. Power Range, Heutron Flux, M.A. R(4)# Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 High Negative Rate

5. Intermediate Range, S R(4,Sa)# Q N.A. N.A. 1###, 2 Neutron Fluz

6. Source Range, Neutron Flux 5 R(4, Sb, -le)# Q(9) N.A. N.A. 2##, 3, 4, 5 l

7. Overtemperature AT S R(13)# Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 k8. Overpower AT S R Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2 s

k9. Pressurizer Pressure-Low 5 R Q** N.A. N.A. 1 5 (Above P-7)

P 10. Pressurizer Pressure-High 5 R Q N.A. N.A. 1, 2

11. Pressurizer Water Level-High 5 R Q N.A. N.A. 1 (Above P-7)

,t .

. l l

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

With the Reector Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.

- These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Operational Test frequency for these channels in Table 4.3-2 is more conservative and, therefore, ,

controlling.

- - A Reactor trip on Turbine trip is enabled above P-7 (10%) until the modifica- 7 tion is implemented which enables Reactor trip on Turbine trip above P-8 '30%). L

The specified 18 month interval may be extended to 32 months for Cycle 1 only.

1. Below P-6 (Intermediate Rangt: Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint,

1. 1. Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1) If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2) Comparison of calorimetric to excore peser indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Speci-fication 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3) Single point comparison of incore to excore AXIAL FLUX OlFFERENCE above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(Sa) Initial plateau curves shall be measured for each detector. Subsequent plateau' curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial curves. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicab! for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(Sb) With the high Gitage setting varied as recommended by the manufacturer, E

an initial disr:riminator bias curve shall be measured for each detector.

l Subsequent discriminator bias curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial curves, ,

(6) Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provi-sions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

l (7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(8) With power greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the required ANALOG CilANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of verifying that th( inter-lock is in' the required state hv observing the permissive annunciator window.

l,(9) Surveillance in H0 DES 3*, 4", and 5* shall also include verification that t permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for enisting plant

conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator vintlov. Nrvei+--

l 4em: shall ir.cittde veri ficat4ttt-of-the-6cren-9Httt4en-Alers -GeWo+nt-of W t H er rqu L--tc an increau of tw+ee-the-eeuet-tc4:e dek-e--

14-*4+ utWeth-BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENT NO. J6

l ,.

l g TABLE 4.3-1 (Cont _inued) i TABLE NOTATIONS (10) Setpoint verification is not applicable.

(11) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall be performed such that A each train is tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS and t 1 following maintenance or adjustment of the Reactor Trip Breakers and /~ ,-

shall include independent verification of the OPERABILITY of the '

Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

(12) At-4easN 'cr-10 aontha- during-shutdown verify-thsta e s bl e.ted.

Boeon-Otht4en-lbubling teategnaWS-vehes-H20-end-E epen and di20-and-C-ehs e-wii.hin-60-s econ d s; (13) CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

(14) Verify that the appropriate signals reach the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Relays, for both the Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers from the Manual /

Trip Switches. Initial perfcrmance of this surveillance requirement for C the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers is to be completed prior to the startup following the third refueling outage for Unit I and the second refueling outage for Unit 2.

}

{s (15) Manual Shunt Trip prior to the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker being racked '

in and closed for bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker.

/

(16) Automatic Undervoltage trip. Initial performance of this surveillance I requirement is to be completed prior to the startup following the third "

refueling outage for Unit I and the second refueling outage for Unit 2.

8YRON UNITS 1 & 2 1/4 3-126 AMENDMENTNO.fdi

$3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOVN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOW MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity t.ansients asso-ciated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the . reactor vill be maintained sufficiently suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOW MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of ,

The most restrictive j fueldepletion,RCSboronconcentration,andRCST,ykn.

condition occurs at EOL, with T,yg at no load operat g temperature, and is l associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncon- i trolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN i MARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient. l Accordingly, the SHUTDOW MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety ant. lysis assumptions. With T,yg less t.han 200'F, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steaa line hreak cooldown are minimal and a 1% Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate protectiog -

L5ert 1 The-OPERABli:1 TY-of-the-four-th a rgi ng-pump-s uc tion-v alvet-ens u res-adequa t+

-e s p a b il i ty-fo r-nega ti ve-rea c t iv i ty-i n s er tion-to-p ee ve nt-a-tra n si ent-caned 4y-the-unconttelled-di4ution-of-the-ACS. T he-fu nc ti o ni ng-o f-the-v alves-precludes-

-t he-nece ss i ty-e f+ ope ra to r-a c ti on-to -p re ve n t-fu rthe e-d i4 uti on4y-te rminating-flow--

-to-the-c ha rg ing-pumps-from-possible-unbo ra ted-wa tee-sources-a nd-ini-ti a t4 ng-fl ow f ree-the-RWSTv-Ac tion s-ta ke n-by-the-# ic rop roce ssor-14-the-ee utron-count-ra te---

45-d oubled-wi44-peeve nt-ce tu rn-to-c ei ti c a 14 ty-i n-t he se-HOD E &v 3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIERT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditi..i othe'r than those explicitly st_ated will reqJire extrapolation to those conditions in '

order to permit an accurate comparison. -

BYRCH - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-1

IREACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS BASES - , , , . . . .

BORAT10N SYSTEMS (Continued)

A Boric Acid Storage System level of 40% ensures that there is a volume of greater than or equal to 15,780 gallons available. A RWST ;. vel of 89% ensures that there is a volume of greater than or equal to 395,000 gallons available.

With the RCS temperature below 350'F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection system becomes inoperable, ,

The limitation for a maximum of one rer.trifugal charging pump tu be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requiremen verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 330*F provides assurance that a mass addition pr usure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or an RHR Suction valve.

The boron capability reriired below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% ak/k af er xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140*F. This condition requires either 2,652 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 11,840 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water'from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). A Boric Acid Storage System level of 7% ensures there is a volume of greater than or equal to 2652 gallons available. An RWST level of 9% ensures there is a volume of greater than or equal to 38,740 gallons available.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solutd on recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

Inart 3 .

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTkol ASSEMoL;rs The ipecifications of this section ensure that: (1) accept 6tle peser distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN M % TIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on a;sochted accident analyses are limited. OPERABI ITY of the control rod po:it;on indicators is requ! red to determine control rod positions and th eby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. Verification that the Digital Rod Positicn Indicator agrees with the demandtd por,ition within 112 56eps at 24, 48, 120, and 228 steps withdr N n for the Control Banks and BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 0/4 1-3

,~ .

' I InsedJL1 Sperification_31LE(Eage_3141-3) l

a. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.3% Ak/k declare both Doron Dilution Protection System subsystems inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.2.7.b.

b. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1% Ak/k, immediately inillate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equa to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored to greater than or equal to 1% Ak/k.

Insert >I2 13asesJOLSpecifications_3/AALLand.3L4J12]Page13L4_E1) 3rovided that boration dilution paths are isolated. A 1.3% Ak/k SHUTDOWN WARGIN is required to ensure the OPERABILITY of the automatic Boron Dilution Protection System losedJta Bas elf 0LSperlilcall0IL31312_{E0 ge13L4_13)

The OPERABILITY of the automatic Boron Dilution Protection System ensures adequate capability for negative reactivity insertion to prevent a transient caused by the uncontrolled dilution of the RCS in MODES 3,4, and 5. The functioning of the system precludes the necessity of operator action to 3revent further dilution by terminating flow to the charging pump (s) from possib e unborated water scurces and initiating flow from the RWST. The most restrictive condition occurs shortly after beginning of life when the critical boron concentration is highest, and a 205 gpm dilution flowrate provides the maximum positive reactivity addition rate. One roactor coolant pump in operation with all reactor coolant loop stop isolation valves open reduces the reactivity addition rate by mixing the dilution through all four reactor coolant loops. A minimum count rate of ten counts per second minimizes the impact of the uncertainties asociated with the sourco ran0e nuclear instrumentation. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k is required to control the reactivity transient.

Actions taken by the micro arocessor if the neutron count rate is doubled will prevent return to criticality n these MODES.

ZNLD/2038/19

,4 .

ALTACUMENLG EVALUATIOttOESIGNIE10 ANLilAZARDS EONSID E RATIONS

1. INIBOD_UCIlON Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) and Westinghouse Energy Systems have re analyzed the consequences of an inadvertent boron dilution accident in HOT STANDBY, HOT SHUTDOWN, and COLD SHUTDOWN. The analysis periormed demonstrates with reasonable confidence that the Boron Dilution Protection System (BDPS) can successfully detect an inadvertent dilution, actuate the required valves, and in.ect 2000 parts per million (ppm) boric acid into the reactor, and restore the SHUT DOWN MARGIN prior to an inadvertent criticality. The inputs and assum 3tions of the analysis conservatively bound all applicable plant conditions as required ay the Standard Review Plan (SRP) NUREG-0800, Section 15.4.0, Revision 1. The results of the analysis satisfy the acceptance criteria of the Section 15.4.6 by demonstrating that the BDPS can successfully mitigate criticality.

Administrative controls of dilution flowpaths required by the amended Technical Specifications ACTION Statements provide sufficient margin to ensure that an inadvertent dilution will not eliminate the plant SHUTDOWN MARGIN for conditions not 3rotected by an OPERABLE BDPS. These administrative controls have been mplemented at Byron and Braldwood.

The re analysis serves to techn.cally justify the increase of the safety analysis limit for the most limiting COLD SHUTDOWN critical boron concentration. Additionally, the re analysis incorporates changes to inputs to disposition deficiencies in current licensing basis analysis,

11. Analysla.Changea Severalinputs and assumptions were revised in the analysis:

LimitingSIllical.Bolon_Concenttation: This value was increased from 1050 ppm to 1300 ppm in order to bound actual critical boron concentrations predicted for Byron and Braidwood candidate core designs. Since this change adversely affects the results of the analysis, the minimum required SHUTDOWN MARGIN and assumed reactor coolant system volume were revised to recover the lost margin.

Setpoint.Uncedalaty: A setpoint uncertainty was incorporated to disposition a deficioney in the current licensing basis analysis. This uncertainty does not result in any change to the selpoint in the plant, but its incorporation :nto the analysis adversely affects the results of the analysis. Since this incorporation adversely affects the results of the analysis, the minimum required SHUTDOWN MARGIN and aseumed reactor coolant system volume were revised to recover the lost margin. -

ZNI.D/2038/20

o .' .

Invers e_C ou r)LB ate _B atia,(IC R B)_C u ry e: The analysis utilizes a predicted responso curve which represents a bounding sourco range nuclear instrumentation rosponse to a boron dilution. The curvo from the current licensing basis was replaced with a curve measured during Braidwood Unit 1 Cycle 3 startup testing.

This change was made to disposition a deficioney in the current licening basis analysis. Since this incorporation adversely affects the results of the analysis, the minimum required SHUTDOWN MARGIN and accumed reactor coolant system volumo woro revised to rocover the lost margin.

SHUIDOWttMABGIN: The COLD SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN MARGIN was increased from 1.0% Ak/k to 1.3% Ak/k. The increase in SHUTDOWN MARGIN arovidos substantial bonofit to the analysis and providos additional real margin in lhe plant.

ReactotCoolaoLSystenLVoluma: Conservatively small volumes were credited throughout the analysis. However, credit was taken for the fullinventory of the reactor coolant system including the loops and steam generator tubos when the reactor coolant pumps are in service and the Loop Stop Isolation Valvos are open.

Credit for the additional volumes provided a bonofit to the analysis.

Ill. Evaluation CECO has ovaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no sl0nificant hazards considerations. According to 10 CFR 50.92(c), a proposed amendmont to an o aorating licenso involves no significant hazards considerations if oporation of the fac lity in accordance with the proposed amendmont would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalueted; or

2. Create the possibility of a now or different kind of accident from any accident previously ovaluated; or

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Ceco has reviewed the SRP, the Byron /Braidwood Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and Byron /Braidwood Technical Specifications and concludes that the results and assumptions for the analysis of an inadvertent boron dilution in HOT STANDBY, HOT SHUTDOWN, and COLD SHUTDOWN are acceptable.

This amendment will not result in an increase of the probability of occurrence of an accident. The initiating event of an inadvertent dilution is the failure of a component or operator error which results in the decrease of the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system. This amendment does not increase that probability. Isolation of dilution flowpaths is required when automatic protection is not available. This luolation requiroment reduces the probability of a dilution.

ZNLD/2038/21 1

f

~

o /

The amendment will not result in an increase of the consequences of an accident.

Analysis has demonstrated that the automatic protection provided by BDPS prevents the reactor from achieving criticality due to an inadvertenL diluilun. Fuel damage and pressure boundary failure is precluded by maintaining the reactor sub critical.

This amendment will not result in an increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The amendment does not modify any component or system or modify any operating procedure which would adverse y affect the operation of a component or system important to safety.

This amendment doas not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated accident in the UFSAR. The changes to the operation of equipment required to control reactor coolant system boron concentration do not affect i i

the ability to increase reactor coolant system inventory or boron concentration as '

required by Technical Specifications and accident analysis. No credit is taken in any accident analysis for the flowpaths which have been isolated as a result of the i administrative controls prescribed by the ACTION Statements of the amended Technical Specificatione. The administrative controls do not result in a new type of transient which would result in a change in reactor coolant system inventory or heat removal, nor do these controls result in a reactivity anomaly.

This amendment does r 31 create the possibility of a component or system malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated accident in the UFSAR.

The changes to the operation of equipment roc ulted to control reactor coolant system ,

boron concentration do not affect the ability to ncrease reactor coolant system inventory or boron concentration as required by Technical S 3ecifications and accident analysis. No credit is taken in any accident analysis for the "lowaaths which have been isolated as a result of the administrative controls prescribed by t,e action statements of the amended specifications. The amendment does not modify any component or

. system or mod fy any operating procedures which would adversely affect the operation of a component or system important to safety.

This emendment does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Dases for any Technical Specification. The administrative controls over dilution flowpaths, the revised ICRR Curve, the inclusion of the estimated setpoint uncertainty, and the increase in SHUTDOWN MARGIN ade uately com aensate for the increase in the critical boron concentration safety anal is limit anc the potentialloss of conservatism due to the deficiencies in the ICRR an setpoint uncerta nty assumptions in the current licensing basis. The analysis demonstrates that the BDPS can successfully detect a l dilution, isolate the source of the dilution, and restore plant SHUTDOWN M ARGIN before fuel design limits or pressure boundary limits are exceeded. The acc3ptance criteria is met by demonstrating that criticality is not achieved.

l l

ZNLD/2038/22 mt

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l . p IV. Conclusion The results of Cornmonwealth Edison's ovaluations with respect to the provision of 10CFR50.92 demonstrate that the changes to the analysis for an inadvertent boron dilution in HOT STANDBY. HOT SHUTDOWN, and COLD SHUTDOWN do not involve a significant safety hazard.

M ZNLD/2038/23 i

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o .s .

O ATTACllMENED ENVillONMENTALASSESSMEN ESTAT EMENT Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) has ovalt,ated the proposed amendment against the criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10CFR51.22(c)(9).

The proposed change alters the operation of the Boron Dilution Protection System (BDPS). The change involves adding administrative controls to compensate for nonconservatisms identiflod in the safety analysis. BDPS is used to mitigate translents that result in a decrease in the reactor coolant system boron concentration. BDPS provents inadvertant criticality and precludes fuel damage. This change assures that uho DDPS w?ll perform its required safety function. This change does not involve radioactive effluent roloases or personnel exposure. All changes proposed by this request can b9 modified or cancelled without impact to the environment. Therefore, this chango wll1 not result in any irreversible consequences.

The propos9d change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed in Atttchment C to this lotter. Also, this proposed amendment will not involve significar t changes in the types or amounts of any radioactivo eifluents nor does it affect any of the permitted release paths. In addition, this chango does noi involvo a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure.

Therefore, this change meets the categoricel exclusion perm tied by 10CFR51.22(c)(9).

ZNLD/2038/24

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ML20113H779

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