ML20237B702
| ML20237B702 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1998 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237B701 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9808190159 | |
| Download: ML20237B702 (950) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. . ATTACHMENT 1 ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST l SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE. INSERT PAGE l l I 3.3 BYRON ITS 3.3-1 - 3.3-19 3.3.1-1 - 3.3.1-19 3.3-20 - 3.3-36 3.3.2-1 - 3.3.2-14 l 3.3-37 - 3.3-40 3.3.3-1 - 3.3.3 4 3.3-41 - 3,3-42 3.3.4-1 - 3.3.4-2 3.3-43 - 3.3-44 3.3.5 1 - 3.3.5-2 )' l 3.3-45 - 3.3-48 3.3.6 3.3.6-4 1 l 3.3-49 - 3.3-52 3.3.7 3.3.7-4
- 3.3-53 - 3.3-56 3.3.8 3.3.8-4 l
3.3 57 - 3.3-60 3.3.9 3.3.9-4 I B3.3-1 - B3.3 62 B3.3.1 B3.3.1-60 B3.3 63 - 83.3-126 B3.3.2 83.3.2-57 B3.3-127 - B3.3-144 B3.3.3-1 B3.3.3-17 eg B3.3-145 - B3.3-150 B3.3.4 1 - B3.3.4-5 Q B3.3-151 - B3.3-156 B3.3-157 - B3.3 165 B3.5.5 B3.3.5-6 B3.3.6 1 - B3.3.6-9 j B3.3-166 - B3.3-171 B3.3.7 B3.3.7-6 B3.3-172 - B3.3-177 B3.3.8-1 B3.3.8-5 B3.3-178 - B3.3-186 B3.3.9 B3.3.9-9 i l I I
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9808190159 990812 PDR ADOCK 05000454 P PDR l __ - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ __ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - . J
ATTACHMENT 1 A i 3 V ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE 1 3.3 BRWD ITS 3.3-1 - 3.3-19 3.3.1-1 - 3.3.1-19 3.3-20 - 3.3-36 3.3.2-1 - 3.3.2-14 3.3-37 - 3.3-40 3.3.3-1 - 3.3.3-4 3.3-41 - 3.3-42 3.3.4-1 - 3.3.4-2 3.3-43 - 3.3-44 3.3.5-1 - 3.3.5-2 3.3-45 - 3.3-48 3.3.6 3.3.6-4 3.3-49 - 3.3-52 3.3.7 3.3.7-4 3.3-53 - 3.3-56. 3.3.8-1 3.3.8-4 3.3-57 - 3.3-60 3.3.9 3.3.9-4 B3.3-1 - B3.3-62 B3.3.1 B3.3.1-60 B3.3 B3.3-126 B3.3.2 B3.3.2-57 B3.3-127 - B3.3-144 B3.3.3 B3.3.3-17 .i B3.3-145 - B3.3-150 B3.3.4 B3.3.4-5 B3.3-151 - B3.3-156 B3.5.5 B3.3.5-6 [sT B3.3-157 - B3.3-165 B3.3.6 B3.3.6-9 V B3.3 166 - B3.3-171 B3.3.7 B3.3,7-6 { l B3.3-172 - B3.3-177 B3.3.8 B3.3.8-5 l B3.3-178 - B3.3-186 B3.3.9 B3.3.9-9 W t _ _ - - - _ - _ _
,o ATTACHMENT 1
'v' ITS SECTION 3.3 l ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE 3.3 BYRON CTS MARKUPS 2-3 thru 2-6 2-3 thru 2-6 INSERT 3.1-13aA INSERT 3.1-13aA 3/M 1-13b 3/4 1-13b INSERT 3.1-13bA INSERT 3.1-13bA 3/4 3-1 3/,4 3-1 INSERT 3.3-1A INSERT 3.3-1A 3/4 3-2 thru 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-2 thru 3/4 3-5 INSERT 3.3-5A-C INSERT 3.3.5A-D 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 INSERT 3.3-6A-G INSERT 3.3-6A-H 3/4 3 6a 3/4 3-6a X INSERT 3.3-6aA X INSERT 3.3-6aB n 3/4 3-9 thru 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-9 thru 3/4 3-12 INSERT 3.3-12A-C INSERT 3.3-12A-C (L') 3/4 3-12a 3/4 3-12a 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13 INSERT 3.3-13A INSERT 3.3-13A X INSERT 3.3-13aA 3/4 3-14 thru 3/4 3-14 thru 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-21 INSERT 3.3-21A-F INSERT 3.3-21A-F 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 INSERT 3.J.-22A-C INSERT 3.3-22A-D 3/4 3-25 thru 3/4 3-25 thru 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-39 3/4 3-39 3/4 3-40 3/4 3-40 3/4 3-42 3/4 3-42 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-65 3/4 3-65 3/4 9-14 3/4 9-14 l
n l (,/ . 3
ATTACHMENT 1 O ITS SECTION 3.3-ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST I I SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE- INSERT PAGE 3.3 BRWD CTS MARKUPS 2-3 thru 2 6 2-3 thru 2-6 INSERT 3.1-13aA INSERT 3.1-13aA 3/4 1-13b 3/4 1-13b INSERT 3.1 13bA INSERT 3.1 abA 3/4 3-1 '3/4 3-1 INSERT 3.3-1A INSERT 3.3-1A 3/4 3-2 thru 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-2 thru 3/4 3-5 INSERT 3.3 5A-C INSERT 3.3-5A-D 3/4 3 6 3/4 3 6 INSERT 3.3-6A-G INSERT 3.3-6A H 3/4-6a 3/4-6a X INSERT 3.3-6aA X INSERT 3.3-6aB 3/4 3-9 thru 3/4 3-12 3/4 3 9 thru 3/4 3-12 INSERT 3.3-12A-C INSERT 3.3-12A-C 3/4 3-12a 3/4 3 12a 1 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13 INSERT 3.3-13A INSERT 3.3-13A 1 X INSERT 3.3-13aA 3/4 3-14 thru 3/4 3-14 thru 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-21 INSERT 3.3-21A-F INSERT 3.3-21A-F 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 INSERT 3.3.-72A-C INSERT 3.3-22A-D 3/4 3-25 thru 3/4 3-25 thru i 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-28 3/4 3 37 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-39 3/4 3-39 _ 3/4 3 40 3/4 3-40 3/4 3 42 3/4 3-42 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-65 3/4 3-65 j 3/4 9-14 3/4 9-14 4 g _______________________________m_.-_. --__________..__m___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ . _ . _ ___ _ _ . . - _ .
I 1 ATTACHMENT 1 O U l ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST l I I SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE l l I
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I 3.3 CTS DOCS 3.3-2 thru 3.3-5 3.3-2 thru 3.3-5 i X 3.3-5a l 3.3-9 3.3-9 l 3.3-10 3.3-10 X 3.3-10a 3.3-11 thru 3.3-16 3.3-11 thru 3.3-16 X 3.3-16a ! 3.3-21 3.3-21 3.3-22 3.3-22 3.3-23 3.3-23 3.3-24 3.3-24 ; 3.3-26 3.3-26 ' 3.3-27 3.3-27 I 3.3-31 3,3-31 i
'( X 3.3-31a I
j- i O s
ATTACHMENT 1 v ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE 3.3 LC0 MARKUP 3 3.3-1 (2 pgs) 3.3-1 3.3 2 3.3-2 X INSERT 3'.3-2A/B 3.3-3 3.3-3 3.3-4 3.3-4 X INSERT 3.3-4A 3.3-5 thru 3.3-19 3.3-5 thru 3 3-19 3.3-23 X 3.3 20 3.3-20 3.3-21 3.3-21 3.3-22 3.3-22 INSERT 3.3-22A/B INSERT 3.3-22A/B 3.3-23 thru 3.3-29 3.3-23 thru 3.3-29 INSERT 3.3-29A INSERT 3.3-29A 3.3-30 thru 3.3-37 3.3-30 thru 3.3-37 X INSERT 3.3-37A X INSERT 3.3-37B 3.3-38 3.3-38 3.3-39 3.3-39 3.3-42 3.3-42 3.3-47 3.3-47
. 3.3-49 3.3-49
. 3.3-64 X 3.3-65 ._
X
- 3.3-64 3.3-64 INSERT 3.3-64A INSERT 3.3-fAA 3.3-65 3.3-65 INSERT 3.3-65A INSERT 3.3-65A 3.3 LCO JFDs 3.3-2 thru 3.3-12 3.3-2 thru 3.3-12 3.3-12a 3.3-12a X 3.3 12b X 3.3-12c 6
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ATTACHMENT 1
\l ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE 3.3 BASES MARKUPS B3.3-1 (2 pgs) B3.3-1 B3.3-2 thru B3.3-4 B3.3-2 thru B3.3-4 INSERT 83.3-4A INSERT B3.3-4A B3.3-5 thru B3.3-20 B3.3-5 thru 3.3-20 X INSERT B3.3-20A B3.3-21 thru B3.3-24 B3.3-21 thru B3.3-24 INSERT B3.3-24A INSERT B3.3-24A B3.3-25 B3.3-25 X INSERT B3.3-25A B3.3-26 thru B3.3-28 B3.3-26 thru B3.3-28 INSERT B3.3-28A/B INSERT B3.3-28A/B B3.3-29 thru B3.3-39 B3.3-29 thru B3.3-39 INSERT B3.3-39A INSERT B3.3-39A/B g~3 B3.3-40 thru B3.3-42 B3.3-40 thru B3.3-4
('-' j X INSERT B3.3-42A B3.3-43 B3.3-43 B3.3-44 B3.3-44 X INSERT B3.3-44A B3.3-45 thru B3.3-49 B3.3-45 thru B3.3-49 INSERT B3.3-49A INSERT B3.3-49A B3.3-50 B3.3-50 INSERT B3.3-50A INSERT B3.3-50A B3.3-51 B3.3-51 ' 83.3-52 ,,_ B3.3-52 X INSERT B3.3-52A B3.3-53 B3.3-53 X INSERT B3.3-53A B3.3-54 thru B3.3-56 B3.3-54 thru B3.3-56 INSERT B3.3-56A INSERT B3.3-56A B3.3-57 B3.3-57 INSERT B3.3-57A INSERT B3.3-57A B3.3-61 X B3.3-58 B3.3-58 B3.3-59 B3.3 59 X INSERT B3.3-59A B3.3-60 B3.3-60 ('N Q,) 7 ? . L____________________ __ _ _
l l l ATTACHMENT 1 ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISI'N O E AFFECTED PAGE LIST I SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE 'NSERT PAGE i 3.3 BASES MARKUPS INSERT B3.3-60A INSERT B3.3-60A (cont'd)- B3.3-61 thru B3.3-63 B3.3-61 thru B3.3-63 X INSERT B3.3-63A B3.3-64 thru B3.3-82 B3.3-64 thru B3 3-82 X INSERT B3.3-82A/B B3.3-83 thru B3.3-93 B3.3-83 thru B3.3-93 X INSERT B3.3-93A B3.3-94 B3.3 94 B3.3-95 B3.3 95 I INSERT B3.3-95A INSERT B3.3-95A , B3.3-96 thru B3.3-97 B3.3-96 thru B3.3-97 l l B3.3-98 thru B3.3-104 B3.3-98 thru B3.3-104 INSERT B3.3-104A/B INSERT B3.3-104A/B B3.3-105 B3 3-105
-INSERT B3.3-105A-C INSERT B3.3-105A-C B3.3-106 thru B3.3-106 thru B3.3-107 B3.3-107 INSERT B3.3-107A INSERT B3.3-107A B3.3-108 thru B3.3-108 thru B3.3-109 B3.3-109 INSERT B3.3-109A/B INSERT B3.3-109A/B B3.3-110 B3.3-110 X INSERT B 3.3-110A B 3.3-111. _ B 3.3-111 INSERT B 3.3-111A INSERT B 3.3 111A B3.3-112 B3.3-112 X INSERT B3.3-112A, B3.3-113 B3.3-113 INSERT B3.3-113A INSERT B3.3-113A
! B3.3-114 B3.3-114 B3.3-115 B3.3-115
- INSERT B3.3-115A/B INSERT B3.3-115A/B l B3.3-116 thru B3.3 116 thru l B3.3-119 B3.3-119 INSERT B3.3-119A INSERT B3.3-119A/B B3.3 120 B3.3-120
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4 ATTACHMENT 1 ITS SECTION 3.3 ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT PAGE 3.3 BASES MARKUPS B3.3 122 thru B3.3-122 thru l (cont'd) B3.3-125 B3.3-125 i B3.3-131 B3.3-131 ! INSERT B3.3-131A INSERT B3.3-131A/B i B3.3 133 B3.3-133 INSERT B3.3-133A INSERT B3.3-133A B3.3-137 B3.3-137 1NSERT B3.3-137A/B INSERT B3.3-137A/B B3.3-144 B3.3-144 INSERT B3.3-144A INSERT B3.3-144A B3.3-145 B3.3-145 B3.3-147 B3.3-147 B3.3-149 B3.3-149 e INSERT B3.3-149A By INSERT B3.3-149A By
/
INSERT B3.3-149A Bw INSERT B3.3-149A Bw B3.3-150 B3.3-150 83.3-153 B3.3-153 B3.3-155 B3.3-155 i B3.3-175 (2 pgs) B3.3-175 l X INSERT B3.3-175A l B3.3-176 B3.3-176 INSERT B3.3-176A INSERT 83.3-176A B3.3-177 B3.3-177 INSERT B3J-177A/B INSERT B3.3-177A/B B3.3-178 B3.3 178 INSERT B3.3-178A/B INSERT B3.3-178A-D INSERT B 3.3-179A-C INSERT B 3.3-179A-C l [ 3.3 BASES JFDs 3.3-2 thru 3.3-8 3.3-2 thru 3.3-8 3.3-8a 3.3-8a 3.3 9 3.3-9' 3.3-10 thru 3.3-13 3.3-10 thru 3.3 13 X 3.3-13a
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d ATTACHMENT 1 U ITS SECTION 3.3 ; ITS REVISION E AFFECTED PAGE LIST l SECTION/ TAB REMOVE PAGE INSERT.PAGE i 3.3 NSHC 3.3 9 3.3-9 3.3-13 3.3-13 3.3-14 3.3-14 3.3 17 3.3-17 3.3-19 3.3-19 3.3-21 3.3-21 3.3-22 3.3-22 l 3.3-29 3.3-29 l 3.3-33 3.3 33 i 3.3-34 3.3-34 3.3-35 3.3-35 X 3.3-56a X 3.3-56b 3.3-56c O X X 3.3-56d X 3.3-56e X 3.3-56f ;
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RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3l3 INSTRUMENTATION h '3 3.1. : Reactor Trip. System (RTS)- Instrument'ation. LC053.3.1 The' RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table' 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. 4 APPLICABILITY ;According to Table 3.3.1-1. lhCTIONS NOTE l Separate. Condition entry is allowed for each Function. -{ i 1 s if CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ! 1
. .A. .0ne or:more Functions: A.1' Enter the Coridition Immediately i with one or more referenced in
,i required channels-or' Table 3.3.1-1 for the {
. trains inoperable. ch ) or .,
B. One Manual Rea'ctor- B.1- Restore channel to- 48 hours
' Trip channel OPERABLE status.
-inoperable.
08 i B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours l
-l (continued) j i,,
- BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.3.1 - 1 7/9/98 Revision E' i
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RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) ) O CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One channel or' train NOTE inoperable. While this LCO is not met for Function 18. 19. or 20-in MODE 5. making the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal is not permitted. C.1 Restore channel or 48 hours train to OPERABLE status. 0E-C.2.1 Initiate action to 48 hours fully' insert all. rods. AND C.2.2 Place the Rod Control 49 hours System in a condition inca able of rod
-h'. with rawal.
i l- (continued) 4 ese l I i
'O' iBYRON'- UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.1 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E l
.RTS Instrumentation
. ' 3.3.1:
i
. 1 ACTIONS (continuedh '
LCONDITION. REQUIRED ~ ACTION. COMPLETION TIME ~
.,. I D. One' Power Range NOTE-Neutron' Flux- High The inoperable. channel may be channel-inoperable, bypassed for-up'to 4 hours for' surveillance testing and' setpoint adjustment of other .
channels. D.1.1 Place channel in 6 hours trip. E. D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 12 hours ! to s-75% RTP. l gg . . D.2.1 Place channel in' 6 hours:
' trip.
M ! V(1:. .. - _ NOTE Only required'to be performed when the Power Range Neutron . Flux inaut to QPTR is-inoperaale. I D 2.2 PerformSR3.2.4.2. On~ce per ) 12 hours ! 08 D.3 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours l; (continued) l
)
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h ' fBYRON-UNITS 1&2 3. 3.1 - 3 7/9/98 Revision E
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RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 : 1 I i ACTIONS ~(continued) h CONDITION' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-El One channel: NOTE
- inoperable. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of; other channels.
E.1 Place channel in 6 hours l trip. , j E.2- Be in MODE 3. 12. hours F. One. Intermediate Range F.1- Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 hours Neutron Flux channel to < P-6.
; inoperable. .
+
l F.2 ~ Increase THERMAL- 2 hours POWER to ) P-10.
- 15. Two. Intermediate Range G.1 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channels involving positive inoperable. reactivity additions. j gg _ ;
G.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 hours to < P-6. H. One Source Range H.1 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channel involving positive ; 1 inoperable, reactivity additions. l
;l (continued)
[. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.1 - 4 7/9/98 Revision E
TJS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) i
) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. Two Source Range I.1 Open Reactor Trip Immediately Neutron Flux channels Breakers (RTBs).
inoperable. J. 'One Source Range J.1 Restore channel to 48 hours ! Neutron Flux channel OPERABLE status, inoperable. 2 J.2.1 Initiate action to 48 hours ' fully insert all rods. AND ! J.2.2 Place the Rod Control 49 hours System in a condition incapable of rod 4 withdrawal. I
% _.,s K. One channel NOTE inoperable. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.
K.1 Place channel in 6 hours trip. 2 K.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 12 hours to < P-7. , l (continued)
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BYRON ' UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.1 - 5 7/9/98 Revision E 4 l L _ __
[ ['i.- RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS- (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION- COMPLETION TIME L i L. One Turbine Tri). NOTE-channel.inoperaale. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing'of Other channels. l- L.1 Place channel in 6 hours
. trip.
l-E- !- L.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 12 hours to.< P-8. E I l M .~ One train inoperable. -
. NOTE L One train may be bypassed for E up to 4 hours for surveillance testing 3rovided up the other train is OPERABLE.
! V M.1 Restore train to 6 hours L OPERABLE status. - M.2 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours
]_ (continued) l l
A r- . BYRON.- UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.1 - 6 7/9/98 Revision E l 1
t. RTSJ Instrumentation p , 3.3.1 lJ e . L ' ACTIONS -(continuedL CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION. . COMPLETION TIME '((]
- N. One RTB train. -
NOTES inoperable. 1. One train may be bypassed for.up to.2 hours for surveillance testing. provided the'other train is OPERABLE.
- 2. One RTB may be bypassed L
t
.for up.to 2 hours for.
maintenance on ' undervoltage or shunt-g trip mechanisms, provided the other train is ( : OPERABLE. N.1 Restiore train to .1' hour' OPERABLE status. . 1 i .. ! N.2 Be in MODE-3. 7 hours "LO . , O. One or more channels 0.1- Verify interlock is 1 hour inoperable.- in required state for , existing unit [:
. conditions. .
0.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours [ (continued) L I ' Q' - BYRON - UNITS l'& 2 3. 3.1 - 7 7/9/98 Revision E I p.
. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________m_.____ . _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ d
RTS-Instrumentation 3.3.1' ACTIONS '(continued) Q CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME P. One or more channels- P.1. Verify interlock is 1 hour zinoperable. in requi. red state for existing unit conditions. P.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours
- 0. One tri) mechanism 0.1 Restore inoperable 48 hours
.inoperaale for'one tria mechanism to RTB. OPEMBLE status.
2- . 0.2 Be in MODE 3, 54 hours
.O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
. NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RTS Function.
~
- SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY
-SR 3.3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours -
'(continued) -
i i l. BYRON- UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 8 7/9/98 Revision E f' i 1 l' _________-__________-__-___O
L RTS Instrumentation j 3.3.1 i: I-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E(continued)
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l:xJf SURVEILLANCE : FREQUENCY
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i SR 3.3.1.2s NOTES { L 1. .' Adjust NIS channel if absolute j difference is > 2%. l
- 2. _ Not required to be- performed until l
i 12 hours after THERMAL ~ POWER 1s 1
= 15% RTP.
o
. Compare results of calorimetric heat 24 hours balance calculation to Nuclear -
Instrumentation System (NIS)' channel
~ l- output. ,
L ! SR 3.3.1. 3 NOTES ,
- ' 1. Adjust' NIS channel'if absolute- 1 difference is = 3%. i L
- 2. Only required to be 3erformed with 1
THERMAL POWER > 15% RTP.
-'h Compare results of the incore detector Prior to l measurements to NIS AFD. exceeding' 75% RTP after each refueling L
BiQ 31 Effective Full Power days l
. (EFPD) !
thereafter l 1 (continued) I L ! 4 1 8 )
- 3. 3.1 - 9 7/9/98 Revision E
' .* BYRON - UN'ITS l'& 2 I
I g
I RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1
, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.4 NOTE - This Surveillance must be 3erformed on the RTBB prior to placing the aypass breaker in ! service. Perform TAD 0T. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.6 NOTE Not required to be performed until 24 hours
/'"N after THERMAL POWER is a 75% RTP.
d Calibrate excore channels to agree with 92 EFPD incore detector measurements. SR 3.3.1.7 NOTE -- Not required to be performed for source
. . range instrumentation pr%r to entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry into MODE 3.
Perform COT. 92 days (continued) l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 10 7/9/98Revisiond L-----------------.--_-.--.---.----
RTS Instrumentation- l 3.3.1
- g. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)' -l
() : SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR-~ 3.3.1 8 . NOTE
.This Surveillance shall. include verification that interlocks P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing unit conditions.
Perform COT. NOTE ) Only required- -) when not J performed within previous ! 92 days ll 1 Prior to reactor startup ; _AJQ .l Four hours l after reducing L ,- yw)- ( aower below l ?-10 for power and intermediate ~ ! instrumentation i MD - i Four hours
. after reducing
. power below P-6 for source i I' range <
instrumentation i MD [~ - ! Every 92 days
. thereafter (continued) y ..
-tj -
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.3.1 - 11 7/9/98 Revision E ' 2. i
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p RTS' Instrumentation- [.. 3.3.1 s l. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -(continued)
... SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR; 3.3.1.9 . NOTE -
L Verification of setpoint is not ' required. Perform TADOT; 92 days ! -SR 3.3.1;10
' Perform CHANNEL. CALIBRATION. 18 months i .
L -SR. 3.3.'1.11
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NOTE- - b Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Perform CHANNEL' CALIBRATION. 18 months'
. : .SR 3.3.1.12 ' Perform COT. 18 months SR 3.3'.1.13 -
- NOTE Verification of setpoint is not required.
Perform TADOT. ._ 18 months (continued) 4 L .
,..}'
,- (N BYRON.'- UNITS'1 &'2- _3.3.1 - 12 7/9/98 Revision E iI
RTS Instrumentation.. 3.3.1
. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) p Q. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR~ 3.3.1.14 .
NOTE
-Verification of setpoint. is not required.
' Perform TADOT. -
NOTE Only required when not performed 4 within previous 31 days Prior to reactor startup SR 3.3.1.15 _ NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded from 1 response time testing. , Verify RTS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST ..! BASIS 1 1 I 1 1 i
.. I TY
- r v' . BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 3'.3.1 - 13 7/9/98 Revision E l-
RTS Instrumentation-3.3.1 Table 3.3;1 1 (page 1 of 6) Reactor Trip System Instr a ntation ID. I. V _ APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
.l. .1. 'Hanual Reactor Trip 1.2 2 B SR 3.3.1.13 NA
-l. 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) 2 C SR 3.3.1.13 NA
- 2. Power Range Neutron j
' Flux j
- a. Hign 1.2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 s 111.361 SR 3.3.1.2 RTP SR 3.3.1.7 (
SR 3.3.1.11 l SR 3.3.1.15 l: b. ' Low 1(b) 2'. 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 27.361 SR 3.3.1.8 . RTP-i-
- SR 3.3.1.11 1 ,
SR 3.3.1.15 '
- 3. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate l' a .- High Positive Rate 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 s 6.3% RTP SR 3.3.1.11 -with time constant a 2 sec j
.l ' b. _H1gh Negative Rate 1.' 2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11
- s 6.3% RTP with time
~l. SR 3.3.1.15 constant a 2 sec l 4. Intermediate Range 1(b), p(c) 2 F.G SR 3.3.1.1 s 31.5% RTP Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11
~
l* 5. Source Range Neutron Flux 2(d) 2 . H. ! SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.8 s 1.42 E5 cps SR 3.3.1.11
.l SR 3.3'.1.15 l 3(a), 4(a). 5(a) 2 1.J SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.42 E5 cps '
SR 3.3.1.7 l SR 3.3.1.11 1- SR 3.3.1.15 (continued) p l~(a) 'With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
.(b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(c) ' Above the P-6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.
-(d) Below the P-6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.
D t~/ BYRON . UNITS 1 & 2L 3.3.1 - 14 7/9/98 Revision 5' o i.
p - RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1
-Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 6)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS (ALW
'l - 6. Overtemperature AT 1.2 - 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.3 Refer to-Note 1 (Page, SR 3.3.1.6 3.3 16)
SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 l SR 3.3.1.15 l -7 Overpower AT ~1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to SR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 (Page SR 3.3.1.10 3.3-19) l SR 3.3.1.15
- 8. Pressurizer Pressure
~l a. Low I(8) '4- K SR 3.3.1.1 . = 1869 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SE 3.3.1.10 l SR 3.3.1.15 l b. 'High 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 2393 psig SR 3 3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15
- 9. ' Pressurizer Water 1(') 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 s 93.5% of Level - High SR 3.3.1.7 instrunent SR 3.3.1.10 span
- 10. Reactor Coolant 1(e) 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 = 89.3% of Flow- Low (per loop) SR 3.3.1.7 loop minimum SR 3.3.1.10 measured flow SR 3.3.1.15
- I l 111 Reactor Coolant Pump I I ') 4 K SR 3.3.1.13 NA (RCP) Breaker Position (per train)
(continued) I
-(e) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
l l ! l L l.i, A ) vg-. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 15 7/9/98 Revision E , i
RTS Instrumentation.
-3.3.1 ..
f Table 3.3.1 1 (page 3 of 6) ! Reactor Trip System Instrumentation 1 O . APPLICABLE MODES 1R OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE c ( l ' '12. Undervoltage I I'I - 4 K SR 3.3.1.9 a 4920 V
,RCPs (per train) SR 3.1.1.10
- l. SR 3.3.1.15 l 13. Underf requency -
RCPs (per train)' II 'I 4 K SR 3.3.1.9 a 56.08 Hz SR 3.3.1.10 ( ..' l SR 3.3.1.15 i I 14: Steam Generator (SG) Water Level - Low Low (per SG)- l a. Unit 1 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1- a 16.1% of i SR 3.3.1.7 narrow range SR 3.3.1.10 instrument SR 3.3.1.15 span
- b. Unit 2 1.2 4 L SR 3.3.1.1 a 34.8% of SR 3.3.1.7- narro, range SR 3.3.1.10 instrument SR 3.3.1.15 span I
I
- 15. - Turbine Trip !
\ a. Emergency Trip lif} 3 L SR 3.3.1.10 a 815'psig .
l '- Header Pressure SR 3.3.1.14 (per train)
- b. Turbine Throttle IIII 4 L *R
> 3.3.1.10 a It open l- Valve Closure SR 3.3.1.14
-(per train).
1 I
'l 16. Safety injection (SI)
Input from Engineered 1.2 2 trains M SR.3.3.1.13 NA i Safety Feature ,, . I Actuation System
- (ESFAS) l.
(continued)~ l (e)' Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock. ' t. (f). Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. l l O ' BYRON _- UNITS 1_& 2 3.3.1 - 16 7/9/98 Revision E . L (___.__ - --_ _ - . - _ _ __ - _-- . . _ - -
HTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 6) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
/~% .
hL APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED' RE0 VIREO SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE , FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS V4UE l
- 17. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
- a. Source Range Block 2(d) 2 0 SR 3.3.1.11 a 6E-11 amp Permiss1ve. P-6 SR 3.3.1.12
- b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P 7 (1) P-10 Input 1 3 P SR 3.3.1.11 NA SR 3.3.1.12 (2) P-13 Input 1 2 P SR 3.3.1.11 NA SR 3.3.1.12-
- c. Power Range 1 3 P SR 3.3.1.11 s 32.1% RTP Neutron Flux, P-B SR 3.3.1.12
.d. ' Power Range 1.2 3 0 SR 3.3.1.11 = 7.91 RTP and .
Neutron Flux, P-10 SR 3.3.1.12 s 12.1% RTP l e .- Turbine impulse 1 2 P SR 3.3.1 10
. s 12.11
, Pressure. P-13 SR 3.3.1.12 turbine power i
l
+
- 18. Reactor Trip - 1.2 2 trains N- SR 3.3.1.4 NA i l Breaters (RTBs)(9) l 3(a) 4(a). 5(a) 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.4 NA Ol l
- 19. Reactor Trip Breaker' Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Hechanisms 1.2 3(a), 4(a) 5(a) 1 each per RTB 1 each per RTB 0
C SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA l 20. Automatic Trip Logic 3.2 2 trains M SR 3.3.1.5 NA
- l. 3(a) 4(a). 5(a) 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.5 M
'l (a) With Pad Control System capable 'of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
(d) Below the P-6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock. !
. (g)_. Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB.
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RTS Instrumentation
, 3.3.1
(] Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 6) U' Reactor Trip System Instrumentation I i Note 1: Overtemoerature AT The.0vertemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more than 1.33% of AT span.
' ~ ' '
SAT'o K - K (l'+ r,s) 1 1 A T(1+r s) i T- - T' + K3 (P-P')- f (A I) ' (1+r 2s) 1+rs 3, 1 2 (1+r3s) (1 + r,s) 1 Where: AT is measured Reactor Coolant System (RCS) AT. F. ATo is the indicated AT at RTP. F. s is the Laplace transform operator, sec'1 T,is the measured RCS average temperature. F. T is the nominal T,y at RTP. s 588.4*F. P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig. P is the nominal RCS operating pressure, a 2235 psig. l ('M C) K - 1.325 3 K2 - 0.0297/ F K3 - 0.00181/psig 73 - 8 sec 72 = 3 sec r3 s 2 sec T4 - 33 sec T3 - 4 sec rs s 2 sec f (AI) = -3.35{24+(qt - q,)} when qt - Ao < - 24% RTP 1 0% of RTP when -24% RTP s qt - qn 5 10% RTP 4.11{(qt - q,) - 10} when qt - q, > 10% RTP
. Where qt and q, are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core, respectively, and q, + q3 is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.
s l BYFkQN-UNITS 1&2 3.3.1 - 18 7/9/98 Revision A I L_--______-____
RTS Instrumentation ' 3
'3.3.1
( (f) Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 6) ! -D Reactor Trip System Instrumentation l Note 2: Overoower AT - The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more than-3.65% of:AT span. i. j - . , ~ L 1 r,s 1 1 A T (1+r s) 3 SAT' o K,- K3 T.- K3 T - T" - f,(A I) '
' (1+r rs). 1+rs 3 1 + r, s 1 + r,s 1+res -l Where: .AT is measured RCS'AT, 'F.
l ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, *F. s is the Laplace transform operator, sec'3 . 1 T,,is the measured RCS average temperature. *F. l T is the nominal T,, at RTP, s 588.4*F. K4 - 1.072 K3 - 0.02/ F for increasing T,,, K6 0.00245/ F when T > T" 0/ F for decreasing T ,, 0/ F when T s T" f- 73 - 8 sec 72 - 3 sec' r3 s 2 sec. 76 s 2 sec 77- 10 sec f 2(AI) = 0 for all AI. l L
)
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[ . ESFAS Instrumentation L 3.3.2 L \ r.
- 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION vs.
U- 3.3.2 Enginee'ed r Safety. Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation t-LC0 3.3.2 The ESFAS' instrumentation for.each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE. L (- ~ APPLICABILITY; According to Table 3.3.2-1. l l i- ACTIONS. ' l
- NOTE
- 'l-- Separite . Condition entry is allowed-for each Function.
- l. - _
CONDITION- REQUIRED A'CTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in required channels or Table 3.3.2-1 for the trains inoperable, channel (s) or-train (s).
~B. One channel B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
. inoperable. OPERABLE status B.2.1 Be in MODE 3; 54 hours 6N.D B.2.2- Be in MODE 5. B4 hours
'f '
(continued) , i p "(1 3. 3.2 - 1 7/9/98 Revision E
. j j
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 k_._._m.___.m___ ______________-___.m_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . __.____._-.____._.-__.-_m_. ._-_..___.__.___.._..____._______._m__ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ --
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued) D); x CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
- .C. One train inoperable. C.1 NOTE
, m One train may be
-bypassed for up to 4 leurs for.
surveillance testing-provided the other train is OPERABLE. Restore train'to' 6 hours OPERABLE status. 2 C.2.1 Be in MODE 3 12 hours AND C.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 42 hours fl'# D. One channel D .1- NOTE inoperable. The inoperable-channel may be by)assed for up to 4 1ours for surveillance testing of other channels. Place channel in 6 hours trip. D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours A_ND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours o L l (continued) D. l . BYRON - UNITS:1 & 2 3. 3.2 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E L e__ - _--- _---- - _ _ -------
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)-
;<] CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
-E. One Containment E.1 NOTE Pressure channel One additional inoperable. channel may be by)assed.for up to 4.1ours.for surveillance testing.
Place channel in 6 hours bypass. 2 E.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours AND'. , E.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours i g l F. One channel or train F.1 Restore channel or 48 hours .
.O inoperable.
train to OPERABLE status. I 2 F.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours , bid . F.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours i 1- (continued) f l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 3 7/9/98 Revision E
ESFAS' Instrumentation 3.3.2-ACTIONS '(continued)- , CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-I] ] G. One train inoperable. G.1 NOTE One train may be by]assed for up to 4 lours for surveillance testing provided the other : train is OPERABLE. Restore train to 6 hours OPERABLE status. i M G.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours M G.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours O ". oae chaame inoperable.
".1 "oTe One channel may be by]assed for up to 2 1ours for surveillance testing provided the other ;
channel is OPERABLE. Place channel in 1 hour trip. M
- H.2.1 Be in MODE-3. 7 hours M
H.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours l (continued) L BYRbN-UNITS 1&2 3.3. 2 - 4 7/9/98 Revision E u
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 , tACTIONS (continued)-
- h. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
~ I...One channel =
~
1.1 -
-NOTE -
' inoperable. The inoperable channel may be by)assed for up to
.4. lours for .
surveillance testing of other channels.
^
Place channel in 6 hours trip. u g.
'I .2 Be in MODE.3. '12 hours J .- 'One'or more trains J.1- Declare associated Immediately L inoperable.- auxiliary feedwater-pump inoperable.
h eK; One channel K.1. NOTE ; inoperable. -The inoperable channel.may be ! by)assed for up to 4 lours for ' surveil. lance testing p , , of d her channels. l Place channel in 6 hours trip. K.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours 6hlQ - K.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 42 hours
.c-l. (continued)
L [ BYRON --UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 5 7/9/98 Revision E L.
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ; ACTIONS (continued)- _O co"otTio" REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L. One or more channels L.1 . Verify interlock is 1 hour j inoperable. -in required state for ' existing unit condition. 2 L.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours AND-L.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ESFAS Function. O v , SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.2 2 Perform COT. 31 days SR 3.3.2.3 NOTE Verification of relay setpoints not required. L Perform TAD 0T., 31 days l
.(continued)
,}
' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3. 2 - 6 7/9/98 Revision E
_ = _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ .
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
.SR 3.3.2.'4 Perform'ACTUATIONILOGIC' TEST. 31' days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
- SR 3.3.2.5 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 31 days on a>
STAGGERED TEST BASIS SRE 3'.3.2.6. Perform' COT. 92 days
-SR .3.3.2.7 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 92 days SR- 3 3 2 8 NOTE
.O -
ver fication of re av setroints aot required. Perform TADOT. 92 days ) SR '3.3.2.9 NOTE - lL Verification of setpoint not required. t Perform TAD 0T. 18 months SRf3.:3.2.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months - (continued) r 3.3.2 - 7 7/9/98 Rev1sion E
' BYRON . UNITS 1 & 2.
l
ESFAS Instrumentation ) 3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE ; FREQUENCY 1 SR 3.3.2.11 Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within 18 months limit. SR 3'. 3. 2-.12 Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within 18 months on a limit. STAGGERED TEST BASIS O l
~
_ i t ! l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 8 7/9/98 Revision A , 4
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 6) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation f l' APPLICABLE H0 DES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 1. Safety Injection
- a. Manual Initiation. 1.2.3.4 2 B SR 3.3.2,9 NA '
- b. Automatic - 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation. SR 3.3.2.7 Relays
-l c. ' Containment 1.2.3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 s 4.6 psig Pressure - High 1 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10.
SR 3.3.2.12 l l d. Pressurizer 1.2.3(a) 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 = 1813 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2,12 l- e. Steam Line 1.2.3(a) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 a 614 psig(D) Pressure - Low line SP 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10' SR 3.3.2.12
- 2. Containment Spray l- a. Manual Inittation' 1.2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA
- b. - Automatic 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7
~
l Relays. l- c. Containment . 1.2.3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 s 21.2 psig l Pressure H1gh - 3 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12
~
(continued) l-l (a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock. (b) Time constants used in the lead / lag controller are t, a 50 seconds ald t, s 5 seconds. BYRON - UNITS l'& 2 3.3.2 - 9 7/9/98 Revision E L-- - _ - _ _ = - - - - - _ . - - - - _ - - - - _ - - - _ - - _ -
I ESFAS' Instrument'ation 3.3.2 ! l Table 3.3.2 1 (page 2 ef 6)- Engineereo Safety Feature Actuation System Instrtnentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED. RE0VIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE i I FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS 40NDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE c
'3. Containment Isolation -
. a; L Phase A Isolation ,
)i d) Manual 1.2.3.4 2 B SR 3 3.2.9 NA - )
Initiation
' (2) ' Automatic . 1.2.3.4 '2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4' NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.5.
Logic and. SR 3.3.2.7 Actuation Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. Injection ;
- b. Phase B Isolation (1) Manual 1.2.3.4 .2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA
- . Initiation i (2) A.utomatic '1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuati'v1 SR 3.3.2.5 Logic and SR 3.3.2.7
[)
._ V. . .;
Actuation Relays d l (3) Containment 1.2.3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 s 21.2 psig
~ Pressure SR 3.3.2.6 High - 3 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 (continued) 4 e -
- l. .
t i O - BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 10 7/9/98 Revision E 1 , I . l l
~.
-ESFAS Instrumentation
. 3.3.2 4
. Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 6)~
.._ Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrume7tation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REOUIRED SURVEILLMCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREME NTS VALUE 4.. Steam Line Isolation
'l -a. Manual Initiat$on. 1.2(C) 3(C)
. 2 .F SR 3.3.2 9' NA l b. Automatic Actuation 1,2(h) 3Ih)
. 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.4 NA Logic and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5
' Relays SR 3.3.2. '
.l c Containment . .
1.2(h) 3(h) 4 3 0 SR 3.3.2.1 s 9.4 psig Pressure - High 2 SR 3.3.2.6 SR13.3.2.1.1 SR.3.3.2.12
-di. Steam Line Pressure ,
III LO"
;li 1.2 h) 3(a)(h)(f)
. 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 = 61'4 psig(b) line SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10
. SR 3.3.2.12 (2) Negative 3(h)(d) 3 per steam 0 SR-3.3.2.1 s.165.3 psi (')
Rate - High line SR -3.3.2.6 . SR 3.3.2.10 SR .3.3.2.12 (continued) (a) ' Above the P-11'(Pressurizer Pressure) interlock. (b) Time constants *used 'in the lead / lag controller are t = 50 seconds and t, s 5 seconds. C l - (c)' Except when all Main St,eam isolation Valves (MSIVs) are cilTed. (d) . Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock with Function'4.d.1 blocked. (e) Time constant utilized in the rate / lag controller is = 50 seconds. (f)' Below the P 11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock with Functt'on 4,d,2 not enabled. L'
. _-~l(h). Except when all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MS!vs) and MSlv bypass valves are closed.
L i O 1 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2-3.3.2 - 11 7/9/98 Revision E ____.h__.'__..m._._
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 i
- . Table 3.3.21 (page 4 of 6)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation l t .f i j 'k APPLICABLE MODES OR.
- OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWABLE
. FUNCTION CONDITIONS. CHANNELS CONDITIONS . REQUIREMENTS VALUE l.
' S. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation l . a - - Automatic '. . 1.2(9) 3. I93 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.4 NA~ ,
._ Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5
, and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 ! Relays L b. Steam' Generator (SG) Water .. ' Level - High High i (P.14) )
-1
,1) ' Unit I- 1.2(9) 3(9)
. 4 per SG 0 SR .3.3.2.1 s 89.9% of SR 3.3.2.4 narrow range SR 3.3.2.5 Instrument SR 3.3.2.6 . span SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12
- 2) Unit 2 1.2(9) 3(9)
. 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 s 82.8% of '
SR 3.3.2.4 narrow range-SR 3.3.2.5 instrument SR 3.3.2.6 span. SR 3.3 2.7 SR 3.3.2.10 > (: . SR 3.3.2.12 l %./
- c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
l (continued)
'l -(g) : Eicept when all Feedwater Isolation Valves are closed or isolated by a closed manual valve. ;
i 1 i I I x i O . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 '12 7/9/98 Revision E h .
'k, ESFAS' Instrumentation 3.3.2 ,
l i Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 6) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
.(
u. APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REOUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS _ . REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater l' a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation 1.2.3 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2 5 NA
-Belays SR 3.3.2 7
- b. SG Water Level'- Low Low
- 1) Unit 1 -1.2.3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 = 16.1% of SR 3.3.2 A . narrow range SR 3.3.2.30 instrument SR. 3.3.2.'. 2 span
- 2) Unit 2 1.2.3 ~ 4 per SG 0 SR 3.3.2.) = 34.8% of
' SR 3.3.2.( narrow range SR 3.3.2.10 instrunent SR 3.3.2.12 span
- c. Safety injection RefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsendrehuirements.
l- 'd. Loss of Offsite Power. 1.2.3 7 H SR 3.3.2.3 = 2730 V
. (Undervoltace on. SR 3.3.2.1C Bus 141(241)) SR 3.3.2.11 i j
C e. Undervoltage Reactor 1.2 4 I SR 3.3.2.8- = 4920 V
- ( : Coolant Pump (per SR 3.3.2.10 train) SR 3.3.2.12 ll. ' f. Auxiliary Feedwater 1.2.3 1 per train J SR 3.3.2.1 a 17.4 psia Puno Suction Transfer SR 3.3.2.2 on Suction SR 3.3.2.10 i: Pressure - Low i
- 7. Switchover to Containment Sump
- a. Automatic Actuation 1.2.3.4 2 tratff.i C SR 3.3.2.4 NA
, Logic and Actuation - SR'3.3.2.5 f Relays . SR 3.3.2.7-L
- b. Refueling Water 1.2.3.4 4 'K SR 3.3.2.1 a 44.7% of
[( . Storage Tank (RWST) SR 3.3.2.6 instrument [ Level - Low Lcw SR 3.3.2.10 span SR 3.3.2.12 Coincident with . Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. Safety l~n.1ection (continued)
' BYRON ~ UNITS 1-& 2- 3.3.2 - 13 7/9/98 Revision E L.
Cm__ ' ____________________-.m- _ . _
4 ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 6) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation d-APPLICABLE MODES 'OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE i FUNCTION. CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITION $ REQUIREMENTS VALUE i
- 8. ESFAS Interlocks
- a. Reactor Trip. P-4 1.2.3 2 per train F SR 3.3:2.9 NA
- b. Pressurizer Pressure, 1.2.3 2 -L. SR 3.3.2.6 s 1936 psig F-11 SR 3.3.2.10
- c. T,- Low Low. P-12 1.2.3 3 L SR 3.3.2.6 = S46.9'F <
SR 3.3.2.10 G U q l 1 l l
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PAM~ Instrumentation 3.3.3 3.3; INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for'each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.3-1. ACTIONS NOTES - 1.. LC0 3.0.4 is'not applicable.
- 2. Separate Condition' entry is allowed for each Function.
. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions. A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately s
with one required referenced in channel inoperable. Table 3.3.3-1 for the channel.
B. As required by B.1 Restore required 30 days Recuired Action A.1 channel to OPERABLE anc referenced in status. Table 3.3.3-1. l C '. Required Action and C.1 Initiate acticn in Immediately associated Completion accordance with L Time of Condition B Specification 5.6.7. not met. l
;._ (continued) 04 '
. BYRON ' UNITS 1 &_2- 3.3.3 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A
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PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 , ! i/ [') ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I D. As required by D.1 Restore one required 7 days Recuired Action A.1 channel to OPERABLE anc referenced in status. Table 3.3.3-1. I l l E. - NOTE -- E.1 Restore all but one 7 days l Not applicable tc required channel to l Function 15. OPERABLE status. One or more Functions with two or more required channels , inoperable. l I F. Two hydrogen monitor F.1 Restore one hydrogen 72 hours f N channels inoperable. monitor channel to OPERABLE status. G. NOTE G.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Not applicable to Functions- 11.12. and AND 14. G.2 NOTE---- _ No n pplicable to Required Action and Function 15. associated Completion ----- Time of Condition D. E. or F not met. Be in MODE 4. 12 hours (continued) (3 V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 ,
- 3. 3.3 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 ACTIONS- (continued) n r V- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H,- NOTE H.1 Initiate action in Immediately Only applicable to accordance with Functions 11.- 12, and Specification 5.6.7. 14. i Required Action and associated Ccmpletion Time of Condition D or E not met. I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
. NOTE SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.2 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table.3.3.3-1.
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O SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR '3.3.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required - 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized. i SR 3.3.3.2 - NOTE ; Radiation detectors for Function 11.- !
-Containment Area Radiation, are excluded.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months i. L . O ' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3. 3 - 3 7/9/98 Revision E
-l PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 l f Table 3.3.3 1 (page 1 of 1) 5 Fost A:01oent Monitor 1rg Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS
- 1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure 1.2.3 2 B (Wide Range) l
- 2. RCS Hot leg Temperature (Wide Range) 1,2,3 2 B
- 3. RCS Cold leg Temperature (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 B 4 Steam Ge.,e ator (SG) Water Level 1.2.3 1 0 (Wide Range)(per SG)
- 5. SG Water Level (Narrow Range)(per SG) 1.2.3 1 0 l i
- 6. Pressurizer Water Level (Narrow Range) 1.2.3 2 B
- 7. Containment Pressure (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 B B. Steam Line Pressure (per SG) 1.2.3 2 8
- 9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 1.2.3 2 B
- 10. Containment Floor Water Level (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 B
- 11. Containment Area Radiation (High Range) 1.2.3 1 0
- 12. Main Steam Line Radiation (per steam line) 1,2.3 1 D
- 13. Core Exit Temperature (per core quadrant) 1.2.3 4 B
. 14. Reactor Vessel Water Level 1.2.3 2 B
- 15. Hydrogen Monitors 1,2 2 B i
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I Remote Shutdown System L , 3.3.4 T(] v: 3.3 -INSTRUMENTATION l 3.3.4 ' Remote Shutdown System l LCO- 3.3.4' The Remote Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, and 3. i !- ACTIONS
--- --NOTES -
1 (1. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required . 30 days
'y Functions inoperable. Function to OPERABLE status.
.b 1
-B. Required Action and B '.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours j 1
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.. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.4 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A I
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Remote Shutdown System L 3.3.4
- (O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
%)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days ! instrumentation channel that is normally !- energized. l-SR 3.3.4.2 - NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL l CALIBRATION. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each 18 months l required instrumentation channel, l l l O !
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l \ I i l O ) L BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.4 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A
LOP DD Zn-instrumentation 3.3.5
'3.3 - INSTRUMENTATION g: '
L ). 3.3.5: Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator-(DG)-Start Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5 .Two channels 3er bus'of the' loss of volt' age Function.and two channels per; Jus of the degraded voltage Function shall be-OPERABLE.
.l:. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4: .
When associated DG is requi' red to be 0PERABLE by LC0 2.8.2.
"AC Sources.-Shutdown." ,
JACTIONSE
. . ' NOTE -
LSeparate'Cond.ition entry'is' allowed for.each Function. CONDITION- ' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
'A. One or more Functions A.1- . -NOTE For loss of voltage 4h'
- with one channel on-one or~more buses- Function, the-inoperable. inoperable channel-may be bypassed.for up to 2 hours for-
' surveillance testing
,. of the other channel.
- Plate channel in 1 hour trip.
B. 10ne or:more Functions B.1 Restore one channel 1 hour with t'wo channels on for the Function on one or more buses 'the affected bus to ihoperable. OPERABLE status.
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(continued) i i IBYRON - UNITS 1 & 2. 3.3.5 - 1 7/9/98 Revision E u
-LOP DG Start Instrumentation 3.3.5 ACTIONS (continued)
. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ;
I C. Required Action and C.1 Enter applicable Immediately associated Completion Condition (s) and Time not met. Required Action (s) for the associated DG if-made inoperable by LOP DG start instrumentation. t i SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-SR- 3.3.5.1 - NOTE Verification of relay setpoints not i required. 31 days
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Perform TADOT. l
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-SR 3.3.5.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 18 months Allowable Value as follows:
- a. Loss of voltage Albwable Value a 2730 V with a time delay of ~
{ s 1.9 seconds. j
- b. ' Degraded voltage Allowable Value -
= 3793 V with a time. delay of 310 30 seconds.
l l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.5 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E I e- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6
^ -
3.:3 INSTRUMENTATION
\
3.3.6 ' Containment Ventilation. Isolation Instrumentation LC0 3.3.6 The. Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1. ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One radiation A.1 Restore the affected 4 hours monitoring channel channel to OPERABLE inoperable. status. A. p) (continued) ) c
-Q .
U . L . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.6 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A l t 4 __ - - - - - J
Containment Ventilation Isolatiori Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued) ( CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. - NOTE B.1 Enter applicable Immediately Only applicable in Conditions and MODE 1, 2. 3. or 4. Required Actions of LCO 3.6.3.
" Containment One or more automatic Isolation Valves."
actuation trains for containment purge inoperable. valves made inoperable by
@ isolation instrumentation.
Two radiation monitoring channels inoperable. 2 Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A o not met. O C. - NOTE C.1 Place and maintain Immediately Only applicable when containment purge Item C.2 of LCO 3.9.4 valves in the closed is required. position. Two radiation monitoring channels C.2 Enter applicable Immediately inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of
@ LCO 3.9.4,
" Containment Required Action and Penetrations," for associated Completion containment purge Time of Condition A valves made not met, inoperable by isolation instrumentation.
I n . b BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.6 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A E______--_------__--__---
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 1 p; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS V NOTE- - 4 Refer to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Containment Ventilation Isolation Function. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.6.2 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31. days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
)
SR 3.3.6.3 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 31 days on a I STAGGERED TEST BASIS 3 (V \ SR 3.3.6.4 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.5 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 92 days l l SR 3.3.6.6 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months 1 1 l [ l Ch V ( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3. 6 - 3 7/9/98 Revision A i f _- - - -
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' Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Tacle 3.3.6-1 (p ;e 1 of 1)
Containmer.t Ventilation Isolation Instrurrentation I' APPLICABLE l FUNCTION M00E5 5p( 0THER CONDITIONS (D REQUIRED CHANNELS [Mh TRIP SETPOINT { 4 , 1. Manual Initiation - Phase A Refer to LCO 3.3.2. ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 3.t.1. for al! l- initiation functions and reautrements. L l l l 2. Manual Initiation Phase B Refer to LCD 3.3.2. "ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 3.b.1. for all l initiation functions and requirements. i l 3 Automatic Actuation Logic 1.2.3.4 2 trains SR 3.3.6.2 NA I i and Actuation Relays SR 3.3.6.3 1 SR 3.3.6.5 4 Containment 1.2.3.4.(a) 2 SR 3.3.6.1 (b) Radiation - Hign SR 3.3.6.4 - SR 3.3.6.6 . 1
- 5. Safety injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2. "ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 1. for all initiation functions and requirements.
l (a) Wnen Item C.2 of LCO 3.9.4 15 required. l (b) Tr1D setpoint shal' be established such that actual sJomersion dose rate 15 s 10 mR/hr in the Containment Building . The tr1C setpo1nt may be increased above ttis value in accordance with the methodology established in the Offsite Oose Calculation Manual. l I L l l
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- l l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.6 - 4 7/9/98Revisiond l . !
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! VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 ,O- -3.3 -INSTRUMENTATION
- 3. 3. 7. Control Room Ventilation (VC) Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The VC Filtration System actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.7-1.
' ACTIONS CONDITION' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels. A.I' Place the redundant I hour on one train VC Filtration System l> inoperable. train in normal mode.
OE A.2 Place one VC. I hour l Filtration System i . train in emergency - mode B. One or more channels B.1 Place one VC 1 hour on both trains Filtration System inoperable. 1 . train in emergency moh. l L' E C. . Required Action and
; associated Ccmpletion C.1 Be 'in MODE 3. 6 hours Time of. Condition A AND l or B not net in E
MODE 1, 2, 3. or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours (continued) Q.
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. BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.~ 7 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A t _ - - - - -- -- _ -- -- --
VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation l 3.3.7 O ACTIONS (continued) b'/ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l .
- D. Required Action and D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately associated Completion irradiated fuel Time of Condition A assemblies.
or B not met during movement of irradiated l fuel assemblies. E. Required Action and E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately associated Completion ALTERATIONS. Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 5 AND or 6. E.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore one VC Filtration System train to OPERABLE status. ( SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE-- Refer to Table 3.3.7-1 to determine which SRs apply for each VC Filtration System Actuation Function. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
]
I t SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.7.2 Perform COT. 92 days l (continued) O V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A c-- --- --- ------ - - - - -- -
VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
~ SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY l
'SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months 1
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VC Filtration' System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 ,' Table 3.3 7 l'(page 1 of 1)
- VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation I
l APPLICABLE MODES FUNCTION 5 ECIp}ED CONDITIONS THER REQUIRED CHANNELS k$[hh TRIP SETPOIN1 l ! 1. Control Room 1.2.3,4.5.6 (a) 2 per train SR 3.3.7.1 s 2 mR/tr Radiation-Gaseous SR 3.3.7.2 i l SR 3.3.7.3 l
- 2. Safety injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2. "ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 1. for all initiation functions and requirements.
(a) ur ng movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. O i L) r BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7 - 4 7/9/98 Revision A E 'r .r _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
(~ FHB Ventilatica System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 t-3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 1 3.3.8 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenum (FHB) Ventilation System
- l. Actuation Instrumentation l
L LCO 3.3.8 The FHB. Ventilation System actuation instrumentation for y each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.8-1. !~ ACTIONS l NOTE LC0 3.0.3 is'not applicable. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L ( .' l A. One channel 'A.1 Restore channel to 7 days ! inoperable. OPERABLE status t I L ! (continued) l-I L [- L O.' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , 3.3.8 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A
FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 - I I l ACTIONS (continued)- 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Place in emergency Immediately associated Completion mode one FHB Time not met. Ventilation System train capable of
@ being Jowered by an l OPERAB E emergency Two channels power. source.
L inoperable. E B.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately ; irradiated fuel i assemblies in the l fuel handling l- building. AND B.2.2 NOTE Only required with equipment. hatch not intact. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment.
, AND
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. . B.2.3 NOTE Only required with equipment hatch not intact.
Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. 4 6 - 7/9/98 Revision A BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8 - 2
FHB Ventilation dystem Actuation Instrumentation , I
, 3.3.8
- - , SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE-Refer to Table 3.3.8-1 to determine which SRs apply for each FHB Ventilation System Actuation Function.
!- 3 l f SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I ) SR 3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours I l 1 I* SR 3.3.8.2 Perform COT. 92 days i i
- SR 3.3.8.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months I l-i
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FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 F Ta:le 3.3 E-1 (page 1 of 1)
- FH6 ventilation Systen Actua
- 1on Instrumentation l
l. APPLICABLE l M00ES HE FUNCTION p C FIED PE00!REDCHANNELS TRIP SETPOINT U CONDITIONS l l
- 1. Fuel Handling Building (a) (D).(c) 2 SR 3.3.8.1 s 5 mR/hr
! Radiation SR 3.3.8.2 SR 3.3.8.3 l
- 2. SafetyInjection Refer to LCO 3.3.2. *ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 1. for all initiation functions and reQu1re rnts.
(a) During movement of irradiated fuel assembites in the fuel handling building. (b) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment with the equipment httch not Intact. (c) During CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. lI i l l l l P I' i l !^ BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3. 8 - 4 7/9/98 Revision A c______-_-____-___
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BDPS 3.3.9 1 1 Q 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION v 3 3.3.? Baron Dilution Protection System (BDPS) ] LC0 .3.3.9 Two trains of the BDPS shall be OPERABLE. q NOTE The boron dilution flux doubling signal may be blocked in MODE 3 during reactor startup. , I l APPLICABILITY: MODES 3. 4, and 5. i ACTIONS NOTE -- Unborated water source isolation valves may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. I
}
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I
. v)
A. One train inoperable. A.1 Restore train to 72 hours OPERABLE status. B. Required Action'and B.1 Close unborated water 1 hour associated Completion source isolation Time of Condition A vakes. not met. - AND B.2 Verity unborated Once per 31 days water source l isolation valves i closed. l l l (continued) , !- i l j
' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.9 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A i.
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BDPS 3.3.9 I ACTIONS (continued)- I A U CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION . COMPLETION TIME C. Two trains inoperable C .1- .Close and deactivate 8 hours I due to the refueling isolation valves from water storage tank the RWST. (RWST) boron
. concentration not .
within-limits. DJ Two trains ino)erable D.1 Close unborated water 1 hour
- l. for reasons otler than source. isolation '
Condition C. valves. ; AM D.2 - Perform SR 3.1.1.1. I hour ! AND . , Once per 1 l 12 hours fm thereafter l_L] l AND. l D.3 Verify unborated Once per l water source 12 hours i isolation valves l closed. l E. Two trains inoperable E.1 Suspend positive Immediately due to required. source reactivity additions. range neutron flux monitor. inoperable for control room monitoring of core status. Q BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.9 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E
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BDPS 3.3.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FRE0UENCY J SR 3.3.9.1 NOTE - - - - Not requi' red to be performed prior to entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry..into MODE 3. Verify required source range monitor signal 12 hours
. to BDPS is indicating a count rate
.a.10 cps.
SR 3.3.9.2 Verify required reactor coolant pump in 12 hours operation. SR 3.3.9.3. Verify each. Reactor Coolant System loop' .12 hours
, isolation valve is open. ..O SR .3.3.9.4- Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours-SR 3.3.9'.5 Verify RWST boron concentration is greater 7 days than the e the COLR. quivalent SDM limits specified in esemp -
4 sR.3.3.9.6- Verify each manual.- )ower operated, and 31 days automatic valve in tie flow path, that is E not~ locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position. is in the correct. position.
'SR '3.3.9.7 Verify-the BDPS alarm setpoint is less than 92 days or equal to an increase of twice the count rate within a 10 minute period.
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, (continued)
BYRON ' UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.9 - 3 7/9/98 Revision E
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-BDPS-
'3.3.9
' SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS'- (continued) h -
SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY SR- 3.3.9.8' . NOTE-- Not required to be performed prior to
' entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry;into MODE 3.
Perform COT. 92 days SR'.3.3.9'.9 Verify each BDPS valve actuates to its . 18 months correct' position on an actual or' simulated signal. SR. 3.3.9.10. . NOTE . Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. M. V. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months:
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 p B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation I BASES j i BACKGROUND The RTS initiates a unit shutdown, based on the values of l selected unit parameters, to protect against violating the core fuel design limits'and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) l pressure boundary during Anticipated Operational Occurrences , (A00s) and to assist the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems in mitigating accidents. The protection and monitoring systems have been designed to assure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RTS. as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance. The LSSS, defined in this specification as the Allowabl:e Values, in conjunction with the LCOs. establish the threshold for protective system action to prevent exceeding
,s acceptable limits during Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
t \ C/ During A00s, which are those events expected to occur ore or more times during the unit life.' the acceptable limits are:
- 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB):
- 2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur: and
- 3. The RCS pressure E of 2735 psig shall not be exceeded.
Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0 " Safety Limits (SLs)." also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will be within the 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 100 criteria during A00s, p . v ' BYRON - UNITS 1 &.2 B 3.3.1 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 (T BASES V BACKGROUND (continued) Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they.are~ not expected to occur during the unit ~ life. The acceptable limit during accidents.is that offsite. dose shall be maintained ~within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits. Different accident categories are allowed a-different fraction of these limits based on probability of
. occurrence. Meeting the acceptable dose limit for an accident category-is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.
The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected modules as identified below. The RTS process is illustrated in UFSAR, Chapter 7 (Ref. 1):
- 1. Field transmitters or process sensors; provide a measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured:
- 2. Signal Process Control and Protection System, including Analog Protection System, Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS). field contacts, and protection channel sets: provide signal conditioning, bistable set)oint comparison, process algorithm actuation. compati ale-electrical signal-output to protection system devices, and control board / control ~ room / miscellaneous '
indications: i
- 3. Solid State Protection System (SSPS), including input, logic, and output bays: initiates proper unit shutdown and/or ESF actuation in accordance with the defined logic. which is based on the bistable outputs from the signal process cqn, trol and protection system; and
- 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) and bypass breakers: provides the means to interrupt power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs), or " rods." to fall into the core and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow testing of the RTBs at power.
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RTS' Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASESJ - n(/; LBACKGROUND-(continuedL Field Transmitters or Sensors To meetithe design demands for redundancy and reliability, more than one. and 'often as many as four. field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. ..To account for the calibration tolerances.and instrument drift. which are assumed.to occur between calibrations.' statistical allowances are provided-in the Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values. .The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its "as found" calibration data are-compared against its documented acceptance criteria. Sianal Process Control and Protection System
' Generally, three or four channels.of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit '
parameters measured by the field-instruments. The process control . equipment. provides signal conditioning. . comparable output signalsL for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with 1 established setpoints. If the measured value of a. unit
. parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint. -an output from a bistable is forwarded to the'SSPS for decision evaluation.
(n ' f' Channel' separation is maintained'up to and through the input
. bays..-However, not all unit parameters require four channels.of sensor measurement and, signal processing. Some
_ unit parameters provide input-only to the SSPS. while others provide input to the SSPS. the main control board, the plant computer, and one or more control systems.
' Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits. three channels with a two-out-of-three
- . . logic are sufficient to provide' the required reliability and
^, redundancy. 'If one channel fails.in a direction that would not result.in-a partial Function trip, the Function is still DPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that' a partial Function trip occurs, a trip wi-ll not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic. L
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B 3.3.1 - 3
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, RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1-BAS'ES -
BACKGROUND (continued)' Generally, if a parameter is used for; input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels.with a.two-out-of-four-logic are redundancysufficient The circuittomust provide the:torequired be able withstandreliability both an and
- input failure.to the control.: system. which may then require the protection' function: actuation, and'a single failure in
- the other channels providing the. protection function actuation. Again, a . single. failure will neither cause nor.
prevent the protection function. actuation. These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref.'4). The-actual number of channels required for each unit parameter
;is :specified in~ Reference 1.
Two trains are' required to ensure no single random failure ,~ . of a ' logic' channel will disable the RTS. The logic channels are designed such that testing required while the reactor is at' power may. be ac'comphshed'without causing -a trip. Provisions to allow removing logic channels from . service during maintenance are unnecessary because of the logic _ system's designed reliability.
~
Itio Setooints and Allowable Values Allowable: Values provide'a conservative margin with regards
- {M:. l-l 2
.to. instrument' uncertainties to ensure that SLs are not ~
violated during A00s and that the consequences of DBAs will be acceptable providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the event-and. required equipment functions as designed. -If the-measured value of a bistable exceeds the Allowable Value without tripping, then.the
, associated RTS Function is considered inoperable. Allowable Values for RTS Functio,n.j are specified in Table 3.3.-1-1.
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RTS Instrumentation I y,. B 3.3.1 ! BASES yv . , () BACKGROUND (continued) 1 Thip.Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables l; or setpoint comparators are set. The ectual nominal. Trip Setpoint-entered into the bistable /comparator is.more
- conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to
(( . account:for changes in normal measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0TL One example , of huch a change in measurement error is attributable to n- , calculated normal uncertainties durirg the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considenec to be properly
- adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for-
-l CHAhNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the metsured value of a
, bistable exceeds the Trip Setpoint but is within the Allowable Value., then the associated RTS Function is considered OPER/BLE. Trip.Setpoints are Epecified in tne-Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. SL +
Allowable Values and Trip'Setpoints are based on a method-ology which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each. instrument channel. I Reference 6 provides a detailed ' description, of the
- methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints,-including their explicit uncertainties, for all instruments listed in Table 3.3.1-1 except the Turbine Trip
'(-7) Functions. The Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints for the Turbine Trip Functions are based on specific Comed setpoint
. methodo1ogy.
Solid. Slate Protection System
' The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables.
. To meet the redundancy _ requirements, two trains of SSPS.
- - each performing.the same functions, are provided. If one train Tis taken out of service for maintenance or test
- purposes. the second train will arovide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the. unit. If Joth trains are taken out of l- ' service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each-train is packaged in its own cabuet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence
! l... requirements. The system has been designed to initiate a reactor trip in the event of a loss of power. directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition.-
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RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 l \ . 1
. BASES-
' BACKGROUND (continued)-
The SSPS performs the decision. logic for actuating a reactor trip or ESF actuation: generates the electrical Output signal that will initiate the required trip or actuation. and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit. The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment
.are sensed by the SSPS equi 3 ment and combined into logic l matrices that represent com31 nations indicative of various transients. If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will initiate a reactor trip or send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate l the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
L Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses. LCO. l and Applicability sections of this Bases. L . Reactor Trio Switchaear
- l! The RTBs are in the electrical power supply line from the control rod drive motor generator set power supply to the E,.
c' CRDMs. Opening of the RTBs interrupts power to the CRDMs. which allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into lf' the core by aravity. Each RTB is equipped with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the RTB while the unit is at l l! power. During normal operation the output from the SSPS is a voltage signal that energizes the undervoltage coils in
- . the RTBs and bypass breakers, if in use. When the required ii logic matrix combination is completed, the SSPS output voltage signal is removed, the.undervoltage coils are-L,. de-energized, the breaker trip. lever is actuated by the L ,
de-energized undervolt.a.ge coil. and the RTBs and bypass l - breakers are tripped open. This allows the shutdown rods : L and control rods to fall into the core. In addition to the !- de-energization of the undervoltage coils, each . breaker is also equi) ped with a shunt trip device that is energized to trip the areaker o]en upon receipt of a reactor trip signal i (the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB) shunt trip device is L energized only by a manual reactor trip signal). Either the L . undervoltage coil or the shunt trip mechanism is sufficient
; by itself, thus providing a diverse trip mechanism.
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RTS Instrumentation I B 3.3.1
. BASES h LBACKGROUND (continued)
The decision logic matrix Functions are described in the J functional diagrams included in Reference 1. In addition to the reactor trip or ESF.'these diagrams also describe the-various " permissive interlocks" that are associated with unit conditions.. Each train bas a built in testing device that can automatically test the decision logic matrix . Functions and the actuation devices while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out of service for testing the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed.' Th'e testing device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time. APPLICABLE. The RT5 functions to maintain.the SLs during all
' SAFETY ANALYSES. A00s and mitigates the consequen'ces of DBAs in all MODES in LCO. and . which the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or APPLICABILITY one or more rods are not fully inserted.
'Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RTS Functions. The accident analysis described in Reference 3 takes credit for most RTS' G
,D trip Functions. RTS trip. Functions not s ecifically-credited in the accident analysis are qua itatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. .These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function )erformance.
They may also serve as backups to RTS trip runctions that
. were credited in the accident. analysis.
.The LCO requires all fiistrumentation performing an RTS Function. listed in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO.
to be OPERABLE when the unit status is within the _l Applicability. Failure of any instrument renders the' affected channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the-affected Functions. \; 1
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RTS Instrumentation
. B 3.3.1 l BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of three or four channels in each instrumentation Function. two channels of Manual Reactor Trip in each logic Function and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function. Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-four configuration are required when one RTS channel is also used as a control system input. This configuration' accounts for the possibility of the shared channel failing in such a manner that it creates a transient that requires RTS action. In this case, the RTS will still provide protection, even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels. Three OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-three configuration are generally required when there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below. Reactor Trio System Functions O C The safety anaTyses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable to each RTS Function are discussed below:
- 1. Manual Reactor Trio The Manual Reactor Trip ensures that the control room operator can initiate a reactor trip at any time by using either of two reactor trip switches in the control room. A 11anual Reactor Trip accomplishes the same results as any one of the automatic trip Functions. It is used by the reactor operator to shut down the reactor whenever any parameter is rapidly trending toward its Trip Setpoint.
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- RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES h
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) The LCO req'uires two Manual Reer*or Trip channels to be OPERABLE. Each channel is controlled by a manual t reactor trip. switch. Each channel activates the reactor trip breakers in both trains Two independent
. channels are required to be OPERABLE so that no single random failure will disable the Manual Reactor Trip-
-Function.
In MODE 1 or 2. manual initiation of a reactor trip
-must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the
-shutdown rods and/or control rods are partially.or fully withdrawn from the core. In MODE 3. 4. or 5. the
~
. manual initiation Function must also be OPERABLE if one or more shutdown rods or control rods' are withdrawn or the Rod Control System is capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or control rods. In this condition..
inadvertent control rod withdrawal is possible. In MODE 3. 4. or 5. manualLinitiation of a reactor trip does not have to be OPERABLE if.the Rod Control System is not capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or
. control rods and if all rods are fully inserted. If the rods cannot be withdrawn from the core or all of
~ the rods are inserted, there 'is no need to be able to
-(}
u trip the. reactor. In MODE 6. the CRDMs are disconnected from the control rods and shutdown rods. Therefore, the manual initiation Function is not required. .
- 2. Power Ranae Neutron Flux 4
. .The NIS power ran e detectors are located external to i the. reactor vess and measure neutrons leaking from
- the core. The N power range detectors provide input to the Rod Control System and the Steam Generator (SG)
Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to l prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod l withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor. b, o' TBYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.3.1 - 9 5/30/98 Revision E i l b
,RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 i l .
( BASES l pd l APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (contir;ed) , a. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah The Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided, from all power levels, against a positive reactivity excursion leading to CNB during power operations. . These can be caused by rod withdrawal or reductions in RCS temperature. , The LCO requires all four of the Power Range l Neutron Flux-High channels to be OPERABLE. In MODE 1 or 2. when a positive reactivity excursion could occur, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip must be OPERABLE. This Function will terminate the reactivity excursion and shut down the reactor prior to reaching a power level that could damage the fuel. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this range. In these MODES. the Power Range Neutron Flux-High does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and l V f] reactivity excursions into the power range are extremely unlikely. Other RTS Functions and administrative controls provide protection against reactivity additions when in MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6.
- b. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low The LCO requirement for the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip Function ensures that protection is provided aga,imst a positive reactivity excursion
- from low power or subcritical conditions.
The LC0 requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low channels to be OPERABLE. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 10 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICAB1-LITY (continued) In MODE 1, below the Power Range Neutron Flux (P-10 setpoint). and in MODE 2. the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip must be OPERABLE. This Function may be manually blocked by the operator when two out of four power range channels are greater than approximately 10% RTP (P-10 setpoint). This Function is automatically unblocked when three out of four power range channels are below the P-10 setpoint. Above the P-10 setpoint, positive reactivity additions are mitigated by the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function. Ir MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this range. Other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls provide protectron against positive reactivity additions or power excursions in MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. O 3. Power Ranoe Neutron Flux Rate
%)
The Power Range Neutron Flux Rate trips use the same channels as discussed for Function 2 above,
- a. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate t
The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate , trip Function ensures that protection is arovided against rapilincreases in neutron flux tlat are
- characteristic of an RCCA drive rod housing rupture and the accompanying ejection of the RCCA.
This Function compliments the Power Range Neutron Flux-High and Low Setpoint trip Functions to ensure that the criteria are met for a rod ejection from the power range. The LCO requires all four of the Power Range i Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate channels to be OPERABLE. j BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 11 5/29/98 Revision A f-
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
. BASES 4
APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE'1 or 2.' when there is a potential to add a large amount of. positive reactivity from a Rod Ejection Accident (REA), the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip must be OPERABLE. In MODE 3, 4, 5 'or 6, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls will provide ll protection against positive reactivity additions. 4 L b. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah Neaative Rate The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate trip Function ensures that protection is provided f for multiple rod drop accidents. At high power levels, a multiple rod drop accident could'cause - l local flux peaking that would result in an , unconservative local DNBR, DNBR is defined as the ratio of the heat flux required to cause a DNB at 1 a particular location in the core to the local heat flux. The DNBR is indicative of the margin L to DNB. No credit is taken for the operation of I l this Function for those rod drop accidents in l which the local DNBRs will be greater than the limit. i The LCO requires all four Power Range Neutron ; Flux-High Negative Rate channels to be OPERABLE, In MODE 1 or 2, when there is potential for a L multiple rod drop accident to occur, the Power l Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate trip must
- be OPERABLE ~~In MODE 3, 4, 5 or 6, the Power l Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the core is not critical and DNB is not a concern.
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-RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES.
T's,j3 APPLICABLE' SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 4. Intermediate Ranae Neutron Flux
.The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that 3rotection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip
-Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint trip Function. The NIS intermediate. range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from j the core. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor.
The LC0 requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux'to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.' Because this trip Function is important only during
.startup, there is generally no need to disable channels f' for testing while the Function is required to be \--)' .
OPERABLE.- Therefore, a third channel is unnecessary.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO.-and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1 below the P-10 setpoint, and in MODE 2 above the P-6 setpoint, when there is a potential for an 4 uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident during reactor startup, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Above the P-10 setpoint, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip provide core protection for a rod withdrawal accident. In MODE 2 below the P-6 setpoint, the Source Range Neutron Flux Trip provides the core protection for reactivity accidents. In MODE 3, 4. or 5, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip does not have to be OPERABLE because the control rods must be fully
' inserted and only the shutdown rods may be withdrawn.
The reactor cannot be started up in this condition. The core also has the required SDM to mitigate the consequences of a positive reactivity addition accident. In MODE 6 all rods are fully inserted and the core has a required increased SDM. Also, the NIS intermediate range detectors cannot detect neutron levels present in this MODE.
- 5. Source Ranae Neutron Flux' V The~LC0 requirement for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is )rovided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod wit 1drawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup.
This trip Function provides redundant protection to the l Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip Function. In MODES 3, 4. and 5 administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled withdrawal of rods. The NIS source i range detectors aFe located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The l NIS source range detectors do not provide any inputs to l control systems. The source range trip is the only RTS automatic protection function required in MODES 3, 4 and 5 when rods are capable of withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. Therefore, the functional capability at the specified Trip Setpoint is assumed to be available. l EO' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 . B 3.3.1 - 14 5/30/98 Revision E i
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES O ^ePtiCABLE SAFerv AN^tvSES. LCO. ene ^eetICABitIrv <contimued) The Source Range Neutron Flux Function provides 3rotection for control rod withdra'wal from subtritical . Joron dilution and control rod ejecti.on events. In MODE 2 when.below the P-6 setpoint, and in MODES 3.
- 4. and 5 when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal accident, two channels'of Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure.no single random failure will disable this trip. Function. Above the P-6 setpoint, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip and-l the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip will arovide 1 core protection for reactivity accidents. A)ove the P-6 setpoint. the NIS source range detectors are l- de-energized.
In MODES 3. 4; and 5 with all rods fully inserted and the Rod Control System not capable of rod withdrawal. and in MODE 6. the out)uts of the Function t6 RTS logic are not required OPERA 3LE. The requirements for the NIS source range detectors to monitor core neutron levels and provide indication of reactivity changes that may occur as a result of events like a boron dilution are addressed in 'C0 3.3.9. " Boron Dilution {d Protection System (BDPS)" for MODE 3. 4. or 5 and LCO 3.9.3. " Nuclear Instrumentation." for MODE 6. i
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and-APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 6. Overtemoerature AT The Overtemperature AT trip Function -is.provided to ensure that the design limit DNBR is met. This trip Function also limits the range over which the Overpower AT trip Function must provide protection. The inputs to the 0vertemperature AT trip include pressurizer pressure, coolant temperature, axial power distribution and reactor power as indicated by loop AT assuming full reactor coolant flow. Protection from violating the DNBR limit is assured for those transients that are slow with respect to delays from the core to the measurement system. The Function monitors both variation in power and flow since a decrease in flow has a similar effect on 6T as a power increase. The Overtemperature AT trip Function uses each loop's AT as a measure of reactor power and is com]ared with a setpoint that is automatically varied wit 1 the following parameters:
o reactor ccolant average temperature-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in i coolant density and ' specific heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature; e pressurizer pressure-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in system pressure: and e axial power distribution- the Overtemperature AT Trip Setpoint is varied to account for imbalances in the axial power distribution as detected by the NISupperanglowerpowerrangedetectors. If
. axial peaks are greater than the design limit, as indicated by the d!fference between the tupper and lower NIS power range detectors, the Trip Setpoint is reduced in accordance with Note 1 of
- Table 3.3.1-1.
Dynamic compensation is included for system pioing delays from the core to the temperature measurement system. O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B '3. 3.1 - 16 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICAbLF SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) The Overtemperature AT trip Function is calculated for each loop as described in Note 1 of Table 3.3.1-1. A trip occurs if Overtemperature AT is indicated in two l loops. Since the pressure and temperature signals are used for other control functions the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system which may then require the protection function actuation and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to generate a turbine runback 3rior to reaching the Trip Setpoint. A turbine runbac( will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A reduction in power will normally alleviate the Overtemperature AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip. The LC0 requi~res all four channels of the Overtemperature AT trip Function to be OPERABLE. Note that the Overtemperature AT Function receives input from channels shared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions. In MODE 1 or 2. the Overtemperature AT trip must be OPERABLE to prevent DNB. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. this trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the , reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about DNB. l () v -- -. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 ~B 3. 3.1 - 17 5/29/98Revisionk L___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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, B 3.3.1 L: .
L BASES Q,,l APPLICABLE;SAFETYANALYSES.'LCO.andAPPLICABILITY'(continued) l *
- 7. <0veroower AT The 0verpower AT trip Function ensures that. protection
- is no'fuel provided to ensure pellet melting andthe integrity less than 1% of cladding.
the fuel (i.e. . . strain) under all possible overpower conditions. This l- '~ trip Function also limits the required range of the Overtemperature AT trip Function and provides a backup-to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High tri). The Overpower AT trip Function ensures that t1e allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) of the fuel is not exceeded. It uses-the'AT of each loop as a measure of reactor power.With a setpoint that is automatically varied with the following parameters: o reactor coolant average temperature-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in ' coolant density and specific heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature: and e rate of change of reactor coolant average temperature-including dynamic compensation for the delays between the core and the temperature-. measurement system.
.The Overpower AT trip Function is calculated for each loop as per Note 2 of Table 3.3.1-1. A trip occurs if l Overpower AT is indicated in two loops. Since the I temperature signals are used for other control functions, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require 1he arotection function actuation and- )
a single failure in t1e remaining channels providing
.the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to generate a turbine ;
[ runback prior to . reaching the Trip Setpoint. A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A-
-reduction in power will normally alleviate the Overpower AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip.
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RTS Instrumentation B-3.3.1
. BASES .b:
U APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) The LC0 requires four channels of the Overpower AT trip Function to be OPERABLE. Note that the Overpower AT trip Function receives input from channels shared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions. . In MODE 1 or 2. the Overpower AT trip Function must be OPEPABLE. These are the only times that enough heat is generated,in the fuel to be concerned about the heat generation. rates and overheating of the fuel. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. this trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about fuel overheating and fuel damage.
- 8. Pressurizer Pressure The.same sensors provide input to the Pressurizer j Pressure-High and-Low trips and the Overtemperature AT trip. Since the Pressurizer Pressure channels are also used to provide input to the Pressurizer Pressure Control System, the actuation logic must be able to
? -
withstand an input failure to the control system, which. 3 may then require the arotection function actuation, and a single failure:in t1e_other channels providing the protection function actuation,
- a. Pressurizer Pressure-Low The Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip Function ensures thatJ rotection is provided'against
- - violating the DNBR limit due to low pressure.
The LC0 requires four channels of Pressurizer Pressure-Low to be OPERABLE. BYi10N-UNITS 1&2 B 3.3.1 - 19 ' 5/30/98 Revision E L i
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RTS Instrumentation i B 3.3.1
- BASES
{ ' APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES..LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MOD'E 1. when DNB is a major ccncern the L Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip must be OPERABLE. ' L This trip Function is automatically enabled on l increasing power by the P-7 interlock (NIS power l range P-10 or turbine impulse pressure P-13 greater than approximately 10% of full power i equivalent). On decreasing power this trip
- Function is automatically blocked below P-7.
-Below the P-7 setpoint, no conceivable power
' distributions can occur that would cause DNB.
concerns. [ b. Pressurizer Pressure-Hiah The Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided against
- overpressurizing the RCS. This trip Function l- operates in conjunction with the pressurizer l relief and safety valves to prevent RCS l' . overpressure conditions.
l-h >
'The LC0 requires four channels of the Pressurizer
! Pressure-High to be OPERABLE. l [ 'The Pressurizer Pressure-High LSSS is selected to be below the pressurizer safety valve actuation -
- pressure and above the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) setting. This setting minimizes challenges to safety valves while avoiding. unnecessary reactor trip for those pressure increases that can
. be_ controlled by the PORVs.
t
#h . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 ' B '3.3.1 - 20 5/30/98 Revision E 4
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES (~~S APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) v In MODE 1 or 2. the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip must be OPERABLE to help prevent RCS
-overpressurization and minimize challenges to the relief and safety valves. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6.
the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because transients that could cause an overpressure condition will be slow to occur. Therefore, the operator will have sufficient time to evaluate unit conditions and take corrective actions. In addition. the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Systems provide overpressure protection in MODE 4. MODE 5. and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.
- 9. Pressurizer Water Level--Hiah The Pressurizer Water Level-High trip Function provides a backup signal for the~ Pressurizer Pressure-High trip and also provides protection against water relief through the pres ~surizer safety valves. These valves are designed to pass steam in order to achieve their design energy removal rate. A reactor trip is actuated prior to the pressurizer r-'3 becoming water solid. The LC0 requires three channels (s / of Pressurizer Water Level-High to be OPERABLE. The channel Allowable Values are specified in percent instrument span. The pressurizer level channels are used as in)ut to the Pressurizer Level Control System.
A fourth clannel is not required to address control / protection interaction concerns. The level channels do not actuate the safety valves, and the high pressure reactor trip is set below the safety valve setting.
. Therefore, with t5e slow rate of charging available, pressure overshoot due to level channel failure cannot cause the safety valve to lift before reactor high pressure trip. 8 .
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 O BASES U APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1. when there is a potential for overfilling the pressurizer. the Pressurizer Water Level-High trip must be OPERABLE. This trip Function is automatically enabled on increasing power by the P-7 interlock. On decreasing power, this trip Function is automatically blocked below P-7. Below the P-7 setpoint, transients that could raise the pressurizer water level will be slow and the operator will have sufficient time to evaluate unit conditions and take corrective actions.
- 10. Reactor Coolant Flow- Low The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to low flow in the RCS loops. while avoiding reactor trips due to normal variations in loop flow.
Each RCS loop has three flow detectors to monitor flow. The flow signals are not used for any control system input. The LCO requires three Reactor Coolant Flow-Low s channels per loop to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-7. Each loop is considered a separate Function. The [V '$ channel Allowable Values are specified in percent of loop minimum measured flow. The minimum measured flow is 92.850 gpm. The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Function encompasses a single loop and a two loop trip logic. In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint and below the P-8 setpoint a loss of flow in two or more loops will initiate a reactor trip. Above the P-8 sety_oint, which is approximately 30% RTP.
- a loss of flow in any one RCS loop will actuate a reactor trip because of the higher power level and the reduced margin to the design limit DNBR. Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on low flow are .
automatically blocked since no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a ONB concern at this low power level. l I BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 22 5/29/98 Revision A
{ RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BAS.ES- _h 1 APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 11. Reactor Coolant Pumo (RCPF Breaker Position The RCP. Breaker Position trip Function operates on four
. auxiliary contacts per train. Each train is considered l' a separate. Function. This Function anticipates the Reactor. Coolant Flow-Low trips to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates.
l The RCP Breaker Position trip Function ensures that protection is 'provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow in two or more RCS loops. The position of each RCP breaker is monitored. Above the-l P-7 setpoint, a loss of flow in two or more loops will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will
. generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant
- l. l Flow-Low Trip-Setpoint is reached. ,
One OPERABLE channel is sufficient for this Function because the RCS Flow-Low trip alone provides sufficient protection of unit SLs for loss of flow events. The RCP Breaker Position trip serves only to l anticipate the low flow trip.. minimizing the thermal
. transient associated with loss of an RCP.
. -O U This Function measures only the discrete position (open or closed) of the RCP breaker, using a position switch.
Therefore, the Function has no adjustable trip setpoint with which to associate an LSSS. In MODE 1'above the P-7 setpoint, the RCP Breaker Position trip must be OPERABLE. .Below the P-7 i ' ' setpoint, all reaffor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power ! distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 setpoint. the reactor trip on loss of flow in two RCS loops is automatically enabled. l 4
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
' BASES m
k,) APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 12. Undervoltaae Reactor Coolant Pumos The Undervoltage RCPs reactor trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of flow-in two or more RCS loops.
The voltage to each RCP is monitored. Above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of voltage detected on two or more RCP buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) Trip Set]oint is reached. Time delays are incorporated into t1e Undervoltage RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power-transients. The LC0 requires four Undervoltage RCPs channels to be OPERABLE. There are two undervoltage sensing relays on each 6.9 kV b'us which feeds an RCP. ~0re relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train A and the other ' relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train B. , Each reactor trip logic train requires input from two of the four buses to initiate a reactor trip. Each train _is considered a separate Function. O In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint. the Undervoltage RCP trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7 setpoint, all i reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power distributions could occur , that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7'setpoint, the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled.
. '. This' Function uses the same relays as the Engineered SafetyFeatureArgationSystem(ESFAS) Function 6.e.
1
.[ l
. . "Undervoltage Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)" start of the {
Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) pumps.
]
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 13. Underfreauency Reactor Coolant Pumos The Underfrequency RCPs reactor trip Function ensures l that protection is provided against violating the DNBR '
limit due to a loss of flow in two or more RCS loops from a major network frequency disturbance. An , underfrequency condition will slow down the pumps. , thereby reducing their coastdown time following a pump j trip. The proper coastdown time is required so that reactor heat can be removed immediately after reactor trip. The frequency of each RCP bus is monitored. Above the P-7 setpoint. a loss of frequency detected on two or more RCP buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) Trip Setpoint is reached. Time delays.are incorporated into the Underfrequency RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power transients. The LCO requires four Underfrequency RCPs channels to be OPERABLE. There are two underfrequency sensing relays on each 6.9 kV bus which feeds an RCP. One relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train A and the other relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train B. Each reactor trip logic train requires input from two of the four buses to initiate a reactor trip. Each train is considered a separate Function. In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint. the Underfrequency RCPs trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power distr'ibutions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. Above the P-7 setpoint. the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled. i s l I
/m .
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3AFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 14. . Steam Generator Water level-Low Low The SG Water Level-Low Low trip Function ensures that protection is provided against a loss of heat sink and actuates the.AF System prior to uncovering the SG tubes. The SGs are.the heat sink'for the reactor. In order to act as a heat sink, the SGs must contain a minimum amount of water. . A narrow range low low level in any SG is indicative of a loss of heat sink for the reactor. The level transmitters provide input to the SG Level Control System. .Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
This Function also performs the ESFAS function of starting the AF pumps'on low low SG level. The LCO requires four channels of SG Water Level-Low Low per SG to be OPERABLE in which these channels are
. shared between protection and control. Each SG is considered a separate Function. The Channel Allowable Values are specified in percent of narrow range instrument span.
In MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor requires a heat sink, the SG Water Level-Low Low trip must be OPERABLE. The L normal source of water for the SGs is the Feedwater (FW) System (not safety related). The AF System is the safety related backup source of water to ensure that-
. the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. During normal startups and shutdowns, the startup feedwater
, _ oump provides feeTwater to maintain SG level. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the SG Water- Level-Low Low Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the FW System may not be in operation and the reactor is not operating or critical.
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l 1 RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 ) (] BASES U APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) l
- 15. Turbine Trio
- a. Turbine Trio-Emeroency Trio Header Pressure The Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure trip Function anticipates the loss of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a turbine trip. This trip Function acts to minimize the pressure / temperature transient on the reactor.
Any turbine trip from a power level below the P-8 setpoint, approximately 30%. power, will not actuate a reactor trip. Two trains of three pressure switches monitor the control oil pressure in the Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System. A low pressure condition sensed by two-out-of-three pressure switches in either protection-train will actuate a reactor trip. These pressure switches do not provide any inout to the control system. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sustain core damage or challenge the RCS pressure limitations. Core protection is n provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip i lV \ Function and RCS integrity is ensured by the pressurizer safety valves. i The LCO requires three channels in each train of Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-8. Each train is ] considered a separate Function. ' Below the P-8 setpoint. a turbine trip does not actuate a rea.Lqtor trip. In MODE 2. 3. 4. 5. or 6. there is no potential .for a turbine trip and the Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure trip Function does not need to be OPERAELE. I l (q! .\ / i BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 27 5/29/98 Revision A 1 i
RTS Instrumentation y , B 3.3.1 7 , i BASES APPLICABLE. SAFETY ANALYSES LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) b b. Turbine Trio-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure The Turbine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure trip Function anticipates the loss of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a turbine trip from a power level above the P-8 setpoint approximately 30% power. This action will actuate a reactor trip. The trip Function anticipates the loss of secondary heat' removal capability that occurs when the throttle valves close. Tripping the reactor in anticipation of loss of secondary heat removal acts to minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor.. This trip Function will not and is not required to operate in the presence of a single channel failure. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sust'ain core damage or challenge the RCS pressure limitations. Core protection is provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function, and RCS integrity is ensured by the pressurizer safety valves. This trip Function is diverse to the Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure trip O- Function. Each turbine throttle valve is equipped
'with one limit switch that inputs to the RTS.
Each limit switch is equipped with two contacts. l- One contact provides input to reactor trip logic Train A and the other contact provides an input to reactor trip logic Train B. If all four limit switches indicate that the throttle valves are all closed, a reactor trip is initiated.
. The LSSS for~this Function is set to assure channel trip occurs when the associated throttle i valve is completely closed.
The LC0 requires four Turbine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure channels per train, to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-8. All four channels must trip to cause reactor trip. l l
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t RTS Instrumentation B 3..' 1 BASES {v} l APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Below the P-8 setpoint, a load rejection can be accommodated by the Steam Dump System. In MODE 2.
- 3. 4. 5. or 6. there is no potential for a load rejection. and the Turbine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.
- 16. Safety Iniection (SI) Inout from Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System The SI Input from ESFAS ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the RTS. the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). However, other transients and accidents take credit for varying levels of ESF performance and rely upon rod insertion. except for the most reactive rod that is assumed to be fully withdrawn. to ensure reactor shutdown. Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present.
[' Allowable Values are not applicable to this Function. The SI Input is provided by relay in the ESFAS. Therefore, there is no measurement signal with which to associate an LSSS. The LCO requires two trains of SI Input from ESFAS to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is l present. Therefqrf, this trip Function must be l OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2. when the reactor is critical. I and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In I MODE 3. 4, 5. or 6. the reactor is not critical . and l this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE. p'a BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3. 3.1 - 29 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation-B 3.3.1 . . BASES-APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) I
- 17. Reactor Trio System Interlocks l
I Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current unit status. They back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed _. , during unit conditions under which the safety analysis l' assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore.-the o interlock Functions'do not need to be OPERABLE when the i associated reacto'r trip functions are outside the applicable MODES. These are: '
- a. Source Ranae Block Permissive. P-6 The Source Range Block Permissive. P-6 interlock is actuated when any NIS intermediate range channel goes a minimum channepproximately onechannels 1 reading. If both decade above drop the below the setpoint, the permissive will automatically be defeated.. The LCO requirement for. the P-6 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:
h e on increasing power. the P-6 interlock allows the manual block of the NIS . Source Range. Neutron Flux reactor tri). This prevents a premature block of tie source range trip and allows the operator to ensure that the intermediate range is OPERABLE prior to. leaving the source range. When the source range trip is blocked. the high voltagg.to the detectors is a' iso removed: and
- e. on decreasing power, the P-6 interloc.k l -
automatically energizes the NIS source range detectors, and enables the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip and Boron Dilution Prevention System (BDPS) actuation. l i l-
. 1 O '
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES o ( ,) APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) The LC'O requires two channels of Source Range Block Permissive. P-6 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 when below the P-6 interlock setpoint. Above the P-6 interlock setpoint. the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip will be blocked, and this Function will no longer be necessary. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the P-6 interlock does not have to be OPERABLE because the NIS Source Range is providing core protection.
- b. Low Power Reactor Trios Block. P-7 The Low Power Reactor Trips Block. P-7 interlock is actuated by input from either the Power Range Neutron Flux. P-10. or the Turbine Impulse Pressure. P-13 interlock. The LCO requirement for the P-7 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:
(1) on increasing power the P-7 interlock automatically enables reactor trips on the (., following Functions: o Pressurizer Pressure-Low: a Pressurizer Water Level-High: e Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops): e Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Breaker
. PoTition:
e Undervoltage RCPs: and e Underfrequency RCPs. { BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 31 5/30/98 Revision E L________. - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . . .
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1
\
i BASES
) APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) i These reactor tri as are only required when I operating above t1e P-7 setpoint ;
(approximately 10% power). The reactor { trips provide protection against violating the DNBR limit. Below the P-7 setpoint the { RCS is capable of providing sufficient natural' circulation without any RCP running. (2) on decreasing )ower, the P-7 interlock automatically alocks reactor trips on the following Functions: e Pressurizer Pressure'-Low; e Pressurizer Water Level-High: e Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops); e RCP Breaker Position; e Undervoltage RCPs: and 7 e Underfrequency RCPs.
'Y Allowable Value are not applicable to the P-7 interlock because it is a logic Function and thus has no parameter with which to associate an LSSS.
The low power trips are blocked below the P-7 setpoint and unblocked above the P-7 setpoint. In MODE 2. 3. 4. 5. or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABif because the interlock performs its
- Function when power level droas below approximately 10% power, whic1 is in MODE 1.
(
) .
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RTS Instrumentation
..B 3.3.1 f- BASES i
- h APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- c. Power Ranoe Neutron Flux.' P-8_
i The Power Range Neutron Flux. P-8 interlock is actuated at approximately 30%. power as determinec
- by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors. The-P-8 interlock automatically enables the Reactor i Cooiant Flow-Low (Single Loop) reactor trip on
- f. low flow in one or more RCS loops on increasing-L ' power. The LCO requirements for this trip Function.
i ensures that protection is provided against a loss ! of flow.in any RCS loop that could result in DNB I
, conditions in the core when greater than
! approximately. 30%. power. ' The P-8 interlock ensures that the Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure and Turbine Trip-Turbine. Throttle Valve Closure reactor trips P.re enabled above the P-8 setpoint. - Above the P-8 L setpoint, a turbine trip may cause a load rejection beyond the' capacity of the Steam Dump , System. - A reactor trip is automatically initiated on a turbine trip when it is above the P-8 l
- setpoint, to minimize the transient on the reactor. On decreasing power, the reactor tri on turbine tri) and low flow in one loop are ps automatically alocked.
The.LC0 requires three channels of Power Range
- Neutron Flux, P-8 interlock to be OPERABLE in y
. MODE 1.
.In MODE 1. a loss of flow in one RCS loop could
- result in Dfsconditions, so the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8. interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2. 3. 4, 5. or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the core is not 3roducing ;
. sufficient power to be concerned about )NB i conditions.
. j l
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I RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1' l BASES {-d( . APPLICABLE' SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1. a turbine trip could cause a load rejection beyond the capacity'of the Steam Dump System, so the Power Range Neutron Flux interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE-2, 3. 4. 5. or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the , reactor is not at a power level sufficient to have L a ' load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System.
- d. Power Ranae Neutron Flux. P-10 .
The Power Range Neutron Flux. P-10 interlock is actuated at approximately 10% power, as determined by two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors If power level falls below 10% RTP on 3 of 4 channels, the nuclear instrument trips will be automatically unblocked. The LC0 requirement for the P-10 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed: e on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor
- h. trip. Note that blocking the reactor trip also blocks the signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal:.
e on' increasing power, the P-10 interlock. allows the operator to manually block the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip: e on inqtgasing power. the P-10 interlock
. - automatically provides a backup signal to block the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip, and also to de-energize the NIS source range detectors; e the P-10 interlock provides one of the two-inputs to the P-7-interlock: and po BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 34 5/30/98 Revision E
- c
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES h -' APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) e on decreasing power. the P-10 interlock automatically enables the Power. Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip and the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trip (and rod.stop). The LCO requires three channels of Power Range Neutron Flux. P-10 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2. L OPERABILITY.in MODE 1 ensures the Function is available to perform its decreasing power Functions .in the event of a reactor shutdown. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 2 to ensure that core protection is provided.during a startup or shutdown by the Power. Range Neutron Flux Low and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor tr'ips. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not at power and the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip provides core protection.
- e. Turbine Imoulse Pressure. P-13 L- The Turbine Impulse Pressure. P-13 interlock is actuated when the pressure in the first stage of I the high. pressure turbine is greater than I approximately 10% of the rated full. power pressure. This'is determined by one-out-of-two pressure detectors. The LC0 requirement for this.
Function provides one of'the two inputs to the P-7 interlock _
~
The LC0 requires two channels of Turbine Impulse Pressure. P-13 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1. The Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure. P-13 ' interlock must be OPERABLE when the turbine generator is operating. The interlock Function is not required OPERABLE in MODE 2, 3. 4. 5 or 6 because the turbine generator is not operating. l I i BYR0t4 UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 -35 5/30/98 Revision E
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAF:TY ANALYSES. LCO and APPLICABILITY (continued) l 18. Reactor Trio Breakers This trip Function applies to the RTBs exclusive of individual trip mechanisms. The LC0 requires two OPERABLE trains of trip breakers. A trip breaker train consists of.all trip breakers associated with a single. , RTS logic train'that-are racked in. closed. and capable tl of supplying power to the Rod Control System. Two OPERABLE trains ensure no single random failure can' disable the RTS trip capability. , These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3.- 4. or 5. these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. l 19. Reactor Trio Breaker Undervoltaae and Shunt Trio Mechanisms The LCO requires both the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms to be OPERABLE for each RTB that is in r service. The trip mechanisms are not required to be L L O- OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out. incapable of supplying power to the Rod. Control System. l or declared inoyerable under Function 18 above. OPERABILITY of )oth trip mechanisms on each breaker ensures that no single trip mech 6nism failure will prevent opening any breaker on a valid signal. l These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3', 4 or 5. l these RTS trip FuTctions must be OPERABLE when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. . L l l. 1 [:
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R 1 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1 BASES? 73
.V INAPPLICABLE SAFETY. ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY-(continued)-
[ 20. Automatic T'rio Loaic LThe LC0 requirement-~for the RTBs (Functions'18 and 19) and Automatic Trip Logic'(Function 20) ensures that
.means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is-equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coll to trip the breaker open when needed. Each RTB is=
. equipped with a bypass bre'aker to allow testing of the trip breaker while the unit.is at power. The reactor s
trip signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open y and shut down the reactor. The' LCO requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE trains ensures that random. failure of a single logic train will not
~
prevent' reactor trip. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3. 4. or 5.
'these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the Rod x- -
Control System-is capable of rod withdrawal or one or
=h more rods are not fully inserted.
The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of
, 110 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
ACTIONS' A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the a) plication of CompletJ.pn Time rules. The Conditions of
- t1is Specification may be entered independently for eacti Function--listed in Table 3.3. ?.-l.
In the event' a channel's Trip Set)oint is found nonconservative with respect to t1e Allowable Value. or the transmitter. instrument. loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all.affected Functions 3rovided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the _C0 Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s)
-affected. .h .
V . BYRON -. UNITS 1,& 2
. - B 3.3.1 - 37 5/30/98 Revision E r
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 i 1 BASES C) ACTIONS ccontinoed) When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those specified in all related Conditions associated
-with.a trip Function, then'the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore. LCO 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.
A.1 Condition A applies to all RTS protection Functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or niore l required-channels or trains for one'or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times.are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions. B.1 and B.2 Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. This action addresses the train orientation of the
- l. SSPS for this function. With one channel ino)erable. the ino)erable channel must be restored to OPERAB E status witlin 48 hours.- In this Condition. the remaining OPERABLE
>(] channel is adequate to perform the safety function.
The Completion Time of 48 hours is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE. and the low probability of an event occurring.during this interval. If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to l- OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time.
. the unit must be brougTt to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours (54 hours total time). The 6 additional. hours to reach MODE 3 is reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. With the unit in MODE 3. Action C would apply to any inoperable Manual Reactor Trip Function if.the Rod Control System is capable
, of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. [ ! i l BYRON-'- UNITS 1-& 2 B ' 3.3.1 - 38 5/30/98 Revision E l i l: . LL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
u
< RTS Instrumentation ;
B 3.3.1' i l
.. BASES
. m):
(_ ~ . ACTIONS J(continued)
.l C;1 and C.2- I l Condition C applies to the-following reactor trip Functions in' MODE 3 :4.-or 5 with the Rod Control. System capable of
'l: rod withdrawal-or.one or more. rods are not fully _ inserted:
1 e Manual Reactor Trip:
- RTBs:
e RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms: and e Automatic Trip Logic.
.This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel or train inoperable, the inoperable channel or train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. If the affected Function (s) cannot.
be restored to.0PERABLE status within the allowed-4B hour. Completion Time, the unit must be placed iri a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this. status, the action must be initiated within the same 48 hours to ensure that all rods are fully inserted...and the Rod Control System must be > laced in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal
.(]~'
within tie next hour. 'The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With rods fully inserted and the Rod Control System incapable of rod withdrawal these Functions are no longer required.
-The Completion Time.is reasonable considering that in this Condition; the remaintog OPERABLE train is adequate to
- perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event' occurring during this interval, t
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R'TS Instrumentation B 3.'3.1 l BASES O ACTIONS <continuee) l A Note to the ACTIONS restricts the transition from MODE 5 with the Rod. Control System not capable of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted..to MODE 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal 'or all rods not fully inserted for Functions 18. 19. and 20 while com)1ying with the ACTIONS (i.e.. while the LCO is not met). _C0 3.0.4 .
~ typically allows entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Ap)licability while in MODE 5. however, the restriction of t1is Note is necessary to assure an OPERABLE RTS function prior to commencing operation with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or all rods not fully inserted.
D.1.1. D.1.2. D.2.1. D.2.2. and 0.3 Condition 0 applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Function. The NIS power range detectors provide' input to the Rod Control System and the SG Water Level Control System and, therefore, have a two-out-of-four trip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition; This results in a partial trip condition requiring only i .O one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 6 hours allowed V to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 7). In addition to placing the ino)erable channel in the tripaed condition.' THERMAL POWER must )e reduced to s 75% RTP wit 11n 12 hours. Reducing the power level prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits. With one of the NIS power range detectors inoperable.1/4 of the~ radial power distribution monitoring capability may be lost. 1 1: i h BYRON . UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 40 5/30/98 Revision E N__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _-l__--__--__-_-___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
j RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
~ BASES
-h ACTIONS (continued)
As an alternative to the above actions. the inoperable channel can be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours' and the OPTR monitored once every 12 hours as per SR 3.2.4.2. OPTR verification. Calculating OPTR every
.12 hours compensates for the potential . lost monitoring
. capability due to the inoperable NIS power range channel and allows continued unit operation at power levels a 75% RTP.
.The 6 hour Com]letion Time and the 12 hour Frequency are consistent witi LCO 3.2.4. "00ADRANT POWER TILT RATIO
-(QPTR)."
As an alternative to the above Actions, the plant must be placed in a MODE where this Function is no longer required OPERABLE. Twelve hours are allowed to place the plant in MODE 3.' This is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. If Required Actions cannot be completed within their allowed Completion Times,.LC0 3.0.3 must be entered.
. The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino)erable channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 1ours while performing routine b-V surveillance testing of other channels. The Note also allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition to allow setpoint adjustments of other channels when required to reduce the setpoint in accordance with .i other Technical Specifications. The 4 hour time limit is
-ju.stified in Reference 7.
., . Required Action D.2.2 has been modified by a Note which only requires SR 3.2.4.2 tQ be performed if the Power Range Neutron Flux input to OPTR becomes inoperable. Failure of a component in the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel which renders the High Flux Trip Function inoperable may not .
. affect the capability to monitor OPTR. As such, determining I
.0PTR using this movable incore detectors once per 12 hours may not'be necessary, n
s I n
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES I ACTIONS (continued) l E.1 and E.2 Condition E applies to the following reactor trip Functions: o Power Range Neutron Flux-Low: e Overtemperature AT: e Overpower AT: o Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate; e Power Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate: o Pressurizer Pressure-High; and e SG Water Level-Low Low. l A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation of the _' two-out-of-four trips. The 6 hours allowed to place the .'
; inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 7. a l
If the' operable channel cannot be placed in the trip ! condition within the specified Completion Time, the unit I must be placed in a MODE where these Functions are not j required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours is allowed to j
) lace the unit in MODE 3. Six hours is a reasonable time. .
Jased on operating expgrience, to place the unit in MODE 3 l
- from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging i plant systems.
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino)erable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 4 lours while performing routine j surveillance testing of the other channels. The 4 hour time
. limit is justified in Reference 7.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BAS.ES i
,q . m ,/ ACTIONS-(continued) 1 F 1 and F.2 Condition F a) plies to the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip when-THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 set)oint and below the P-10 setpoint and one channel is inoperaale. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. If THERMAL POWER-is greater than the P-6 i setpoint but less than the P-10 setpoint. 2 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint or increase i to THERMAL POWER above the P-10 setpoint. The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 allow entry into a MODE or other specified l condition in the Applicability as directed by the Required '
Actions Therefore a MODE change is permitted with one channel inoperable whenever Required Action F.2 is used. The NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels must be . OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability. cf the ' source range. P-6. and below the capability of the power range, P-10. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-10 setpoint, the NIS power range detectors perform the monitoring and protection functions and the intermediate ; range is not required. The Completion Times allow for a ' x slow and controlled power adju'stment above P-10 or below P-6 l'") and take'into account the redundant capability afforded by the redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of its failure during this Jeriod. This action does not require the inoperable clannel to be tripped because the Function uses one-out-of-two logic. Tripping one channel would trip the reactor. Thus, the Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failure does not result in reactor trip.
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t h ' R1S instrumentation B 3.3.1
. . BASES
.p
( ,/ . ACTIONS (continued)
.l- G.1 and G.2 Condition G applies to two inoperable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip channels in MODE 2 when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint.
Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failures do not result in reactor trip. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. With no intermediate range channels OPERABLE. the Required Actions are to suspend operations involving positive reactiv'ty additions immediately. This will preclude any power level increase since there are no OPERABLE Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels. The operator must also reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 1 setpoint within two hours. Below P-6, the Source Range l Neutron Flux channels will be able to monitor the core power level. The Completion Time of 2 hours will allow a slow and l controlled power reduction to less than the P-6 s'etpoi.nt and takes into account the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection i afforded by the NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip. ! (') v l g Condition H applies to one inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channel when in MODE 2. below the P-6 setpoint. With the unit.in this Condition, below P-6 the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. ;
'j . With one of the two channels inoperable, o erations
, involving positive reactivity additions sh 11 be suspended i immediately. _
' ~
This will preclude any ower escalation. With only one sou.rce range channel OP RABLE. core protection is severely
- . reduced and any actions that add positive reactivity to the core must be suspended immediately, b
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 44 5/30/98Revisionh
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES n l_,) . ACTIONS (continued) l .L.1 Condition I applies to two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channels when.in MODE 2. below the P-6 setpoint. and in MODE 3. 4, or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. With the unit .in this Condition.'below P-6. the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With both source range channels inoperable, the RTBs must be opened immediately With the RTBs open. the core is in a more stable condition. l J.1 and J.2 i
- l. Condition J ' applies to one inoperable source range channel in MODE 3, 4 or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. 'With the unit in this Condition.. below P-6. the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the source range channels inoperable. 48 hours is allowed '
to restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the channel cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status. action must be initiated within the same 48 hours to' ensure that all rods are fully i7,Y inserted, and the Rod Control System must'be placed in a-condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour. The allowance of 48 hours to restore the channel to OPERABLE status. and the additional hour, are justified in Reference 7.
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g, - - - l RTS Instrumentation. B 3.3.1 [ LBASES r Aq ,, ACTIONS (continuedi 1 K r and K.2 , ! l Condition K applies to the following reactor trip Functions: l L eL Pressurizer Pressure-Low: e Pressurizer Water _ Level-High: f e Reactor.Qoolant Flow-Low;, e 'RCP Breaker Position:- o Undervoltage RCPs: and e underfrequency RCPs. l With.one channel' inoperable, the'ino erable channel must'be placed in'the tripped condition with n 6 hours.. Placing the , channel in the tripped condition results in a partial-trip
- condition requiring only one additional channel-to initiate a reactor trip'above the P-7 setpoint. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint. The 6. hours
, allowed to place-the channel in the tripped. condition is
(,)- justified in Reference 7. An additional 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel.cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time. Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration trie redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the. low probability of occurrence of an event during this p,griod that may require 'the protection
- afforded by the Functions associated with Condition K.
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino)erable channel in the bypassed condition for.up to 4 1ours while performing routine
. surveillance testing of the other channels. The 4 hour time
' limit is justified in Reference 7.
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' 0~ ' ' B 3.3.1 - 46 5/30/98 Revision E 4 LBYRON.' UNITS.I.& 2 2 L _-_ _ L_ - _- _ l. _ - - - - - -
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES h ACTIONS (continued)L
); L.1 and L.2.
' Condition L applies to Turbine Trip.on Emergency Trip Header Pressure or on Turbine Throttle Valve Closure. With one channel' inoperable.: the inoperable channel must.be placed in the trip condition within-6 hours. If placed in the_' tripped condition. this results in a partial trip condition-requiring.only one additional channcl to initiate a reactor trip. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed-in the trip. condition..then power must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within the next 6 hours. .The 6 hours
' allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 7.
.The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino)erable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 4' lours while performing routine surveillance testing of the other channels. The 4 hour time limit is ' justified in Reference 7.
1 . M.1 and M.2-
. Condition M applies to the SI Input from ESFAS reactor trip
[v-l l and the RTS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 1 and 2.
- actions address the train orientation of the RTS for these These Functions. With.one train inoperable. 6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status (Required .
Action M 1) or the unit must be placed in. MODE 3 within the next'6 hours. The Comaletion Time of 6-hours (Required i
. ~ Action M.1) is reasonaale considering that' in this
. . . Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to ,
e perform the safety fung. tion and given the low probability of
- an event during this interval. The Completion Time of 6 hours. (Required _ Action M.2) is reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly . manner and without challenging plant systems.
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours for surveillance T . testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. L I' [\ A')' BYRONi ' UNITS 11 & 2' B 3.3.1 - 47 5/30/98 Revision E Li I p
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES p y 2 ACTIONS (continued)
.l: N.1 and N.2 T Condition N applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation-of the RTS for the RTBs. With one train inoperable. I hour is allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function. Placing-the unit'in MODE 3 results in Action C entry while RTB(s) are inoperable.
The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows one' channel to be bypassed for u) to 2 hours for-surveillance testing, provided the other clannel is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RTB to be bypassed for'up to 2 hours for maintenance on undervoltage or' shunt trip mechanisms if the other RTB train is OPERABLE. The 2 hour time limit is' justified in Reference 7. ['j') m l 0.1 and 0.2 Condition 0 a) plies to the P-6 and P-10 interlocks. With' one or more clannels inoperable for one-out-of-two or ' two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be.in its required state for the existing unit condition by observation of the associated
)ermissive annunciator. window within 1 hour or the unit must ae placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. Verifying the-
. interlock' status manuaTiy accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time'of 6 hours is reasonable. based on operating experience.. to reach MODE 3 from~ full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The l' hour and 6 hour Completion
. Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the. event of a complete loss of RTS Function.
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5/30/98 Revision E , i h . - - l
RTS Instrumentation
< B-3.3.1 BASES g
d ACTIONS-(continued)
.l P.1 and P.2 Condition P applies to the.P-7~ P-8, and P-13 interlocks.
With one or more channels inoperable for one-out-of-two 'or two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing. unit condition by observation of the associated
)ermissive annunciator window within 1 hour'or the unit must; 3e placed in~ MODE 2 within the next 6 hours. These actions are conservative for the case where power level is being raised. Verifying the interlock status manually' accom)lishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time o
of 1 lour is based.on operating experience and' the minimum amount' of time allowed for'. manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience. to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
.l 0.1 and 0.2
.l Condition 0 applies to the RTB Undervoltage and Shunt' Trip Mechanisms, or diverse trip features. in MODES 1 and 2.
With one of the diverse' trip features ino)erable, it must be
- ]'
1 restored to an OPERABLE status within 48'1ours or the unit must be placed in a MODE where the requirement does not 1 apply. This is accomplished by placing the unit in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours (54 hours total time). The Completion Time of 6 hours 1s a reasonable time. based on operating experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. With the unit in MODE 3 Action C would apply to any ino)erable RTB trip me1c anism. The affected RTB shall not be )ypassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable , exce)t for the time required to perform maintenance to one ) of t1e diverse features. The allowable time for performing - maintenance of the diverse features is 2 hours for the reasons stated under Condition N. q 1 jm .
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. BYRON UNITS l'& 2-B 3.3.1 - 49 5/30/98 Revision E
, l l T: _ - _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ ' - - -
RTS Instrumentation B 3. 3.1~
. BASES n_ l l
l Q ACTIONS (continued) J j r- The'Com]letion Time of 48 hours for Required Action 0.1 is 4 reasonaale considering that in this Condition there is one remaining diverse' feature for the affected RTB. and one OPERABLE RTB capable of performing the' safety. function and given the low probability of an event occurri.ng during'this
' interval.
SURVEILLANCE The-SRs for each RTS Function are identified by the SRs column of Table 3.3.1-1 for that Function. REQUIREMENTS A Note has been added to the SR Table stating that
~ Table 3.3.1-1 determines which SRs apply to which RTS Functions.
Note that'each channel of process 3rotection supplies both
~ trains of the RTS. -When testing C1annel I. Train A and Train B'must be examined. Similarly. Train A and Train P must be examined when testing Channel II. Channel III, and
+
Channel-IV (if applicable), The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the-
- assumptions used in analytically calculating the required 4 -channel accuracies.
G. , SR 3.3.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has' not occurred. ' A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter l .. indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is baseOn the assumption that instrument
. - channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect
! gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying that the ! instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
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l l hJ . . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3,3.1 - 50 5/30/98 Revision E I-o
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES. h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Agreement criteria are determined based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria. it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on ' operating experience that demonstrates. channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.2 compares the calorimetric heat balance calculation to the NIS channel out)ut every 24 hours. If the calorimetric exceeds the NIS clannel output by > 2%'RTP. l the NIS is not declared inoperable, but.must be adjusted. If the NIS channel output cannot be properly adjusted, the channel is declared inoperable. Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.2. The first Note indicates that the NIS channel output shall be adjusted consistent with the h3 calorimetric results if the absolute difference between the NIS. channel' output and the calorimetric is > 2% RTP. The second Note clarifies that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is = 15% RTP and that 12 hours is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 15% RTP. At lower power levels, calorimetry: data are inaccurate. The Frequency of every,_24 hours is adequate. It is based on
- plant operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.
Together these factors demonstrate the change in the absolute difference between NIS and heat balance calculated powers rarely exceeds 2% in any 24 hour period. In addition, control room operators periodically monitor redundant indications and alarms to detect deviations in-channel outputs. f i O- .
' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2l B 3.3.1 - 51 5/30/98 Revision E l
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES
) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.3 SR 3.3.1.3 compares the incore system to the NIS channel output prior to exceeding 75% RTP after each refueling and every 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) thereafter, If the absolute difference is = 3%. the NIS channel is still . OPERABLE. but must be readjusted. If the NIS channel cannot be properly readjusted, the channel is declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(AI) input to the Overtemperature AT Function. Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.3. Note 1 indicates that the excore NIS channel shall be adjusted if the absolute difference between the incore. and excore AFD is a 3%. Note 2 clarifies that the Surveillance is required only if reactor power is > 15% RTP. The Frequency of once prior to exceeding 75% RTP following each refueling outage considers that the core may be changed during.a refueling outage such that the previous comparison.
, prior to the refueling outage, is no longar completely (3) valid. The Frequency also considers that the comparison accuracy increases with power level such toat the: comparison is preferred to be performed at as high a power. level as possible. An initial performance at s 75% RTP provides a verification prior to attaining full power.
The Frequency of every 31 EFPD is adequate. It is based on plant operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operatj.pg history data for in'strument drift.
- Also, the slow changes in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can be detected during this interval.
SR 3.3-1.4 SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TADOT every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test shall verify -OPERABILITY by actuation of the end devices. t 'N
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 52 5/30/98 Revision E
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES O SuavElttANCe aeoulaesENTS < continued) The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. Independent verification of RTB undervoltage and shunt trip function is not required for the bypass breakers. No capability is provided for performing such a test at power. The independent test for bypass breakers is included in SR 3.3.1.13. The by) ass breaker test shall include a local shunt trip. A Note las been added to indicate that this
. test must be performed on the bypass breaker prior to placing it in service.
The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data. SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION t0GIC TEST. The SSPS is tested every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS,
. using the semiautomatic tester. The. train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent r actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible Q logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.
SR 3 3.1.6
^
SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. IftTemeasurementsdonotagree,the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be calibrated to agree with the incore detector measurements. If the excore channels cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(AI). input to the Overtemperature AT Function. O , BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 53 5/30/98 Revision E 1 . L __ __-_-____ -_-_-- -___-___-
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 i BASES l 0 -SuavEi>.t4NCe ReouiaeMENTS ccontinuee) a A Note modifies SR 3.3.1.6 The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is a 75% RTP and that 24 hours is allowed for performing the first ' surveillance after reaching 75% RTP. The Frequency.of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on ,
-industry operating experience considering instrument !
reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 92 days. A COT I
'is performed on each required ~ channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must.
be within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1. The difference.between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the l 1 calculated normal uncertainties consistent with the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. j O The "as found" and "as left" values must also be' recorded-and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis (Ref. 7) when applicable SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that provides a 4 hour I delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed
.without a delay for teTting in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours. this Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours after entry into MODE 3.
The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 7. ;
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N RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
- BAS.ES o
, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
. SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of'a' COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7. except it is' modified by a ' Note that this-test shall include verification that the P-6 and P-10 ' interlocks are in their required state for the existing unit condition.
The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance-to be satisfied if it has'been performed within 92 days of the Frequencies prior to reactor startup and four~ hours after-reducing power.below P-10 and P-6. The-Frequency of " prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is
. performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source, intermediate and power range low instrument channels. The Frequency'of "4 hours after reducing power below P-10" (applicable to intermediate and )ower range. low channels) and "4 hours after reducing power )elow P-6"
- (applicable'to source range channels) allows a normal
- shutdown-to be completed and the unit removed.from the MODE.
. of Applicability for this surveillance without a. delay to 3erform~the testing recuired by.this surveillance. The requency-of every 92 cays thereafter applies if.the unit
- remains in the MODE of' Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup.and four hours
./ T '
after reducing power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of M Applicability for this surveillance is < P-10 for the power-range low.and intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the
- source range channels. Once the unit is in MODE.3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to-be-maintained < P-10 or.< P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the testing required by this surveillance must be ')erformed
- prior to the expiration of the 4 hour limit. our hours is a reasonable time to co.01plete u the required testing or place
. - the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. .This test ensures that the NIS source.
intermediate.-and power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to-taking the reactor critical and after reducing
. power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or < P-6) for periods
> 4 hours.
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s RTS In.strumentation. B 3.3.1 x BASES
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lSURVEILLANCEREQUIREEENTS(continued) SR.'3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1~. 9 is the p'erformance of a TADOT every 92 days, as justified in Reference 7. The SRLis modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency relays. setpoint verification requires elaborate bench calibration and is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. n SR 3.3.1.10 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL _ CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the. sensor,.
.The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy..- In addition, the test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted.to the prescribed values where applicable y- CHANNEL CALIB' RATIONS must be performed' consistent with the
'(j- ' assumptions of the plant specific setpoint methodology. The.
difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the calculated normal uncertainties consistent with the setpoint methodology.
. The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an
. 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the ,
magnitude of equipmeni;.4 rift in the setpoint methodology. j l
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J * ' RTS Instrumentation p, B 3.3.1-
-BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (cont: ved)
SR' 3.3.1.11'
, 'SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION as m described in SR 3.3.1.10. every 18 months. This SR is lf modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. -The CHANNEL l CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors' based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed-above-15% RTP, and
' obtaining-detector plateau curves. evaluating those curves,
, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. The
, CHANNEL CALIBRAT!0N for.the source range, intermediate. range ~and )ower range neutron detectors consists of
-obtaining tie detector plateau or preamp discriminator L curves, evaluating those curves.'and comparing the curves to s 'the manufacturer's data. This Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1. and.is not required-for the NIS intermediate range
. detectors for entry into MODE. 2,= because the unit must be in at .least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors.
.The 18 month Frequency is-based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant
- )h.,i outage and the potential for.an un)lanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with tie ~ reactor at power.
0)erating experience has shown these components usually pass tie. Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency. Q - SR 3.S M
. SR 3.3.1.12 -is the. performance of a COT of RTS interlocks
.every 18 months. _
The~ Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating . experience. l 1 (s I-h BYRON - UNITS?l & 2 B 3.3.1 - 57 5/30/98 Revision E
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. RTS Instrumentation- =I 4* . B 3.3.1
, BASES ym.
- V. - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SR 3.3.1.13 SR 3.31.13 is the performance of a TAD 0T of the Manual Reactor Trip RCP Breaker Position, and the SI-Input from ESFAS :This TADOT is performed every 18 months. The test 4 . -shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the .
l Undervoltage;and Shunt Trip Mechanisms for the Manual Reactor Trip Function for the Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers. The Reactor. Trip Bypass. Breaker test shall: include' testing of the automatic undervoltage t' rip. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Functions and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.. The-SR is modified by a Note 'that excludes verification of setpoints from the TAD 01. The Functions affected-have no setpoints associated with them. l SR 3.3.1.14 SR _3.3.1.14 is the performance of a TADOT of Turbine Trip l
.f] Functions. -This TADOT.is performed prior to. reactor -
startu), A Note states that this Surveillance is' required if it 1as not been performed once within the previous
.31 days. Verification of the Trip Setpoint does not have to be performed for this Surveillance. Performance of this test will ensure that the Turbine Trip Function is OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical. This test cannot be performed with the reactor at power and must therefore be performed prior to rea,,ctor startup.
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-l SR 3 3.1.15 I -
SR 3.3.1.15 verifies that the individual channel / train actuation response times are less'than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Res)onse time testing acceptance criteria are included in the JFSAR. Section.7.2 (Ref.'.9). Individual component response times _are not modeled in the analyses.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 ! BASES
,3 V SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The analyses mod'el the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state.
~
For channels that include dynamic transfer Functions (e.g..
-lag lead / lag, rate / lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer Function set to one, with the resulting measured response time comaared to the appropriate UFSAR response time. Alternately, tie response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value, provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response tiine may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor
. response times with actual response time tests on the
! remainder of the channel. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic noise, or power interrupt tests). (2) inplace, onsite. or offsite (e.g.
vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. Reference 8 provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time
. verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by.
test. ,,_ The allocations for sensor response times must be verified prior to placing the component in o)erational service and re-verified following maintenance tlat may adversely affect response time. In general, electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value. One example where response time could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter. i r\ . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 59 5/30/98 Revision E I l l
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- RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 l
BASES (q ._j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) As appropriate, each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices is included in the testing. Response times cannot be determined during unit operation because equipment o)eration is required to measure response i times. Experience las shown that these components usually , 3 ass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month requency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. l SR 3.3.1.15 is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficu'lty in generating an appropriate detector in)ut signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because t1e principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 7.
- 2. UFSAR. Chapter 6.
IlwJ
- 3. UFSAR. Chapter 15. i
- 4. IEEE-279-1971.
l
- 5. Technical Requirements Manual.
l 6. WCAP-12523. "RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodology Study." j October 1990. l
. 7. WCAP-10271-P-A. Epplement.2. Rev. 1. June 1990.
- 8. WCAP-13632 Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." August 1995.
l 9. UFSAR. Section 7.2. i l O r 'j . l 1 BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 60 5/30/98 Revision E _m_._______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . - _ . _ _ _____________]
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
^
( ') B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION G B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System tESFAS) Instrumentation I BASES I BACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessary safety systems. based on the values of selected unit parameters tc protect against !. violating core design limits and tre Reactor Coolant System i (RCS) pressure boundary, and to mitigate accidents. j The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct l but interconnected modules as identified below: I e Field transmitters or process sensors and instrumentation: provide a measurable electronic signal based on the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured: l e Signal processing equipment including analog protection { system, field contacts, and protection channel sets: j provide signal conditioning. bistable setpoint comparison. process algorithm actuation, compatible em electrical signal output to protection system devices, l ) and control board /coritrol room / miscellaneous indications: and e Solid State Protec" ion System (SSPS) including input, logic and output Days: initiates the proper unit shutdown or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the -defined logic and based on the bistable outputs from the signal process control and protection system. y-- , N)3 . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A - _ - _ - - ---.- 1
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ESFAS Instrumentation
'B 3.3.2 BASES:
M V -BACKGROUND (continued) Field Transmiltgrs or Sensors:
.n i To meet the' design demands for redundancy.and reliability, more than one,. and. often as many as four. field. transmitters i or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. In'many.
cases, field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor: Trip System (RTS). In some cases, the same channels also provide control system inputs.
.To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift, which are assumed to occur between-calibrations, statistical
, allowances are provided in the Trip:Setpoint and Allowable Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can beLevaluated when its "as found" calibration da'ta are 33 compared against its documented acceptance criteria.
Sional Processino Eauioment ,
- Generally, three'or four channels of crocess control equipment are used for. the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field' instruments. The process-control: equipment' provides signal conditioning, comparable
, -output ~ signals for instruments located on the main control-
.. board.?and comparison of measured input signals with 1N. O. I established setpoints. If the measured value of a unit'
' parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from
/- -a bistable is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays'. L However., not all . unit parameters require four ch6nnels of sensor measurement and signa 1 processing. Some unit parameters provide input only'to the SSPS. while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the plant computer, and one or agre control' systems. 3 o , i
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2' BASES. ()~ BACKGROUND (continued)- Generally.fif a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits. three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required. reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.
- Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function. -four channels with a two-out-of-four
- logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and
. redundancy. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which.may then require the protection function actuation and a single failure in the other channels'providing the protection function actuation.' Again, a single failure will neither.cause nor prevent the protection function' actuation.
These' requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971.(Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit.
,. parameter is specified in Reference'2.
q(f - Trio Setooints and Allowable Values. l Allowable Values provide a conservative margin with regards to instrument uncertainties to ensure that Safety Limits (SLs) are not violated during Anticipated Operational Occurrences (A00s) and that the consequences of Design Basis
- Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable providing the unit is operated from within tjg LCOs at the onset of the event and
- . - required equipment functions as designed. If the measured.
l- value of a bistable / contact is less conservative than the Allowable Value, then the associated ESFAS function is considered inoperable. Allowable Values for ESFAS functions are specified in Table 3.3.2-1. t
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ESFAS Instrumentation l B 3.3.2 I 1 BASES I ) BACKGROUND (continued) Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables l or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to l account for changes in measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example of such a change in measurement error is attributable to calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the measured value of a bistable is less conservative than the Trip Setpoint, but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated ESFAS Function is considered OPERABLE. . Trip Setpoints are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5). Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a methodology which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each instrument channel. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties is provided in Reference 6. I 3 Solid State Protection System (v, The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will 3rovide ESF actuation for. the unit. If both trains are tacen out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements. The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation: generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation: and provides the status, permissive and annunciator output signals to the main control room. [ l') BYRbN-UNITS 1&2 B 3.3.2 - 4 5/30/98 Revision E 3 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 O BASES V BACKGROUND (continued) The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients. If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition. Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses. LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases. Each SSPS train has a built in testing device that can automatically test the decision logic matrix functions and : the actuation devices while the unit is at power. When any 1 one train is taken out of service for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed. The testing device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time. The actuation of ESF components is accomplished through master and slave relays. The SSPS energizes the master
,- relays appropriate for the condition of the unit. Each master relay then energizes one or more slave relays, which
('-}. then cause actuation of the end devices. The master and
- slave relays are routinely tested to ensure operation. The test of the master relays energizes the relay, which then l operates the contacts and applies a low voltage to the l associated slave relays. The low voltage is not sufficient l to actuate the slave relays but only demonstrates signal path continuity. The SLAVE RELAY TEST actuates the devices if their operation will not interfere with continued unit operation. For the la,Lter case, actual component operation
! is prevented by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit and slave l relay contact operation is verified by a continuity check of j the circuit containing the slave relay. { l n . U BYRQN - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 5 5/29/98 Revision A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . __. i
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l l BASES I i (~') ^ i APPLICABLE Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or SAFETY ANALYSES. more ESFAS Functions. One of the ESFAS Functions is the i LCO and 3rimary actuation signal for that accident. An ESFAS ) APPLICABILITY unction may be the primary actuation signal for more than one type of accident. An ESFAS Fanction may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents. For example. Pressurizer Pressure-Low is a . j primary actuation signal for small Loss Of Coolant Accidents 1 (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for Steam Line Breaks (SLBs) outside containment. Functions such as manual , initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis, are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis { , and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These Functions may provide protection for conditions that i . do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 3). l The LC0 requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function to be OPERABLE when the' unit status is within the l l Applicability. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability q of the affected Functions. U The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of three or four l channels in each instrumentation Function and two channels in each logic and manual initiation Function. The. , two-out-of-three and the two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or
, testing without causing an ESFAS initiation. Two logic or manual initiation channels are required to ensure no single random failure disables the ESFAS.
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ESFAS Instrumentation-
' B 3.3.2.
~ BASEST en V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The required channels of ESFAS instrumentation provide unit 3rotection in'the event of any of the analyzed accidents. ESFAS protection functions are as follows:
- 1. Safety Iniection
[ Safety' Injection (SI) provides two primary functions:
.1. Primary side water addition to. ensure maintenance or recovery of reactor vessel water level (coverage of.the active fuel ~for heat removal.
- clad integrity, and for limiting peak clad temperature to < 2200 F): and
' 2.
.Boration to ensure recovery ~and maintenance of SDM.
These functions ~are necessary to mitigate-the, effects of High Energy Line Breaks (HELBs) both inside and-outside of containment. The SI signal is also used to
. ' initiate other Functions such as:
e- -Phase A Isolation: Q.. V e Containment Purge Isolation: L e Reactor Trip: e Turbine Trip: s 'Feedwater Isolation: 1
- e Start of Auk 1Tiary Feedwater (AF) pumps; e Control room ventilation isolation'; and i e Enabling automatic switchover of Emergency Core l
Cooling Systems (ECCS) pump suction to containment sump. l L l l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2- 7 5/30/98 Revision E L . L .. .
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
. BASES
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_J APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) These other functions ensure: e Isolation of nonessential systems through containment penetrations; e Trip .of the turbine and reactor to limit power generation; e Isolation of FW to limit secondary side mass losses; o Start of AF to ensure secondary side cooling capability e Isolation of the control room to ensure habitability; and e Enabling ECCS suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) switchover on low low RWST level to ensure continued cooling via use of the containment sump. 7, a. Safety Iniection-Manual Initiation The operator can initiate SI at any time by using either of two switches in the control room. This , action will cause actuation of all components in i the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. The LC0 requires two channels to.be OPERABLE. Each channel,gonsists of one switch and the
- interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet such that either switch will actuate both trains. This ensures the pro)er amount of redundancy is maintained in tie manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has l manual ESFAS initiation capability. i The applicability of the SI Manual Initiation Function is discussed with the Automatic Actuation l Logic and Actuation Relay Function below. l l
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l l BASES r] APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- b. Safety Iniection- Automatic Actuation looic and Actuation Relays l
This LCO requires two trains to be OPERABLE. Actuation logic consists of all circuitry housed f within the actuation subsystems including the . initiating relay contacts responsible for actuating the ESF equipment. Manual and automatic initiation of SI must be j OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3. In these MODES. i there is sufficient energy in the primary and j secondary systems to warrant automatic initiation - of ESF systems. Manual Initiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation is not required. In. this MODE. adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. but because of the large number of components actuated on an SI. actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support g)
> system level manual initiation.
V These Functions are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is adequate time for the operator to evaluate unit conditions.and respond by manually starting individual systems. pumps, and other equipment to mitigate the consequences of an abnormal condition or accident. Unit pressure and temperature are very low and many ESF com29.nents are administratively locked
- out or otherwise prevented from actuating to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of unit systems.
( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 9 5/29/98 Revision A l l j l l ) l ) j
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
/ ^s BASES r i
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- c. Safety Iniection-Containment Pressure-Hioh 1 This signal provides protection against the following accidents:
- SLB inside containment:
- LOCA and e Feed line break inside containment.
Containment Pressure-High 1 provides no input to any control functions. Thus, three OPERABLE channels are sufficient to satisfy protective requirements with a two-out-of-three logic. The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics are located outside of containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment. Thus, the high pressure Function will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint
,. reflects only steady state instrument (v ) uncertainties.
Containment Pressure-High 1 must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment. l l l 4 1 I N-] l i BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B ~ 3. 3.2 - 10 5/29/98 Revision A 1
1 l ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES f~'} v j APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- d. Safetv Iniection- Pressur12er Pressure- Low This signal provides protection against the following accidents:
e Inadvertent opening of a SG relief or safety valve; e SLB: e A spectrum of rod cluster control assembly l ejection accidents (rod ejection); e Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer relief or safety valve:
- LOCAs: and e SG Tube Rupture.
Pressurizer pressure provides both control and protection functions with inputs to the I,a)
's Pressurizer Pressure Control System. reactor trip.
and SI. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then recuire the protection function actuation, anc a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels are required to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic.
- The transmitters are located inside containment, with the taps in the vapor space region of the pressurizer and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (LOCA. SLB inside containment, rod ejection). Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties. l l ,a .
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BAS.ES b, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 (above P-11) to mitigate the consequences of an HELB inside containment. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint. Automatic SI actuation below this pressure setpoint is then performed by the Containment Pressure-High 1 signal . This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 below the P-11 setpoint. Other ESF functions are used to detect accident conditions and actuate the ESF systems in this MODE. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation.
- e. Safgly Iniection-Steam Line Pressure-Low Steam Line Pressure-Low provides protection against the following accidents:
e SLL. n e Feed line breaki and e Inadvertent opening of an SG relief or an SG safety valve. Steam Line Pressure-Low provides a control input to density compensate the steam flow channels that j are part of the SG water ' level control function. However. this control function cannot cause the events that 1.tle Function must protect against.
- Thus, three OPERABLE channels on each steam line are sufficient to satisfy the protective requirements with a two-out-of-three logic on each steam line.
With the transmitters typically located inside the I steam tunnels, it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental conditions during l a secondary side break. Therefore, the Trip q Setpoint reflects both steady state and adverse 1 environmental instrument uncertainties. l > l l p 1 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.2 - 12 5/30/98 Revision E i L
l ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l /m BASES !( ) f APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) l This Function is anticipatory in nature and has a
- typical lead / lag ratio of 50/5.
I Steam Line Pressure-Low must be OPERABLE in l MODES 1. 2. and 3 (above P-11) when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint. Below P-11. feed line break is not a concern. Inside containment. SLB will be terminated by automatic SI actuation via Containment Pressure-High 1. and outside containment SLB will be terminated by'the Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High signal for steam line isolation. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. 5. or 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit that would result in a release of enough quantities of energy to cause a .significa.nt cooldown of the RCS. 7 2. Containment Sorav Containment Spray provides three primary functions:
- 1. Lowers containment pressure and temperature after an HELB in containment:
- 2. Reduces the amount of radioactive iodine in the containment atmosphere: and
- 3. Adjusts the p,H_ of the water in the containment
- recirculation sump after a large break LOCA.
l '0 1 U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.2 - 13 5/29/98 Revision A
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ( i ) APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) These functions are necessary to: e Ensure the pressure boundary integrity of the containment structure: e Limit the release of radioactive iodine to the environment in the event of.a failure of *.1e l' containment structure; and e Minimize corrosion of the components and systems inside containment following a LOCA. The containment spray actuation signal starts the containment spray pumps and aligns the discharge of the pumps to the containment spray nozzle headers in the upper levels of containment. Water is initially drawn from the RWST by the containment spray Jumps and mixed with a sodium hydroxide solution ~from tie spray l additive tank. When the RWST reaches the Low-3 level setpoint, the spray pump suctions are' shifted to the containment sump if continued containment spray is required. Containment spray is actuated manually or s automatically by Containment Pressure-High 3. i
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 (~'s BASES b) APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) >
- a. Containment Sorav-Manual Initiation The operator can initiate containment spray at any time from the control room by simultaneously turning two containment spray actuation switches in the same channel. Because an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could have such serious consequences, two switches must be turned simultaneously to initiate containment spray.
There are two sets of two switches each in the control room. Each set of two switches is considered a channel. Simultaneously turning the two switches in either set will actuate containment . spray in both trains in the same manner as the automatic actuation signal. Two Manual Initiation channels are required to be OPERABLE ~to ensure no single failure-disables the Manual Initiation Function. Note that Manual Initiation of containment spray also actuates Phase B containment isolation.
- b. Containment Sorav- Automatic Actuation looic and
(,s) Actuation Relays s_s Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b. I l
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ESFAS Instrumentation
, B 3.3.2 BASES l
APPLICABLE. SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) i Manual and automatic initiation of containment spray must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 when there is a potential for an accident to occur, and sufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pose a threat to containment integrity due to overpressure conditions. Manual initiation is also required in
' MODE 4. even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE. adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. However, because of the large number of components actuated on a containment spray, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to result in containment overpressure. In MODES 5 and 6. there is also adequate time for the operators to evaluate unit conditions and respond. to
. mitigate the consequences of abnormal conditions by manually starting individual components.
- c. Containment Sorav-Containment Pressure-Hiah 3 This signal provides protection against a LOCA or an SLB inside containment. The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics are located outside of containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment. Thus, the high pressure function will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint reflects only
- steady state instrument uncertainties.
This Function requires the bistable output to energize to perform its required action. It is not desirable to have a loss of power actuate containment spray, since the consequences of an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could be serious. Note that this Function also has the inoperable channel placed in bypass rather than trip to decrease the probability of an inadvertent actuation. l ,O ' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 16 5/29/98 Revision A a _ _ - _-_ - __- - _ _ _ A
l ESFAS Instrumentation
,, B 3.3.2 l
i BASES q V l APPLICABLE SAFETY-ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Four channels of containment pressure are utilized in a two-out-of-four logic configuration. Since containment pressure is not used.for control, this arrangement exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements. . Additional redundancy is warranted because this Function is energize to trip. Containment Pressure-High 3 must be OPERABLE in l MODES 1. 2. and 3 when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the. containment following a pipe break. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is insufficient. energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment and reach the Containment Pressure-High 3 setpoint.
- 3. Containment Isolation Containment Isolation provides isolation of the containment atmosphere, and all proces's systems that penetrate containment from the environment. This Function is necessary to prevent or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a
{} large break LOCA. There are two separate Containment Isolation signals. Phase A and Phase B. The Phase A signal isolates all automatically isolable process lines. except Component
.l Coolir;g water (CC) at a relatively low containment pressure indicative of primary or secondary system leaks. For these types of events, forced circulation cooling using theJeactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) and SGs.
- is the preferred (but not required) method of decay heat removal. Since CC is required to support RCP operation, not isolating CC on the low pressure Phase A signal enhances unit safety by allowing operators to use forced RCS circulation to cool the unit. Isolating CC on the low pressure signal may force the use of feed and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficult to control.
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. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.3.2 - 17 5/30/98 Revision E i
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Phase A Containment Isolation is actuated automatically
.by SI or manually via the automatic actuation logic.
All process lines penetrating containment. with the exception of CC, are isolated. CC is not isolated at this time to permit continued operation of the RCPs with cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat , exchangers and RCP motor bearing oil coolers. All process lines not equipped with remote operated isolation valves are manually closed, or otherwise isolated. prior to reaching MODE 4. Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is accomplished by either of two switches in the control room. Either switch actuates both trains. Note that manual actuation of Phase A Containment Isolation also actuates Containment Ventilation Isolation. The Phase B signal isolates CC. This occurs at a relatively high containment pressure that is indicative of a:large break LOCA or an SLB. For these events, forced circulation using the RCPs is no longer desirable. Isolatin the CC at the higher pressure OV
'does not Jose a chal enge to the containment boundary because tie CC System is a closed loop inside containment. Although some system components do not meet all-of the ASME Code requirements applied to the containment itself, the system is continuously pressurized to a pressure greater than the Phase B setpoint. Thus, routine operation demonstrates the integrity of the system pressure boundary for 3ressures exceeding'the Phase B set)oint. Furthermore. ]ecause system pressure e.geeds t1e Phase B setpoint, any
- system leakage prior to initiation of Phase B isolation would be into containment. Therefore, the combination of CC System design and Phase B isolation ensures the CC System is not a potential path for radioactive release from containment.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B-3.3.2 BASES G t
). APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Phase B Containment Isolation is actuated by .
-l' Containment Pressure-High 3. or manually. via the automatic actuation logic. For containment pressure to reach a value high enough to actuate Containment Pressure-High 3. a. large break LOCA or SLB must have occurred and containment spray must have been actuated.
RCP operation will no longer be required and CC to the RCPs is, therefore, no longer necessary.
-Manual Phase B Containment Isolation is accomplished by the same-switches that actuate Containment Spray. When the two switches in either set are turned simultaneously.. Phase B Containment Isolation and Containment Spray will be actuated in both trains.
- a. Containment Isolation-Phase A Isolation (1) Phase A Isolation-Manual' Initiation Manual Phase A Containment I' solation.is actuated by either of two switches in the control room. Either switch actuates both trains. Each switch is considered a channel.
Note that manual initiation of Phase A Containment Isolation also actuates Containment Ventilation Isolation, r- (2) Phase A Isolation- Automatic Actuation Loaic. L and Actuation Relays Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays cgnsist of the same features and , operate in the same manner as described for l
, ESFAS Function 1.b. ]
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l 1 1 i IO) "~ BY'RON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 19 5/30/98 Revision E I
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 O BASES V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Manual and automatic initiation of Phase A Containment Isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1.
- 2. and 3 when there is a potential for an accident to occur. Manual initiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation is not required. Ir this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. but because of the large number of components actuated on a Phase A Containment Isolation, actuation is simplified.by the use of the manual actuation switches.
Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment to require Phase A Containment Isolation. Also, there is adecuate time for the operator to evaluate unit concitions and manually actuate individual isolation valves in response to abnormal or accident conditions. '( (3) Phase A Isolation-Safety Iniection Phase A Containment Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate SI. The Phase A Containment Isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore. the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead. Function 1. SI. is refergnced for all initiating Functions
- and requirements.
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( l ESFAS Instrumentation i B 3.3.2 l I 1 (3 BASES { V l APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- b. Containment Isolation-Phase B Isolation Phase B Containment Isolation is accomplished by Manual Initiation. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays. and by Containment Pressure channels (the same channels that actuate Containment Spray, Function 2). The Phase B Containment Isolation Function requires the bistable output to energize to trip in order to minimize the potential of spurious trips that may damage the RCPs.
(1) Phase B Isolation-Manual' Initiation Manual Phase B Containment Isolation is actuated by simultaneously turning tw. switches in the same train. There are two sets of two switches each in the control room. Each set of two switches is considered a channel. g (2) Phase B Isolation- Automatic Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relays Automatic actuation logic and actuation i relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3. 3. 2 - 21 5/29/98 Revision A 9
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 q l BASES-(] APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and APPLICABILITY _(continued) Manual'and automatic initiation of Phase B [ containment isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1.
. 2. and 3, when there is a potential for an-accident to occur. Manual initiation is also required in MODE-4 even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE. adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. However, because of the large number of components actuated on a Phase B containment isolation, actuation is' simplified by ~
.the use of the manual actuation switches.
Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment to require Phase B containment isolation. There also is adecuate time for the operator to evaluate unit concitions and manually actuate individual isolation valves in response to abnormal or accident conditions. (3) Phase B Isolation-Containment
. Pressure-High 3 The basis for containment pressure MODE .
,. applicability is as discussed for ESFAS l Function 2.c above. l 4. Steam Line Isolation Isolation of the main steam lines provides protection l ' -. in the~ event of arr SLB inside or outside containment. Rapid isolation of the steam lines will limit the steam break accident to the blowdown from one SG, at most. l-
- For an SLB upstream of the MSIVs, ins'ide or outside of L containment, closure of the MSIVs and their bypass valves limits the accident to the blowdown from only the affected SG. For an SLB downstream of the MSIVs, l closure of the.MSIVs and their bypass valves terminates the accident as soon as the steam lines depressurize.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.3.2 - 22 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 L BASES h U PLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) a Steam Line Isolation-Manual Initiation Manual initiation of Stean: Line Isolation can be
.accom)lished from the control room. There are two switcles in the control roca and either switch can initiate action to immediately close all MSIVs.
The LC0. requires two channels to be OPERABLE.
- b. Steam Line Isolation- Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Automatic actuation logic arid actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the o same manner as described for ESFAS Function l'.b.
Manual and automatic initiation of steam line isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2 'and 3. when there is sufficient energy in the RCS'and SGs to have an SLB or other accident. This could result in the release of-significant quantities of energy and cause a cooldown of the primary system. The Steam Line Isolation Function is not required in MODES 2 and 3 when all MSIVs and their bypass valves are closed. In MODES 4.
/N ~ l 5. and 6 there is insufficient energy in the RCS and
-d SGs to experience an SLB or other accident releasing significant quantities.of energy.
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ESFAS Instrumentation ! B 3.3.2 l BASE,5 h . APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- c. Steam Line Isolation-Containment Pressure-High 2 This Function actuates closure of the MSIVs and their bypass . valves in the event ~ of a LOCA or an SLB inside containment to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics are located outside containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the i transmitter.) located inside containment. f Containment Pressure-High 2 provides no input to any control functi.ons. Thus, three OPERABLE >
channels are sufficient to satisfy protective requirements with two-out-of-three logic. Thus, they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions, and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties. Containment Pressure-Hign 2 must be OPERABLE. in i MODES 1. 2, and 3, when there is sufficient energy
.in the primary and secondary side to )ressurize the containment following a pipe breac. This ;
would cause a significant increase in the ' (\. containment 3ressure, thus-allowing detection and l closure of t1e MSIVs and their bypass valves. The
. Steam Line Isolation Function is not requjred in MODES 2 and 3 when all MSIVs and their bypass valves are closed. In MODES 4. E, and 6, there is not enough energy in the primary and secundary sides to pressurize the containment. to tne Containment Pressure-High 2 setpoint.
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- d. Steam Line Isolation-Steam Line Pressure (1) Steam Line Pressure-Low Steam Line Pressure-Low provides closure of l the MSIVs and their bypass valves in the
, event of.an SLB to maintain at least ona
- unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, l and to limit the mass and energy release to '
i- containment. Steam Line Pressure-Low ws l discussed previously under SI Function 1.e, 4
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1
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES
; APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSLS, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Steam Line Pressure-Low Function must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODE 3 2 and 3 (above P-ll), with any MSIV and associated bypass valve open, when a secondary side break or stuck open valve cculd result in the rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This signal may be manuelly blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint. Below P-11, an inside containment stb wi31 be terminated by automatic actuation sia ContainmEt Pressure-High 2. Stuc valve transients and outside contairnent ELBs will be terminated by the Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High signal for Steam Line Isolation below P-ll when SI has
.been manually blo-ktvJ. The Steam Line Isolation function is required in liODES 2 and 3 unless all MSIVs and their bypas.i
, valves are closed. This Function is nct required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4, 5. <1nd 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit that would result in a release of enough quantities of energy g to cause a significant cooldown of the RCS.
(2) Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High Steam Line Pressure -Negative Rate-High 3rovides closure of the MSIVs and their
]ypass valves for an SLB when less than the P-ll setpoint, to naintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor,
, _ and to imfiit the mass and energy release to containment. When the operator manually blocks the Steam Line Pressure-Low main steam isolation signal wnen less than the P-11 setpoint, the Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High signal is automatically enabled. Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High provides no l input to any control functions. Thus, three i OPERABLE channels are sufficient to satisfy requirements with 'a two-out-of-three logic on each steam line.
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ESFAS' Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES (]) -APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High must be OPERABLE in MODE 3 when less than the Pill setpoint when a secondary side break or
. stuck open valve could result in the rapid depressurization of the ' steam line(s). In
-MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3, when above the P-11 setpoint, this signal.is automatically disabled and the Steam Line Pressure-Low signal is automatically enabled. The Steam Line Isolation Function is not required in 1~ - MODE 3 when all MSIVs and their bypass valves are closed. In MODES 4, 5, and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to have an SLB or.Other accident that would result in a release of enough quantities of energy to cause a significant cooldown of the RCS.
While the transmitters may experience elevated ambient temperatures due to an SLB, the trip function is based on rate of change, not the absolute accuracy of the indicated steam pressure. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint 3/ reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.
- 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation The primary functions of the Turbine Trip and Feedwater-Isolation signals are to prevent damage to the turbine due to water in the steam. lines, and to stop the excessive flow of feedwater into the SGs. These Functions are necessary to mitigate the effects of a l
. high water level in the SGs, which could result in I carryover of water into the steam lines and excessive
, cooldown of the primary system. The SG high water .
U level is due to excessive feedwater flows. ' r 1
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 t c 's 1 BASES
\ j APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The Function is actuated when the level in any SG exceeds the high high setpoint. and performs the following functions: e Trips the main turbine: e Trips the FW pumps: e Initiates feedwater isolation: and e Shuts the FW pump discharge valves. This Function is actuated by SG Water Level-High High. or by an SI signal. The RTS also initiates a turbine trip signal whenever a reactor trip (P-4) is generated. In the event of SI. the unit is tripped and the turbine generator is tripped. The FW System is also taken out of operation and the AF System is automatically started.
- a. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation- Automatic
, Actuation Loolc and Actuation Relavs i ~/ Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
- b. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Steam Generator Water Level-?ich Hlah (P-14)
This signal provides protection against excessive feedwater flg. The ESFAS SG water level
- instruments provide input to the SG Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic I
must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system (which may then require the i protection function actuation) and a single l failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels per SG are required to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic. The channel Allowable Values are specified in percent of narrow range instrument span. (y BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.2 - 27 5/29/98 Revision A
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES p -
- V APPLICABLE SAFETY. ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY-(continued)
The transmitters (d/p cells) are located inside containment; However.-the events that this Function protects-against cannot cause a severe environment in containment. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady. state. instrument uncertainties. .
- c. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Safety Injection c
Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate SI. The Feedwater' Isolation Function requirements for these Functions are the same as the. requirements for their SI function. Therefore. the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead Function 1. SI.' is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements: Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 except when j all Feedwater (FW) Isolation Valves are closed or isolated by a closed manual valve when the FW System is
'O in operatioa ead the turb4ae 9emerator mer be in operation. In MODES s. 5. and 6. the FW System and the
{ turbine generator are not in service and this Function j is not required to be OPERABLE. The applicable FW Isolation Valv'es are listed below: lW
- FW Isolation Valve (FW009A through D)
- FW Tempering Flow Control Valve (FWO34A through D)
- FW Tempering Vah e (FWO35A through D)
- - Low Flow FW IsoTation Valve (FWO39A through D-Unit 1 only)
- FW Preheater Bypass Isolation Valve (FWO39A through D-Unit 2 on ly)
- FW Isolation Bypass Valve (FWO43A through D-Unit 2 only)
- FW Regulating Valve (FW510.520.530.540) .
- FW Regulating Bypass Valve (FW510A.520A.530A.540A)
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1 ESFAS Instrumentation ! B 3.3.2 l O BASES J APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater The AF System is designed to provide a secondary side i heat sink for the reactor in the event that the FW System is not available. The system has a motor driven pump and a diesel driven pump which are described in ,
LCO 3.7.5. "AF System."
- a. Auxiliary Feedwater- Automatic Actu6 tion Logic and I Actuation Relays Automatic actuatior: logic and actuation relays ,
consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
- b. Auxiliary Feedwater-Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low SG Water Level-Low Low provides protection against a loss of heat sink. A feed line break, inside or outside of containment, or a loss of FW.
p: would result in a loss of SG water level. SG i Water Level-Low Low provides input to the SG
'd Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system which may then require a protection function actuation and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels per SG are required to satisfy the requirements with two-out-of-four logic. The channel Allowable Values are specified in percent
. . of narrow range instrument span.
With the transmitters (d/p cells) located inside containment and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (feed line break), the Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties. f' . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 29 5/29/98 Revision ~ l
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
' BASES-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and APPLICABILITY.(continued)
- c. Auxiliary Feedwater-Safetv Iniection An SI signal starts the motor. driven and diesel driven AF pumps. The AF initiation functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the' requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead. Function 1.
SI. is referenced for all initiating functions and
. requirements.
- d. Auxiliary Feedwater-Loss of Offsite Power (Undervoltaae on Bus 141(241))
-l The loss of offsite power to bus' 141(241) is detected by a voltage drop on the bus. Upon l restoration of power via the "A" DG to bus 141(241), which su) plies the motor driven AF pump, the motor driven A pump will automatically start to ensure that at least one SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink for reactor decay
. heat and sensible heat-removal following the reactor trip.
Functions 6.a through 6.d must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2 and 3 to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink
. for the reactor. SG Water. Level-Low Low in any - 1 operating SG will cause the motor and diesel driven AF l 4
pumps to start. The system.is aligned so that upon a ! start of the pum), water immediately begins to flow to the SGs. These r unctions do not.have to be OPERABLE in MODES 4. 5. and 6 because the Steam Generators are not. normally used for heat removal, and the AF System is
. : not required.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 (~] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- e. Auxiliary Feedwater-Undervoltaae Reactor Coolant Pumo A loss of power on the buses that provide power to the RCPs provides indication of a pending loss of RCP forced flow in the RCS. The Undervoltage RCP Function senses a loss of power on two or more RCP buses and starts the AF pumps to ensure that at least one SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal following the reactor trip.
There are two undervoltage sensing relays on each 6.9 kV bus which feeds an RCP. One relay provides an input to actuation logic Train A and the other relay provides an input to actuation logic Train B. Each actuation logic train requires input from two of the four buses to initiate both AF pumps. Each train is considered a separate Function. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. O This ensures that at least one SG is provided with b water to serve as the heat sink to remove reactor decay heat and sensible heat in the event of an accident. In MODES 3. 4. and 5. the RCPs may be normally shut down, and thus, a pump trip is not indicative of a condition requiring automatic AF initiation.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 . BASES 8 N; APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- f. Auxiliary Feedwater-Pumo Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure-Low A low pressure signal:in the AF pump suction line coincident with an automatic start. signal protects
-the AF pumps against a loss of.the normal supply of water for.the pumps, the Condensate Storage p Tank (CST). 'A pressure transmitter is located on each.AF pump suction line from the CST. After an
' [ ' automatic start, a. low pressure signal will cause the emergency supply of. water for the associated pump to be aligned, or cause the associated AF pump.to stop until the emergency. source of water is aligned. The Essential Service Water System (safety grade)'is then lined up to supply the AF' , pump to ensure.an adequate supply of water for.the AF System to maintain at-least one of the'SGs as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal. ) Since the detectors are located in an area not affected by HELBs or high radiation. they will not ; experience any adverse environmental conditions '~ h -. and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument' uncertainties. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. ! and.3 to ensure a safety grade supply of water for the AF. System to maintain the SGs as the heat sink
. for the reactor. This Function does not have to i be OPERABLE in MODES 4. 5. and 6 because the SGs i are not normally used for heat removal and the AF Sistem is noTrequired. j l I 3
l ! L ! O ' BYRON - UNITS ~1 & 2 B 3.3.2- 32 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 7. .S_witchover to Containment Sumo At the end of the safety injection phase of a LOCA. the RWST will be nearly empty. Continued cooling must be provided by the ECCS to remove decay heat. The source of water for the ECCS pumps is switched to the ,
containment recirculation sump. The low head Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps and containment spray pumps draw the water from'the containment recirculation sump. the RHR pumps pump the water through the RHR heat exchanger. inject the water back into the RCS, and supply the cooled water to the other ECCS pumps. The ECCS switchover from safety injection to cold leg recirculation is initiated automatically upon receipt of the RWST auto switchover trip signal and is completed via timely _ operator action at the main control board. Switchover from the RWST to the containment sump must be completed before the RWST empties to prevent damage to the ECCS pumps and a loss of core cooling capability. For similar reasons. switchover must not occur before there is sufficient
,_ water in the containment sump to support ECCS pump suction. Furthermore. early switchover must not occur
!- to ensure that sufficient borated water is injected from the RWST .This ensures the reactor remains shut down in the recirculation mode. i Switchover is' initiated via automatic opening of the ! containment recirculation sump isolation valves (SI8811 A/B). -This automatic action aligns the suction l Of the RHR pumps to the containment recirculation sump
- to ensure contintgi availability of a su' ction source.
. Upon receipt'of the RWST low low level switchover L alarm, the operator is required to initiate the manual
! operations required to complete switchover in a timely manner (Ref. 1). [- O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 33 5/29/98 Revision A u
ESFAS Instrumentation
- B 3.3.2 e
BAS.ES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- a. Switchover to Containment Sumo- Automatic Actuation Locic and Actuation Relays Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function '1.b. -
- b. Switchover to Containment Sumo-Refuelina Water l Storace Tank (RWST) Level-Low Low Coincident With !
Safety Iniection During the injection phase of a LOCA, the RWST is the source of water for all ECCS pumps. A ' low low level in the RWST coincident with an SI signal i provides protection against a loss of water for the ECCS pumps and indicates the end of the injection phase of the LOCA. The RWST is equipped with four level transmitters. These transmitters ~ J provide no control. functions. Therefore, a ! two-out-of-four logic is adequate to initiate the protection function actuation. Although only three channels would be sufficient, a fourth channel has been 'added for increased reliability. O The transmitters are located in an area not affected by HELBs or post accident high radiation. Thus.'they will not experience any adverse- , environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint ' ref'ects only steady state instrument l uncertainties. Automatic ope,ning n of the containment sump suction
- valves occurs only if the RWST low low level
! signal is coincident with SI. This prevents accidental switchover during normal operation. Accidental switchover could damage ECCS pumps if they are attempting to take suction from an empty sump. The switchover Function requirements for the SI Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI. function. Therefore, the i requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead. Function 1. SI is referenced for all initiating Functions and requirements. BYRON.- UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.2 - 34 5/30/98 Revision E
lESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES h : APPLICABLE SAFETY-ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
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These Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 when there is a potential- for a LOCA to occur. to ensure a continued supply of water for
.the ECCS pumps. These Functions are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is adequate time for the o)erator to evaluate unit conditions and respond )y. manually initiating the switchover and starting systems, pumps. and other i equipment to mitigate the consequences of- an abnormal condition or accident. System pressure and temperature are very low and many' ESF components are administratively locked out or otherwise prevented from actuating to prevent-
' inadvertent overpressurization of unit systems.
- 8. Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks To allow some flexibility in unit operations. several
. interlocks are included as part of the ESFAS. These interlocks permit the o)erator to block some signals, automatically enable otler signals. 3revent.some i actions from occurring.- and cause otler actions to I occur The interlock Functions back up manual actions 1
.h to ensure.bypassable functions are in operation under the conditions assumed in the safety analyses.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l BASES l APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO.1and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- a. Enoineered Safetv Feature Actuation System Interlocks -Reactor Trio. P-4
'i The P-4 interlock is enabled when a Reactor Trip '
Breaker (RTB) and its associated bypass breaker is open. Once the P-4 interlock is enabled, automatic SI-initiation'may.be manually blocked 1 after a 60 second time delay. This Function j allows operators to take manual control.of SI 1 Systems after'the initial phase of injection is
, 'compl ete.. Once SI is blocked. automatic actuation-of SI cannot occur until the P-4 interlock has been momentarily cleared by closing the RTB. The functions of the P-4 interlock are:
I e Trip the main turbine; i I e Isolate FW: o Prevent automatic reactuation of SI after a manual reset'of SI: and' m o Prevent opening of the FW isolation valves if-
/ L they were closed on SI or SG Water V Level-High High.
Each of the above Functions is inte'rlocked with P-4 to avert or reduce the continued cooldown of the RCS following a. reactor trip. An excessive cooldown of the RCS following a reactor trip could cause an insertion of positive reactivity with a subsequent ing.rease in core power. To avoid such
- a situation, the noted Functions have been interlocked with P-4 as part of the design of the .
unit control and protection system.
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i.. L____-__--___-____--_-____-__-- _-_ _ _ _ _ _
ESF S Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES O AeeLicABLE SAFETv ^NALvSES. Lc0. end ^eeLicAB1LiTv (continued) None of.the noted Functions' serves a mitigation function in the plant licensing basis safety analyses. Only the turbine trip Function is explicitly assumed since it is an immediate consequence of the reactor trip Function. Neither turbine trip., nor any of.the other Functions , associated with the reactor trip signal. is required to show that the plant licensing basis safety analysis acceptance criteria are not exceeded. The RTB position switches that provide input to
-the P-4 interlock only function to energize or de-energize (0)en or close) contacts. Therefore, this Function las no adjustable trip setpoint with which to associate a Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value.
This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES'1, 2. and 3 when the reactor may be critical or approaching criticality. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5. or 6 because the main turbine. and the FW System are not in
] b.
operation. Engineered Safsty Feature Actuation System Interlocks-Pressurizer Pressure. P-ll The P-11 interlock permits a normal unit cooldown and depressurization without actuation of SI or main steam line isolation. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels less than the P-11 setpoint, thdT)perator can manually. block the Pressurizer Pressure-Low and Steam Line Pressure-Low SI signals and the Steam Line Pressure-Low steam line isolation signal (previously discussed). When the Steam Line Pressure-Low steam line isolation sign.al is manually blocked a main steam isolation signal on Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is enabled. This provides protection for an SLB by closure of the MSIVs and their bypass valves.
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i 1 B 3.3.2 - 37 5/30/98 Revision E
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. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 l
L
.j ESFAS Instrumentation 'I B 3.3.2- j l
BASES' (, APPLICARLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO,.and APPLICABILITY (continued)
. i With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure- 'l channels above the P-11 setpoint, the Pressurizer :
Pressure-Low and Steam Line Pressure-Low SI i u' signals and the Steam Line Pressure-Low steam ! line isolation signal are automatically enabled. . i The operator can also enable these trips by use of the respective manual reset buttons. When the Steam Line Pressure-Low steam line. isolation
. signal is enabled, the main steam isolation on Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is disabled.
This Function must be:0PERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 to allow an orderly cooldown and depressurization of the unit without the actuation of SI or main steam' isolation. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. 5. or 6 because 4 system pressure must already be below the P-11 ! setpoint for-the requirements of the heatup and cooldown curves to be met.
- c. Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System
;- Interlocks - T y- Low Low. P-12
- O On increasing reactor coolant temperature. the i P-12 interlock provides an arming signal to the '
Steam Dump System. On a decreasing temperature, the P-12 interlock removes the arming signal to ! the Steam Dum) System to prevent an excessive ! cooldown of t1e RCS due to a malfunctioning Steam :
. Dump System.
Since T m is used as an indication of bulk RCS !
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temperature, this Function meets redundancy i requirements with one OPERABLE channel in each i loop. In four loop units. these channels are used in a two-out-of-four logic. ; t i ! l \; t r.- [ .
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 38 5/30/98 Revision E l
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
\
[. BASES-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) This Function must be .0PERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve.could result in the rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This Function does not have ' to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. 5. or 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit to have an accident.
. The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
sa ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the a) plication of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of tais Specification may be entered independently for each channel listed on Table 3.3.2-1.. In the event a channel's Trip Set)oint is found ; nonconservative with respect to tie Allowable Value, or the transmitter. instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable. then all affected Functions 3rovided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the _C0 Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s)
.O- affected. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.2-1 are specified on a per steam line, per loop. per SG. etc.,
basis, then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop. - SG. etc. , as appropriate. When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function I exceeds those specified in all related Conditions associated with a trip function..lben the unit is outside the safety
- analysis. Therefore. LC0 3.0.3-should be-immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.
A.,.1 ! Condition A applies to all ESFAS protection functions. I Condition A addresses the situation where one or more
. required channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same t.ime. The Required Action is to l refer..to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Re uired Actions for u
the protection functions affected. The C mpletion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.
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i' 4 . h BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2- 39 5/30/98 Revision E 1
. \
ESFAS Instrumentation I
, B.3.3.2- i l
BASES h,m: ACTIONS:.(continued)- 1 -B.1. B.2.1. and B'.2.2 i Condition B applies to manual initiation of: e SI:- i o Containment Spray: 1 Jo Phase A-Isolation: and e Phase B Isolation. l This action addresses the train orientation offthe SSPS for 4 the functions listed above. If.one. channel is~ inoperable. .
-48 hours is allowed to return it to an OPERABLE' status. !
Note that for containment spray and Phase B isolation. ' failure of one or both switches in one channel renders the' -l
- channel inoperable. Condition B. therefore. encompasses :i
!l both situations. The specified Completion Time .is j
reasonable'considering that there- are two automatic - actuation trains and another manual initiation train i OPERABLE for each Function. and the low probability of an i a,3 - event occurring during this interval. . If the train cannot
'be restored.to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a b'1- : MODE in which the.LCO does not aaply. This is done by i placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional. ,
'6 hours (54 hours total time).and.in MODE 5 within an !
-additional 30 hours (84 hours total time). The allowable ;
Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating i experience. to reach the required unit. conditions from full .i power conditions in_ an orderly manner and without ! challengi.ng unit systeas. !
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'il BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2= B 3.3.2-40 5/30/98 Revision E i
[ l r . x = _ -____--_____-___--__--_
g . i ESFAS Instrumentation g B 3.3.2 BASES
;q pD ' ACTIONS.-(continued)-
l: C.1. C:2 1. and C.2 2
]
Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and _ actuation relays for the following functions: l 7 l' e SIi L L e. Containment Spray; e Phase A Isolation: o Phase B Isolation: and e- Automatic Switchover to Containment. Sump.
. This' action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and ' i l- the master and slave relays. If one train is inoperable. ;
6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status, i The specified Completion Time is reasonable cons 1'dering that 1 there-is another train OPERABLE and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train
- cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be p - placed in a MODE-in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an Q' 4 additional 6 hours (12 hours total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours (42 hours total time). The i Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating ;
experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full 1 power conditions in an orderly' manner and without ; challenging unit systems., l The Required Actions a_r,g' modified by a Note that allows one
. . . - train to be bypassed for up-to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability' analysis assumption of WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 7) that 4 hours is the average time required to perform channel surveillance.
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B 3.3.2 -41 5/30/98Revisioni (BYRON-UNITS 1&2 r 9
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 i BASE 3 l ACTIONS (continued) l D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 i l- Condition D applies to: l c Containment Pressure-High 1: ! l e Pressurizer Pressure-Low: ; I l
- Steam Line Pressure-Low: !
l e Containment Pressure-High 2: l e Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High: l e SG Water Level-Low Low; and l e SG Water Level-High High (P-14). ! l If one channel is inoperable. 6 hours are allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition. Generally, this Condition applies to functioris l that operate on two-out-of-three logic or a two-out-of-four logic. Therefore, failure of one channel places the Function in a two-out-of-two configuration. One channel must be tripped to place the Function in a one-out-of-two configuration that satisfies redundancy requirements. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status cr place it in the tripped ccndition within 6 hours requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours.
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- The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4. these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
f i BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 42 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 ; BASES
-3
( ,) ACTIONS (continued) The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. The 6 hours allowed , to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 4 hours allowed for testing, are justified in Reference 7. l E.1. E.2.1. and E.2.2 l Condition E applies to: o Containment Spray Containment Pressure-High 3: and e Containment Phase B Isolation Containment Pressure-High 3. None of these signals has inp' u t to a control function. Thus, two-out-of-three logic is necessary to meet acceptable protective requirements. However, a two-out-of-three design would require tripping a failed ' channel. This is undesirable because a single failure would i then cause spurious containment spray initiation. Spurious
-, spray actuation is undesirable because of the cleanup
( , problems presented. Therefore, these channels are designed with two-out-of-four logic so that a failed channel may be bypassed rather than tripped. Note that one channel may be bypassed and still satisfy the single failure criterion. Furthermore, with one channel bypassed, a single instrumentation channel failure will not spuriously initiate containment spray.
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\"' l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 -43 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES-LOL ACTIONS:<continoed) l- ~ To avoid the'ina'dvertent actuation of containment spray and-Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel should - not be'placed in the tripped condition. Instead it is-bypassed. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status.. or placing.the. inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 6 hours..is. sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function
- may be in a: partial trip condition '(assuming the inoperable
. channel has failed in a trip condition). The Completion
- Time isL further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this , interval.. The Completion Time is further justified based on the low event occurring during this interval. probability Failure to. of restore an the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status', or place it in the bypassed condition within 6 hours requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6_ hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach.the recuired unit conditions from full power conditions in an
. orcerly manner and w.ithout challenging unit systems. In MODE 4. these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
The Required Actions are. modified by a Note that allows one O additional channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 4. hours for testing purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference 7. l
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. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 . B 3. 3. 2 - 44 5/30/98 Revision E
____.____.,_____.__._________________m.__'_ _-____-__m . . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ , ._m ..._.m.._,____..-_.__._...-._..__.___-,_______._____.__.__.-_.____J
i ! ESFAS Instrumentation I B 3.3.2 BASES s i I _ ACTIONS (continued) i F.1. F.2.1. and F 2.2 Condition F applies to: 3 i e Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation: and l e P-4 Interlock. ' For the Manual Initiation and the P-4 Interlock Functions. this action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS. If a train or channel is inoperable. 48. hours is allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the nature of'these Functions, the available redundancy, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manrier and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4. the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions s that require the explicit use of the protection functions
) noted above.
l G.I. G.2.1 and G.2.2 l Condition G applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the Steam Line Isolation. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation. and AF actuation Functions.
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 45 5/30/98 Revision E l l 9
ESFAS Instrumentation i B 3.3.2 I BASES. l
,[ ACTIONS (continued) 1 The action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and l l the master and slave relays for these functions. If one l train is inoperable, 6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time for restoring !
a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the-low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be 4 brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the recuired unit conditions from full power. conditions in an orcerly manner and without challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE. the unit does not have analyzed. transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above. l The Required Actions are modified by a Note that' allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance I testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reli' ability analysis (Ref. 7) OV assumption that 4 hours is the average time required to perform channel surveillance. H.1. H.2 1. and H.2,2 Condition H applies to Loss of Offsite Power. For this Function, if one channel is inoperable I hour is allowed to i restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition. Fq11ure to restore the inoperable
- channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within an hour requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours (total of 7 hours) and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours (total of 13 hours).
i l (3 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.2 - 46 5/30/98 Revision E l L_
I ESFAS Instrumentation i B 3.3.2 fBASES l a h ACTIONS'(continued) Tne allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on L operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions-from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without
. challenging unit systems. In MODE 4. the Function is no
-longer required OPERABLE.
The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be bypassed for up to 2 hours for , surveillance testing of other channels. The 1 hour allowed { to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 2 hours allowed for testing, are deemed acceptable based on engineering judgement. j l 1.1 and 1.2 Condition I applie's to the Undervoltage Reactor Coolant Pump Function. If one channel is ino>erable. 6 hours are allowed to restore one channel to OPERAB.E status or to place'it in the tripped o condition. If placed in the tripped condition, the-Function '~ is then in a partial trip condition on the affected train - O.. where one-out-of-three logic will result-in actuation. The s 6 hour Completion Time is justified in P,eference 7. Failure ! to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or i place it'in the tripped condition within 6 hours requires !
' the unit to be placed in MODE 3 within the following l
6 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is l reasonable, based on. operating experience, to reach MODE 3 ;
. from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without' :
challenging unit systegi. In MODE 3. these Functions are no
. longer required OPERABLE.
The. Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for ; L surveillance testing of other channels. The 6 hours allowed 1- to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 4 hours allowed for a second channel to be in the L bypassed condition for testing, are justified in Reference 7. h '~ BYRON.- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 47 5/30/98 Revision E' 4
i
., , ESFAS Instrumentation
(. g _, 9
. B 3 3.2-AN~
! : BASES 1 L ACTIONSI (continued) ~
)
..y
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Condition J. applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater-Pump Suction -
- Transfer. on. Suction Pressure-Low Function. With one train inoperable, the associated auxiliary feedwater pump must be
, immediately-declared inoperable. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.-7.5. . "AF -
, System." a
[ . K.1. K.2.1. and ILL2 u j Condition K applies to the RWST Level-Low Low Coincident 3
-with Safety Injection Function. '
RWST Level--Low' Low Coincident with SI provides actuation of
.switchover to the containment sump. Note that this Function requires the bistables to energize to perform their required action.
This Condition applies to a Function that operates on two' out-of-four. logic. - Therefore, failure of one channel
~p laces the Function-in a two-out-of-three configuration, One channel must be trippe<1 to place the Function in a
,h:
one-out-of-three configuration that satisfies redundancy requirements. i- 4
! If the channel cannot be returned to OPERABLE status or placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, the unit R
.must be brought to MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and
. MODE 5 within the next-30 hours. The allowed Completion .
. Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to l s reach the required unit conditions from full )ower
. conditions in an orde Ty manner and without challenging unit ~!
systems. In MODE 5. the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of < the protection function noted above. L The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition for u) to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. T11s is acceptable based on the results of Reference 7. L L l I nu L -' -
.BYkON-UNITS.1&2 B 3.3.2 -48 5/30/98 Revisic
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q
'ESFAS' Instrumentation
,. B 3.3.2 !
l
-BASES-d ;
Q iACTIONS (continued)
.L.11 L.2.1 and L.2.2 '
LCondition L applies to the P-11 and P-12 interlocks. m, With one or more cha'nnels inoperable the. operator must . ! verify.that the interlock is in the required' statefor the , existing unit condition. This action _ manually accomplishes c , the function of. the interlock. Determination must be made within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time.is equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 to initiate shutdown actions in the event-of a com lete loss of ESFAS function.- If the o3 A interlock is not i the required. state (or placed in the required state) for'the existing unit' condition, the unit must be ) laced in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within t1e following 6 hours. The' allowed Completion Times-are reasonable.. based 'on operating experience, to reach the , recuired unit conditions from full power conditions ~in an I
. orcerly manner and without challenging unit systems.-
Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of. these: interlocks. The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs h~! SURVEILLANCE-REQUIREMENTS . column of. Table 3.3.2-1. A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that 1
. Table 3.3.2-1 determines which SRs apply to which ESFAS !
Functions. { i
. Note that'each channel of process protection supplies both !
trains of the ESFAS. .When testin Channel I.' Train A and
- Train B must.be examined. Simila ly. Train A and Train B must be examined when testing Channel II. Channel III. and Channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and ;
COTS are performed in a manner.that'is consistent'with the ' assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies. L 1 BYRON' UNITS 1-&'2 B 3.3.2 - 49 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS' Instrumentation. B 3.3.2
-BASES:
Q,w SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS'(continued):
~
~SR 3.3.2.1
. Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hour's ensures that a gross' failure of instrumentation has not: occurred.
~
A CHANNEL CHECK.1s normally-a. comparison of the. parameter' indicated on one-channel-to a'similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption-that instrument
. channels monitoring the same_ parameter should read approximately the-same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of'excessiveLinstrument' drift in one of the channels or of :l something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each
; CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determir-d based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability. If a channel is outside the criteria. it may be an indication.that the sensor or the signal-
. processing equipment'has, drifted outs.ide its limit.
. - The Frequency.is based on operating experience that
?Vn )^- demonstrates channel. failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements.less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.'
SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of a COT every'31 days. A COT is performed on each reDuired channel to ensure the entire-
. channel will perform tTe intended Function. Setpoints must be found within the Allowabl_e Values specified in
. Table 3.3.2-1. l The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the b calculated normal uncertainty' consistent with the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall'be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current plant' specific setpoint methodology.
t N:
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 (3 BASES V SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis (Ref. 7) when applicable. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data. SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a TADOT every 31 days. This test is a check of the Loss of Offsite Power Function. The Function is tested up to, and including. the master relay coils. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays. Relay setpoints require elaborate bench calibration and are verified during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Frequency is adequate. It is based on
. industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.
V SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition. thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester. all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each pr,,gtection function. In addition, the
- master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and that there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils.
The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data. A . V l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 51 5/29/98 Revision A l
Ll" , ESFAS Instrumentation
.B 3.3.2 L
L . .. BASES 7~ A,}J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i
,SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.5'is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The
~ <
. MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay.
3 verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity. check of.the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact l operation, a low. voltage is injected to the slave relay
. coil. This. voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay.lbut=large enough to demonstrate signal path
' continuity. This test is performed every 31 days on a.
' STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The time allowed for the testing
~
'(4 hours) and the~ surveillance interval are justified .in Reference 7.
SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.'2.6 is the performance of a COT. A COT is performed on.each required channel to ensure the entire channel will prform the intended Function.
-Setpoints must be found within the Allowable Values specified 'in Table 3.3.2-1.
{'; The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the calculated normal uncertainty consistent with the setpoint l I l methodology. Tne setpoint shall be left set consistent with j the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint ' methodology. , The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded i and reviewed for consi,s.tency with the assumptions of the j surveillance interval extension. analysis (Ref. 7) when applicable. The Frequency of 92 days'is justified in Reference 7. 4
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5/30/98 Revision E B 3.3.2- 52 BYRON: . UNITS.1 & 2-1 L_.___._ .
i ESFAS Instrumentation I B 3.3.2 l t O BASES v < l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS fcontinued) SR 3 3.2 7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the perfccmance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The I SLAVE RELAY TEST .is the energizing of the slave re'ays. i Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation ' i equipment that may be operated ir; the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function, or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equi) ment. Actuation equipment , that may not be operated in t1e design . mitigation mode is l prevented from operation by the SLAVE. RELAY TEST circuit. ) For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a l continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. " This test is performed every 92 days. The Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability ar,d operating history data. SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT every 92 days. This test is a check of the Undervoltage RCP Function. The c) (, Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. The test also includes trip devices that provide actuation signals directly to the SSPS. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints for relays. Relay setpoints require elaborate ber.ch calibration and are verified during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Frequency is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument Reliability and operatireg history l
- data.
I l l
)
( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 53 5/29/98 Revision A l !
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N, . x p ; c. Iy ' ESFAS-Instrumentation B 3.3.2 u / n& ; ' sAS.ES L ,, " SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) E T SR ~3.3.2.9 ,- L SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance'of a-TADOT. This test is a. check-of the Manual Actuation Functions and P-4 Reactor Trip l Interlock. It is performed every 18 months. Each Manual
. Actuation Function'is: tested'up to, and including, the master relay coils. :In some instances.-the test includes
. actuation'of the end device (i .e. . pump starts, valve i i cycles.'etc.). The Frecuency is adequate. based on industry y operating experience anc is consistent with the typical 4" refueling. cycle. The SR is; modified by a Note that excludes
[ t verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions A
.have no associated setpoints.
[k( SR 3 3.2.10 ,,m SR 3.3.2.10-is the' performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. s
- i A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months or I
approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL' CALIBRATION.is a (' . complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. A The test verifies that' the channel responds to measured
-Q E
parameter.within' the necessary; range and accuracy. CHANNEL.CALIBRATIO'S N must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the plant specific setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the
' drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 18 months is based on the assumption of an 18 month. calibration 1,nterval in the determination of the
- magnitude of equipment drift in the.setpoint methodology.
I y [) 4
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't q j -
1 %y), .- -- --- i 1 .B 3.3.2 - 54 5/30/98 Revision E
, l BYRON - UNITS l'& 2 ,
L e i I: ~ 1 , i
L ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 m BASES
, L SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3:3.2.11 and SR '3.3.2.12 These SRs ensure tho individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response Time testing acceptance l criteria are included in the USFAR. Section 7.2. (Ref. 9). Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the aarameter exceeds the Trip Setpoint value at the sensor to tie point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state' (e.g. , pumps at rated discharge pressure, valves in full open or closed position). For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag. lead / lag, rate / lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to one with the resulting measured response time com)ared to the . appropriate UFSAR response time. Alternately, t7e response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is
-s '
analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set I i at their nominal values. The response time may be measured V by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured. Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor
, response times with actual . response time tests on the
.. remainder of the channel. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained,ffom: (1) historical records based on
. acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power.
interrupt tests). (2) inplace, onsite or offsite (e.g. vendor) test measurements or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. Reference 8 provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test. I' .
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~
ESFAS. Instrumentation 7 B 3.3.2
. : BASES
)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)' The allocations for sensor response times must be' verified j prior to ' placing the component in o)erational service'and re-verified following maintenance tlat may adversely affect '
' response time; In general. electrical repair work does;not impact response time provided the parts used for' repair are of the same type and value. One example where response time.
could 'be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter. ESF RESPONSE. TIME tests are conducted on an 18' month. STAGGERED TEST BASIS with the exception of Function 6.d.. Testing of the final actuation devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is ! tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 18 months. Function 6.d is associated with the start of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater Sump only (Train A).. Therefore. 'a Frequency of 18 montis is specified. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on plant operating experience, which shows.that random failures of instrumentation components
.h causing serious. response time. degradation, but not channel
' failure.are infrequent. occurrences.
L l' I l l - O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2- 56 5/30/98 Revision E
.' .ESFAS Instrumentation.
4 B 3.3.2. Lg .- BASES g , 7 0 REFERENCES 1; UFSAR.: Chapter 6' .
-2. LUFSAR. Chapter.7.
- 3. .UFSAR. Chapter 15.-
'4. -IEEE-279-1971. .
.5 .- ' Technical . Requirements Manual .
'l 6. WCAP-12523. "RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodology _' Study."
October 1990.
- 7. WCAP-10271-P-A. Supplement 2. Rev.1. June -1990.
- 8. : WCAP-13632 Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing. Requirements," August 1995.
;l_ 9. USFAR. Section 7.2. -
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[
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o .
+
b
-LBYRON(-LUNITS~;11&2 B 3~ 3.2 . 5/30/98 Revision E
- i. ,
L c_ :- _ _ _-- _ - - _ _ _ - _ - - - -
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 ) i p B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation BASES The primary purpose of the PAM instrumentation is to display BACKGROUND unit variables that provide information required by the control room operators during accident situations. This information provides the necessary support for the operator to take the manual actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and to assess unit status and behavior following an accident. The availability of accident monitoring instrumen.tation is important so that responses to corrective actions can be observed and the need for, and magnitude of, further actions , ,, can be determined. These essential instruments are t identified by plant specific documer.ts (Ref.1) addressing V the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Ref. 2) as required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (Ref. 3). The instrument channels. required to be OPERABLE by this LCO include two classes of parameters identified during plant specific implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 as Type A and Category I variables. Type A variables are included in this LC0 because they
- provide the primary information requir ed for the control room operator to take specific manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for DBAs.
! i l ! O.' l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A
)
I I L-- _ i
y, _ - -l . t PAM Instrumentation
;4 B'3.3.3-
~:r & ' LBASES-LBACKGROUND-(continued)
- Category I varia'bles are the key sariables deemed risk significant because they are needed to:
e Determine whether.other systems important .to safety
-are performing their intended functions:
1 e- Provide information to the o>erators that will enable them t<> determine the likelilood of a gross breach of
. the barriers to radioactivity release; and e- Provide information regarding the release of radioactive materials to allow for early indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public,.' and to estimate the magnitude 'of any . impending
-threat.
These key v'ariables are identified by the plant specific
- Regulatory Guide 1.97 analyses-(Ref. 1) and are consistent
.with the current plant licensing basis. These analyses identify the. plant specific Type A and; Category I variables
. and provide justification'for deviating from the -
p , requirements of_ Regulatory Guide 1.97.. U The specific instrument Functions listed in Table -3.3.3-1 are discussed in the LC0'section. a
~
i e . I th
- f BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.3.3 - 2 5/30/98 Revision E
- i l I
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3
~ BASES ~
' APPLICABLE -
The PAM instrumentation ensures the operability of SAFETY ANALYSES Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A and Category I variables so. 1 that the control room operating staff can: o Perform the diagnosis saecified in the Emergency Operating Procedures (tiese variables are restricted to preplanned actions for the primary success path of DBAs), e.g. , Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA): e Take the specified, pre-planned, manually controlled actions, for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function: e Determine whether systems important to safety are performing their intended functions; e Determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release:
- e Determine if a gross breach of a barrier has occurred:
and l O e Initiate action necessary to protect the aublic and to V estimate the magnitude of any impending tareat. PAM instrumentation that meets the definition of Type A in Regulatory Guide 1.97 satisfies Criterion 3 of l- 10 CFR 50,36(c)(2)(ii). Selected Category I, non-Type A, instrumentation are included in Technical Specifications because it is intended to assist operators in minimizing the
- consequences of accidents. Therefore, Category I non-Type A. variables are important for reducing public risk l _ ,and satisfies CriterioT4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
L L L s BYRON - UNITS 1.& 2 B 3.3.3 - 3 5/30/9B Revision E
i PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 ! A BASES I V ' LC0 The PAM instrumentation LC0 provides OPERABILITY requirements for Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A instruments, which provide information required by the control room operators to perform certain manual actions specified in the Emergency Operating Procedures. These manual actions ensure that a system can accomplish its safety function, and are credited in the safety analyses. Additionally, this l LCO addresses selected Regulatory Guide 1.97 instruments that have been designated Category I, non-Type A. The OPERABILITY of the PAM instrumentation ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and assess unit status following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 1. LCO 3.3.3 requires two OPERABLE channels for most Functions. Two OPERABLE channels ensure no single failure prevents operators from getting the informatiori necessary for them to determine the safety status of the unit. and to bring the unit to and maintain it in a safe condition following.an accident. (]
' Furthermore. OPERABILITY of two channels allows a CHANNEL CHECK during the post accident phase to confirm the validity of displayed information. More than two channels may be required if it is determined that failure of one accident monitoring channel results in information ambiguity (that is, the redundant displays disagree) that could lead operators to defeat or fail to accomplish a required safety function.
Table 3.3.3-1 lists all Type A and Category I variables identified by the plants)ecific Regulatory Guide 1.97 analyses, as amended by tie NRC's SER (Ref. 1) with the exception of the containment spray add tank level. Type A and Category I variables are required to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category I design and qualification requirements for seismic and environmental qualification, single failure criterion, utilization of emergency standby power, immediately accessible display, continuous readout, and recording of display. n , BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3 - 4 5/30/98 Revision E t
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 (i BASES LJ LCO (continued) Listed below are discussions of the specified instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3-1.
- 1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure (Wide Ranaa)
RCS wide range pressure is a Category I variable provided for verification of core cooling and RCS integrity long term surveillance. RCS pressure is used to verify delivery of Safety Injection (SI) flow to RCS from at least one train when the RCS pressure is below the pump shutoff head. RCS pressure is also used to verify closure of manually closed spray line valves and pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). In addition to these verifications. RCS pressure is used for determining RCS subcooling margin. .RCS pressure can also be used: e To determine whether to terminate actuated SI or to reinitiate stopped SI:
;g -
e To determine when to reset SI and shut off Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps; e To manually restart ECCS pumps; e As Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) trip criteria: and e To make a determination on the nature of the accident in grogress and where to go next in the l
. - procedure. ,
RCS subcooling margin is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control. 1 { l l I p.3 I G . l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3 - S 5/29/98 Revision A l m________.__________ )
PAM Instrumentation-4 , B 3.3.3- -l
; BASES
. LC0'(continued)
RCS' pressure is also related to three' decisions about ) depressurization. They are: e' To determine whether to. proceed with primary system depressurization: e To verify termination of depressurization; and e To determine whether to close accumulator isolation valves during a controlled
.cooldown/depressurization. -
- A-final use of RCS pressure is to determine whether to operate the pressurizer heaters.
RCS pressure is a Type A variable because the operator uses this indication to monitor the cooldown'of the RCS following a Steam Generator Tube Rupture-(SGTR) or small break LOCA. Operator actions to maintain a. controlled cooldown, such as adjusting Steam Generator (SG) pressure or level, would use this indication. Furthermore RCS pressure is one factor that may be 7 used -in decisions to terminate RCP operation.
.d_
- 2. 3. RCS Hot and Cold Lea Temperatures (Wide Ranaer RCS Hot'and Cold Leg Temperatures are Category I variables provided'for verification of core cooling and~1ong term surveillance.
RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperatures may be used as a backup to determias RCS-subcooling margin. RCS.
. - subcooling margin will allow termination of SI. if
~
still in progress, or reinitiation of SI if it has been sto) ped. RCS subcooling margin is al.so_used for unit sta)1112ation and cooldown control. In addition. RCS Cold' Leg Temperature is used in conjunction with RCS hot leg temperature to. verify the unit conditions necessary to establish natural 4 . circulation in the RCS, V IfRu
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_ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ .
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3
/ . BASES' LCO..(continued)
~
- 4. Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Ranae)
Wide Range SG water level-is a Ty]e A variable used to determine if an adequate heat sinc is being maintained through the SGs for decay heat removal, primarily for the response to'a-loss of secondary heat sink event wnen the level is below the narrow range. The wide range SG level indication may also be used in conjunction with auxiliary feedwater flow for SI termination. In addition the wide range level is cold calibrated and provides a complete range for monitoring SG level during a cooldown. Auxiliary feedwater flow provides a diverse indication for wide range SG water level. Four channels (one on each SG) L are required to be OPERABLE.
- 5. Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Ranae)
Narrow Range SG water level is a Type A variable used to determine if an adequate heat sink is being maintained through the SGs for decay heat removal and to maintain the SG level and prevent overfill. !A also used to determine whether SI should be terminated It is l Q-and may be used to diagnose an SG tube rupture event. Four channels.(one on each SG) are required to be OPERABLE. !' 6. Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Water Level is used to determine whether to terminate SI. if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if ~it has been stopped. Knowledge of
- pressurizer water level is also used to verify the unit conditions necessary to establish natural circulation in the RCS and to verify that the unit is maintained in a safe shutdown condition.
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PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3
/"~ %. BASES
?
LCO (continued)
- 7. Containment Pressure (Wide Rance)
Containment Pressure (Wide Range) is provided for verification of RCS and containment OPERABILITY. Containment pressure is used to verify closure of Main. Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), and containment spray Phase B isolation when High-3 containment pressure is reached.
- 8. Steam Line Pressure Steam Line Pressure is a Type A variable provided for the following:
e Determining if a high energy secondary line break occurred and which steam generator is faulted: e Maintaining an adequate heat sink: e Verifying Auxiliary Feedwater flow to the faulted steam generator is isolated:
- )
'w/ e Verifying operation of pressure control steam dump system; e Maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition:
e Monitoring the RCS cooldown rate and e Providing diverse indication to Cold Leg
- temperatureTor natural circulation determination.
Two channels per steam line are required with sufficient accuracy to determine the faulted steam generator. I l m .
._)
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l I P W Instrumentation l B 3.3.3 i r 'x)
~~
BASES
<; {
i LCO (continued)
- 9. Refuelina W'ater Storace Tank (RWST) Level The RWST Level is a Type A variable provided for verifying a water source to the ECCS and Containment Spray. determining the time for initiation of cold leg recirculation following a LOCA and event diagnosis.
The RWST level accuracy is established to allow an adequate supply of water to the Residual Heat Removal and Containment Spray pumps during the switchover to cold leg recirculation mode. A high degree of accuracy is required to maximize the time available to the operator to com]lete the switchover to the cold leg recirculation plase and ensure sufficient water is available to avoid losing pump suction.
- 10. Containment Floor Water Level (Wide Ranae)
Containment Floor Water Level is provided for verification and long term surveillance of RCS integrity. (mv) Containment Floor Water Level is used to determine: e Containment water level accident diagnosis: e When cold leg recirculation can be implemented: and e Whether to terminate SI. if still in progress.
- 11. Containment Area _ Radiation (Hiah Ranae)
Containment Area Radiation is provided to monitor for the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plans. Containment radiation level is used to determine if a High Energy Line Break has occurred, and whether the event is inside or outside of containment. j l l l l 1
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L________ - - . -. !
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 (3
<.y BASES LC0 (continued)
- 12. Main Steam line Radiation The Main Steam Line Rea1ation level is a Type A variable provided to allow detection of gross secondary side radioactivity and to provide a means to identify the ruptured steam generator. Steam generator narrow range level serves as diverse indication for the one monitor per loop required.
- 13. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Thermocouple are used as a primary means to determine RCS subcooling margin. RCS subcooling margin will allow termination of SI. if still in progress, or reinitiation of SI if it has been stopped. RCS subcooling margin is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.
Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling, o An evaluation was made of the minimum number of valid () ' Core Exit Thermocouple (CETCs) necessary for measuring core cooling. The evaluation determined the reduced complement of CETCs necessary to detect initial core recovery and trend the ensuing core heatup. The evaluations account for core nonuniformities, including incore effects of the radial decay power distribution.. excore effects of condensate runback in the hot legs and nonuniform inlet temperatures. Adequate core cooling is ensured with four CETCs pgr quadrant. Core Exit Temperature
- is used to determine whether to terminate SI if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if it has been sto) ped. Core Exit Temperature is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.
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U . BYRON ' UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3 - 10 5/30/98 Revision E I l
PAM Instrumentation l B 3.3.3 l 1 BASES LC0 (continued) 14.. Reactor Vessel Water Level Reactor Vessel' Water Level is provided for verification and ~1ong term surveillance of core - cooling. It.is also used for accident diagnosis and to. determine reactor coolant inventory adequacy. . The Reactor Vessel Water Level Monitoring System provides a direct measurement of the liquid level ;
'above the fuel. Two channels are required OPERABLE l (Train A and Train B). Each channel consists of eight sensors on a probe. For a channel to be considered- f OPERABLE one of the two sensors in the " head" region and three of the six sensors in.the " plenum" region shall be OPERABLE. The level indicated by the OPERABLE sensors represents the amount of liquid mass
.th6t is in the reactor vessel above the core.
Operability of each. sensor may be determined by reviewing the error codes displayed on the control room indicator.
- 15. Hydroaen Monitors Hydrogen Monitors are provided to detect high hydrogen ~
concentration conditions that represent a potential for containment breach from a hydrogen explosion. This variable is also important in verifying the adequacy of mitigating actions. APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2.
. and 3. In MODE 3, the~fiydrogen monitoring function is not-recuired since the hydrogen production rate and the total hycrogen produced would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. These variables are related to the diagnosis and pre-planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 2. and 3.
In MODES.4. 5. and 6. unit conditions'are such that the
. likelihood of an event that would require PAM
, instrumentation is low: therefore. the PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
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PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3
' BASES Note 1 has been added in the ACTIONS to exclude the
.- ACTIONS L MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows i entry into the applicable MODE-while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require unit shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive I function of the instruments the operator's ability to res)ond to an accident using alternate instruments and l met 1ods, and the low probability of an event requiring these l instruments. i Note 2 has been added.in the ACTIONS to clarify the L application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of tils Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.3-1. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable char.nel(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function. A1 Condition A applies to all PAM Functions. Condition A l addresses the situation where one or more Functions with one !c' required channel are inoperable. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.3-1 and to take the Required Actions for !- the Functions affected. The Completion Times are those from l the. reference Conditions and Required Actions, f l If Condition B'is required to be entered by Table 3.3.3-1. I the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status l within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on
' operating experience and takes into account the remaining
- OPERABLE channel, the passive-nature of the instrument (no l critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these f
instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval. l L 1 i O . ( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3 - 12 5/29/98 Revision A ______mm___i___m._.._ _ . -__. .._..______.
-PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES' ACTIONS'(continued)
C.J. Condition C applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition B are not met. This Required
' Action specifies the imaediate initiation of actions in -
accordance with Specification 5.6.7. which requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and ' identifies proposed restorative actions. This action is. appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability. and given the likelihood of unit conditions that would require information provided.by this instrumentation. ' D.1 and E.1 Condition D applies ~to Functions with one required channel as_ required to be entered by Table 3.3.3-1. Required Action D.1 requires restoration of an inoperable channel within 7 days. Condition E applies to one or more Functions with two or more required inoperable channels on the same O
' Function. Required Action E.1 requires all but one channel on the same Function be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with no required channels OPERABLE in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentatigrL Therefore, requiring restoration
- of the channel (s) limits the risk that the PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.
Condition E is modified by a Note that excludes hydrogen monitor channels. p L i . O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.3 - 13 5/29/98 Revision A
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued) F.1 Condition F applies when two hydrogen monitor channels are inoperable. Required Action F.1 requires restoring one hydrogen monitor channel to OPERABLE status within 72. hours. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the backup capability of the Post Accident Sampling System to monitor the hydrogen concentration for evaluation.of core damage and to. provide information for operator. decisions. Also. it is unlikely that a LOCA (which would cause core damage) would occur during this. time G.1 and G.2-If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D. E. or F is not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE where the requirements of this LC0 do not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within-6 hours and MODE 4 within 12 hours. Condition G is also modified by a Note that excludes Functions 11. 12. and 14. Required Action G.2 is modified
- by a Note that excludes Function 15 since the hydrogen monitors are only applicable in MCDES 1 and 2.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions , . from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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-PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3
[. , f L . BASES
= ACTIONS (continued)-
H.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D or E is not met. Required Action H.1 specifies the immediate initiation of actions in accordance with Specification 5.6.7. This Specification requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses i the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions. . I This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the low likelihood of unit conditions that would require information 3rovided by this instrumentation. Condition H is modified )y a Note that indicates that this Condition is only 2pplicable to Functions 11, 12. and 14. , SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.2 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table-3.3.3-1. SR 3.3.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross instrumentation failure has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other
. channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument-
, channels monitoring the same parameter should read
- approximately-the samualue. Significant deviations
- between the two instrument' channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the .
instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrumentation should be compared to similar instruments located throughout the plant. Io ( . B 3.3.3 - 15 5/29/98 Revision A LBYRON . UNITS 1 & 2
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 A BASES U SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Agreement criteria are determined based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties. including isolation. indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the criteria. it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. As specified in the SR, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels.that are normally energized. The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal. but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. SR 3.3.3.2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a 73 complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. (j The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the channel for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/h with an installed or portable gamma source. For the hydrogen monitors, a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed using five gas l samples which cover the range from zero volume percent hydrogen (100% N 2 ) to > 20 volume percent hydrogen. balance nitrogen. _. l l (3 d BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3 - 16 5/29/98 Revision A
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES:
.U SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Th'is 'SR is modif'ied by a Note that excludes the radiation detector for Function ll, Containment Area Radiation. For this Function'. the CHANNEL CALIBRATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the remainder of the channel for range decades above 10 R/hr; and a one Joint calibration-
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check of the. detector below 10 R/hr wit 1 an installed or portable gamma source. Whenever a sensing element is replaced, the next required CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the CETC
.. sensors, which may consist of.an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor. behavior.and normal calibration of.the remaining adjustable devices in the channel, is accomplished by. an inplace cross calibration that compares.the other sensing elements with the recently instal. led. sensing .
element. The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle REFERENCES -1. Safety Evaluation Report, dated May 19s 1989.
. 2. Regulatory Guide 1.97.' Revision 3 May 1983.
[ 3. NUREG-0737. Supplement 1. "TMI Action Items."
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Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4
/"'j) B 3.3 1 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System BASES l
BACKGROUND The Remote Shutdown System provides the control room operator with sufficient instrumentation that supports i placing and maintaining the unit in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room. This capability is necessary to protect against the possibility i that the control room becomes inaccessible. A safe shutdown condition is defined as MODE 3. With the unit in MODE 3. the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) System and the main steam safety valves or the Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) can be used to remove core decay heat and meet all safety requirements. The long term supply of water for the AF System and the ability to borate the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from outside the control room allows extended operation in MODE 3. - If the control room becomes inaccessible, the operators can monitor the status for placing and maintaining the unit in MODE 3. The unit can be maintained safely in MODE 3 for an (a) extended period of time. The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation functions ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible. APPLICABLE The Remote Shutdown Sy.lilem is required to provide equipment SAFETY ANALYSES - at a)propriate locations outside the control room with a ! capa3ility to promptly shut down and maintain the unit in a ' safe condition in MODE 3. The criteria governing the design and specific system requirements of the Remote Shutdown System are located in 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 19 (Ref. 1). , i The Remote Shutdown System is considered an important l contributor to the reduction of unit risk to accidents and l as such it has been retained in the Technical Specifications ) l as satisfying Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). l . i i D (G . I BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.4 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A l- . \ L l ! l l l ;
Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION V( T ^ B'3.3.4 ' Remote Shutdown System BASES $ BACKGROUNDS The Remote. Shutdown System provides the_ control room
-operator with sufficient instrumentation that supports
~p lacing and maintaining the unit in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control-room. .This capability is;necessary to protect against the possibility
' that the control room becomes inaccessible. A safe shutdown condition is defined.as MODE 3. With the unit in' MODE 3.
the_ Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) System and the main steam safety valves or the Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated
' Relief Valves (PORVs) can be used to remove core decay heat and meet all safety requirements. The long term supply of water for the AF System and the ability to borate the l Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from outside the control room )
allows extended operation in MODE 3. l If the control room becomes inaccessible, the operators can monitor the status for placing and maintaining the unit in
.- MODE 3. The unit can be maintained safely in MODE 3 for an extended period of time.
The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation functions ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit ! in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible.
' APPLICABLE The Remote Shutdown Sygem is required to provide equipment
. SAFETY ANALYSES - at appropriate locations outside the control room with a capa)1lity to promptly shut down and maintain the unit in a
_ safe condition in MODE 3. The criteria governing the design and specific system requirements of the Remote Shutdown System are located in ! 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 19 (Ref.1). !
- The Remote Shutdown System is considered an important contributor to the reduction of unit risk to ' accidents and y as such it has been retained in the Technical Specifications ;
as satisfying Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). ! BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.4 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A
Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 BASES LCO The Remote Shutdown System LC0 provides the OPERABILITY-requirements of the monitoring instrumentation necessary to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 from a location other i than the control room. The required instrumentation is ' listed in Bases Table B 3.3.4-1. The monitoring instrumentation is required for: ! e Core reactivity control (initial and long term): 1 l e RCS pressure control; e Decay heat removal via the AF System and the main steam safety valves or SG PORVs; arid e RCS inventory control via charging flow. A Function of a Remote Shutdown System is OPERABLE if all l instrument channels needed to support the Remote Shutdown , System Function are OPERABLE. In some cases. Bases l Table B 3.3.4-1 may indicate that the required information 1 is available from several alternate sources. In these l (' cases, the Function is OPERABLE as long as one channel of i any of the alternate information sources is OPERABLE. The remote shutdown monitoring instrument circuits covered by this LC0 do not need to be energized to be considered OPERABLE. This LC0 is intended to ensure the monitoring. instruments will be OPERABLE if 31 ant conditions require that the. Remote Shutdown System 3e placed in operation.
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APPLICABILITY' - The Remote Shutdown SyTtem LC0 is applicable in MODES 1. 2. and 3. This is required so that the unit can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 for an extended period of time from a location other than the control room. This LC0 is not applicable in MODE 4, 5, or 6. In these MODES. the facility is already subcritical and in a
; condition of reduced RCS energy. Under these conditions.
considerable time is available to restore necessary instrument functions if control room instruments become unavailable, l j C)~ ( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.4 - 2 5/29/98 Revision A 1 1
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Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 lA : BASES LU ACTIONS Note 1 is included which excludes the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into an applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require a unit shutdown. This exception is acce) table due to the low probability of an event requiring t1e Remote Shutdown System.and because the l equipment can generally be repaired during operation without significant risk of . spurious trip. Note 2 has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function listed on Bases Table B 3.3.4-1. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s)/ train (s) of a Function will be tracked separately i for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function. AJ. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required Functions of the Remote Shutdown System listed in Table B 3.3.4-1 are inoperable. O Theaeae4ree^ct4en4storestorethecehu4reeFunct4 OPERABLE status within 30 days. The Com letion Time is e based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room. B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action and associated Com)letion Time of Condition A is not met. the unit must be arought to a MODE in which the LCO @es not apply. To achieve this
- status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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Remote Shutdown System ' B 3.3.4 ;
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t BASES _ 1' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1 REQUIREMENTS . Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK'once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter. ; indicated on one channel to a similar parametec on other ' channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should recd approximately the same value. Significant deviations i between the two instrument' channels could be an indlation of excessive instrument. drift in one of.the channels or of ; something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect 4 gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication ! and readability. If the channels are within the.. criteria. it.is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. If a channel.is outside the criteria, it may be an indication I that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. O . As specified in the Surveillance, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels which are normally energized. The Frequency of 31 days is based upon operating experience which demonstrates that channel failure is rare. SR 3;3.4.2 , 1
. CHANNEL-CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. .The test verifies that the channel
.- - responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
TheFrequencyof18monthsisbaseduponoperating
. experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.
REFERENCES-. '1. 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC.19. f BYRON - UNITS'1 & 2 83.3.4-4 5/29/98Revisiond i N__-__-_____
Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 O Table B 3.3.4-1 (Page 1 of 1) b Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation REQUIRED FUNCTION / INSTRUMENT PARAMETER NUMBER OF CHANNELS 1.' Intermediate Range Neutron Flux 1 2, Source Range Neutron Flux 1
- 3. Reactor Coolant Temperature - Wide Range j
- a. Hot Leg (per loop) 1
- b. Cold Leg (per loop)
I
- 4. Pressurizer Pressure 1
(
- 5. Pressurizer Level 1
- 6. Steam Generator Pressure (per SG) 1
'7. Steam Generator Level (per SG) 1
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- 8. Residual Heat Removal Temperature 1
- 9. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate (per SG) 1 O
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LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 i i cq :B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5 Loss Of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND. The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to
- allow safe unit operation. Undervoltage protection will generate an LOP start if a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition occurs. There are two LOP start signals, one for each 4.16 kV ESF bus.
Two undervoltage relays with inverse time characteristics-are provided on each 4.16 kV ESF bus for' detecting a sustained degraded voltage condition or a loss of bus voltage. The relays are combined in a two-out-of-two logic to generate an LOP signal if the voltage is below 70% for a short time or below 95.8% for a long time. The LOP start actuation is described in UFSAR. Section 8.3 (Ref.1). Trio Setooints and Allowable Values
,, l Allowable Values provide'a conservative margin with regards
(' ) to instrument uncertainties to ensure analytical limits are not violated during anticipated operational occurrences and that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the event and required equipment functions'as designed.
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- f. LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES l BACKGROUND (continued)
, Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the relays
- l are set. The actual. nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the relay. is more conservative than that specified by the' Allowable Value to account for changes in random and
.non-random measurement errors. One example'of such a change in measurement error is attributable to calculated normal
-uncertainties--during the surveillance interval. Any rela'y is considered to be 3roperly adjusted when the "as left" l ~- value is within the aand for CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance.
If the measured value of a relay exceeds the Trip Setpoint but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated LOP DG Start Instrumentation function is considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints'are specified in Reference 2. APPLICABLE The LOP DG start instrumentation is required for the SAFETY ANALYSES Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems to function in any
' accident with a loss of offsite power. Its design basis is that'of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS).
h Accident analyses credit the loading of the DG based on the loss of offsite power during a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The actual DG start has historically been. associated with the ESFAS actuation. The DG-loading has been included in the delay time associated with each safety system' component requiring.DG supplied power following a loss of offsite )ower.. The analyses assume a non-mechanistic M loading, which does not explicitty account for each individual component'of . loss of power detection and subsequgnt actions.
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The required channels of LOP DG start instrumentation, in conjunction with the ESF systems powered from the DGs, provide unit protection in.the event of any of the analyzed accidents discussed in Reference 3. in which a loss of offsite power is assumed. BYRON _ UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.5 - 2 5/30/9B Revision E _ _ - - - - - _ -- -. - - - - - - . - - _ _ - - . - ]
i LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) The delay times assumed in the safety analysis.for the ESF equipment include the DG start delay, and the appropriate sequencing delay. if applicable. The response times for ESFAS actuated equipment in LCO 3.3.2. " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation." include the appropriate DG loading and sequencing delay. . The LOP DG start instrumentation channels satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LCO The LCO for LOP DG start instrumentation requires that two channels per bus of both the loss of voltage and degraded voltage Functions shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 when the LOP DG start instrumentation supports safety systems associated with the ESFAS. In MODES 5 and 6. the channels must be OPERABLE whenever the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the automatic start of the DG is available when needed. Loss of the LOP DG Start Instrumentation Function could result in the delay of safety systems initiation when required. This could lead to ,f 'q unacceptable consequences during accidents. During the loss of offsite power. DG A powers the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Failure of this pump to start would leave only .the diesel driven pump. as well-as an increased i potential for a los of decay heat removal through the secondary system. 1 l APPLICABILITY The LOP DG Start Instr
- MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 bgentation ecause ESFFunctions are designed Functions are required to in provide protection in these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6
, is required whenever the required DG must be OPERABLE.so !~ that it can perform its function on an LOP or degraded power l to the vital bus.
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! BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.5 - 3 5/29/98 Revision A
LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5
- y. ' BASES Q
. ACTIONS- In the event'a channel's Trip Set)oint is found )
, nonconservative with res)ect to t1e Allowable Value, or the J P channel is'found inoperaale, then the function that channel provides must.be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition entered for the particular protection function affected. A Note has been added in'the ACTIONS to clarify the a) plication of Comp.letion Time rules. The Conditions of t1is Specification may be entered seaarately for each
- l. Function listed in the LCO on'a per aus basis. The o
Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a L - Function will be tracked separately for.each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function. Condition A applie's to the LOP DG Start Instrumentation Function with one channel on one or more buses inoperable. If one channel is inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires 1 that channel to be placed in trip within 1 hour. With a
- channel in trip, the LOP DG Start Instrumentation channels
[:O are coor49ured to Prov'de e ooe-out-or-oae 'o94c to ioitiate an undervoltage or degraded voltage signal for that bus. For the Loss of Voltage Function.'a Note is added to allow bypassing an inoperable' channel for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of the other channel. This allowance-is made where bypassing the channel does not cause an actuation. The specified Completigi Time is reasonable considering the
. low probability of an event occurring during these.
intervals.
- B
- l. Condition B applies to the LOP DG Start Instrumentation Function with two channels on one or more buses. inoperable.
Required Action B.1' requires restoring one channel of the affected Function to OPERABLE status. The 1 hour Completion Time takes into account the low probability of an event requiring an LOP start occurring during this interval. BYRON -~ UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.5 - 4 5/30/98 Revision E i 3, f ,
l LOP DG Start Instrumentation l
~B 3.3.5 q BASES ACTIONS (continued) ))
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Condition C applies to each of the LOP DG Start .' Instrumentation Functions when the. Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B are not met. In these circumstances the Conditions specified in LC0 3.8.1. "AC Sources-03erating." or LC0 3.8.2. "AC Sources-Shutdown." for t1e DG made inoperable by failure of the LOP DG start instrumentation are required to be entered immediately. The actions of those LCOs provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure plant safety. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.1 is the performance of a TADC. . This test is performed every 31 days. The test checks trip devices that provide actuation signals directly, bypassing the analog 3rocess control equipment. The Frequency is based on the (nown reliability of the relays and controls and the
/m multichannel redundancy available. and has been shown to be
' ') acceptable through operating experience. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of relay setpoints j during the TADOT. q SR 3.3.5.2 SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
.The setpoints, as well,,its the response to a loss of voltage i
- and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay, as described in Reference 1. l A CHANNEL CALIBRATION 'is performed every 1B months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. L I L.) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.5 - 5 5/30/98 Revision E A-..-#___am_-.. _ - _
I i LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 l l BASES l)i q. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) The Frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is ' justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Section 8.3.
- 2. Technical Requirements Manual.
- 3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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' Containment' Ventilation-Isolation Instrumentation l B 3.3.6 1 fi B 3.3 . INSTRUMENTATION Af
-B 3.3.6' Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation
' BASES.-
i BACKGROUND : Containment ventilation isolation instrumentation closes the containment isolation valves in the Minipurge System and the Normal Purge System. This action isolates the containment atmosphere from the environment to: minimize releases of
. radioactivity in.the event of an accident. A discussion of
' the containment ventilation system is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.6.3.'" Containment Isolation Vaives."
Containment ventilation isolation initiates on an automatic Safety Injection (SI) signal, by manual actuation of Phase A Isolation, by' manual actuation of Phase B Isolation, or by a high. radiation signal-from REtAR011 or RE-AR012. The' Bases for.LC0 3.3.2. " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System l (ESFAS) Instrumentation." discuss the ESFAS modes _of-initiation. Two radiation monitoring channels (RE-AR011-and RE-AR012) Jrovide input to the containment ventilation isolation.
'f-A'g : ~
Each of the purge systems has inner and outer containment isolation valves in its su) ply ~and exhaust ducts. - A high radiation signal from RE-AR011 initiates Train A containment
-ventilation isolation, which closes the inner containment isolation valves. .'A high radiation signal from RE-AR012 initiates Train B c'ontainment purge isolation. which closes
.the outer containment isolation valves.
~ The trip setpoint is established such that the actual submersion dose rate g ld not exceed 10 mR/hr.in the.
- containment building. The setpoint value may be increased up to twice the maximum concentration activity in
. containment determined by the sample analysis performed pr'ior to each release provided the value does not exceed 10%
of the limits determined by the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual- .
.)
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Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES 1 APPLICABLE The safety analyses assume that the containment remains i SAFETY ANALYSES intact with penetrations unnecessary for core cooling isolated early in the event (i.e., within approximately 60 seconds). The isolation of the purge valves has not been analyzed mechanistically in the dose calculations although its rapid isolation is assumed. The containment ventilation isolation radiation monitors act as backup to the SI signal l to ensure closing of the purge valves. They are also the primary means for automatically isolating containment in the event of a fuel handling accident. Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1) limits. i The containment ventilation isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). 1 LCO The LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is OPERABLE.
- 1. Manual Initiation - Phase A Refer to LC0 3.3.2, function 3.a.1, for all initiating Functions and requirements.
- 2. Manual Initiation - Phase B Refer to LC0 3.3.2. Function 3.b.1. for all initiating >
Functions and requirements. l O ' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.6 - 2 5/29/98 Revision A l
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 O BASE,5
'LC0 (continued)
- 3. Automatic-Actuation Looic and Actuation Relays The LCO requires two trains of Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays OPERABLE to ensure that no single random failure can prevent automatic actuation.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Function 1.b. SI. ESFAS Function 3.a. Containment Phase A Isolation, and ESFAS Function 3.b. Containment Phase B Isolation. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the containment ventilation isolation portion of these Functions are different and less restrictive than those for their Phase A isolation. Phase B isolation, and SI roles. If one or more of the SI. Phase A isolation. or Phase B isolation Functions becoines inoperable in such a' manner that only the Containment Ventilati,on Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions- . applicable to their SI. Phase A isolation, and Phase B isolation Functions need not be entered. The less O.- rer;rictive Actions specified for inoperability of the
. Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case.
- 4. Containment Radiation The LC0 specifies two required channels to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation remains OPERABLE. ,_
- 5. Safety Iniection Refer to LC0 3.3.2. Function 1. for all initiating Functions and requirements.
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Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 L ( BASES APPLICABILITY The Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2 3 and 4 and when Item C.2 of L
- LCO 3.9.4 is required. Under these conditions. the potential exists for an ' accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment. Therefore. the
; containment ventilation isolation instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES.
- - While.in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, or l with a penetration closed by a manual or automatic isolation
! ., valve. blind flange, or equivalent, the containment L ventilation isolation instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of < Reference 1. The Applicability for the containment ventilation isolation on the ESFAS Manual Initiation-Phase A. Manual Initiation-Phase B. and Safety Injection Functions are specified in LC0 3.3.2. Refer to the Bases.for LC0 3.3.2 for discussion of the Manual Initiation-Phase A. Manual p . Initiation-Phase B and Safety Injection Functions Q . Applicabilities. ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperabihty is outright failure or drift ~of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by plant specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be
. small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of functiorL_ This determination is generally
. - made during the performance of a COT. when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure.
the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered. 4 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.6- 4 5/29/98 Revision A l
"- Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 s {} . BASES-r ACTIONS (continued) A Note has been'added to the ACTIONS to clarify the a] plication of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of t1is Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.6-1. The Completion. Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s)/ train (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function. M Condition A applies to the failure of one containment ventilation isolation radiation monitor channel. Condition A requires the ino)erable channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 1ours. The Completion. Time is justified by the low likelihood of events' occurring during this interval, and recognition that the remaining channel will respond to most events. M. Condition B applies to all Containment Ventilation -Isolation cn- Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid ' V' State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these Functions. It also addresses.the failure
- of both radiation monitoring channels, or the inability to
' restore a single failed channel to OPERABLE . status in the time' allowed for Required Action A.1.
If one or both trains are inoperable, both radiation monitoring channels are inoperable, or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, o]eration may continue,as long as the Required Action for
- t1e applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6.3 is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation.
!- Condition B is modified by a Note stating that the Condition' L is only applicable in MODE 1, 2. 3. or 4. u n BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.6- 5 5/29/98 Revision A c ___ _ ___ ____ _ __-__ _ _ _ -_-_
Containment Ventilation' Isolation' Instrumentation B-3.3.6 BASES-fy D ~
' ACTIONS'(continued)
C.1 and C.2
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Condition C applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train. orientation of:the SSPS and the master.and slave relays;for these Functions.- It lalso addresses the failure of both radiation monitoring channels. or the inability to restore a single failed channel;to 0PERABLE status in the time allowed for Required o . Action A.1. If a train is inoperable, both channels are inoperable, or the Required Action and associated Completion o Time of-Condition A'are not met, operation may continue as long as the Required Action to place and maintain containment purge valves in their closed position is met or the applicable Conditions of LC0 3.9.4. " Containment Penetrations." are met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. The Completion Time
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[ for these Required Actions is immediately. A Note states that Condition C is only applicable when Item C.2 of LC0 3.9.4 is required.
.c Og-SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3-6-1 determines which SRs apply to which Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions.
SR 3.3.6.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normaJ 11 a comparison of the parameter
- indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect !
gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each j CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 1 l L
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l Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation i B 3.3.6
' BASES
. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that.the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on operating experience that
. demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.
SR 3.3.6.2 SR 3.3.6.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The train being tested is placed.in the bypass condition. , thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the- ) semiautomatic tester all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each i protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is I tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules j m are OPERABLE and there is an intact voltage signal path to 1 i - the master relay coils. This test is performed every i 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Surveillance i interval is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry op'erating experience. SR 3.3:6.3 SR 3.3.6.3 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER' RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay. verifying contact oper.ation and a low voltage' continuity
- check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage. is insufficient to pick up the slave re' lay, but large enough to demonstrate. signal path continuity. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Surveillance interval is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating experience.
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O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.6 - 7 5/29/98 Revision A
k ContaibmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation B 3.3.6 Av BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3 3.6:4 A COT is performed every 92 days on each required channel to L ensure the entire channel will perform the intended L Function. The Frequency 1.s based on the staff i recommendation for increasing the availability of radiation L monitors according to NUREG-1366 (Ref. 2). This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment ventilation system isolation. The setpoin_t shall be left consistent with the current plant specific. calibration procedure tolerance.
- . SR 3.3.6.5 SR 3.3.6.5'is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE _ RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays.
l Contact ' operation 1s verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function or is placed in'a condition where the relay contact operatiori can be verified without
.. operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may q not be operated in the design mitigation mode is )revented Q from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. :or this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity l check of.the circuit containing the slave relay. This-test '
is performed every.92 days. The Frequency is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating experience. E . SR 3.3.6.6 L , A CHANNEL CALIBRATION jji performed every 18 months. or
- approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor.
The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and ~ accuracy. The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. l' O . BYRON - UNITS 1 &'2 B 3.3.6- 8 5/29/98 Revision A Cm _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ . - . _ - - - _ _ - . . - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ -
I l i Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES i REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11. ,
- 2. NUREG-1366. December 1992. I 1
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IL , VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 ;I I I i B -3,. 3- INSTRUMENTATION l' B 3.3.7 Control Room Ventilation (VC). Filtration System Actuation L ' Instrumentation l l b BASES l I' BACKGROUND- The VC Filtration System provides an enclosed control room environment from which the unit can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. During normal operation the VC Filtration System provides control room ventilation. Upon receipt of an actuation signal, the VC Filtration System initiates filtered ventilation and pressurization of the control room. This system is described in the Bases for:LC0 3.7.10. " Control Room. Ventilation (VC) Filtration System."
.The actuation instrumentation consists of two channels in each of-the air intakes. A high radiation (gaseous) signal
- from one of two channels will initiate its associated train of the VC Filtration System. The VC Filtration. System is also actuated by a Safety Injection (SI) signal. The.SI L Function is discussed in LCO 3.3.2. " Engineered Safety Lj W Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation."
-Q-APPLICABLE The control room must be kept habitable for the operators SAFETY ANALYSES : stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations; !
~The VC Filtration System acts to terminate the supply of unfiltered outside air to the control room initiate
" filtration. and pressu.tize the control room. These actions
- are necessary to ensure the control room is kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations by minimizing the radiation exposure:of control room personnel.
In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. the radiation monitor actuation of the VC Filtration System provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following a loss Of Coolant Accident or Steam Generator Tube Rupture. l 1
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B 3.3.7 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A , i
VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES l l (v) l APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) The radiation monitor actuation of the VC Filtration System in MODES 5 and 6. and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is the primary means to ensure control room habitability in the event of a fuel handling or other event which could provide a significant radioactive release. The VC Filtration System actuation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LC0 The LCO requirements ensure that the control room air intake radiation-gaseous instrumentation necessary to initiate the VC Filtration System is OPERABLE. The LC0 specifies two channels per train (0RE-PR031B and ORE-PR032B for Train A and ORE-PR033B and ORE-PR034B for Train B). Refer to LCO 3.3,2. Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements for the SI instrumentation which actuates the VC Filtration System. O APPLICABILITY The VC Filtration System Functions must be OPERABLE in l MODES 1, 2, 3. 4. and at all times during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Functions must be OPERABLE 4 in MODES 5 and 6 to provide protection from significant radioactivity releases.
. The Applicability for the VC Filtration System actuation on ,
. the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) SI J Functions are specifiefin LCO 3.3.2. Refer to the Bases
. - for LCO 3.3.2 for discussion of the SI Function Applicability,
!q U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.7 - 2 5/29/98Revisionk
VC filtration System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7
. BASES ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or-drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific calibration procedures. -Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a. delay of actuation rather i than a total loss of function. This determination is generally-made during the performance of a COT. when the process. instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable ;
immediately and the appropriate Condition entered. A.1 and A.2 I Condition A applies to the failure of one or more radiation channels in one VC Filtration System train. If one or more channels on one train is inoperable, one hour is permitted to either place the redundant.VC Filtration System train in the normal mode of operation or to place one VC Filtration System train-in the emergency mode of operation. The Completion Time of. one hour is sufficient to ensure that the train operating in the normal mode is the train opposite "s . from the train associated with the ino)erable channel, alternate action would be to place eitler train in the An emergency mode. This accomplishes the actuation . instrumentation Function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation. Condition B applies to the failure of one or more radiation channels in both VC F1]j; ration System trains. If one or
- more channels on both, trains are inoperable, one VC Filtration System train must be placed in the emergency mode of operation within 1 hour. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation Function and places the unit in a .
conservative mode of operation.
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l O BYfkON-UNITS 1&2 83.3.7-3 5/29/98 Revision A
VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASE'S ACTIONS (continued)L
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C.1'and'C.2 -
-Condition C applies when tne Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B have not been met and the unit is in MODE 1. 2. 3. or 4. The. unit must be brought to a-MDDE in which the likelihood of an event requiring the.
VC Filtration System is minimized. .To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach the recuired unit conditions from full power conditions in an orcerly manner and without" challenging plant systems. D.l ' Condition D' applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B have not been met when irradiated. fuel assemblies are being moved. Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately to
. reduce the-risk of. accidents that would require VC Filtration System actuation.
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(m) E 1 and'E.2 Condition E applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B have not been met in . MODE 5 or 6. CORE ALTERATIONS must be suspended immediately and actions must be initiated immediately to restore the inoperable train (s) to OPERABLE status to provide protection from significant radioactivity releases. i
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VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7-BASES L SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.7-1 determines which SRs apply to which VC Filtration System Actuation Function. SR 3 3.7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the. parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument. channels monitoring the same approximately the same value. parameter should read' Significant de between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will' detect gross channel. failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to' operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined based on' a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties.. including indication and readability. If a channel ~is outside the criteria, it
.1~ may be an indication that the' sensor or the signal 1 processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure'is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal but more frequent, checks of j channels during normal operational use of the displays ) associated with the LC0 required channels. SR 3.3.7.2 _ A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the 1 intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the VC Filtration System actuation. The set)oints shall be left consistent with the
)lant specific celi) ration procedure tolerance. The ,
requency is based on the known reliability of the ! monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. O : BYRON UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.7 - 5 5/29/98 Revision A l
VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES f~')N
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3 3.7.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months. or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. REFERENCES None. I
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's_/ i B 3.3.7 - 6 5/29/98 Revision A BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2
FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8
\ B 3,3 INSTRUMENTATION
(~'/ w B 3.3.8 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenum (FHB) Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The FHB Ventilation System ensures that radioactive materials in the fuel handling building atmosphere following a fuel handling accident are' filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment. The system is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.13. " Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenum (FHB) Ventilation System." The system initiates filtered ventilation of the fuel handling building automatically following receipt of a high radiation signal I or safety injection signal. Two radiation monitoring channels (0RE-AR055 and ORE-AR056) 3rovide input to the FHB Ventilation System isolation. A ligh radiation signal from ORE-AR055 initiates Train A FHB Ventilation System isolation. A high radiation signal from ORE-AR056 initiates Train B FHB Ventilation System isolation. High radiation detected by any monitor initiates , r3 fuel handling building isolation and starts the FHB ' (j ' Ventilation System. These actions function to prevent exfiltration of contaminated air by initiating filtered ventilation, which imposes a negative pressure on the fuel handling building. APPLICABLE The FHB Ventilation System ensures that radioactive SAFETY ANALYSES materials in the fuel handling building atmosphere following a fuel handling accideJ1t are filtered and adsorbed prior to
- being exhausted to the environment. This action reduces the radioactive content in the fuel handling building exhaust following a fuel handling accident so that offsite doses remain within the limits specified in 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1).
The FHB Ventilation System actuation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). l l (%; LJ l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 , B' 3.3.8 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A
FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 N V BASES i i LCO The LCO requires'two channels to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the FHB Ventilation System remains OPERABLE.
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APPLICABILITY High radiation initiation of the FHB Ventilation System must be OPERABLE during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the-fuel handling building to ensure automatic initlation of the FHB. Ventilation System when the potential for a fuel handling accident exists. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or CORE ALTERATIONS with the containment equipment hatch not intact, the FHB' Ventilation System actuation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE to alleviate the consequences of an accident inside containment. The containment equipment hatch "not intact"' refers to the requirement to have one door in the personnel air lock closed and the equ pment i ! hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts as i described in the Bases for LCO 3,9.4, " Containment 1 Penetrations." While in MODES 1. 2, 3, 4. 5, and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the FHB Ventilation System instrumentation need j not be OPERABLE since a fuel handling accident cannot occur. ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module-sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by plant specific calibration procedures Typically, the drift is found to be
. - small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally !
made during the performance of a COT, when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within s ) edification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative l tlan the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the ; appropriate Condition entered. l O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.8 - 2 5/29/98 Revision A' [ _ _ _ ._ _ . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
FHB Ventilation. System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8- _ BASES
' ACTIONS (continued)
A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of.LCO 3.0.3. 'LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1. 2. 3. or 4. the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6. LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1. 2. 3. or 4. the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. A.1 Condition A applies to the failure of a single radiation monitor channel. If one channel is inoperable, a period of 7 days is allowed to restore it to OPERABLE status.' The 7 day Completion Time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion.of the system is inoperable. The basis for this time is the same as that provided in LCO 3.7.13. B.1. B.2.1. B.2.2. and B.2.3 Condition B applies if the Required Action or associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met or the failure of two radiation monitors. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, one FHB Ventilation System train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode. The FHB Ventilation System train placed in operation must be ca
.of being powered by anJPERABLE emergency power source.pable This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation.
t O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.8 -3 5/29/98 Revision A l e ! i s -- - a
FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8
)O BASES lV L ACTIONS (continued) c Alternative actions may be taken if the FHB Ventilation i-System train is not placed in emergency mode or does not have an associated OPERABLE diesel generator. Required Action B,2.1 requires the suspension of fuel movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Fuel Handling Building.
precluding a 'Jel handling accident. Required Actions B.2.2 l and B.2.3.repire the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment, precluding an accident that would require FHB Ventilation i System actuation when the ecuipment hatch is not intact. l These actions do not precluce the movement of fuel ' assemblies to a safe position. Required Actions B.2.2 and B.2.3 are modified by a Note which indicates that these Required Actions are only required if the equipment hatch is not intact. If the hatch is. intact, only Required Action B.2.1 is required. l SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that p ' REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.8-1 determines which SRs apply to which Fuel V Handling Build 11g (FHB) Radiation Actuation Functions 4 SR 3 3.8.1 l Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12' hours ensures l that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument ! channels monitoring th,g_same
- approximately the same value.Significant parameterdeviations should read between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
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FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8
/~'i BASES U
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Agreement criteria are determined based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties. including indication and readability. If a channel is outside tne criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on operating experience that . demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal. but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays i associated with the LCO required channels. ! SR 3.3.8.2 A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the FHB Ventilation System actuation. The set]oints shall be left consistent with the plant specific cali] ration procedure tolerance. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of pgj the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. SR 3.3.8.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months. or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured
. parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The J
Frequency is based on gerating experience and is consistent j
- with the typical industry refueling cycle. ,
l i REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11. j i g) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.8 - 5 5/29/98 Revision A t---_____ - - - -
BDPS B 3.3.9 7N B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Q - LB 3 3,9. Boron Dilution Protection System (BDPS)
- BASES V BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the BDPS is to mitigate the consequences-of the inadvertent addition of unborated primary grade water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) when the reactor is in a shutdown condition (i.e. MODES 3.
- 4. and 5).
The BDPS utilizes two channels of source range instrumentation. Each source range channel provides a signal to both trains of the BDPS. However, only one source-range' channel is required to be OPERABLE to support-OPERABILITY of both BDPS trains. An internal microprocessor is used to record the counts per minute provided by these signals.once per second. At the end of each minute, an
' algorithm compares the average counts per minute value (flux rate) of the 60 recorded readings for that 1 minute ~ interval with the counts per minute value.for the previous nine.
1 minute' intervals. If the flux rate during a 1 minute j f- interval is greater than or equal to twice the flux rate'
-during any of the prior nine 1 minute intervals, the BDPS i)~
s' provides a signal to initiate mitigating actions. Upon detection of a flux doubling by either source range instrumentation train, an alarm is sounded to alert the operator and valve movement is automatically initiated to
'[ terminate the dilution'from the. assumed dilution source.
. Valves that isolate the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) are. opened-to supply borated water to the suction of the charging pumps, and val.ves which isolate the Volume Control
[ Tank (VCT) are closed to terminate the assumed dilution.
. APPLICABLE The BDPS senses abnormal increases.in source range SAFETY ANALYSES counts per minute (flux rate) and > 'uates VCT and RWST valves to mitigate the consequences of an inadvertent boron
. dilution event as described in UFSAR, Cha)ter 15 (Ref.1).
The accident analyses rely on automatic B)PS actuation to mitigate the consequences of inadvertent boron dilution events. The BDPS satisfies Crite.rion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(11). W U BYRON'- UNITS 1 &'2 B 3.3.9-1 5/30/9B Revision E L Ex -
BDPS B 3.3.9 M BASES. L/L LC0 LCO 3.3.9 provides the requirements for OPERABILITY of the BDPS that mitigate the consequences of a boron dilution event. Two redundant trains of BDPS are required to be OPERABLE to provide protection against single failure. Because the BDPS utilizes the source range instrumentation as its detection system. the OPERABILITY of the detection-l system (i .e. . control room indication, the. flux doubling algorithm, the alarms, and signals to the various valves) for one Source Range Monitor (SRM) is also part of the OPERABILITY for. each train in the system to be considered OPERABLE. Only one SRM is required for BDPS to be OPERABLE. Therefore, with no SRM capable of supporting the BDPS. both trains are' inoperable. Because the RWST is assumed to be a boration source, the RWST concentration required to satisfy the minimum required l boron concentration for SHUTDOWN MARGIN of LCO 3.1.1.
" SHUTDOWN MARGIN" must be maintained for BDPS OPERABILITY.
Therefore, with the RWST boron concentration not. satisfying _
'these requirements, both trains of BDPS are inoperable.
The LCO is modified by a Note that allows the boron dilution C,' . flux doubling signal to be olo'cked during reactor startup in MODE 3. Blocking the flux doubling signal is acceptable during startup while in MODE 3. provided the reactor trip-breakers are closed with the intent to withdraw rods for startup, i APPLICABILITY The BDPS must be OPERABLE in MODES 3. 4. and 5 because the safety analysis identi.fles this system as the primary means
- to mitigate an inadvertent boron dilution of tie RCS.
The BDPS OPERABILITY requirements are not applicable in MODES 1 and 2 because an inadvertent boron dilution would be terminated by a source range trip, a trip on the Power Range Neutron Flux-High, or Overtemperature AT. These RTS Functions are discussed in LC0 3.3.1 "RTS Instrumentation." In MODE 6. a dilution event is precluded by locked valves that isolate the RCS from the )otential source of unborated
- water (refer to LCO 3.9.2. "Unaorated Water Source Isolation Valves"). ;
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, BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 ,
B 3.3.9-2 5/30/98 Revision E l
BDPS B 3.3.9 O G BASES ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific calibration procedure. Typically. the drift is 4 found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather ! than a total loss of function. This determination of setpoint drift is generally made during the performance of a COT when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it to within specification. If the Trip l Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared i inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered. The Actions are modified by a Note that allows the unborated water source isolation valves to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. A.1 With one train of the BDPS OPERABLE. Required Action A.1 , requires that the inoperable train must be restored to q OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining BDPS train is adequate to provide protection. The
'u 72 hour Completion Time is based on the BDPS Function and is consistent with Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Completion Times for loss of one redundant train. Also, the remaining OPERABLE train provides continuous indication of core power status to the operator, has an alarm function, and sends a signal to both trains of the BDPS to assure
. system actuation.
1 >o G BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.9 - 3 5/29/98 Revision A O
BDPS
. B 3.3.9 BASES O)
\
ACTIONS (continued) B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met, the unborated water source isolation valves CV111B. CV8428. CV8441. CV8435, and CV8439 are. recuired to be closed and. secured within 1 hour to prevent the flow of unborated water into the RCS. The 1 hour Completion Time takes into consideration the time to close and' secure open isolation valves. The isolation valves are also required to be verified closed and secured once every 31 days. The Completion Time of "once 3er 31 days" is t appropriate considering the fact that t1e isolation valves are o)erated under administrative controls and the remaining
'0PERA3LE train provides continuous indication of core power status to the operator, har an alarm function, and sends a signal to both trains.of the BDPS to assure system actuation.
U With two trains inoperable due to the RWST boron em concentration being out of its required limits. valves () CV112D and CV112E from the RWST are required to be closed and deactivated within 8 hours to prevent the flow of unborated water into the RCS. The 8 hour Completion Time takes into consideration the time required to restore boron concentration limits. . D.1. 0.2. and D.3 With two trains inoperable for reasons other than Condition C. unboratecL9ater source isolation valves CV111B.
. - CV8428. CV8441. CV8435, and CV8439 are required to be closed and secured within 1 hour to prevent the flow of unborated water into the RCS. The 1 hour Completion Time. takes into consideration the time to close and secure open isolation valves. The isolation valves are also required to be verified closed and secured once every 12 hours. The Completion Time of "once per 12 hours" is appropriate considering the fact that the isolation valves are operated under administrative controls and confirms that the unborated water source isolation valves are in their correct position.
l - BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.9 - 4 5/30/98 Revision E t u-_____.'___'_.. _ . _
BDPS B 3.3 9-(
' BASES' ACTIONS'(continued)
With the required source range neutron flux monitor not' capable of supporting the-BDPS automatic function (e.g.. when the source range neutron flux monitor count rate drops to < 10 cps). both BDPS trains are-inoperable and Condition D is entered. ' Condition.E may or may not also be entered. depending on whether the source range neutron flux monitor control room indication remains OPERABLE. When the source range neutron. flux monitor is inoperable for control room-monitoring of core status both trains of BDPS are inoperable and both Condition 0 and Condition E are entered. Required Action D.2 accompanies Required Actions D.1 and D.3 to verify the SDM according to SR 3.1.1.1 within 1 hour.and once per 12 hours thereafter. This action is intended to. confirm tht no; unintended boron dilution has occurred while the BDPS was inoperable, and that the required SDM has been maintained. The specified Completion Time takes into-consideration sufficient time for the initial determination of SDM and other information available in the control room f related to SDM. V With no source range neutron flux monitor -0PERABLE for control room monitoring of core status. both BDPS trains are
. inoperable and both Condition D and Condition E-are entered.
In this event, positive reactivity additions must be L .immediately suspended. This includes withdrawal-of control or shutdown rods and intentional boron dilution. i i , L < L l-O -
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- . B 3.3.9 - 5 5/30/98 Revision E
BDPS . B 3.3.9 n -BASES V SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3 9.1. SR 3.3 9.2. and SR 3.3.9.3 REQUIREMENTS These SRs require verification every 12 hours that at least one SRM signal to BDPS (OPERABLE control room indication may be used) is indicating at a count rate of a 10 cps. one Reactor Coolant Pump is in operation, and the RCS loop isolation valves are open. Source Range cannot be "211ed on to indicate a proper rate of change below 10 cps due to. instrument tolerances, externally induced electronic noise, and instrument sensitivity. Proper mixing of RCS coolant in the reactor cannot be assured with less than one RCP running. Without proper mixing. BDPS may be inadequate to recognize and terminate a dilution event. Having RCS isolation valves closed presents the possibility that the isolated loop represents a dilution source that is not analyzed. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RCS loop performance. SR 3.3.9.1 is modified by a Note that provides a 4 hour n . delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for
! ) source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from
MODE 2. This Note allows a shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3.
This Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. SR 3.3.9.4 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not~ occurred. A
- CHANNEL CHECK is norma'ly a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an. indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
L i n fU BYh!0N-UNITS 1&2 B 3.3.9 - 6 5/30/98 Revision E
i
. BDPS B 3.3.9 p BASES V
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l' Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties.
-including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the critcria. it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. - The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal. but more frequent checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. SR 3.3.9.5
. This SR requires. verification.- every 7. days, that the RWST ,
boron concentration is greater than or' equal to the equivalent SDM limit specified in the COLR. This verification provides added assurance that the RWST does not become an unborated water source or a source of borated water with an insufficient amount of . boron such that when it
- is added to the RCS, it dilutes the RCS boron concentration-below the SDM limits. This SR is: not applicable when the l RWST is isolated and not the primary source of makeup .to the RCS.
l SR 3.3.9.6 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the BDPS flow path provides
, assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for BDPS J operation. This SR dqn not apply to valves that are I locked, sealed. or otherwise secured in position, since i these were verified to be in the correct position prior to !
locking. sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification.- through a system walkdown, that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. I L , " /m. !
- U .
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BYRON - UNITS 1 &'2 B 3.3.9 - 7 5/30/98 Revision E , D
BDPS B 3.3.9 { L ... p 1 BASES ,+ V ' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Jcontinued)
-l' SR 3.3 9.7' This SR requires verification every 92 days that the BDPS alarm setpoint is less-than-or equal to an increase of twice -
the count rate within a 10 minute period. The Frequency of 92 days is ~ sufficient since it is consistent with the Frequency of the COT. l ., SR 3 3.9.8 l SR.3.3.9.8 requires. the performance of a COT every 92 ' days. to ensure that each train of the BDPS and associated trip setpoints are fully operational. -This test shall include verification that the boron dilution alarm setpoint is equal to or less than an increase of-twice the count rate within a 10 minute period. The Frequency of 92 days is consistent with the requirements for source range channels in WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 2).
- l. SR 3.3.9.8 is modified by a Note'that provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement.to perform this surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from
[-)_ MODE 2. This Note allows a shutdown to proceed without'a
. delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3.
l 'This surveillance must be performed within 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. 1 SR 3.3.9.9
. These Surveillance demonstrate that' valves CV112D and .
CV112E open and valves CV112B and CV112C close in l- s 30 seconds on'an act
. signal. This Surveillyal or simulated BDPS Flux Doublingance is n are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls'. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillance. under the conditions that apply during a unit outage-and the potential for an unplanned unit transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
4 u i, L L) L 5/30/98 Revision E
' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.9 - 8 e
BDPS B 3.3.9 fj BASES v' SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SR- 3.3.9.10
-[ 'SR 3.3.9.10:is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The test verifies that the_ channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
- The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
- 2. WCAP-10271-P-A. Supplement 2. Revision 1. June 1990.
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i
.RTS' Instrumentation 3.3.1 yf)(x
- 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION-
, 3.3.11 Reactor.. Trip System.(RTS) Instrumentation LC0J.3.3.1 The' RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 :I shall be OPERABLE.
, APPLICABILITY: According'to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTIONS
. NOTE- - -
l LSeparbte Condition entry is~ allowed for each Function. '
.e CONDITION-- ' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -0ne or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately fwith one-or more ' referenced in
-,, . required channels or. Table 3.3.1-1 for the
. trains inoperable < channel (s) or
- Qw . train (s).
B. One Manual Reactor B.1 l Restore channel to' 48 hours Tr.ip channel 0PERABLE status. inoperable, B.2 Be in MODE 3: 54' hours
'[ (continued) t
[
.n =t /. .
BRAIDWOOD.- UNITS 1 & 2' 3. 3.1 - 1 .7/9/98 Revision E - , 1
- l. , i .
p 4
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION' COMPLETION TIME l
C. 'One channel or train . NOTE- -- l inoperable. While this LC0 is not met for Function 18. 19. or 20 in MODE 5. making the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal is not permitted. C.1' ' Restore channel or 48 hours train to.0PERABLE status. . 2 C.2.1 Initiate action to 48 hours fully insert all rods. bM C.2.2 Place the Rod Control 49 hours D System in a' condition V incapable of rod-withdrawal.
.l. (continued) i i
/d U
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 ,
- 3. 3.1 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E
i RTS Instrumentation-3.3.1
-ACTIONS (continued)'
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One. Power Range NOTE Neutron Flux-High The inoperable channel may be channel inoperable. bypassed for up to 4 hours .l for surveillance testing and i setpoint adjustment of other channels. D.1.1 Place channel in 6 hours f trip. M-D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 12 hours
~to s'75% RTP.
2 D.2.1 Place channel in 6 hours trip. h - E-NOTE Only required-to be performed l when the Power Range Neutron Flux inaut-to GPTR is
- inoperaale.
D.2.2 Petf.prm SR 3.2.4.2. Once per 12 hours
@ I D.3 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours 1
.l , ,
(continued) I BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.1 - 3 . 7/9/98 Revision E L-________.____________._.__________. _ _ _ _ . .
q j
~
RTS Instrumentation
.,. 3.3.1 3
)
- ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i E. 'One channel NOTE---- -
. inoperable. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other-channels.
E.1- Place channel in 6 hours trip. E.2 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours
- F. One Intermediate Range F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 hours '
Neutron Flux channel to < P-6. inoperable. 2 h F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10. 2 hours G. Two Intermediate Range G 1- Suspend operations- Immediately Neutron Flux channels involving positive inoperable reactivity additions. M ~ G.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 hours to < P-6.
'H. One Source Range H.1 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channel involving positive
' inoperable. reactivity additions.
l (continued) 7/9/98 Revision E BP IDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.1 - 4 C_i__ -- - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ __ _ _ _
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 I - r- '
' ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l 1. Two' Source Range I.1 Open Reactor Trip Immediately Neutron Flux channels Breakers (RTBs). inoperable. J One Source Range- J.1 Restore channel to 48 hours Neutron Flux channel OPERABLE status.
-inoperable.
J.2.1 Initiate action to 48 hours fully insert all rods. MD ' i J.2.2 Place the Rod Control .49 hours " l System in a condition incapable of rod
-p, .. withdrawal, O
K,
~
One channel - NOTE-inoperable. The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours a for surveillance testing of 1 other channels.
~
I(.1 Place channel in 6 hours trip. j i K.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 12-hours , to < P-7. l l-- (continued) I i O> l BRkIDWOOD'-UNITS 1&2 3,3.1 - 5 7/9/98 Revision E L l. L-
l - RTS Instrumentation ! 3.3.1
. ACTIONS (continued)
' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L. One Turbine Tri) -
NOTE channel inoperaale.* The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. L.1 Place channel in 6 hours trip. 2 L.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 12 hours to < P-8. M. One train-inoperable. -
. . NOTE --
One train may be bypassed for up.to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided A the-other train is OPERABLE. . M.1 Restore train to 6 hours OPERABLE status. M.2. Be in MODE 3, 12 hours
] (continued)
( ' . ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 6 7/9/98 Revision E L--_-______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ---_____________________________________________-_________1
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N. One RTB train NOTES ilnoperable. 1. One train may.be bypassed for.up to 2 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.
- 2. One RTB may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms, provided the other train is OPERABLE.
l N.1 Restore train to 1 hour OPERABLE status. M Q N.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours
- 0. One or more channels 0.1 Verify interlock is 1 hour inoperable. in required state for 1 existing unit conditions.
0.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours l (continued) l l
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O - BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 7 7/9/98 Revision E
RTS Instrumentation-
'3.3.1 em ACTIONS (continued)
U . CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME P., One or more channels' P.1 Verify interlock is 1 hour inoperable. in required state for existing unit conditions. 2 P.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours
- 0. One tri1 mechanism 0.1 Restore inoperable 48tiours inoperaale for one- trip mechanism to-RTB. OPERABLE status.
^
2 0.2 Be in MODE 3. -54 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to_ determine which SRs apply for each RTS Function. l
~
l
.. -SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY - -l 1
i lc :SR' 3.3,1.1 '
. Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours i.-
(continued) O
. .BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 ,
- 3. 3.1.- 8 7/9/98 Revision E
=________-._=-___--___--
_-- _ _ i
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENT5 (co.itinued) SURVEIU.ANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2 . NOTES i 1. Adjust'NIS channel if absolute difference is > 2%.
- 2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is
= 15% RTP.
Compare results of calorimetric heat- 24 hours balance calculation to Nucloar Instrumentation System (NIS) channel l output. SR 3.3.1.3 NOTES
- 1. Adjust NIS channel if absolute difference' is = 3%.
c 2. Only required to be 3erformed with d THERMAL POWER > 15% RTP. Compare results of the incore detector Prior to l- measurements to NIS AFD. exceeding 75% RTP after each refueling gg 31 Effective Full Power days (EFPD) - thereafter (continued)
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s BRAIDWOOD.'-' UNITS l'& 2. 3. 3.1 - 9 7/9/98Revisionb
1 l RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) ( SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.4 NOTE This Surveillance must be 3erformed on the RTBB prior to placing the )ypass breaker in service. Perform TADOT. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.6 NOTE Not required to be performed until 24 hours (^3 v after THERMAL POWER is a 75% RTP. Calibrate excore channels to agree with 92 EFPD incore detector measurements. SR 3.3.1.7 NOTE Not required to be performed for source range instrumentation pr%r to entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after l entry into MODE 3. L Perform COT. 92 days (continued)
>0)
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 10 7/9/98 Revision A
I RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 _
. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -(continued)
Q" . . SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
)
1
'SR,3.3.118' . NOTE .
This Surveillance shall include Verification that interlocks' P-6 and P-10 ' are in their. required state for existing
. unit-conditions.
Perform COT. NOTE Only required when not
, performed within previous 92 days Prior to reactor startup M
Four hours after reducing
)ower below P-10 for power and intermediate instrumentation M
~ Four hours
. after reducing power below P-6 for source-range 4 instrumentation M
Every 92 days thereafter-(continued)
'BRAIDWOOD -'. UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 11 7/9/98 Revision E
( '
c _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - - _ c RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 .l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS '(continued) l: ' SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
-SR- 3.3.1.9 NOTE
! Verification of setpoint is not required. L ! Perform TADOT. 92 days . SR 3.3.1 10 ' Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR' 3.3.1.11 . NOTE !. Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL l CALIBRATION. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR. 3.3.1.12 Perform COT. 18 months I 1 SR: 3.3.1.13 NOTE Verification of'setpoint is not required. . l Perform TADOT. ,,_ 18 months i (continued) I 1 1 1BRhlDWOOD'-UNITS 1&2 '3.3.1 - 12 7/9/98 Revision E t i
.RTS Instrumentation
- 3. 3.- 1
.n. SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS' (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FRE0VENCY SR'.3.3~1.14
. . NOTE Verification of'setpoint is not-required.
Perform TADOT. --NOTE Only required when not performed within previous. 31 days Prior to reactor startup SR 3.3.1.15. NOTE- -- Neutron detectors are excluded from response time testing. O Verify RTS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 18' months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS L l-39 x/- . BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 &~2 3.3.1 - 13 7/9/98 Revision E
~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~- -- -
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 e~ Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 6)
- l. _Reacto.* Trip System Instrumentation
' APPLICABLE MODES OR
- OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE- ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~
.l 1. . Manual Reactor Trip 1.2 2 B SR 3.3.1.13 NA
)l. 3(a), 4(a). 5(a) 2 C SR'3.3.1.13 NA
- 2. . Power Range heutron Flux l- .a. High ' 1.2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 s 111.361 SR 3.3.1.2 RTP SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11
- l. SR 3.3.1.15 l 'b. Low 1(b) 2'
. 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 27.361 SR 3.3.1.8 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 il SR 3.3.1.15
- 3. ' Power Range Neutron Flux Rate l' a.- High Positive Rate 1.2 4- E SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 5 6.3% RTP with time constant
~O. b. High Negative Rate
= 2 sec
-l 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 s 6.31 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 with time l SR 3.3.1.15 constant
= 2 sec
'l' _ 4.' Intermediate Range Neutron Flux 1(b),.2(C) 2' F.G SR 3.3.1.1
-SR 3,3.1.B-s 31.51 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 1
l S. . Source Range Neutron- 2(d) 2 H.I SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.42 E5 cps Flux ' SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 2 l_ SR 3.3.1.15 l
-l- 3(a), 4(a) $(a) .2 1.J SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.42 E5 cps l SR 3.3.1.7 .
SR 3.3.1.11 l SR 3.3.1.15 l (continued) l'(a) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. ' (b)J Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. S (c) - Above the P-6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.
.(d) Below the P-6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.
p a . BRAIDWOOD'- UNITS 1 & 2- 3.3.1 - 14. 7/9/98 Revision E
. . _ _ . . _ _ . ._.m. . -__.___.- __.___._ _ ___-._.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - __-____.____ _ _ - _ . - _ ,_.__ _ _ _ _ _.__ - _ __.- ___ _, _ _ _
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 6) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS' REQUIREMENTS VALUE l l '6. '.Overtemperature AT ' 1.2' 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 (Page SR 3.3.1.6 3.3 18)-
'SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 l? l SR 3.3.1.15 r
I l- l 7. ' Overpower AT 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to SR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 (Page
- SR 3.3.1.10 3.3 19)
- l. SR 3.3.1.15
- i. 8. Pressurizer Pressure
'l
- a. Low '1I ') 4- K SR 3.3.1.1 = 1869 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10
, .l SR 3.3.1.15 l l b .' Hign 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1'.1 = 2393 psig l-SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10
- .l. .
SR 3.3.1.15 4
- 9. Pressurizer Water. 1(e) 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 s 93.5% of Level - High SR 3.3,1.7 instrument SR 3.3.1.10 span
, 10. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low (per. loop)
II 'I 3- K SR 3.3.1.1 = 89.3% of
. loop minimum
( SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 measured flow SR 3.3.1.15 l 11.- Reactor Coolant Pep 1(8) 4 K SR 3.3.1.13 NA (RCP) Breater Position - (per train)
.3 (continued)
~
(e) . Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock, i. 4 v ! BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 , 3.3.1 - 15 7/9/98 Revision E l t ~. I
RTS Instruments' tion 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (page 3 of 6) Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR-OTHER SPECIFIED REOL' IRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS. _ CHAMELS CONDITIONS. . REQUIREMENTS VALUE
'l 12. Undervoltage- 1(') 4 K SR 3.3.1.9 e 4920 V RCPs (per. train) SR 3.3.1.10
.l SR 3.3.1.15
- l 13 Underfrequency . 1(') 4 K SR 3.3.1.9 a 56.08 H2 RCPs (per train) SR 3.3.1.10
<l SR 3.3.1.15
~14 Steam Generator (SG)
Water Level - Low Low (per SG) ! a. Unit 1 , 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 = 16.1% of
, SR 3.3.1.7 narrow range
, SR 3.3.1.10 instrument SR 3.3.1.15 span
- b. Unit 2 '
1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 = 34.8% of SR 3.3.1.7 narrow range SR 3.3.1.10 instrunent SR 3.3.1.15 span
- 15. Turbine Trip
! a. Emergency Trip. 1(f) 3 L SR 3.3.1.10 a 815 psig l '- 'l- Header Pressure
.(per train)
SR 3.3.1.14
- b. Turbine Throttle III) '4 L SR 3.3.1.10 a It open -
.l Valve Closure SR 3.3.1.14 (per tratn) l 16. Safety injection (SI) 1.2 .2 trains -M. SR 3.3.1,13 NA Input from Engineered Safety feature ,,
^
Actuation System (ESFAS) (continued)
- (e) .Above the P 7 (Low Power Reacter Trips Block) Interlock.
(f) -Above the P B (Power Range Neutron flux) interlock. h , BRAIDWOOD - UNITS .1 & 2. 3.3.1 - 16 7/9/98 Revision E' u _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _
RTS Instrumentation 3.3 1
'(N ' Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 6)
Reactor Trip System Ir.strumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS ' REQUIREMENTS VALUE 4 17. Aeactor Trip
!;ystem Interlocks
- a. .Soutce Range Block 2(d) 2 0 SR 3.3.1.11' a 6E 11 amp Permissive, P 6 SR 3.3.1 ?2
- b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block. P 7 (1) P-10 Input 1 -3 P SR 3.3.1.11 NA SR 3.3.1.12 (2) P 13 Input. I 2 P SR 3.3.1.11 NA SR 3.3.1.12
- c. Power Range . 1 3 P SR 3.3.1.11 s 32.11 RTP heutron Flux, P-B SR 3.3.1.12
.d. Power Range 1.2 3 0 SR 3.3.1.11 a 7.9% RTP and Neutron Flux P 10 SR 3.3.1.12 .s 12.11 RTP ei Turbine Impulse 1 2 P SR 3.3.1.10- s 12.1%
Pressure. P-13 SR 3.3.1.12 turbine power
- 18. Reactor Trip 1.2 2 trains N SR 3.3.1.4 NA Breakers (RTBs)(9) 3(a)-, 4(a), 5(a) 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.4- NA l 19 Reactor Trip Breaker 1.2 1 each per RTB 0 SR 3.3.1.4 NA Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms 3(a) 4(a). 5(a) 1 each per RTB SR 3,3.1.4 NA
. l: C l 20. Automatic Tri. 44. <
1.2 2 trains M SR 3.3.1.5 .NA l 3(a), 4(a) $(4) 2 trains C SR 3.3.1 5 NA l (a) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
-(d) Below the P 6 (Source Range Block Permissive) inter 1cck. ,
(g) Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypasstng ta RTB. l _ (~) . J BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 17 7/9/98 Revision E h. 9
I' RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 y Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 6)
'V- Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overtemoerature AT
- o. The Overtemperature AT. Function Allowable.Value shall not exceed the following-
-Trip Setpoint by more.than 1.33% of AT span.
1 K - K (1 + r,s) 1
' A'T (1+7 s) 3 SAT' o 3 T - T' + K3 (P-P')- f (A I) 3
- . (1 + r,s) 1+rs 3 2 (1+rss) - (1 + r,s)
L l :Where: AT is measured Reactor Coolant System (RCS) AT, F.
- ATs is the indicated AT at RTP, F.
L s is the Laplace transform operator, sec'2 . T,is the. measured RCS average temperature ;*F. l T is the nominal Tm at RTP, s 588.4 F. . L P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig. P .is the nominal RCS operating pressure, a: 2235 psig. ( Ki = 1.325 K2 = 0.0297/ F K3 = 0.00181/psig . 73 - 8 sec 72= 3 sec 73 s 2.sec ! T4 _= 33 sec- .73 - 4 sec 76 s 2 sec f ( AI) = -3.35{24 + - (qt -_ q,)} when qt - Ao < - 24% RTP 3
- 0% of RTP when -24% RTP s qt - q, s 10% RTP
- 4.11{(qt - q3) 10} when qt - go > -10% RTP
~ Where qt and q, are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core, respectively, and-qt. + q, is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.
p-l
;f"y LV. .
lBRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2: 3.3.1 - 18 7/9/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation 1 3.3.1 l 1
) '
. Table 3.'3.1-1 (page 6 of 6)
Reactor Trip _ System Instrumentation l Note 2: 'Overoower AT-l ;The Overpower AT: Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip Setpoint by more than 3.65%~of AT span. l l: l . . . . 1- 7s 1 1 A 1 (1+r s)L i
- s A To
- K,- K3 7
'T - K. T - T" - f 7(A I) '
;1+T 2S) 1+T3s 1+T7 s 1+T6 s 1+T6 8 Where: 'ATLis measured RCS AT, F.
l 6To ..is the ' indicated oT at RTP, F s.is the Laplace transform operator,.sec'!
~
T,,is the measured RCS average temperature, F. l T is the nominal T ,, at RTP s 588.4'F. .
~
l Kt - 1.072 ' Ks = 0.02/ F for increasing T,,, K, = 0.00245/ F when T > T"
'0/ F for decreasing T,,, 0/ F when T s T"
- f-] .)
- A./ T3 - 8 sec
. 72 3 sec r3 s 2 sec !
l
, 76 s-2 sec. 77= 10 sec
.f2 (AI) = 0 for all AI.
t , p I-
,I l
. BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 19 7/9/98 Revision A
> i L
]
i 1 j
ESFAS Instrumentation-3.3.2 3.'3 -INSTRUMENTATION.
!,-)-
3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System'(ESFAS) Instrumentation
~
'LCO 3.3 2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall'be OPERABLE.
~
APPLICABILITY: -According to Table 3.3.2-1.
' ACTIONS ,
.. . . NOTE l Separste Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION ~ REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. .One or'more Functions A.1'
~
Enter the Condition .Immediately with one or more- referenced in
-_y - required channels or Table 3.3.2-1 for the
/ trains inoperable. channel (s) or.-
. d' train (s).
!B. .One channel B.1. Restore channel to 48 hours inoperable. OPERABLE status.
OR . 'l B.2.1' Be in MODE 3; 54 hours A_N_Q B.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours
, .- [ - (continued) i l
;;^v x.) . '
!BR IDWOOD'- UNITS l'& 2 3. 3. 2 - 1 7/9/98 Revision E
-_.__________-__&____.m ...-_._h____- - . - - . -
l' . ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued) V CONDITION ~ REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. . One train inoperable. C.1 NOTE i One train may be l by3assed for up to j l 4 lours for ' L surveillance testing l provided the other. I train is OPERABLE. Restore train to ~6 hours t OPERABLE status. i @ C.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours MQ C.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 42 hours l-D. One channel D1 NOTE inoperable. The inoperable channel may be i by)assed for up to 4 lours for E surveillance testing j of other channels. Place channel in 6 hours trip. 2 l D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours. AND-D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours
.[. (continued)
BRAIDWOOD.- UNITS l'& 2 3.3.2 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E l l l I I . l
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2
'cs ACTIONS (continued) k>) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
E. One Containment E.1 NOTE- ) Pressure channel One additional 1 inoperable. channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for i surveillance testing. Place channel in 6 hours j bypass'. j i e i E.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours
@.Q E.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours
[d F. One channel or train F.1 Restore channel or 48 hours inoperable. train to OPERABLE status. 8 F.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours AND F.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours l (continued) i
; i %)
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3. 2 - 3_ 7/9/98 Revision E L
ESFAS Instrumentation
.3.3.2 j9 ACT. IONS (continued)-
'N CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G. ~ One' train inoperable. G.1 NOTE
.0ne train may be by)assed for up.to , 4 1ours for-surveillance testing provided the other train is 0PERABLE.
1 Restore train to 6 hours
.0PERABLE status.
G.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours gg .
~
G.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours b'] . :H. One cha'nel n H.1 . NOTE - inoperable. One channel may be , by>assed for up to 2 lours for . surveillance testing provided the other channel is'0PERABLE. Place channel in 1 hour trip. H.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours J AND L H.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours (- .
..] (continued)
()! . L . LBRAIDWOOD'- UNITS 1 & 2 ,
- 3. 3. 2.- 4 7/9/98 Revision E L.
-_a_m. _____.__'_.____._
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 f ACTIONS- (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
~ I '. One channel ~ I .1. .
NOTE inoperable. The inoperable channel may be by3assed-for up to 4.1ours for. surveillance' testing of other channels. Place channel in 6 hours
. trip.
I.2' Be in MODE 3. 12 hours J. One or more trains J.1- Declare associated Immediately r p n e K, One channel- K.1 NOTE inoperable. The inoperable l channel may be. H - by)assed for up to 4 lours for. 4 surveillance testing
'of ether channels.
4 Place channel in- 6 hours trip. ! M. . K.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours
.A,_NQ
- l. '
K.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 42 hours
. ,X - f (continued)
BRAIDWOOD ' UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 5 7/9/98 Revision E'
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2
. ACTIONS (continued)-
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION- COMPLETION TIME
.L. One'or more channels L.11 Verify . interlock is 1 hour inoperable.- in required state for existing unit condition.
DE L.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours 6.ND L.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE
,Q Refer to Table 3.3.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ESFAS Function.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-SR' 3.3.2.1' Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours L SR 3.3.2.2 Perform COT. 31 days ! SR 3.3.2.3 . NOTE Verification of relay setpoints not required. Perform TAD 0T. 31 days (continued) A. U_ . BP IDWOOD --UNITS 1-& 2 3.3.2 - 6 7/9/98 Revision E m____ a _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ ._
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS- (continued) (] SURVEILLANCE ! FREQUENCY
)
SR .3.3.2.4 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.2.5 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS' SR. 3.3.2.6 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.2.7: . Perform SLAVE RELAY. TEST. 92 days h.. -SR 3.3.2.8 . NOTE
. Verification of relay setpoints not required.
Perform TAD 0T. 92 days
. SR 3.3.2.9 . NOTE-
_[ Verification 6f setpoint not required. PdrformTAD0T. 18 months SR '3.3.2.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months (continued)
"BRkIDWOOD'-UNITS 1&2 3.3. 2 - 7 7/9/98 Revision E 0 -
L
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.11 Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within 18 months limit. SR 3.3.2.12 Verify ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within 18 months on a limit. STAGGERED TEST BASIS O l l
~~
l ? i i O ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 8 7/9/98 Revision A'
l r , l ESFAS Instrumentation l 3.3.2 l t i Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 6)
- Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR .
OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE ]
- 1. Safety Injection
- a. Manua1' Initiation 1.2.3.4 2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA
- b. Automatic 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 i
and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays l' c. Containment Pressure - High 1 1.2.3 3 'D SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.6 s 4'.6 psig SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 l 'd. Pressurizer 1.2.3(a) 4 0 SR-3.3.2.1 = 1813 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10
. SR 3.3.2.12 j l e. Steam Line 1.2.3(a) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 a 614 psig(D)
! Pressure - Low line SR 3.3.2.6 ! SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12
,- , 2. Containment Spray
- a. Manual Initiation 1.2.3.4 2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA
- b. Automatic 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays l c. -Containment 1.2.3 4 E- SR 3.3.2.1 s 21.2 psig' Pressure High - 3 SR 3.3.2.6 .. I' SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 (continued) l (a) Above the P-11'(Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
(b) Time constants used in the lead / lag controller are t =i 50 seconds and t, s 5 seconds, t l I O . BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 3.2 - 9 7/9/98 Revision E l 4 i i
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2
- q- ' Table 3.3.2 1 (page 2 of 6)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation 2, APPLICABLE MODES'0R t-OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS. CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 3. ' Containment Isolation
- a. Pnase A ! solation-
-(1) Manual . 1,2,3.4 2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA Initiation
- (2) Automatic 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Logic and SR 3.3.2.7
. Attuation
, Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
In,)ection
- b. Phase B Isolation (1) Manual 1.2.3.4 2- B SR 3.3.2.9 NA Initiation (2)'Automatte 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.5
' Logic and SR 3.3.2.7 Actuation Relays
_ [- (3) Containment- 1. 2. 3 - 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 s 21.2 psig Pressure SR 3.3.2.6 High - 3 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 m (continued) 4 l P h , BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2* 3.3.2 - 10 7/9/98 Revision E e L __ _ . - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ , _ m__
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 6)
- Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation f-N./ )
APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED. REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE > FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE {
. l
- 4. . Steam Line Isolation .
l La. Manual Initiation 1.2(C) 3(C)
. 2 F SR 3.3.2.9 NA
'l b. Automatic Actuation
. Logic and Actuation
-1.2(h) 3(h)
. 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.4 ' NA SR 3.3.2.5 Relays - SR 3.3.2.7
'l' c. Containment' 1.2(h) 3(h)
. 3 '0 SR 3.3.2.1 s 9.4 psig Pressure - High 2 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12
- d. Steam Line Pressure l 1.2(h) 3(a)(h)(f)
. 3 per steam 0 SR 3.3.2.1 a 614 psig(b) line SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10' SR 3.3.2.12 'M (2) Negative 3(h)(d) 3 per steam ' 0 SR 3.3.2.1 s 165.3 pst(*)
(d-I. Rate - High line. SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 (continued) (a) ' Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
-(b) Time constants used in the lead / lag controller are t ai 50 seconds and t, s 5 seconds.
.lj(c) Except when all Main Steam.lsolation Valves (MSIVs) are cltfEd.
(d) Below the P 11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock with Function 4.d.1 blocked. (e) Time constant utilized in the ratellag controller is a 50 seconds. (f)- Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock with Function 4.d.2 not enabled. l (h) Except when all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and MSIV bypass valves are closed. t i BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3:3.2 - 11 7/9/98 Revision E. [- . L k
ESFAS Instrumentation i 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 6)
}q' .
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE N00ES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION' CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 5. : Turbine Trip and Feeowater Isolation.
l a. Automatic .
' 1.2(9) 3(9) I
. '2 trains G SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays.
. b'. ' Steam Generator (SG) Water Level- High High (P 14)-
- 1) . Unit 1 1.2(9) 3(9)
. 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 's 89.9% of SR 3.3.2.4 narrow range SR 3.3.2.5 instrument SR 3.3.2.6 span SR 3.3.2.7 i SR 3.3.2.10 i '
SR 3.3.2.12 ,
- 2) Unit 2 1.2(9) 3(9)
. 4 per SG 0 SR 3.3.2.1 s 82.8% of SR 3.3.2.4 narrow range SR 3,3.2.5 . instrument i SR 3.3.2.6 span i SR 3.3.2.7 ,
-' /* . -
SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 4 1 j
-. .. 1
- c. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety In,jection) for all initiation functions and requirements. l l
(continued)
~
, - l: (g) Except when all Feedwater Isolation Valves are closed or isolated by a closed manual valve.
l l O ' < BRAIDWOOD - UNITS l'& 2- 3.3.2 - 12 7/9/98 Revision E l: l-
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 6) ( g) - Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
- V APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE
'. FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
'l a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation 1.2.3 2 trains - G SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.5 NA Relays. SR 3.3.2.7
, b. SG Water Level - Low Low
- 1) Unit 1 1.2.3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 = 16.11 of l , SR 3.3.2.6 narrow range SR 3.3.2.10 instrument SR 3.3.2.12 span
- 2) Unit 2. 1. 2. 3 , 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 = 34.8% of SR 3.3.2.6 narrow range SR 3.3.2.10 instrenent SR 3.3.2.12 span
- c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
l'. d. Loss of Offsite Power . 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.2.3 = 2730 V (undervoltage on- SR 3.3.2.10 Bus 141(241)) SR-3.3.2.11
'h d- e Undervoltage Reactor 1.2 4 I SR.3.3.2.8 = 4920 V Coolant Ptap (per SR 3.3.2.10 :)
train) SR 3.3.2.12 l f. Auxiliary Feedwater 1.2.3 1 per train ~J SR 3.3.2.1 = 17.4 psia Pump Suction Trans1er SR 3.3.2.2 on Suction . SR 3.3.2.10 Pressure - Low ~ I
- 7. Switchover to Containment.
l Stnp a.' Automatic Actuation 1,2,3.4 '2 tratir C ' SR 3.3.2.4 NA ! Logic and Actuation -. SR 3.3.2.5 l Relays SR 3.3.2.7 b, Refueling Water 1.2.3.4 4 K SR 3.3.2.1- = 44.*71 of Storage Tank (RWST) SR 3.3.2.6 instrtment i ' Level - Low Low ' SR 3.3.2.10 span l SR 3.3.2.12 Coincident with . . Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. Safety injection (continued) ) I I i 0 u . l
~
1BRAIDWOOD-UNITS 1&2 3.3.2 - 13 7/9/98 Revision E i l I
.__-__a__--.--_-_-- - - _ _ -- - . _ - - - - . . - . _ - - - _ _ . _ . _ _ - = . - _ _ _ _ . . - - . _ - - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ = - - - - _ -- - _ . _ _ _ . . _ - . _ - - _ _ _ . - - _ - - - _ - - - - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ . = _ _ _ .s
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.21 (page 6 of 6) ( Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation l APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED ' REQUIRED - SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS . CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE l-l B. ESFAS Interlocks
- a. Reactor Trip. P-4 1.2.3 2 per train F SR 3.3.2.9 NA D. Pressurizer Pressure. 1.2.3 2 L SR 3.3.2.6 s 1936 psig P ll SR 3.3.2.10
- l. c. T,,, - Low Low. P-12 1.2.3 3 L SR 3.3.2.6 = 546.9'F .
SR 3.3.2.10
+
l m b BRdIDWOOD-UNITS 1&2 3.3.2 - 14 7/9/98 Revision E
- l. .
L___n____._________________..____________. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ ___ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __._ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
7-----
}
!.- PAM Instrumentation p , 3.3.3 )
- l. .
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION- ! , ~3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO .3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 ) shall be. OPERABLE. According to Table 3.3.3-l'. APPLICABILITY: ACTIONS NOTES l E 1. LCO .T0 4 is not applicable. i
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ~
- ('T A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
(~') with one required - referenced in
. channel. inoperable. Table 3.3.3-1 for the channel.
i B. As required by B .1' Restore required 30 days Recuired Action A.1 channel to OPERABLE. , anc referenced-in status. ' Table 3.3.3-1.
.C. -Required Action'and. C.1 Initiate action ~in Immediately
- associated Completion accordance with LTime of Condition B' Specification 5.6.7.
not met. (continued) v V~ BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1.&'2 3.3. 3 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A u J__i___-_..-__.L_: -
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 (O
%J ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME j 4 D. As required by D.1 Restore one required 7 days Recuired Action A.1 channel to OPERABLE anc referenced in status. Table 3.3.3-1. ,
, i E. ---NOTE- E.1 Restore all but one 7 days Not applicable to required channel to l Function 15. OPERABLE status.
One or more Functions with two or more required channels inoperable. F. Two hydrogen monitor F.1 Restore one hydrogen 72 hours
/m i channels inoperable. monitor channel to O OPERABLE status.
G. NOTE G.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Not applicable to Functions 11, 12. and AND 14. G.2 NOTE Not' applicable to , Required Action and Function 15. I associated Completion - Time of. Condition D. E or F not met. Be in MODE 4. 12 hours (continued) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.3 - 2 7/9/9B Revision A
L , j PAM Instrumentation 4 3.3.3' i l . ! ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I H. -NOTE - H.1 Initiate action in !mmediately Only applicable to accordance with Functions 11, 12. and Specification 5.6.7. 14. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D or . E not met.
)
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.2 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.3-1.
.]
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally J energized. I SR 3.3.3.2 - NOTE
. Radiation detectors for Function 11.
Containment Area Radiation. are excluded. 1 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months ; 1 I l
.BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.3 - 3 7/9/98 Revision E I
J
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 ( '\ Table 3 3.3-1 (page 1 of 1) Post Acc1 cent Moritoring Instrumentation d l APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED i FUNCTION CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS
- 1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure 1.2.3 2 B (Wide Range) l
- 2. RCS Hot Leg Temperature (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 6
- 3. RCS Cold leg Temperature (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 B 4 Steam Generator (SG) Water Level 1.2.3 1 D (Wiae Range)(per SG)
- 5. SG Water Level (Narrow Range)(per SG) 1.2.3 1 0
- 6. Pressur12er Water Level (Narrow Range) 1.2.3 2 B
- 7. Containment Pressure (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 B B. Steam Line Pressure (per SG) 1.2.3 2 B
- 9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 1.2.3 2 B
- 10. Containmer.t Floor Water Level (Wide Range) 1.2.3 2 B
- 11. Containment Area Radiation (High Range) 1.2.3 1 D
- 12. Main Steam Line Radiation (per steam line) 1.2.3 1 D
- 13. Core Exit Temperature (per core quadrant) 1.2.3 4 B j m 14 Reactor Vessel Water Level 1.2.3 2 B I
- 15. Hydrogen Monitors 1.2 2 B
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BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.3 - 4 7/9/98 Revision A
Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4
. 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System
! j LC0 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3. I ACTIONS NOTES --
- 1. -LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
L
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
i l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
- A. One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days !
gx Functions inoperable. Function to OPERABLE jV status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion i Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours es t l
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Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4
. C'i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS v _ = _
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally y energized. SR 3.3.4.2 ----- - NOT E . Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each 18 months required instrumentation channel. lO i 1 1 __ j O l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.4 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A
LOP DG Start-Instrumentation 3.3.5
.L 3. 3 INSTRUMENTAL. TON qf v.'
3 3.5 Et. css' of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5 Two channels per bus of the loss of voltage Function and two channels per bus of the degraded voltage Function shall be
+ OPERAB!.E.
l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,.3. and 4: When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2.
"AC Sources -Shutdown."
~ ACTIONS.
NOTE --
. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION. - COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 NOTE with one channel on For loss of voltage one or more buses Function, the inoperable. inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of the other channel.
PlaTechannelin 1 hour trip. B. One o'r more Functions B.1 Restore one channel 1 hour with two channels on for the Function on
-one,or more buses the~affected bus to inoperable OPERABLE status.
,s (continued) n v. li' _.BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.5 - 1 7/9/98 Revision E _ _- 2-_._. _. _ - . - _ - - - . - , _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . - _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ .
LOP DG Start Instrumentation 3.3.5 ACTIONS- (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Enter applicable Immediately associated Completion Condition (s) and Time not met. Required Action (s) for the associated DG if made inoperable by LOP DG start instrumentation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1 NOTE Verification of relay setpoints not required. Perform TADOT. 31 days SR 3.3.5.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 18 months
' Allowable Value as follows:
- a. Loss of voltage Allowable Value
= 2730 V with a time delay of s 1.9 seconds.
- b. Degraded voltage Allowable Value
= 3930 V with a time delay of 310 30 seconds.
h ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.5 - 2 7/9/98 Revision E i L i
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 l' 3.3' INSTRUMENTATION l d/^ i
- 3.3.6 ContainmentLVentilation Isolation Instrumentation i
LCO' 3.3.6 The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1. ACTIONS NOTE
.Seoarate' Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L-A. One radiation A.1 Restore the affected 4 hours monitoring channel channel to OPERABLE-
- y inopera51e. status.
U (continued) e i l I ln .V , BRAIDWOOD -~ UNITS 1 & 2 3.3. 6 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A l l _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a
. Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3 3.6 ACTIONS ~~(continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4 B. NOTE B.1 Enter applicable Immediately Only applicable in- Conditions and MODE 1, 2. 3. or 4. Required Actions of LC0 3.6.3.
" Containment One or more automatic Isolation Valves."
actuation trains for containment purge inoperable. valves rade inoperable by
@ isolation instrumentation.
Two radiation monitoring channels inoperable. Required Action and associated Completion
- Time of Condition A .
not met. 7 l . C. ---NOTE - C.1 Place and maintain Innediately Only applicable when containment purge , Item C.2 of LC0 3.9.4 valves in the closed I is required. position. ) l @ Two radiation _ l monitoring channels C.2 Enter applicable Immediately j inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of L @ LC0 3.9.4,
" Containment l Required Action and Penetrations." for i associated Completion containment purge {
Time of Condition A valves made j not met. inoperable by , isolation instrumentation. l l O BRAiDWOOD-UNITS 1&2 3. 3. 6 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A L__________________.________________
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE Refer to. Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each' Containment Ventilation Isolation Function. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.] Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.6.2 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days'on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.3 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.4 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.5. Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.6 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months O ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.6 - 3 7/9/98 Revision A
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6
'f(J Table 3 3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)
Containmei.t Ventilation Isolation ' instrumentation APPLICABLE- l FUNCT!0N M00E5 5pEC ED CONDITIONS 0THER REQUIRED CHANNELS h TRIP SETPOINT
- 1. -Manual-Initiation - Phase A Refer te LCO 3.3.2. "ESFAS Instrumentation." function 3.a.l. for all Initiation functions and reautrements.
- 2. . Manual.Inttiation - Phase E Refer to LCO 3.3.2. *ESFAS Instrumentation." function 3,b.1. for all in'tiation functions and requirements.
3.. Automatic Actuation Logic 1.2.3.4 2 trains SR 3.3.6.2 hA and Actuation Relays SR 3.3.6.3 SR 3.3.6.5
- 4. .ontatnment 1.2.3.4.(a) 2 SR 3.3.6.1 (b)
Aadt ation - High . SR 3.3.6.4 SR 3.3.6.6
- 5. Safety injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2. *ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 1. for all initiation l - functions and requirements.
(4) When item C.2 of LCO 3.9.4 1s required. (b) Trip setpoint shall be established such that actual submersic9 dosa rate is s 10 mR/n, in the Containment Building. The trip setpoint may be increased above this value in accordance W1th the methodology establis ied in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. ~ I l l l
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VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation
'3.3.7 q
3.3 -INSTRUMEN ATION
- j. 3.3.7 Control Room Ventilation (VC) Filtration System Actuation p Instrumentation l- LCO 3.3.7 The VC Filtration System actuation instrumentation for each.
l; Function'in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE. l L APPLICABILITY: .According to Table 3.3.7-1. l ACTIONS U CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Place the redundant 1 hour
.on one train VC Filtration System
' inoperable. train in normal mode.
- 2 lc A'. 2 Place one VC Filtration System 1 hour
(' ' l train in emergency mode. B. One or more channels B '.1 Place one VC. I hour on both trains Filtration System inoperable. train in emergency moh. C. . Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion
. Time of Condition A AND D 2 . or 4.. C.2- Be in MODE 5. 36 hours (continued)
I O BRAIDWOOD -_ UNITS l'& 2 3.3.7 - 1 7/9/98.RehisionA i
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VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 ACTIONS (continued)-
' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I
D Required Action and D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately
-associated Completion irradiated fuel Time of Condition A- assemblies, or B not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
E. Required Action and E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately associated. Completion ALTERATIONS. Time of Condition A or_B not met in MODE 5 AND or 6. E.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore one VC Filtration System train to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE -- Refer to Table ~ 3.3.7-1 to determine which SRs apply for each VC Filtration System Actuation Function. I te** SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.7.2 Perform COT, 92 days (continued) BRAIDWOOD . UNITS 1 & 2 , 3.3. 7 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A l
VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months
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i g e i O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7 - 3 7/9/98Revisiond
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I VC Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7
-(N Table 3.3.7 1 (page 1 cf 1) j VC F11tration System Actuation instrumentation l
- APPLICABLE MODES R
FUNCTION' REQUIRED CHANNELS' SfECIFED f TRIP SETPOINT l ' CONDITIONS
' Ic Control Room 1.2.3.4.5.6.(a) 2 per train SR 3.3.7.1 s 2 mR/nr l
Radiation Gaseous SR 3,3.7.2 SR 3.3.7.3 , 2. Safety in.jection Refer to LCO 3.3.2. "ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 1. for all initiation l-functtons and requirements. l-(a) During movement of irradiated fuel assemolies. l f I l' 4 l t I, ? l-l l p 1 ( l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7 - 4 7/9/98 Revision A 1 E_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . - - - - _ _ - _ - . - - - - - - - - -- - - . - - - _ _ - - -------d
, i FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 m' 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 _ Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenum (FHB) Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation J
' ' LCO 3.3.8 The FHB Ventilation System actuation instrumentation for f
each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.8-1. ACTIONS L NOTE i' LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. i i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME t I A. -One channel A.1 Restore channel to 7 days inoperable. OPERABLE status O u (continued) i 1 O-
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BRkIDWOOD'-UNITS 1&2 3.3. 8 - 1 7/9/98 Revision A i
FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued) I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Place in emergency Immediately associated Completion mode one FHB Time not, met. Ventilation System train capable of
@ being powered by an OPERABLE emergency
. Two channels power _ source.
. inoperable.
2 B.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building. AND B.2.2 - NOTE Only required with i equipment hatch not lO lV intact. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel . assemblies in the containment. . i
, AND l
~~
- B.2.3 NOTE
. Only required with equipment hatch not intact.
Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. i. l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8 - 2 7/9/98 Revision A 4
l FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE -
. Refer to Table 3.3.8-1 to determine which SRs apply for each FHB Ventilation l System Actuation Function. l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR -3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR-.3.3.8.2 Perform COT. 92 days SR- 3.3.8;3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION, 18 months t q% J l
l l j.- t O l) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS l'& 2 . 3.3,8 - 3 7/9/98 Revision A i _.____---_-_--.---__-.-]
FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instruttentation 3.3.8 Table 3.3.8 1 (page 1 of 1) O - FHB Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES T" FUNCTION REQUIRED CHANNELS TRIP SETPOINT pEC FIED f CONDITIONS
- 1. Fuel Handling Building (a),(b).(c) 2 SR 3.3.8.1 s 5 mR/nr Radiation SR 3.3 8.2 SR 3.3.8.3
- 2. Safety Injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2. "ESFAS Instrumentation." Function 1. for all initiation functions and requirements.
(a) During movement of irradiated fuel 855emblies in the fuel handling building, (b) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment with the equipment hatch not intact.
-(c) During CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not Intact.
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BDPS 3.3.9
- 3. 3. 1 1 INSTRUMENTATION'
- 3.3.9-. Boron Dilution Protection System (BDPS)
LC0 .3.3.9 Two trains of the BDPS shall be OPERABLE. NOTE-The boron dilution flux doubling sigr.al may be blocked in MODE 3 during reactor startup. APPLICABILITY: MODES-3, 4. and 5. '
- ACTIONS-
. . .- NOTE - -----
- Unborated water source isolation valves may be unisolated intermitted,tly under administrative controls.
CONDITION. ' REQUIRED ACTION. . COMPLETION TIME A. One train inoperable. A.1 Restore' train to 72 hours OPERABLE status. f B. Required Action'and B.1 Close unborated water. I hour associated Completion source isolation Time of Condition A - vakes.
-not met'.
AND B.2- Verify unborated Once per 31 days water source isolation valves closed. , i (continued) l O BRAIDWOOD ' UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.9 - 1 7/9/9BRevision5 i ____m__________u_ ____________.-____u - ------__------_---_.---__-i- --_-.m --. - - - _ - - _ - - - - _ - - - - -
t I l BDPS i 3.3.9 <- f ACTIONS (continued)
~J' A
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i j C. Two trains inoperable C.1 Close and deactivat'e 8 hours due to the refueling isolation valves from. water storage tank the RWST. (RWST) boron concentration not j within limits. D. Two trains ino)erable D.1 Close unborated water 1 ho'ur
'for reasons otler than source isolation Condition C. valves.
! E. ! D.2 Perform.SR 3.1.1.1. I hour M Once per l
.O 12 hours
- . V thereafter M
D.3 Verify unborated Once per water source 12 hours isolation valves
. closed.
b E. Two trains inoperable E.1 Suspend positive Immediately due to required ' source ' reactivity additions. - range neutron flux monitor inoperable for control room , monitoring of core status. l 1
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BDPS 3.3.9 4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
!b SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
-SR-'3'3.9.1
. NOTE Not required to be performed prior to
-entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry into MODE 3.
Verify required source range monitor signal 12 hours to BDPS is indicating a count rate
= 10 cps.
SR '3.3.9.2 Verify required. reactor coolant pump in 12. hours operation. SR 3.3.9.3 . Verify each Reactor Coolant System loop 12 hours
-isolation valve is open.
'(] '
-SR- 3.3.9.4 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours )
SR- 3.3.9.5 Verify RWST boron concentration is greater , 7 days than the equivalent SDM limits specified in the COLR.
.- i SR '3.3.9.6 . Veri.fy each manual. )ower operated and - 31 days '
automatic valve in tie flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in' ;
, position...is in the correct' position. .
j L 'SR 3.3.9.7 Verify the BDPS alarm setpoint is less than 92 days
.or equal to an increase of twice the count.
L I rate within a'10 minute period. ,
.g (continued) f] '
L BR IDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.9 - 3 7/9/98 Revision E
.BDPS j, 3.3.9 V .
g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .(continued)
]
i , SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY l 1 i SR 3.3.9.8 NOTE .. l
- l. .
Not required to be performed prior to ! entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours ! i- after entry'-into MODE 3. 4 Perform COT. 92 days i
'SR 3 3.9.9 Verify each BDPS valve actuates to its 18 months correct L. ' signal. position on an actual or. simulated l:
i SR 3.3.9.10 NOTE . Neutron detectors are' excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. l O- Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months I [- , j
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RTS Instrumentation
., B 3.3.1-c .
B 3.3 _ INSTRUMENTATION L B 3.3.1; Reactor. Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation l_ BASES. BACKGROUND The RTS initiates a unit shutdown, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating the core fuel design limits and Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
. pressure boundary during Anticipated Operational Occurrences (A00s)-~and to assist the Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
. Systems in mitigating accidents.
The protection and monitoring ' systems have been designed to assure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by
.specifying Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) in terms l-of. parameters directly monitored by the RTS. as well as specifying LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.
The LSSS, defined in this specification as the Allowable Values, in conjunction with the LCOs establish the ! threshold'for protective system action to prevent exceeding.
- n acceptable limits during Design' Basis Accidents. (DBAs).
During A00s. which are those events expected to occur one or L more times during the unit life, the a:ceptable limits are:
- 1. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall
'be maintained above the Safety Limit (SL) value to prevent Departure fram Nucleate Boiling (DNB):
- 1
- 2. Fuel centerline melt shall not occur: and.
- 3. The RCS pressure TL of 2735 psig shall not be exceeded.
Operation within the SLs of Specification 2.0. " Safety Limits (SLs)." also maintains the above values and assures that offsite dose will.be within the 10 CFR 50 and l 10 CFR 100 criteria during A00s. l g l O BRALDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 1 5/29/98 Revision A b'
I ! RTS Instrumentation 1 L B 3.3.1 A : BASES V; . L.~ . BACKGROUND (continued)- Accidents are events that are analyzed even though they,are l not expected to occur during the unit life The acceptable limit during accidents is that offsite dose shall be maintained within an acceptable fraction of 10 CFR 100
. limits. Different accident categories are allowed a different fraction of these limits, based on probability of.
- occ'urrence. Meeting the acceptable dose limit for 'an accident category is considered having acceptable consequences for that event.
The RTS instrumentation is segmented into four distinct but interconnected modules as identified below. The RTS process is illustrated .n UFSAR, Chapter 7 (Ref. 1): l, 1. -Field. transmitters or process sensors: provide a i measurable electronic signal based upon the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured: Signal Process Control and Protection System. including. l 2. Analog Protection System. Nuclear Instrumentation l System (NIS), field contacts, and protection channel l1 ' : sets: provide signal conditioning, bistable set)oint ll1 ' comparison process algorithm actuation. compatiale electrical signal output to protection system devices. and control board / control room / miscellaneous ! .. indications:
- 3. Solid-State Protection System (SSPS). including input.
logic, and output bays: initiates pro)er unit shutdown and/or ESF actuation in accordance wit 1 the defined logic, which is based on the bistable outputs from the signal process co,,n_ trol and protection system; and
~
l 4. Reactor trip switchgear, including Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) and bypass breakers: provides the means to interrupt power to the Control Rod Drivb Mechanisms (CRDMs) and allows the Rod Cluster Control l Assemblies (RCCAs) or " rods." to fall into the core L and shut down the reactor. The bypass breakers allow l testing of the RTBs at power. L O-l- -BRAIDWOOD'- UNITS 1 &'2 B 3.3.1 - 2 5/29/98 Revision A l
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASFI g J BACKGROUND-(continued) Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability. more than one, and often as many as four, f_ield transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. To account I for the calibration tolerances and instrument drift. which I are assumed to occur between calibrations, statistical allowances are provided in the Trip Setpoint and Allowable l Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can < be evaluated when its "as found". calibration data are compared against its documen.ted acceptance criteria. Sianal Process Control and Protection System Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments. The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable i output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with l established setpoints. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from
- o. a bistable is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
t) Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input ! bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing. Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS. while others provide input to the SSPS the main control board, the plant computer, and one or more control systems. > Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, t_hree channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic. e~. , G BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 3 5/30/98 Revision E
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES-
-BACKGROUND (continued):
Generally, if a parameter'is used for.' input to the SSPS and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. lThe circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require
.the protection. function actuation, and a single. failure in Lthe other channels providing the protection function.
actuation. 'Again.:a s~ ingle failure will neither cause nor prevent the_ protection function actuation. These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number'of' channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Reference 1. Two trains are required'to ensure no single random failure of a logic channel will ' disable the RTS. - The logic channels are designed such that testing required while-the reactor is at power may be accomplished without causing a trip. Provisions to' allow removing logic channels from service during maintenance are unnecessary because of the logic system's designed reliability.. Trio Setooints and Allowable Values q
'V -
- j. . Allowable Values provide a conservative margin with regards to. instrument uncertainties to ensure.that SLs are not-violated during .A00s and that the ' consequences of DBAs will-
'be acceptable providing the unit is operated from within the..
LCOs at the onset of the event and required eq'ipment u functions as designed. If the measured value of a bistable exceeds .the Allowable Value without tripping, then the assnciated RTS Function is considered inoperable. Allowable Values ~ for RTS FunctiQDs are specified in Table 3.3.1-1. u b- . l 0 -BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.3.1 - 4 5/30/98' Revision E l l i-w x __l_ - -_ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ . - . _ _ _
9' RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1
. BAS.ES
{
. BACKGROUND (continued)
Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables
- l. or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to 1 account for changes in normal measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example of such.a change in measurement error is attributable'to calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly.
adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for l CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the measured value of a bistable exceeds the Trip Setpoint but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated RTS Function is I considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5). Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a ' methodology which incorporates all of the known - uncertainties applicable for each instrument channel.
.] Reference 6 provides a detailed description of the .
methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints, including their explicit-uncertainties, for all n instruments listed in Table 3.'3.1-1 except the Turbine Trip V Functions. The Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints for the Turbine Trip Functions are based on specific Comed setpoint ; methodology. !; Solid State Protection System
.The SSPS equipment is used for the' decision logic processing ,
of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. To meet the redundancyJ requirements, two trains of SSPS.
- each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance'or. test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and. independence
.. l . . requirements. The system has been designed to initiate a reactor trip in the event of a loss of. power. directing the ~
unit to a safe shutdown condition. 4 l D. v
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B 3.3.1 - 5 5/30/98 Revision E
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES i BACKGROUND (continued) The SSPS performs the decision logic for actuating a reactor trip or ESF actuation; generates the electrical output signal'that will initiate the required trip or actuation, and provides the status, permissive. and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit. The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment
-are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients. If a required logic. matrix combination is completed, the system will initiate a reactor trip or send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to alleviate the condition and restore the unit to a safe condition.
Examples are given in the Applicable Safety Analyses. LCO. and Applicability sections of this Bases. Reactor Trio Switchaear The RTBs are in the electrical power supply line from the
. control rod drive motor generator set power supply to the CRDMs. Opening of the RTBs interrupts power to the CRDMs.
O which allows the shutdown rods and control rods to fall into the core by gravity. Each RTB is equipped with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the RTB while the unit is at power. During normal operation the output from the SSPS is a voltage signal that energizes the undervoltage coils in the RTBs and bypass breakers, if in use. - When the required logic matrix combination is completed, the SSPS output voltage signal is removed the undervoltage coils are
, de-energized, the breaker trip lever is actuated by the de-energized undervoltbreakers arethe pen. This allows tripped o,a.ge shutdown rodscoil, and the R and control rods to fall into the core. In addition to the de-energization of the undervoltage coils, each breaker is also equipped with a shunt trip device that is energized to trip the breaker open upon receipt of a reactor trip signal (the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB) shunt trip device is energized only by a manual reactor trip signal). Either the undervoltage coil or the shunt trip mechanism is sufficient by itself. thus providing a diverse trip mechanism.
O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 6 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation , B 3.3.1 g BASES U BACKGROUND (continued)
.The decision logic matrix Functions are described in the functional diagrams included in Reference 1. In addition to the reactor trip or.ESF. these diagrams also describe the ;
various " permissive interlocks" that are associated with unit conditions. Each train has a built in testing device that can automatically test the decision logic matrix Functions and the actuation devices while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out of service for testing, the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed. The testing device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time. APPLICABLE The RTS functions to maintairi the SLs during all SAFETY ANALYSES. A00s and mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in LCO, and which the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or
~
APPLICABILITY one or more rods are not fully inserted. Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RTS Functions. The accident n analysis described in Reference 3 takes credit for most RTS U trip Functions. RTS trip Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function 3erformance. They may also serve as backups to RTS trip runctions that were credited in the accident analysis.
. The LC0 requires all 1Tstrumentation performing an RTS Function. listed in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO.
to.be OPERABLE when the unit status is within t.he l Applicability. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions. [q v . BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 7 5/30/98 Revision E u_._ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES
-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of three or four channels in each instrumentation Function. two channels of Manual Reactor Trip in each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function. Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-four. configuration are required when one RTS channel is also used as a control system input. This configuration accounts for the possibility of the shared channel failing in such a manner that-it creates a transient that recuires RTS action. In this case, the RTS will still provice protection, even with random failure of one of the other three protection channels. Three OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a two-out-of-three configuration are generally required when there is no potential for control system and protection system interaction that could simultaneously create a need for RTS trip and disable one RTS channel. The two-out-of-three and two-out-of-four configurations allow one' channel to be tripped during maintenance or testing without causing a reactor trip. Specific exceptions to the above general philosophy exist and are discussed below. Reactor Trio System Functions The safety analyses and OPERABILITY requirements applicable to each RTS Function are discussed below:
- 1. Manual Reactor Trio The Manual Reactor Trip ensures that the control room
. operator can initiate a reactor trip at any time by using either of two reactor trip switches in the control room. A janual Reactor Trip accomplishes the
- same results as any one of.the automatic trip Functions. It is used by the reactor operator to shut down the reactor whenever any parameter is rapidly trending toward its Trip Setpoint.
l l l O. ' BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 8 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS' Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES p N -APPLICABLE M ETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) > The LCO requires two Manual Reactor Trip channels to be OPERABLE, Each channel is controlled by a manual reactor trip switch. Each channel activates the reactor. trip breakers in both trains. Two independent ) channels are required to be OPERABLE so that no single i random failure will disable the Manual Reactor Trip Function. In MODE 1 or 2 manual initiation of a reactor trip must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the shutdown rods and/or control rods are partially or fully withdrawn from the core. In MODE 3. 4 or 5, the j manual. initiation' Function must also be OPERABLE if one or more shutdown rods or control rods are withdrawn or the Rod Control System is capable of withdrawing the~ shutdown rods or control rods. .In this condition, inadvertent control rod withdrawal is possible. In MODE 3. 4..or 5, manual initiation of a reactor trip. does not have to be OPERABLE if the Rod Control System is not capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods-or control rods and if all rods are fully inserted. If the rods cannot be withdrawn from the core or all of e the rods are inserted, there is no need to be able to ,
'( trip the reactor. In MODE 6. the CRDMs are . l disconnected from the control rods and shutdown rods.
Therefore, the manual initiation Function is not required.
- 2. Power Ranae Neutron Flux The NIS power ran e detectors are located external to the reactor vess and measure neutrons leaking from the' core. The N power range detectors provide input l to the Rod Control System and the Steam Generator (SG) '
. Water Level-Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Note that this Function also provides a signal to , prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to ! initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod I withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor. 4 i n
.L]
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 l (3, BASES
%J APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- a. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah The Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided, from all power levels, against a positive reactivity excursion leading to DNB during power operations.
These can be caused by rod withdrawal or reductions in RCS temperature. ) l The LCO requires all four of the Power Range i Neutron Flux-High channels to be OPERABLE. In MODE 1 or 2, when a positive reactivity excursion could occur. the Power Range Neutron i Flux-High trip must be OPERABLE. This function l will terminate the reactivity excursion and shut down the reactor prior to reaching a power level that could damage the fuel. In MODE 3. 4. 5. { or 6. the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this range. In these MODES, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down ano ,O reactivity excursions into the aower range are extremely unlikely. Other RTS unctions and administrative controls provide protection against reactivity additions when in MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6.
- b. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Low
. The LCO requirement for the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip Function ensures that protection is
, provided aga,j,nst a positive reactivity excursion . from low power or subtritical conditions. l The LCO requires all four of the Power Range i Neutron Flux -Low channels to be OPERABLE. , I l I
- 1 l
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1. below the Power Range Neutron Flux (P-10 setpoint), and in MODE '2. the Power Range j - Neutron Flux-Low trip must be OPERABLE. Thts j Function may be manually blocked by the operator when two out of four power range channels are greater than approximately 10% RTP (P-10 L setpoint). This Function is automatically l unblocked when three out of four power range channels are below the P-10 setpoint. Above the P-10 setpoint. positive reactivity additions are
- i. mitigated by the Power Range Neutron Flux-High i
trip Function. In MODE 3, 4. 5. or 6. the Power Range Neutron L Flux-Low trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and the p: NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron ! levels.in this range. Other RTS trip Functions , and administrative. controls provide protection against positive reactivity additions or power l excursions in MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6.
- 3. Power Ranae Neutron Flux Rate The Power Range Neutron Flux Rate trips use the same channels as discussed for Function 2 above.
i- a. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hiah Positive Rate The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function ensures that protection is 3rovided against rapid increases in neutron flux tlat are
. _ characterist% of an RCCA drive rod housing .
rupture and the accompanying ejection of the RCCA. This Function compliments the Power Range Neutron l Flux-High and Low Setpoint trip Functions to ensure that the criteria are met for a rod !> ejection from the power range. l The LC0 requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate channels to be ! OPERABLE. I O BRAIDWOOD ' UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 11 5/29/98Revisiond
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 ;
\
1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO..and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1 or 2. when there is a potential to add a large amount of positive reactivity from a Rod Ejection Accident (REA) the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip must be OPERABLE. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls will provide protection against positive reactivity additions.
- b. Power Ranae Neutron Flux-Hioh Negative Rate The Power Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate trip Function ensures that protection is provided for multiple rod drop accidents. At high power levels, a multiple rod drop accident could cause
. local flux peaking that would result-in an l unconservative local DNBR. DNBR is defined as the ratio of the heat flux required to cause a DNB at a particular location in the core to the local heat flux. The DNBR is indicative of the margin i to DNB. No credit is taken for the operation of l( this Function for those rod drop accidents-in which the local DNBRs will be greater than the limit. The LCO requires all four Power Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate channels to be OPERABLE. In' MODE 1 or 2 when there is potential for a multiple rod drop accident to occur. the Power Range NeutrorL F lux-High Negative Rate trip must l
- be OPERABLE." In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the Power i Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the core is not . critical and DNB is not a concern.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES- I p APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) I
- 4. Intermediate Ranae Neutron Flux The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Function
. ensures that 3rotection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power' Range Neutron Flux-Low Setpoint-trip Function. The NIS intermediate range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from I the core.' Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting further rod withdrawal may terminate the transient and eliminate the need to trip the reactor.
The LC0 requires two:cha'nnsis of Intermediate Range , Neutron Flux to be.0PERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function'. Because this trip Function is important only during
.n startup, there is generally no need to disable channels
'Q - for testing while the Function is required to be OPERABLE. Therefore, a third channel is~ unnecessary, '
I 1 l 1 1 ll 1
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RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 l
)
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1 below the P-10 setpoint, and in MODE 2 above q the P-6 setpoint, when there is a potential for an 1 uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident during i reactor startup. the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux f trip mutt be OPERABLE. Ahove the P-10 setpoint, the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip provide core protection for a rod withdrawal accident. j In MODE 2 below the P-6 setpoint. the Source Range ; Neutron Flux Trip provides the core protection for ' reactivity accidents. In MODE 3, 4. or 5. the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip does not have to be OPERABLE because the control rods.must be fully 1 inserted and only the shutdown rods may be withdrawn. I The reactor cannot be started up in this condition. l The core also has the required SDM to mitigate the consequences of a positive reactivity addition accident. In MODE 6. all rods are fully inserted and I the core has a required increased SDM. Also, the NIS l intermediate range detectors cannot detect neutron I levels present in this MCDE. p 5. Source Ranae Neutron Flux The LC0 requirement for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures that protection is arovided ) against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod wit 1drawal ! accident from a subtritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the l Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip Function. In
. MODES 3. 4. and 5. administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled wLthdrawal of rods. The NIS source
- range detectors are located external to the reactor ves.sel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS source range detectors do not provide any inputs to control systems. The source range trip i.s the only RTS automatic protection function required in MODES 3. 4.
and 5 when rods are capable of withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. Therefore'. the functional capability at the specified Trip Setpoint is assumed to be available. m , BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 14 5/30/98 Revision E
'RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
,. BASES
-APPLICABLE SAFETY. ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The: Source Range Neutron Flux Function provides 3rotection for control rod withdrawal from subcritical.
)oron. dilution and control rod ejection events.
In MODE 2 when below the P-6 setpoint, and in MODES 3. 4'. and 5 when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal accident. two channels of Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random . failure will disable' this trip Function. Above the P-6 setpoint. the Intermediate Range. Neutron Flux trip and j the. Power Range Neutron Flux-Low trip will 3rovide. core protection for reactivity accidents. A)ove-the
,P-6 setpoint, the NIS source range detectors are.
.[
de-energized.
-In MODES 3, 4 and 5 with'all rods. fully inserted and the Rod Control System not capable of rod withdrawal, and in MODE 6, the out)uts of the. Function to RTS logic are.not required OPERA 3LE. The requirements for the NIS source range detectors to monitor core neutron levels and provide indication of reactivity changes thu may occur as a result of events like a boron h;~ .. dilution are addressed in LC0 3.3.9. " Boron Dilution Protection System (BDPS)" for MODE 3. 4, or 5 and-LC0 3.9.3, " Nuclear Instrumentation." for MODE 6.
k ' h' ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2~ B - 3.3.1 - 15 5/30/98 Revision E
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 j BASES s . APPLICASLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 6. Overtemoerature AT The_ Overtemperature AT trip Function is proviaed to ensure that the design limit DNBR is met. .This trip Function also limits the range over which the Overpower AT trip Function must provide protection. The inputs .
to the Overtemperature AT trip include pressurizer pressure. coolant temperature, axial power distribution. and reactor power as indicated by loop AT assuming full reactor coolant flow. Protection from violating'the DNBR limit is assured for-those transients that are slow with respect to delays from the core to the measurement system. The Function monitors both variation in power and flow since a decrease in flow has a similar effect on AT as a power increase. The Overtemperature AT trip Functior, uses each loop's AT as a measure ^of reactor power and is com)ared with a setpoint that is automatically varied wit 1 the following parameters: o reactor coolant average temperature-the Trip Setpoint is varied to. correct for changes in
; coolant density and specific heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature; e pressurizer pressure-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in system pressure; and e axial power distribution- the Overtemperature AT Trip Setpoint is varied to account .for imbalances in the axial power distribution as detected by the NIS upper an,cLlower power range detectors. If
. axial peaks are greater than the design limit, as indicated by the difference between the upper and lower NIS power range detectors, the Trip Setpoint is reduced in accordance with Note 1 of Table 3 3.1-1.
Dynamic compensation is included for system piping delays from the core to the temperature measurement I system. O < BRkIDWOOD'-UNITS 1&2- B 3.3.1 - 16 5/29/98 Revision A L
e RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 O BASES
. APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The Overtemperature AT trip Function is calculated for each loop as described in Note 1 of Table 3.3.1-1. A trip occurs if Overtemperature AT is indicated in two loops.. Since the pressure and temperature signals are
.used for other control functions, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuatico, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation.
Note that this Function also provides a signal to generate a turbine runback 3rior to reaching the Trip Setpoint. A turbine runbacc will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A reduction in power will normally alleviate the Overtemperature AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip. The LCO requires all four channels of the Overtemperature AT. trip Function to be OPERABLE. Note that the Overtemperature AT Function receives input from channels shared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry
-into the Conditions applicable to all affected
/ Functions.
In MODE 1 or 2. the Overtemperature AT trip must be OPERABLE to prevent DNB. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. this trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about DNB.
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i, t l O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1-& 2 B 3.3.1 - 17 5/29/98 Revision A
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
- BASES
] (\
M APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 7. Overoower AT
-The. Overpower AT trip Function ensures that protection is provided to ensure the integrity of' the fuel (i .e. .
no fuel pellet melting and less than 1% cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions. This trip Function.also limits the required range of the - Overtem)erature AT trip Function and provides a backup to the )ower Range Neutron Flux-High tri). The Overpower AT trip Function ensures that t1e allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) of the fuel is not exceeded. It uses the AT of each loop as a measure of reactor power with a setpoint that is automatically varied with the following parameters: e reactor coolant average temperature-the Trip Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in coolant density and specific ~ heat capacity with changes in coolant temperature: and { 1 e rate of change of reactor coolant average , temperature-including dynamic compensation for ) (f-). the delays between the core and the temperature-measurement system. { The Overpower AT trip Function.is calculated for each j loop as per' Note 2 of Table 3.3.1-1. A trip occurs if Overpower AT is indicated in two loops. Since the temperature signals are tGed for other control functions, the actuation logic must be able to ; withstand an input. failure to the control system, which i may then-require the 3rotection function actuation and a single failure Tn' tie remaining channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this i Function also provides a signal to generate a turbine l- runback prior to reaching the Trip Setpoint. A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A reduction in power will normally alleviate the Overpower AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip. L I h v '
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B 3.3.1.- 18 5/30/98 Revision E c
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES g
\
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) I The LCO requires four channels of the Overpower AT trip Function to be OPERABLE Note that the Over)ower AT trip Function receives input from channels saared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions.
, In MODE 1 or 2. the Overpower AT trip Function must be
-OPERABLE. These are the only times that enough heat is
-generated in the fuel to be concerned about the heat generation rates and overheating of the fuel. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. this. trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about fuel overheating ~and fuel damage.
- 8. Pressurizer P'ressure
~
The same sensors provide input to the Pressurizer ' l Pressure-High and-Low trips and the Overtemperature AT trip. Since the Pressurizer Pressure channels are also used.to provide input to the Pressurizer Pressure
/m, Control System, the actuation logic must be able to V withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the 3rotection function actuation, and ,
a single failure in tie other channels providing the ! protection function actuation. '
- a. . Pressurizer Pressure-Low
. The Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip Function ;
ensuresthatJrotectionisprovidedagainst "
. - violating the DNBR limit due to low pressure.
The LC0 requires four channels of Pressurizer Pressure-Low to be OPERABLE. ,. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 &'2 B 3.3.1 - 19 5/30/98RevisionN 4
_ , - - _ - _ _ _ _ - - . - = _ -
/ - -
.RTSIInstrumentation ,
B 3.3.'1 BASES ' APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES.LCOIndAPPLICABILITY.(continued) 2 . In MODE 1. when.DNB is.a. major concern, the-Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip must be OPERABLE. This trip Fun~ ~c tion is automatically enabled on-g -4 increasing power by the P-7 interlocki(NIS power range P-10'or turbine impulse pressure P greater.than approximately 10% of full power '
' -l
, equivalent). On decreasing power, this trip Function-is automatically. blocked below P-7.
., - Below the P-7 setpoint, no conceivable power-ELT distributions can occur that would'cause DNB concer.ns.
i
- b. Er psurizer' Pressure-Hiah 3 l
The Pressurizer Pressure--High trip Function a ensures that protection is provided against. I' cverpressurizing the RCS. This trip Function ' operates in, conjunction with_ the pressurizer
. relief and safety valves to prevent RCS -
overpressure conditions. ! The LC0 recuires four channels of the Pressurizer Pressure-Figh to be OPERABLE.
. l:
The Pressurizer Pressure-High LSSS .is selected to be belcw tt:e pressurizer safety valve actuation pressure and above the Power Operated' Relief Valve (PORV) setting. -This setting minimizes challenges
.to safety valves while avoiding unnecessary
. reactor trip for those pressure increases that_can lbe controlled by the.PORVs.
L .
. w -
p j. , y' i 9 d 1 o sp e a. ,
- ; r~
9 m * '
< i g- i i c<> !
I
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[h t _BRAI.DWOOD - UNITS 1, & 2 B' 3.3.1 - 20 5/30/98 Revision E t __ _ _._______.________m. _ _ _ _ , _ , , _ _ _ _ , _ _ . , _ , _ _
RTS Instrumentation B-3.3.1 BASES U APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LC0. and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1 or 2, the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip must be OPERABLE to help prevent RCS overpressurization and minimize challenges to the , relief and safety valves. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. ' the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because transients that . could cause an overpressure condition will be slow to occur. Therefore, the operator will have sufficient time to evaluate unit conditions and take corrective actions. In addition, the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Systems provide overpressure protection in MODE 4. MODE 5. and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on. ;
- 9. Pressurizer Water Level-Hiah The Pressurizer Water Level'-High trip Function 3rovides a backup s.ignal for the Pressurizer 2ressure-High trip and also provides protection against water relief through the pressurizer safety valves. These valves are designed to pass steam in order to achieve their design energy removal rate. A o reactor trip is actuated prior to the pressurizer V becoming water solid. The LC0 requires three channels of Pressurizer Water Level-High to be OPERABLE. The channel Allowable Values are specified in percent instrument span. The pressurizer level channels are used as input to the Pressur12er Level Control System.
~
A fourth clannel is not required to address control /
-protection interaction concerns. The level channels do not actuate the safety valves, and the high pressure reactor trip is. set below the safety vaTve setting.
. Therefore, with tTe slow rate of charging available, pressure overshoot due to level channel failure cannot cause.the safety valve to lift before reactor high pressure trip.
'N) .
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO.-and APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 1. when there is a potential for overfilling the pressurizer, the Pressurizer Water Level-High trip must be OPERABLE. This trip Function is automatically enabled on increasing power. by the P-7 interlock. On decreasing power. this trip Function is automatically blocked below P-7. Below the P-7 setpoint. transients that could raise the pressurizer water level will be slow and the operator will.have sufficient time to evaluate unit. conditions and take corrective actions.
- 10. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to low flow in the RCS loops, while avoiding reactor trips due to normal variations in loop flow.
Each RCS loop has three flow detectors to monitor flow. The flow signals are not used for any control system input, The LC0 requires three Reactor' Coolant Flow-Low channels per loop to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-7. O Each loop is considered ~a separate Function. The channel Allowable Values are specified in percent of loop minimum measured flow. The minimum measured flow is 92.850 gpm. The Reactor Coolant Flow-low Function encompasses a single loop and a two loop trip logic. In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint and below the P-8 setpoint, a loss of j flow in two or more loops will initiate a reactor trip. l Above the P-8 setJpint, which is approximately 30% RTP. )
- a loss of flow in any one RCS loop will actuate a j reactor trip because of the higher power level and the reduced margin to the design limit DNBR. Below the P-7 setpoint. all reactor trips on low flow are <
automatically blocked.since no conceivable power distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at this low power level. 4 l ! l O ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 22 5/29/98 Revision A l L___.mm_. ._-______-_________m_______.__ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . m______ _ _ _ _ _ __ .____....__m__
RTS Instrumentation 3 3.3.1 p BASES l O APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) l
- 11. Reactor Coo'lant Pumo (RCP) Breaker Position The RCP Breaker Position trip Functici operates on four j auxiliary contacts per train. Each train is considered a separate Function;' This Funuion anticipates the
. Reactor. Coolant Flew-Low tr9s to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates.
The RCP Breaker Position trip Function ensures that protection 's provided against violating.the ONBR 1.imit due to a loss cf flow in two or more RCS . loops. :The Josition of each- RCP breaker is monitored. Above the 3-7 setpoint a loss of flow in two or-more loops will initiate a reactor trip. 'This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant l Flow-Low L p Setpoint is reached. One OPERABLE channel is sufficient for. this Function because the RCS Flow-Low trip alone provides sufficient protection of unit SLs for loss of flow events.. The' RCP Breaker Position trip serves only to anticipate the low flow trip. minimizing the thermal transient associated with loss of an RCP.
'This Function measures only the discrete position (open or closed) of the RCP breaker, using a position switch.
Therefore. the Function has no adjustable trip setpoint with which to assoc.iate an LSSS. a- In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint. the RCP Breaker P o Position trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7
,setpoint, all regj;or trips on _ loss of flow are
- automatically blocked since no conceivable power.
distributions could occur that would cause a DNB concern at-this low power level. Above the P-7 1 setpoint. the-reactor trip on loss of flow in two RCS loops is automatically enabled. l i 1 Da ) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 &'2 B 3.3.1 - 23 5/30/98 Revision E
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; BASES. ;
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES.,LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 12. Undervoltaae Reactor Coolant Pumos The Undervoltage RCPs reactor trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to a loss of-flow in two or more RCS loops. !
The voltage to each RCP is monitored. Above the P-7 setpoint. a loss of voltage detected on two or more RCP buses will initiate a reactor trip. This trip Function will generate a reactor trip before the Reactor Coolant L Flow-Low (Two Loops) Trip Setpoint is reached. Time-delays are incorporated into the.Undervoltage RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary. electrical power transients. The LC0 requires four Undervoltage RCPs channels to be OPERABLE. There are two undervoltage sensing relays on each 6.9 kV bus which feeds an RCP. One relay provides an input- to reactor trip logic Train A and the other relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train B. Each reactor trip logic train requires _ input from two~ of the four buses to initiate a reactor trip. Each train is consider,ed a separate Function. In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint, the Undervoltage RCP trip must be OPERABLE. Below'the P-7 setpoint, all i reactor trips on loss.of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable ]ower distributions could occur that would cause a DN3 concern at this low power level. Above the P_-7 setpoint. the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled. This Function uses the same relays as the Engineered
- l. -Safety Feature Aqtuation. System (ESFAS) Function 6.e,
- "Undervoltage Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)" start of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF). pumps.
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RTS Instrumentation t B 3.3.1 l BASES
-APPLICABLE-SAFETY. ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 13. Underfrecuency Reactor Coolant Pumos
! The Underfrequency RCPs reactor trip Function ensures l that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due tc3 a loss of flow in two or more RCS loops from a major network frequency disturbance. An underfrequency condition Will slow down the pumps, thereby reducing their coastdown time following a pump. l trip. The proper coastdown time is required so that l reactor heat can be removed immediately 6fter reactor
- trip. The frequency of each RCP bus is monitored.
- Above the P-7 setpoint, a loss of frequency detected on
- two or more RCP buses.will initiate a reactor trip.
This trip Function will generate a reactor trip beforc the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops) Trip Setpoint is reached. Time delays are incorporated into the Underfrequency RCPs channels to prevent reactor trips due to momentary electrical power transients. The LCO requires four Underfrecuency RCPs channels to be OPERABLE. There are two uncerfrequency sensing , . relays on each 6.9 kV bus which feeds an RCP. One relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train A l and the other relay provides an input to reactor trip logic Train B. Each reactor trip-logic train requires input from two of the four buses to initiate a reactor trip. Each train is considered a separate Function. l In MODE 1 above the P-7 setpoint. the Underfrequency RCPs trip must be OPERABLE. Below the P-7 setpoint. all reactor trips on loss of flow are automatically blocked since no conceivable power distributions could-
. occur that would"c~ause a DNB concern at this low power level. . Above the P-7 setpoint. the reactor trip on loss of flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically
! -enabled. i 4 I 5/29/98 Revision A BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.1 - 25 i-l t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. _ _ _ _ _ _
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 (~N -BASES O APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. aid APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 14. Steam Generator Water ' Level-Low Low The SG Water Level-Low Low trip Function ensures that protectico is provided against a loss of heat sink and actuates the AF System prior to uncovering the SG ,
tubes. The SGs are the heat sink for the reactor, in I 1 order to act as a heat sink, the SGs must contain a minimum amount of water. A narrow range low low level in any SG is indicative of a loss of heat sink for the reactor. The level transmitters provide input to the SG Level Control System. Therefore. the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation. and a sinale failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. This Function also performs the ESFAS function of starting the'AF pumps on low low SG level. The LC0 requires four channels of SG Water Level-Low Low per SG to be OPERABLE in which these channels are shared between protection and control. Each SG is considered a separate Function. The Channel Allowable O Values are specified in percent of narrow range D) instrument span. In MODE 1 or 2, when the reactor requires a heat sink, the SG Water Level-Low Low trip must be OPERABLE. The normal source of water for the SGs is the Feedwater (FW)-System (not safety related). The AF System is the safety related backup source of water to ensure that
, the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. During normal startups and shutdowns. the startup feedwater
. . pump provides feeTwater to maintain SG level. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the SG Water Level-Low Low Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the FW L
System may not be in operation and the reactor is not operating or critical. l. I n V. 5/29/98 Revision A
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 f( BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 15. Turbine Trio
- a. Turbine Trio-Emeraency Trio Header Pressure The Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure trip' Function anticipates the loss of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a
. This trip Function acts to minimize "
turbine the trip / temperature transient on the reactor. pressure Any turbine trip from a power level below the P-8 setpoint approximately 30% power will not actuate a reactor trip. Two trains of three pressure switches monitor the control oil pressure in the Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System. A low pressure condition sensed by two-out-of-three pressure switches in either protection train will actuate a reactor-trip. These pressure switches do not provide any input to the control system. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sustain core damage or challenge the RCS pressure limitations. Core protection is
;,e - provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function and RCS inte rity'is ensured by the =
pressurizer safety va ves. The LCO requires three channels in each train of Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-8. Each train is considered a separate Function. Below the P-8 setpoint. a turbine trip does not actuate a re In MODE 2. 3. 4. 5. or 6. there is no,jLctor trip. potential for a turbine trip, and the
.t Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.
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' APPLICABLE-SAFETY ANALYSES. LC0. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- b. Turbine Trio -Turbine Throttle Valve Closure.
The Tur' bine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure trip Function' anticipates- the loss' of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a turbine trip from a power level above the P-8 setpoint, approximately 30% power. This action will actuate a reactor trip. The trip Function anticipates the loss of secondary heat removal capability that occurs when the throttle valves close. Tripping the reactor in anticipation of - loss of- secondary heat removal acts to minimize the pressure and tem)erature transierit' on the reactor. This trip runction will not and~is not required to operate in the presence of a single channel failure. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sustain , core damage or cnallenge.the RCS pressure limitations. Core protection is provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function. and RCS
; integrity is ensured by the pressurizer. safety valves. This trip Function is diverse to the Q,-. Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure trip Function. Each turbine throttle valve is equipped with one limit switch that-inputs to the RTS.
Each limit switch is equippect with two contacts.
- l' One contact provides input to. reactor trip logic Train A and the other contact provides an input to reactor trip logic Train B. If all-four limit switches indicate that the throttle valves are all closed, a reactor trip is initiated.
- The LSSS for~this Function is set to assure channel trip occurs when the associated throttle valve is completely closed.
The LC0 requires four Turbine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure channels per train, to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-8. All four channels
-must trip to cause reactor trip.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 F
, BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
.Below the P-8 setpoint, a load rejection can be l accommodated by the Steam Dump System. In MODE 2.
- 3. 4. 5. or 6. there is no potential for a load rejection, and the Turbine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure trip Function does not need to be
-OPERABLE.
- 16. Safety Iniection (SI) Inout from Enoineered Safety Feature Actuation System The SI Input from ESFAS ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the RTS. the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will-initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the Loss Of Coolant Accident-(LOCA). However, other transients and accidents take credit for varying levels of ESF performance and rely u)on rod insertion except for the most reactive rod tlat is assumed to be fully withdrawn, to ensure
' reactor shutdown. Therefore, a reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present.
Allowable Values are not applicable to this Function. The SI Input is provided by relay in the ESFAS. Therefore, there is no measurement signal with which to associate an LSSS. The LC0 requires two trains of SI Input from ESFAS-to. be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is - present. Therefqr.e. this trip Function ~must be ' OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical.
. and must be shut down in the event of an accident. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the reactor is not critical.;and
- this trip Function does not need to be OPERABLE.
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l RTS Instrumentation B 3 3.1 p ' BASES
^ APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 17 Reactor Trio System Interlocks
, -Reactor protection interlocks are provided to ensure ]
reactor trips are.in the correct configuration for the { current unit status. They back up operator actions.to 1 ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during unit conditions under which the safety analysis
~'
assumes the Functions are not bypassed. Therefore.ithe interlock Functions do not need to be OPERABLE when the associated reactor trip functions are outside the applicable MODES. These are: - '
- a. Source Ranae Block Permissive. P-6 The Source Range Block Permissive. P-6 interlock
-is actuated when any NIS intermediate range channel goes approximately one decade above the minimum channel reading. If both channels drop below the setpoint, the permissive will' automatically be defeated. The LC0 requirement
'for the P-6 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:
e on increasing power, the. P-6 interlock allows the manual block of the NIS Sourc'eL Range, Neutron Flux reactor tri). This prevents a premature block of tle source range trip and allows the operator to ensure that the intermediate range is OPERABLE prior to leaving the' source' range. When the
^
source; range trip is blocked, the high voltagtothedetectorsisalsoremoved:
. .. and e on decreasing power, the P-6 interlock automatically energizes the NIS' source range detectors, and enables the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip and Boron Dilution Prevention-System (BDPS) actuation.
l h B 3.3.1- 30 5/30/98 Revision 5 BRAIDWOOD -~ UNITS 1 & 2
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)% :- BASES ~
U;Q) , APPLICABLE SAFETY-ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) [ The LC0 requires two channels of Source Range j , Block Permissive. P-6 interlock- to be OPERABLE in L MODE 2 when below the P-6 interlock setpoint. l -- Above the P-6 interlock setpoint, the NIS Source Range Neutron Flux reactor trip will be blocked. and this Function will'no. longer be necessary. In MODE 3. 4. 5. or 6. the P-6 interlock does not have to be OPERABLE because the NIS Source Range is.providing core protection.
~b. Low Power Reactor Trios Block. P-7 The Low Power Reactor Trips Block P-7 interlock is actuated by input from either the Power Range Neutron Flux P-10.'or the. Turbine Impulse Pressure. P-13 interlock. The LC0 requirement for the P-7 interlock ensures'that the following
-Functions are performed:
(1) on increasing power, the P-7 interlock O' ' automatically enables reactor trips on the l U. ! following Functions: o Pressurizer Pressure-Low: o Pressurizer Water Level-High: e Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops); e Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Breaker P6's'ition; e Undervoltage RCPs: and ;
. :1 e Underfrequency RCPs.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 q BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) These reactor trias are only required wh.en l operating above t1e P-7 setpoint J (approximately 10% power). The reactor trips provide protection against violating the DNBR limit. Below the P-7 setpoint, the RCS is capable of providing sufficient . natural circulation without any RCP running. (2) on decreasing aower. the P-7 interlock automatically alocks reactor trips on the following Functions: o Pressurizer Pressure-Low: o Pressurizer Water Level-High: e Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Two Loops); e RCP Breaker Position: e Undervoltage RCPs: and (] e Underfrequency RCPs. Allowable Value are not applicable to the P-7 interlock because it is a logic Function and thus has no parameter with which to associate an LSSS. The low power trips are blocked below the P-7 setpoint and unblocked above the P-7 setpoint. In MODE 2. 3. 4. 5. or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABJJ because the interlock performs its
- Function when power level droas below approximately 10% power, whic1 is in MODE 1.
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- BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 32 5/30/98 Revision E l I
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- BASES U
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) t
- c. Power'Rance Neutron Flux. P-8 i The Power Range Neutron Flux P-8 interlock is
! actuated at approximately 30% power as determined L by two-out-of-four NIS power. range detectors. The i P-8 interlock automatically enables the Reactor Coolant Flc N-Low (Single Loop) reactor trip on low flow it one or more RCS loops on increasing power. The LC0 requirement for this trip Function ensures that protection is provided against a. loss of flow in any RCS loop that could result in DNB conditions in the core when greater than approximately 30% power. The P-8 interlock ensures that the Turbine Trip-Emergency Trip Header Pressure and Turbine Trip-Turbine Throttle Valve Closure reactor trips are enabled above the P-8 setpoint. Above the P-8 setpoint, a turbine trip may cause a load rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump
. System. A reactor trip is. automatically initiated
. on a turbine trip when it is above the P-8 setpo nt, to minimize the transient on the
. O. reactor. On decreasing power, the reactor trips on turbine tri) and low flow in one loop are
!. automatically alocked. The LC0 requires three channels of Power' Range Neutron Flux. P-8 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1.
'In MODE.1 L.]oss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions, so the Power Range Neutron Flux P-8 interlock must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2. 3. 4, 5.- or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the core is not producing sufficient power to be concerned about DNB conditions.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 L l BASES O . APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued; In MODE 1. a turbine trip could cause a load
. rejection beyond the capacity of the Steam Dump System. so the Power Range' Neutron Flux interlock-must be OPERABLE. In MODE 2. 3. 4. 5. or 6. this Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not at a power level sufficient to have a load rejection.beyond.the capacity of the Steam Dump System.
- d. Power Ranae Neutron Flux. P-10 The Power Range Neutron Flux P-10 interlock -is actuated at approximately 10% power. as determined by.two-out-of-four NIS power range detectors. If
. power-level falls below 10% RTP on 3 of 4 channels, the nuclear instrument trips will be automatically unblocked. The LC0 requirement for the'P-10 interlock ensures that the following Functions are performed:
- e. on increasing power, the.P-10 interlock allowstheo[>eratortomanuallyblockthe Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor
{- trip. Note that blocking the reactor trip also blocks the signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal: e on increasing power, the P-10 interlock allows the operator to manually block the
~ Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip:
e on inc,neasing power, the P-10 interlock l
- automatically provides a backup signal to ,
block the Source Range. Neutron Flux reactor j trip, and also to de-energize the NIS source .I range detectors: o the P-10 interlock provides one of the two inputs to the P-7 interlock: and . 9 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 34 5/30/98 Revis'1on E
i i RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
- m. BASES -
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) e on decreasing power, the P-10 interlock , automatically enables the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low reactor trip and the-Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trip (and rod stop). The LC0 requires three channels of Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2.
; OPERABILITY in MODE 1 ensures the Function is available to perform its decreasing power Functions in the event of a reactor shutdown.
This function must be OPERABLE in MODE 2 tu ensure
-that core protection is provided during a startup or shutdown by the Power Range. Neutron Flux-Low and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux reactor trips.
In MODE 3; 4. 5. or 6. this Function does-not have to be OPERABLE because.the reactor is not at power and the Source Range Neutron Flux reactor tr.ip
- provides core protection.
- e. Turbine Imoulse Pr. essure. P-13 The Turbine Impulse. Pressure. P-13 interlock is actuated when the pressure-in the first stage of the high pressure turbine is greater than approximately 10% of the rated full-power pressure. This is determined by one-out-of-two 3ressure detectors. The 1.C0 requirement for this
~
~ unction provides one of the two inputs to the P-7 interlock. _
.The LC0 requires two channels of Turbine Impulse Pressure. P-13 interlock to be OPERABLE in MODE 1.
The Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure. P-13 interlock must be OPERABLE when the turbine generator is operating. The interlock Function is
-not required.0PERABLE in MODE 2, 3. 4. 5. or 6 because.the turbine generator is not operating.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 n BASES (#) APPLICABLE SAFETY ANAL 1SES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
-l 18. Reactor Trio Breakers This trip Function applies to the RTBs exclusive of individual trip mechanisms. The LC0 requires two OPERABLE trains of trip breakers. A trip breaker. train
. consists of all trip breakers associated with a single RTS logic train that are racked in, closed, and capable
'j of supplying power to the Rod Control System. Two OPERABLE trains ensure no single random failure can disable the RTS trip capability.
These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3. 4. or 5. these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. l 19. Reactor Trio Breaker Undervoltaae and Shunt Trio Mechanism _q The LCO requires both the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms to be OPERABLE for each RTB that is in (~) service. The trip mechanisms are not required to be L' OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out, incapable of supplying power to the Rod Control System, j- or declared ino)erable under Function 18 above. OPERABILITY of Joth trip mechanisms on each breaker ensures that no single trip mechanism. failure will prevent. opening any breaker on a valid signal. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is' critical. In MODE 3. 4. or 5;
. - these RTS trip FuTctions must be OPERABLE when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted.
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-l .20. Automatic Trin Loaic The LCO requirement for the RTBs (Functions 18 and 19) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 20) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each RTB is equip >ed with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip areaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor.
The LCO requires two trains of RTS Automatic 1 rip. Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE trains ensures that' random failure of a single logic train will not prevent reactor trip. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE l' or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4. or 5. _ these RTS trip' Functions must be OPERABLE when the Rod i Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or
'> more rods are not fully inserted.
The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the
.a) plication.of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of 4
- tais Specification may'be entered independently for each Function listed in Table-3.3.1-1. ,
1 In the event a channells Trip Set)oint is found . {
, nonconservative with respect to tie Allowable Value, or the {
transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable. then all affected Functions 3rovided by that channel.must be declared inoperable and the _C0 Condition (s)~ entered for the protection Function (s) affected. l l q ; if - BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 37 5/30/98 Revision E l L
RTS Instrumer,Rtion B 3.3.1
' BASES; jw( -
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ACTIONS (continued) When the number of inoperable channe'is in a trip Function exceed those specified in all related Conditions associated with a trip Function. then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore. LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation, b.l Condition A applies to all RTS protection Functions. Condition A addresses the-situation where one or more l- required' channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions. B.1 and B.2 Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for this Function. With one channel ino)erable. the
-l ino)erable channel must be restored to OPERAB.E status wit 11n 48 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE
/]
'L channel is adequate to perform the safety function.
The Completion Time of 48 hours is reasonable considering - that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to l- -OPERABLE status within_.the allowed 48 hour Completion Time.
- the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours (S4 hours total time). The 6 additional hours to reach MODE 3 is reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. With the unit in MODE.3 Action C would apply to any inoperable !!anual Reactor Trip Function if the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted. -
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-B 3.3.1 3 l
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, BASES. i n).
Q ACTIONS;(continued): l 'C'1 and C.2
~l Condition C a
.in MODE 3. 4.pplies .or 5 with tothe theRod following Control reactor Systemtrip Functions capable of ll rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted:
l} e Manual . Reactor Trip:
. e RTBs:
- ,7 e RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms; and e Automatic Trip Logic.
This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel or train inoperable, the
. inoperable channel or train must be restored to OPERABLE l status within 48 hours. If the affected Function (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE.in which
. . the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status.-the action must be initiated within the same 48 hours to ensure-C.l.
V
.that all rods are fully inserted, and the Rod Control' System-
. must be ) laced in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within'tle next hour, The additional. hour provides.
sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly - manner. With rods fully-inserted and the Rod Control System
. incapable of rod withdrawal. these Functions are no longer-required.
. The Completion Time is reasonable considering that in this
~ Condition, the remaini0g OPERABLE train is adequate to
- perform the safety function' and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
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RTS Instrumentation i B 3.3.1 .l1 BASES b ACTIONS (continued) A Note to the ACTIONS restricts the transition from MODE 5 with the Rod Control System not ca)able of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted, to MO)E 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or all rods.not fully inserted for Functions 18, 19. and 20 while com)1ying with the ACTIONS (i .e. , while the LCO is not met). _C0 3.0.4 typically allows entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Ap)licability while in MODE 5. however, the restriction of tais Note is necessary to assure an OPERABLE RTS function ~ prior to commencing operation with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or all rods not fully inserted, D.1.1.-D.1.2. D.2.1. D.2.2. and D,3 Condition D applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High
. Function.
The NIS power range detectors provide input to the Rod Control System and-the SG Water Level Control System and, therefore, have a two-out-of-four tiip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition. G This results in a partial trip condition requiring only V one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 6 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 7). In addition to placing the inoyerable channel ir. the trip)ed condition, THERMAL POWER must )e reduced to 5 75% RTP witlin 12 hours. Reducing the power level prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits. With one of the NIS power range detectors
. . inoperable,1/4 of the~ radial power distribution monitoring capability may be lost.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 o
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' BASES' ACTIONS (continued)
As an alternative to the above actions, the inoperable channel can be placed in the tripped condition within
.6 hours and the OPTR monitored once every 12 hours as per SR 3.2.4.2. OPTR verification. Calculating OPTR every 12 hours compensates for the )otential lost monitoring capability due to the inoperaale NIS power range channel and allows continued unit operation at power levels a 75% RTP.
The 6 hour Com)letion Time and the 12 hour Frequency are consistent witi LCO 3.2.4. "0VADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (0PTR)."
~As an alternative to the above actions, the plant must be placed in a MODE where this Function is no loncjer required OPERABLE. Twelve hours are allowed to place the plant in MODE 3. This is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging 31 ant systems. If Required Actions cannot'be completed wit 11n their allowed' Completion Times. LC0 3.0.3 must be entered. .
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino)erable channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 lours wh'ile performing routine D(N surveillance testing of other channels. The Note also allows placing the inoperable channel:in the bypass condition to allow setpoint adjustments of other channels when required to reduce the setpoint in accordance with other Technical Specifications. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference 7. Required Action D.2.2 has been r.dified by a Note which only requires SR 3.2.4.2 tq.be performed if the Power Range
- Neutron Flux input to OPTR becomes inoperable. - Failure of a component in the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel which renders the High Flux Trip Function inoperable may not
-affect the capability to monitor OPTR. As such. determining QPTR using this movable incore detectors once per 12 hours may not be necessary.
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B :3.3.1 - 41 5/30/98 Revision E b
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 yx . BASES-ACTIbNS1(continued) l1 E 1 and E.2'- Condition ~ E applies to the following reactor trip Functions:
- e. Power Range Neutron Flux Low:
e .0vertemperature AT:
!s Overpower.AT:
-e Power Range Neutron Flux-High -Positive' Rate:
o Power Range Neutron Flux-High Negative Rate: o Pressurizer Pressure-High; and e SG Water Level-Low Low, i [ 'A' known inoperable channel must be placed in the ' tripped condition.within 6 hours. Placing the channel.in the tripped condition-results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation of the f'. two-out-of-four trips. The 6 hours allowed to place the N inoperable channel in the. tripped condition is justified in Reference 7. If. the operable channel cannot be placed in the trip condition within:the specified Completion Time, the unit must be placed in'a MODE where these Functions are not required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours is allowed to
> lace the unit in MODE 3. Six hours is a reasonable time.
Jased on operating exp,efience, to place the unit in MODE 3
. . from full. power in an orderly manner and without challenging )
plant' systems.
~
The' Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino>erable channel in the bypassed , condition for up to 4 lours while performing routine ! lL surveillance testing of the other channels. The 4 hour time J liait is justified in Reference 7. l I l 1 l
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 )
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,-w . ' BASES' e
CTIONS-(continued) [ , F.1'and F.2 Condition F applies to the Intermediate Range Neutron Flus trip when-THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 set)oint and below the P-10 setpoint and one channel is.inoperaale. Above the
-P-6 setpoint and below the P-10~setpoint..the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. 'If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-6 setpoint but less than the P-10 setpoint. 2 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint.or increase.
to THERMAL POWER above the P-10 setpoint-. The provisions of; LC0 3.0.4 allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability as directed by the Required Actions. Therefore, a MODE change is permitted with one channel inoperable whenever Required Action F.2 is used. The NIS' Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range, P-6. and below the capability of the'aower range. P-10. If THERMAL POWER.is greater than the 3-10 setpoint.:the NIS power range detectors perform the monitoring and protection functions and the intermediate range is not required. The . Completion Times allow for a O U-slow and controlled power adjustment above P-10 or below P-6 and take into account the redundant capability afforded by , the redundant 0PERABLE channel', and the low probability of-
.its . failure during this )eriod. .This action does not require the inoperable clannel to be tripped because the Function uses one-out-of-two logic. ' Tripping one channel would trip the reactor. Thus, the Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failure does not result in reactor trip.
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, B 3.3.1' py a m BASES 1 y9 JACTIONS,(continued)L X
f 1 G 1 and G.2-
. Condition G applies to two ino)erable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip channels'in iODE 2 when THERMAL POWER is s ,
above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10.setpoint. Required Actions specified in-this Condition are only . applicable when channel 1 failures do:not result in reactor trip. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the 'P-10 setpoint, the NIS-intermediate range' detector performs the monitoring-Functions'. With no intermediate range channels OPERABLE.
'the Required A'ctions are to suspend operations involving positive' reactivity ' additions immediately. This will preclude any power level increase since there are no OPERABLE Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels. The-operator must also reduce THERMAL POWER-below the P-6 setpoint within two hours.. B.elow P-6 the Source Range Neutron Flux channels will be able to monitor the core power level; The Completion T.ime of 2 hours will allow a slow and controlled power reduction to-less than the.P-6 setpoint' and takes into account the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the' protection -
y afforded by the NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip,
' A >y- H.1
[ , Condition H applies to one inoperable Source Range Neutron
; Flux trip channel when in MODE 2. below the P-6 setpoint.
With the unit.in this Condition, below P-6 the NIS source
. range performs the monitoring-and protection functions,
.l With one of the two channels inoperable, operations involving positive. reactivity additions shall be suspended immediately. _
This will; preclude any aower escalatior< With only one source range channel DPERABLE, core protection is sev.erely reduced and any actions that add positive wactivity to the
+ core must be suspended immediately.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
,- s BASES ACTIONS (continued) l Ll Condition I applies to two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channels when in MODE 2. below the P-6 setpoint, and in MODE 3. 4.-or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
With the unit in this Condition, below P-6 the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With both source range channels inoperable. the RTBs must be opened immediately. .With the RTBs open. the core is in .a more stable condition.
~l J.1 and J.2 l Condition J applies to one inoperable source range channel in MODE 3, 4. or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6. the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the source range channels inoperable. 48 hours is allowed
. to restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the channel cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status action must be initiated
(~') within the same 48 hours to ensure that all rods are fully
\_/ inserted, and the Rod Control System must be placed in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within the next hour.
The allowance of 48 hours to restore the channel to OPERABLE status, and the additional hour, are justified in Reference 7.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
. BASES' o
ACTIONS (continued) i l K.1 and K.2 l Condition K applies to the following reactor trip Functions: e Pressurizer Pressure-Low: o Pressurizer Water Level-High; e Reactor Coolant Flow-Low: e RCP Breaker Position: e Undervoltage RCPs: and e Underfrequency RCPs. l With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 setpoint. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint. The 6 hours O U allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 7. An additional 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in i trip within the specified Completion Time. j Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant
-OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this oeriod that may require the protection
. afforded by thb FunctEins associated with Condition K. !
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows pl6cing the ino)erable channel in the bypassed l condition for up to 4 lours while performing routine surveillance testing of the other ch n els. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference 7. I
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
,7 . BAS.ES
~ ACTIONS-(continued) l L.1 and L.2 Condition L applies to Turbine Trip on Emergency Trip Header Pressure or on Turbine Throttle Valve Closure. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the trip condition within 6 hours. If placed in the tripped condition, this results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip.. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed!in the trip condition. then power must be reduced below thelP-8 k tpoint within the next 6 hours. The 6 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 7. '
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the ino)erable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 4 lours while performing routine surveillance testing of the other channels. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference'7. l' M.1 and M.2 ['; v [ Condition M applies to the SI ~ Input from ESFAS reactor trip and the RTS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for these Functions. With one train ino)erable 6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERAB..E status (Required Action M.1) or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Com)letion Time of 6 hours (Required Action M.1) is reasona)le considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety fu gtion and-given the low probability of
- an event during this interval. The Completion Time of 6 hours (Required Action M.2) is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. ,
The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours for surveillance
-l testing, provided the.other train is OPERABLE.
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y 3 s. RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 hAS'ES!,T 4 ACTIONS;(continued) 1 !N11-and N.2-
.l; Condiki'on N applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2.- These actions address the train'or,ientation of the RTS.for the RTBs. With'one train inoperable 1 hcar is allowed to restore the train to 0PERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is- reasonable.-based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner.and without challenging. plant systems. The 1 hour 4
and 6 hour Completion Times are: equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdown actions <in the event of a complete
; loss of RTS Function. Placing the unit in MODE 3 results in Action C entry while RTB(s) are inoperable.
The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note'1. allows one ' channel to be bypassed for u) to 2 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other clannel is
.n a :0PERABLE. Note 2 allows one RTB to be bypassed for up to 2 hours for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip
. . . mechanisms if the other RTB train is OPERABLE. The 2 hour t.. time limit .is justified in Reference 7.
n 0 l ' and 0,2 , V l: y '[ K ..
+ ' .
. Condition 0 a) plies to the P-6 and P-10 interlocks. With o > one or. more. clannels inoperable for one-out-of-two or two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the
;~; existing unit condition by observation of the associated 3ermissive annunciator window within 1. hour cr the unit must Je placed in MODE 3 wittiin the next 6 hours. Verifying the
. - . . interlock status manuahy accomplishes the . interlock's H- Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on 1 , operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time' of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating exper_ience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The I hour and.6 hour Completion
, Times are equal'to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for
" - shutdown actions in the event of'a complete loss of RTS
+ Function.-
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 A BASES' LACTIONS (continued) l P.1 and P.2 Condition P applies to the P-7. P-8. and P-13 interlocks. With'one or more channels inoperable for one-out-of-two or two-out-of-four coincidence logic, the associated interlock must le . verified to be in its required state for the existing unit condition by observation of the associated aermissive annunciator window within 1 hour'or the unit must
]e placed in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours. These actions are conservative for the case where power level is being raised. Verifying the interlock status manuall accom)lishes the interlock's Function. The C letion-Time of 1 lour is based on operating experience and he minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. ,
l 0.1'and 0.2
.j' Condition 0 applies to the RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms. or diverse trip features, in MODES 11 and 2.
TY With one of the diverse trip features ino)erable, it must be d restored to an OPERABLE status within 48 lours or the unit must be placed in a MODE where the requirement does not apply. This is accomplished by placing the unit in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours:(54 hours total time). The Completion Time of 6 hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience. to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging p15nt systems. With the unit in MOCE 1 Action C would apply to any
- inoserable RTB trip mechanism. The affected RTB shall not be )ypassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable exce)t for the time required to perform maintenance to one of tle diverse features. The allowable time for performing maintenance of the diverse features is 2 hours for the reasons stated under Condition N. -
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RTS' Instrumentation B'-3.3.1
. BkSES LACTIbW3.(continued)-
The Comaletion Time of 48 hours for" Required' Action 0.1 is reasonaale considering that in this Condition there is one
-remaining diverse feature for.the affected RTB, and one-OPERABLE RTB capable of performing the safety function and:
given the'. low probability of an event occurring during this
. interval.
. SURVEILLANCE The SRs for each RTS Function are identified by the SRs -
REQUIREMENTS column of Table 3.3.1-1 for that Function.
- c
~
A' Note has been added to the SR Table stating that Table 3.3.1-1 determines which.SRs apply to which RTS Functions. Note that each channel of probess )rotection supplies'both trains of the RTS. When. testing Clannel I Train A and Train B must'be examined. Similarly. Train A and Train B' must be examined when testing Channel IIl. Channel <III'. and Channel IV (if applicable). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the' required. (]~ channel accuracles. SR 3.3.1.1 Performance of the' CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other- ! channels. It is based on the assumption that' instrument
- channels monitoring thTsame parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations .
between the two instrument channels could be an indication' ! of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK w1ll detect gross channel failure: thus, it.is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues:to operate proprtrly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATIDfL i
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ue , RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1 L BAS.ES
~)'
(~ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
-Agreement criteria are determined based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channei is outside the criteria, it
^
may be an indication that the sensor or the signal. processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less fcrmal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LC0 required channels. SR 3.3.1'2 . SR 3.3.1.2 compares the calorimetric heat balance calculation to the NIS' channel out)ut every 24 hours. If
' the calorimetric exceeds the NIS clannel output by > 2% RTP.
I the NIS.is not declared inoperable, but must be adjusted. If the NIS channel output cannot be properly adjusted the channel 'is. declared inoperable. Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.2. The first Note indicates that
. (G the NIS channel output shall be adjusted consistent with the V calorimetric results if the absolute difference between the NIS channel output and the calorimetric is > 2% RTP. The second Note clarifies that.this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is = 15% RTP and that 12 hours is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 15% RTP. At lower power levels, calorimetric data are inaccurate. 1 l
' TheFrequencyofeveryJ4hoursisadequate. It is based on
. plant operating experience, considering nstrument reliability and ope _ rating history data for instrument drift.
Together these factors demonstrate the change in the absolute difference between NIS and heat balance calculated powers rarely exceeds 2% in any 24 hour period. In addition, control room operators periodically monitor I redundant. indications and alarms to detect deviations in channel outputs. l l
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RTSInst'rumentation B 3.3.1~ m
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, . BASES V SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-(continued).
SR 3.3:1.3- ' SR 3.3.13 compares the'incore system-to .the .NIS channel
. output. prior to exceeding 75% QTP after each refueling and-every 31 Effective Full Power Days-(EFPD) thereafter. .If the absolute difference is a 3%. the NIS channel' is still OPERABLE..but must be readjusted. '
If the NIS-channel cannot be pro
. channel Eis deciare"i inoperable; Thisperly Surveillance readjusted is~ the-performed to veriiy the f(AI) input:to the Overtemperature-
-AT. Function.
Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.3. . Note 1 indicates that the excore NIS channel shall be' adjusted if the absolute difference between the incore.and excore AFD is = 3%. Note 2 clafifies that' the Surveillance is required only if reactor power;is > 15% RTP. The Frequency of once; prior.to exceeding"75% RTP' following each refueling outage considers that the' core ifiay be changed
- . during a refueling outage such that the previous comparison. , .O t prior to the refueling outage, is no longer.completelyi Q valid. The Frequency also considers.that.the comparison .
accuracy increases with power level such that the comparison is preferred to be performed at as-high a possible. . An initial performance at 5 75% power . level asRTP pr verification prior to attain 1ng full power.
' . .~
The Frequency of every .31 EFPD is adequate. It'is based on
. plant operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history; data for instrument drift.
. - Also. the slow changes'in neutron flux'during the fuel cycle Can be detected during this interval.
F :SR' 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TADOT every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test-shall. verify OPERABILITY by
' actuation of the end devices.
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,- S _ BASES )
." F SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. Independent verification of RTB undervoltage and shunt trip function is not required for the bypass breakers. No capability is provided for performing such a test at power. The independent test for bypass breakers is included in SR 3.3.1.13. The by) ass breaker test shall include a local
. shunt trip. A Note las been added to indicate that this test must be performed on the bypass breaker prior to placing it in service.
The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data. SR 3.3.1.5 SR 3.3.1.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The SSPS is tested every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. using the semiautomatic tester. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent O actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all pcssible U logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives,
~are tested for each protection function. The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.
SR 3.3.1.6
.SR 3.3.1.6 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. .If the measurements do not agree, the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be calibrated to agree with the incore detector measurements.
If the excore channels.cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(AI) input to the Overtemperature AT Function. f. t g V BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 53 5/30/98 Revision E I L L___.____-.------__------___-----_---.- .
w . RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
,q: BASES
-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A Note modifies SR 3.3.l.6. The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power 'is = 75% RTP and that 24 hours is allowed for' performing the first surveillance after reaching 75% RTP. h The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adecuate. It is based on . industry operating experience. considering instrument reliability' and operating history data for instrument drift. SR 3. 3 < 1_l , SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every 92 days. A COT-is performed on each. required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the-intended Function. Setpoints must be within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1. The difference'between the current "as found" values and the previous test "as left" values must be consistent with the l- calculated normal uncertainties consistent with the setpoint methodology. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. df- The "as found" and "as left" values must also be recorded s and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis'(Ref. 7.) when applicable. SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a Note that provides a 4 hour delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when~ entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown t'o proceed
- without a delay for.te' sting in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the'RTBs closed for > 4 hours this Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours after entry into MODE 3. j The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 7. ;
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- BASES ~ l f)..
y SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR' 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3;1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.7. except it is modified by a Note that this test shall include verification that the.P-6 and P-10 interlocks are in their required . state for the existing unit condition. The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 92 days of the Frequencies prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power-below P-10 and P-6. The
, Frequency of " prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the
, source. intermediate and power range low instrument channels. The Frequency of "4 hours'afte' rreducing power below P-10" (applicable to 1 intermediate and Jower range low channels) and 4 hours after reducing aelow P-6" (applicable to source range channels) power allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed fp m the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to Serform the testing recuired'by this surveillance The
. Irequency of every 92 cays thereafter applies iY the unit remains in the MODE of Applicability after the iiiitial
' Af' performances of: prior to reactor startup and four hours d- after reducing power below P-10 or P-6. The MODE of 1 Applicability for this surveillance is '< P-10 for the power range low and intermediate range channels and < P-6 for the source range channels. Once the unit is in. MODE 3. this surveillance. is no longer required. If power is to be ;
maintained < P-10 or < P-6 for more than 4 hours, then the ' testing required by this surveillance must be 3erformed prior.to the expiration of.the 4 hour limit. our hours is a reasonable time to ggnplete the. required testing or place ) the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer i
~
required; This test ensures that the NIS source. intermediate, and power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing
. power into the applicable MODE (< P-10 or < P-6) for periods ];
- > 4 hours. y 1
4 I 3 l 1
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w . , f .y-RTS Instrumentation- i
'B 3.3.1 1 iBASES-ttxi.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR' 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.9 is the. performance of a TADOT every 92d'ays, as
-justified -in Reference 7.
The SR:is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from-the TADOT.- Since this SR applies to RCP undervoltage and underfrequency' relays, setpoint.
. verification requires elaborate bench calibration a'nd is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
SR 3.3.l.10
;A' CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a
~
complete check of the instrument loop including- the sensor.
,The test verifies that the channel: responds ~ to a measured parameter within.the necessary range and accuracy. In addition. .the test sh-all include verification that the time
. constants-are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable.
U
/T CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions.of the plant specific setpoint methodology. The difference between the current "as-found" values and the previous' test "as left" values must be consistent with the calculated normal uncertainties consistent with the setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 18 months is; based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipmentJrift in the setpoint methodology.
+
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BAS,ES p/ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.11 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION as described in SR 3.3.1.10. every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed above 15% RTP. and obtaining detector plateau curves, evaluating those curves. and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range intermediate range and )ower range neutron detectors consists of obtaining t1e detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves.. and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Surveillance is not required for the NIS power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 or 1, and is not required for the NIS intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2. because the unit must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the inte'rmediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this , l") C' Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an un)lanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with tie reactor at power. 0)erating experience has shown these components usually pass tie Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency. l SR 3.3.1.12 SR 3.3.1.12 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every 18 months. _ The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. V 5/30/98 Revision E BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.3.1 - 57 1 LE _. _ _ = _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _. _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
b l i RTS Instrumentation
. B 3.3.1 S[ 4 "/ '
iBASES- P ; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued).
-ll SR' 3.3.1.13 SR3.3.1.13istheperformanceofaNAD0IoftheManual
. Reactor Trip. RCP Breaker Position.'and the SI Input from ESFAS. This TADOT is performed every 18 months. The. test shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the l, Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms for the Manual Reactor Trip Function for the Reactor Trip Breakers and
,y Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers. The Reactor Trip Bypass-
,' Breaker test shall. include testing of the automatic
.undervoltage trip. -
s s r 'The Frequency is based on'the known reliability of the A1 Functions and the multichannel redundancy available. and has been shown to be acceptable'through operating experience. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. The Functions affected have no setpoints' associated with them. ,
.l .SR 3.3.'l.14
~ SR 3.3;1.14 is the 3erformance of a TADOT of Turbine Trip t/N ll- Functions. This TA)0T is-performed prior to reactor , '
~s tartu). A Note states that this Surveillance is required if it 1as not been' performed once within the previous 31 days. Verification of the Trip Setpoint does not have to be performed for this Surveillance. Performance of this test will ensure that the Turbine Trip Function is OPERABLE prior to taking'the reactor critical. This test cannot be 9 ., performed with the reactor at power and must therefore be
- performed prior to reitrJ;or startup.
1
'j. SR 3.3.1.15 j
~
r , 'l' SR 3.3.1.15 verifies that the individual channe'l/ train actuation response times are less than or equal to the : < , maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Res)onse : time testing acceptance criteria are included in the JFSAR. . Section 7. 2 (Ref. 9). Individual component response times are not modeled in.the analyses. ;
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
. BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the equipment reaches th9 required functional state. For channels that include dynamic transfer Functions (e.g., lag, lead / lag. rate / lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer Function set to one, with the resulting measured response time com3ared to the appropriate UFSAR response time. Alternately, t1e response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value, provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured. Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise or power interrupt tests), (2) inplace. onsite, or offsite (e.g. vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. Reference 8 provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by
. test. ,,_
The allocations for sensor response times must be verified prior to placing the component in o)erational service and re-verified following. maintenance tlat may adversely affect response time. In general, electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value. One example where response time could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) As appropriate, each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices is included in the testing. Response times cannot be determined during unit operation because equipment o)eration is required to measure response times. Experience las shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. l SR 3.3.1.15 is' modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary.because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector in)ut signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because t1e principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response. R REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 7.
- 2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
- 3. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
- 4. IEEE-279-1971.
- 5. Technical Requirements Manual. [
l 6. WCAP-12523. "RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodology Study," October 1990.
. 7; WCAP-10271-P-A, SITpplement 2. Rev.1. June 1990.
- 8. WCAP-13632 Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," August 1995'.
l 9. UFSAR Section 7.2. O BR'AIDWOOD'- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 60 5/30/98 Revision E _ _ _ _ _ _ i
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 g B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The ESFAS initiates necessary safety systems, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating core design limits and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. and to mitigate accidents. The ESFAS instrumentation is segmented into three distinct but interconnected modules as identified below: o Field transmitters or process sensors and instrumentation: provide a measurable electronic signal based on the physical characteristics of the parameter being measured: e Signal processing equipment including analog protection system field contacts, and protection channel sets: provide signal conditioning, bistable setpoint comparison, process algorithm actuation, compatible e electrical signal output to protection system devices, and control board / control room / miscellaneous indications: and e Solid State Protection System (SSPS) including input. logic, and output bays: initiates the proper unit shutdown or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation in accordance with the defined logic and based on the bistable outputs from the signal process control and protection system.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES O BACKGROUND (continued) Field Transmitters or Sensors To meet the design demands for redundancy and reliability. more than one, and often as many as four, field transmitters or sensors are used to measure unit parameters. In many cases, field transmitters or sensors that input to the ESFAS are shared with the Reactor Trip System (RTS). In some cases, the same channels also provide control system inputs. To account for calibration tolerances and instrument drift. which are assumed to occur between calibrations, statist.ical allowances are provided in the Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values. The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its "as found" calibration data are compared against its documented acceptance criteria. Sional Processino Eauioment Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field' instruments. The process
. control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control Ol board, and comparison of measured input signals with established setpoints. If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation.
Channel separation is maintained up to and through.the input bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing. Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS while others provide input to the SSPS. the main control board, the plant computer, and one or 99re control systems. 1 O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.;2 - 2 S/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES O BACKGROUND (continued) Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits. three channels with a'two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic. Generally, a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-fourif a parameter logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation. These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 4). The actual number of channels required for each unit g parameter is specified in Reference 2. Trio Setooints and Allowable Values l Allowable Values provide a conservative margin with regards to instrument uncertainties to ensure that Safety Limits (SLs) are not violated during Anticipated Operational Occurrences (A00s) and that the consequences of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) will be acceptable providing the unit is operated from within tfie LCOs at the onset of the event and
- required equipment functions as designed. If the measured j value of a bistable / contact is less conservative than the Allowable Value, then the associated ESFAS function is considered inoperable. Allowable Values for ESFAS functions are specified in Table 3.3.2-1.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 3 , 6 BASES i V BACKGROUND (continued)- Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables l or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to l account for changes in measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example of such a l change in measurement error is attributable to calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the mrasured value of a bistable is less conservative than the Trip Setpoint, but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated ESFAS Function is considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5). Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a methodology which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each instrument channel. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in Reference 6. Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is -used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. i To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS. each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes the second train will 3rovide ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are tscen out of service or placed
. in test, a reactor trfp~will result. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation: generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room. i i-(
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ESFAS Instrumentation-B 3.3.2 7 BASES
-(V BACKGROUND.(continued)
The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equi) ment and combined into logic matrices that represent com)inations indicative of various transients'. If a required logic matrix combination is completed, the system will send actuation signals via master and slave relays to those components whose aggregate Function best serves to' alleviate the condit+on and restore the unit to a safe condition. Examples aro given in the Applicable Safety Analyses. LCO, and Applicability sections of this Bases. Each SSPS train has a built in testing device that car automatically test the decision logic matrix function and the actuation devices while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken out of service for testing. the other train is capable of providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has been completed. The testing device is-semiautomatic to minimize testing time. - The actuation-of ESF components is accomplished through master and slave relays. The SSPS energizes the master relays appropriate for the condition of the unit. Each 'b O master relay then energizes one or more slave relays, which then cause actuation of the end devices. The master and slave relays are routinely tested to ensure operation. The test of the master relays energizes the relay, which then operates the contacts and a) plies a low voltage to the associated slave relays. T1e low voltage is not sufficient to actuate the slave relays but only demonstrates signal path continuity. The SLAVE RELAY TEST actuates the devices if their operation will not interfere with continued unit operation. For the latter case, actual component operation is prevented by the SLTVE RELAY TEST circuit, and slave relay contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. L i l O. '
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j ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 J l n BASES V APPLICABLE Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or SAFETY ANALYSES, more ESFAS Functions. One of the ESFAS Functions is the LCO, and 3rimary actuation signal for that accident. An ESFAS APPLICABILITY : unction may be the primary actuation signal for more than one type of accident. An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more. Other accidents. For example, Pressurizer Pressure-Low is a primary actuation signal for small Loss Of Coolant Accidents
-(LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for Steam Line Breaks (SLBs) outside containment. Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis, are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit.
These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 3). The LC0 requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function to be OPERABLE when the unit status is within the l Applicability. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability
] of the affected Functions.
The LC0 generally requires OPERABILITY of three or four channels in each instrumentation Function and two channels in each logic and manual initiation Function. The two-out-of-three and the two-out-of-four configurations allow one channel to be tri) ped during maintenance or testing without causing an ESFAS initiation. Two logic or
, manual initiation channels are required to ensure no single random failure disable,s_the ESFAS.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l BASES l APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) The required channels of ESFAS instrumentation provide ~ unit protection in the' event of any of the analyzed accidents. E ESFAS protection functions are as follows:
- 1. -Safety In.iection l Safety Injection (SI) provides two primary function.s:
- 1. Primary side water addition to ensure maintenance or recovery of reactor vessel water level (coverage of the active fuel for heat removal, 1 clad integrity, and for limiting peak clad temperature to < 2200*F) and
- 2. Boration to ensure recovery and maintenance of
'SDM.
These functions are necessary to mitigate the effects of High Energy Line Breaks (HELBs).both inside and L outside of-containment. The SI signal is'also used to initiate other Functions such as: j- 'O - ehese ^ tso'etio": l- e Containment Purge Isolation: 1 l l e Reactor Trip: ) e Turbine Trip: o Feedwater Isolation:
- e Start of AuxTTiary Feedwater-(AF) pumps:
o Control room ventilation isolation; and-o Enabling automatic switchover of Emergency Core 5 Cooling Systems (ECCS) pump suction to containment L sump. O BRIIDWOOD-UNITS 1&2 B 3.3.2 - 7 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
)
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) These other functions ensure: e Isolation of nonessential systems through containment penetrations; o Trip of the-turbine and reactor to limit power . generation: e Isolation of FW to limit secondary side mass losses: e Start of AF to ensure secondary side cooling capability; e Isolation of the control room to ensure habitability; and e Enabling ECCS suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) switchover on low low RWST level to ensure continued cooling via use of the containment sump.
- a. Safety Iniection-Manual Initiation
],
The operator can initiate SI at any time by using either of two switches in the control room. This action will cause actuation of all~ components in the same :nanner as any of the automatic actuation signals. The LCO requires two channels to be OPERABLE. Each channelgonsists of one switch ~and the ' interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet such that either switch will actuate both trains. This ensures the pro)er amount of redundancy is maintained in t1e manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has l manual ESFAS initiation capability.
~
The applicability of the SI Manual Initiation Function is discussed with the Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relay Function below. 1 l' p"
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- b. Safety Iniection- Automatic Actuation Looic an_d Actuation Relays This LC0 requires two trains to be OPERABLE.
Actuation logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including the initiating relay contacts responsible for actuating the ESF equipment. Manual and automatic initiation of SI must be
- OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3. In these MODES.
there is sufficient energy in the primary and ! secondary systems to warrant automatic initiation ! of ESF systems. Manual Initiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation , , is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is l available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. but because of the large number of components actuated on an SI. actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support
- system level manual i'nitiation.
l These Functions are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is adequate time for the operator to evaluate unit conditions.and respond by manually starting individual systems. pumps. and other equipment to mitigate the ! consequences of an abnormal condition or accident. Unit aressure and temperature are very low and many ESF components are administratively locked out or otherwise prevented from actuating to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of unit systems. l I, O - BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 9 5/29/98 Revision A
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 ("'; BASES U APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- c. Safety Iniection-Containment Pressure-Hioh 1 This signal provides protection against the following accidents:
e SLB inside containment; e LOCA: and e Feed line break inside containment. Containment Pressure-High 1 provides no input to any control functions. Thus, three OPERABLE channels are sufficient to satisfy protective requirements with a two-out-of-three logic. The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics are located outside of containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment. Thus, the high pressure Function will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint
,-3 reflects only steady state instrument t \j) uncertainties.
l Containment Pressure-High 1 must be OPERABLE in l MODES 1. 2. and 3 when there is sufficient energy l in the primary and secondary systems to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment. i I l 1 I l 1 I ' L_gl . BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 10 5/29/98 Revision A 1 t___._____ - . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _
ESFAS Instrumentation I B 3.3.2
; BASES (G
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- d. Safetv Iniection-Pressurizer Pressure-Low This signal provides protection against the following accidents:
e Inadvertent opening of a SG relief or safety valve; e SLB: e A spectrum of rod cluster control assembly ejection accidents (rod ejection); e Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer relief or safety valve; e LOCAs: and e SG Tube Rupture. Pressurizer pressure provides both control and
,m protection functions with inputs to the / '") Pressurizer Pressure Control System, reactor trip, and SI. Therefore, the actuation logic must be '
able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then recuire the ; protection function actuation, anc a single l failure in the other channels providing the l protection function actuation. Thus, four l OPERABLE channels are required to satisfy the j requirements with a two-out-of-four logic. ) 1 ThetransmitErsarelocatedinsidecontainment. I with the taps in the vapor space region of the I pressurizer, and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (LOCA SLB inside containment rod ejection). Therefore. the Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environmental instrument I uncertainties. l
,q LJ l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 11 5/29/98 Revision A l
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 q BASES V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 (above P-11) to mitigate the consequences of an HELB inside containment. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint. Automatic SI actuation below this pressure setpoint is then performed by the Containment Pressure-High 1 signal. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 below the P-11 setpoint. Other ESF functions are used to detect accident conditions and actuate the ESF systems in this MODE. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation.
- e. Safetv In.iection-Steam Line Pressure-Low Steam Line Pressure-Low provides protection against the following accidents:
e SLB; ( ) e Feed line break; and e Inadvertent opening of an SG relief or an SG safety valve. Steam Line Pressure-Low provides a control input to density compensate the steam flow channels that l are part of the SG water level control function. However. this control function cannot cause the events that ttle Function must protect against.
. Thus, three OPERABLE channels on each steam line are sufficient to satisfy the protective requirements with a two-out-of-three logic on each steam line, With the transmitters typically located inside the steam tunnels it is possible for them to experience adverse environmental conditions during a secondary side break. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects both steady state'and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 I
/~ BASES
- O' APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) l This Function-is anticipatory in nature and has a l typical lead / lag ratio of 50/5.
Steam Line Pressure-Low must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2, and 3 (above P-11) when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the. rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint. Below P-11. feed line break is not a concern. Inside containment. SLB will be terminated by automatic SI actuation via Containment Pressure-High 1. and outside containment SLB will be terminated by the Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High signal for steam line isolation. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. 5. or 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit that would result in a release'of enough quantities of energy to cause a significant cooldown of the RCS. n 2. Containment Sorav Containment Spray provides three primary functions:
- 1. Lowers containment pressure and temperature after an HELB in containment:
- 2. Reduces the amount of radioactive iodine in the containment atmosphere; and
- 3. Adjusts the diof the water in the c~ontainment
- recirculation sump after a large break LOCA.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 m BASES
\)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and APPLICABILITY (continued) These functions are necessary to:
- Ensure the pressure boundary integrity of the containment structure; e Limit the release of radioactive iodine to the environment in the event of a failure of the containment structure; and e Minimize corrosion of the components and systems inside containment following a LOCA.
The containment spray actuation signal starts the containment spray pumps and aligns the discharge of the pumps to the containment spray nozzle headers in the upper levels of containment. Water is initially drawn from the RWST by the containment spray aumps and mixed with a sodium hydroxide solution from t1e spray-l additive tank. When the RWST reaches the Low-3 level setpoint, the spray pump suctions are shifted to the containment sump if continued containment spray is
.. required. Containment spray is actuated manually or
() automatically by Containment Pressure-High 3. i _
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i ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LC0. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- a. Containment Soray-Manual Initiation The operator can initiate containment spray at any time from the control room by simultaneously turning two containment spray actuation switches in the same channel. Because an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could have such serious consequences, two switches must be turned simultaneously to initiate containment spray.
There are two sets of two switches each in the control room. Each set of two switches is considered a channel. Simultaneously turning the two switches in either set will actuate containment spray in both trains in the same manner as the automatic actuation signal. Two Manual Initiation channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single failure disables the Manual Initiation Function. Note that Manual Initiation of containment spray also actuates Phase B containment isolation.
- b. Containment Soray- Automatic Actuation looic and Actuation Relays Automatic actuation logic and actuatiori relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
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ESFAS Insu umentation B 3.3.2 ' BASES v APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Manual and automatic initiation of containment spray must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 when there is a potential for an accident to occur, and sufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pose a 1 threat to containment integrity due to overpressure conditions. Manual initiation is also required in MODE 4, even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. However, because of the large number of components actuated on a containment spray, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic ~and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6, there is insufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to result in containment overpressure. In MODES 5 and 6, there is also adequate time for the operators to evaluate unit conditions and respond, to mitigate the consequences of abnormal' conditions by manually starting individual components. I ) c. Containment Sorav-Containment Pressure-Hioh 3 This signal provides protection against a LOCA or an SLB inside containment. The transmitters (d/p cells) and electronics are located outside of containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment. Thus, the high pressure function will not experience any adverse environmental conditions anA the Trip Setpoint reflects only
- steady state instrument uncertainties.
This Function requires the bistable output to energize to perform its required action. It is not desirable to have a loss of power actuate containment spray, since the consequences of an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could be serious. Note that this Function also has the inoperable channel placed in bypass rather than trip to decrease the probability of an inadvertent actuation. I o_ BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 16 5/29/98 Revision A
i ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 LBASFS l
'( APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) .
Four channels of containment pressure are utilized ; in a .two-out-of-four logic configuration. Since containment pressure is not used for control, this , arrangement exceeds the minimum redundancy i requirements. . Additional redundancy is warranted because this Function is energize to trip. Containment Pressure-High 3 must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is' sufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is insufficient energy in - the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment and reach the Containment ~ Pressure-High 3 setpoint. 3-. Containment Isolation . 1 Containment Isolation provides isolation of.the I containment atmosphere, and all process systems that ! 3enetrate containment, from the environment. This r unction is necessary to prevent or limit the release O of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a i d large break LOCA. There are two separate Containment Isolation signals; Phase A and Phase B. The Phase A signal isolates all automatically isolable process lines, except Component l Cooling water (CC), at a relatively low containment pressure indicative of primary' or secondary system leaks. For these types of events, forced circulation cooling using the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) and SGs is the preferred Tbut not required) method of decay : l heat removal. Since CC is required to support RCP ' operation, not isolating CC on the low pressure Phase A signal enhances unit safety by allowing operators to use forced RCS circulation to cool the unit. Isolating i CC on the low pressure signal may force the use of feed ! and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficult to l control. ! i
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 i BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Phase A Containment Isolation is actuated automatically by SI. or manually via the automatic actuation logic. All process lines penetrating containment. with the exception of CC, are isolated. CC is not isolated at this time to permit continued operation of the RCPs with cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangers and RCP motor bearing oil coolers. All process lines not equipped with remote operated isolation valves are manually closed, or otherwise isolated, prior to reaching MODE 4. Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is accomplished by either of two switches in the control room.' Either switch actuates both trains. Note that manual actuation of Phase A Containment Isolation also actuates Containment Ventilation Isolation. The Phase B signal isolates CC. This occurs at a relatively high containment pressure that is. indicative of a-la_rge break LOCA or an SLB. For these events, forced circulation using the RCPs is no longer desirable. Isolating the CC at the higher pressure O does not Jose a challenge to the containment boundary because t1e CC System is a closed loop inside containment. Although some system components do not meet all of the ASME Code requirements applied to the containment itself the system is continuously pressurized to a pressure greater than the Phase B setpoint. Thus, routine operation demonstrates the integrity of the system pressure boundary for 3ressures exceeding the Phase B set)oint. Furthermore. )ecause system pressure exceeds tie Phase B set)oint. any
- system leakage prior to initiation of P1ase B isolation would be into containment. Therefore. the combination of CC System design and Phase B isolation ensures the CC System is not a potential path for radioactive release from containment.
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l l ESFAS Instrumentation j B 3.3.2 j s BASES ; APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Phase B Containment Isolation is actuated by l Containment Pressure-High 3. or manually, via the automatic actuation logic. For containment pressure to reach a value high enough to actuate Containment Pressure-High 3. a large break LOCA or SLB must have occurred and containment spray must have been actuated. RCP operation will no longer be required and CC to the RCPs is, therefore, no longer necessary. Manual Phase B Containment Isolation is accomplished by the same switches that actuate Containment Spray. When the two switches in either set are turned simultaneously. Phase B Containment Isolation and Containment Spray will be actuated in both trains.
- a. Containment Isolation-Phase A Isolation (1) Phase A Isolation-Manual Initiation Manual Phase A Containment Isolation is actuated by either of two switches in the control room. Either switch actuates both G trains. Each switch is considered a channel.
(._) Note that manual initiation of Phase A Containment Isolation also actuates Containment Ventilation Isolation. (2) Phase A Isolation- Automatic Actuation Loaic and Actuation-Relays Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and
. . operate Tn the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Manual and automatic initiation of Phase A 4 l Containment Isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. i l 2,-and 3. when there is a potential for an j l accident to occur. Manual initiation is also ; L required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation j is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is - l available to manually actuat. required components l in the event of a DBA. but because of the large l number of components actuated on a Phase A , L ' Containment Isolation, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays i must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level i manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6, there is L insufficient energy in the primary or secondary l systems to pressurize the containment to require Phase A Containment Isolation. Also, there is adecuate time for the operator to evaluate unit concitions and manually actuate individual isolation valves in response to abnormal or accident conditions. (3) Phase A 1501ation-Safety In.iection l Phase A Containment Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate SI. The Phase A Containment Isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. L ' Therefore, the requirements are not repeated
- in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead, Function 1. SI, l is referenced for all initiating Functions
! . . and requirements. l l l O BRAIDWOOD -' UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 20 5/29/98 Revision i
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 (7 g BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- b. Containment Isolation-Phase B Isolation Phase B Containment Isolation is accomplished by Manual Initiation. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays, and by Containment Pressure channels (the same channels that actuate Containment Spray. Function 2). The Phase B Containment Isolation Function requires the bistable output to energize to trip in order to minimize the potential of spurious trips that may damage the RCPs.
(1) Phase B Isolation-Manual Initiation Manual Phase B Containment Isolation is actuated by simultaneously turning two switches in the same train. There are two sets of two switches each in the control room. Each set of two switches is considered a channel. (2) Phase B Isolation- Automatic Actuation Loalc and Actuation Relays y Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b. O BRAIDWOOD-UNITS 1&2 B 3.3.2 - 21 5/29/98 Revision A l l.
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES (\ V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) Manual and automatic initiation of Phase B containment isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. when there is a potential for an accident to occur. Manual initiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation is not required. In this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. However, because of the large number of components actuated on a Phase B containment isolation, actuation is simplified by the use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment to require Phase B containment-isolation. There also is adecuate time for the operator to evaluate unit concitions and manually actuate individual isolation valves in response to abnormal or accident conditions. (7 (3) Phase B Isolation-Containment V Pressure-High 3 i The basis for containment pressure MODE i applicability is as discussed for ESFAS ! I Function 2.c above.
- 4. Steam Line Isolation Isolation of the main steam lines provides protection
. in the event of arr3LB inside or outside containment. ,
Rapid isolation of the steam lines will limit the steam ' break accident to the blowdown from one SG, at most.
. For an SLB upstream of the MSIVs, inside or outside of containment, closure of the MSIVs and their bypass valves limits the accident to the blowdown from only the affected SG. For an SLB downstream of the MSIVs.
l closure of the MSIVs and their bypass valves terminates the accident as soon as the steam lines depressurize. I
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l ESFhSInstrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- a. Steam Line Isolation-Manual Initiation i Manual initiation of Steam Line Isolation can be accom)lished from the control room. There are two switcles in the control room and either switch can initiate action to immediately close all MSIVs. ,
The LC0 requires two channels to be OPERABLE.
- b. Steam Line Isolation- Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays
{ Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the I same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b. ' Manual and automatic initiation of steam line isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES'1.'2. and 3, when there is sufficient energy in the RCS and SGs to have an SLB or ' other accident. This could result in the release of significant quantities of energy and cause a cooldown of the primary system. The Steam Line Isolation
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Function is not required in MODES 2 and 3 when all MSIVs and their bypass valves are closed. In MODES 4, (d' l 5. and 6. there is insufficient energy in the RCS and i SGs to experience an SLB or other accident releasing significant quantities of energy. t p. U f BRA'IDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 23 5/30/98 Revision E l
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES 7.s
\') APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- c. Steam L'ine Isolation-Containment Pressure-High 2 This Function actuates closure of the MSIVs and I their bypass valves in the event of a LOCA or an !
SLB inside containment to maintain at least one unfaulted SG.as a heat sink for the reactor, and , to limit the mass and energy release to ) containment. The transmitters (d/p cells) and i electronics are located outside containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment. ! Containment Pressure-High 2 provides no input to I any control functions. Thus, three OPERABLE { channels are sufficient to satisfy protective ! requirements with two-out-of-three logic. Thus, they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions, and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties. Containment. Pressure-High 2 must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to 3ressurize the containment following a pipe breac. This (Q a would cause a significant increase in the containment 3ressure, thus allowing detection and l closure of t1e MSIVs and their bypass valves. The Steam Line Isolation Function is not required in MODES 2 and 3 when all MSIVs and their bypass valves are closed. In MODES 4. 5 and 6. there is J not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment'Pressure-High 2 setpoint. l
. i
- d. Steam Line Isolation-Steam Line Pressure I i
(1) Steam Line Pressure-Low j Steam Line Pressure-Low provides closure of l the MSIVs and their bypass valves in the ; event of an SLB to maintain at least one ! unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor. l and to limit the mass and energy release to ' containment. Steam Line Pressure-Low was discussed previously under SI Function 1.e.
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ESFAS Instrumentation l B 3.3.2 . l
- g. BASES
. APPLICABLE' SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Steam Line Pressure-Low Function must be 1 I OPERABLE in MODE 1. and in MODES 2 and 3 (above P-11), with any MSIV and associated f bypass valve open, when a secondary side { break or stuck open valve could. result in the j rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint. Below P-11. an inside containment SLB will be ' terminated by automatic actuation via Containment Pressure-Hi.gh 2. Stuck valve transients and outside containment SLBs will t be terminated by the Steam Line i Pressure-Negative Rate-High signal for Steam Line Isolation below P-11 when SI has
, been manually blocked. The Steam Line Isolation Function is required in MODES 2 and 3 unless all MSIVs and their bypass valves are closed. This Function is not t-required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4. 5. and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit that would result n in a release of enough quantities of energy U to cause a significant cooldown of the RCS.
(E) Steam _Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High ; Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High
)rovides closure of the MSIVs and their
)ypass valves for an SLB when less than the P-11 setpoint to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor.
and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. When the operator manually
,' blocks the Steam Line Pressure-Low main steam isolation signal when less than the P-11 setpoint, the Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High signal is l automatically enabled. Steam Line l Pressure-Negative Rate-High provides no input to any control functions. Thus, three OPERABLE ch'annels are sufficient to satisfy requirements with a two-out-of-three logic on each steam line. 'Q.
Q) L BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 25 5/30/98 Revis' ion E l l
EiFAS Instrumentation- l B 3.3.2 l BASES
,_3 V( APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High nust be OPERABLE in MODE 3 when less than the P-11 setpoint, when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid depressurization of the steam line(s). In MODES 1 and 2. and in MODE 3, when above the. P-11 setpoint, this signal is automatically 1 disabled and the Steam Line Pressure-Low signal is automatically enabled. The Steam Line Isolation Function is not required in MODE 3 when all MSIVs and their bypass valves l are closed. In MODES 4. 5. and 6. there is i insufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to have an SLB or other accident that would result in a release of enough quantities of energy to cause a significant cooldown of the RCS, While the transmitters may experience elevated ambient temperatures due t'o an SLB. the trip function is based on rate of change, not the absolute accuracy of the indicated G steam pressure. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint , V reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.
- 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation The primary functions of the Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation signals are to prevent damage to the turbine due to water in the steam lines, and to stop the excessive flow of feedwater into the SGs. These
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Functions are necefsary to mitigate the effects of a high water level in the SGs. which could result in carryover of water into the steam lines and excessive cooldown of the primary system. The SG high water
- level is due to excessive feedwater flows.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) The Function is actuated when the level in any SG exceeds the high high setpoint and performs the following functions: e Trips the main turbine; e Trips the FW pumps: e Initiates feedwater isolation: and e Shuts the FW pump discharge valves. This Function is actuated by SG Water Level-High High. or by an SI signal. The RTS also initiates a turbine trip signal whenever a reactor trip (P-4) is generated. In the event of SI. the unit is tripped and the turbine generator is tripped. The FW System is also taken out of operation and the AF System is automatically' started. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation- Automatic a. Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relays Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
- b. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Steam t Generator Water Level-Hiah Hiah (P-14)
This signal provides protection against excessive feedwater flox. The ESFAS SG water' level
- instruments provide input to the SG Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic l
must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system (which may then require the i protection function actuation) and a single l failure in the other channels providing the - l protection function actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels per SG are required to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic. l-The channel Allowable Values are specified in percent of narrow range instrument span, i
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ESFAS hstrumentation l B 3.3.2 BASES t APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) The transmitters (d/p cells) are . located inside containment. However, the events that this Function protects against cannot.cause a severe environment in containment. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument l uncertainties.
- c. . Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation-Safety Injection Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation is also 1 initiated by all Functions that initiate SI. The Feedwater Isolation Function requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements l for their SI function. Therefore. the !
requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead Function 1. SI. is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements. - Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1. and in MODES 2 and 3 except when l all Feedwater (FW) Isolation Valves are closed or O isolated by a closed manual valve when the FW System is V- in operation and the turbine generator may be_in operation. In MODES 4, 5. and 6'. the FW System and the i turbine generator are not in service and this Function ) is not required to be OPERABLE. The applicable FW ] Isolation Valves are listed below: j
- FW Isolation Valve (FWOO9A through D)
. - FW Tempering Flow Control Valve (FWO34A through D)
- FW Tempering Valye (FWO35A through D)
. -. - Low Flow FW Isolation Valve (FWO39A through D-Unit 1 only)
- FW Preheater Bypass Isolation Valve (FWO39A through D-Unit 2 only) 1
- FW Isolation Bypass Valve (FWO43A through D-Unit 2 '
only)
- FW Regulating Valve (FW510.520.530,540) . i
- FW Regulating Bypass Valve (FW510A,520A,530A,540A)
I h BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B .3.3.2 - 28 5/30/98 Revision E
l ' ESFAS' Instrumentation B 3.3.2 l BASES i APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY-(continued) l 6. Auxiliary Feedwater The AF System is designed to provide a secondary side l heat sink for the reactor in the event that the FW'
- System 1s not available. The system has a motor driven cump and a diesel. driven pump which are described in
_C0 3.7.5. "AF System." a Auxiliary Feedwater- Automatic Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relays l t Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
- b. Auxiliary Feedwater-Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low SG-Water Level-Low Low provides protection against a loss of heat sink. A feed line break, inside or outside of containment, or a loss of FW, would result in a loss of SG water level. SG Water Level-Low Low provides input to the SG O.- Level Control System. Therefore the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system which may then require a prctection function actuation and a single failure in the other channels providing the
. protection function actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels per SG are required to satisfy the requirements with two-out-of-four logic. The.
channel Allogble Values are specified in percent
- of narrow range instrument span.
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With the transmitters (d/p cells) located inside
-containment and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (feed line break), the Trip Setpoint reflects-the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environmental. instrument uncertainties.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 4 l - m BASES U APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- c. Auxiliary Feedwater-Safety In1ection An SI signal starts the motor driven and diesel driven AF pumas. The AF initiation functions are the same as tie requirements for their SI function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead. Function 1.
SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.
- d. Auxiliary Feedwater-Loss of Offsite Power (Undervoltaae on Bus 141(241))
l The loss of offsite power to bus 141(241) is detected by a voltage drop on the bus. Upon j restoration of power via the "A" OG to bus 141(241). which su) plies the motor driven AF pomp. the motor driven A pump will automatically start to ensure that at least one SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal following the reactor trip. V Functions 6.a through 6.d must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,
- 2. and 3 to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. SG Water Level-Low Low in any operating SG will cause the motor and diesel driven AF pumps to start. The system is aligned so that upon a start of the pump, water immediately begins to flow to the SGs. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 4, 5. and 6 because the Steam Generators are not normally used forjleat removal, and the AF System is
- not required.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 i i s BASES
.)
j APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- e. Auxiliarv Feedwater-Undervoltaae Reactor Coolant Pumo A loss of power on the buses that provide power to the RCPs provides indication of a pending loss of RCP forced flow in the RCS. The Undervoltage RCP Function sens'es a loss of power on two or more RCP buses and starts the AF pumps to ensure that at-least one SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal following the reactor trip.
There are two undervoltage sensing relays on each 6.9 kV bus which feeds an RCP. One relay provides l an input to actuation logic Train A and the other i relay ]rovides an input to actuation logic Train 3. Each actuation logic train requires input from two of the four buses to initiate both AF pumps. Each train is considered a separate Function. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. This erisures that at least one SG is provided with water to serve as the heat sink to remove reactor decay heat and sensible heat in the event of an accident. In MODES 3. 4. and 5. the RCPs may be normally shut down. and thus, a pump trip is not indicative of a condition requiring automatic AF initiation. p*
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ESFAS' Instrumentation-B 3.3.2 m BASES; V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO.'and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- f. Auxil'iarv Feedwater-Pumo Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure-Low A low pressure signal in the AF pump suction line coincident with an automatic start signal
-the AF pumps against a loss of the normal. protects supply .
of water for the pumps, the Condensate Storage l Tank (CST). A pressure transmitter is located on each AF pump suction line from the CST. After an _] automatic start, a low pressure signal will cause the emergency supply of water for the associated pump to be aligned. or cause the associated AF pump to stop until the emergency source of water is aligned. The Essential Service Water System (safety. grade) is then lined up to supply the AF pump to ensure an adequate supply of water for the AF System to maintain at least one of the SGs as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal. Since the detectors are located in an area not affected by HELBs~or high radiation, they will not exper e"ce e"r edveree e"v'r "=e"te' c "dit4o"s O. ' and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2..
;and 3 to 'nsure e a safety grade supply of water for the AF System to maintain the SGs as the heat sink for the reactor. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 4. 5.'and 6 because the SGs are not normally used for heat removal and the AF
- System is noF required, l
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
~'N BAS,ES (V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and' APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 7. Switchover to Containment Sumo At the end of the safety injection phase of a LOCA. the RWST will be nearly empty. Continued cooling must be provided by the ECCS to remove decay heat. The source of water for the ECCS pumps is switched to the containment recirculation sump. The low head Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps and containment spray pumps draw the water from the containment recirculation sump, the RHR pumps pump the water through the RHR heat exchanger, inject the water back into the RCS. and supply the cooled water to the other ECCS pumps. The ECCS switchover from safety injection to cold leg recirculation is initiated automatically upon receipt of the RWST auto switchover trip signal and is completed via timely operator action at the main control board. Switchover from the RWST to the containment sump must be completed before the RWST empties to prevent damage to the ECCS pumps.and a loss of core cooling capability. For similar reasons.
switchover must not occur before there is sufficient water in the containment sump to support ECCS pump O. suction. Furthermore, early switchover must not occur to ensure that sufficient borated water is injected from the RWST. This ensures the reactor remains shut down in the recirculation mode. Switchover is initiated via automatic opening of the containment recirculation sump isolation valves (518811 A/B). This automt. tic action aligns the suction of the RHR pumps to the containment recirculation sump to ensure continued availability of a suction source.
. Upon receipt of the RWST low low level switchover alarm. the operator is required to initiate the manual operations required to complete switchover in a timely manner (Ref. 1).
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L' ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES-
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V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- a. Switch 6ver to Containment Sumo- Automatic l Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relays
- Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays l consist of the same features and operate in the j .same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.
L b. Switchover to Containment Sumo-Refuelina Water Storaae Tank (RWST) Level-Low Low Coincident With Safety In.1ection During the injection phase of a LOCA, the RWST is the-source of water for all ECCS pumps. A low low level.in the RWST coincident with an.SI signal l provides protection against a loss of water for the ECCS pumps and. indicates the end of the injection phase of the LOCA. The RWST is equipped with four level transmitters. These transmitters provide no control functions. Therefore, a two-out-of-four logic ~is adequate to initiate the-
. protection function actuation. Although.only three channels would be sufficient, a fourth channel has been added for increased reliability.
The transmitters are located in an area not affected by HELBs or post accident high radiation.
~ Thus they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint-reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.
Automatic opening of the containment sump suction
- valves occurs only if the RWST low low level
. signal is coincident with SI. This prevents accidental switchover during normal operation.
Accidental switchover could damage ECCS pumps if they are attempting to take suction from an empty sump. The switchover Function requirements for the SI Functions are the same as the requirements for their SI function. -Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.
'Instead Function 1. SI is referenced for all
- initiating Functions and requirements.
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1 ESFAS Instrumentation l B 3.3.2 BASES V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) These Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 when there is a potential for a LOCA to occur. to ensure a continued supply of water for the ECCS pumps. These Functions are not required i to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is adecuate time for the o)erator to evaluate unit concitions and respond ]y manually initiating the switchover and starting systems, pumps, and other equipment to mitigate the consequences of an abnormal condition or accident. System pressure and temperature are very low and many ESF components are admini0tratively locked out or otherwise prevented from actu~ating to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of unit systems.
- 8. Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks To allow some flexibility in unit operations, several interlocks are included- as part of the ESFAS. These interlocks permit the o]erator to block some signals, automatically enable otler signals. 3revent some actions from occurring, and cause otler actions to (N occur. The interlock Functions back 'up manual actions C) to ensure bypassable functions are in operation under the conditions assumed in the safety analyses.
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L l ESFAS Instrumentation j . B 3.3.2 l BASES L APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) o L a. Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks -Reactor Trio. P-4 The P-4 interlock is enabled-when a Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) and its associated bypass breaker is open. Once the P-4 interlock. is enabled. automatic SI initiation may be manually blocked after a 60 second-time delay. This Function-allows operators to take manual control of SI Systems after the initial ahase of injection is i complete.' Once SI is bloc (ed. automatic actuation , of SI cannot: occur until the P-4 interlock has L been momentarily cleared by closing the RTB. The [ functions of the P-4 interlock are: e Trip the main turbine: e Isolate FW:
~
l e Prevent automatic reactuatio~n of SI after a
- manual reset of SI
- and E h e Prevent openind of the FW isolation valves if they were closed on SI or SG Water Level-High High.
Each of the above Functions is interlocked with
- . P-4 to avert or reduce the continued cooldown of the RCS following a reactor trip. An excessive cooldown of the RCS following a reactor trip could cause an insertion of positive reactivity with a subsequent increase in core power. -To avoid such
- -a situation, the noted Functions have been
- interlocked with P-4 as part of the design of the L unit control and protection system.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 g BASES
-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
! None of the noted Functions serves a mitigation function in the plant licensing basis safety analyses. Only the turbine trip Function is explicitly assumed since it is an immediate consequence of the reactor trip Function. Neither turbine trip, nor any of the other Functions l associated with the reactor trip signal, is L required to show that the plant licensing basis
- safety analysis acceptance criteria 'are not l exceeded.
[ . L The RTB position switches that provide input to j' the P-4 interlock only function to energize or de-energize (o)en or close) contacts. Therefore, this Function las no adjustable trip setpoint with which to associate a Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES'1, 2, i and 3 when the reactor may be critical or i approaching criticality. This Function does not ! . have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5, or 6 because the main turbine, and the FW System are not in l V(3 operation. i b. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System l Interlocks-Pressurizer Pressure. P-ll The P-11 interlock permits a normal unit cooldown and depressurization without actuation of SI or main steam line isolation. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels less than the P-11 l , _ setpoint, thrDperator can manually ' block the Pressurizer Pressure-Low and Steam Line l Pressure-Low SI signals and the Steam Line Pressure-Low steam line isolation sicjnal
- (previously discussed). When the Steam Line l
- Pressure-Low steam line isolation signal is manually blocked, a main steam isolation signal on
. Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is
, enabled. This provides protection for an SLB by
. closure of the MSIVs and their bypass valves, h. l D O BRAIDWOOD -JUNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 37 5/30/98 Revision $- t
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 b,' 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels above the P-11 setpoint.:the Pressurizer Pressure-Low and Steam Line Pressure-Low SI signals and the Steam Line Pressure-Low steam
- line' isolation signal are automatically enabled.
The operator can also enable these trips by use of the respective manual reset buttons. When the
-Steam Line Pressure-Low steam line isolation signal is enabled. the main steam isolation on Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is
. disabled.
This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2. and 3 to allow an orderly cooldown and depressurization of the unit without:the actuation
-of SI or main steam-isolation. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. 5. or 6 because system pressure must already be below the P-11 setpoint.for the requirements of the heatup and cooldown curves to be met.
- c. Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System
.h.
- Inter 1ocks - Tx - Low Low. P-12 On increasing reactor coolant temperature, the.
P-12 interlock provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On a decreasing-temperature, the P-12 interlock removes the arming signal to the Steam Dum) System to prevent an excessive cooldown of: tie RCS due to a malfunctioning Steam
. Dump System.
.. Since-T is temperature,Tsed as an indication of- bulk RCS '
this Function meets redundancy 1 requirements with one OPERABLE channel in each loop. In four-loop units, these channels are used in a two-out-of-four logic. ! L BRk.IDWOOD-UNITS 1&2 8 3.3.2 - 38 5/30/98 Revision E L , 6
1 l ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) ThisFunctionmustbeOPEfiABLEinMODES1.2. and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. 5. or 6 because there is insufficient energy in.the secondary side of the . unit to have an accident. The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the a] plication of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of t1is Specification may be entered independently for each channel listed on Table 3.3.2-1. In the event a channel's Trip Set)oint is found-nonconservative with respect to t1e Allowable Value, or the signal processing electronics, transmitter, or bistable isinstrument loop,le, then all affected Functions found inoperab O V provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. When the Required Channels in Table 3.-3.2-1 are o specified on a' per steam:line, per loop, per SG, etc. .
~ basis, then the Condition may be entered separately.for each steam line, loop. SG. etc., as appropriate.-
When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function exceeds those specified in all related Conditions associated , with a trip function, then the unit is outside_the safety
. _ analysis. :Therefore. Tt0 3.0.3 should be immediately -
entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation. u , Condition A applies to all ESFAS pratection functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required channels or trains for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected.- The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions, h 5/30/98 Revision E ( - BRAIDWOOD' UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2- 39 [1
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
^ BASES ACTIONS (continued) l B.1. B.2.1. and'B.2.2 Condition B applies to manual initiation of:
- SI:
o Containment Spray: o Phase A Isolation; and e Phase B Isolation. This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for the functions listed above. If one chann'el is inoperable. 48 hours is allowed to return it to an OPERABLE status. , Note that for containment spray and Phase B isolation. I failure of one or both switches in one channel renders the l channel inoperable. Condition B. therefore. encompasses l both situations. The specified Completion Time is I reasonable considering that there are two automatic ! actuation trains and another manual initiation train j
,, OPERABLE for each Function and the low probability of an i
! event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot j be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a !
MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by j placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional ! 6 hours (54 hours total time) and in MODE 5 within an j additional 30' hours (84 hours total time). The allowable Completion Times are reasonable based on operating i experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without I challenging unit systems. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.3.2 - 40 5/30/98 Revision E
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 fN \_f BASES-
-ACTIONS (continued)
Ll~ C.1. C.2.1. and C.2.2 Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and. actuation relays for the following functions: e SI: o Containment Spray: o Phase A Isolation:
~
o Phase B Isolation: and e Automatic Switchever to Containment Sump. This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and l- the master and slave relays. If one train is inoperable. 6-hours are allowed to-restore the train to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time 1s reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE.'and the: low probability of-an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be p aced in a MODE in which the.LC0 does not apply. This is.
.O.- done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours (12 hours total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional.30 hours (42 hours total time). The-Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience.-- to. reach the required unit conditions from full power ' conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
The Required Actions ar
.- train to be bypassed fo.e r up modified to 4 hoursbyforasurveillance Note that allows one testing. provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on-the reliability analysis assumption of WCAP-10271-P-A-(Ref.'7) that.4 hours is the average time required to perform channel surveillance.
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 y% BASES
'x' '.i -
ACTIONS (continued). [ D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 l~ Condition'D applies to: ll.
- Containment Pressure-High 1:
l' e Pressurizer Pressure-Low:
-l: e ' Steam Line Pressure-Low: , l- e' Containment Pressure-High 2:
1 e Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High:. e SG Water Level-Low Low; and SG Water Level-High High (P-14). l .e
=l_ If one channel is ino)erable. 6 hours are allowed to restore the channel to OPERAB_E status or to place it in the tripped condition. Generally, this Condition applies to functions that operate on two-out-of-three logic-or a two-out-of-four
./ l .l K /'-
logic. Therefore, failure of one channel places the Function in a two-out-of-two configuration. One channel must.be tripped to place the Function in a one-out-of-two i configuration that satisfies redundancy- requirements. ; Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or. place it in the tripped condition within 6 hours requires the. unit be placed in MODE-3 within'the following 6 hours
. and MODE'4 within the next.6 hours. 1 i
The allowed CompletioiTimes are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without ' challenging unit-systems. In MODE 4. these Functions are no . longer required OPERABLE. ! p n-q k ,) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 ,
' B 3.3.2.- 42 5/30/98 Revision E
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 i
- O BASES.
l G$ ACTIONS-(continued) The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the i- inoperable channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. The 6 hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place the l inoperable channel in the tripped condition and the 4 hours allowed fo'r testing, are justified in Reference 7.
-l E.1- E.2.1. and E.2.2 l Condition E applies to:
o Containment Spray Containment ' Pressure-High 3: and e Containment Phase B Isolation Containment Pressure-High 3. ! None of these signals has input to a control function. Thus, two-out-of-three logic is necessary to meet. - acceptable protective requirements. However, a two-out-of-three design would require tripping a failed channel. This is undesirable because a single failure would then cause spurious containment-spray initiation. Spurious L ;], spray actuation is undesirable because of the cleanup l - (' problems presented. Therefore, these channels are designed with two-out-of-four logic so that a failed channel may be bypassed rather than tripped. Note that one. channel may be
- bypassed and 'still satisfy the single failure criterion.
l- Furthermore, with one-channel bypassed, a single instrumentation channel failure will not spuriously initiate containment spray. , ! .. I
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued) l To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and
-Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel should not be placea in the tripped condition. Instead it is bypassed. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 6 hours, is sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed in a trip condition). The Completion Time is further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. The Completion Time is further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in the bypassed condition within 6 hours, requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times a're reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the recuired unit conditions from full power conditions in an orcerly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
I') The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one additional channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 hours for testing purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference 7. i l 1 p. V BP IDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 -44 5/30/98 Revision E L - - - - - - -
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
,2 BASES A ' ACTIONS (continued)
F .1. F . 2.1. and F . 2. 2 ]
- Condition F appl'ies to:
e- Manual. Initiation of Steam Line Isolation; and
~
e P-4: Interlock. For the Manual Initiation and the P-4 Interlock Functions. this action addresses the train orientation ~of the SSPS. If a train or channel is inoperable. 48 hours.is-allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable.considering the nature of these Functions, the
- available redundancy and the low probability of an event occurring.during this interval. If the Function cannot be-returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in-MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within'the
-- following 6 hours.' The allowed Completion . Times are
- reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. -In MODE 4..the
. - unit does'not have any analyzed transients or conditions TN that require the explicit use of. the protection functions O noted above.
lL G.I. G.2.1 and G.2.2 l '= Condition G applies' to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays-for the Steam Line Isolation. Turbine Trip
~
and Feedwater Isolation. and AF actuation Functions. e L J.) J OIDWOOD'.-UNITS B 1&2 B 3.3.2-45 5/30/98 Revision E}}