ML20153G433
| ML20153G433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1998 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153G421 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9809300073 | |
| Download: ML20153G433 (600) | |
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3.6 CONTAINMEfC SYS~ EMS 3.6.1 Containment i
'LCO 3.6.1 Containment snall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 ACTIONS v
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment A,1 Restore containment 1 hour inoperable. to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 O Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and In accordance leakage rate testing except for containment with the air lock testing. in accordance with the Containment Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued) 9809300073 980925 PDR
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P ADOCK 05000454 ppg BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.1 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
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Sjr.:E: At':E CEOUI EMET,~- : r: r e: O V SURVEILLANCE 7E .'. E ', SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity in In accercance accoraance with the Containment Tendon witr :ne Surveillance Program. Containmen-Tenacn Surveiiiance Program V 4 i l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.1 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A I .
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3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 5
- ([ 3.6.2 Containmen; A1r locks
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LCO' 3.6.2 Two containment air. locks snall be OPERASLE.
~ APPLICABILITY: ' MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
ACTIONS i NOTES - - - - - - I
- 1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock l components.
N 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. J 8 i M 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1. 1 kj " Containment." when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall i containment leakage' rate. 4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A, One or more NOTES containment air locks 1. Required Actions A.1. with'one containment A.2. and A.3 are not air lock door applicable if both doors inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.
- 2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.
(continued)
'1j,) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.2 - 1 8/13/98 Revision J
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- 4. (con:1nued) A.; Verify tne OPERAB_E ; r.Or ooor is Closec in ins affe::ec air iccA.
i AND A.2 Lock tne OPERABLE 24 naurs ! coor closed in the ! affected air lock AND A.3 --NOTE Air lock doors -in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means. Verify the OPERABLE Once per 31 aays coor is locked closed O in the affected air lock. r (continuea) 4 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2
- 3. 6.2 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A
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g N vi ..) . . s. . . . . -. . . . .- .- .< .. ..;..-., E. One or more -- NOTES containment air locks 1. Reoulrec Actions E.~.. vatn containment air E.2. and E.3 are no: ! lock interlock SDDl1 Cable if Dctn ocors me nanism 1noperacie. in the Same air ic:n are inoperable anc
~Conoition C is enterec.
- 2. Entry and exit of containment is permiss1 Die unoer the ,
control of a oeolcateo ' individual. ! B.1 Verify an OPERABLE 1 hou-door is closed in the , affected air lock. ' AND B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door
-4 hours ;
O closed in the affected air lock.
- i AND B.3 .
NOTE i Air lock doors in high radiat-ion areas may be ver1 fled locked closed bv administrative 'eans. m t Verify an OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed in the affected air L. lock. (continued) e BYRUN - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.2 - 3 8/13/98 Revision A I f 1
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- . One or more :.1 Initiate action :: Imme::a:e-containment air locks evaluate ove all inoperable for reasons containment leaKace l
otner tnan Conc 1 tion A rate per L:D 3.6.1. or B AND C.2 Verify a coor is l' hour closed in the affected air lock. AND C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours OPERABLE status. l D. Recu1 red Action and D.1 Be in MDDE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND p) v 0.2 Be in MDDE 5. 36 hours I i l i I (O) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.2 - 4 8/13/98 Revision A
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- 1. An incoeracie air lock coor coes no-invallcate Ine crevious successfu' performance of Ine overall air io:A leakage test.
- 2. Results snall De evaluated acainst acceotance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.
Perform reouired air lock leakage rate In accorcance testing in accordance with the Containment with tne Leakage Rate Testing Program. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.2.2 ' Verify only one door in the air lock can be 24 months opened at a time. n l l l 1 l l j BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6. 2 - 5 8/13/98 Revision A
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Con:ainme.: :s 'a:': .4 d.- ;
'3.f CONIAIIJMEf~'3Y37EM3 ,
fw. 2.6.3 Conta1nmen:< Isola:1cn 31ves . l V E-ml LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve snall be OPERABLE. dI
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- p. [ APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. anc 4. j l
1 ACTIONS i NOTES -- l'. -Penetration flow path (s) except for 48 inch purge valve flow patns may De ! unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
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- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
5 3. ' Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems'made inoperable by containment isolation valves. a I i
- 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1~ .
I
;[ " Containment." when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the !
overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria. : 1 Q l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -. NOTE A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours Only applicable to penetration flow path 1 penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and isolation valves. de-activated automatic or remote manual valve. closed One or more manual valve, blind penetration flow paths flange, or check with one containment valve with flow isolation valve through'the valve I inoperable except for secured. purge valve leakage not within limit. MQ I (continued) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.3 - 1 9/9/98 Revision J e
Containment Is01a** .5'.e.:
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4: IONE CONDITION: . REQUIRED ACTION COM E ::!,;vE
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A. (continued) .A.2 NOTES ---
- 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may'be ]
verified by use .{ of administrative ; means. l
- 2. Isolation devices that are' locked.
' sealed, or otherwise secured i may be verified i by use.of l
administrative j means. Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path .for isolation i 2 is isolated. devices outside ;
.y containment f.; b-@
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"' Prior to-entering MODE 4 y from MODE 5 if m not performed within the previous 92 days
!' for isolation devices inside-containment (. (continued) t. L . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- 3. 6.3 - 2 9/9/98 Revision J f ., 4 i'
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( 1 _n.,._. zy% .v..u:n10 . nwu : .. .. .s. .-y-,. . : E. NOTE --- S.1 Isolate tne affecte: ' nou-Only applicable to penetration flow catr l oenetration tion oaths Dy use of at least' with two containment one closed and 1 solation valves. ce-activatec automatic or remote-manual valve. closed . One or mcre manual valve. or ' penetration flow' paths blind flange with two containment-isolation valves inocerable except for ' purge valve leakage not within limit. 1 (continueci l i r i BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.3 - 3 8/13/98 Revision A
Containmen: I s f. 5' ' :' .,4 .+:
.:.- IONE ',:en:,nber CONDITION: REQUIRED ACTION COMF.E :.7. ~;"i C, .
NOTE C.1 Isolate the affected 72 noJrs Only applicable to penetration flow path l penetration flow paths by use of at.least with only one one closed and , containment isolation de-activated -) valve and a. closed' . automatic.or remote
- system. manual valve. closed- 1 manual valve. or l
. blind flange. !
One or more " penetration flow paths A@ 1 with one containment isolation valve e.e NOTES inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation ' areas may be ) verified by use l of administrative means. 1
'2. Isolation devices I that are locked.
sealed. or .]. otherwise secured may be verified
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.'by use'of administrative 'l means. I Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is isolated.
D. One or more D.1 Restore purge valve 24 hours penetration flow paths leakage to within with one or more limits. containment purge
. valves not within L
purge valve leakage
, limits.
(continued) LBYRON - UNITS 1 &'2 3. 6. 3 - 4 9/9/98 Revision J l , L l 1 l j l ..
Containmen- :s::ar : .. .e. A: :0NS -(rn ,nuef
. CONDITION REQUIRED A: TION :0Mr E :D*. :ei E, Required Action and E.1 Be-in MODE 3. 6 nou-s ,
associated Completion Time not rnet. ANQ E.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY .
'SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each 48 inch purge valve is sealed 31 days closed.
SR 3.6.3.2 Verify each 8 inch purge valve is closed. 31' days n y except when the 8 inch containment purge valves are open for purging or venting under administrative controls. SR 3.6.3.3 NOTE Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative controls. Verify each containment isolation manual 31 days
- l. valve. remote manual valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and not lot.ked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open undcr administrative controls.
(continued) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 ~ 3.6.3 - 5 9/9/98 Revision J
- cntainmen:.:s: 5: :- .3 .+:
I : - L SU vEILLAN:E REOUI:EuEU 5 .:cc a naer FRE:JE:,: - ' T(] SURVEILLANCE 1 l SR 3.6.3.4 NOTE' -- f, -Valves and blind fianges in nign radiation
, areas may be verified by use of
.. aaministrative means.
M ___ 4 N Verify each containment isolation manual Prior to j valve. remote manual valve. and blind entering MODE ;
's flange that is located inside containment from MODE 5 1f
. g and not. locked. sealed. or otherwise not performed l
% secured and required to be closed during within the accident. conditions is closed, except for previous l l
containment isolation valves that are open 92 days i under administrative controls SR 3.6.3.5 Verify _ the isolation time of each automatic In accordance ! containment isolation valve is within with the i limits. Inservice ! Testing Program I SR 3.6.3.6 Perform leakage rate testing for 8 inch 92 days containment purge valves with resilient seals. SR 3.6.3.7 Perform. leakage rate testing for 48 inch 184 days containment purge valves with resilient j seals. 1 l. i SR 3.6.3.8 Verify each automatic containment isolation 18 months valve that is not locked. sealed or l otherwise secured in position actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. l i !n U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 3 - 6 9/9/98 Revision J l..
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\s ,- 2.f.2 : r:a'nrer.: Cressu e L:C 3.6.4 Containmen cressure snal' oe 2 - C . '. :31; an: s.~- :5 :
APPLICABILITY- MODES 1. 2. 3. anc 4. H A:TIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment pressure A.1 Restore containment I nour i not within limits. pressure to within limits. B. Recu1 red Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND
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(Ts,,) B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FRE0VENCY SR 3.6.4.1 Verify containment pressure is within 12 hours l limits.
l l l r ; r' l \- - BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.4 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
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_CC 3.6.5 Con alnmen average ale temoe a u e sna :s s '.:I:: APPLICABILITY: MODES '. 2. 3. anc 4 { ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION. COMDLETION TIME i l A. Containment average A.1 Restore containment S hours air temperature not average air within limit. temperature to within i limit. B. Recu1 red Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.5.1 Verify containment average air temperature 24 hours is within limit. l r I i I 'n I BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.5 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A i
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Q) 3.6.6 :or.:alnmen: Sora an: Co:iin; Sys:e s LCC 3.6.6 Two containmen; scrav trains an: :r.c con:a nTe : ::: : trains snall ce OPERABLE. ADPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. l ACTIONS
' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l
l i A. One containment spray A. Restore containment 7 aays i train inoperable. spray train to l L OPERABLE status. AND 1 14 days from , discovery of failure to meet - , the LCO (m) - l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours asso:1ated Completion { l Time of Condition A AND , not met. l B.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours 1 l 4 l i C. One or more C.1 Restore containment 7 days , containment coo 11nc cooling train (s) to ! l trains inoperable. OPERABLE status. AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet the LC0 1 (continued) i (. 1
\- / BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.6 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A i ~
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1 E. Recuirec A::1on an; D . ~. Sa in MODE 3. f ,: . associated Completion l Time of Conal:1on C AND not met. l D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 nou s i 1 l E. Two containment spray E.1 n'?r LCO 3.0.3. Immea'atels trains inoperable. D3 Any combination of tnree or more trains inoperable. 1 1 -/) J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.6.1 Verify each containment spray manual. power 31 days operated. ana automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked. sealed. or , i otherwise secured in position is in the I correct position. SR 3.6.6.2 Operate each containment cooling train fan 31 days unit for a 15 minutes. SR 3.6.6.3 Verify each containment cooling train 31 days cooling water flow rate is a 2660 gpm. (continued) jm
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s- / BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6. 6 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A
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I SR 3.6.6.4 Verify ea'cn containmen spray Dum 's Ir a::: ca :# oevelopec neac a! Ine flow tes; poin 1s v. t r T r+ creater Inan or ecual tc Ine recu1re: Inse . :s developea neac. Testv:; :; a-SR 3;6.6.5 Verify each automatic containment spray 18 montns valve in tne flow patn that is not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position. actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.6.6.6 Verify eacn containment spray pump starts 18 montns automatically on an actual or simulated , actuation signal. O SR 3.6.6.7 VC-1fy each containment cooling train 18 months V starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.6.6.8 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed. 10 years ( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.6 - 3 8/13/98 Revision A
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-() 3.6.~ 5;ra;. A': 1: n's Syster LCO 3.6.7 Tne Spray Accitive Syster snaE De 00 ERA 5 E.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. an: :, ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4 A. Spray Accitive System A.1 Restore Spray 7 days inoperable. Aaditive System to. OPERABLE status, B. Reouired Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND O 8.2 8e >" "oot s. 84 " ere SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.7.1 Verify each spray additive manual and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position. SR 3.6.7.2 Verify spray additive tank solution-level 184 days is a 78.6% and 5 90.3% (continued) I BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.7 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
5: a. ::: - .: A ( :..v.__>.: -;..;. SR 3.6.~.3 . Verify spray a0:1tive tant soc 1ur ny: ce :e 5; ce, solution concentration is a 304 an: 5 36% Dy weignt. SR 3.6.7.4 Verify eacn spray additive automatic vaive IE man:ns in the flow patn tnat is not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position. actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. i l l [ SR 3.6.7.5 Verify spray additive flow rate from each solution's flow path. 5 years
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\^ i . F i i j j \- BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 7 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A a i
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.() 2.6.8 nycrcger. Re:omainers LCO 3.6.8 Two nyarogen re:omaine s sna' os 0;ERAE.E.
APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION- COMPLETION TIME A. One hydrogen A.1 NOTE recomoiner inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. Restore hydrogen 30 aays recombiner to OPERABLE status. ('- Two nydrogen B. B.1 Verify by 1 hour recomoiners administrative means inoperable. that the hydrogen AND control function is maintained. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND B.2 Restore one hydrogen 7 days recombiner to OPERABLE status. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. 1 k> BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 36.8-1 8/13/98 Revision A I
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SR 3.6.6.: Perform a syster fun::1onal tes: f r ea:- IE r.: s nyorogen recomciner. SR 3.6.8.2 Visually examine each hydrogen recombiner 18 man:n3 enclosure anc verify inere is no eviaence of abnormal conditions. SR 3.6.8.3 Perform a resistance to ground test for 18 montns each heater phase. t l 1 l (~
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6. 8 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A
A a - L Ls s - . J A E ;.c ::, ::qvia- 3 ; Ev3 /3
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BA3E3 BA:KGROUND ine containment consists of tne concrete containre-- DuliG104. its steel liner, anc Ine Denetrations !"Du;" I' - structure. The structure is cesignec to contair racios:: e material that may be released from tne reacter core following a design basis Loss Of Coolant Acc1 cent u.0:A Additionally, this structure provides shielding from tne fission proaucts that may De present in the containment atmosonere following accident conditions. The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cyllnarical wall. a flat foundation mat. and a snailor. come roof. The inside surface of the containment is 11nec with a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak t1gntness auring operating and accident conditions. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions. and the come roof 1s prestressed utilizing a three way post i tensioning system. n U The concrete containment building 1s required for structural integrity of the containment under Design Basis Accident (DBA) conditions. The steel liner and its penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B (Ref. 1). as modified by approved exemptions. l l i O V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
l ,, .q v . - . - l 3ASE3' j -BACKGROUND'(con:1nuec) Tne isolation aevices.for tne pene:ra:1cns.1' .:ne containment councary are a part of tne cor ainme . ..sas.'
- ignt carrier. To maintain In1s leak tigr.: ca m e-
- a. All penetrations 'reouired .to be closec car 1r.:: a:: ce.--
conditions are either:
- 1. - capable of beino closed by an OPERABLE automa:1:
containment isolation system, or
- 2. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or ce-activated: automatic-or remote manual valves i secured in their closed positions. except as 1 provided in LCO 3.6.3. " Containment Isolation Valves":
- b. Each air lock is OPERABLE. except as proviaed in eo LCO 3.6.2. " Containment Air Locks": and i k, c. The equipment hatch is closed.
4' .d. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration i M - (e.g. , welds. bellows. or 0 rings) is OPERABLE. except i
'$ as provided in LCO 3.6.3.
O. :
-APPLICABLE- The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2. B 3.6.1 - 2 8/13/98 Revision J
3 . . . .. ; .. . l.
, BASE 3 l
h( LA PLICAELE SAFETt ANALY5E5 (continued)
- The'DBAs that result in a cnallenge'to containment ;
OPERABILITY from high pressures and temoeratures are a LC ; and a steam line creak-(Ref. 2). In addition, release cf significant fission product radioactiv1ty witnin containmen: E -can occur from a LOCA. secondary system pipe break. or fue' handling accident (Ref. 3). In the DBA analyses..n is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that. for tne , DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity. 1 release to the' environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.10% of containment air weight l per day (Ref.3). :This leakage rate. used to evaluate ' offsite doses resulting from accidents. is defined in ! 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B.(Ref. 1). as L : the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated < eak containment internal pressure (P ) resulting from the .i imiting design basis LOCA. The allowable leakage rate I represented by L forms the basis for the acceptance l criteria imposed,on all containment leakage rate testing. ) L,- is assumed to be 0.10% per day in the _ safety analysis at l l P = 47.8 psig .for Unit 1 and P, = 44.4 psig for Unit 2 !
.(kef.3). ' ;qt . Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for -3
- v. the' establishment of containment OPERABILITY. j The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of i
, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
p LCO' Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to s 1.0 L,. -except prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage jl- test. At this time, applicable leakage limits must be met. d Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment g configuration, including the equipment hatch, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the' safety analysis. i i j cX: hV BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 3 8/13/98 Revision J l L
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InG1V1Cual leakage rates s090'f190 fc" In9 Oc".!a'"Te" a~' lock (LCO 3.6.2) ano ourge valves v' r es '1er- sea's (LCO 3.6.3) are not,scecifically car: cf tre a;:er:ay:e criteria of 10 Cm 00. Appenc1x e. Oo:1 cr. E . :ne e r e leakage rates-exceeding inese inciv1aual limits cr' . e3 .' -
-in tne containment Deina inoperable wnen the leaka:e res.J i in exceecing tne overall acceptance criteria of 1.C %
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 anc 6. the probability anc consequences of these events are reauce: due to the pressure and temperature limitations of inese MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment
.durina MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.4. " Containment Penetrations."
. ACTIONS A._1 O
V In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within tne required Completion Time. the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating ' experience. to reach tne required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. t BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
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E13EL fQ L .dVRVEILLANCE S0 361 I
~ REQUIREMENTS '
Maintain 1nc the containment OPERABLE recu1res comahance with the visual examinations and leakage rate tes: recuirements of tne Containment Leakage Rate Testin Program._ Failure to meet air lock ano purge valve leasa:s
-limits specified in LCO'3.6.2 and LCO 3.6.3 ooes not u
o i I ?lnvah date the acceptability of these overall leaKace J 5
-. 9 determinations unless their contribution to overali~Tyoe 2 l l
d' B.: and C leakage causes that to exceed. limits. As lef: leakage prior to the first startup after performing a l required leakage test is required.to be < 0.6 L, for 1 e for overall Type
'9 Acomoined leakage. Type'B andtimes At all-other C leakage betweenand requ < 0.75 L, ired leakace rat)l tests. the. acceptance criteria'is based on an overall' Type A W{g leakage limit of s 1.0 L consequences are. bounded'. At s 1.0 L, the offsite doseby the a analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by the Containment. l Leakage Rate Testing Program. These periodic testing i requirements verify that the containment. leakage rate ooes 'j L not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis. l L ..
4 SR 3.6 1.2 I 1 This SR ensures that the structural integrity of the 4 -]~-
^ containment will be maintained in accordance with the
. provisions of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program.
i H Testing and Frequency are consistent with the requirements -i
- of 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(vi) " Effective Edition and Addenda of i Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL. SECTION XI" (Ref. 4). and l
Section 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(1x). " Examination of Concrete l L Containments" (Ref. 5). Predicted tendon ~ lift off forces I will be determined consistent with the recommendations of-Regulatory Guide 1.35.1. (Ref. 6). .l l l. I j l I BYRON - UNITS l & 2 B 3.6.1 - 5 8/13/98 Revision J
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f, -- REFERENCES 11 10 CFR 50.-Appena n-J. 00: on E. .
- 2. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
-3. .UFSAR. Section 6.2.
- 4. 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(vi) " Effective Edition an Accenza of Suosection IWE and Subsection IWL. SECTION XI..'
- 5. 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(ix). " Examination of Concrete l . Containments."
.l 6. Regulatory Guide 1.35.1. July 1990.
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.i 1-l 1
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<U BYRON ~- UNITS l'8 2 B 3.6.1 - 6 8/13/98 Revision J a
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i E :.f : T 1*NME.',' 3 3 E"! E :.f.2 ~;n:57 nrer.: 1." ::c BASE 3 BACKGROUND Containment air locks forrr cart o' :ne cor:ainmer: : es 3.. - Douncary and provias a means for personnel a: ess au-in; e MODES of coeration. Each air lock is nominally a r1gnt circular cyllncer IC " in diameter with a door at eacn end. The coors are interlocked <to prevent simultaneous opening. During perle:s when containment is not required to be OPERABLE. tne coc-interlock mecnanism may be disabled, allowing both coors c-an air lock to remain open for extended periods wnen frequent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock oocr has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure o' a single door supm..c containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contaln Q D I, gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capaD: :o ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal., the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i .e. an O increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door). The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure bounaary. As such. air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the plant safety analyses. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
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BASES APPLICABLE . Tne DBAs that result in a release of racloactive ma:e-;a' SAFETY' ANALYSES within containment are a Loss Of Coolant Acclaen: (LO3
' secondary-system pipe break, and a fuel. handling acclaer.:
(Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of these acclaents. :: 13
= assumed that containment is OPERABLE sucn that release M fission products to the environment is controllea Dy tne rate-of containment leakage. The containment was oesicnec with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of. containment 51r
; weight per day (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is defined in i- 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B (Ref. 1). as the maximum
; allowable. containment leakage rate at the calculated peak e containment internal ressure, at P = 47.8 psig for Unit 1 and P - 44.4 ps1g fo Unit 2 follow,ing a DBA. This
& allow'able leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks.
The containment air locks ' satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LCO Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of the containment' pressure boundary. the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness 'are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event. Each air lock is reauired to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE. the air. lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE. the air lock must be in compliance with
-the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.
Closure of a single door in each air lock 'is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless. both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into or exit from containment.
$: BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 2 8/13/98 Revision J
;;.. 3. - 9. - _- ,_
'00_I:AE kITi Ir MODES '. 2. 3. ar.; 2 a 09 C : :ause a re'eagg -
raCloactive material t0 Cor.ta'nmfr . Ir P:DE5 E ar- . . DroDSD111 y an0 Consecuences of triese ever's are re ,: c..- to tne pressure anc temoerature 11m'ta:1cns : : ese v::E5 Tnerefore. tne containment al- ic:Ks are no: re:.. re: - MODE 5 to prevent leakage of racioactive matena - :- containment. Tne recuirements for Ine containmer; a - . l curing MODE 6 are accressec in LCO 3.9.2 "Containrer-Penetrations." l l l ACTIONS The ACTIONS are mooified by a Note tnat allows entry an: exit to perform repairs on the affectea air lock comoonen: If the outer door is inoperable. then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. If the inner door is inoceraDie. it is preferred that the air lock be accessed from inslae primary containment by entering through tne other OPERABLE air lock. However. if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door, then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door, which means there is a shor time during which the containment boundary is not intact (during access througn the OPERABLE door). The ability to p open the OPERABLE door, even if-it means the containment i Q boundary is temporarily not intact. 15 acceptable due to tne low probability of an event that could pressurize tne l containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door l 15 expe::ed to De open. Opening the OPERABLE door must be 1 done unaer strict administrative controls, consisting of a dedicated individual (1.e., not involved with any repair or other maintenance effort) assigned to ensure that the door is opened only for the period of time required to gain entry l into or ex1t from the air lock, and that any OPERABLE door is re-locked prior to the departure of the dedicated individual. After each entry and ex1t. the OPERABLE door must be immediately closed. If ALARA conditions permit. I entry and exit snould be via an OPERABLE air lock. ' 4 l I b( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 3 6/]3/98 Revision A 1 l
-r.3-r gr. _. ,
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0% Q C :0!.3 s200:1 nae:; A seconc N0te nas beer,acce; ;c crav1:e clar " ca: ;rr ; for Inis LCO. separate Conc 1:1on en:ry ,5 e'io..e: fcr ed. air lock. Inis 15 accettaDie. Since tne Recm re: 1 : :-: { for eaCh Condition Drov1Ge SDDro0" late Com?snsa!:"'. 80 's for each inoDeraDie air lo:K. Complying alir :ne $e ;.'re; Actions may allow for ContinueC oDeration. anC a 5;;seaser-inoperable air lock 15 governec by suDsecuen: Cen;-- cr entry and acDlication of associated Recu1 red Ac:lons In the event the air lock leakage results in exceealnc :ne overallcontainmentleakagerate. Note 3directsentri intc the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.
" Containment."
A1 L.2. and A.3 With one air lock door in one v' more containment air locks inoperable the OPERABLE door must be vurifleo closed (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock Tnis ensures that a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within 1 hour. Tnis specified time period 1s consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. which recuires containment be restored to OPERABLE status within (d I hour. In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door. considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is ! being maintained closea. l l O V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
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BASEI (%. k) ACTIONS (continued)
. Required Action A.3 verifies that an air lock witr. an inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a locKec anc closed OPERABLE air-lock door. This ensures tnat an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintainec. Tne Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the 10,.
likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls. Required Action A.3 1s moc1flec os ' a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked
' closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small .
The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable. an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the nb y appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does
? not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial 4 entry into Condition A: only the requirement to comply with Ml the Required Actions.
U e, ]. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 5 8/13/98 Revision J
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cr.ta v e : l', :- : 5:5E5 A: TION 5 (continusc2 Note 2 allows use of tne air lock for entry anc ed 10-7 days under aaministrative controls if Dotn air locks nave an inoperable door. This 7 cay restriction begins wner tne second air lock 15 discovered inoDerable. Containmen: er: . may be reau1rea on a periodic basis to perform Tecnrica'
~
Specifications (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions. as well as other activities on eauipment inside contalemen: Inat are required by TS or activities on eau 1pment tnat support TS-reau1 red equipment. This Note is not intenaec :c preclude performing other activities (i.e.. non-TS-reau1 rec activities) if the containment is entereo. using the inoperable air lock, to perform an allowed activity listed above. The aaministrative controls consist of a dedicated
-individual (i.e. not involved with any repair or other maintenance effort) assigned to' ensure that the door is opened only for the period of time required to gain entry into or exit from the air lock, and that any OPERABLE door is re-locked prior to the departure of the dedicated individual. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is expected to be open.
B1 B 2 and B.3 With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or ' more air locks, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are consistent with those specified in Condition A with the exception that both air lock doors may still be OPERABLE. in which case either door can be used to isolate the air lock penetration. i
! BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A if N
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~ ;entro e : , .::.
BASE 5E
' ACTIONS (continued)
. Tne Required Actions have been moc1 fled Dy twc. Notes.
L Note 1. ensures that only the Required Actions anc ass 0:1a:e: ' Completion Times.of Condition C are. reautrea 1f octn acers 3'. ~1n the same air lock are inoperable. With both coo s ir :ne f .- .same air lock inoperable. an OPERABLE door is not-asa11aM e N. . to be closed; Required Actions C.1 and C.2.are tne
- 8 appropriate remedial actions.
M u Note 2 allows entry into and exit from' containment under'the - l
$- control of;a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time (i.e..itne
- individual performs the function of the interlock) and one E
door is re-locked prior to the departure of the dedicated individual. Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows. these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification b administrative means is considered acceptable.ysince access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore the probabilityofmisalignmentofthedoors,oncethejhave been verified to be in the proper position is small. p (h t BYRON - UNITS 1 8'2 B 3.6.2 - 7 8/13/98 Revision J r l
Conta1nmer:
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.. BASES-O .V ACTIONS (continued)
I C.1 C? and C 3 > With on'e or more air locks inoperable for reasons ornar na-those described in Condition A or B (e.g. Dotn coors ir :ne ' same air lock are inoperable) Condition is entere:. N :e. ; an air. lock with only an inoperable door (Condition A' ~an: interlock (Condition B) does not require entry into Condition C. The Required Actions of Conditions A and B ! provide the appropriate remedial actions for the degraced ' condition. Required Action C.1 requires action to be- , initiated immediately to evaluate previous combined leakage ! rates using current air lock test results. An evaluation is acceptable, since it is-overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g.. only one seal per door has failed), containment remains OPERABLE. yet only 1 hour (per LC0 3.6.1) would be provided.to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a unit shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test. the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits. l l O Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected 'O. 2 containment air lock must be verified to be closed within-the 1 hour Completion Time. This specified time period is O consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. which requires j that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within. A 1 hour. N Additionally. the affected air lock (s) must be restored to '! d OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The i specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring ;
- i. an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at '
least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock and the overall containment leakage rate is within the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage limits. l l l l J i /~'} 2 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 8 8/13/98 Revision J
Contalnme -7.. 4 i BASE 5
~p d ACTIONS (continuec) l D 1 and D.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be reste ec :: '
OPERABLE status within the required Completion T1me. ine unit must be brought to a MODE in whicn tne LCO aces no: apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be trougn ;; i ' at least MODE 3 witnin 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE- SR 3.6:2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requireinents of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance : criteria were established during initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing t'% requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not d exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.- The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous
.g successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is 3 capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event s of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the i a results to be evaluated 6 gainst the acceptance criteria of ! SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C
. containment leakage rate.
I i n _. _.._. _ (U) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 9 8/13/98 F.evisici J i
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Containmer: ( . :s.; l 'SA5E5 3 b SL'RVEILLANCE RE00lREMENTS (continued) SR -3 6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single. air lock. Since oe:r :ne inner and outer coors of an air' lock are aesignec I: 4 withstand .the maximum expected post accident containment i pressure. closure of either door.will support containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment, OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of i the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Dua l to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock. and given that the interlock mechanism is not normally challenged when the containment air lock door is used for entry and exit (procedures require strict adherence to single door opening). this test is only required to be performed every b, 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to 4 perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply 4 during a plant outage, and the potential for loss of m containment OPERABILITY if the Surveillance were performed i u with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency for the p LU 2
' interlock i_s justified based on generic operating experience.
l The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during use of the air lock, REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B.
- 2. UFSAR. Section 6.2.
i 1% !V l~ BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 10 8/13/98 Revision J
c . . . . ._-. . . --, -.-- -_ _ l Containmen Iscla ' ' .5'.e5 l.
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S 3.6 :DNTAINMENT SYSTEM 5 1 i V,o B 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves l i. BASES
'l BACKGROUND The containment isolation valves (Table B 3.6.3-1) forrr par:
of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means fc-fluid penetrations not serving accident consequence.11miting systems to be provided with two isolation bar.riers tnat are closed on a containment 1 solation signal. These isolation devices.are either passive or active (automatic). Manual l valves, de-activated automatic or remote manual valves secured in their closed position, check v61ves with flow , through the valve secured, blind flanges, and closed systems I are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other I automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident. are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that l- no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that I exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. These barriers (containment isolation valves, blind flanges. and closed systems) make up the Containment Isolation System. '(7 Automatic isolation signals are produced during accident U conditions. Containment Phase "A" isolation occurs upon I receipt of a safety injection signal. The Phase "A"- isolation signal isolates nonessential process lines in order to minimize leakage of fission product radioactivity. Containment Phase "B" isolation occurs upon receiat of a l High-3 containment pressure signal and isolates t1e remaining process lines except systems required for. accident mitigation. The purge valves (supply and exhaust) receive a containment ventilation isolation signal on a containment high radiation condition, safety injection signal, manual Phase A actuation and manual containment spray actuation. As a result. the containment isolation valves (and blind flanges) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the environment in the event of a release of fission product radioactivity to the containment atmosphere as a result of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). L 4 O# BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 1 9/9/98 Revision J-l
ContainmentIsciat:q.f.es BASES BACKGROUND (continuea) The OPERABILITY requirements for containment isolation valves help ensure that containment is isolated witnin tne time limits assumed in the safety analyses. Therefore. tre OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that tne containment function assumed.in the safety analyses v.il' De maintained. Normal Purae Svstem (48 inch ource valves) , The Normal Purge System operates to supply outside air into I the containment for ventilation and cooling or heating and may also be used to reduce the concentration of noble gases within containment prior to and during personnel access. The supply and exhaust lines each contain two isolation 3 valves. Because of their large size. the 48 inch purge l valves are not qualified for automatic closure from their open position under DBA conditions. Therefore, the 48 inch purge valves are sealed closed in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 to ensure the containment boundary is maintained. Miniource System (8 inch ourae valves) The Minipurge System operates to: O- a. Reduce the concentration of noble gases within containment prior to and during personnel access, and
- b. Equalize internal and external pressures.
Since the valves used in the Minipurge System are designed to meet the requirements for automatic containment isolation valves, these valves may be opened as needed in MODES 1. 2.
- 3. and 4.
O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A
Containmen:-Isf.a: :q .3 .e5 H BASES { - 7 APPLICABLE 'The containment _1 solation valve LCO was cerivec from :ne ti, SAFETY ANALYSES assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor l
' J coolant inventory and establishing tne containmen: ocuncary during major accidents. As part of the containmen:
boundary, containment isolation valve OPERABILITT supports
'W' leak tightness of the containment. Therefore the safen q
< b- l analyses of any event requiring isolatlen of containmen:
applicable to this LCO.
's' L
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material ' within containment are a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). secondary system pipe break, and fuel handling accident (Ref. 1). In the analyses.for each of these accidents. 1t i is assumed that containment isolation valves are either l closed or function to close within the required 1 solation I time following event initiation. This ensures that I potential paths to the environment through containment I isolation valves (including containment purge valves) are l minimized. The safety analyses assume that the 48 inch ' I purge valves are closed at event initiation. In the calculation of control room and offsite doses I following a LOCA, the accident analyses assume that 25% of I the equilibrium radioactive iodine and 100% of the j l r- equilibrium radioactive noble gas inventory developed from
'_ maximum full power operation of the core is assumed to be immediately available for leakage from the containment. The containment is' assumed to leak at the design leakage rate. '
L,. at the peak accident pressure. P,. for the first t
' 24 hours and at 0.5 L, for the remaining duration of the accident (Ref. 2). ,
The containment isolation valves ensure that the containment design. leakage rate remains within L, by automatically isolating penetrations that do not serve post accident functions and providing isolation capability for penetrations associated with safe shutdown functions. The l L maximum isolation time for automatic containment 1 solation I valves is 60 seconds (Ref. 1). This isolation time is based on engineering judgement since the control room and offsite dose calculations are performed assuming that the leakage from containment begins immediately following the accident. L y BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 3 9/9/98 Revi'sion J l I
Containment 1sciat' ;.4 .;e! . l
. BASES l m
O APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) l. Tne single failure criterion reou1reo to be 1moosec in tr.e conduct of plant safety analyses was consioered in tne original. design of the containment mini purge valves. Tw: valves in series on each mini purce line provice assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolatec ; even if a single failure occurred. The. inboard and outcoarc l 1 isolation valves on each line are provided with diverse power sources and solenoid operated valves that will fail i closed on the loss of power or air. This arrangement was designed to preclude common mode failures from disablina u both valves on a mini purge line. ' i The normal purge valves may be unable to close in the. I environment following a LOCA. Therefore. each of the normal purge. valves is required to remain sealed closed during MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. The requirement to seal closed the normal purge valves precludes a single failure from ! compromising the containment boundary as long as the system ' is operated in accordance with the subject LCO. The containment isolation valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). f3
'V '
1 LCO Containment isolation valves (Table B 3.6.3-1) form a part of the containment boundary. The containment isolation ! valves' safety function is related to minimizing the loss of l reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary during a DBA. The automatic containment isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and to actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The 48 inch purge valves must be maintained sealed closed. The valves covered by this LC0 are listed.along with their associated stroke times in l Table B 3.6.3-1. ' i !O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 -4 9/9/98 Revision J
Containmen: Isola: :- 3 .e: BASES L) LCO (continued) e., s l The normally closed containment isolation vahes are
,j considered OPERABLE wnen manual valves are closec or coer lLj under aaministrative controls. remote manual valves are 9 closed. or automatic valves are de-activated ano secure:: in N their closed position. Other OPERABLE 1 solation cevices H include blind flanges are in place and Closed systems are t intact. These passive isolation valves / devices are inose
% listed in Reference 1.
Purge valves with resilient seals must meet additional leakage rate requirements. The other containment isolation valve leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. 3, " Containment." as Type C testing.
"! This LC0 provides assurance that the containment isolation
'd valves and purge valves will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory M and establish the containment boundary during accidents.
G APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the O probability and consequences of these events are reduced due V to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containment 1 solation valves j (Table B 3.6.3-1) are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5. , The requirements for containment isolation valves during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.4. " Containment Penetrations."
/^x
/
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 5 9/9/98 Revision J l
i Ccntainmen: :sc'a: c ,,.3 .9: l r - i g BA3ES O ACTIONS Tne ACTIONS are modified by a Note alioxing penetra::er c. paths. except for 48 inch purge valve penetration flon paths. to be unisolated intermittently under acministrat've controls. Tnese aoministrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, anc is in continuous communication with the control room In j this way. the penetration can be rapidly 1solatec wner a need for containment isolation is indicated. Due to tne size of the containment purge line penetration and the fac: that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that. for this LCO. separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable. since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required' q Actions. O The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve. In the event the containment isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate. Note 4 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1. i A j BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A
Containment !si ar .3.gf
?:-
BASES
.O-V A{TIONS(continued)
A 1 and A 2 In the event one containment isolation valve l l (Table B 3.6.3-1) in one or more penetration flow catns ,s ) inoperable. except for.purae valve leakage not witnin ilmn i the affected penetration' flow path must De isolated. ine
' method of isolation must. include the use of at least one
. isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic or remote l' manual containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve a
- 7. blind flange. .and a check valve with flow through the valve
; secured. De-activated remote manual valves may include. air
$ operated valves with air removed, or de-energized motor ;
j operated valves. Automatic valves refer to those valves l that require a motive force to actuate such as air or ; electric, and receive an automatic actuation signal. Power !
% operated valves require a motive force to actuate. such as !
3-
- air or electric. but do not receive an automatic actuation i signal. Based on the design, the acceptable means of isolating the 48 inch purge valve penetration is to close and de-activate the 48 inch purge valve. For a penetration
. flow path isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1. /^s the device used to isolate the penetration should be the
~() closest available one to containment. Required Action A.1 must be completed within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable., considering the time required to isolate r the penetration and the relative importance of supporting i containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4. i l l
\
v 1 x(%) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 7 9/9/98 Revision J l I
~
Containment :s:na: : .a .#:
?3' 3*SE5 !
O ACTIONS (continued) For affected penetration flow patns tnat canno ce re" re: to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour Completion Time an; that have been isolated in accordance witn Reautrec 1 Action A.1. the affected penetration flow patns must es l verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations recu1re: to be isolated following an accident and no longer capacie of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather. it g involves verification, through a system walkdown. that those
' isolation devices outside containment and capable of beina mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion 9 Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside u containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the ti devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the 1 solation h devices inside containment. the time period specified as
% " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed D within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the '
inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation O
\. J device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. For penetration flow 4 paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed ' system. Condition C provides the appropriate actions. A sj BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 8 9/9/98 Revision J
Containmen:-:s;ia: r .5 ,es
?: : l BASE 3- ,
- /i (s / 1 ACTIONS (continued)-
i i [ Requireo Action A.2 is modified by two Notes.
. Note ; j
. applies to isolation devices located in-hign racia:1or areas and-allows these devices-to be verified closed Dy use c' administrative means. Allowing verification by l administrative means is considered acceptable. Since access -l to these. areas is. typically restricted. Note 2 applies te isolation devices that are locked, sealed.- or otherwise-secured-in' position and allows these devices to be veriflec closed by use of administrative means. Allowing i verification by administrative means. is considered 4-acceptable. Since.the function of locking. sealing, or ., c otherwise securing components is to ensure.these devices are- l " not inadvertently mispositioned. 'Therefore, the probability- ) of misalignment of these devices once they have been- 1 verified.to be in the proper position, is small. ;
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4 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.6.3 - 9 9/9/98 Revision J c- r - - - . , , . . , , . , . -.
Containmen: Iscla: c ;.f ef 1 I BASES ACTIONS (continued) n With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, tne affected penetra:1cr flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. Tne me:noc c' ! isolation must include the use of at least one isolation ! h barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single act've ! O failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a 1 l closed and de-activated' automatic or remote manual valve. a ; q closed manual valve. and a blind flange. De-activated remote manual valves may include, air operated valves with l 9 air removed, or de-energized motor operated valves. i
% Automatic valves refer to those valves that require a motive force to actuate. such as air or electric. and receive an !
H automatic actuation signal. Power operated valves require a l T motive force to actuate, such as air or electric. but do not k receive an automatic actuation signal. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1. the affected , penetration must be verifled to be isolated on a periodic ! basis per Required Action A.2. which remains in effect. This periodic. verification is necessary to assure leak <C tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring d isolation following an accident are isolated. The , Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices ! outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period , specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not ' performed once within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment 1 solation valves. Condition A of this LCO addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve inoperable in this type of penetration flow path. - l i !O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 10 9/9/98 Revision J
-~ _ . . . .. ... _ . _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _._ -
Containmen: 'sia: y .5 .e-E: - I l. l BASES t dp ACTIONS (continued) l C 1 and C'2
)
l With one or more penetration flow paths witn one containmen: isolation valve inoperable, the. Inoperable valve floa ca - must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affectec i , penetration flow path must be isolated. The metno et ' i isoldtion must inCiude the use of at least one isola!1on N barrier that cannot be adversely.affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterlon are a- , , i closed and de-activated automatic or remote manual valve. a i i p' closed manual valve, and a blind flange. De-activated remote manual valves may include. air operated valves'with 4 air removed. or de-energized motor operated valves.
., Automatic valves refer to those valves that require a motive
- force to actuate. such as air or electric.. and receive an t
automatic actuation signal. Power operated valves require a i N motive force to actuate. such as air or electric. but ao not T receive an automatic actuation signal. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration flow path. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour ! Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence reliability) to act as a penetration isolation
/"% boundary and the relative importance of maintaining
! C1 containment integrity during MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in i accordance with Required Action C.1. the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodic verification is necessary to t assure leak tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days'for verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their l misalignment is low, t (~J BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 11 9/9/98 Revision J i
- ~ -. - .. -- -. ... .
Containmen: :s :a:::~ .a'.+!
??.
BASE 5
. ,,9
() ACTIONS (continued) Condition C is modified by a Note indicating tna; tnis Condition is only applicaole to tnose cenetration flow ca: r with only one containment isolation valve anc a close; system. The closed system must meet the requiremen:s o<
'l Reference 3. This Note is necessary since this Conal: Ton is written to specifically address those penetration flov, pa:ns in a clo. sed system.
' Required Action C.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verifled closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or otherwise securing components is to ensure these devices are not inadvertently mispositioned. Therefore. the 3robability of misalignment of these valves, once they have seen verified to be in the proper position. is small.
D_1 In the event one or more containment purge valves in one or more penetration flow paths are not within the purge. valve leakage limits. purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits within 24 hours. If the leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance , criteria. ACTIONS Note 4 would assure the more restrictive ! ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1. " Containment." are applied. The specified Completion Time of 24 hours represents'a reasonable time to effect repairs of leaking purge valve (s). i l l ! ;d O) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 12 9/9/98 Revision J
[cntainmen: I sc ^ a: * :- .i E l S t.. .; r.t l V A:TIONS (continued) E 1 and E 2 l If the Reoulred Actions and associated Completion Times are l not met, tne unit must ce brougnt to a MODE in wnicr :ne LCO coes not apply. To acnleve this status. tne un:: mus: be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and :: MOD; ; - within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are l reasonable. based on operating experience to reacn the required unit conditions from full power conditions ir an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. l L i SURVEILLANCE SR 3 6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS ' Each 48 inch containment purge valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals. This l Surveillance is designed to ensure that a gross breach of containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a containment purge valve. Detailed analysis of l the purge valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their I ability to close during a LOCA in time to limit offsite ! fx doses. Therefore, these valves are required to be in the ( ) sealed closed position during MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. A v containment purge valve that is sealed closed must have l motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de-energizing the source of electric power or by installing a mechanical block. In this application. the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3.3. O V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3. 6. 3 - 13 6/13/98 Revision A
Ccntainmer: :s:^3: :" .3
??-
BASE 3 C SURVE!LLAN:E REQUIREMENTS (continuei; SR 3632 Tnis SR ensures that tne minipurge valves are close; as requirea or if open. open for an allowaole reasor unce-aaministrative control. If a purge valve is open ir violation of this SR. the valve is considerea inoperable. If tne inoperable valve is not otherwise known to nave excessive leakage when closed. it is not conslaered to nave leakage outside of limits. The SR is not required to be met when the minipurae valves are open under administrative control. The valves may be opened for example: for pressure control. ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel ; entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be i open. The minipurge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3.3. (O v i I a & BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 14 6/13/98 Revision A
Contalnmen; Iscla: c ;.g .i! BASES
..C\
U SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS acontinued) SR 3.6 3.3 This SR requires verification that each containmen l isolation manual. valve, remote manual valve. and D'1nc flange located outside containment and not locked, sealec. or otherwise secured and required to be closed durin:: accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure ina post ' accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outsice of the containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather it involves. verification. through a system walkdown, that those containment isolation valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for containment isolation valves outside containment is R relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency is based on' engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added q assurance of the correct positions. The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under
\S administrative controls are not required to meet the 3
I SR during the time the valves are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked sealed, or otherwise-N secured in the closed position, since these were verified to
- P g be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or
? k securing.
The Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing - verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore. the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. (
,~.
BYRON -~ UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 15 9/9/98 Revision J V . _ -
. . -- . . . -= . .~. -. --
Containment 15015: 7 .5'.e!
.-.. 1 i
j
' BASE 5 f* ) i j \) -SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (cnntinued) l L SP 3.6.3 4 This SR requires verification that each containment l isolation manual valve, remote manual valve. ano bilnc flange located inside containment and not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured and required to be closea during accioen:
conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that oost-
'l 3 accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outslae of i o the containment boundary is within design limits. For 1 containment isolation valves inside containment. the l M? Frecuency of " prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not i 3:9j- performed within the previous 92' days":is appropriate since. l
~%i these containment isolation valves are operated under '
administrative controls and the probability of their s misalignment is low. The SR specifies that containment 7 isolation valves that are open under administrative controls ni are not required to meet the SR during the time they are , u open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked. ' sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position since ! N these were verified to be in the correct position upon i Q locking., sealing, or securing. This Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high r^ radiation areas to be verified closed by use of ' d' administrative means. Allowing verification by . administrative means is considered acceptable since access l ' to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1. 2. 3. l and 4. for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probabilit I misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once y of they have been verified to be in their proper position. is small. SR 3.6.3.5 Verifying that the isolation time of each automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time-test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. - 'p id BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 16 9/9/98 Revision J 1
Containmen: Isc 5: : f .+{ BASE 3
/3 . V SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.6.3 1 and SF 3 6.3 - For containment purge valves with resilient seals. additional leakage rate testing beyond the test recu1remer.:s of 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B. is required to ensure , OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstratec tna: l this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a snorte- I time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established for the 48 inch purge valves as part of'the NRC resolution of Generic Issue B-20. ~' Containment Leakage j Due to Seal Deterioration" (Ref. 4). The 92 day Frequency was chosen for the 8 inch purge valves recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been opened). Thus. decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure since the 8 inch purge valves may be opened periodically during the ' 92 day interval. n SR 3.6 3.8 V Automatic containment isolation valves close on a-containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of. radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation signal. This surveillance is not required for valves that~ are locked. sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. o LU BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 17 9/1/98 Revision J I
'1 L .
Contalnmerr50'.a; :".,i ;e! ~% , ?3: : .l 1
'Bt.3ES.
l~ Y .I p~ l: REFERENCES - 1. UFSAR. Section 6'.2. i t L, 12- . Regul'atory Guide 1.4.-Revision 2. ) v
- 3. Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 4: .Generie ' Issue B-20 " Containment-I.eakage Due to Seal-Deterioration; '
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f l 7i IAF::3:ia, 33rgi3; $73 3 ;3;. kh ,: 9F 2A:013C;a' 2AFC13: 5/3 Isol Viv l .:
'l 76 IAT:13sta) ;Ar:13- 5/3 0 15o1 Vh .:
l 99 2AFC13,(a) 2 arc 138 5/G D Isol Viv N: . 79 I l 1A:013A.at IAF013A 5/G A Isol Viv h ': ) l 100 2AFC13A(a) 2AF013A 5/G A Isol Viv P. -a l 79 1AF013E(a) 1A"113E 5/G A Isol Viv A.A : l IC: .2AFC13E(a) 2AF0131 5/G A 1501 Viv AA :
.l 64 1AT313B(a) 1AF0135 5/G B Isol Viv. NiA :
l IC; 2AFC13B(a) 2AF013B 5/G B Isol Viv N/A : l 64 '1AFC13F(a) 1AFC13F 5/G B 1s01 Viv N,A 3 lmI
%./ l 10: 2AF013rta) 2AF013T S/G B 1s01 Viv N/A 3 l E' 1A::;3ga; 1AF0130 5/G C 1501 Viv N/A 3 l- 1:2 ' 2A:C13da) 2AF0130 5/G C 1 sol Viv N/A 3 l B7 1AF013G(a) 1AF013G 5/G C ! sol Vlv N/A 3
.l 102 2AFC13G(a;
-2AF0133 5/G C 1501 Viv N/A 3 2; C09414 CC0416' CC9414 CC From RC Pianos isol Vlv 10.0 1 CC9534 CC9416 CC From RC Pumps 1s01 Viv 10.0 CC9534 CC From RC Pmp 1501 Byp Check Viv N/A l 22 CC9437B(a)
CC9437B CC From Exc Ltown Hx Isol Viv. 10.0 3 24 CC6BS CC9438 CC685 CC From RC Pps Therm Bar Isol Viv CC9518 CC9438 10.0 1 CC From RC Pos inenu Bar 1s01 Viv 10.0 CC951B CC Frm RC Pps Therm Barr 150 Byp Chk N/A (continuec) i (a) Nct suDject to Tyoe C leakage tests. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 19 8/14/98 Revision J
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16 050:75 0500E! 050076 Cnet 5: ray P B H - !sel viv 3: : . C500BS Cne. 5; ray Hor B Ince Cnr. Cneen AA 2! CVS100 CVS112 . CV6100 Seal ktr Rtrn Cnm- Isol vlv 1; O , CV8113 CVB112 CV8113 Seal ktr Rtrn Cnmt Isel Vlv Seal Wt Rten neck viv hA 33 Cv8355A(a) CVB36BA(al CVE355A RCD Seal InJe:tlon Isol CVE36BA R*P Seal Inje: tion Cnet Isol Viv AA ha 33 CV5355?(a) Cv8368D(a) CVS3550 RCD 5eal Inje: tion Isol A/A : Cv6368D RCP 5eal Inje: tion Cnmt Isol Vlv hiA 37 CVE346 I4) CV834B(a) ~ CV8346 Loco fill Nor Outed Man Isol viv N/A CVB346 R: Loop Fill Cnmt Isol Viv h/A 7% I l, 4 '. CVE152 Cv8160
.i CVE152
.Cv8160 Letcown Line Cnmt 1501 Viv Letoown Line Cnmt isol Viv 10 :
%I 10 53 CVB355B(a: CVS36B2(a) CVB3555 R:P Seal Injection N/A CVE36BS R:P Seal Inje: tion Cnet 1501 Viv N/A i3 CVE355:(a) CVB3680 t a) CVE355: RCP Seal Inje:tton N/A CVB368' R:D Seal Inje: tion Cnet 1501 Viv N/A 8 a 7; Cv8105 Cng Line Cnet Isol Viv l Cv8105((a)i CVE106 CVE106 Cn; Line Cnmt 1501 Vlv 10 IC 10 32 FC011 FCCu' FC011 Dem Loop Rtn To Rfuel Cav Cnmt isol N/A 2 FC012 Dem LooD Rtn To Rfuel Cav Cnmt 1501 N/A 57- FCDIC FC009 FCC10 Pc Sutt From Refuel Cav Cnmt 1501 N/A 2 TC009 Pc Su:t From Refuel Cav Cnmt 1501 N/A 34 FP010(a) FP345(a) FP010 Fire Protection 0/5 ! sol 364 viv 12.0 2 FP345 Fire Prot Cnmt 1s01 Viv N/A (continued)
(a) het subje:t to Type C leatage tests.
,f Y BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 20 8/14/98 Revision J
.. - = . . . . - . . , _ . . . ~ . . -- _
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2FW343T8 ' 27 0430 SIG C Fah Bypass is:' ik : 1 79 FWDC9A(a) FWOO9A Fa Isolation Viv '.000 i i-2FW343A(a)- 2FW343A S/G A Fa!V Byoass !sel vh t-B: FWOO9B(a) FWOO95 Fm Isolation Viv Lo0: E i: 2 FWD 43B(a) 2FWO435 S/G B FWlv Byoass Isol th i: ) 87 FW009C(a) FWOO90 Fm Isolation Viv Loco C 5 2 FWD 430(a) 2FWO430 S/G C FWlV Bypass 1501 Viv 6.I 76 IFWO35D(a) 1FWO350 S/G D FW Temorng Isol Viv 76 6: - IFWO39D((a) IFWD390 5/G ID Low Flow Fm 1 sol Viv 6.s 99 IFWC15D a) IFWOI5D S/G Recir: N/A , 99 2FWO35D 2FWO35D' S/G D FW Temorng Isol Viv 2FWO390@,) 2FWO39D S/G D FW Pnte Byp viv 377 DWST Isol 6.0 : 2FWO150 g 60 2FWO150 ' SG D F Cnem Feed Isol s N,A 79 1FWO35A(a) IFWO35A S/G A FW Temorng isol Viv 79 8 6.0 3 IFWO39A((a)3 IFWO39A S/G 1A Low Flow FW 1s01 Viv 6.C 10C IFWO15A IFWD15A S/G Re:1r: N/A 100 2FWO35A S/G A FW Temorng Isol Viv
/N - 2FWO35A((8) 6.0 3 i 2 FWD 39A(a) 2FWO39A S/G A FW Pntr Byp Viv 377 DWST Isol 6.0 '
2 FWD 15A a) 2FWO15A SG A FW Cnem Feed 1501 N/A 64 1FWO35B(a) IFWD35B S/G B FW Temorng 1501 Viv 6.0, 64 IFWO39B(a! 3 IFWO39B S/G 15 Low Flow FW ! sol Viv 6.0 1C1 1FW0155(a' 1FWO156 S/G Recire N/A 101 2FWO35B 2FWO35B S/G B FW Temorng Isol Vlv 2FWO399{a a 2FWO395 S/G B FW Pnte By Viv 377 DWST 1501 6.0 60 3 i 2Fm'015B(a) 2FWO155 SG B FW Chem Feed 1501 N/A l B7 IFWO35C IFWO35C S/G C FW Temorng 1501 Vlv 67 1FWO39C 6.0 3 IFWO390 S/G IC Low Flow FW 1501 Viv 6.0 102 IFWOISC(a) IFWO150 '/G Recir: N/A a 102 2FWO35C S/G C FW Tempeng 1501 Viv 2FWO35C(a) 2 FWD 39C( ) 6.0 3 2FWO39C S/G C FW Pntt Byo Vlv 377 DWST ! sol 6.0 2FWO15C(a) 2FWO15; SG C FW Cnem Feed Isol N/A (continued)
-(a) Not sub, lect to Type C leakage tests.
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 21 8/14/98 Revision J l
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.. VA.JE VA.t! : :.: : - '
*:'i 3 E. -
;33 - IA065 : IA065 1 A0fi ' D/S Cnt: 1scl Vit lsc' \h- ;; - .
.IAci; IA065 lestrumect A1* Icsice Is:' t h ;t IAn; g estre IA Sply Tc A% .IAS i (ng Vh * ,;
7' M51010(a{ . g33 ;; g3 y g 3,33 y3, ge ; t ; M5013;(a .y33 3; SGD1{.35Pst;Re11e* *;.
. MS014D(8I ' M501C . '53 0 1220 Psig Relle' t, ;
'MSCISD(a) M5015D SG D 1205 Psig Relte'. N:
a M50160 ' SG D 1190 Psig Relle' A: M5016D(a)) M5017D( - . M5017D - SG 0 1175 Pstg Relief A ' t.
~M501BD(a) .
M501BD SG D PORV . 2: ; M50210(a).. M50210 .SG D Dr1ples Den DWST Isol -t.A 76 g31gga . p3;y gypass y)y goop a .g; ; *
~M5101A((a). 81 '
M5013A SG A 1235 Psig Relie*- AA
.M5013A(8) LG A 1220 Ps1g Relief M5014A(a) M5014A Aa M5015A MS015A SG A 1205 Pstg Relief- N/A M5016A(a) M5016A- ..SG A 1190 Dsig Relief A. A MS017A(a) ta M5017A- SG A 1175 Psig Relief N. A '
M5018A SG A PORV MS018A(a )) - M5021A .M5021A SG A Dripleg Den DWST ! sol 20.C A.A i B5 . M5101B(a) ~ MS101B :MSIV Byoass Viv Loop E 6.0 :. M5013B(a) M50135 SG B 1235 Pstg Relief N/A M5014B(a) M5014B SG B 1220 Ps19 Relief N/A 8 M50155 SG B 1205 Psig Relief N/A
. M5015B((a)) M50168 - SG B 1190 Psig Relief .N/A M5016B(a) g3g373 SG B 1175 Psig Relief M5017B(a) N.A
- M501BB M501BB SG B PORV 20.0 M5021B(a)-
O;V M50218 SG B Dr1pleg Drn DWST 1 sol N/A i Si M51010(a) MS101C MSIV Byoass Viv Loop C 6.0 3 M5013;(a) M5013: SG C 1235 Pstg Relief N/A M5014:(a) MS014: SG C 1220 Pstg Relief N/A i M5015:ja! M5015 SG C 1205 Ps19 Relief N/A M5016C S3 C 1190 Ps19 Relief- N/A M50160('a( SG C 1175 Psig Relief M5017;(a, M5017C N/A M5016: 8 M5018 SG : PORV 20.0 M5021C(a! ' SG : Drioleg Drn DWST 1501 M5021: N/A 13- OG082 OG079 OG082 M2 Recemo Outbd Cnmt 1501 Viv 60.0 2 OG079 M2 Recomb Disen Cnmt 1501 Viv 60.0 13 OG084 OG080 DG084 M2 Recomo Outbd Cnet Isol Viv 60.0 2 OGOBO H2 Recemo Suct Cnmt 1s01 Viv 60.0 23 OGOB5 OGOB1 000$5 M2 Recomb Outbd Cnmt 1 sol Viv 60.0 2 OGOB1 H2 Recomo Suction Cnmt 1101 Viv 60.0 69 OG083 OG057A OG083 M2 Recomb Dutbd Cnmt Isol Viv 60.0 2 OG057A M2 Recomb Cnmt 1501 Viv 60.0 (continued)
-(a) . Not subject to Type C leaka9e tests.
Lx R M)' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 22 8/14/98 Revision J
-- .. _ - . _ . = . .. - . ~ - ~. . ,
4
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1 A. PU33A . PR:331 A - Les 426 Iis A - Lc= Rac M:- 1s: ', ; l- PRC335: PR0335 Air Lea 426 les M - cs Ra- Mo s: l l I A. PRC 2I PC 25 PRC^2i At- Locs 426 A' Mar Outlet is:' PR;;23 - At* Lect Air Man Out et l Cneca ', ; 1. I
. A~ PR;33: PR033: Emg Air Let Ins Air Lck Ra Mom 150 L' l i
PR0333 PRC333 Emg Air Let Ins At Lck Ra3 Mon !se hA A* PR002F PR002H PR002: At* Locs 401 Air Man Ostlet 1s01 PR002H Emerg Maten Air Lek Mon Outlet Cnt A 'a : L t-52 PR001A PR301A UPST Cnmt Atmos To PR 0/S Isoi Vlv PR0015 PR001B OWST Cnmt Atmos To PR 0/5 1501 Viv 4 i. .: 4 . i-52 .PR066 -PR032 PRC66 Sample Return 0/5 Cnmt Isol 5.0 : PR032 Cnmt Process Rad Mon Return Chk h/A l l 36 FS2255 . PS22BB Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnet 1s01 Viv .N/A% ;; PS2295 PS229B Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt 1s01 V1v N/AL 36 PS2305- PS231 PS230B Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt 1501 Viv N/A(D' ;- (31) Bye PS2316 Post LOCA H2 Mon B Return Chk v1v N/A r"N 45- PS228A PS22BA Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cnet Isol Viv b gg
/t 4 PS229A PS229A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cnmt Isol Viv N/
N/A A(ID {' (V 4* PS23GA PS231A FS230A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cntt 1501 Viv N/A(b) ;_ (1215ye PS231A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Return Chk Viv N/A 70 PS9354B PS9354A PS93548 Prr Stm Sample Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 :
.PS9354A Pre Stm Sample Cnet Isol Viv 10.0 70 PS93555 PS9355A PS93558 Pra Lod Sample Cnet Isol Viv 10.0 2 PS9355A Pr* Lod Sample Cnmt Isol vlv 10.0 70 PS9356B PS9356A- PS9356B Loop Sample Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 2 l~ PS9356A Loop Sample Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 70 PS9357B PS9357A PS9357B Acctsnulator Sample Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 2 PS9357A Accumulator Sample Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 l
11 RE9170 RE1003 RE9170 RCDT Pumps Outside Isol viv 10.0 2 RE1003 RCOT Pumps Dscn Cnmt InDC ! sol Vlv 10.0 (continued) i (b) Proper valve operation will be demonstrated by verifyin9 that the valve strokes to 1ts required position. n d BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 23 8/14/98 Revision J
. . . . .. - - - . . - _ - - . - . - . - . ~ . . . . .~
1; j Containmen: Istoan :' i .e5 2
- -..' 1
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- l. *: I:- ;" l si- *E9:!' RE~~1601 RE9157 R*** N2 Su:: y Duts :e Is:' th .: ' .
RI915:2 RE91605 R :T *er.: ' tsice Is:' V v .' ' RE9160A R:;T vert A N2 Sv: Ir4'oe Is0 ti, .' ' , l 65 FE9159B RE9159A RE9:595 R::' T: Gas Anal Outsloe Iso; vii :
- RE9159A R DT To Gas Anal Insice Isci Vh !! '
s 47 RrC27 RF026 RF027 lCnm-FirDenSepDsenHo-0/5Isol 15.: . RF026 Cnet Fir Drn Sump Ds:n Hor 1/5 Isol 15.; i i ! 63 RH6701A(0} RHB701A RC Loco A To R.i PP A Suct 37' Iso! N'A :' I RH57012(a) RriB7018 RC Loco A To RH PD A Su:: 377 Isol N,A i 75 RHB702A(a) RHB702A RC Loop C To RH P' E Su t 377 ! sol N4' ; RH8702B(a) RHS7022 R: Loop C To Rn PP E Suct 377 Isol NA l 1
.l. - 15 RYC75 RYO75 0/5 CTMT Deae weight Tester Isol N/A :
1 1 27 RY8025 RYB026 RY8025 PRT To Gas Anal Cnm: Isol Vlv 10.0 0 ! RYB026 PRT To Gas Anal Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 l l \ 27 RY8033 N2 Supply To PRT 1 sol viv RY8047 RYB033 RYSO47 PRT N2 Supply Line I/5 Cnmt Cnt Viv 10.0 : 1 N/A I
' /"'N ' 44 RY8026 RYB046 RYB028 PW To PRT Cnmt 1 sol Viv 10.0 1
l RY8046 PRT Spray Line Insice Cnmt Chk Viv N/A J 55 SA032 SA033 SA032 SA033 Service Air Cnmt 1501 Viv 0/5 Service Air Instae Isol viv 4.5 : 4.5 20 SD002.(ai 1500020 5/G IC B/D ! sol 7.5 3 B0/81 500052i8) 250002: Steam Generato- ID Upper B/D isol 7.5 50005B Steam Generator ID B/D Sample Isol 3.0 , B1 50002D(a) 1500020 5/G 10 B/D lsol 7.5 3 80/81 SD005B(a) 250002D Steam Generator ID Lower B/D 15o1 7.5 50005B Steam Generator ID B/D Sample Isol 3.0 1 82 CD002A(a) 150002A 5/G 1A B/D 1s01 82/83 7.5 3 SD005A(a) 250002A Steam Generator IA Upper B/D 15o1 7.5 i l SD005A Steam Generator 1A B/D Sample Isol 3.0 1 a 83- 1500028 5/G 1A B/D ] sol 82/B3 50002B((a) SD005A
) 7.5 3 I 2500028 Steam Generator IA Lower B/D 1501 7.5 SD005A Steam Generator IA B/D Sample 1s01 3.0 l (continueo)
(a) Not suoje:t to Type C leakage tests.
- I i
', j l Ih'- l i BYRON - UNITS l'& 2 B 3.6.3 - 24 8/14/98 Revision J I I l
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COntainmen: 15:13 '?"
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~
SE 5 002-(a) 15D;;2: 5/G 15 S/D 150' i BE/S' SC005:ia) 2500:2 Steam Generate" 15 ;.o-e* B.: 1s0' ' - 50005; Steae Generate 15 8/D Samole Ise' 3 1
- 9: SD002G l a) 15D0023 5/C,10 8/D Isol 90/9; 1 .' I 500050(*) 250002G 5 teem Generater it upoee 8/D Isol 3 50005D Steam Generator I; 8/D Sample Isol 3.;
9; SD002H(a) 150002H 5/G 1: B/D isol ~ 5 005Di a)
'i 93/91 250002H Steam Generator 1: Lowea B/D Isol ~1 500050 Steam Generate
- IC B/D Samole Iso' 3.0 26 SIEB0lA(8) 518815(8L SIB 801A CHG Po To Cold Legs Inj lsol N.A 5188018(a) 5;gg43t a, 5!B801B CHG Po To Colc Legs Isol Viv UA 5
518815 Cng Pos Cole Leg Inj Mar Chk Viv N,A 518843 Accm Fill Frm SI Tst Line Isol Viv N,A i SC SI8809d') SIB 890A((8) 518809A RH To Cold Legs A/D 1s01 Viv . N/A 518818A a) SIB 890A RHR To Cold Legs 1&4 Tst Line Iso VI N/A SI6818D(a) 518BIBA SI Loo: 1 Cold Leg Upst Chk Viv N/A , 5186180 51 Loop 4 Cold Leg upst Cha Viv N/A 51 5!68098(a) SIB 8908(a) 5188098 RH To Cold Legs B/C 1501 Viv (Q - a N/A SIBB188(a)) 5188906 RHR To Colc Legs 2&3 Tst Line Iso v1 N/A 518816:( 5188188 SI Loco 2 Cold Leg ucst Chk Viv N/A 518816" SI Loop 3 Cold Leg upst Cnk V1v N/A ' 55 518 W 516671 518964 SI st Lines To Radweste 1501 Viv 10,0 4 i 518588 518888 SI s To Accum Fill Line 1501 Viv 10.0 ! 518871 Fil / Test Line Isol Viv 10.0 ! l 55 518880 51 Acc Aulaters N2 Supply 1s01 Viv
~
l 518968 518880 10.0 2 i 518968 51 Accum N2 Supply Chk Viv N/A t Siggg3(a) 59 SIB 602A a) 518802A SI To Het Legs A/D 1501 Viv N/A 7 SI8905A(a) 518881 SI Test Line Iso Viv. 51 Pps To A/D Hot Legs N/A SIB 905D(a) SIB 905A SI Loop 1 Het Leg upst Chk Viv 518905D SI Loop 4 Met Leg upst Cnk Viv N/A N/A 63 SIB 835(a) 5!BB23(a) 518835 SI Pos Cold Legs 1501 Viv N/A 7 518819A(a) 518823 SI Test Line Iso Viv. 51 Pos To Cold Legs N/A SIB 8198(a) 518819A 5" Pos Dsch Hor To Cold Leg Lp 1 Chk N/A SIBB19C 516819B 5:: Pos Dsch Har To Cold Leg Lp 2 Chk N/A 5186190 518819: 5:: Pos Dsch Hdr To Cold Leg Lp 3 Chk N/A 5188190 51 Pps Osch Hde To Cold Leg Lp 4 Chk N/A (continued) (a) Not subject to Type C leakage tests. ,, w I '(m) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3- 25 8/14/98 Revision J j l i
'7 COntainmen* 15:52.~10" .5.'.fr
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te,'M3ER .VA.VE VAiVE 5 2.1 * * :'
*:i !!! -
ff -SIBB4:I3; S!BB25',a( gggg ., g,7e n : g,;3 4.; ;3 y), g j SIBB41A('a,ai 518325 RAR To Col: Leg '; SIB 541B 3;ggaig . 3: to : ; ,:: ,,s 113
;y3 Ts cn,'iee
, g1st V q
5185418 S* . o : 3 net Le; u:st Cn* Viv s: i 73 SIBB02B(a) S!BB24(a) 518802B S: Tc Net Legs B/C Is:1 vh t. . SIB 905B(a) SIBB24 SI Test Line Iso viv. 5: Pos To B/ not Legs A: SIB 905C(a) 5189058 S! Loo: 2 Hot Leg u:st Chk Vh.. Aa , 518905: S: Loop 3 Hot Leg u:st Cns Viv A e t. j
.l 92 SIBB11A(a) SIBB11A ' Cnm Sump A Isol V1v . t, t . j
.l 93 SIBB11B(a) 5188118 Cnm Swnc B Isol Viv N;a .
l 7 SX016BI a) SX0166 Rx Cnmt Fan Cooler B/D SX Inlet hea :
'l 9 SX027B(a) SX027B Rx Cnet Fan Cooler B/D SX Outlet N/A 3 .;
l 14 SX027A(a) SX027A- Rx Cnmt Fan Cooler A/C SX Outlet N/A 3
-l l 15 SX016A(a) SX016A Rx Cnet Fan Cooler A/C SX Inlet N/A 3 l3 V0018 V0016 V001B Int Leak Rate Cnmt Isol N/A
- i V0016 In: Leak Rate Cnmt Isol N/A
.fm' l .s ) i ' ?-d II V0019 V0017 V0019 Int Leak Rate Cnmt 1501 N/A :
V0017 -Int Leak Rate Cnmt 1501 .N/A
' 94 V0003 V0005A V0003 Cnmt Post-LOCA Purge 1501 5.0 6 V0005: V0005: Cnmt Mini Flow Purge Exnaust 1s01 5.0 V0005B V0005B Cnmt Mint Flow Purge Exhaust 15o1 5.0 V0005A Cnmt Mint-Flow Purge Exhaust Isol 5.0 95 V0002B V0002A V0002B Cnm Purge Exnaust Isol Viv 50 2(C)
V0002A Cnmt Purge Exnaust Isol Viv 5.0 96 V00048 V0004A V0004B V0004A Cnmt Mini-Flow Purge Supply 1s01 Cnmt Mint-Flow Purge Supply 1501 5.0 : 5.0 97 .V0001B V0001A V0001B Cnm: Purge Suppl isol viv 5.0 2(C) V0001A Cnmt Purge Suool 1s01 Viv 5.0 30 WM190 WM191 WM190 Demin Wtr Her To Cnmt DWST 1501 N/A 2 WM191 Demin Wtr Her To Cnmt Cneck Viv N/A (continued) (a) ~Not sub. lect to Type C leakage tests. (c) Valve INOPERABLE as a result of leakage not witnin limit. refer to Tecn Spec 3.6.3. Condition D. i?
'n (
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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 26 8/14/98 Revision J
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'E WO306A - .W0007A WOOO6A Rn Cnr: Fe Coolers A.': Cm' : Ir :.
WOO;'A Ai! R*F: S gply n:- Iren ;neeg i' ; l E WC320S WO3565 WOO 205 Rx Cne Fn Ccolers B/ Ch! W: 0. 5: " WOO 565 Rx Cnm Fn Coolers S/D :n1 W:r Cg: 5: ;
~
10 WOODEB WOOO78 WOOO66 Rx Cnet Fn Coolers 8/D Chi Wtr In - 50 0 ' WOOO78 B/D RCFC S coly Her In:nm: Cnecx rA t N l f j'. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 27 8/14/98 Revision J
- <. - - , ._ m ., _ _ . . - - , . _ ., . ._ - _ _. _ . _ . . , _
^ '
Containment 15Cla W .5h f5 L- :: .t-..: I-
. . *a:'e : iJ3 : .:e;* . :' .
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kt*'EE; ,
.. :.. 45.~.
p.
; a. Outstee valve 2 ettne testce valve INO3ERAB' E .. . : .
- c. B:tn insice vaives INOPERABLE -
, y :; J Cutsice A$2 ettne* insice valve INUERABLE i .;
2- a Outstoe valve inside valve INODERABLE :.
- c. Outsioe valve ins 1oe valve INOPERABLE E j' 3 a' ,
valve INOPERABLE : 4 : a. ' Inside valve 2 eitner cutstoe valve INOPERABLE A O. Botn outsloe valves INOPERABLE A '
- c. Instoe valve 3 eitner outstoe valve INOPERABLE !
-5 a. Ettner cf tne outsioe valves 3 eitner of tiie insioe valves INOPERABLE A
- ;. Betn insiot valves E Dotn outstoe valves INOPERABLE A
.:. Ettner of tne instoe valves M eitner of tne outstae valves INOPERABLE E.
6 ,s. -1 2 more outside valves INOPERABLE A
~0. Ins 10e valve INOPERABLE ~ . - A
- . Instoe valve E any outstee valve (s) INOPERABLE B-
'7- a. 1 more insioe valves INOPERABLE A
.D. Ou@tstoevalveINOPERABLE' '
A' Outsioe valve 3 any inside valve (s) INOPERABLE B
~'
t ..
.l- -B.. -a. Valve INOPERABLE- B
- 9- e. 1 inside valve INOPERABLE 'A
- 3. Botn insiot valves INOPERABLE B J
10 a; I outstee valve INOPERABLE A- I
- c. -Botn outs 1oe valves INOPERABLE B i
I
.I i
i. 1 L' - BYRONJ- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 28 8/14/98 Revision J f I i g - - --
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's / 8 3.6.2 Containmen: Dressure BASES BACKGROUND The containment structure serves to contain radioa::: se material that may be released from tne reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Tne containmen: pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve Ine , initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a i Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Steam Line Break (SLB). ! These limits also prevent the containment pressure from ' exceeding the containment design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere in the event of inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray i System. Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored and controlled. The containment pressure limits are derivea , from the input conditions used in the containment functional l analyses and tha containment structure external pressure analysis. Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a Design Basis Accident (DBA). post accident p containment pressures could exceed calculated values. (.) APPLICABLE Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used ; SAFETY ANALYSES in the DBA analyses to establish the maximum peak ' containment internal pressure. The limiting DBAs considered. relative to containment pressure. are the LOCA and SLB. which are analyzed using computer modeled pressure transients. The worst case LOCA generates larger mass and energy release than the worst case SLB. Thus. the LOCA event bounds the SLB event from the containment peak pressure standpoint (Ref. 1). [ ) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A l
-_. _m._.__ - _ . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ . . . . _ .
.- _ . ~ . _ , _ . . . - . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . - ,
. s ;
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. * : ~~AE :l3?. EI . lea Y3E3 COC1r.ae::
Ine 1nitial pressure conCitier- use; 1" ;"e 20" a* e" '
- analysis was.0.3'Ds19, Evalua:1ons De"ferme: s".0,.e:::'.a- **
Ine initial pressure was raise: :c *. Osic :ne ma n : re.w , f ' pressure from a LO^A was C.8 Ds19 fo" uhn ~ an: 22 2 ::*c . . i for Unit-2. Tne containment analysis (Ref. l'> sr.ce.; : a-
.tne max 1 mum peak calculated containmen pressure ; , l L .
'results from the'11miting LOCA. Tne maximum con:a'Emen:- i L ;ji pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA aces nc: exces:L i the containment design pressure. 50 psig.
1 The. containment was also evaluated for an' external pressure j ,. load equivalent to -3.5 psig (Ref. 2). Tne inaavertent : l actuation of the Containment Spray System was analyzec te 1 l determine the resulting reduction in containment pressure. l
- - The initial pressure condition used in this analysis was i L.
0.0 osig. This resultec in a' minimum pressure inslae i containment of -3.48 psig. which is less than the design load, a , 'For certain aspects of transient accident analyses. i maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not 1 conservative. In particular the cooling effectiveness of l the Emergency Core. Cooling System during the core reflood , phase of a LOCA analysis. increases with increasing l O. containment backpressure. ..Therefore, for the reflood phase. M L the containment backpressure is calculated in-a manner designed to conservatively minimize. rather than maximize. l L the containment pressure response in accordance with 10 CFR 50. Appendix K (Ref. 3). i Containment pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(11). e l I I f BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 2 8/20/98 Revision J , i i; l
_ . . - . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . _ ._ . . . . _ . . . . . - - . _ . _ . _ _ .__ - _. _ m .._m_. . _ . . . ~
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. .-ma..
n e =_ _.s s . c =. . , - . =. e. s . < : - . e. .- . ( 5 051 :ne resultan'. Dea ( :on:5'nmer: 5 : := : r-e5 5..r+
#em31r Delor. In: con!5inmen: ces19# O'essu e, 5 ' : : - - -
" essure a gre5 s- Inar c' e:s3 :: +
ccn 51nmen - c:C ior.-er cressure 11m1: Drov' 55 "eas0rarle ass Sr:s
- ne containment will not exces: :n= cesign nega: se . ,
c1fferer:1ai cressure folioxing :ne inaave- er.: 5:: 5: :- --
- ne Containmen: Soray System.
i l 1 APPLICAEILIT( In M03E5 1. 2. 3. anc 4. a DBA couic cause a release c' , racloa::1ve material to containment. Since maintain 1n: i containment pressure witnin limits is essential to ens're u i initial conditions assumed in tne accicent analyses are i maintainec. tne LC0 1s applicable in MODES 1. I. 3. anc ; In MODES 5 and 6. tne probability anc conseauences of :nese events are recucec due to tne pressure anc temperature limita lons of tnese MODES. Tnerefore. maintainanc containment oressure within the limits of the LCO is not recuireo in-MODES 5 or 6. 1
.. . 0t.se.s .
Wnen containmen: pressure is not within the limits of the l l LCO. it must be restorea to within these limits witnin i 1 nour. Tne Reau1 red Action is necessary to return l operation to within tne bounds of the containment analysis. , l Ine i nour Completion Time 15 consistent with the ACTIONS of l ' LCO 3.6.1. " Containment." which requires that Containment be restorea to OPERABLE status witnin I hour. l l l j .' BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A i d
. .~ .. _ .. -- _ . . . _ . . -. . -
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- ::"tB'nmen Dressu'9 Car":: De "es. #e: .: . .
v.1:91r ;ne re ;1re: 0 016 10' - e. - .e o r- - :: Cr ugn* It a MODE 1r Wni:P ;":e _:: COes n:, 3 r', a:n' eve .n's s~a!US, the ur* CuS. OE D'Oug" . 5: ed:- g l M3DE 3 v., nin 6 n urs anc to MODE 5 w1 nir 36 r: - allowe3 CoC0letion Ilmes are reasonaDie. Dase: Or : e a-excerlen:e. I: reacn tne reau1rea unit conc 1:1cn3 :- - Dower Conci lons in an orcerly manner anc witnog; cnalienging plan systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3641 REQUIREMENT 5 . Verifying that containment pressure is witnin limits ensures tnat uni opera *1on remains witnin tne limits assume: 'n :ne containment analysis. The 12 hour Freauency of tnis SR was ceveloped baseo on operating exoerlence related to trencing of containment pressure variations curing the applicaDie MODES. Furtnermore. tne 12 hour Frecuency is conslaerec aceouate in view of otner indications available in tne
/ ,T control room. including alarms. to aler; the operate" tc an \- / aonormal containment pressure condition.
1 4 l
- EFERENCES
. 1. UFSAR. Section 6.2. 1 l
i
- 2. Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Byron Station Units 1 an: 2. Supplement 2. l l
- 3. 10 CFR 50. Appendix K. l b\,
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 4 6/13/98 Revision L
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BASE 5 BA:K3ROUN: Tne ::n ainmera stru::ure se ves :: ::r.:a-- a: :a:- . ma:enal ina: ma) De release: " or tae -sa::: Tne ::r : -ea - e ; following a Design Basis A::1cen- QBU . average air temperature is ilm1te: curing norma 1r t ~ e :ce a:: a:
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to creserve tne initial con 01tions assume: .-ce analyses for a Loss of Coolant Acc1 cent u.C: ' c 5 tea Break (SLB). The containment average air temperature limi: 1s ce-ne: from the input concitions usec in tne containment func; ion'a' analyses and tne containment structure external pressure analyses. This LCO ensures tnat initial concitions assume: in tne analysis of containment response to a DBA are nt; violatec curing unit operations. The total amount o' energy to ce removec from containment Dy tne Containment Scra) anc l Cooling Systems during cost acclaent concitions is aecencen; upon tne energy releasea to tne containment aue to tne event. as well as the initial containment temperatu-e ana pressure. The higner tne initial temperature. the more pd energy tnat must ce removec. resulting in nigner peak Exceeding containment containment pressure ano temperature. I cesign pressure may result in leakage greater than that assumec in tne acciaent analysis. Operation witn I containment temperature in excess of.the LCO limit violates an 1mtlal condition assumed in the acclaent analysis. APPLICABLE Containment average air temperature is an initial condition used in tne DBA analyses and 15 an important consideration SAFETY ANALYSES in establishin:: tne containment environmental cualification operating envelope for born pressure and temperature. Tne limit for containment average air temperature ensures that operation is maintained within the assumptions used in the DBA analyses for containment (Ref. 1). i B 3.6.5 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A ( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 N e---m- _
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OPERABILITY are tne LOCA anc SLB. Tne DBA LOC: an: 5;E a e analyzed using computer coces aesignea to creal t tne resultant containment pressure transients. No two DBAs a e assumed to occur simultaneously or conse:utivel.s. ine postulated DBAs are analyzed witn regara to Enginee e: Safety Feature (ESF) Systems, assuming tne loss of one ES: bus, whicn 1s the worst case single active failure. l resulting in one train each of the Containment Sorav Syster Residual Heat Removal System and Containment Coollno system
~ ~
being renaered inoperable. , 1 The limiting DBA for the maximum peak containment air temperature is an SLB. The initial containment average air temperature assumed in tne design basis analyses (Ref. 1) 1s i 120*F. This resulted in a maximum containment air i temperature of 319.7'F. The design temperature of the ! containment structure is 280*F. The maximum peak I containment air temperature was calculated to exceed the ; containment design temperature.for only a few seconds during ) l the transient. Thermal analyses showed that the time interval during which the containment air-temperature exceeded the containment design temperature was short enouch that the containment temperatures remained below the desigii (] temperature. The basis of the containment design V temperature, however. 1s to ensure the performance of safet~y related equipment inside containment (Ref. 2). Therefore. it is concluded that the calculated transient containment air temperature is acceptable for the DBA SLB. l The containment average air temperature limit is also used I to establish the environmental qualification operating l envelope for containment. The temperature limit is also used in the depressurization analyses to ensure that the minircum pressure limit is maintained following an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System (Ref. 1). O 8va0u - uu1TS 1 s 2 B 3.e.s -2 B,13,9B Rev,s,on a
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- w ini:1ai air mass in cen:a'nme.: an:. Tne :ne-e':-e : : :.: : -~ ;
int:ial containmer; air :emperatu-e. : i : es - r.: e - . estaclisnin: tne maximum osax ::r.:a nrer: is a LO:A. -Tne temoerature liri: 's use: " :ris : 3 -
- o ensure :na: in tne internal even: c' pressure ar a::::en:
v.11', :ne mac nc: ce exceece:. con:alnmen: ! Containmen: average air temperature satis'les C-ite cr : 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). t LCO During a DBA. with an initial containment averace air temperature less tnan or equal to.tne LCO temperature 1:r : tne resultant peak accident temperature is maintainec celow ; tne evaluated containment temperatures. As a result. tne ; ability of containment to perform its design fun :1on is ; ensurec.
- PDLICABI_:TY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of r radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the
\ probability and ccnsequences of tnese events are reduceo cue to tne pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Tnerefore. maintaining containment average air temperature
-within the limit is not required in MODES 5 or 6.
ACTIONS A1 When containment average air temperature is not within the limit of the LCO. it must be restored to within limit within 8 hours. This Reoulred Action is necessary to return i operation to within tne bounds of the containment analysis. The 8 hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the sensitivity of the analysis to variations in this parameter and provides sufficient time to correct minor problems. a 83.6.5-3 6/13/98 Revision A BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2
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recu1 rec uni: con:1!1ons from *u- Dowe" C000'0"i ?" or erly manne" anC Without Cna'lenging Dian~ sys~e 5 dmup a. ; 11. . _ _I ,* pw
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- ne LCC lim 1 ensures Inat containmen coera:1cr ema'ns 61:nin tne 11m1: assumed for tne containmen: analyses. Ir l orcer to cetermine Ine containment average air temperature. !
an ar1:nme:ic average is calculated using measurements taxer. a: icca:1ons within Ine containment selectec to provice e conservative es:1 mate of tne overall containment atmospnere (e.g. tne a"y Dulo inlet temperature of the runnina reac cr ()N (. con:alnment fan coolers). Tne 24 nour Freauency of':nis SR 's consloered acceDiable basec on ODserve: slow rates of 4 temperature increase w1:nin containment as a result of , environmental nea; sources (due to the larae volume of I con 51nment). Furtnermore. tne 24 hour Frecuency is conslaerec adeauate in view of other indications available ir :ne con:rol room to alert tne operator to an aDnormal containment temDerature conaltion. n:r:nt- - - - L- - -:a .. U- 2,_.n de::1on o._,. 1
- 2. 10 C R'50 49. l 1
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\m / BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.5 - 4 9/1/98 Revision A i i
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cr.:a v,mer.t r -a. anc .:: - ': , .m 3 3.i : ',~4:fP'U.~ 3 3~E"2 Eiff ;cr,tainmer,: 5::-a.s anc Ecciar.; Sys:ers ~ BASE 3 BACKGROUND Tne Containment Spray and Containment Cooling Sys:e. , provice containment atmospnere cooling Ic nmit ccs: acc1 cent oressure and temperature in containmen: :: less
.than the oesign values. Reouction of containment pressa s and the lodine removal caDability of tne spray recuces :ne release of fission product radioactivity from containmen: ::
the environment. in the event of a Design Basis Acc10en:. (DBA), to within limits. The Containment Spray and Containment Cooling Systems are designed to meet tne requirements of 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 38. "Containmen: j Heat Removal." GDC 39. " Inspection of Containment Heat ! Removal Systems." GDC 40. " Testing of Containment Heat 1 Removal Systems." GDC 41. " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup." GDC 42 " Inspection of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems." and GDC 43. " Testing of Containment Atmospnere Cleanup Systems" (Ref. 1). 1 The Containment Coolino System and Containment Spray System ! are Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems and are discussed in UFSAR. Sections 9.4.8 and 6.5.2. respectivelv
-Q V
(Refs. 2 and 3). They are designed to ensure that the heat
~
removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained. The Containment Spray System in conjunction with the Containment Cooling System limit and gf . ,J maintain post accident conditions to less than the 4. 3 t 8; containment design values. 'In addition. the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System provide an g #! alternate hydrogen control function to the hydrogen pH recombiners. hydrogen mixing during post Loss Of Coolant g @l Accident (LOCA) conditions. i h,) BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 1 8/13/98 Revision J
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i ! :- 3 n-sr- 57r: . C.: - Tne ;cntainmen: So ay S.cs:e :ensis s :' : : se: ara + , 2808:1:y trains. en:r CaOSDie C* mee**r.; ~"e Ces'; :As-: Escr ~#aln incluGes a can:al"~en; 50"a) OJm:. 5:"A. " e~'d- .- nc2:les, valves. anC 0101n9 Eacn tra'n is co..e"f: - seDarste ESF Dus. Tne Refueling wate" S:o" age 'ar( . E.. .;~ suoclies coratec water to tre Containmen: Scray Sys e-curing tne inje: tion onase of operation. In Ine re:1rcula* ion moGe of oDera:lon. Containmen! sDrat OsT.: suction is transferred from tne RWST to tne con;ainmer; sump (s). , I ine Containment Spray System provides a spra) of :01: Dorated water mixec witn sodium hyoroxiae (NaOH) f rom :ne soray additive tank into tne upper regions of containment :c l reduce tne containment pressure and temperature anc tc reauce fission croducts from Ine containment atmosonere auring a DBA. Tne RWST solution temperature is an importan i t factor in aetermining tne heat removal capability cf tne Containment Spray System during the injection onase. In :ne recirculation mode of operation. heat is removec from tne i ontainment sump water by tne reslaual heat removal neat l / excnangers. Eacn train of the Containment Spray System c provices aaeauate spray coverage to meet the system aesign i recu1rements fo- containment neat removal. 1 l j Tne Spray Additive System injects an Na0H solution into the spray. Tne resulting alkaline pH of the spray ennances the ! aD111ty of tne spray to scavenge fission products from the containment atmospnere. The NaOH added in the spray alsc ensures an aikaline pH for the solution recirculated in the containment sumo. The pH band of the containment sump water minimizes the evolution of lodine wnile minimizing the occurrence Gf chloride and caust1C stress corrosion on mecnanical systems and components exposed to the fluid. The ' cnemical aspects of loaine removal capaollity are addressed in LCO 3.6.7. " Spray Additive System." l-l i i 4 ! I i
/g BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A l
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3C .31.?.~. -::C9 3 Tne :cr ainment 5:"a3 Syste- s 5:t 5:e: e : e" automa 1: ally o) a con' E' n~e9~. -1;"-3 0'e5sJ"e 5~?"5 2" J manually. Or au'Oma'12,a^'.Ja~10" 009"I ~79 "~5'"~9"' stray oJm: Cistnarge Valve 5. s!a"~5 I' :^ 22"~a'"~9"' ' scrav oum?s. an: D9;105 *n9 1Pje:'*0" 0"ase ~ a : a:!LE11Cr C ine 20ntalnmen: 3:'"Ey Syste- "e:s1"ei '"; opera *Cr to actuate two separate sn1*:nes o" tne ~5 ) i CCntrol DoarC to Degin tne same secuen:e. Ine tr;e: :" 1 onase continues until an RWST t0-3 alarm is rece".e: an: Ine operator l moce. Tne Containment Soray System in1:ne rci re: :0-manually alil l moce maintains an ecuillorium temperature cetweer :.ne containment atmosonere and tne recirculate: sume wa:e-Doeration of tne Containment Spray System in :ne re:1rculation mode is controllec by tne operato" 'r accoraance witn the emergency operating procecuret. Certainmer* Co 9 nc Svste-Two trains of containment cooling. eacn of sufficient capacity to sucoly 100% of tne aesign cooling recu1remen:. are prov10ed. Eacn train consistina of two Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (RCFCs) 1s 5upplied witn cooling p water from a separate train of Essential Service Water (SX) Q and is powerea from a separate ESF Dus. During all operating conditions air is arawn from the uoper vo,lume o: . tne containment approximately 50 feet above tne operating floor Dy a return air riser (one riser for each RCFC unit). Tne return air is then routed throuch the $X cool 1nc coils. the Cn111ed Water (WO) cooling colli, and the fan aild discharce duct (one for each RCFC unit). Tne RCFC alsenarges directly into Ine lower containment volume. Tne WO cniller unit condensers ar< served by the SX return i from tne RCFC SX cooling coils. Upon receipt of an ESF ! signal. the WO concensers are automatically isolated from SX. Containment Cooling System train A consists of RCFC A and C. and train B cons?.sts of RCFC B and D. 1 4 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6- 3 6/13/98 Revision A
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l V B CKGROUC icon:1nue:F Durin normal operatior.. :ne fans are coerste; a: *..: n eer with $X suppliec to tne coo 11nc colis. Tne Conia'nxi-: Cooling System 1s cesigneo to nmit tne amolen: :cr.:3 r e - l air temperature curing normal unit opera:1on te less : .a-
-tne limit specified in LCO 3.6.5. "Containmen: A4 -
Temperature." This temperature 11mita:1on ensures :na: : .e containment' temperature-does not exceed the ini:1al temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs. l I In post accident operation following an actuation slanal. the Containment Cooling System fans are designed to itar: ! automatically in slow speed if not already running. If running in hign (normal) speed. the fans automatically shif: to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent adverse fan conditions
- (e.g. motor overload. increased blade stresses-) from the higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the SX 15 an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units.
l APPLICABLE: The Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System , SAFETY ANALYSES limit the temperature and pressure that could be experienced i f] V following a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the LOCA 'l and the Steam Line Break (SLB). The LOCA and SLB ar.e analyzed using computer codes _ designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. l No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF bus. which is the worst case single active failure and results in one train of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable. l 10 U B 3.6.6- 4 8/13/98 Revision J BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2
' Containment'5 ora.y an: ,::, " ?. ,'
3A3E3 z 7; _ LE - - AcP ICAELE SAFE Y ANALYSE 5-(continueci l Tne analysis and evaluation snov, tnat unoer tne w -s casi $ scenarlo. the h1gnest peak containment pressure is r J 05 : j " for Unit I and 44.4.psig for Unit 2 (experiente: cu-in; E l-LOCA). The analysis shows that the peak containmen - B tr j' temperature is 319.7'F (experienced during an SLB; esults meet the intent of the des 1gn basis. (See Ine Bases
'or LCO 3.6.4. " Containment Pressure." and LCO 3.6.5 for a cetailed discussion.) .The analyses and' evaluations assume ~a unit specific power level of 3579 MWt. one containment spra.s train and one containment' cooling train operating. and-iritial (pre-accident) containment conditions of 120'F ana 0.3 psig. Evaluations were performed that showed-1f the imtial pressure was raised to 1 psig the maximum peak pressure would be 47.8 psig for Unit 1 and 44.4 psig for Unit 2. The analyses also assume a response time delayed ini-iation to provide conservative peak calculated
- containment pressure and. temperature responses. s 1
For certain aspects of transient accident analyses'. 1 maximizing the calculated containment' pressure is not J conservative. 'In particular. the effectiveness of the Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood phase of'a-LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations. the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to
\- conservatively minimize. rather than maximize. the calculated transient containment pressures-in accordance with 10 CFR'50. Appendix K (Ref. 4).
I The effe:t of'an inadvertent containment spray actuation has been analyzed. An' inadvertent spray actuation results in a
-3.48 psig containment pressure and is associated with the-sudden cooling effect in the interior of the leak tight i containment. Additional discussion is provided in the Bases 1 for LC0 3.6.4.
The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment analysis is based on a response t1me associated with exceeding the containment High-3 pressure setpoint to ' achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles. The Containment spray System total response time of 58 seconds includes Diesel Generator (DG) startup (for loss of offsite power), sequencing of equipment containment spray pump startup, and spray line filling (Ref. 5).. l l B 3.6.6- 5 8/13/98 Revision J BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 y -ms-4 -.- t w rm - =-=r -- N * * - -
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con: Sinner am:1er. Conc 1 lon5. "eCulre: .: re :- : + l a Cicen analyses. is alsc snowr 1r Reference - Tne mocelec Containment Cooling System 3 :ua:1cr "::e containmen analysis is Dase0 UDon a resDonse ~1re l assc:1ated witn exceeding :ne containmen: P1g -3 : ess,.re ' setcoln: to acnievanc full Containmen Ccci1ng Sys:e a'- anc safety grace cooling water flow. Tne Con alnme : Cooiin? System total response :1me of 40 seconas. r:: aces signal aetay. DG startuo :fo" loss of offsite cone ' an: service water cumo startuo times (Ref. 5) Tne Containmen: Soray System and tne Containmen: Co:11ng System satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36tcH2 n n
;CD During a DBA. a minimum of one containment cooling train anc cne containment spray train are reau1 red to maintain the
('_N
\~l containment peak pressure and temperature celow tne design limits (Ref 7). Additionally. one containment spray train is also required to remove lodine from ne containment l atmosonere anc maintain concentrations beicw those assumed in tne safety analysis. To ensure that these reau1rements !
are met. two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains must be OPERABLE. Tne chemical aspects of lodine removal caDability are addressed in LCO 3.6 3 Therefore. in the event of an acclaent, at least one train in eacn system operates. assuming the worst case single active failure occurs. Eacn Containment Spray System incluaes a spray pump. spray neacers. noz:les. valves, piping. Instruments. ano controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump. I A (, BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 6 4 6/13/98 Revision A
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Eacr [or..alnmen: 2 0' ' # "; Sy5 e- '#.C'J"j! :: ' '"; :: camoe"s. fans. 'ns.# uter 5. an : "** 5 *, : e"5J + 5~ 00 ERA 3 E # ion ca!n-i??.ICASIL:TY In MODES '_. 2. 3. anc 4. a DBA coulc cause a re' esse :^ racloactive material to cor.tainment ano an increase - containment pressure anc temperature reau1 ring :ne cre a-of ne containment spray trains anc containmen ::cn; trains. In MODES 5 anc 6 tne probabillt) and consecuences O' :nese events are reduced due to Ine pressure and temoerature limitations of tnese MODES. Thus, tne Containmen: Seras System and the Containment Cooling System are not reaul' rec to De OPERABLE in MODES'5 and 6. ACTIONS f_1 With one containment spray train inoperable, the inoperable O d containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERCLE spray and cooling trains are aceauate to perform the loaine removal and containment cooling functions, The 7. day : Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat i removal caoaD111ty afforded by the Containment Spray System. reasonaDie time for repairs. and low probability of a DBA occurring curing nis perloc. The 14 aay portion of the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 15 Dased upon engineering judgment. It takes into account ne low probability of coincident entry into two Concitions in inis Specification coupled with the low 1 i proDa0111ty of.an acc10ent occurring during this time. Refer to Section 1.3. " Completion Times." for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet tne LC0" portion of the Completion Time. l BYRON - UNITS 1.& 2 B 3.6.6 - 7 6/13/98 Revision A j
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- c 0 ERABLE status v,1:nin :ne recaire: :cm: e- : - - -
un mus.-os c cugr.: :: a CDE in wnl r :ne .:: ::ei -- acciy. it a:rleve Inis status. :ne uni: mus; ce : :..:-- - , at leas: MDDE 3 v.1:nin 6 nours an: to MDDE 5 v.1:r'- l 84 nours. Tne allowed Comole:1on Time of 6 nou s 5 reasonacie. Dase: on operating experience. Ic rea:- C:E : from full power conditions in an orderly manne- an: <, : . ,- cnallenaing plant systems. Tne extencec interva: :: ea:" MODE 5 illows aaditional time for attempt 1n restora:1er :- the containment soray train and is reasonaole wner l consicering tne driving force for a release of racica :: te ! material from tne Reactor Coolant System is reduce: 1r MODE 3. C1 , l With one or more of the containment coolina trains ' inoperable. ne inoperable containment cooling traintsi mus: be restored to OPERABLE status witnin 7 days. The OPERABLE components in Inis degraced cona1 tion provice lodine remosal
, cacao 111tles anc provide a redundant cooling system for neat removal needs. The 7 day Completion Time was aevelopeo
. taking into account the neat removal capabilities afforced by ne Containment Spray System and the low probability of DBA occurring curing this period. The 14 aay por:1on of the Completion Time for Reouired j Action C.1 1s based uoon engineering judgment. It takes into account tne low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low i probability of an accident occurring during this time. Refer to Section 1.3..f.or a more detailed discussion of tne purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LC0" portion of tne Comoletion Time. (V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 8 6/13/98 Revision A
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- en;1 tion C C# 101s LCU 8"e U ! me~. INe U"'I ~ II Tf~~
a::'s crouan: to a MODE in wn1:n tne L:: coes n : fi3' a n Eve In1s s~atus. the un1! mJs~ ce o#oJgr* ~C SI ~~r MODE 3 witnin 6 nours anc t0 MODE 5 witn1r 36 cre ".ca-s a--" allowed Comple lon Times are reasonacie. case; cr . experience, to reach the recuire un10 conc m o#5 ' cr powe- concitions in an orceriy manner anc C !nou! cnallenging plant systems. G Witn two containment spray trains or any como1 nation c' t Inree or more containment spray and cooling trains 1 cent inocerable analysis. the unit 15 in a condition outslae tn 3 I I l SURVEILLANCE SC 3661 REQUI;.iMEC3 Verifying tne correct alignment for manual . power operated. and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provices assurance that the proper flow Tnis paths SR does willnot exist apply for Containment Spray System operation. to valves'that are locked. sealed or otherwise secured in pos1:1on since these were ver1 fled to be in the correct This position prior to locking sealing. or securing. SR does not recuire any testing or valve manipulation. ; Ratner. it involves verification. tnrough a system walkdown. tnat tnose valves outside containment (only check valves are , insioe conta'nment) and capable of potentially being l misoositionec are in the correct position. l l l l /N O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 9 6/13/98 Revision A l 4
;;r,3+ g-, 5:"3 3": : : '
p 7. - = .
- j. %
- : . :. . 1... :.::-....
. 7::v:.-:....
.. .-. -e~ . - ..
3: ; ;;- _ l l l Coera1n: ea:r containmer* :::l'n; !"a'" #a" ;"'-
- 3:
sDead fCr 2 10 minu!es ensures :Ca' a ' ~"a'"i a'e .9 M..' an: :na! all asso:1 ate 0 00n!Pcl5 a"e fun!!10n'": " 9" I als ensures Ina! DioCNage, fan c# C0!cr fa'I/f 2" excessive Vioration Can De Gete!!a; for Cor"e !'st a:-' - i Ine 31 Cay Frecuer.Cy Was CeveloDe0 Cons 10e"19; ~"e (" .- l reilac-11t~v of tne fan units anc controis. :ne ta: : " .= - recuncancy available. and tne low proDao111:3 c' s1 " :ar-l cecracation of :ne containmen: coo.11nc train o::u-in: , cetween surveillances. It has also Deen snown :; 09 ~ acceotaole tnrougn opera:1nc experience. 5: 3663 Verifvina that eacn containment coollnc train SX cochac l flow rate to eacn cooling unit is a 2660 gpm provices ' l l assurance ina: Ine cesign flow rate assumed in :ne safe:3 ! analyses will be achievea. The Frequency was develocec conslaering tne known reliability of the SX System :ne two train reduncancy available. and the low probabilly of a 3
- STanificant aearacation of flow occurrina Detween
~
~
l l surveil 1 antes.
$? 7 A 6 .: )
Verify 1,0 eacn containment spray pump's aeveloped head at , Inc flow test point is greater than or equal to the reau1 red l GeveloDed neac ensures that spray pump performance has not cegracea curing the cycle. Flow and differratlai pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by SECTION XI of tne ASME Code (Ref. 8). Since the containment spray Dumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray neacers. they are tested on recirculation flow. This test i confirms one point on the cump design curve and is j inoicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY trend performance. and detect incipient failures by abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR 15 in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6,6 - 10 6/13/98 Revision A
.w, -
-m-e r- --
- ';3 e"- 3 "5 n"'.. !
1
. ::.. .. :.:r: .-- . < :-
$: ze- 3:
Iness SR$ '9 J1re ve #1 5 10" trs* SS:" 5,*:r5: :
- or 31nmer. 50"ay valve a:!uS~es !! 1*.3 : ##60' :: -
' r.3: este co# 51nTen* s0'a) Dum s!a "~. 5 LO " "i f'C' 8:tLi c- simuiste; actua 1Cr 0 5 Cor.~31Cmer' F ' ;' ~ - 3 Cressure slan51. Inis Surveillance 's n : re:L' e: #"
Valves ;na!'are locked, seale . o# CinerW1se se:u's: -" - re aire: cositicn uncer aaministra 1ve controis. 7"e 15 montn Frecuency is base on tne nee: te cerform : ness Surveillances unaer the conal 1ons Inat acoiy cu-1r; 3 ur" outage anc tne ootential for an unplannea transier.: :ne Surveillances were performea witn Ine reactor at cov.er Operating excerlence nas snown tna; tnese componen s usua. Dass tne Survelliances wnen performed at the IS man:r Freauency. Tnerefore. the Freauency was concluce: :0 ce acceptacle from a reliability stanaccin:. Tne surveillance of containment sump 1 solation valves is also recuirea oy SR 3.5.2.5. A single surveillance may De used to satisfy both requirements. 5: 366-Tnis SR reau1res verification that eacn containment toolina train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulatea safety injection signal. Tne 18 month Frecuency is based on engineering juagment anc nas been shown to De - acceptable tnrougn operating experience. See SR 3.6.6.5 anc SR 3.6.6.6. above. for furtner ciscussion of the basis for tne.18 month Freauency. 50 3668 W1th the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray heacer crained of any solution. low pressure air or smoke can be blown througn test connections. Tnis SR ensures that eacn spray nozzle is unobstructed ano provides assurance tnat spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle. a test at 10 year intervals is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. k-- BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3. 6. 6 -- 11 6/13/98 Revision A
.. . c.
in ::-:- s -. -.
- c-..- ;r c.. c. .
- . .. c ,. .. - . c.. .
1:::::. w . . C a. . . 3 cr G. . ' . .: n:3-- .:. . :...- .1 e r. . .... s. n ..-rn
.. n o t. A,ccendix L.
- . U_rs _. , n ., qe::1on e.t.;.,..o.
- 6. U 5AR. Se::1on 6.2.2.
s
-dA,n. Se::1on o.:.
- 8. ASME. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Coce. SE TION X:
r'~s
- A
'A s
B 3.6.6 - 12 6/13/98 Revision A BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 i
r ra A:: T .i,: :e- ,
\
?~3.i 2.7:.1HHit? SYi'i5 5 3.6.~ 5:ra.s A::1 1ve System BASES BACKGROUND Tne Spray Additive System is a subsystem of the Cc".tain er:
Soray System tnat assists in reducing tne iocine f1ssler proauct inventory in the containment atmorphere resul:1n: from a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and.1s descr10e: in U SAR f i Section 6.5.2 (Ref.1). Radiciodine in its various forms is.the fission product of ! primary concern in the evaluation of a DBA. It is adsorbed l by the spray from the containment atmosphere. To ennance ! the iodine absorption capacity of the spray. the spray ! solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH that promotes loaine i hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile l forms. Because of its stability when exposed to radiation I and elevated temperature. sodium hydrox1de (NaOH) 15 the preferred spray additive. The Na0H added to the spray also ensures an equilibrium sump pH value of a 8.0 and s 11.0 of the solution recirculated from the containment sump. This . pH band minimizes tne evolution of iodine, while minimizing ! the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on ' mechanical systems and components. ( The Spray Additive System consists of one spray additive tank that is shared by the two trains of spray additive equipment. Each train of equipment provides a flow path from the spray additive tank to a containment spray pump and consists of an eductor for each containment spray pump. valves, instrumentation. and connecting piping. Each eductor draws the NaOH spray solution from the common tank j using a portion of the borated water discharged by the A containment spray pump as the motive flow. The eductor j mixes the'NaOH solution and the borated water and discharges
.A the mixture into the spray pump suction line. The eductors w are designed to ensure that the pH of the spray mixture is E between 8.5 and 12.8.
'(g 3 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 1 8/13/98 Revision J
=
5:"b- -:: '
, .u
- ~ i .~ i.3 0. JT. . "!'rse:.
Tne C n 8795e".- 5 #a) Sys s~ a:! a. " s ;"a :"r *- valves fro" Ine stray 2;;' 1V9 :ans .: ;re 9:..::
'CS3191/5'. Ine Ciscnargs salve
- "e e:u::Or -"-- - + l_
Cum: C15CarQ9 (C3C'04'3' n: s "s a t s e" a ' !. - " ? isola *1on Valve in;o con.alnmen- ( 500'i E ' ' " 2 ::- - 'c - star:1n Ine C5 oumDs. Tne 30% c 364 Na0- solu- :- : crawn into Ine soray pumo su :1ons. Tne soray a;: - si r-caDa .1;v provices for ~tne add 1!1on of NaDr scia:1er :: a of :ne " water sprayed from tne Refueling nater 5: ra:e a"s (RWST) into containment. Tne cercen solution an: i::u 9 :- solution sorayec into containment ensures a long terr containment sumo pH of a 8.0 anc 5 11.0. Tnis ensures :ne continuec locine retention effectiveness of tne sum: v.5: e- 1 curing Ine retirculation onase of spray opera: Ton an: als: j minimizes the occurrence of chlorloe induced stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel re 1rcula:1on piping. I 1 l 1 APPLICABLE The Soray Additive System 1s essential to the removal o' SA~ETY ANALYSES airoorne lodine within containment following a DBA. l Following tne assumed release of radioactive materials into ! s containment. tne containment is assumed to leak at its l cesian value volume followina the accident. The analysis ~ 1 assumes that 100% of containment is covered oy the spray ) (Ref. 2L The DBA response time assumed for the Spray Additive System 15 ine same as for the Containment Spray System and is discussed in tne Bases for LCO 3.6.6. " Containment Soray and Cooling Systems." The DBA analyses assume that one train of the Containment Spray System / Spray Additive System 15 inoperable and that tne entire spray adultive tank volume is added to the remaining Containment Spray System flow path. The Spray Additive System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(11). i i (~ BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A
- ~ - - .. . - - - _ _ - . - . . - . - , - - . . - - - . - . _ _ . - . . . . . -
~ 30 3 _;-* 2
,;; .e 50 ay ic ~~,'e 5f5,9- 'I "e29553'- !! "9 !i ~"f 't -
C "acioa:!'>Ve ma!e'ia I: IPs e#, 2" 9"~ - I"9 9 9"~ D31 TO De Cor.s1Ce#e: 00 ERA 3-E. ~na . '.u~e a"
;cn en:ra 1C" C ne sDre) 31'1 \ e s C l u*. " ' ~ .5: 29 sJf#101en! !O CFCV1ce ha3- 1"290!'0' 'PI I" 30'3- - -
ur,- Ine Co".;ainment Sora) System su:!' " 03:" ': 5.'12"f7 from tne RW5T ;c ne containmer sum:. an :: ra se - + average spray solu:1on pH to a leve: conc.:1ve :: ':: re removal namely. Io a 8.0 anc s 11.C. Tnis o- range maximizes tne effectiveness of tne lodine remosa' me:na s-witnout introaucing canaltions tna; may incuce caus:': stress corrosion cracking of me:nanical system comroner:s In acal lon. it is essential inat vaives in tne Scray Aca1tive System flow patns are orocerly positione; anc :na: automatic valves are capaDie of activa 1ng to tne, corre:: ; cositicns. : i A:P_ICAEI'ITY _ In MODES 1. 2. 3. anc 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment recu1 ring tne opera:1on of tne Soray Auditive System. Tne Spray Additive System - assists in reducing the lodine fission product inventory , Crior to release to the environment. O k -) In MODES 5 and 6. tne probability and consequences of tnese events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in tnese MODES. Thus, the Spray Auditive System is not requirec to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 or 6. ACTIONS s_1 If the Soray Additive System 1s inoperable. it must be restorec to OPERABLE within 7 aays. The pH adjustment of tne Containment Soray System flow for corrosion protection ano locine removal ennancement is reduced in this condition. Tne Containment Soray System would still be available and would remove some lodine from the containment atmosphere in the event of a DBA. Tne 7 day Completion Time takes into account the reduncant flow path capabilities and the low - probability of the worst case DBA occurring during this period. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A
, ,. - - - - - . . - , -g
i: : : .- ' - ' . - () g
-~~..+...,..,.s..
- _ _ 2r.
~~
*ne 50-ay AC*1~.1Ve Sys~er carr De_res : e: ; :[:;3,.
s!a!us witn'" Ine re0J're" Co Cle 10" ' me . - e ; - . - - - Drougn* *. a M30E in wn1Cr ; e .2: 009s n arr', ~- 3 n' eve ~nis sta*.us. Ine u.1 mas: De ougn; ::'a. 'sa5+ MODE 3 witnin 6 nours an c MODE 5 wi rir 52 ; 5 , allowe0 ComDie*1on Time of 6 n0urs 15 reasona; e_ case: r opera 1ng experience. tc reacr MODE 3 from ful'. 00ne-conal ions in ar orderly manner and witncut cnallenc'n: - Diant systems. Tne extencea interval to reacn MDDE 5 i: .c.: ,. accl:1onal time for attempting res' oration of Ine So as Additive System and is reasonable wnen conslae-in: :ne' or1ving force for a release of radioactive materlii fro- - e Peactor Coolant System is recurec in MODE 3. SURVEILLAN:E S ?A- 1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying tne correct alignment of Soray Additive System manual an automatic valves in tne spray additive flow patn provices assurance that tne system is able to provice g- s accitive to the Containment Soray System in the event of a (- ) DBA. This SR aces not apply to valves that are lockec. sealed. or otnerwise secured in position. Since tnese valves were ver1 fled to be in tne correct cosition prior to locking. sealing. or securing. This SR coes not require any testing or valve manipulation. Ratner. 1 involves verification. tnrougn a system walkoown. that those valves outslae containmen* and capable of potentially being miscositioned are in tne correct position. l I t l l l l l (O,/ BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3. 6.7 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
. . ~ . . ~ . - . ~.-_-.- - ..~. ~.- - . .- ~ - . _ _ .. - _ -. . _ - - . .
l
-~ :.
. . :. . . 1.. . :. . :: . . . . .
- .v :..e .. . .-+.....
~ 3: ;: T: ovice e##s tive ic:1re remosa' :"e :: :a'r e" :. . mus ce ar alAaline solL;10r # 3'nze ~".e E..3~ : "le" - - n:rmaliv a:1:1;. t"e Volu~e C Ire s0ra.s a:~'~.'\f *.a ." ~" - OroV10e'a suf#1~1e#~ volume o# S0ra.s a;;'*.ive ~: a:l for all wate" inje:ted. Ints SR is ce# forme ~ I: .e"' . *"- availari it'y c# suff1Clen! Na0r. solu *1or 1r ~ne 30"a. l AC01:1ve System. Ine 164 Gay Crecuency was Ceve'00e; Ca3e: on tne low procacility of an uncetected cnange ir ans volume c: Curring curing tne SR interval (ine ans s 1solatec curing normal. unit ooerations). Tans lete~ s a's: incicatec anc alarmed in the control room, so tna. Inere : nign conficence that a substantial change in level we,.1: Ce cetected. ; SR 3' 3 r Tnis SR provices ver fication of the NaOH concentratior 'r tne scray accitive tank and 15 sufficient to ensure tnat :ne SDray solution De1ng injected into Containment is at the correct pH level. Tne 184 day Frecuency is sufficient to ensure tnat tne concentration level of NaOH in the scrat accitive tank remains within the establishec limits. This
\- 1s Dasea on tne low likelihood of an uncontrollea cnanae in concentration (the tank is normally isolated) and tne '
prooability inat any substantial variance in tank volume will De detecteG. SP 36 4 Tnis SR prov1aes verification that each automatic valve in the Spray Adc1tive System flow path actuates to its correct position. -Tnis Surveillance is not reauired for valves that are locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in the reau1 red Dosition under aaministrative controls. The 18 montn Frecuency is Dased on the need to perform this Surveillance under the cono1tions tnat apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance wnen performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore. the Freauency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability stancooint. N 4
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 5 6/13/98 Revision A
i , .: .- .c. _.--. 1 e~s
/
7: :- . . < . . . ...
'\ . .... 1... : .....
- - ::r:.
. . ". s
. . 'u " . * . rt: . . ",2 -**"c..-. a. - ~ s::. ' ' . - c. .: . .: -.'.-~;.-..-
1
-u.e r. a . a. .- v. .: .c. r sn.iu. lor ""ovio:- . .. "'. *.";. .^"..:'"*." .'".~~
^
dv.e..... . n. . =. e l o^ ". c' *.:. 1 r *. *. i:. E a. ": t 1.---. s:. E. .s .t . . - t i
\,'c.r e. , o. -. on w a. c. u. e. r..v .;. y e. a " Cin
. . . .'....t .E E ". " .'. ' ' . .: ..'..":"'=.
- na: n= corre- amount of NaOH v. l' o= me.ere:
.: "+
flov. Da*n 1r ea n CS train uoan Containmen! $r"ay 5.,5:=~ ini:1a:1on. Due to tne cassive nature of :ne sc"ay a;:-- .= flov. controls. tne 5 vear Frecuency is suf'acient :: icentify comoonent cegracation ina; ma,s affe:: 'i on "a:e
--< , Ur -dan. .qe :1on c.c.c,.
--- R NLtd n.: . ..
- 2. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
3 x 4 1 I I 1 1 l m k BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 6 6/13/98 - Revision A
.:"::+ ~::'-
v E '.f.E -v ::e Re: m:'ce'I
~
3ASE3 5' KGRO'JfC Tne fur. tior c' ne nya ope- re :.rine s '.s : e- a: - 0 en 1al Drea r Of containmer! cue *. a ryc Ope" :s s ge-rea tlon. Per 10 CFR 5C.J; . "Stancaras for Comous!1 ole Gas ::-:-:' Systems 1r Lign!-Water-Coole Reactors" (Ref an: . GDC 41. " Containment Atmosonere Cleanuc" (Ref I' ny: cger recomoiners are recu1 red to reauce tne nyarogen concentration in tne containment following a Loss O' Cc:'.a - Acc1 cent (LO'A) or Steam Line Break (SLB). Tne recomrine s accomplisn tnis by recomolning hyorogen anc oxygen !c ferr water vapor. Tne vapor remains in containment. Inus elimina:1ng any alscharge to tne environment. Tne nva ocer recomciners are manually initiated since flammable l'imits wcula not os reatnec until several days after a Deslan Basis Acclaent (DBA). Two 100% capa:'ty indepenaent nyarogen recomoiner systems are crovided ano snarec between the units. Eacn consists of q controls located in tne auxiliary building. a power supply anc a recomoiner. Recomo1 nation is accomplished by heating a nyarogen air mixture to 1325'F. The resulting water vapor anc ciscnarge gases are cooled prior to discharge.from tne recomoiner. A single recombiner is capable of maintaining tne nyarogen concentration in containment below the 4.1 volume percent (v/o) flammability limit . Two recomolners are prov10ea to meet the requirement for reaunaancy anc inaecenaence. Each recomDiner is powered from a separate Engineerea Safety Features bus. ano 1s provioed witn a separate power panel and control panel. Tne hyurogen recomolners are cesCrlbed in UFSAR. Section 6.2.5 (Ref. 31. O)' ( BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
_ _ . _ _ .__ _ ..~.____._m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ .
.:~:;e --
I
)
==_:::E_E
. -ne e.:-=e- -e:::: re : : :. :e <c - e :a:a: - -
5:.:E- 1,N:. (5Ei contrillir.: tr.e :.it w -::e- ::r:e-t a: : - :: :a - e - l
- -
- : less *nar tne 1or.e #1amma:19 COP:9 ~ a 2" ! - .
f ollor.1n: a DBA. In15 Cr.- 01 wDsi: ;"es er a 27- 3 --:~ v.1ce n/chc er. Dur" *"u$ ensu-in: *.re 0 95sJ e a :
~
~9mDera urE assume: 1r tne analyses 3 e n: es:eece: %.
lim 1.1ng 03f rela 1ve *C Dy0r0ge genera *10- 15 a . - Hy0rogen may a =utlate ir cor 21nmen- followin; a .: /. : result o#-
- a. A metal steam reaction Detween tne 21rconiu 'se' ::
claccing anc tne reactor cooiant:
- b. Raciolytic decomoosition of water in tne Rea:te-Coolant System (RCS) and the containment sume. i i
- c. Hycrogen in tne RCS at the time of tne LOCA it e. !
nyorogen dissolvec in the reactor coolant anc nycroger l gas in tne pressurizer vapor space): or
- c. Corrosion of metals exposed to containment spra.s anc Emergency Core Cooling System solutions. 1 To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in
^
con ainment following a LOCA. the hyorogen generation as a function of time following the initiation of the accioent is calculated. Conservative assumptions recommended by Reference 4 are used to maximize the amount of nyarogen , calculated. 1 Based on the conservative assumptions used to calculate the nyarogen concentration versus time after a LOCA. the
- hyarogen concentration in tne primary containment would reacn 3.5 v/o about 6 days after the LOCA and 4.0 v/o about l 2 days later if no recomD1ner was functioning (Ref. 3).
Initiating the hydrogen recombiners when the primary containment hydrogen concentration reaches 3.5 v/o will maintain tne hydrogen concentration in tne primary containment below flammability limits.
~
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3,6.8 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A
O i II:
- _:::.E_E 3 :E :J__: EE5 . ::-:- .se:
Tr.e ny:-oge -s::g: re- are :ss ;re: 5.: : a: conse va:'ve n ca::s.a s: ny: :ger gene a- r f a:e.: e :- -- cis:usse: aoove. a singie re:::: ne s ca:3: r, e :: er --
- ne Deat nycrogen concen: a:10- - ::r. a
.: .0 w e (Ref 5:
Tre ny: roger re: mciners sa:isfy :n :e 1or 3 c' 10 C R 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Two nycrogen recomoiners must be OPERAB_E. Tnis e-sures LCD operation of at least one nycrogen retomainer in tne even: , of a wors case single active failure. Operation with a: least one nyorogen recomoiner ensures ina: l tne cost LOCA hydrogen concentration can be p-eventec fron exceecing tne flammability limit. APD:_:CaEILITY In MODES 1 and 2. two hydrogen recomoiners are recu1 rec :: control Ine nyorocen concentration witnin containment below its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o following a LOCA. assuming b-3 a worst case single failure. l l In MODES 3 and 4. both the hyorogen production rate and the total nyorogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that l Also, because of the limited calculated for the DBA LOCA. time in tnese MODES. the probability of an accident reouiring tne nydrogen recombiners is low. Therefore. the nyorogen retomainers are not required in MODE 3 or 4. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consecuences of a LOCA are low. cue to the pressure and temperature limitations in tnese MODES. Therefore hydrogen recombiners are not reau1 rec in these MODES. l l f B 3.6.8 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2
i l l 1 1 1 i q .....
) ~.
(V . . . . . . 1
. . . .' O .- l
- e, y .e -. - s. e #:-~~~.e:s
. . . . ~ .
~e.--:.<.._.
- y. . . r,> m.e. . . 2. , n7. . e - .:.
9r.:. . , .. r, re r e. ..:... - r - .- ....... r.v .
- s. e.e.n.a.-e
- c. c , . e s. .-v+u.. i n.a. m. .
,.>....r. 1.t . a.v:.
'. *n1.- .s..- - - ' . - - .-":.. = . ~ . - ' ' ^ , -
';r. :. .
n...v r s: ar., ;- a. . ....' ns.- '. c. a 's. . ~ .-a,._
.. . ,=.
w- . ne ove -eoa:' -- contro Tun: lor nowever 3:ER;E.E e:: -
-ecute: ce:ause e single fa'iu-e in :ne recute: ny cogen con:ro' capar: ~- .
ouic resui: in1on Time is case: or :ne as.ailar ' -i : : g 3C cay Comois: otner nycrogen re:omainer. :ne smal' ococao :3c':" a .:::
. :ce-o- SLB o::urring (inat woulc generate an amoun:
inat excesos tne flammacility limit). an ne amour- c' i
+
l ava11acie after a LOCA or SLB (snouic one o :u-' fr-ooerator at:1on to preven nyorogen accumula:ior ' rom exceecing ins flammaollity limit. Reauire: A lon A.1 nas been modified 0.1 a Note tr,a: states
-s a tne orovisicns of LCO 3.0.4 are no: applicacie- l result. a MODE cnance is allowed wnen one recomoine- c', 's inoperaole. Tnis allowance is casec on tne avalja:111t) the otner nvorogen recombiner tne small procaolilty ci a l LO~A or $LB' occurring (tna would cenerate an amount of ;
nvcrocen tna exceecs tne flammability limit). anc ine
-'s a' mount of time available after a LOCA or SLB (snoulc Ton on
( ) 00 ur) fo- coerator action to prevent nyorogen accumula: from excee:1ng ine flammaallity limit. l l I l 1 f% i \ As',/ B 3.6.8 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 i l t
. .~ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ - -. . . _ -. _ .__ _ _ .. _ .m .
.:.: -.~
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ci two nvc-ocer re:0mo'ners 'n::e 3:1s. tre 5:- -- - Ce-ferir In's nyc-ogs" cor.- O' Jn-'0 sia a';e-3:9 # CaDa:111.les r'us! De Ver1'ie: D) 8 0-" -'s t ra 1 Ve "f a ' . - - 1 n0U' Ine alte*nate hyC Ogen con.rc' 03Da;11 : e: 3u Drovicec o,s Ine natural ConveC lon Drocesses. C0r!a "~en fan c oler coera lon. containment soray, anc tne 2:s: _:;- Purce System. Tne 1 hour Completion Time Slio(s a reasonaDie perloc of time to verify that a loss cf ny: cge-control function coes not exist. In aca1 tion, tne alterna:e nyarogen control system capaD111ty must De verifisc ence re-12 nours tnereafter to ensure its continued avaliac-11:s ' Both tne initial verification and all suosecuent verifications may be performed as an aaministrative ene:L r, examin1nc logs or otner information to aetermine tne availaD111ty of the alternate hyorocen control system. !! aces not mean to perform the Surveillances neecec to ! cemonstrate OPERABILITY of tne alternate hyarogen control system. If Ine ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintainea, continued operation is permittea with two hyarogen recomD1ners inoperable for up to aays. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two hyarogen recomD1ners to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probabilits cf Ine occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hyorogen in'Ine amounts caDaole of exceeding the flammaD111ty limit.
.C_.1 If.tne inoDerable hyarogen recombiner(s) cannot be restored to OcERABLE status witnin the required Completion Time or the nydrogen control function cannot be maintained. the plant must be Drought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status. the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours. The Completion Time of
.6 hours is reasonable. based on operating experience. to reacn MODE 3 from full power cona1tions in an orderly manner and without cnallenging plant systems.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 5 9/4/98 Revision A 'i
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, l re:om ine# 9".su'es :ne.re:OmO'"9"5 2"9 COe"a**:"3 !"; ;- l St:aln an0 sustain Ine :empe#a:ure ne: essa ,, # " .." ;";;f- i recom:1na:1or.. In Dar:1Cula# tr's SE ve"ei "St "i l minimum nea er sneatn temDera*ure in; eases ;; a '.:.'^7 i s 90 minu:es. After rea:ning 1200*F. tne power s r:" ease: l to maximum Dower for aporoximately .~. minutes an: 2 0. . = "
Ver1 flee to ce a 35 kW. l l Operatin: experience has snown tna tnese compone.:s ussa, ! Dass the Surveillance wnen performed a tne 15 mor:r Frecuency. Tnerefore. tne Frecuency was conciuce: :: De l acceptacle from a reliacility stancoolnt. ! SR 3682 This SR ensures there are no physical problems tha: coulc affe:: retomolner operation. Since tne recomoiners are
-mechanically passive, tney are not suoject to mecnanical i failure. Tne only credible failure involves loss of poner. I blockage of tne internal flow. missile impact. etc. l
( A visual insoettion is sufficient to determine aonormal conaltions-(e.g.. loose wiring or structural connections. l ( l aeoosits of foreign material . etc. ) that could cause such i failures. Tne 18 montn Freauency for this SR was-aevelopec ! consicering tne inclaence of hydrogen recomolners failing tne SR in tne past is low. SP 3683 This SR reau1res performance of a resistance to ground test for each heater phase to ensure that there are no-aetectacle grounds in any heater pnase. This is accomolisnec oy verifying that the resistance to ground for any neater pnase is a 10.000 onms. Tne 18 montn Freauency for this Surveillance was developed considering the incidence of hydrogen recombiners failing tne SR in the past is low.
) BYRON - UNITS 1 &.2 B 3.6.8 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A i
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REQUIRED A TION CONDITION
- Tu-A.1 Restore conta nment ,
A. Containment to OPERABLE status. 1 anoceracle. : J Be in MODE 3. 6 nou-s S.1
- 5. Recu1 red Action anc asso:1atec Completion AND T1me not met.
36 nours B.2 Be in MODE 5. ( SURt!EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENC) SURVEILLANCE ; i i in accordance ; 3R 3.6.:.: Perform reau1 red visual examinations andwith the leakage rate testing except for containment Containment air lock testing. in accoraance with tne Leakage Rate Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Testing Program (continued) i l (*
\v 8/13/98 Revision A 3.6.1 - 1 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2
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i 1 i i 1 l l l l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.1 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A
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2] .::'. A..'W i'. 3 f 3 i'*3 yy (_,/ - 2.6.2 Con:atnmen: ' air Locks LCO 3.6.2 ~ Two containmen: air iocks snall oe 0:ERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3.- and 4. ACTIONS NOTES
- 1. Entry-and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components.
9 2. : Separate Condition entry ~ is allowed for each air-lock. N d 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1'. ul " Containment." when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate. {~ _-- REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
< CONDITION 1
NOTES l A. One or more containment air locks 1. Required Actions Aul. ! with one containment A.2. and A.3 are not air lock door applicable if both doors inoperable, in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.
\
- 2. Entry and exit is j permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air.
locks are inoperable. (continued) O ' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.2 - 1 8/13/98 Revision J m
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\,_. CONDITIOl, REQUIRED ACTI0t. : T' _ E - ' :' ~ ~ "
A. (continued) A.1 Verify the OPERABLE 1 nour coor is closec in tne affected air lock. AND A.2 Lock the OPERABLE 24 hours door closed in tne affected air lock. AND A.3 ---- NOTE Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by aaministrative means. Verify the OPERABLE Once per 31 days < <- s door is locked closed l i O 1 in the affected air i lock, (continued) l l l i ex '( BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 2 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A
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COND: TION REOUIRED A: TION CDt'; E~' J' _ :v. i B. One or more -NOTES- -- containment air. locks 1. Reouired Actions B.1. ! l with containment air B.2 and B.3 are not lock interlock applicable if both doors mechanism inoperable. in the same air lock are , inoperable and l Condition C is entered. l
- 2. Entry and exit of containment is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual. l l - ,
l B.1 Verify an OPERABLE 1 hour door is closed in the i affected air lock. AND l B.2 O b Lock an OPERABLE door closed in the 24 hours I affected air lock. AND l B.3 ----NOTE -- Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means. Verify an OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed in the affected air lock.
- (continued) i BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 2 - 3 8/13/98 Revision A i
t i.
- cnta nre _:;..
- p .: 1045 <:onn nued:
. - (b CONDITION' RE2LIREE A: TION ?:_E'::', ~:". C. One or more C.1 Initiate action to Imme:;a:eh containment air locks evaluate overall inoperable for reasons containment leakage other,than Condition A rate Der LCO 3.6.1. or B. AND C.2 Verify a door is 1 hour closed in the affected air lock. AND C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours - OPERABLE status. D. Reauired Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met, AND s,) . D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours J
/
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 2 - 4 8/13/98 Revision A
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SURVEILLANCE ; E;. E'., 1 I SR 3.6.2.1 NOTES- - - -
- 1. An inocerable air lcck door does not
- l- invalidate the orevious successful l performance of tne overall air lock leakage test.
I 2. Results'shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1. Perform required air lock leakage rate In accordance testing in accordance with the Containment with the Leakage Rate Testing Program. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program l SR 3.6.2.2 Verify only one door in the air lock can be 24 months-opened at a time, f3 V i i. l: f-- I(_ l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.2 - 5 8/13/98 Revision A
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Containmen: :s:!a: : .3' e-3- 3.t C0t.T"IfiMEf;T SYSTEM.5 - l
'g-Containmen: Isola:1on Valves l L: r.I, i LCO3.6.3 Each containment 1 solation valve'shall'De OPERABLE.
9.
'?l'
/$ APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2.:3. and 4.
t , ACTIONS NOTES --
- 1. Penetration flow path (s) except for 48 inch purge valve flow paths 'may be l *,
unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. , 3 '2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path, n; d 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made
;.; inoperable by containment isolation valves.
W -4 g . Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1." Co overall containment leakage rate acceptance _ cri_teria. h CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
~A. NOTE- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closed and
. isolation valves. de-activated automatic or remote manual valve, closed One or more manual valve. blind penetration ' flow paths flange, or check with one containment valve with flow isolation valve through the valve
' inoperable'except for secured. -
. purge valve leakage not within limit. A_ND (continued) i(3 i\~/' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.3 - 1 9/9/98 Revision J
y Containmer.: :s:13- :- .f .f: l
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!: ~ (V9-LCONDITION REOUIRED ACTI0ta COMPLE :2. ~:"E
~
F[A.l(continued)- A.2 -------NOTES - - -
.j. 1. Isolation cevices in-high radiation areas may be.
l . verified by use L- of administrative
-means.
}:.
- 2. Isolation devices
-that are locked.
sealed. or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means. Verify the affected Once per 31 days-penetration flow path .for. isolation is isolated.- devices outside 9 containment u 4 Prior to entering-MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for . isolation devices inside. containment (continued) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6. 3 - 2 9/9/98 Revision J
Containmer.: : scla: :
.5',es
'- :0NS (con ?r.uer CONDITION REOUIRED A TI0t. COM ;E :?. ~:v-B. NOTE B.1 Isolate the affected 1 nour Only applicable to penetration flow path
~
penetration flow paths by use of at least with two containment one closec and isolation valves. de-activated . automatic or remote manual valve. closed l One or more manual valve. or I penetration: flow paths blind flange. ' with'two containment isolation valves inoperable except for purge: valve leakage not within limit. I (continued) O l i i 1 k BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.3 - 3 8/13/98 Revision A
r i Cortainmer.: :s: a: : .g .e: J.: IO'E .:: mus::
-O conotTtoo -outato :::to- ' os= = - -
L C. -- NOTE C.1 Isolate the affected 72 nou s l
- Only applicable to penetration flow patn 1
! penetratun flow paths. by use of at least I with only one one closed and '
. containment isolation de-activated valve and a closeo . automatic or remote system. manual valve. closed !
manual valve. or blind flange. One or more penetration flow paths A.,N,,Q E with one containment isolation valve .C.2 NOTES inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation-areas may be verified by use of administrative means.,
- 2. Isolation devices that are locked.
A' sealed. or V otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means,
~
Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path l is isolated. D. One or more D.1 Restore purge valve 24 hours penetration flow paths leakage to within with one or more limits. !' containment purge valves not within - purge valve leakage limits. , L (continued) ifh BRAIDWOOD - liNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.3 - 4 9/9/98 Revision J L L i r.,
!- Conta3nmem ;s:;3: :. .3 .-
- l. ,
3.: I0rs rc on:,nuer T 'i CONDITION REQUIRED A:TIOh ! A_/ :DM _E ::1. ~ :' i
.E. Required Action and . E 1' Be in MODE 3. f nours associated Completion Time not n.et. AND' E.2- Be in MODE 5. 36 nours l ~
r SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY n SR 3.6.3.1 Verify each'48 inch purge valve is sealed 31 days closed. l
'SR 3.6.3.2 Verify each 8 inch purge valve is closed. 31 days except when the 8 inch containment purge .' 'yq valves are open for purging or venting under administrative controls.
SR 3.6.3.3 - - NOTE -- Valves and blind flanges in high radiation
- areas may be verified by use of
-administrative controls, p --- --- .-- --
. Verify each containment isolation manual 31 days j' valve. remote manual valve. and blind flange that is located outside containment and not locked. sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. except for
. containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls.
(continued) I
- (%
i V BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.3 - 5 9/9/98 Revision J t
Ccr.tainmen: Is:'s: : . '.es SUR!EILLA!CE REOUI:EuE?c5 (tem uer SURVEIaLANCE FRE:vit.:) SR 3.6.3.4 ' NOTE
> Valves and blind flanges in high radiation C areas may be verified by use of I administrative means.
4 -- d faify each containment' isolation manual Prior to r.i l valve, remote manual valve and blind enterina MODE 4 flange that is located inside containment from MODE 5 if H and not locked. sealed, or otherwise not performed v secured and required to be closed during within the W accident conditions is closed, except for previous containment isolation valves that are open 92 days under administrative controls. SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each automatic In accordance containment isolation valve is within with the limits. Inservice Testing Program G O SR 3.6.3.6 Perform leakage rate testing for 8 inch 92 days - containment purge valves with resilient seals. SR 3.6.3.7 Perform leakage rate testing for 48 inch 184 days containment purge valves with resilient seals. SR 3.6.3.8 Verify each automatic containment isolation 18 months valve that is not locked. sealed or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the isolati.on position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
! BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.3 - 6 9/9/98 Revision J
- r.
- a e- es s. c
-~3 3.6 :0NTAINMENT E d E'E 3.6.2 Containment Pressure l
LCO 3.6.4 Containment pressure shall be a -0.'. es1; an: s -;.c rs .. j l
' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1.- 2. 3. and 4 l J
i l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment pressure A.1 Restore containment- 1 nour not within limits. pressure to within limits. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND O (/ B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1 Verify contair,. -t pressure is within 12 hours limits. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.4 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
~ . . - . . . - _ - - - - - - - - - . . - . - . - - . - - .-
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Ls/ 3.6.5 :antainmen: Air Temaerature LCO -3.6.5 Containment average air temperature snali of s 120#: APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. 1 l ACTIONS- ) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment' average A.1 Restore containment 8 hours air temperature not average air within limit. temperature to within limit. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. ( AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.5.1 Verify containment average air temperature 24 hours is within limit. .t ,A l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6. 5 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
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Ccctainmer.: Oc af, anc.:cc : eIT-l L I l' ( l. r.' :Ci!T'-IfNE', 3 '5 TEM 3 l 3.6.6 Containment Spray anc Cooling Systems LCO 3.6.6 Two containment sprav trains and two containmen: cos' r.: ' trains shall be OPERABLE. APFLICABILITY: MDDES 1..'2. 3. and 4
' ACTIONS [
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One containment spray A.1 Restore containment 7 days train inoperable. spray train to i- OPERABLE status. AND l 14 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours C. One or more C.1 Restere containment 7 days containment cooling cooling train (s) to trains ' inoperable. OPERABLE status. AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO I (continued) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6. 6 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
- n a'nmer.: 5 ra.. an: :::' ; 3 e-
~ : ::!:: ' : r.! nue:.
O :0ND: TION REQUIRE: A:TI0f. COM _ E : :!. ' ' ' . D. Reauired Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 nours associated Completion Time of Condition C AND not met. D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 nours E. Two containment spray' E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immealately trains inoperable. 03 Any combination of three or more trains inoperable.
. () SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
! SR 3.6.6.1 Verify each containment spray manual. power 31 days l operated. and automatic valve in the flow l path that is not locked. sealed. or L otherwise secured in position is in the i' correct position. SR 3.6.6.2 Operate each containment cooling train fan 31 days unit for a 15 minutes. SR 3.6.6.3 Verify each containment cooling train 31 days
- cooling water flow rate is a 2660 gpm.
3 (continued) ] BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3. 6.6 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A 4 s e en- -
l \ Corta7"mer: Sc 33 an: :::^ ': 5.5:e - I
- : .: . .< v..:. ::s c. ::v:n..-.
- . ,, - . r sa. -
l SURVEILiAN:E ::E _ c..
. 1 l
I SR 3.6.6.4 Verify each containment spray Dumo's Ir a : r:ar:# developed heaa at tne flov. test point is v.1tr ine greater than or equal to the requirea Inse u :e developed head. Testing trac e < l 1 1 l SR 3.6.6.5 Verify each automatic containment spray 18 montns l valve in the flow path that is not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position. actuates to the Correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 1 SR 3.6.6.6 Verify each containment spray pump starts 18 months automatically on an actual or simulated J ,. actuation signal. t 1 l - SR 3.6.6.7 Verify each containment cooling train 18 months starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. I SR 3.6.6.8 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed. 10 years 1 r i i-O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.6 - 3 8/13/98 Revision A
Stra. A 07 .9 4 19" 5' 3.6 CDN-'!!NENT Si3TEMS
- \
3.6.- Spray A3:1tive System LCO 3.6.7 Tne Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE.
. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. Spray Additive System A.1 Restore Spray 7 oays inoperable. Additive System to OPERABLE status. l l B. Required Action and B.i Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion i Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours 1 1 l I 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.7.1 Verify each spray additive manual and 31 days I automatic valve in the flow path that is
-not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position.
SR 3.5.7.2 Verify spray additive tank solution level 184 days I is a 78.6% and s 90.3%. (continued) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.7 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
, . ~ . . .- , -. , _ _ , .
5c ra.. cc : ' . + 5. :; e-500'.'E : L L at!:E ECJI EvEN'5 <ccr- nue:- I
\, SUR.'EIL_aN:E ::i; . E ',,
SR 3.6.7.3 Verify spray additive tank sodlum nyaroxice 182 cays solution concentration is a 30% anc s 36% oy weight. SR 3.6.7.4 Verify each spray additive automatic valve 18 montns in the flow path that is not locked. sealed, or otherwise secured in position. actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. ! SR 3.6.7 5 Verify spray additive flow rate from each 5 years solution's flow path.
- 10 V l
l l l l l I d . . -~s . b Y-- 4 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 7 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A
n;;c<:;+c i:-- - 3.{ :ZOINFEN 545 E'G O 2.6.5 y: roger. Recom:1ners LCO 3.6.8 Two hyorogen recombiners snall be 00ERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION T!NE A. One hydrogen A.1 NOTE recomoiner inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. Restore hydrogen 30 days recombiner to OPERABLE status. ex -( B. Two hydrogen B.1 Verify by 1 hour recombiners administrative means inoperable. that the hydrogen AND control function is maintained. Once per 12 hours thereafter AND B.2 Restore one hydrogen 7 days recombiner to OPERABLE status. C Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion' Time not met. l
)
. LJ BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.8 - 1 8/13/98 Revision A
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SR 3. 6. 8 .1. Perform a system functional test for eacr. 15 men:ns nyorogen recomoiner i SR 3.6.8.2 Visually examine each hydrogen recomD1ner 18 mon:qs l- enclosure and verify there is no evidence of abnormal conditions. \ l SR 3.6.8.3 Perform a resistance to ground test for 18 months l each heater phase. l l l
\
l 1 I i l-l O iO
- j. BRAIDWD0D - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6. 8 - 2 8/13/98 Revision A 1
l l 1 I
E3i ; TAINMEt,~ 5 FEv5
- ; . c. .._ _:'t5'nment BASES BACKGROUND Tne containment consists of tne concrete containmen; building. 1ts steel liner. and tne penetrations inrou; tr 3 structure. The structure is designed to contain raalcar: 1w material that may be released from the reactor core following a design basis Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCC Additionally. this structure provides shielding from ine fission products that may be present in the containment !
atmosphere following accident conditions. ; The containment is a reinforced concrete structure witn a cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat. and a shallow come roof. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions. The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post tensioning system. The concrete containment building is required for structural integrity of the containment under Design Basis Accident 1 (DBA) conditions. The steel liner and its penetrations l estabilsh the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. I Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B (Ref. 1). as modified by approved exemptions. A U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
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BA:K5 Rout.: fecn:1nue:, (f Ine'1sola!1on GeV1Ces for Ine eene -a:1on.c :re containment bouncary are a par: c' ne'cor:ainmen: leas ,
- ignt barrier. 'To maintain Inis leas tigr.: ear e- t
- a. All; penetrations reauire: Ic ce closec curin;.a : ;er-
.cond1:1ons are either: ,
- 1. capable of'being closed by an OPERABLE au:oma:::
containment isolation system or
- 2. closed by manual valves. blind flanges.' or de-activated automatic or remote manual valves i secured in their closed positions ~. exceDt as .I provided in LCO 3.6.3. " Containment. Isolation i Valves":
l b .- Each air lock is OPERABLE. except as provided in co LCO 3.6.2. " Containment Air Locks": . and o j 2: c. The equipment hatch is closed. !
-As Fi . d. The sealing mechanism associated with~each penetration l H (e.g.'.fwelds. bellows. or 0 rings) is OPERABLE. except i f-s fy; as provided in LCO 3.6.3. i u.s).
APPLICABLE . The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. I 1 I l ( . i - L i e BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 2 8/13/98 Revision J f f
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.V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
. The DBAs tnat result in a cnallenge to containmen: l OPERAB.'LITY from high pressures and temperatures are a LOC l and a steam line break (Ref. 2). In addition. release c' significant fission product radioactivity within containmer.:
can occur from a LOCA. secondary system pipe break. or fuei nandling accident (Ref. 3). In the DBA analyses. it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for tne DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.10% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting from accidents. is defined in 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B (Ref. 1), as L,: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (P,) resulting'from the limiting design basis LOCA. The allowable leakage rate represented by L forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed,on all containment leakage rate testing. L, is assumed to be 0.10% per day in the safety analysis at l P = 47.8 psig for Unit 1 and P, - 44.4 psig for Unit 2 (kef.3). , 1 p Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for Q the establishment of containment OPERABILITY. The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LCO Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to i s 1.0 L,. except prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage
.l test. At this time, applicable leakage limits must be met.
3 Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including the equipment ~ hatch that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. l S (O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 3 8/13/98 Revision J
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q U3E3 Lu iccntinuec) Individual leakage rates soecifiec for tne containme : 3-lock (LCO 3.6.2) and purge valves witn resilient seals (LCO 3.6.3) are not specifically part of tne accectance criteria of 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B. Tnerefere. leakage rates exceeding tnese incivlaual limits onb ~resf: in tne containment Deing inoperable wnen tne leakage resf u in exceeding the overall acceptance criteria of 1.0 t, APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 ana 6. the prcbability and consequences of these events are reouced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore. containment is not reauired to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are adaressed in LCO 3.9 4. " Containment : Penetrations." ACTIONS A1 I In the event containment is inoperable containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this i status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within ; 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed . Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
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5:5Ei SURVEILLANCE SR 3 6.1 1 ! REQUIREMENTS Maintaining tne containment OPERABLE requires comf iance with the visual examinations and leakaae rate tes:
- reauirements of tne Containment Leakage Rate Tes :n:
Program. Failure to nieet air lock and purge vaive '.sasage e limits specified in LCO 3.6.2 and LCO 3.6.3 ooes no: l invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overal' Type A.
' #r%: l B and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. As left le, : age prior to the first startup after performing a re4 ' red leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L for
- combined Type B and C leakage and < 0.75 L, for,overall Type 2 A leakage. _ At all Other times between required leakage rate L. J tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A 2 vi leakage limit of s 1.0 L,. At s 1.0 L the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assump,tions of the safety analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by the Containment Leakage Rate-Testing Program. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the . leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.
SR 3.6.1.2 p This SR ensures that the structural integrity of the
=b containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program.
Testing and Frequency are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(vi) " Effective Edition and Addenda of Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL. SECTION XI" (Ref. 4). and l Section 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(ix) " Examination'of Concrete l Containments" (Ref. 5). Predicted t?ndon lift off forces will be determined consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35.1. (Ref. 6). l l O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 , B 3.6.1 - 5 8/13/98 Revision J
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'e J l,)x. j REFERENCES. :1. 10'CFR 50. Appendix J. Op:1on B. i i
- 2. lUFSAR. Chapter 15.
Y .3. UFSAR:-Section 6-2. . .i
.. 1
-4. 10 CFR50,55a(b)(2)(vi) " Effective Edition.anc A::en 3- l
.of Subsection IWE and Subsection:IWL. SECTION:4 I . -i u
1
- 5. 10 CFR50.55a(b)(2)(ix). " Examination of Concrete :
Containments."
- j 6. Regulatory l Guide 1.35.1. July 1990.
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'd 'BRAIDWOOD.- UNITS 1 & 2. B 3.6.1 - 6 8/13/98 Revision J L
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o,..-iy _ .:.:v.: E 3.t.I Containmen: Air locks BASES BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containmer cressart boundary and proviae a means for personnel access carm; i. MODES of operation. Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder.10 "; in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. During perlocs when containment is not required to be OPERABLE. the coor i interlock mechanism may be disabled. allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when freauent containment entry is necessary. Each air lock acor i has been designed and tested to certify its ability to ! withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in ; containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal. the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e. an (m
) increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).
The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such. air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the plant safety analyses. Q L) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
Containmer.: ( _ _ : s s, BASES APPLICABLE The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive maten a' SAFETY ANALYSES within containment are a Loss Of Coolant Acciaent (LOCA' secondary system pipe break and a fuel handling acclaer.: (Ref. 2), in the analysis of each of these acc10ents. 1: 1s assumed that containment is OPERABLE sucn that release cf fission products to the environment is controllec Dy tne rate of containment leakage. The containment was aesignec i with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containmen air
, weight per day (Ref. 2). This leakage rate is definec in c 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B (Ref. 1). as the maximum 4 allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak
-containment internal pressure. at P, - 47.8 psig for Unit 1
= 44.4 psig for Unit 2 following a DBA. This e and allowP'able leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance
- criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks.
The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LCO Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of the containment pressure boundary, the air lock safety function.is related to control e of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus. ( each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event. Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE. the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into or exit from containment. 1 I O v BRAIDWOOD -~ UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 2 8/13/98 Revision J
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l ,.- E 5E V APPLICAEILITi In MODES 1. 2. 3. and . a 05 coJ : causej e}eas+ :- raaloactive material to containment. ;r Mu m : an: t :"- orobability anc consecuences o' Inese events are re:a:e: a.- to tne pressure anc temoerature limitations o' Inese C E5 Therefore. the containment air lo:Ks are not reau1re- - MODE 5 to prevent leakage of racloactive materia' containment. Tne recuirements Tor tne containment air or , ::e durina MODE 6 are adaressed in LCO 3.9.4 "Containmen: Penetrations." ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry anc exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoperable. then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. If the inner door is inoperable. it is preferred that the air lock be accessed from inside primary containment by entering through the other OPERABLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable. or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door. which means there is a short time during which the containment boundary is not intact
- (during access through the OPERABLE door). The ability to lp)
. open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment l' V boundary is temporarily not intact. is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. Opening the OPERABLE door must be done under strict administrative controls. consisting of a dedicated individual (i.e. not involved with any repair or other maintenance effort) assigned to ensure that the door is opened only for the period of time required to gain entry into or exit from the air lock. and that any OPERABLE door is re-locked prior to the departure of the dedicated individual After each entry and exit. the OPERABLE door mut ' ' immediately closed. If ALARA conditions permit.
- entr. d exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock.
l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A l l
hr,;3rgr- - _7. p Ei3E5 U ACTIONS (continued; A seCono Note has Deen added to cro, ice clar #1ca ' r ra-for tnis LCG. separate Con 1 tion er.try is alio..ec trr ea:- air lock. Inis is acceptaDie. Since the ReCu' rec Ac:'rr: for eacn Condition provioe appropriate compensa:O rl. ar- em for eacn inoperable air lock. Complying witn tne ;.ecs:re: Actions may allow for continued operation. anc a su:'secaer-inoperable air lock is governed by subsecuent Conc 1:1on entry ano application of associated Requirec Actions. In the event the air lock leakage results in exceedina ine overallcontainmentleakagerate. Note 3directsentriinte the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1. Containment." A1 A.2. and A.3 With one air lock door in one or more containment air locks inoperable. the OPERABLE door must be veriflea closed (Recu1rea Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock. This ensures that a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by tne use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within 1 hour. This specified time p period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. which ( requires containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hcur Completion Time is reasonat,le for locking the OPERABLE air lock door. considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is being maintained closed. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6. 2 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
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l l . E*5E5 A:TIONS (continueo) Reauired Action A.3 verifles tnat ar air lock v.1tn ar ! inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a ic;Ae; an; I closed OPERABLE air lock aoor. inis ensures ina an acceptable containment leakage.bounoary-1s maintainec, Tne Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on encineerin:
~
judoment and is considered adeouate in view of tne'io.s likE11 hood of a locked door being mispositioned and otner aoministrative controls. Required Action A.3 1s modifie: n '
- a Note that applies to air lock doors located in n1ah radiation areas and allows these doors to be verif15a lockea closed by use of administrative means. Allowing ,
verification by administrative means is considered 1 acceptable. Since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position is small. The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. i Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated' I Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available o' to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the A ? appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does
'C N. not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial 4 entry into Condition A: only the requirement to comply with ;
w the Required Actions. c r.i i l' I I h') BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 5 8/13/98 Revision J l
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A:TIOS scontinusa; Note 2 allows use of Ine air locs for e it r;. an: ee: cr 7 cays under aaministrative controis if born a'r '.::e ra.e an inoperaole coor Tnis oay restrictior Dec'ns v.rer ce secono air lock is discovered inoperaDie. Containmen: er s may be reau1rea on a perlocic basis to perform Te:nnica-Specifications (TS) Surve111ances ana Requirec Actions. as l well as other activltles on eculpment inside containment i i that are required by TS or activities on equipment ina: ! I support TS-required equipment. This Note is not intencer. :c l preclude performing other activities (i.e. non-TS-recuirec ! activities) if the containment is entered. using tne I inoperable air lock, to perform an allowed activity liste; i above. The administrative controls consist of a oedicateC l individual (i.e. not involved with any repair or otner : maintenance effort) assigned to ensure that the door is ) , opened only for the period of time required to gain entry j l into or exit from the air lock, and that any OPERABLE door is re-locked prior to the departure of the dedicated [
, individual. This allowance is acceptable due to the low l l probability of an event that could pressurize the !
containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is ! expected to be open. V B1 B.2. and B.3 With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or more air locks. the Required Actions and associated ) Completion Times are consistent with those specified in Condition A with the exception that both air lock doors may still be OPERABLE. in which case either door can be used to isolate the air lock penetration. l l l D) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A 1
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[ -. ACT10t6 _(continuec)
. .Tne Required Actions nave been mociflec 0) tw f.::es . .
Note 1 ensures tnat only the Require: A::1ons an: ass:: re - l ' Completion Times of Condition C are reau1re: l' o::r :: ; c in the same air lock are inoperable. With octr cc:rs '" :ce M. same air. lock inoperable. an OPERABLE cooe is n:: a.aC ar e A to-be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are ne
- j appropriate remedial actions.
l A I Note 2 allows entry into and exit from containment unoer ne control of a dedicated individuel stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time (1 e. tne individual performs the function .of the interlock) and one - door is re-locked prior to the departure of the dedicated individual. i l Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to ' air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore..the probability of misalignment of the doors, once they have been verified to be in the proper position. is small. A p [ BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 7 8/13/98 Revision J
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- -m D- X TIONS (continued).
e' r? anc C.3 With one or more air locks inoperable for reasons c:ner : .a - those described in Condition A or B (e.g. . Dotn cocrs ~ :re ' same-air lock are inoperaDie) Condition C 1s enterec. A::e an air lock with only an inoperable door (Conditior C arc interlock (Condition B) does_not recuire entry into , Condition C. The Required Actions of Conditions A anc B , provide-the appropriate remedial actions for the oegrace: condition. Required Action C.1 requires action to be i initiated immediately to evaluate previous combinea leakage rates using current air lock test results. An evaluation 15 - acceptable. Since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air ; lock have failed a seal' test or if the overall air lock leakage is not witnin limits. In many instances (e.g.. only
- one seal per-door has failed), containment remains OPERABLE.
yet only I hour-(per LCO 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior.to requiring a unit shutdown. In addition even with both doors failino ~ the seal test. the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.
, (v3 Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected c containment air lock must be verified to be closed within-T the 1 hour Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1 which requires 4 . that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 6
1 hour.
$ Additionally. the affected air. lock (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock and the overall containment leakage rate is within the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage limits.
l l C) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 8 8/13/98 Revision J 1 l I
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- A:TI0tG-(continuea) ,
l- D.1 and D.2 i If the inoperable containment air lock canno: ce res:c e :: OPERABLE status within the reouired Completion Time. :ne i unit must be brought.to a MODE in wnich tne LCO aces n:: apoly. To achieve this status. the unit must be crouan; :: at'least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within ' 36 hours. Tne allowed Completion Times are reasonable. L based on operating experience. to reach the required unit i conditions from full power conditions in an oraerly manner and without cnallenging plant systems.
. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air. locks OPERABLE ~ requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the <
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. 'This SR reflects ' tne leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock' leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance - criteria were established during initial air lock and ' L_ containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing l
- h. requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not !
i U exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment ' I L leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Containment 1 Leakage Rate Testing Program. The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that I s an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous j
- o. successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test, a
This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is L J capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event M. of_a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the y results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of
'L SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly L accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C !
containment leakage rate. l l lh L l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 9 8/13/98 Revision J i i w - - -.
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-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 54continuect SP 3 6.2.2 j The air lock interlock is oesigned to prevent simu'taneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since Dc:r re inner and outer doors of an air lock are oesignec te witnstand the maximum expected post accident contalnmen: '
pressure. closure of either door will support containmen:
-OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports l . containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being usec for personnel transit in and out of.the containment. Periodic l testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock
- will function as designed.and that simultaneous opening of the. inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock. and given that the interlock mechanism is not normally challenged when the containment air lock door is used for entry and exit (procedures require strict adherence to single door e- opening). this test is only required to_ be performed every
? 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to 98 p'erform this Surveillance under the. conditions that apply during a plant outage. and the potential for loss of to containment OPERABILITY if the Surveillance were performed u with the' reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency for the
~Y E interlock is justified based on generic operating (V -
experience.. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during use of the air lock. l REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B.
- 2. UFSAR. Section 6.2.
I L. . V BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2 - 10 8/13/98 Revision J l L
Cor.talnmen: Is:1r eq ..{ .e5.. 1 E 3.6 : D .INME!C 535 EMS
- O .B 3.e.3 Conteinment Ieolet,on ve,ves BASES l
l BACKGROUND The containment isolation valves (Table B 3.6.3-1) form pa- i of the containment pressure boundary and provice a means for i fluid penetrations not serving accident consequence ilmitin~ { systems to be provided with two isolation barriers Inat are closed on a containment isolation signal. These isolation devices are either passive or active _(automatic). Manual l valves. de-activated automatic or remote manual valves secured in their closed position, check valves with flow i i through the valve secured, blind flanges, and closed systems I are considered passive devices. Check valves. or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action l following an accident, are considered active devites. Two i barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. These barriers (containment isolation valves, blind flanges, and closed systems) make up the Containment Isolation System. O Automatic isolation signals are produced during accident ( 1 conditions. Containment Phase "A" isolation occurs.upon receipt of a safety injection signal. The Phase "A" isolation signal isolates nonessential process lines in-order to minimize _ leakage of fission product radioactivity. Containment Phase "B" isolation occurs upon receipt of a High-3 containment pressure signal and isolates t1e remaining process lines, except systems required for accident mitigation. The purge valves (supply and exhaust) receive a containment ventilation isolation signal on a containment high radiation condition. Safety injection signal. manual Phase A actuation, and manual containment spray actuation. As a result the containment isolation valves (and blind flanges) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the environment in the event of a release of fission product radioactivity to the containment atmosphere as a result of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). .VO BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.6.3 - 1 9/9/98 Revision J l
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g BASES kJ BACKGROUND (continued; The OPERABILITY recuirements for containmen: scia: or valves nelp ensure that containment is isolatec v. :r.'r tre I time limits assumed in tne safety analyses. Tnerefre tre l OPERABILITY requirements proviae assurance ina: :ne containment function assumed in tne safety analyses v. ' ce i maintained. I NormH Purce Svstem (48 incn ource valvesi l The Normal Purge System operates to supply outside air inte l the containment for ventilation and cooling or heating anc ! may also be used to reduce the concentration of noole gases l within containment prior to and during personnel access. l Tne supply and exhaust lines each contain two isolation valves. Because of their large size, the 48 inch purge valves are not qualified for automatic closure from their open position under DBA conditions. Therefore. the 48 incn purge valves are sealed closed in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 to ensure the containment boundary is maintained. I Miniource Svstem (8 inch ource valves) The Minipurge System operates to: 'd
- a. Reduce the concentration of noble gases within containment prior to and during personnel access. and l
- b. Equalize internal and external pressures.
Since the valves used in the Minipurge System are deslaned to meet the requirements for automatic containment isolation valves, these valves may be opened as needed in MOCES 1. 2.
- 3. and 4.
l O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A
Ccntainmen: sel 5: q . i , e.'
,.. bk3E3 O
g APPLICABLE The containment 1 solation valve LCO was aerivec from tre 1 SAFETY ANALYSES assumptions related to minimizing the loss of rea:ter n coolant inventory and establishing tne containmen Douncam. during major accidents. As part of tne containmen: 1
, boundary, containment isolation valve OPERABILITN su;;ocr:s leak tightness of the containment. Therefore. tne safe ;.
L analyses of any event requiring isolation of containmen: 1s y gl applicable to this LCO. The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). secondary system pipe break, and fuel handling accident (Ref. 1). In the analyses for each of these accidents. it is assumed that containment isolation valves are either closed or function to close within the required 1 solation time following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through containment isolation valves (including containment purge valves) are minimized. The safety analyses assume that the 48 inch purge valves are closed at event initiation. In the calculation of control room and offsite doses followin a LOCA. the accident analyses assume that 25% of the equi ibrium radioactive iodine and 100% of the C) V equilibrium radioactive noble gas inventory developed from maximum full power operation of the ccre is assumed to be immediately available for leakage from the containment. The containment is assumed to leak at the design leakage rate. L , at the peak accident pressure. P, for the first 2,4 hours and at 0.5 L, for the remaining duration of the accident (Ref. 2). The containment isolation valves ensure that the containment design leakage rate remains within L, by automatically isolating penetrations that do not serve post accident functions and providing isolation capability for penetrations associated with safe shutdown functions. The maximum isolation time for automatic containment isolation valves is 60 seconds (Ref. 1). This isolation time is based on engineering judgement since the control room and offsite dose calculations are performed assuming that the leakage from containment begins immediately following the accident. (J3 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3. 6. 3 - 3 9/9/98 Revision J
Containment : scla 'cr .a es
.Ji.
BASE 5 l L - APPLICABLE' SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) L The single failure criterion required to be impose: 1r :ne l conduct of plant safety analyses was censiderec in tne L original design of the containment mini purge valves. Twc l valves in series on each mini purge line provice assurance
- that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolate even if a single failure occurred. -The inboard and outocarc 1 isolation valves'on each line are provided with diverse power sources and solenoid operated valves that will fall
~
L closed on the -loss of power or air. This arrangement was designed to preclude common mode failures from disabling i both valves on a mini purge line. The normal purge valves may be unable to close in the I environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the normal purge valves is required to remain sealed closed during , MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. The requirement to seal closed the ' normal purge valves precludes a single failure from compromising the containment boundary as long as the system is operated-in accordance with the subject LCO. The containment isolation valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). < 'q
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l l 8 IAF;;3Et a) 1AF0135 S/G E ! sol Viv h.A :. {i l ;16; 24r013SI8I 2AF0135 S/G E 1501 Viv .N/A : l? B4 :Ae:13 (a) _3479:3: 3fg g g3g yjy g,g 3 O 10; (a) l 2AF0:3:(a' 2AF013F S/G B ! sol viv NA 3
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'l' ' 102 2AF0133(a's 2AF0133 S/G C Isol Viv N/A- 3 2; ~0C9414 CC9416 CC9414 C: From RC Pumos 1s01 Viv C;9534 10.0 1 CC941s CC From RC Pumos isol V'v 10.0 CC9534 CC from RC Pmo Isol Byp Check Vlv N/A li 22 C;94372(a)
- CC94378 C: From Exc Ltown Hx 1501 viv 10.0 3
-- 24 'CC6S5 CC9438 CC685 C From RC Pos Tnerm Bar Isol Viv 10.0 1 CC9516 CC9438 CC From RC Pos Tnerm Bar 1501 Viv 10.0 CC9516 C: Frm RC Pps Therm Barr 150 Byp Chk N/A (continueo)
(a) . h01 subje:: to Type C leakage tests. ,q. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 o B 3.6.3 - 19 8/14/98 Revision J e
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C50065 Cnr. Speay He* 6 Ino: Cnmt Cne:t N: 25 - CVE103 CVS 12 CV8100 Seal w:e R:re Cnm: *soi viv :: : CV8113 CV61:2 Seal c - R rr Cnm. Ise V15 .:
- CV6:13 Seal w:* Rter Cnect Vis N:
i 33- CVB355A(a) Cv836BA(a) Cv8355A R:e Seal Injection Iso' AA : CVB366A - R;D 5eal Injection Cnm: Isol Viv N. 33 CV2355 (a) CVB36E;(a) CVE3553 RCD Seal Injection Iso? A.A . CVE36SD RC8 Seal injection Cnmt Isel Viv A. A 27 CVS346(a) C/6345t a) CVE346 Loom Fill her Outoc Ma Isol viv A;A - CVB348 R; Leo: Fill Cnm: Isol tiv N/A e ' 4: 5 f CV5152 -CVE160 CVS152 CV6160 Letcown Line (net Isol Viv Letoown Line Cnm: Isol Viv 10 : 10- 1 i t 53 CVE3*53(a: CV636af al CVE2555 RC# 5eal In]e::1on A, A : CV83655 R*D 5eal Inye: tion Cnet 1 sci Viv N/A. .
- 53 CVE355 (a) CVB368 (a) CVB355: R~P Seal Injecttee jl CVB368: -R:r'5eal Inje: tion Cnmt 1s01 Viv N/A N/A '
! 7' OVS105(a) CV2105 Cr.g Line Cnm: 1 sol Viv 10 10
,. CV!!06(a)- CVE106 Cn; Line Cnmt Isol Viv 10 32 F 01: FC012 FC0ll De't Loco Rtr. To Rfuel Cav Cnmt Isol N/A 2 FCCl2 - Dem Loco Rtn ic Rfuel Cav Cnmt Isol N/A 5' F;;10 FC005 rC01C 6 Su:: From Gefuel Cav Cnet Isol h/A 0 FC009 P Sue: From Refue) Cav Cnmt Isol N/A 34 - FP010t a) pp345(a) FP01C Fire Protection 0/5 Isol 364 Viv 12.0 2 FP345 Fire Prot Cnet Isol Viv N/A (Continued) j (al' Act subject to Type C leakage tests.
L 'i r\ f BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 20 8/14/98 Revision J
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IC" 2FW:35A(a 2 FWD 35A S/G A Fm Temorng 1s01 Viv-va039Aja! 6.C p 1- 2FWO39A S/G A FW Fhte Byp Viv 377 DWST Isol 60
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'2FWO15;(a) 6.0 2FWO15 SG C FW Cnem Feee Isol- N/A (Continued) tal Not subject to. Type C leatage tests.
I I l . . ! n-
- \ >4 '
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 L B 3.6.3 - 21 8/14/98 Revision J l L.
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- MS;170g M50160l,,)3 M5016: SG C 1190 Psts Re11 e* ,: 1
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'25 M5101B MSIV E pass Viv Loco E
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5014 B , MS0145 SG E 1220 Dsig Relief NA i
50152l,y M50152;
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Ef M51010 - ' MS!v B oass Viv Loos C MS!01 $,I MS013 g ' M5013:' SGClb35PsigRelief 6)0 NA 3 M5014: M5014: SG C 1220 Psig Relief N/A M5015:g,j' M5015: SG C 1205 Psig Relief M5016:g p s/A M5016 SG C 1190 Pstg Reitef Nf A - MS017:g,j M5017C SG C 1!75 Pstg Relief N/A MS01E'g,' MSCIB: 33 C DORY 20 0 MS 210(a' M50210 SG C Dripleg Den DWST isol g/A 13 OG082 OG079 l: OG082 H2 Recomo Outbd Cnmt 15o1 viv
! OG079 H2 Recemo Disen Cnet Isol viv 60'.0 60 0 13 vG084 0G080 OG084 H2 Recomb Dutbd Cnm1 ! sol Viv 60 0 '
OGOBO H2 RecomD Satt Cnmt 1s01 Viv 60I0 23 OG055 OG081 OG085 H2 Recomo Outbd Cnm 1s01 viv 60 0 OG081 H2 Recomb suction Cnmt isol VIv 60.0
. 69 OG083 OG057A OG083-- H2 Recomo Outbd Cnmt Isol viv 60'0 2 OG057A H2 Recomo Cnmt 1501 Viv 60.0 (Continued)
(al Not $ubject to Type C leakage tests. t t l: D,<% i -BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 22 8/14/98 Revision J
Containmen; 15c'3: O i . f .- ci.: : . :s;+ ! :d 9
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- PR:335 R:33! A' .:a 426 Irs A' .:s Ra: FO- 15:
- A. 'PR3:25 PR 23 CR:0 ! A1 50:n 426 Ala MO- Outlet !s:' *:.
CR ::3 A Lc:L Air Moa Outlet One:s
- A. CR033: PR033: [mg Air Lct les Air Let Rad Me* Iso - N ,
PR:330 PR033 Emg Ata Les les Air Let Ra: Mor. 150 N 1. A. PR002P DR002m PR002- Ata Lect 401 Air Mon Outlet Isel N>A : PR002w Emerg Haten Air Let Hon Outlet Cnt Na 52 PR001A PR031A -UPST Cnet Atmos To PR C/S Isol V1v PR001B J.5 .- CR0016 DdST Cnet Atmos To PR 0/5 1501 Viv 4i 52 PR366 Samole Return 0/5 Cnmt Isol PR032 PR066 PR032' 5.0 : Cnmt Process Rad Mon Return Chk N/A 36 PS2285 052285 Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt Isol Viv N/A!O N / A ' D , 1: PS229B PS229B Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt Isol Viv 36 PS230E PS231 PS230B Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt 15o1 Viv N/AIDl (31)By* PS2315 Post LOCA H2 Mon B Return Chk Viv N/A 45 PS22BA PS228A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cnet 1501 Vlv N/Alb) 3g fN): (v- PS229A PS229A Pos LOCA H2 Mon A Cnmt isol Viv N/Atb)
'l, 45 (12)Sy*
PS230A PS231A PS230A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cnmt 1501 Viv N/A(b) ; . PS231A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Return Chk Viv N/A 7: PS93546 PS9354A PS93548 Pzr Stm sample Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 2 . PS9354A Pzr Stm Samole Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 ! l 7C PS9355B PS9355A PS93555 Pzr Lod Samole Cnet 1501 Viv 10.0 *
; PS9355A Pzr Lad Sample Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 7C PS93568 PS9356A PS9356B Loop Samole Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 ?
PS9356A Looo Sample (net 1501 Viv 10.0 70 PS93578 PS9357A PS93576 A cauletor Sunple Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 2 PS9357A Accumulator Sample Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 11 RE9170- RE1003 RE9170 RCOT Pmos Outside Isol viv 10.0 2 RE1003 RCOT P aps Osch Cnmt Inbd 1501 Viv 10.0 (continued)
.(b) Proper valve operatioh will be demonstrated by verifying that the valve strokes to its required position.
g.
- t BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 23 8/14/98 Revision J L.
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-RHB702A((a)
RHS702B a) RHB7025. R~ Loop C To RH PP B Suct 377 Isol N N,' A i i I j 15 RYO75 RYO75 D/S CTMT Dead W ignt Tester 15o1 N/A E 27 RYB025 RY8026 RY8025 PRT To Gas Anal Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 l RY8026 - PRT To Gas Anal Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 1 4 21 - RY8033 RYB047 RYB033 N2 Supply To PRT Isol Viv 10.0 I RYB047 PRT N2 Supply Line 1/5 Cnmt Cnk Viv N/A 44- RYS028 RYB046 RYB026 PW To PRT Cnet 1501 Viv 10.0 0
'RY8046 PRT Soray Line Instoe Cnmt Chk Viv N/A Si SA032 SA033 SA032 Service Air Cnmt Isol viv 0/5 4.5 :
- SA033 Service Air Instoe.15o1 Viv 4.5 ;
60 SD002;(a) 150002: S/G 10 B/D 1s01 7.5 3 B0/81 . SD005B(a) 25D0020 Steam Generator ID Upoer B/D ! sol 7.5 500055 Steam Generator ID 6/D Sample isol 3.0 .! El SD002D(a) 1500020 S/G 10 B/D 1s01 7.5 3
.. 80/81 SD005S(a) . 250002D Steam Generator ID Lower B/D isol 7.5 500056 Steam Generator ID B/D Sample Isol 3.0 82 SD002A(a) ISD002A S/G 1A B/D 1so1 7.5 3 E2/83 SD005A(8)- 2SD002A Steam Generator IA Upper B/D lsel 7.5 SD005A Steam Generator IA B/D Sample Isol 3.0 83- 500026(8) 15D002B S/G 1A B/D ! sol 7.5 3 62/83 SD005A(a) 250002B Steam Generator IA Lower B/D ! sol 7.5 SDD05A Steam Generator IA B/D Sample 1501 3.0 (continued)
(a) Not. subject to Type C leaka9e tests. l l . L t i3 l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 24 8/14/98 Revision J t
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50005D Steam Generato- 1: B/D Sample Isol 3.: l 91 SD002/a) 150002H S/G 1: B/D 1s01 *i l 90/91. SDC05D(a) 250002- Steam Generator 1C Lower B/D ! sol *t 1 SDCC5D Steam Generater it B/D Sample Isol 3. 26 SISB01AI8) $!8815(a) S!8801A CHG Po To Cold Legs Inj ! sol NA 9 SIB 8018(a) 3gg343(a). 5188012 CH3 Po To Cold Lecs Isol Vlv NA S:8815 Cng Pos Colc Leg Inf Hor Cnx viv N:A 516843 Accum Fill Fnr SI Tst Line Isol Viv N/A 50 SIB 809da) SIB 890A(8) SIEE09A RH To Cold Legs A/D isol Viv NrA SIB 818A((a) S!8890A RHR To Cold Legs 184 Tst Line Iso VI N/A S!881BD a) SIBS 18A SI Loco 1 Colo Leg upst Chk Viv N/A S18818D SI Loop 4 Cold Leg Upst Cnk Viv N/A
.G't El S!8809B(a). SIB 890B(a) -$188095 RH To Cold Legs B/C ! sol Viv SI6518BI8) -$188903 RNR To Cold Legs 2&3 Tst Line 150 VI N/A N/A S!8818;(a) SIB 81BS SI Loop 2 Cold Leg upst Chk Viv I N/A l 516818 SI Loop 3 Cold Leg Uost Chk Viv N/A 55 $!8964 516871 518964 SI Test Lines To Radwaste 1501 Viv :
.518888 518888 51 Pos To Accum Fill Line 1501 Viv 10l0 10 0 518B71 Fill / Test Line Isol V1v 10.0
(, S' SIBBBC S!B968 518880 516968 SI Accumulaters N2 Supply isol Viv SI A: Cum N2 Supply Cnt Vlv 10.0 : :' N/A a) 59 SIB 802AI8) SIB 681(I S.5:8802A 8881
$1 To Hot Legs A/D lsol Viv SI Test Line Iso Viv. 51 Pos To A/D Het Legs N/A 7 S!8905A(8)
SIB 905D a) S 8905A - 51 Loco 1 Hot Leg Uost Chk Viv N/A Sl8905D SI Loop 4 Hot Leg upst Chk Viv' N/A N/A 60 $18835(a) SIB 823(a) 518835 51 Pos Cold Legs 1501 Viv N/A 7 SIB 819A(a) 518823 51 Test Line Iso Viv. S! Pos To Cold Legs N/A SIB 8198I8I. 5::6819A St Pos Osch Her To Cold Leg Lp 1 Ct.k N/A 518819;fe) 5: BB19B $1 Pos Dsen Hde To Cold Leg Lp 2 Chk N/A S188190 a) SLBS19C St Pos Dsch Her To Cold Leg Lp 3 Chk N/A
$!SB190 51 Pos Osch Her To Cold Leg Lp 4 Chk N/A (continued)
(a) Not subje:t to Type C leakage tests. p 3} BPAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 25 8/14/98 Revision J i
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5!B905gs a' - SIES2: 5: Test Line 15: vh. 5: D:s T: .67: nn 6egs . t. :
' 518905:.a' '5129055 5: Lo:: 2 Mot Les ticst Cns Viv L 516905: 5: Loep 3 Mot Leg upst Cns Viv. L t.
.l 92 516B11A(a) . CI8211A Cnmt Sunp A Isol Viv N:. !
l 93 ~ SIBB11B(a) 513811B. Cnet Sump B Iso 1 V1v - N-A s l: J SXOl6B(a) - 5x016S Rx Cnmt Fan Cooler B/D 5x Inlet ' Nia . l: 9' 5x027B(a) - 510272 Rx Cnet Fan Cooler B/D SX Outlet N<A 3 I8I
} ' 14 SX327A 5x027A Rx Cnet Fan Cooler A/C 5x Outlet h!A 3
-l : 151 - 5x016A(a) - 5x016A Rx Cnet Fan Cooler A/C SX Inlet N/A 4 3
13 V0016 V0016 V001B Int Leat Rate Cnmt 1s01 N/A
= , . . . . .
V0016 Int Leat Rate Cnet isol yy N/A
.SjL !3 V0019 V0017 V0019 Int Leak Rate Cnmt Isol N/A ;
VQ317 Int Leat Rate Cnet 1501 N/A 94 V0003 V0005A V0003 Cnmt Post-LOCA Purge Isol-V0005;. 5.0 6 V0005: Cnmt Mint Flow Purge Exnaust Isol 5.0 - V00055 V0005B Cnmt Min). Flow Purge Cxnaust 1501 5.0 V0005A Cnet Hint-Flow Purge Exnaust 1501 5.0 95 V0002B V0002A 'V00025 Cnet Purge Exnaust 1s01 Viv 5.0 2(C' V0002A Cnmt Purge Exnaust Isol Viv 5.0
~ 96 . V0004B V0004A. Cnmt Mini. Flow Purge Scooly 1s01 V0004B V0004A Cnmt Mint Flow Purge Supply 1501 5.0 :
5.0 97 .V00016 V0001A V0001B Cnmt Purge Supoly 1s01 Vh 5.0 2(C) v000}A Cnet Purge Supply 1 sol Viv 5.0 30 'WM190 WM191 WM190 Demin Wtr Hor To Cnmt DWST 1s01 N/A 2 WM191 Demin Wtr Hdr To Cnmt Chect Viv N/A l- (continued)
"(a) Not sue, lect to Type C leakage tests.
(c) Valve INOPERABLE as a result of leakage not witnin limit. refer to Tech Spe: 3.6.3. Condition D. i l 6) . 1 f' BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 26 8/14/98 Revision J
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t i 6 WDC206 WOO 565- WOO 20S Rx Cem: Fn Coolers B/D Chi h . Oct ' WO0cc5 Ra Cnr. Fn Coolers B/D Cn1 W r Ou: E. .
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'q) r .BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3 6.3 - 27 8/14/98 Revision J
l - L0ntainmen 150 c!'0" .5 .fi 3 . d . 2-
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- . . B:tr Ou.stce valve B ettne- instce salve INO ERAB.E insice va ves INDPERABLE -
- / 04sice E ptnt . Insice valve IND ERALE *
.2 a. -Oa side valve OR insice valve INOPERABt! :
, c. Outstoe valve ,F,2 insice valve INOPERABLE 3 lf 3' a. Valwe INOPERABLE.: ; 4 a .- ~1nstoe valv'e B either outs 10e valve INOPERABLE A
- o. Botn outside valves INOPERABLE- -. A ci Inside valve E eitnea outside valve INOPERABLE E 5' a. (Eitner of tne outstae valves 2 eitner of the insice valves INOPERABLE A
- c. Betn insice valves B Doth outside valves INOPERABLE < A
- . Eitner of tne insioe valves 3 eitner of tne outsloe valves INOPERABLE B
~6 ,a I E more outside valves INOPERABLE A I c ' Insice valve INOPERABLE A '
. c; Insioe valve $2 any outsice valvets) INOPERABLE B ]
7 a .- ! more inside valves INOPERABLE A
- e. ~Ou@tsicevalveIN0pIRABLE A
- Outsice valve AJ2 any Inside valve (s) INOPERABLE B.
v ,' - I LB a. Vaive INOPERABLE' B i
.9~ a. I trstee valve INOPERABLE-. A
- c. I Botn insloe valves INOPERABLE B 1
-1: a: 1 outsloe valve INOPERABLE A i
.c! Botn outside valves INOPERABLE B 1
I i 1 I ( i . i ,% o s f
.BRAIDWOOD'- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3 - 28 8/14/98 Revision J
- y -* w-
y, : 5 ~ ,- 9. - :.: . b 3.d b). I!f'*5 . 3*5 b h E 3.6 J Containment Pressuhe BASES BACKGROUt!D Tne containment structure serves to contain racicac:n e material that may be released from tne reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Tne containmen: pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve w e initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Steam Line Break (SLB' These limits also prevent tne containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative pressure ! differential with respect to the outside atmosphere in tne event of inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System. Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored and controlled. The containment pressure limits are derived l from the inout conditions used in the containment functional , analyses and the containment structure external pressure i analysis. Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a Design Basis Accident (DBA). post accident containment pressures could exceed calculated values. O l l APPLICABLE Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used ' SAFETY ANALYSES in the DBA analyses to establish the maximum peak containment internal nressure. The limiting DBAs considered. relative to containment pressure. are the LOCA and SLB. which are analyzed using computer modeled pressure transients. The Worst case LOCA generates larger mass and energy release than the worst case SLB. Thus. the LOCA event bounds the SLB event from the containment peak pressure standpoint (Ref. 1). I i BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
^
cr.: a ' crf ' T'f55.
- . ~
l-f , - E"3E5 \ th lV ADP ICABLE SAFET) ANALYSES (continuec.i The initial pressure condition usec in :ne cor.:aanren: analysis was 0.3 psig. Evaluations performec snowec :na: -
-the initial pressure was raised to 1 ps19 int maximu ceas cressure from a LOCA was 47.8 osig for Un1: ' anc ac.2 :3 : .
. for Unit 2. Tne containment analysis (Ref 11 snoe.s :na; ~
the maximum peak calculated containment pressure, 0,, results from tne limiting LOCA. The maximum conta1hmen: [ pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA does not e.xcesc the containment design pre.ssure. 50 psig. e The containment was also evaluated for an external pressure load' equivalent to -3.5 psig (Ref. 2), The inaovertent ' actuation of the Containment Spray System was analyzed to determine the resulting. reduction in containment pressure. The initial pressure condition used in this analysis was 0.0 psig. This resulted in a minimum pressure inside containment of -3.48 psig, which is less than the design load. For'certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. In particular, the cooling effectiveness of .~ the Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood s phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing !(d containment backpressure. Therefore, for the reflood phase, the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner oesigned to conservatively minimize. rather than maximize.
.the containment. pressure response in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K (Ref. 3). .
Containment pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). l i I I LO r BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 2 8/20/98 Revision J i n , v
- L.c_5,e 9e- :y.
eg Bi3E3 U LCO Maintaining containment pressure at less inan er e:sa' - tne LCO upper pressure limit ensums nat. 7 n ne ever- " a DBA. tne resultant peak containment acc1:ent pressure v. ' remain belov. the containment aesign pressure Mamtrr r; containment pressure at greater tnan or ecua;i ic Ine LCO lower pressure limit provices reasonable assurance ~ r tne containment will not exceed the assign negaine differential pressure following the inaavertent actuatler c-the Containment Spray System. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release o' radioactive material to containment. Since maintaining containment pressure within limits is essential to ensure initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses are maintained. the LCO is applicable in MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consecuences of tnese events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore. maintaining j containment pressure within the limits of the LCO is not ' required in MODES 5 or 6. O - ACTIONS A.1 When containment pressure is not within the limits of the LCO. it must be restored to within these limits within 1 hour. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the containment analysis. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. " Containment." which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. O J t BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A
r 1 _or.:3 m er- ress - I b - q sa: A:TIONS (continued) ) l E: and E 2 If containment pressure cannot be restore: tc v. tm " ' m :s ! witnin the reau1 red Completion Time. tne unit mus: ce brougnt to a MODE in which the LCO coes not apply. Tc achieve this status the unit must be orouant to at leas:
~
MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 nours. Tne I allowed Completion Times are reasonaDie. based on opera: 1nc experience, to reach the required unit cona1tions from ful i power conditions in an orderly manner and witnout challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3 6 4.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that containment pressure is within limits ensures that unit operation remains within the limits assumed in tne containment analysis. The 12 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to trending of containment pressure variations during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the (q/ control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal containment pressure condition. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Section 6.2.
- 2. Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Byron Station Units 1 and 2. Supplement 2.
- 3. 10 CFR 50. Appendix K. I A
O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.4 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
l Containmer: 6 ~e :p 9 l
= .-
l l E 3.6 CDNTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.E Containment .1r Tem erature j BASES l BACKGRDUND The containment structure serves to contain radioact ne material that may be releaseo from the reactor core 1 1 following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Tne containmen: ) average air temperature is limited curing normal opera:1er ' to preserve the initial conditions assumed in the acclaent ! analyses for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Steam Line l Break (SLB). l The containment average air temperature limit is derived from the input conditions used in the containment functional analyses and the containment structure external pressure analyses. This LCO ensures that initial conditions assumed in the analysis of containment response to a DBA are not violated during unit operations. The total amount of energy to be removed from containment by the Containment Spray and Cooling Systems during post accident conditions is dependent upon the energy released to the containment due to the event. as well as the initial containment temperature and n pressure. The higher the initial temperature, the more ( energy that must be removed, resulting in higher peak containment pressure and temperature. Exceeding containment design pressure may result in leakage greater than that assumed in the accident analysis. Operation with containment temperature in excess of the LCO limit violates an initial condition assumed in the accident analysis. l APPLICABLE Containment average air temperature is an initial condition SAFETY ANALYSES used in the DBA analyses and is an important consideration ; in establishing the containment environmental qualification operating envelope for both pressure and temperature. The limit for containment average air temperature ensures that operation is maintained within the assumptions used in the DBA analyses for containment (Ref. 1). A U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.5 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
Cor.tainmerc & e rern.e+ g; :. EASES q V APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continuec) The limiting DBAs conslaered relative to containmen: OPERABILITY are the LOCA and SLB. Tne DBA LOCA anc SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predic* :ne resultant containment pressure transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. Tne postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to Engineerec Safety Feature (ESF) Systems. assuming the loss of one ES; bus. which is the worst case single active failure. resulting in one train each of the Containment Spray System. Residual Heat Removal System.. and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable. The limiting DBA for the maximum peak containment air temperature is an SLB. The initial containment average air temperature assumed in the design basis analyses (Ref. 1) 15 120 F. This resulted in a maximum containment air temperature of 319.7'F. The design temperature of the containment structure is 280*F. The maximum peak containment air temperature was calculated to exceed the containment design temperature for only a few seconds during j the transient. Thermal analyses showed that the time interval during which the containment air temperature exceeded the containment design temperature was short enough O that the containment temperatures remained below the design U temperature. The basis of the containment design temperature. however, is to ensure the performance of safety related equipment inside containment (Ref. 2). Therefore, it is concluded that the calculated transient containment air temperature is acceptable for the DBA SLB. l The containment average air temperature limit is also used l to establish the environmental qualification operating l envelope for containment. The temperature limit is also used in the depressurization analyses to ensure that the minimum pressure limit is maintained following an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System (Ref. 1). l !,3
'~'
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.5 - 2 8/13/98 Revision J ! 1
'cr.t a , nmen: D
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?.-
BASE 3 APPLICABLE SAFETY AMLYSES (CCntinuec) Tne containment pressure transient is sens1:1ve tc ine in1tlal air mass in containment anc. tnerefore. 10 :ne initial containment air temperature. Tne ilmitin; 05: 'r establishing the maximum peak containment internal cressure is a LOCA. The temperature limit is usec in Inis analysis to ensure that in the event of an accident the maximr containment internal pressuce will not De exceecec Containment average air temperature satisfies Criterion of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LC0 During a DBA. with an initial containment average air temperature less than or equal to the LCO temperature limit. 4 the resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the evaluated containment temperatures. As a result. the ability of containment to perform its design function is
- ensured.
t O l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of v radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore. maintaining containment average air temperature within the limit is not required in MODES 5 or 6. ACTIONS A1 When containment average air temperature is not within the limit of the LCO it must be restored to within limit within 8 hours. This Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the containment analysis. The 8 hour Completion Time is acceptable considering the sensitivity of the analysis to variations in this parameter and provides sufficient time to correct minor problems. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.5 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A
y:3 nee- . g 7 9. = - .. n E15E5 l
!d A:TIONS (continued) l E ? anc E 2 l
If the containment average air temperature canno: De restored to witnan its limit within tne recu1 rec Cor; e; y 1 Time. tne unit must ce brought to a MODE in wnicn :ne LCO does not apply. To acnieve this status. the uni: mus: be brouc;nt to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours anc to M0;E E W1tnin J6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach ine required unit concitions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. I SURVEILLANCE SP 3651 : REQUIREMENTS l Verifying that containment average air temperature 15 within 1 the LCO limit ensures tnat containment operation remains within the limit assumed for the containment analyses. In order to determine the containment average air temperature, an arithmetic average 15 calculated using measurements taken , at locations within the containment selected to provide a l
/~' - conservative estimate of the overall containment atmosphere
( (e.g. the dry bulb inlet temperature of the running reactor containment fan coolers). The 24 hour Frequency of this SR is considered acceptable based on observed slow rates of t o erature increase within containment as a result of en.ironmental neat sources (due to the large volume of containment). Furthermore. the 24 hour Frequency is considered adeauate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition. l REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Sectior 6.2.
- 2. 10 CFR 50.49. I l
l O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.5 - 4 9/1/98 Revision A
- ontainmen: 50 a. a : :::' j .
5_2.6 ' 23',nitPGU Ss5 EM5
- A.
IV E 2.6 6 Containment Spray anc Cooling Systems
- BASES ,
BACKGROUND Tne Containment Soray and Containment Cooling Systems ! provice containment atmosonere cooling to limit D0s: acc10ent pressure and temperature in containment to less tnan the design values. Reduction of containment pressure and the iodine removal capability of the spray recuces tne release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment. in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). to within limits. The Containment Spray and i Containment Cooling Systems are designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 38. " Containment Heat Removal." GDC 39. " Inspection of Containment Heat Removal Systems." GDC 40. " Testing of Containment Heat i Removal Systems." GDC 41. " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup." l GDC 42. " Inspection of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup i Systems." and GDC 43. " Testing of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup' Systems" (Ref. 1). The Containment-Cooling System and Containment Spray System are Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems and are O discussed in UFSAR. Sections 9.4.8 and 6.5.2. respectively l V (Refs 2 and 3). They are designed to ensure that the heat
~
removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained. The Containment Spray System in conjunction with the Containment Cooling System limit and a o g'e maintain post accident conditions to less than the containment design values. In addition. the Containment
$ '3 Spray System and Containment Cooling System provide an -4 M
H alternate hydrogen control function to the hydrogen
-g recombiners. hydrogen mixing during post Loss Of Coolant yg e-Accident (LOCA) conditions.
9 t 1
-BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 1 8/13/98 Revision J i
l Containmen: 50 8., an: :::' ~; 5. :: e-E BASE (A) U BACKGROUND (continued) COnta'nment $prav System Tne Containment Spray System consists of two separate ;0: capacity trains, eacn capable of meeting tne ces1gr cases Eacn train includes a containment spray pump. spray neacers-nozzles. valves. and piping. Eacn train is powerec from a separate ESF bus. The Refueling Water Storage Tant (Rns~ supplies borated water to the Containment Sprav System during the injection phase of operation. In the recirculation mode of operation, containment spray pump suction is transferred from the RWST to the containment sump (s). The Containment Spray System provides a spray of cold borated water mixed with sodium hydroxide (Na0H) from the spray additive tank into the upper regions of containment to reduce the containment pressure and temperature and to reduce fission products from the containment atmosphere during a DBA. The RWST solution temperature is an important factor in determining the heat removal capability of the Containment Spray System during the injection phase. In the recirculation mode of operation. heat is removed from the A containment sump water by the residual heat removal heat V exchangers. Each train of the Containment Spray System provides adequate spray coverage to meet the system design requirements for containment heat removal. The Spray Additive System injects an NaOH solution into the spray. The resulting alkaline pH of the spray enhances the ability of the spray to scavenge fission products from the containment atmosphere. The NaOH added in the spray also ensures an alkaline pH for the solution recirculated in the containment sump. The pH band of the containment sump water minimizes the evolution of iodine while minimizing the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to the fluid The ! chemical aspects of lodine removal capability are addressed in LCO 3.6./. " Spray Additive System." O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A :l
Containmen: Soray ar.: :cc'7 ; bs:e - ) B;SES BACKGROUND (continuec) Tne Containment Spray System is actuated eitner I automatically by a containment H1gn-3 pressure signa' or manually. An automatic actuation opens tne containmer: spray pumo ciscnarge valves. starts the two containmen; i spray pumps, and begins the injection pnase. A manuai l actuation of the Containment Soray System requires ne i operator to actuate two separate switches on tne mam control board to begin the same sequence. Tne injectior phase continues until an RWST LO-3 alarm is receivec. anc the operator manually aligns the system to the recircula:1cn mode. The Containment Spray System in the recirculation mode maintains an equilibrium temperature between the containment atmosphere and the recirculated sump water. Operation of the Containnot Spray System in the recirculation mode is controlled by the operator in accordance with the emergency operating procedures. l Containment Coolina Svstem ) l Two trains of containment cooling, each of sufficient capacity to supply 100% of the design cooling requirement, are provided. Each train consisting of two Reactor
/ Containment Fan Coolers (RCFCs) 1s supplied with cooling (3) water from a separate train of Essential Service Water (SX) and is powered from a separate ESF bus. During all i
l operating conditions, air is drawn from the upper volume of the containment approximately 50 feet above the operating floor by a return air riser (one riser for each RCFC unit). i The return air is then routed through the SX cooling coils. ' the Chilled Water (WO) cooling coils. and the fan and discharge duct (one for each RCFC unit). The RCFC discharges directly into the lower containment volume. The WO chiller unit condensers are served by the SX return from the RCFC SX cooling coils. Upon receipt of an ESF signal the WO condensers are automatically isolated from SX. Containment Cooling System train A consists of RCFC A and C: and train B consists of RCFC B and D. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A
% - ...,s. . 4 - __c.+ _ u. s. 4 - +2 a.. -_ - , . 5 a Containmen: 50 53 ar.: :::" ~; 5d:e ;
E. 5AIE5 l BACKGROUND (continue ) Durino normal operation. tne fans are operate: a: rac sree: with $X supplied to tne coolina coils. Tne Containmbn:
- Cooling System 1s aesigned to limit the'amoient containter; air temper 6ture during normal unit operation to less :nar the limit specified in LCO 3.6.5. " Containment Air Temperature." This . temperature limitation ensures ine: :ne containment temperature does not exceed the initial
. temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs.
-In post accident operation following an actuation signal.
the Containment Cooling System fans are designed to start automatically in slow speed if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, the fans automatically snift to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent adverse fan conditions (e.g., motor overload, increased blade stresses) from the , higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the SX 15 an-
]
important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan ' units, i
.. APPLICABLE The Containment Spray System and Containment Coo'ing System Pi -SAFETY ANALYSES limit the temperature and pressure that could be experienced
, L/ . following a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the LOCA and the Steam Line Break (SLB). The LOCA and SLB are , analyzed using computer codes designed to. predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF
- - bus, which is the worst case single active failure and results in one train of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable.
i l k 6 O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 4 8/13/98 Revision J 4
l Containter,: Spray anc c:: r; E.neu !
- .- l l
BASE 3-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) The analysis and evaluation show that under tne worst case i scenario. the highest peak containment pressure is J .6 es1: ~ , for Unit 1 and 44.4 psig for Unit 2 (experientec cur:n; a LOCA). The analysis snows that the peak containmen:
-l temperature is 319.7*F (experienced during an SLB). Bc:n a results meet the intent of the oesign basis. (See tne Ba m i for LCO 3.6.4. " Containment Pressure." and LCO 3.6.5 for a detailed discussion.) The analyses and evaluations assume a unit specific power level of 3579 MWt. one containment spray train and one containment cooling train operating, and initial (pre-accident) containment conditions of 120'F and 0.3 psig. Evaluations were performed that showed if the initial pressure was raised to 1 psig the max 1 rum peak pressure would be 47.8 psig for Unit 1 and 44.4 psig for Unit 2. The analyses also assume a response time delayed initiation to provide conservative peak calculated containment pressure and temperature responses.
For_ certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. In particular, the effectiveness of the Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment .A backpressure. For these calculations, the containment U - backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50. Appendix K (Ref. 4). The effect of ah inadvertent containment spray actuation has been analyzed. An inadvertent spray actuation results in a
-3.48 psig containment pressure and is associated with the sudden cooling effect in the interior of the leak tight containment. Additional discussion is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.6.4.
The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment analysis is based on a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles. The Containment-Spray System total response time of 58 seconds includes Diesel Generator (DG) startup (for loss. of offsite power), sequencing of equipment. containment spray pump startup. and spray line filling (Ref. 5). o .Q-- lV 4 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 5 8/13/98 Revision J L l
Certainmen: Spra; anc :n' r; i. : em i ELSES AOPLICABLE SAFETY AfMLYSES (continuec) Containment cooling train performance for post accacen: conditions is given in Reference 6. Tne result of :ne analysis is that eacn train can proviae 100% of tne re = re; ceak cooling capacity auring tne post acclaent concit,cr Tne train post accident cooling capacity unaer varying containment ambient conaltions, requirea to perform :ne accident analyses. 1s also snown in Reference 7 The modeled Containment Cooling System actuation from tne containment analysis is based upon a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full Containment Cooling System air and safety grade cooling water flow. The Containment Cooling System total response time of 40 seconds. includes signal delay. DG startup (for loss of offsite power). and service water pump startup times (Ref. 5). The Containment Spray System and the Containment Coolina l System satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(11).
~
l p LCO During a DBA. a minimum of one containment cooling train and j Q one containment spray train are required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 7). Additionally. one containment spray train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. To ensure that these requirements l are met, two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains must be OPERABLE. The chemical aspects of lodine removal capability are addressed in LC0 3.6.7. Therefore in the event of an accident, at least one train l in each system operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs. Each Containment Spray System includes a spray pump spray headers, nozzles. valves. piping. Instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A
Containment 50 a, ar: :::n; .ne l 1 BA3E3 l
;O LCO (continued)
Eacn Containment Cooling System inclu es cooling cc :s campers fans. Instruments. and controls to ensure a" OPERABLE flow patn. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure and temperature requiring tne operatien of the containment spray trains and containment cooling ) trains. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus. the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6. ACTIONS A1 O With one containment spray train inoperable, the inoperable i> containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition. the remaining OPERABLE spray and cooling trains dre adequate to perform the iodine , removal and containment cooling functions. The 7 cay l Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat ! removal capability afforded by the Containment Spray System. l reasonable time for repairs. and low probability of a DBA l occurring during this period. ' The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 1s based upon engineering judgment. It tages into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. Refer to Section 1.3. " Completion Times." for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LC0" portion of the Completion Time. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 7 6/13/98 Revision A
Containment Spray an: ::rn;j. n E13E5 A:TIONS (continued > E ! and B.2 If the inocerable containment spray train cannc: ce res: re: to OPERABLE status within the recuired Completion Tine. :ne unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO coes ne: apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be brou;:nt :: at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable. based on operating experience, to reacn MODE J from full power conditions in an orderly manner ana witnou: challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reacn MODE 5 allows additional time for attempting restoration of the containment spray train and is reasonable when considering the driving force for a release of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3. C_.1 With one or more of the containment cooling trains inoperable. the inoperable containment cooling train (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The OPERABLE Q components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal Q capabilities and provide a redundant cooling system for heat removal needs. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the heat removal capabilities afforded by the Containment Spray System and the low probability of DBA occurring during this period. The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the 1ow probability of an accident occurring during this time. l Refer to Section 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LC0" portion of the Completion Time. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 8 6/13/98 Revision A
l C0r:al n'ren: Scra, an: 2:r 3. n s - I E ! l EASEE V A^TIONS (continued) D 1 and D 2 If the Requirea Action and associatec Completion Tre c' Concition C of this LCO are not met. the unit mus: ce brought to a MCCE in wnich the LCO does not apply. Te I achieve this status, the unit must be brought to di leas: ' MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. Tne ! allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on opera: 1n; l experience, to reach the required unit conditions from ful' ' power conditions in an orderly manner and without l challenging plant systems. : l With two containment spray trains or any combinati.on of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable. the unit is in a condition outside the accioent 1 analysis. Tnerefore. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. SURVEILLANCE SR 3 6.6.1 REQUIREMENTS (~ Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated. ' and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path l provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for 1 Containment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply 1 to valves that are locked sealed. or otherwise secured in l position. since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking. sealing or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification. through a system walkdown. that those valves outside containment (only check valves are inside containment) and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. 1 O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 9 6/13/98 Revision A
Containment Sora.s at: ::( r; 'w: q SASE5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continues, SP 3662 Operating eacn containment cooling train fan unit m s're speed) for 2 15 minutes ensures tnat all trains are OPE M E_E and tnat all associated controls are function 1nc proper's It also ensures that blockage fan or motor failure. or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action The 31 day Frequency was developed considering tne known reliability of the fan units and controls, the two train redundancy available. and the low probability of significan: degradation of the containment cooling train occurring between survelliances. It has also been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. SR 3 6 6.3 Verifying that each containment cooling train SX cooling flow rate to each cooling unit is 2 2660 gpm provides assurance that the design flow rate assumed in the safety analyses will be achieved. The Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the SX System. the two train redundancy available. and the low probability of a q significant degradation of flow occurring between Q surveillances. SR 3 6 6.4 Verifying each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by SECTION XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 8). Since the containment spray pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers. they are tested on recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY. trend performance, and detect incipient failures by abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 10 6/13/98 Revision A
- cntainmen: Scray arc [c:r; 3. : #
5 ' e 343E5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continue:D SP 7 6 6 ; anc SR 3666 These SRs reau1re verification that eacn automatic containment spray valve actuates to its correct pos':1cr anc that eacn containment spray pump starts upon rece10: o ar actual or simulated actuation of a containment H1ar-3 pressure signal. This Surveillance is not reau1 rec for valves tnat are locked, sealed. or otnerwise secured in :ne required position under aaministrative controls. Tne 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform tnese Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month Frequencv. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is also required by SR 3.5.2.5. A single surveillance may be used to satisfy both requirements. p SR 3 6 6.7 v This SR requires verification that each containment cooling train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. The 18 month Frequency is based dn engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. See SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6. above, for further discussion of the basis for , the 18 month Frequency. l SR 3 6 6.8 With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray ) header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke ! can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that I each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance ' that spray coverage of the containment curing an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle. a test at 10 year intervals is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. l 0 1 V l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.6 - 11 6/13/98 Revision A l 1 l
l Containmen: Soray anc Cos' n: 5..s;e 5 l
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REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50. Apoendix A. GDC 38. GD: 39. GD: 40. G:: ;; l GDC 42. and GDC 43. .
- 2. UFSAR. Section 9.4,8.
- 3. UFSAR. Section 6.5.2. l l
- 4. '10 CFR 50. Appendix K. I
- 5. UFSAR. Section 6.2.1.1.3.
- 6. UFSAR. Section 6.2.2.
- 7. UFSAR. Section 6.2.
- 8. ASME. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. SECTION XI.
( l 4 l l l f BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6. 6 -- 12 6/13/98 Revision A
I Sra.s A::t .f 5.: c e-E i.6:.:0tJ41NMEtc SYSTEM 5
-B 3.6;7 Spray Aoditive System BASES BACKGROUND The Spray Additive System is a subsystem of the Con alnme--
Spray System that assists in. reducing the looine fisstor - product inventory in the containment atmosphere resul:1n from a Design Basis Accioent (DBA) and is oescr1Ded in.US SE : Section 6.5.2 (Ref. 1). Radiciodine in;its various forms is the fission product of primary concern in the evaluation of a DBA. It is absoroec by the spray from the containment atmosphere. To enhance the iodine absorption capacity of the spray. the spray solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH that promotes lodine hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile forms. Because of its stability when exposed to radiation and elevated temperature. sodium' hydroxide (Na0H) -is the preferred spray additive. The NaOH added to the spray also ensures an equilibrium sump pH value of a 8.0 and s 11.0 of the solution recirculated from the containment sump. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine, while minimizing the occurrence of> chloride and caustic stress corrosion on .O mechanical systems and components. V j The Spray Additive System consists of one spray additive tank that is shared by the two trains of spray additive equipment. Each train of equipment provides a flow path 1 from the spray additive tank'to a containment spray pump and ! consists of an eductor for each containment spray pump. l valves instrumentation. and conntcting piping. Each ! eductor draws the NaOH spray solution from the common tank '
..$ using a portion of the borated water discharged by the
. .:. containment spray pump as the motive flow. The eductor 3
'.j- mixes the NaOH solution and the borated water and discharges !
ri the mixture into the spray pump suction line. The eductors y are designed to ensure that the pH of the spray mixture is y between 8.5 and 12.8. l i BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 1 8/13/98 Revision J
Srra) 4:; - .5 . :e: n b;3E5 BACKGROUND (cor.tinuea) Tne Containment Spray System actua: 1or sicna' caems :re valves from tne spray acoltive tank to tne ecu :c-(C5019A/B). tne alscnarge valve to tne ecuctor fro :ne 3 pump alscnarae (C5010A/B). if not alreaay open. an: :ne isolation valve into containment (C5007A/B): in acal:1cr :: starting tne CS pumps. Tne 30% to 36% NaOH solution is drawn into the spray pump suctions. Tne spray adaltive tans capacity provides for the addition of NaOH solution to al' of the water sprayed from the Refueling Water Storage Tans (RWST) into containment. The percent solution and volume of solution sprayed into containment ensures a long term containment sump pH of a 8.0 and 5 11.0. This ensures the continued iodine retention effectiveness of the sump water during the recirculation phase of spray operation and also minimizes the occurrence of chloride induced stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel recirculation piping. APPLICABLE The Spray Additive System is essential to the removal of SAFETY ANALYSES airborne iodine ,athin containment following a DBA. (O
'y Following the assumed release of radioactive materials into containment. the containment is assumed to leak at its design value volume following the accident. The analysis assumes that 100% of containment is covered by the spray (Ref. 2).
The DBA response time assumed for the Spray Additive System 15 the same as for the Containment Spray System and is discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.6.6. " Containment Spray and Cooling Systems." The DBA analyses assume that one train of the Containment Spray System / Spray Additive System is inoperable and that the entire spray additive tank volume is added to the remaining Containment Spray System flow path. The Spray Additive System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). f3 U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A
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LCO Tne Soray Acc1tive Systerr is necessar;. tc recace :ne eNas of radioactive material to tne environmen m tne ever: c e DBA. To be conslaered OPERABLE. ine volume anc concentration of the SDray acC1tive solution mus: De ,, sufficient to provice NaOH injection into Ine sora,1 ,. until tne Centainment Spray System suction patn is s.. c ec from the RWST to tne containment sump. and to raise : e average spray solution pH to a level conoucive to locine removal. namely. to a 8.0 and s 11.0. Tnis pH range maximizes the effectiveness of the lodine removal mecnanism without introducing conditions that may induce caustic stress corrosion cracking of mecnanical system components. In addition. it is essential that valves in the Sorav , Additive System flow paths are properly positioned a'nd tha: l automatic valves are capable of activating to their correct positions. I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. a DBA could cause a release of ) radioactive material to containment requiring the operation of the Spray Additive System. The Spray Additive System i assists in reducing the iodine fission product inventory prior to release to the environment. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Thus the Spray Additive System 1s not required to be OPERABLE in MODE S or 6. l ACTIONS A1 If the Spray Additive System 1s anoperable. it must be restored to OPERABLE within 7 days. The pH adjustment of the Containment Spray System flow for corrosion protection and iodine removal enhancement is reduced in this condition. The Containment Spray System would still be available and would remove some lodine from the containment atmosphere in the event of a DBA. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant flow path capabilities and the low l probability of the worst case DBA occurring during this
- period.
tO V BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A
5~ e 2.:: - . + c. - BASE 5 ACTIONS (continued) E 1 and E ? If the Soray Ada1tive System cannot be restore: :- OrERAE E status witnin tne reauirec Completion Time. tne um: ms: r-brought to a MODE in which the LCO coes not apph Tc acnleve tnis status. the unit must be brougni to at leas: MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 84 hours. Tne allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable. base or operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 5 allo,.s 1 additional time for attempting restoration of the Spray Additive System and is reasonable when considering the driving force for a release of radioactive material from ine Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3. SURVEILLANCE SR 3671 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment of Spray Additive System I manual and automatic valves in the spray additive flow path < provides assurance that the system is able to provide (- additive to the Containment Spray System in the event of a DBA. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather. it_ involves verification, through a system walkdown. that those valves outside containment ana capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. l A U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
Scra,, :.cc-- .+ = MSE3 SURVEILLAN:E REQUIREMENTS (con:1nued; SP 16~? To provide effective locine removal. tne conta?nme' #. must be an alkallne solution. Since Ine Re,S' cente- 4 normally acidic. tne volume of tne spray accnive av ,E orovide a sufficient volume of spray additive to ac;us: .n - for all water injected. Tnis SR 1s performed to ver,f3 tre availability of sufficient NaOH solution in the Spray Additive System. The 184 day Frequency was developed base: on the low probability of an undetected change in tank volume occurring during the SR interval (the tank is isolated during normal unit operations). Tank level is also l indicated and alarmed in the control room. 50 that there is high confidence that a substantial change in level woula De detected. SR 3673 i This SR provides verification of the NaOH concentration in the spray additive tank and is sufficient to ensure that the spray solution being injected into containment is at the correct pH level. The 184 day Frequency is sufficient to q ensure that the concentration level of NaOH in the spray V additive tank remains within the established limits. This is based on the low likelihood of an uncontrolled change in concentration (the tank is normally isolated) and the probability that any substantial variance in tank volume will be detected. SR 3674 This SR provides verification that each automatic valve in the Spray Additive System flow path actuates to its correct position. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on tne need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient 11 the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. l r ( O b BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 5 6/13/98 Revision A
50-a.s A:: * ' , f 5. t 2- - 9,. I g BLSEE d SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continuea; 50 3.6 5 To ensure that tne correct pH level is estaollsne: an :re borated water solution provicec of the Containmen: 5pras System. the flow rate in the Soray Adaitive System 15 ' verified once every 5 years. Tnis SR provides assurance tnat the correct amount of NaOH will be metered into Ine flow patn in each CS train upon Containment Spray System initiation. Due to the passive nature of the spray adal:ne flow controls. the 5 year Frequency is sufficient to identify component degradation that may affect flow rate. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Section 6.5.2.
- 2. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
/* ( O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.7 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A
sca;ee :i:: : E p 5 3.6 :.Di,7 !ff S ~ 5 T EME B 3.6.8 Hyorogen Recomoiners BASES BACKGROUND Tne function of the hydrogen recomolners is to el m nate : + potential breach of containment due to a nydrogen oxygen reaction. Per 10 CFR 50.44. " Standards for Combustible Gas Control Systems in Lignt-Water-Cooled Reactors" (Ref. 1), anc GDC 41. " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref 2), hycroger recombiners are required to reduce the hydrogen concentration in the containment following a Loss Of Coolan: Accident (LOCA) or Steam Line Break (SLB). The recomoiners accomplish this by recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. The vapor remains in containment, thus eliminating any discharge to the environment. The hydrogen recombiners are manually initiated since flammable limits would not be reacned until several days after a Design Basis i Accident (DBA). i Two 100% capacity independent hydrogen recombiner systems q are provided and shared between the units. Each consists of Q controls located in the auxiliary building. a power supply and a recombiner. Recombination is accomplished by heating 1 a hydrogen air mixture to 1325 F. The resulting water vapor ' and discharge gases are cooled prior to discharge from the recombiner A single recombiner is capaLle of maintaining the hydrogen concentration in containment below the 4.1 volume percent (v/o) flammability limit. Two recombiners are provided to meet the requirement for redundancy and independence. Each recombiner is powered from a separate Engineered Safety Features bus and is provided with a separate power panel and control panel. The hydrogen recombiners are described in UFSAR. l Section 6.2.5 (Ref. 3). A U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 1 6/13/98 Revision A
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s ELSE3 b APPLICABLE Tne nyorogen recomoiners provice fcr :ne caram' :: :- SAFET) ANALYSES controlling tne Dull hyorogen concentratior in cer:ainne ~ to less than the lower flammable concentration c' - : .: follo<nng a DBA. This control would creven a containne"- wide hydrogen ourn. thus ensuring the pressure an: temperature assumed in the analyses are nc; exceece { 'nf limiting DBA relative to nyorogen generation is a m - Hydrogen may accumulate in containment following a LCC- as a result of:
- a. A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel roa cladding and the reactor coolant:
- b. Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the containment sump:
- c. Hydrogen in the RCS at the time of the LOCA (i .e.
nydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant and hyorogen gas in the pressurizer vapor space): or
- d. Corrosion of metals exposed to containment spray and Emergency Core Cooling System solutions.
To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in .' containment following a LOCA. the hydrogen generation as a function of time following the initiation of the accident is calculated. Conservative assumptions recommended by-Reference 4 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen calculated. Based on the conservative assumptions used to calculate the hydrogen concentration versus time after a LOCA. the hydrogen concentration in the primary containment would reach 3.5 v/o about 6 days after the LOCA and 4.0 v/o about 2 days later if no recombiner was functioning (Ref. 3). Initiating the hydrogen recombiners when the primary containment hydrogen concentration reaches 3.5 v/o will maintain the hydrogen concentration in the primary containment below flammability limits. D (v BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 2 6/13/98 Revision A
nycr ger : g 7 7.u.- E:5E3 j
- f APPLICA5LE SAFETi ANALiSES (continuec)
Tne nyorogen recombiners are aesignec sucn :na: i., : - :re conservatively calculated hyorogen generation re:es , discussed aDove. a single recomainer is capaDie O- r: r tne peak nyarogen concentration in containment tc less trar 4.0 v/o (Ref. 5). The hydrogen recombiners satisfy Criterlon 3 of ; 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). l l 1 i LCO Two hydrogen recombiners must be OPERABLE. This ensures operation of at least one hydrogen recombiner in the event of a worst case single active failure. Operation with at least one hydrogen recombiner ensures that I the post LOCA hydrogen concentration can be prevented from i exceeding the flammability limit. I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2. two hydrogen recombiners are required to control the hydrogen concentration within containment below (. its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o following a LOCA. assuming a worst case single failure. In MODES 3 and 4. both the hydrogen production rate and the l total hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also. because of the limited time in these MODES. the probability of an accident requiring the hydrogen recombiners is low. Therefore. the hydrogen recombiners are not required in MODE 3 or 4. In MODES 5 and 6. the probability and consequences of a LOCA are low. due to the pressure and temperature limitations in I these MODES. Therefore. hydrogen recombiners are not i required in tnese MODES. j i i l l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 3 6/13/98 Revision A
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M3E3 ACTIONS L1 With one containment nydrogen recomoiner mcoerarle :N inocerable recomoiner must be restorea to 00ERABLE s;atus within 30 days. In this conaltion. tne remaining OPER;5 E hydrogen recomoiner 15 adeauate to perform tne hycroger control function. However. tne overall reliabilits is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE r'ecomoiner could result in reduced nyorogen control capability. Tne 30 day Completion Time is based on the availability of tne other hydrogen recombiner, the small probability of a LOCA or SLB occurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammabiilty limit). and the amount of time available after a LOCA or SLB (should one occur) for operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exceeding the flammability limit. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that states the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one recombiner is l inoperable. This allowance is based on the availability of the other hydrogen recombiner. the small probability of a LOCA or SLB occurring (that would generate an amount of
,n hydrogen that exceed 5 the flammability limit), and the
(
") amount of time available after a LOCA or SLB (should one occur) for operator action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exceeding the flammability limit.
l l O V BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 4 6/13/98 Revision A
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E15E3 ACTIONS (continuea) B 1 and 9.2 With two nydrocen recomD1ners inoperable. tne aci l y :: perform tne hydrogen control function via alterna:e caDabilities must be ver1 fled by aoministrative mans c: r 1 hour. Tne alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the natural convection processes. containment fan cooler operation. containment spray and the Post-LCC Purge System. The 1 hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of nycrogen control function does not exist. In addition. the alternate hydrogen control system capability must be verifled once per 12 hours thereafter to ensure its continued availability. Both the initial verification and all subseauent verifications may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It I does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two hydrogen recombiners inoperable for up to 7 days. p) q Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two hydrogen recombiners to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would gcnerate hydrogen in the amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit. [1 If the inoperable hydrogen recombiner(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time or the hydrogen control function cannot be maintained. the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. O v BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 5 9/4/98 Revision A
myc cgee :+::3: ~ . - M5E3 V SURVEILL4CE SP ?6 1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of a system functional test for escr nycroger , recomolner ensures the recomolners are operational anc ca-attain and sustain tne temperature necessary for nycrocer 4 recomolnation. In particular. Inis SR ver1fles t":a: the minimum neater sheath temoerature increases to a 1200 1r s 90 minutes. After reaching 1200 F. tne power is increase; to maximum power for approximately 2 minutes and poner 15 verified to be a 38 kW. Operating experience has shown tnat these components usually pass the Surveillance wnen performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore. the Frequency was concluoed to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.6.8.2 This SR ensures there are no physical problems that could affect recomoiner operation. Since the recombiners are mechanically passive. they are not subject to mechanical failure. The only credible failure involves loss of power, blockage of the internal flow. missile impact. etc. A visual inspection is sufficient to determine abnormal conditions (e.g. loose wiring or structural connections. deposits of foreign material etc.) that could cause such failures. The 18 month Frequency for this SR was developed considering the incidence of hydrogen recombiners failing the SR in the past is low. SR 3.6 8 3 This SR requires performance of a resistance to ground test for each heater phase to ensure that there are no detectable grounds in any heater phase. This is accomplished by verifying that the resistance to ground for any heater phase is a 10.000 ohms. The 18 month Frequency for this Surveillance was developed considering the incidence of hydrogen recombiners falling the SR in the past is low. O O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 6 6/13/98 Revision A
- . . . - - . . . . . _ _ . . - . - . ~ . . . - - . . - . - . - . . . - . . . - . - . . - - . ~ . - - . . - . _ . _ - . . . .
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REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.44
- 2. 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 41.
- 3. UFSAR. Section 6.2.5.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.7. Revision 2.
- 5. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
O i BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8 - 7 6/13/98 Revision A
i g BYRON CTS MARKUPS 1 I d O 1 6 s G
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u e s.s - DEFTNTTIONS 5 e:.v.on s.o CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
- 1. ONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist wnen: ./
O a. A netrations required to be closed during accident con tilin's l are ei - t
- 1) Capable of closed by an OPERABLr ntainment automatic isolation valve s m, or
- 2) Closed by manual valve flanges, or deactivated automatic valves Jred in the losed positions, except as provided in e 3.6-1 of Specifica - 3.6.3.
- b. All e ent hatches are closed and sealed, achairlockisincompliancewiphtherequirementsof Soecification 3.6.1.3, 4 d. TS: :ntai- ent '::k:;; rate tre eithd- th: 'i=it: Of S::i'isat4an ,
- 0. 0. : .2, ; .d s.o Cumaaneo m W.ma-
- 2 ine s .i..,i, :::52-4 = ><so:iated with auch re--tr;;i.a (..v.,
- e. weios, to I h811 e er O . *s. o1 is UV :HABLE.
CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals. CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. I DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation and injecting simulated process data to verify OPERABILITY of alarm and/or trip functions. I hbtnwm m hMmh \.\ OTL k"T1org l.0 i BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 AMENDMENT NO. 94 4 O . i
y __ - _ _ . _ _ DEFINITIONS' m D CONTAINMENT INTEGRTTY
- 1. NTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist wnen: ~.
O a. All rations required to be closed during acciden endtions l are either: LA ig 1) Capable of being d by an LE containment automatic
) isolation valve system
- 2) Closed by valves, blind flan or deactivated auto valves secured in their c osed ions, except as vided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.
All eouipment hatches are closed and sealed,
- c. Each air lock is in compliance wiph the requirements of J 5 E.
3 4 L1 Specification 3.6.1.3, W V
- d. The eer.teii.eart leakefie retae are Withii, the li;ite ef Opeaificat4 h
- .:.:.:, er.: gue i S. l
'sTN_
CONTROLLEC LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals. CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATI0ll shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation and injecting simulated process data to verify OPERABILITY of alars and/or trip functions. _~ Ant @.Luen m h idisons 1.1 he. D S ne_ hnon s.O X- _ l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 AMENDMENT NO. 94 l lO wx
- 2. w , ; ,
LLO 3
- k +', l DEFINITIONS t w 'L L .3 CONTAINMENT INTEGRTTY g>Gc h 5.O
~
. AINMENT INTEGRITY snaH exist wnen:
- a. All penetrati ired to be el ng accident conditions -
are either: , t automatic t a le of being closed by an OPERABLE'co I isolation valve System. or j SE 3,6,3,3 sq 3,g.g.q 2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as , ! provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3. i lb. fil ::;;i;;;;t h:t:h:: r: 01:::d : d ::e+ed, l
- c. Eachairlockisincompliancewiphtherequirementsof i, L 2e s t..z.i Specification 3.6.1.3, ,,.
- d. Th; :;nt:ia;;at 1 :k:;: r:t:: Or: within th: li=it: c' 5; :i'5tien 3.0.L2, ;;d Qtytaseo mhns s try . _ gn Lu CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.
CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation and injecting simulated process data to verify OPERABILITY of alann and/or trip functions. Acceess,eo e Mnmons L\ h b %fL bc.Tyse 10 9 1-2 AMENDMENT NO. 94 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 lO l EcJ .7
. . . . . . . ~ _ - _ . _ - - . ~ . . . - - . - - . . . - - _ _ . . _ . . -
/,h .T I (c. I - 02 - 2 . .:
2.s @ CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS -l^ - l't 0 i "":M," RV COinA;;GEid 3
"**. I CONTAINMENTHhicGRi- n LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION LC C 3.6.1j) Primary CONTAINMENT h shall beiHiiiiihtsmes o r n e.c.J APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.
A: ACTION e %f.: A Without primary CONTAINMENTIM restore CONTAINMENTE.TANwithin 1 hour ~
' or be Fat least HOT STAR 2Y within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within'ThT;
~
~
- 8 i following 30 hours. l~
~ -
not locked EE~or , i o berwic e c es u . e . i o i . -' '" SURVElll_ANCE REQUIREMENTS LAO 4.0.1 p nore- &.t Primma'NTAINMEhlLINTE@RffM shall be demonstrated: ca .g.y
- en
.z.6-*h Q
.e- At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations t capable of being I e 3. 'o 1 closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be .
closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges,@r deactivate { a :- A- A 2/:. 24i.Tomatic valvessecured in their positions, except@ ke,i-f+j in TM'.: 3.! S e ~ Q p,.;T,wJw .M; uOfor containment isolation valvesphat are open under administrative controls; ,g enc ent 4 Es i. r s t curue volve flow it h .f' dQ 83 LCo 3.l. 3 At r iott. Ste. I Oy wei;ff ini I.e'. &&sI, sw6teiniA46i sii M !& 56 sw6-- 1,66 ei" s 7,e TeiguireffiEdi'oI'. Spes;Tist;ca 3.S.i.3;: dI A4 (vemt emm,now,c. o...; neit.. ,e ,ge s_a,,y e,a.or nr o , i.d, 0 P 3. l.. I. s Byperforming containmentdeelteeiltesting en accoraance wu 11 163. ****W 1"^', ;; si--d!'ed by en; a- ;r;;d ;O.:r i r :4v-..end j l l^^ CP.",5^.- ?;;-endia J Orkwu O. iee cWoinnient Lenkacje PM Tbig Fya' vm .. 3 Adel ret eci eri 1 ec a heat 8.n f.5.l(o 1 O im. C.o. ,* -..- ' ' < ge ._ m kr Cecw J. . J f (-INCirfir 2.6 -(
- Lfb 3.6.3 f;A A.2/c. 2 W3 4 *Exceptfalves, blind flanges,(and deactivated automatic valvepwhich are located inside the containment and areAocked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. S
,
- L3 jpenetreteener shall be) verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such Q
. verification need not rformed more often than once per 92 days.
- not Li, BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-1 AMENDMENT NO.102 i
EtV, J ~ i.
1 l CTS INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 ( ? d LCO 3.6.1 INSERT 3.6 1B ( A.2)
, j Deleted in Revision J.
i l i i l-1 4 q- 9/9/98 Revision J V u
^
l \ l l CTS INSERT (S) ! SECTION 3.6 LCO 3.6.3 l(INSERT 3.61C.(Lu and LE)
- . CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
)
1 A. ... A.1- ... .. j b.@ A.2 NOTE j 1. Isolation devices in high radiation-areas may be verified by use of, administrative means.
- 2. Isolation devices that are locked.- !
sealed, or 7 otherwise secured may be verified by use-of administrative 1 means. I m 9/9/98 Revision J
,-- -. . . . _ . . . - . . . . . . - . . . . . - ~ _ - - . . . - . - . . . . - . - ~ . - . - i j -. i t CTS INSERT (S) ! SECTION 3.6. J I( ) LC0 3.6.3
~
{' INSERT 3.6 1C L(continued) (Li , and Lu) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTI0'N COMPLETION TIME l
-C. . . . C.1 ... ..
AM C.2 - NOTE ! l '1. Isolation devices ! in high radiation i areas may be. verified by use of administrative means, l
- 2. Isolation devices i that are locked, 1
. s'. Tied, or I otherwise secured (sS/ may be verified by use of administrative means, i ...
l l I
)
i i i
- 1. .
,fs. 9/9/98 Revision J kJ l-l r 4 . _ . .
yy m ._, _ . _ - . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ ._ _ . _ . _ _ _ _
~
'Ish - E.loI -C3 '
'... I . ' '
I' ~
' ' ~
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE UMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:
- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L, at P .
I b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations and valves subject [' V to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P,. L C0 3.G. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4. O ~~e.sr Ador
~
' ~~' ~
'.ed m .:.cean.c n - o i . E ..s . s.
D .
' ' ~
LCo 3.t, . ? _ ACTION: b W N'fe i fath either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L, or the .--- trc 3 (,. g ynessured combined leakaoe rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and_C tests - s Note 3 texceedino 0.60 LRestoreW.:;;;;;;; ::;::::d Met;; . :: ::::::r.:r 075 ', :. .d b; .- Are se,,Mr.;d Mrb 0 --'" 'e ?!! a-MMea.: Odj:-t 0 T p6i " er.d O ::!: te Mer ??a. 030 L, ,
- ~~
l , iprior to.-increasing t.h.e R_eactor Coolant System temperature aDove 200"P. i is _Co E.G./coNDA h cf Mc Lie :.VatU: VJ ni h u k Ihouf ,. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS fh
' 4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. ') f 1
(
'(
- a. Type A (Overall integrated Containment Leakage Rate) testing shall be conducted in A
, accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, as modified by an j
'N approved schedular exception and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
l ! l l l I I BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-2 AMENDMENT NO. 102 t% .
I,t; Z '- . & . I- C 1. , . , _ i . . , z : . s . ; - e.. nn a a- .. :n , . = . e & ;. ~. , L . . . E. e. Cc;; w .;e.rn. r ' "' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS -- - - ' -
-.. ~.. . ' . - -
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Centinued) I O -b 1 The reporting requirements and frequency of Type A tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, as modified by an approved schedular exception and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
-e- The accuracy of each Type A test sha'l be verified by a supplemental test conducted
^
in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. '" ' th- Type B and C tests shall be conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, iN i September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. .$ ,
. Z .S.(,.2.I-e- Airlocks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of ,
Specification 4.6.1.3, s3 9 # 'd. G Purge suppiy and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be
" E 2' G' 30 tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.7.3 ~
or 4.6.1.7.4, as applicable; and Q g 3 ,g,,,l + The structuralintegrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfacu of the w containment vessel, including the liner plate, shall be demonstrated during the G shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test by a visual inspection of l these surfaces. iThis inspection shall be performed at a frequency in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, to verify no apparent changes in % % g appearance or other sbnormal degradation. g n -A , The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable. Q'.C > y.,.-.1 s % -s....
-=
Y b l ($ W $*-- W ll =. ChlOg\ {, () D(.* TV ( D'f j Lo 6 i {,O
.d^..,. . _ _ .
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-3 AMENDMENT No.102 Pr s/ J 1
L. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS g ; , _- CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS ( LIMITING CONDITION FOR ODERATION u:.c u U u 1.2t Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
- . %:h d;;r : h ::d ::::pt th:n th: cir k:k i: bein; a:cd fcr no m.;l tr: :it entry :nd ::it: thr: gh th: ::nt:i ::nt, t'.:r :t k a : :n cir h:k d;;,r :h:11 b; :h::d, :nd i
- b. An overall ait lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L, at i P,.
mm m m s m m APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. - Addre<><d -Sre c *.7<>==;- bel D O L s ic e e t. O e FC A C T I ON : { wi 2ru '_' ' s ~ ' ' ',x' "~> " '
~
w~,,,.-,,...~ CWDA T. T)(ith one enr t t air loc -door inoperable;
- G A A IJc re.s }In ser- 3 le - 4 8 A, fn
'" ' ' ' r 92i-tri i RA A.i at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed andteg g r;;ter w,e in;scrable air led deer to 0"UACG stetus wunin s s A A .;. 24 hours led lock th OPERABLE air lock door closed;c.os 6A A.1 udTe.< ' W F#3 34-M hr q a A A.3 1L. Operation may then continue ! ntil ;;;rfernac cf th; c.e.: l t
] grecaired :cer:1' ni- locE 'r:E::: '--'!provided that the k A OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least 3 Q nn,* no s-
- CCI.'O 3 f Jnser r 34-4d [r L, 4'
- oM: D 1 Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and (D 4. The srensions of %ecific;ti;n 0.0.4 ;r: not ;;;1ic;b12.!
- .cw; c i.Ir.4.
l V.N.,-eWith o}-AA the c..@ containment airlock inoperablet, vexceptec4 .-asi %.c the' Q result of an
' A4 c.a inoperable air lock door,Cr+umat least one air lock door u c. 3 closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hourslor be in at least HOT STANDB7 within the next 6 hours and in i copo 9 (COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
vn DYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-4 AMENDMENT NO. 81 12cv J
i CTS INSERT (S)
.. SECTION 3,6 ,
0 N LC0 3.6.2
.l Ql INSERT 3.64A (A, and A-)
5 . ACTIONS NOTES --- - - - -
' l ( A,)
- 1. Entry and ex1t is permissible to perform repairs on the affecte: '
air lock . components'. { (A,) 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock, j ( A,) 3; Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.
- Q 'l . " Containment." when air lock leakage results in exceeding the s-overall containment leakage rate.
L
.O r' k c5l INSERT 3.6 4B (A . A3 and M3 ) j O C N ITI N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
A. . NOTES ... ( A,) 1. Required Actions A.1. A.2. and A.3 are not applicable if both doors in the same air lock are kr- inoperable and
- 4. n* Condition C is entered.
kk ( A,) (M2 ) 2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days
- g< k under administrative E
controls if both air locks are inoperable. i 8/15/98 Revision J
+ + rwa,
(. t CTS' INSERT (S) L SECTION 3.6 l $ 3
-lo no LCO 3.6.2
'H gl INSERT 3.6 4C ' (Ag and L3)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ' COMPLETION TIME- , B. One'or more N' OTES- - - containment air locks 1. Required Actions B.1. with containment air 'B.2. and B.3 are not lock interlock applicable if both doors i mechanism inoperable. in the same air lock are i
$ inoperable'and a Condition C is entered. i
.a ,
Ul ( A,) 2. Entry and exit of { s- containment is 1 permissible under the I control ci a dedicated
' individual.
~
1
- l p
sj B.1 Verify an OPERABLE 1 hour l door is closed in the 1 affected air lock. l l a!iQ l B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door. 24 hours closed in the affected air lock. I AND B.3 - - NOTE Air lock doors in high radiation areas 1 may be verified ' locked closed by administrative means. - Verify an OPERABLE Once per door is locked closed 31 days in the affected air lock. I) 8/15/98 Revision J
- - - . . _ _ _ _ _ . ~ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . .
LCC 3.a '- 5'pe c ilr; ca n er. E E si O ~ ~ , - stmvrrtLAN r Rz6Uiarum / s g p .2.1 ( 8N 58 4- 3+ -hV e.f.1.5- Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERAEl.Es
- a. By conducting airlock seal leakage tests in accordance with ,,
Regulatory cuide 1.163, september 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendiz J, f option B, by e " (1) Verifying that the door seal leakage is less than 0.0024La 0 when the volume between the door seals is pressurised to ,l greater than or equal to 3 peig by means of a permanently l, installed continuous pressurisation and leakage monitoring A Unm,o (2) Verifying that the door seal leakage is less than 0.01La as determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at a constant pressure of greater than or equal to 10 peig; b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests in accordance with g 34,.g , g Regulatory Guide 1.163, september 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendia J, option 5. l j
- c. At least once per th verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.
d. By verifying that the airlock esal leakage teste are less than 0.01 1.a as determined by precision flow measurements when measured cI for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at s' l Og8, constant pressure of greater than or equal to 10 peig in accordance with Regulatwry Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, l ! Appendix J, option 5. m Addrend id*um ST Sea. DOC he 9 din S.o BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-5 AMENDMENT No.97
LIMITING CONDITf0N FOR OoERATION Ltc 3.s.1
-3.6.1.6- The containment shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABfLITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. (O) EIIM: ' cent A If containment is found to be inoperable restore the containment to OPERABLE _. _sta.tus within_1_houvor be at least H0 BY within the next 6 hours and TiI cop 08 COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. n SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS \ SA,.0.;.. y.6./.J. Verify containment structural integrity in accordance with tne Containment Vessel Structural Integrity Program. O , l I v O w BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-8 AMENDMENT NO. 99 I?.Lu .')~
. . . . . ._~ .- -. . .~ .. .. ~ . . - . . . . - - - . - . - . . - . . . . . . . . - -
CIMfTATIOtENT VEEEEL STRUCTU1ULL INTEGRT*Y ,.-~.. f b 20 T7 .% a O<e EURVEff.f ANcT REOUIREME9f*S ICentinuedi i' t . . s d i i 1 i i M 4 h i a PAGE INTENT LEFT BLANK 1 e 4 b\ c , ,i .g . s {'t: k s e 4 J-q e armon - exzTs 1 a a m .., myo ,, ,,,, , lg wr
. - - . . . . . .. . . ... . ~ - - . . . . ~ . - ~ . ~ . . - _ . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . - . . ~ . . . ~ ~ . . - -
emregruxa,rr vassar, sTaneTan Imcarrr i { i C v'd 2 J sintVEft.IANer REOUTREMEN'S fcentinuedn ,
)
p !-~ ' . I i a e i i I , l I t 1 i j k I , PAGE INTENT Y I. EFT BIJu,K J $' D l J , r a: 1
- O; k mon - .In 2 2 m . 1. ,,,,,,,,,7,,.. f l l
4 I i
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_ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ ~ .
.,. :: ?. W 1 1
i 4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
! SURVEILLANCE RE0VfREMENTS i i
~g
< 3.G. 3.1
' i.:.'.! Each 48-inch containment _ purge supply and exhaust isolation h
,R
- valve (s) shall be verified clo 'r e
- re x x .2d'at least once per 31 days, t $
- s,ct 3 G.3. 2. \seoid' 0
' ' 5.1.'.? Each 8-inch contai purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be positioned in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.7b
- at least once per 31 days.
54 3.G.3. 7 4.5.1.7.1 At least once per 6 months * ; 0'" F,C" TEST " IU the inhoard - and outboard valves with resilient material sea's in each closed 48-inch ! containment guess se; ply and exhaust penetration shall be demonstrated , OPERABLEIW: r""'E; that the-mea--d ' - - " - ,a t t: ?::: the S OS L t;,} j br:r-"-tred t - t l':::t P_./ ' SK 3. & 3. (s 4.5.1.7.1 At least once per 3 months, each 8-inch containment purge supply 3*. { and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be
- demonstrated OPERABLE!by nr4;te; th t th
- == nd Int:;: r:t: i: 1:::
'O.0; L.^.3.;. ; n n ring t: :t 1:nt P..
- n:7,)
3 O 2 1 1 i i l 1 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 2
~
3/4 6-12 AMENDMENT NO. 97 L r~ x F
- 3. (, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSv
,. '7 ,,_,,,,,..u,,,
l
... ..n--- - .-- .--~penND COOLING SYSTE"5 3 .~. , m ,-..~ -- y 33 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .
t.cc 2.e.4 + "o ' a 5 2.5.2.: Twohnsep;ndantl Containment Spray !S." rte :%.shall be OPERABLE : :::r Spcej. System cap;bh ;f t: king : ::::r 're-' tn: ="IT 2rc tr:r:ftr-'r: :::tir.- to th; ::nt:i ::rt :=:. '
]
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,'2, 3, and 4. ! l
-ACTION:
JInsur 3 4-s 3 AQ cowo A With one Containment Spray System inopdrable, restore the inoperable Soray Sy_s, tem-to OPERABLE status within 7 dayslor be in at least HOT STANDBY within "the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status og iwithin the ne,xt 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. con ElI,,3.,+ 3.u-oBIg-SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS
' 5.2.1 Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
S P, 3 6 11. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, O power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, 3 U sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct ?j position; j7 34 re en 3 s 3 4 .,, 4 % . By verifying 6 hn c- e:: :;.::: r :2 9 each pump develops a 99 discharge pressure of greater t_han or equal toio9 aMlwhen teste M pursua to ' 0 El {'.Ei mo r,h, ,,a 4,,,,,g 3"y 4.A , y '4C'- --15i" " Pr .^.~. - t Q a n,,,,,,,, At leas once per 18 months id"- K. c rhetem by-hhc,+ , s r.e+ loc keel sealed er eherwue secu red.a pad.c l
-h sa ne 5 h) Verifying that each automatic valveMn the flow path actua1.n c
to its correct position on a d:-t:- m 1;r:; " a .un omsy 1 signal, and lx+va s or 5.mvi +,s ! g SR36f6,h Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on an C:rt:: ::: s p r :. Mic:t::r :::tisignal, e . i r., , , . . .. , . .; i g
.5 g 3 4,c.g (. At least once per 10 years byp erfor-' ; :r .ir er ;.r.;ka f 6 tm3; lAg rg' rrr' ::r:. h::::r =d ryerifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-13 AMENDMENT NO. 82 ws
l_ L .' ?.o~ ~ l 3 6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS { .- 3+ 1 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM j j LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 7 j' Lc.o 3.6.9 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with:
' R 3 4 ~7- a. A spray additive tank containing a level of between 78.6% and 90.3%
i M 1* k 'h* of between 30% and 36% by weight NaOH solution, and
- b. wo spray ditive eductgs's each capable adding NaOH scyfution 2
from the ray additive /.ank to a Contai nt Spray Systeth pump
. flow s
^
~
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. I ACTION:
.,- Couc A With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE
, status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; l 1 restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours Couo e or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
- I 4.C.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
,J i t. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual. o s A 31.7.1 . ,_... % or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, g ,se_aled, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct -?A! positi j
' a..
- g. At least once per 6 months by: y q
1 M 14 7. 2. r R 3.4.-) 3 1) 2) Verifying the contained solution level in the tank, and Verifying the concentration of the NaOH s ution by chemical hs 4 analysis. J + hot is ei., sotted. seated, er L.ii) co wsse seud h ers:% 1
- g. - At least once per 18{ months '------ rr-- -- a,y verifying that eae
- i A M.'IM automatic valve in the Tsow pat.ntactuates to its correct position on a Li.d c-- .1 'o r. -
.'.ct nior, td. 'sianal and .
1-{debat er sianula+TJ }
" ' ' M g.
.. At least once oer 5 years bv verifvina each water flow rate
[eductorteequivalent t 55(+5,-0) per minute f r 30% NaOH f athey i connections in galloe Spray Addi ve System: 1
+6
- 1) C 6A 68 -0 m (Train A) and ,
i
! CS26B 68 gpm (Tra B).
(2 r0 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-14 AMENDMENT NO.14 y G.::VT
- - " ' ' ' . ~
3.G CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
.: . ~
~
5.v.3 0,'e . C . : CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
- O VQ '
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION [, m -l y
,-4 lay L c_o 3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specifiee indable hs-L shall be d OPERABLE G th i:el:t+on-times as shown-in Table 3. Fli '
l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. . ACTION: @ Y D U S E R T' 2.lo-lG 6 ') g4 cow c A wein m
- 3. c,- 14 cl
- a. J With one or so of the isolation valve (s) ':=='id i nop e rab l e . -- - -- - - - - ' - - ' --- ' - - ' ' -- " - "- = " " = ' '
- a
' - T= b 3 ' 'Qh l I
--@ " g20 effe;;.;; ;;;;tr;ti:n th:t i: 22:2.and within 4 hours: -
(1. ";; tere tr,; ir.eper ti; v;1v;(:) : 0."C""."LE ;;;;;;, ;rl p l 2. Isolate each affseted penetration by use of at least one deactivated
- automatic v valve s c ured i the isolation position, or flA A.I ce r r . - e- - - ... .. 3 l
- 3. Isolate each affectec pene ration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange. ( pg g y_,,y 100 E Otheivise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD !
2 SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l O b. fh; pr;;i;i;;; ;f Sp:.;ifi;;ti;n 2.0.0 ;r; n;; eppli;;ti; pr;;id;d th;; g-l dthin I h;;r; the-effected-peretretien is isei;ted in ::::rd;n:: .;i th ) ACT'0" :.2 ;r :.2 ;;;ve,/- the associated system, if
,"7: M t applicaDle, is declared inoperable and the appropriate ACTION statements WM3 for that system are taken. _
b W " Ik~ coco B % Ihl5E A:.T 3. 6 - II, E ] Q Couc C 4 $URVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS c- L A ,
' C. 2.1 JJhe isolation vespeecifi-dd- T;bl _LE-11 An i De oemonstra),ea T l (OPERABLJ(priortoret ning the valve service after intenance, re r or rep 1 ment work is erformed on the alve or its ass iated actuat ,contro]
tor ower circuit y performance of cycling test, d verificati of f M olation time / 4
, BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-16 1
l CTS INSERT (S) l SECTION 3.6 LCO 3.6.3 INSERT 3.6 16A ( A.,) l Deleted in Revision J. l l INSERT 3'.6-168 ( A- and A7,) ACTIONS l NOTES i
- 1. . l
( A,) 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow M ' path, l 9 1 E 3. ... a 9 ( A,9 ) . 4. Enter applicable Conditions and required Actions of LC0 3.6.1. bl " Containment." when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria. 1 L s I I
-l
..c I
L _ . 1 8/15/98 Revision J p .. !
- . - - - - . .-. . - ~ _ _ - . - ~
CTS INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 i ry
!L.)
LCO 3.6.3
.! INSERT 3.6 16F (Lp and Lu) l l
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l C. NOTE C.1 Isolate the affected 72 hours Only applicable to penetration flow path penetration flow paths by use of at least with only one one closed and containment isolation de-activated valve and a closed automatic or remote system. manual valve. closed manual < valve, or blind flange. One or more penetration flow paths AND with one containment isolation valve C.2 NOTE l inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation !O areas may be ; L/ verified by use i of administrative means.
- 2. Isolation devices that are locked. !
sealed. or otherwise secured may be verified by use of administrative means. Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path is 31 days isolated. 4 l. _ q- 9/9/98 Revision J .i J l
,, e : .
+< - * . .
Q .. : : = - t 4 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) -
. 4. ' p 4
, .s a- , a n n s ..> -.. . m .
l > s t u r e el '* te$**.cr h S A L L,.19 4. 0. 0. 2 Each isolation valve'?;::i'i : '- ':t': 2.5 " shall be demonstrated " OPERABLE ';;rir.;; .= 500 MUTec'.c cr P,5FU L= '"'Onat least once per 18 months by: N
- a. Verifying that on a f" a4 "'- - - 'si gnal , each canase = ysotation valve actuates to its\ isolation position:
b. Verifying that on a '"h::: """ I::!:tirr t:M signal, each
/
r"'---
"==.isosation valve actuates to its isolation position and
- c. Verifying that on a Eca & - c M ant--Irelatter testAsignal, each c:;r . :r.; :;r.:;;iTholation valve actuates to its isolation position.
s t 3. 4. 5.5' . 5. 2. 2 The isolation time of each d:r:r :::rner er automatic valve @ S gel- L 5-;Jshall be determined to be within its limit knen tested oursuant to) [bDec' T 1 Ca f. ' on 4.D.3.L __ r ** in 9 h or:lors: , , , , l 2 R, g , y ,,,,w, Ie5 L r e ., e ,, , , ^ I I o BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-17
. . _ - - _ _ - . _ _ . _ . _ . _ . ~ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _.____.g.- _ _ . _ _ _ _
L's 6 :>. G . 3 i j 3 ~. TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) l' CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l MAXIMUM j EENETRATION VALVE N0. FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME (SEC) d
- 1 6. Main 5 team Isolation (Conti utd)
, 85 M51018* Main Steam 6
\86 MS101C* Main Steam 6; j 7. Feedarater Isolation 76 FW0090* Main F ater 5l Main F ater I 76 79 FWO43D*f FW009A* Main F ater 6l 5
l 79 FW043A i Main F edwater 6 l .l' FW009 Main eedwater- 5 4 84 FWO47k*ff Mai Feedwater 6 l l '87 C* Ma Feedwater 5
- 87 3C*ff Main Feedwater l 99H(76)*** 150* Main Feedwater 6 i- 99H(76)*** WO390*- in Feedwater 6 l 100N(79)*** FWO35A* Main Feedwater 6 i
200H(79)*** FW039A* f Main Feedwater 6 10lH(84)* , FWO358* / Main Feedwater 6 i 10lN(84)*** FWO398* , Main Feedwate 6 ! 102N(87)*** FWO35C* / Main Feedwa r 6 i .102N(87A*** FWO39C* . Main Feedw4ter 6
- s. nemate rianuai j ,/
I
.- i 0 68 RH870 RH Suction of /
N.A.
- 68 RH87#18*,f EH Suction N.A/ e i 7 02A*,f RH Sdetion N. .
7028*,f RH uction A. [5 l 59 18881* Hot Leg Safety I action N.A. 73 518824* t Leg Safety jection N.A. I 66 SI8825* Not Leg RH Inj ction N.A. ] 60 518823*- Cold Leg Safe y Injection N.A. ) 50 SI8890A* , Cold Leg RN njection N.A. i 51 5188903* Cold Leg Injection N.A. 26 518843* Cold Leg fety Injection N.A. 1 i 33 CV8355A* RCP Sea Injection N.A. l- 33 CV835 RCP S Injection N.A. . 53 CV8355 RCP al Injection N.A. F 5 CV835
- RCP eal Injection N.A.
- . L!
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-21 AMENDMENT NO. 91 4 90 k *J l l bT
L CO 3.6 3
/ TABLE 3.6-1 (Contj.ggG CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM PEN TION VALVE No FUNCTION /
ISOLATION TIME (AEC)
/ /
- 8. Remote Manual (Continued) /
/ .
9 S!8802A* Hot Leg Safety Injection N. A. / 73 5188028* . Hot Lapg Safety Injectio N. A. / Hot Leg Safety Injecti
/60-50 SIJ835* -
SIS 809A* RH Id Leg Injection N . A .- N.A'. ' 51 1I88098* old Leg injecti NfA. 66 /518840* Leg Safety inje tion N.A.
/ / /
100H(79)*** AF013A* j7eedwater N.A.
~100H(79)*** AF013E* Feedwater N.A.
101N(84)*** AF0138* Feedwater N.A. 10!N(84)*** AF013F* Feeduater N,A. 102H(87)*** AF013C* / Feedwater N.A. 102Nf87)*** AF013G* / .Feedwater N.A. 99Nf76)*** AF013D* Feedwater N.A. 99 (76)*** AF013N* Feedwater~ N.A. 9 -
/37 CV83
- RCS op Fill N.A.
13 V 16' Ins!rumentPenetrati N .Y. I3 VA017 leystrument Penetrat" n N'. 13 0018 Instrument Penetra lon . A ,- 13 VQ019 / Instrument Penetr ton .A. 15 RYO75 Instrument Pene ration N.A. 30 WM190 Make-Up Demi N.A. 57 FC009 Spent Fuel 001 Cleaning N.A. 57 FC010- Spent Fue Pool Cleaning N.A. 32 FC011 Spent F Pool Cleaning N.A. 32 FC012 Spent F 1 Pool Cleaning N.A.
/
7/ MS0230*,i Main eas N.A. MS021A*,f Main team N.A 85 .MSE218*,i [ 48 86 21C*,f Rai Steam Ma Steam N. . N . I AL- PR002Ei rocess Radiation .A. AL PR033Af rocess Radiatio N.A. AL PR0338f Process Radiati N., A. AL PR002F# Process Radiat%n N.A. AL PR033Cf Process Radiat/ on N.A.
. AL PR033Df Process Radi,ation N.A. (.
<}
}- . BYRON - UNITS.1 & 2 3/4 6-22 AMEN 0 MENT NO. 91 8 90 f 'd k Ne
I ' L Co ~5.0. 3 i , I i TABLE G.6-1 (Continued) # CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM PENETRATION VALVE NO. FUNCTION ISOLATION' TIME (SECF,
/ i !
- 9. gangal (Continued) / .
/ i 99 FWO150*,f ,/ Feedwaterffcas a.a.c.s.c swirsut. tion)***
N.A. '
/
100 FWO15A*,f Feedwaterfices 's.n.cmer n=treuterienF N.A. 101 FWO158*,# Feedwaterif csi a.n.c.t.c n=se.ut.tien)*** N.A. l 102 FWO15C*,ij/ Feedwaterffca a.n.cm.c nuir.utet,s=>*** N.A. - 10 28sk / / 8 CV8113 RCPSeal/haterReturn / N.A. 37 CV8348* RCS Lop Fill ,/ N.A.
/ / /
6 Wp007A Chilled Water / N.A. 10 90078 Chi) led Water / N lAi 21 CC9534 RCP Mtr Brng Return .A. 24 CC9518 f RCP Thermal 8arrier/ Return .A. 25 , CC9486 RCP Cooling Wtr pply N.A. 1 / C5008A Containment Spray N.A., 16 / C50088 Containment S ray f N.A.: 39 / IA091 Instrument ir ' N.A. I i , I j WM191 Make-Up Desin ,. N.A.! 52 PR03 Proces Radiation , N.A.
! AL '
PR 2G Pro ss Radiation / N. P 2H Pr ess Radiation / N
)
{AL . i 12 S231A ydrogen Monitor j .A. 31 PS2318 ydrogen Monitor / N.A. 27 RY8047 PRT Nitrogen N.A. i 44 RY8046 PRT Make-Up N.A. 26 ' 518815* Safety Injec ton N.A. 50 SI8818A* Safety Injedtion N.A. , 50 $188180* Safety I tion N.A.
, 51 51881 Safety ection N.A.
5 51881
- Safety ject. '
N.A. SI8
- Safety /Injectio- N.A.
9 518 SD* SafetfInjection N.A. 60 SI 19A* Safety Injection N.A. 60 8819B* SafetyInjection N.A. - [
'0 -0 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-23 AMENDMENT NO. 91 8 90 k8 l
l
, _ - . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ . _ __ ___._._.__ _._-._ _.m.,_.. . _ . . _ _ - -
J3v j' IABLt 3.6-1 &Lontinued)
~
. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES / 1
- [x / /
F VALVE 40.
/ [ , MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME 45EC) f i- PENETRATION FUNCTION ,
I 10. Shad (Contin d) . [ [,
/ l /
4, .' KI8819C* Safety Injection / N.A./ 60 60 5188190* Safety Injection N.A. ; 66 SIS 841A* / Safety Injection N /A. ; 66 _ S18841B* / Safety Injection K.A. 73> '5185058* / Safety Injection. /N.A. .
' 73 SIS 905C* ,' Safety Injection / N.A.
55 SIS 968 / Safety. Injection / N.A. 34_ FP345* _ / Fire Protection / N.A. 33- CV8368A* / RCP Seal Injection ' N.A. 33 CV83680*' RCP Seal Injection . N.A. < 5 CV83688* RCP Seal . Injection i N.A. ' ' ~ J3 CV8368C* RCP Seal' Injection / N.A.
/ .
- 11. $/G Safeties /PORVs
/
/
/
/ J
/ /
Main' Steam / N.A 77 ft'S013D* 77 /MS014D* Main Steam '
/ N.A.
77 / MS015D* -Main Steas .N/A. i
; 77 / MS016D* M
./ a1a Steas ,/
'N.A. ;
. 77 / MS017D* / Main Steam , N.A. i 8
78 / MS013A*
/ Main Staas / N.A.
i
. ! 78 '
/ MS014A* Main Steam '
N.A. I 78 M5015A* Main Steam / N.A.
- 78 ,/ M5016A* Main Steam ,/ N.A..
I 78/ MS017A* . . Main Steam- N.A. 85 MS0138* Main Steam N.A.
/;85-j 5 M50148 M5015 Main Steam Main Steam /'
N.A. N.A. i 85 MS0 B* Main Steam '
/ N.A.
85 MS 7B* Main / Steam N.A. 86 13C* Main' Steam N.A. 86 14C* Main Steam N. 86 015C* Mdin Steam N . 86 MS016C* in Steam .A. 86 MS017C* Main Steam .A.
- 77 MS018D* Main Staam 20 78 MS018A* Main Steam 20 85 MS0188* Main Stt 4 20 86~ M5018C* Main Ste- 20
'ot subject to T C leakage tests.
- Proper valve ope ation will be demo trated by verifyi g that the v lve strokes to its equired position.
* * *nin t annlienh1 in Unit 2. Annliah in 4f1 1 after ycle B. _
l
-{J
#May be' opened'on an intermittent basis nder administrative control.
I
',, V hediuns No N t- T
,d-BYRON ~-; UNITS-l & 2:
3/4 6-24 AMENDMENT NO. 91 4 90
?.:a T
-$ J Ke+-b-4#.h Jma.aa 414,S 4 m-.M4444Sc++..W- 43* 4 see,d'.46--4*.M,mrm4 4W@ &A 49 mmAA MMha v A.e a=N J AM A4 M A WA AM 46 'a A L.L. nf4 4hh6.6 hhe hm F +4.1m-56 6mh de dw,* mgM==-m85- h6,,AML+.iA.w8e l
4 k BRWD CTS MARKUPS l g l l k 4 4 4
)
4 1 .d 4 1 4 l + 1 4 i
+
1 1 i vm - -~ , - -en. , , ..wa.-a , ,--- ,,- - , --,--. ----. - , --,- -- . ...--- , -- - - , p,,,
__7,-._____ a 1 e.\ '
" "#" A -'
DEFINTTTONS CONTAINWENT INTEGRTTY I. CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when: p -)
- a. enetrations required to be closed during accident co,ng.itTons are e1 : / l
- 1) Capable of closed by an OPERAB N ent automatic isolation valve s m, or I
- 2) Closed by manual val , langes, or deactivated 85 automatic valve cured in their sed positions, except as !
provided i le 3.6-1 of Specificat ow .6.3. l
- b. All pment hatches are closed and sealed, f Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of s Specification 3.6.1.3, N.)Wb li W ef %;;ific;tien [
Ag d. Th: :::t:in : t 1::hq: nt;: 3.0.1.0, end m aithin 6th; 6 nase C m h y' LAig e. The sealing mecnan i. u: ++d wHk -d ;;;.t. .;;m. (=.v., wesos, t b iiown. or o-rinos) is OPERABLE. _l FCONTROLLED LEAKAGE 3 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor 0 coolant pump seals. CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. l DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of tercising the digital c oputer hardware using data base manipulation ano injecting simulated process data to verify OPERABILITY of alam and/or trip functions. DOSE EOUIVALENT I-131 1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie / gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and 1-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in' Table III of (TID-14844. " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites." f BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 AMENDMENT NO. 85 3 y-- / - ~ Awaeo in bm.rse i.I 5c: Ms ga_Sec_mors g.o 1 ~ - 3 (7er. . 'T-
.- - . -- - - - . - - ._ . . _ ~ .
LLo % .6 7 DEFINITTONS Se.noo TD CONTAINWENT INTEGRITY
- 1. NTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when: ,.-
- a. All trations required to be closed during ace,i. dent ~'c'onditions are either.
/y' \
p 1) Capable of being sed by,.a.v W ERABLE containment automatic isolation valve syste
- 2) Closed by al valves, blind , or deactivated aut tic valves secured in their close sitions, except as ovided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3. .
t 4 All eouipment hatches are closed and sealed, M a
- c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of-o 3'b' ?' I Specification 3.6.1.3, a
d_ 9e ceat*mt leeke;e "eter are "4t'4- the 14-i ts of caa 4 'i"+ 4 - A 3
- 0 1 * ? , kiA es m non ,o
~
(e- wiu, CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor . n) t coolant pump seals. CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to '. safe conservative position. I DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation and injecting simulated process data to verify OPERABILITY of alarm and/or trip functions. DOSE EOUIVALENT I-131, 1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie / gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844. " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites." BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 AMENDMENT NO. 85 0 . < ~ - m A Do h sk.d m D ,c. 9 E d o n s \ \ bC h M)ft bCLTTon 1,0 x _ ef" Nrei #
! L.w b.'. 4' W Y"I DEFINTTIONS
- D CONTAINWENT INTEGRITY i
l . INMENT INTEGRITY snail exist wnea: , I
- a. All penetratio ired to be clos d duch nditions are either:
1 e of being closed by an OPERABLE con e A . 'automatic isolation valve system, or _
~.
51 % 3,3 u 3,3,3,q 2) Clossd by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as 3 provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.
- 5. ::2---t Satcher 2-e c'ered sad :::'-g,._ .
'hZ.I c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3, (e
r:
- d. Th- :.t:h r.t h :ht;: te: N c4
. . . . . ;.r.. - eithi- theonwu 'i-its e'm#4"+ 4 aag, e elds, d CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor O. coolant pump seals.
CORE ALTERATION 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST 1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist cf exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation and injecting simulated process data to verify OPERABILITY of alam and/or trip functions. DOSE E0VIVALENT I-131 1.11. DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie / gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133,1-134, and 1-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites." 1 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 1-2 , AMENDMENT NO. 85
~
~
O Anorem m kvm50ns \m\ - N u" kh fon, hT10 6 T .O
~-
OM $
. -.- . . - . - - ~. - - _ - - _ - - .
b .
, M CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
)
- j Q
v pc , or,uaev c9ev a muy c.,.- .,
.6 iCONTAINMENTliNTE0?!'Y,' I i
i LTMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 acc 3.6.1X Primary CONTAINMENT { INT"02:TYl shall be ri-t:: :d.!:ffit A:_; APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: CoHC A Without nrimary CONTAINMENT !!NTE "ITY.l restore CONTAINMENTlINT" ITY.'within 1 hourior.be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD concglSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing30 hours. __ -. ._. _ net i o c k 6 s eue + c- m ~. -d SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS _ securca oaa - 1 (4-i l'.5. .1 Primary ._ CONTAINMENT lINTEM!TY hhall be demonstrated: ! g . 3.
- 3. - io. .s rs newes ;
h At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations,> not ' ep , . 3 3 capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation ,l jr,. -Y2] valves and required to be closed durino accident conditions are automatic valvest ,Gj F l closed by valves, blind flanges, lor deactivated '- w c.:. O A. secured in their oositions, except r nr td:d
'".~'" 23.2 erjfor containment isolation valves.that '
T:M - 2.5 are-9g i u.0 3 . - open under administrative controls; j (e.u p+ 4 * .acn 1.vr.. vo sve ri..,p.N I A s o-1 !Jo+* I "y '.'Orifying th0t 000h 00&t0i""Ont Oi" lOOk i:
- b. 4" 005"li;r.00 L'ith CA N iIni feGuiim, ant 3 Of ",02 ifiC;ti0n 3.5.1.3: Ond L
'v ;sure l c roca. cat.o, s and le a n e ar red e. we s4.a. ence pt for o.c -
Sg 3.gl.1 A By oerformino containment"'er.k:::!testino in accordance with ' l*ck O'ful tury Cuid0 1 153, 50;t0d 0r 1995, 2nd 10 CF" 50, ";;;ndix 2,l A 0?t4"" 9 ! A c or e 4 .o r t e . x ,, e A c,t e Tu+. n. Fr.. r m .
. -- ,-w yAdanssed .. % ,s..,; Ag ,
Se < Do c. s .fo e Sec4.oe 5.0 j
* * % _3 _.e_ -
i l Ltor+ 3.c,- e t L'S Li6, ;
, tc.o 3 c ! A 4 4.s h.2 S A 3.0,3.4E*eept valves, blind flanges, lana aeactivateo automatic valveshwhich are located inside the containment and are, locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. lTtase p;natrui:n lshall be verified closed during cach COLD SHUTDOWN except that uch ification need not be performed more often than once per 92 dhys. t,, nc+
O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 O 3/4 6-1 AMENDMENT NO. 73 co.; .7
CTS INSERT (S)
,; SECTION 3.6 l .g V
d LCO 3.6.1 l 0 INSERT 3.6 1B (Au) l Deleted in Revision J. t E-I i l l l O V 4 9/9/98 Revision J
, .. .. . . - - - . . - -. . - . - . . . . ~ - . - - . . _ . . . -
?.
' l L
' ' CTS INSERT (S) l SECTION 3.6 ) 10 i LCO'3.6.3 l j: INSERT'3.61C-l(La and Lu) i l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l 1
- A. ... .A 1 ... .
30 A.2 . NOTE-j 1. Isolation devices' in high radiation areas may be . ;
. verified by. use. i of administrative l means, i l
- 2. Isolation devices !
that are locked, i sealed.-or- ! AV- otherwise secured may be verified ' by use of. administrative means. l l 9/9/98 Revision J 'v
. - . . - .-.. .~. .-
.. . . . - . -.- . . . .. . . - . . . .-. - . ~.~. . .. ~ -
CTS INSERT (S) n SECTION 3.6 h %, j LCO 3.6.3 ; 1 l INSERT 3.61C (continued) (L3 and La) l 1
.. 1 CONDITION .REQUIr.ED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C .- . C.1 ..
69.Q C.2 NOTE !
'l 1. Isolation devices !
in high radiation areas may be verified by use 3 of administrative ' means.
- 2. Isolation devices i that are locked.
sealed, or
)- otherwise secured l'! - (\_ / may be verified by use of.
administrative means. l I l g . l l [ i. l-l 9/9/98 Revision J 4 g- .v .
1C! ,c ,,
.h '
l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - ' " ' -
- u 6.< 1 (D'
N._) CONTAINMENT LEAltAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to: 1 l i l
- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L, at
~
P,. .
- b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L for all penetrations I and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P,.
1; L c.0 34.lAPPL ICABIL ITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
%,,,,s,,3g,f,,,,,a3[. , 1)
S** Docs forSc ~
\
, y , ,, ACTION: '
gue. 4 - I
, g,t f With either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 4i
% 3./W " O.75 L or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L., trestore' th: =:r:P M ,'l m
intigr:ted 1;;k:g: 7::: t: 1::: th= 0. M L, =d th: = t n:d 1::h:; r:t: f:r k jl
' :11 penetr:ti:n: :ubje:t t: Typ: C :nd C t: t: t: 1; = th = 0.CC L.jprior to j k l
-finereasino the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F. I l a c,0 . s . t COND A jf4 OPEAA S L J 04a rus -rth.r i he, l
~
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated in accordance [V with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
- a. Type A (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) testing shall A be conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
l l-l l m-
- (d i
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-2 AMENDMENT NO. 73 b
6: c +\ 0v 5.c 7
~ .'l
/Qw , , %n - gfe: ~ ::a - ir C.~'
CONTAINMENT' SYSTEMS { I"^ f ~5 SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS (Continued)
' ~'j : ., t . .-
;b. The reporting requirements and frequency of Type A tests shall be in .
accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and > 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. " {
- c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental i test conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, Septemoer 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
Type B and C tests shall be conducted in accordance with Regulatory d. Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Option B. , , g a s,e.2 1 e- Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the require- I ments of Specification 4.6.1.3; i 5O6'36 -t- Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material vt 3 G M seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.7.3 or 4.6.1.7.4, as applicable; and I g :- The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and - R34tI exterior surfaces of the containment vessel, including the liner i plate, shall be demonstrated during the shutdown for each Type A ~,- containment leakace rate test by a visual inspection of these ,4 surfaces. This inspection shaFI be performed at a frequency in f., accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, to verify no h apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation. 4
- h. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.
m A)/fessN in Su Nn, .O 6.e.e O c>c fo r S i c +: n' 5-() BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-3 AMENDMENT NO. 50
i., - 3 y CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ~ ' ' ' 3.s 2 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS @ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 2 3.3.112.5.1.2) Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with: a. h 9:th ferr: clered e'r ;t rh:2 th: :t- 1::h i: 5:i:.; .n;d f;7 ;;g,;1 ) trfr::it 1;;h::tryd:;r: d:h:ll
- it;b;thr::;;h
- 1;;;d, th: ;;d ::nt:in .:.,t, th: m t ', _ ,; ,,,,
- b. ! ,
An P,. overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L, at'E
,__m . m . ,
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. . . . . m . ,. 41 u . . . , w., ,
' A aa,,u.s ., .:ru a., 4 c s~ A i
's ses oc:.s ses <- .:
ACTIOgI,3.ar.m! r., . . - : c c r.. . . . u ; M t g
"'AuD A g. A Eith one c gess,- u,- As -
'nment air ock door inoperable: 1 I , ,,g ". t-".it-'
RA A.l
- tert th- 1: 0 leastr the d'* OPERABLE air lock door einsed andle i
#.A A.. 24 hours @ loc ( the PERABLE :i- 10:E d?0" t0 OPEPfELE It2t"rlwithin {l air lock door closed;and M A.') W M M " S' H S N R A A.3 1. Onaration may then co inuel"*.ti' p;7f; n:::: Of th; ;;;;tf gr;;;ir;d;;;r;11;ir1;;L1;;k;;;i::tlprovidedthatthe b
-O ewD 3 L :,,.- ?. OPERABLE aa A t days;air lock door is verified to be locked closed 4 cowD p1 m j Otherw se, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and k
% 4.
to90 c grs. - 3. T;.. ;rai;ica: ;f 2::i'i :ti:n 3.0.' :r: :t :::li::b!:.! e
?
-% e RA c.16) ' m 4 - 8 h e-R A c.
h ^ with the containment air lock inoperable,MmQ [7 ei l R A c. g: inoperable air IMk door l=2nt:inlat least one air lock dooexcept as the resu hi r r closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABl F statue within M M l
,g hours or be in within SHUTDOWN at least HOT STANDBY the following 30 hours. within the next 6 hours 1
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-4 O AMENDMENT NO. 73
CTS INSERT (S)
- 3. SECTION 3.6 W4 1
) ??
-$ LCO 3.6.2 Yg [ INSERT 3.6 4At (A and A ).
. ACTIONS-
.-NOTES - - --- - --
l (AJ ~ l '. Entry and exit is permissible ~to perform repairs on the affectec air. lock components. Y ' ( A.). 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock N j ( A,) 3. Enter' applicable Conditions ard Required Actions .of LCO 3.6.1. pL " Containment." when air lock leakage results in exceeding the
& overall containment leakage rate.
L
'9 N.
, y ! s. Ll INSERT 3.6 4B (A s. A sand M 3) E CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f)t A. A ~. .. NOTES . (As ) 1. Required Actions'A.1, A.2. and A.3 are not applicable if both doors
- Lq .in the same air lock are
'? ; 1noperable and y Condition C is entered.
6 4A
.j (A,) (M3 ) 2. Entry and exit is
+
yp' permissible for 7 days v es, under aaministrative controls if both air locks are inoperable. 8/15/98 Revision J p
,- . ., . . . . . . .- . .~..- . -- - . .. .. - . . ~ = - -.-.
L:
. i, CTS INSERT (S)
L ._ :o SECTION 3.6 yf*' .- j ,x -
.a:
i LC0 3.6.2 L ;u: . . . . . . L Qld INSERT 3.~6 4C~ ;( A, and L3 ) L I L CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One~or'more . NOTES-- containment air locks 1. Required Actions B.1. I, ' with containment air B.2. and B.3 are not ; i o lock. interlock applicable-if both doors i mechanism inoperable.~ in the same air lock are. l
.! inoperable and ;
,e Condition'C is entered.
- n
< 2. Entry and exit of.
"jL ( A,) -
containment is , permissible under the control of a dedicated I individual.
.. l 1 B.1 Verify an OPERABLE 1 hour 7~)^. docr is closed in the -
( . ) affected air lock.. ' E . 1 B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door 24 hours l closed in the affec+ed air lock. E B.3 --NOTE i Air lock doors in ' '~ high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by I administrative means.
. 1 Verify an OPERABLE Once per door is locked closed 31 days .
in-the affected air l L lock. l~ l ( 8/15/98 Revision J
. _ . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . . _ . _ - . . . . .._ _ _ . . _ _ __ __ . _ . . ..m . . _ ._. . _ . . . _
L c 5 . i .'._
$ p e c i h W' ."r E .i Ic cov-u wvzy- syr-rus St7svr!!! ANCE F20"TPEMEN*S
$ R 3.(p.1.1 e -{ J N S E rk- 3.(,- 5' A /
-t_f_1_? Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated CFERABLE: -- )
- a. '.,
By conducting Regulatory airlock Guide 1.163, seal ieakage tests Septeunber in accordance withand 10 CFR 50, Appendix ]J,*J 1995, option B, by: M (1) Verifying that the door seal leakage is less than 0.0024La j J4 i when the volume between the door seals is pressurised to greater than or equal to 3 psig by means of a permanently ! installed continuous pressurisation and leakage monitoring , system, or a (2) Verifying that the door seal leakage is less than 0.01La as f determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at a s ' constant pressure of greater than or equal to 10 psig; , I
- b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests in accordance with M 3 ' Y ' I Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, option 3.
- c. At least once per jg months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time,
- d. By verifying that the airlock seal leakage tests are less than, e 0.01 La as determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at a o constant pressure of greater than or equal to 10 peig in accordance (f with Regulatory Guide 1.163, September 1995, and 10 CFR 50, l Appendix J, Option B. _
MaassedinSeu 5,6 ( sa Doc &csukm s,o BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-5 AMENDMENT NC. 88 O em
.7,6 ./ 'r'- T'"" -
CONTAINMENT _ _ . . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATi(3 t.te s.c. . 2.5.!_! 'The containment shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: 1 (,mo 4 If containment is found to be inoperable restore the containment to OPERABLE l _ _. status gjthin 1 hour _/orTe Tat least fi8TSTAWUBY within the next 6 hours and c,40 B in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. j SURVEILLANCE RE0UTREMENTS l
' bR 3Cs.I ,..... 2r C Verify containment structural integrity in accordance with the 2
Containment Vessel Structural Integrity Program. l i I l l I O , i I l [ BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-8 AMENDMENT NO 90 R:u $
. ~ ~ . . - - . . - . . . .. . . . - . - . . - . . . - - . . - . . - . - ~ . .. ...-. . . ~ . . - . . . - . - . . . ~ . . . . .
pONTAn3 TINT VES2ZL ITRUCTURAL INTECRT*Y 5 .'C p.T 3, w" StTIRVrfttANOT REOUTRIMENTS fCen*inuedi 4 t a l 4 O PACE INTE AI1Y 1. EFT BLANK I 1 1 j io j s uzowmn - unzTs 2 s 2 4 an 6-9 Axrwaxzur no.90
. . . . . ... . . ~ . . - - . . . - , . . . . - - . ..-~ ~..... - - - - - - - - - . ~ ~ .
l- CONTAINMENT YESSEL .2TRDCTURAL 7"TECRIt I SimVE!tT_ANCT REOUTR2 MEN *5 3ef.MTH 3.b t .: fCentinuedt l~ O ! c I , l i-t
+
/
tt
$ $ 5YO,M b
m zow =o - unzzs 2 s 2 au ._1. m,,, ,,, , I
. . _-. - _-=-.---_.- - _- - - . - . . . - - - . _ - - - _ - _ . - - L:054 5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0UTREMENTS ~ SR 3 4.31
-4.5.1.'.1. Each 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve (s) shall be verifiedjelosedc=: ::c: rn;emat least once per 31 days.
sg3 03.L M5ed *
-4.0.1.7." Each 8-inch containment pu supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be positioned in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.7b at least once per 31 days.
CR 5.&3 a 4.0,.1.7.1 At least once per 6 months w. e :T".;;;;;0 T;;T OA;: R the inboard and outboard valves with resilient material seals in each closed 48-inch containment ource supoly and exhaust eenetration snall.he demonstrated OPERABLE by ve "yM; t%:t-the-measured-44akage-nte i: 1::: th:r. 0.05 L, .;heO R r::: ri::d t: :t 1:::t P..' L4:G sg n. s.O
-4.o.1.7.4 At least once per 3 months, each 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve with resilient gAtarial seals shall be _ _ . .
demonstrated OPERABLE /ty ;;rifytr.; th;; th; ;;;;.r; ';;k;;; ret; i; ';;T C)
!0.02 L. -^.:r - ::: -t:ed t: :t 1 ::t P.. l O
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-12 AMENDMENT NO.88 f] c- r
C . l l .3.;, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS f g,.y . , ,. . ,7 u,q ,
- ; s i.: u a
ve-
-- !'J-' T-:-9+'AND COOL ING SVSTE"3 0 n... . ,,,m
,.- e - - . s.
ev--g-a. I LIMITING CONDITION FOR L.'JRATION
- u. c 1 . < --c. . a + fA,)
- 0. 0. 2.1 - Two hacapanciaQContainment Sorayl5.,st;.i.a jshall be OPERABLEi ... u .i ,
Sprey Sy;;;. ;;;2 h cf ::M ig ::::::r r:r th: "n. ... . . . . . . . . , . . . , . .... l
- th: :nt 9 :nt ::::. { l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION: (,, . _,3g1 coND A With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Soray System to OPERABLE status within 7 daystor ce in at least H0i SiANDB) witnin l
<C'#0 3)Ithe next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followino 30 hours.
,oa: 5 ,.~. se*~ 2 & -IS BJ SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS
' E.2.:
Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: sg 3.;,.;. l t At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, l power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, - sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct 9 ( position; 3p 3. ;,. 4 h. By verifyingL h: rc::rc; :t;;r 9 c 4 each pump develops a w discharge pressure of creater than or equal to!M5 ;;iglwhen tested 5~ pursu to,' 5;:::'t ::ti - ' O.5:J
& r. . .,. rers o . .. so,,,.i he.,d ' !. A s , ys -- ; ,, ,, , , ,,. . l M ' a+ +
- 4. s w i . v .
. 7
- h. At least once per 18 months l derm; ch':td :n,lby: .
M ltk a o s se-" loe bc) s tel*4 t i c4her=*s e secuml e n
,gg, 3. ;, g, )Q Verifying that each automatic artuntu ' # 85 % =r to its correct position on an'. C:ntair; valvedin nt the:;r:;
flow nath ktectier t--t signal, and 1
'w M'ers.- M >l- Q
~ g 3...; 41Q Verifying that each sorav oumo starts automatically on an t -:: - er+ S:-:t 2 :::icr :::tisignal.
w ~ . . . .. .. ,s >--q9 SR 3.4,4 d. At least once oer 10 years bylptrf:rr,in; :n ci r :: d: 9 2. :::t lth, 4 eaa m ;; h-::d:, :ndlveritying each spray nozzle is unobstructed. i l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-13 AMENDMENT N0. 74 ) O k.A O I l l
~,
~ C *: .=
D_
.3. i CONTAINu!Ni SYSTEM 5
- 3. 4. .'7 SDRaY ADDITIVE SYSTEM i
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i L.C .: .. 7 C. C. 2. 21 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with: !
~y' M"""',,;"3y as A spray additive tank containing a level of between 78.6% and 90.3%
of between 30% and 36% by weight NaOH solution, and
& Two/prayadditive uttorseachchableofadding aOH solution frpm the spray add tive tank to a entainment Spr Systes pump / ~
- N '"'
._ __ _._.._.= /
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3,. and 4.
- ACTION:
cc NC. A With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; cete,L e restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours l or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5. ".S The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: CR M T 3 +. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, A pw ;pn;t4 or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- 4. At least once per 6 months by:
2 5 h ~. t' t) Verifying the contained solution level in the tank, and r e., 7 1
- 4) Verifying the concen'. ration of the ROH solution by chemical analysis.
(1.6) M ': " ' 4 T
- 4. At least once per 18 months 7ul'Eu swie s Q by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on ;
G tm,,n ..;.-,1--aray--Aetuation tes'T) signal ; and on noum .. , . . . ..
,,s
' ~ " ' ~ Ln 4 rm i: . .w i e. e :e m . . 3. -. . c , o,r e t -c o . . ., , n ,,r . ,, . n )
.e., moo,w
{ - At least once per 5_ years by verifyino each water flow rate eguivalent to 55(+5;-D) gallons per minute for 30% Na0 from the li
,4ductor test connections in the Spply Additive Syste
-is i
/ ?
i+s G.).s
- 1) CS26A / 68 -0 gpm (Trai A), and jhM
/ / / i;
- 2) CS26B 68 gpm (Tr in B).
g - f
~
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-14 AMENDMENT NO. 4 172 0 .7
l L t. C ? 3 LcC 3'5 Le CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS h I
.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES cd LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION fl u
1 E t.1 L;3 3.6.3 The containment isolation valvest specified in Table 3.6-1,shall be [ OPERABLEiwiter isolation times as shown in Table 3:6-1. ,,, y APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: $ i I 5Jr"~ ' t - ** 2 f-N coND A het Enzere 7.6-lhil A3 j
,.,4 With one or~mwe of the isolation valve (sEncei'ird " Tath 2.0 l' O]
. I inoperable,) maintai/) at least one fsolation valve SPERABLE in eacli! ;
Iaffected nenetratidn that is ooenland within 4 hours: " l G=- e
-1. U.. n,cee, .Ll ..l .e m to 0";"A"tf-status . cr)
@ l r/ / i t. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatigvalvesecuredintheisolationposition,or
;.nen ~.. . a
. Isol a ,.~. n affected pen ration by use of at least one closed manualvalveorblindflange$ ( 1u , ,
c ao
~ ^~ .
Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the nex hours and in COLD ' O) 3
%. SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- 4. j The grovisions of Specificatior 3.0. arenotapplicableprovidedtb[t lwithin 4 hours thep ffected peretr ion is isolated'in accordance with 1 l ACTION a.2 or a.3/above,l-=c ;r:; ::: :natitTiisioiii'ateir system, if Amo s; applicable, is oeclared inoperable and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are taken. ,
MC E Ji .. er t u - 1,T-h t (, m ,,_,,, SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS M.C. 3.1]lThe isolat/on valvesi O;ecifimo m Tobie 3 6-i % hall be demo trated UMtHAl;Lt prior to aturning the va ve to service arter maintenance repair or replacement work s performed on hevalveorit/associatedactu or, control %m. '
/or power circui by performance of a cycling te , and verifica on of
-lisolationtime. ,
/
r) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-16 V.m 3 x . .
CTS-INSERT (S) SECTION 3 6 lOJ LCO 3.6.3 INSERT 3 l6 16A - ( A..)- n- l Deleted in Revision J. INSERT 3.6 16B ( A, Land - A3 ) . ACTIONS
' NOTES- -
- 1. ...
i
- g -(A ) 7 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow :
o path. ^ m' 4
.j 3. ..
w q (A3 ) '4. Enter applicable Conditions and required Actions of LC0 3.6.1. cl;
" " Containment," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall. containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
0 ~~~ 8/15/98 Revision J
. ('.
. . . ._ . . _ . . _ ~ . _ . . . _ . _ _-. _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . . _ .
l 1 CTS ~ INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 LCO 3.6.3' - 1 l INSERT 3.6 16F (Ly and Lu) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME { l C. NOTE C.1 Isolate the affected 72 hours
^
Only applicable to 3enetration- flow path penetration flow paths )y use of at least with only one one closed and
. containment isolation de-activated valve and a closed automatic or remote
- system. manual valve, closed manual valve. or blind flange, penetration flow paths AR with one containment l isolation valve C.2 NOTE i l inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation
!n. areas may be
.U verified by use of administrative means.
- 2. Isolation devices that are locked.
sealed, or otherwise secured I may be verified by use of L administrative means. L Verify the affected Once per penetration flow path is 31 days isolated. l' i q.- a
~
- 9/9/98 Revision J O' . v - . . _ . , . - . _ . , - -
LO ?.,3 g1 c.- -g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued 1 ? a' (3 g ....,,, ...s.- . . . . . ~ . . . . .
.e: a,.8 s...
3 1s o-y ' ;*
#26 i (4. 5. 2.O Each isolation valveasucc i'iro .,
To;ie 2.J L shall be cemenstratec OPERABLE';urir.c :ne ;c;; = UT;;= ;- " ~ C IR O O6B at least once per 18 months by: A ; Veri fyingl D I I
-es that on a F -- """ " ^' " "- -- Osi gnal , each '
3i== T 'Asolation valve actuates to its isolation position; 1
- 4. Verifyina that on a ma= e "F" Ten 1=*4am +-st) signal, each '
"^"7 solation valve actuates to its isolation position; anc
- 4. Verifying that on a re - - - - - - - "ent I: letinr 2: 9 signal, each
- ;; ;r.: ca..umiJisolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
" #' " 'E (4.0.3.2 The isolation time of each _pe. car spjreteo-er. automatic valve E
~
'=:tu
= =2. =0 'cr.
shall .c. be determined to be within ~itspTmit 5.ter test;c :.ur;uam---te-
, , m s,,, ; . s , , ,, ,
Inser v.ce Te n.,. . Lw Peoe, con. 4;:, 1
< s ?
V) BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-17
ttL 3.6.3- I l i TABLE 3;6-1 (Continuedt CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES + _. - - I
,?
' pgX] MUM PENETRATION VALVE N0. FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME (SEC) ! ' / 6. Main / Steam Isolation ontinued)
~
- f. .
85 'MS1018* Main saa i ( as - MS101C* Main Ateam
/6 l
- 7. Feedwater Isolatidn o 7 FWOO in Feedwater. 5
## in Feedwater .' 6 2
9
- l MainFeedwaterFeedwater / 5 79 F 3A*ff Main <
6 l i 84 F 98* Main Feedwater / / 5 lL 84 ' F)f0438+ff MainFeedwater/ 6 37 WOO 9C* l
- 37 3C*ff MainFeedwate/ 5 l Main Feedwat r- 6 99ff(76)***
4 FWO350* Main Feedwa er '6 ) 99ff(76)*** FWO39D* Main Feedw er 6 100ff(79)* FWO35A*- Main Fe ter 6 100ff(79 Main F ter 10]##(84%)A FWO358* FWO39A* f Main F ter 6 6, i 10]##( *** FWO39 Main F ter 6' 102ff( )***. FWO3 Main edwater 4
- 102ff( 7)***- FWO3
- Main eedwater /6 O l 8. Ramate Manual /
68 'R 701A*,# Suction N.A. RH87018*,# Suction 702A*,#- N.A. Suction- N.A. 5 RH87028*,f RH Suction N.A. 59 $1888)* Not Leg Saf ty Injection 73 518824* N.A. Hot Leg S ety Injection N.A. 66 518825* Hot Leg injection 60 - N.A. 518823* Cold Leg afety Injection 50 N.A. SI8890A* Cold Le RH Injection 51 N.A. 5188908* Cold L RH Injection 26 N.A. S18843* Cold Safety Inject n N.A 33- CV835 RCP eal Injection 33 N . CV83550* RC Seal Injection p .A. 5 CV83568* Seal Injection ).. A. CV8485C* P Seal Injectice, /M. A. h 8AAIDWOOD - . UNITS I 1.2 3/4 6-21 AMENDMENT N0. 84 & 83
-O Rcv J = . .. -
D 3.Y $ JABLY 3.6-] (Continued) CONTMNMENT ISOLATION VALVES '
'O PENETRATI /
*~ <
YALVE NO. FUNCTION ISOLATION TIME -(SEC) !
- 8. Remo Manual (Continued) 59 318802A* Hot Leg Safe Injection N.A.
73 S188028* -Hot Les Sa y injection N.A. 60 518835* Hot Leg 5 ty injection 50 N.A. S18809A . RH Cold Injection N.A. 5 SI88093* RH Cold og Injection N.A. 51 Hot L Safety injection N.A.
<100ff(79)*** AF 3A* Fee ater 100f#(79)*** 'A 13E* Feed'ater w N.A.[:
N. A/ 1018f(84)*** 0138* Feddwater N.g. 101tf(84)*** AF013F* F edwater K(A. 102ff(87)*** .AF013C* eedwater .A. 102ff(87) AF013G* Feedwater N.A. 99ff(76)* AF013D* Feedwater N.A. i 99ff(76) A AF013H* Feedwater N.A. 9. 37 CV8346* RCS Loop F 11 t N.A. iI V0016 Instr at Penetration N.A.
).S. V0017 Instrument Penetration N.A.
! 3- V00 Instrpiment Penetration N.A. -
, 13 V 9 Ins unent Penetrati N.A i IS 075 I trument.Penetra on N .
! 30 680 90 ke-Up Domin N.A.
57 .FC009 Spent Fuel P f
; . 57.
Cleaning N.A. i FC010 Spent Fuel P 1 Cleaning
' 32 - FC011 Spent Fuel N.A. I
! 32 1 Cleaning N.A. ;
FC012 Spent Fuel ool Cleaning l i i 77 .M5021D* N.A. 1 Main St a 78 M5021A ,# Main 5 as M.A.l 8 M502) ,f Main .N.A.l eam MS02 *f N.A. Mai team N.A.l AL' 2Ef AL cess Radiation N. . 33Af l ocess Radiation
- l AL 338# N .
' AL Yocess Radiation .A.
PR002FJ Process Radiati [ e AL 3 PR033C# Process Radiat
.A.
N.A. PR033De Process Radia on N. A. , h i BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 l 3/4 6-22 AMENOMENT NO. 84 4 83 .
. , <- m
! U b.0 b 4
/ TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued 4 j 1 i .
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 4
; /
- .. / 1 j PENETRAT _ .yALVE NO. MMUM l FLHCTION ISOLATION TIME (SEn l 9..
1 (Continued) 99 FWOISD*, Feedwaterff i ww.i.e n eirevte ten >*** N. A. 1 FW015A*/,# Feedwaterffes a ..,amic p' 6.o*** N.A. 101 FWO158*,f Feedwaterafcei a w .e sectedtestens*** N. A.
/102 FWOI *#, Feedwat ifese a.wei.e n.cs ' testen)*** N. A.
- 10. Qtd '
28 V8113 RCP/ Seal Water Return i ' 37 CV8348* RC$ Loop Fill N.A/ j N.A: i 6
/ \
4 W9007A hllied Water Y. A. ' 10 Wp0078 Chilled Water ( /M.A. 21 'CC9534 RCP Mtr Brng - turn N.A. 24 CC9518 / RCP Thermal 84rrier Return N.A.
- 25 CC9486 RCP Cooling r Supply / N.A.
i j 1 C5008A
/
Containee Spray M.A. 6 C50088 j' Contai at Spray N.A. l 39- Instrument Air IA09) N.A. j O 20 91 Ma -Up Domin M.A. i 1 52 R032 ess Radiation N . i; AL PR002G- Process Radiation AL PR002H M.A. Process. Radiatio N.A. 12 PS231A Hydro 9en Moni r
- 31 PS2318
, N.A.
Hydro 9en Mon or N.A. ! /
; 27 RY8047 5
PRT Nitrog n N.A. 44 RY8046 PRT Make- p N.A. 6 5188
- Safety njection M.A.
50 51 ISA* Safe Injection ,.
$0 N.A.
] 5 ISD* Saf y Injection N.A i. 51 88188* Sa ty Injection N. . 51 18818C* ety Injection 59 N 518905A* afety injection '
.A.
, 59 5189050* Safety Injection
- 60 N.A.
SI4819A* Safety Injectio N.A. 60 5188198* Safety Injection 1 i
! N.A. h I
1 BRMDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2
- O 3/4 6-23 AMENDMENT NO. 84 8 83 r
Y r *re ~- . _ _.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ -
.._____._.m.. _. _ . . _ . _ , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _. -_...________ _ _ _ _ _._ _ .
LC.0 3.w 5 TABt E /3.6-1 (Continued) / CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VAlYES
~O *tatta^Troa vatvr aa-
[
'u"c" o"
'so'^"
MA[IMUM
" "' 'stc'
- 10. QtSgt Continued)-
-60 518819C* Safety Injecti n N.A.
60- 5188190* Safety injec on N.A. 66 318841A* Safety inje ton N.A. 66 5188418* Safety Inj tion N.A.
-73 5189058' Safety 1 tion N.A.
7 SIS 905C* Safety action N.A. / J5 SI Safety action ,f
*- N.A.
/34 F Fire taction N.A.
33 C
- RCP, al lajection N.A.
33 C 680* RCP eal Injection N.A. 53 V83688* RC Seal Injection N.A. 53 CV8368C* REP Seal Injection N.A. II. s/C sa/eties/PORVs 77 M5013D* Main Steam 77
.A.
MS014P Main Steam 77 N.A. l MS0150* Main Steam N.A. 77 M5016F Main Steas . F.A. l 77 / MS017P Main Ste N.A. ' 78/ MS013A* Main Ste 74 N.A. MS014A . Main St
.p- N.A.
//8 MS01 Main S as N.A.
-t
, 78 M501
- Main aan N.A.
78 MSO A* Main team N.A. 85 13P Mai Steam N.A. 85 148* Ma n Steam 85 N.A. 158* in Steam 85 N..-
- MS0168* in Stcan N .
85 MS0178* an Steae 86 . .A. M5013C* Main Steam 86 N.A. MS014C*' Main Steas 86 N.A. MS015C* Main Steam 86 N.A. MS016C* Main Steam 86 M.A. MS017C* Main Steam 77 N.A. MSOl80* Main Suas 78 20 MS018A* Main SN 20 85 - MS0ISP Main St 20 MS018C Main 5 am 20
*Not subject to ype C leakage sts.
** Proper valve peration will demonstrated by rifying that the y ve j strokes to i s required post ion.
*** Mat maalie la ta haft f_ aaliemkla te tinit aftse rwela 7.
l [a fMay bE opened _ on an e intermit't'nt basis under administrative control.l[ Ac.fiart
. _;;;;__;. u w.; ; 2... ;_- :. ;.ac ;; ; ; n ;;;;; z; y,4c,1, l BRAIDWOOD - UNIT 3 1 & 2 3/4 6-24 AMENDMENT N0.84 4 83 k
ib.r
_. m yy m m 4 ,-,, - -- - _. - -_ -, --- - - l CTS DOCS , i . I l l 4 . e i f a-1 1 1 O
i i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS I ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 7,s
\u I' f z.>jA-
' ~
4 "4 ' 3 CT5 SRs 4.6.1.1.c. 4.6.1.2.a. 4.6.1.2.0. a.6.1.2.0. a.6.1.:.c. 4.6.1.2.g. 4.6.1.2.h. 4.6.1.3.a. 4.6.1.3.b. and 4.6.1.3.c con:a'n
" ii '
requirements to. perform containment leakage rate testing ir, a::o can:e 4-' with Regulatory' Guide 1.163. September 1995. 'ITS SRs 3.6.1.1 an: 3;6.2.1 require tnis same. containment leakage rate testin:. cc: e'e- {[.55 instead to an Aaministrative Controls (ITS Specification 5.5.16: l i Program. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, wnich then contains I the requirement for testing in accordance with Regulatory Gulce 1.163. September 1995. This revised presentation is aaministrative only anc :s j consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-52. Any furtner , technical changes are discussed in ITS Section 5.0 Discussion of ' Changes. 1 I () 1 o i -. l l l i l' i 9 -se BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 2 8/13/98 Revision J
.sj.
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS l ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l uO -
? *:- A'. CTS LCO 3.6.1.2 anc 3.6.1.3 nave oeen revise: tc in:erre-a:e : 5 i 'lw lj. ! LCO 3.6.2 ACTIONS Note 1. Note 3. ITS LCC 3.6.2 Recuire: A:n er Note A.2. E.2. Recu1 rec Acn on C.1. anc ITS SR 3.6.2,1 NO:es. T r ,.
4 ;E additional information facilitates tne use and uncerstan:1ng c' : e b- intent of tne recu1rements. Tne adcitional 1rformation is c h e; as 2 follows: O A - ITS LCO ACTIONS Note 1 states that entrv and exit is cermissiele l
&j to perform repairs on the affected air lock components. Altroa:-
6I not specifically stated in the CTS tne intent was tne same as be
@ ITS which was strictly controlled by aoministrative procecures.
w ITS LCO 3.6.2 ACTIONS Note 3 considers the containment inoperaoie in the event air lock leakage results in the overall ccntainment leakage rate exceeding the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program acceptance criteria. ITS LCO 3.6.2 Required Action Note A.2 allows entry and exit unaer administrative controls if both air locks tre inoperable. As stated above although this is not specifically stated :n the CTS.
!g tne intent was the same as the ITS.
4 - ITS LCO 3.6.2 Required Action Note B.2 states that entry and exit 4 of containment is permissible under the contiol of a dedicated n
- individual. Although not specifically stated in the CTS. current V [
l' administrative practices allow entry and exit consistent with the intent of the ITS. ITS LC0 3.6.2 Required Action C.1 ensures that the overall containment leakage is evaluated against the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program acceptance criteria if an air lock is inoperable. ITS SR 3.6.2.1 Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does l not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall ' air lock leakage test. . Since the inoperability affects only one door. the barrel and the other operable door provide a sufficient containment barrier. Even though the overall test could not be satisfied. and SR 3.0.1 would normally require declaring the LCO not met and entering ITS 3.6.2 Condition C (CTS Action b). the Note clarifles the intent that the previous test .n_qt. be considered "not met." l BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 2a 8/13/98 Revision J i O-
y, m _m.. ._a ._..,_.a _._m....mm _maau..a- -4m. . l i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS l ! ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ' t An Tne CTS Action 3.6.1.3.a.2 recu1rement Ina: an inoot able air ic:. c:r- . . be repaired prior to tne next overall air lock leakage tes: 1s no: ) explicitly stated in ITS LCO 3.6.2 actions. Tne performance of an I overall air lock le6kage test is a requirement of 10 CFR 50 Appenc u ; This recuirement is emoodied in ITS SR 3.6.2.1. Since the reau1 rec :es: L would not be able to be performed with an inoperable air lock acor anc a plant shutdown would be required due to the inability to perform :ne i required surveillance, this restriction on continued operation neea nc: I
' be explicitly stated. Restoration of the air lock door prior to tne required overall air lock test exists inherently as a result of the required Appendix J testing. Therefore, no change in operational requirements or intent is made. The proposed revision to eliminate a l ,.
specific restriction on continued operation is an administrative change g with no impact on safety. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431. An Not used.
;- lA u Not used.
An CTS LC0 3.6.1.7 does not allow the 48 inch purge valves to be opened under administrative control if the Required Actions require closure of that penetration. However, CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a appears to allow opening of any valve under administrative control, without consicering it to be a violation of containment integrity. This inconsister:y is resolved in ('s ITS LCO 3.6.3 Actions Note 1 which allows the administrative opening of inoperable containment isolation valves. except the 48 inch purge valves. The ITS restriction precludes opening a direct path from the containment to the outside atmosphere. This is consistent with the ; intent of the CTS and is therefore an administrative change. j Au CTS Action 3.6.1.3.a.4 states that the provision of CTS Specification i 3.0.4 are not applicable. This allows entry into the specified Mode I without the associated Actions hweg treen met. NUREG-1431 does not I contain this provision, but rathu relies upon the guidance of ITS l 1.C0 3.0.4. which allows entry into *he Modes of the applicability since ' the actions allow continued operat son for an unlimited period of time. As a result of this revised presmtation, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were made to the TS unless they were identified and justified. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. l i
. l l
l lg BYRON /BRAIDWOOO UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 4 9/10/98 Revision J lV , l L
1 l l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS l , ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
)
O A", CTS LCC 3.6.1.7.0 ce: ails when :ne 5-1n:n ource valves are ar o..e: :: N l coen-(1.e. . 'for PURGING or VENTING operationi unaer aam1mstra::ve control"). Tne Comed letters and tne Safety Evaluation Reco : l ossociated with Amenaments 76 (Byron) and 68 (Bra 10 wood) incluce: l specific revisions to the Bases and commitments with respec: :: tre ; c1rcumstances under which the valves woula be open. Consisten v.1:r :ns 1 Amenament philosophy and ITS philosophy, these aetails are inciuce: tr l the Bases for SR 3.6.3.2. The ITS do not incluae a specific cefir. : cr ! of purging or venting and therefore are lower case. Tne CTS oases , statements regarding the aoility of the valve to close under acc1cen: conditions and the instrumentation associated with the valves oein: OPERABLE are not explicitly in the ITS Bases but these requirement 5 are governed by ITS LCOs 3.6.3 and 3.3.6. These changes are only a change i in presentation and no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were made. A3 CTS LCO 3.6.1.7. Action b. requires " isolate the penetration" while ITS ' LCO 3.6.3 Condition A includes a specific list of the devices that may i be used to isolate. LCO 3.6.3 Condition A applies to all penetration fMw paths with two containment isolation valves. In the case of tne l i 8-inch and 48-inch purge valves. the purge valves are the only means bv l which to isolate the penetration. Therefore. this presentation provides j y added clarity without introducing any technical changes. and is I g, therefore an administrative change. l n Not used.
#[ A b
l n BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 5 8/13/98 Revision J ; V
a DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMil,T SYSTEMS 3
-O i V L.
{;A u fic: used. A3 CTS _C0 3.6.2.3 for containment cooling fans 12 seoarate: from tre : 5 LC0 for Containment Spray Systtim. However, tne Actions for incoerarie coolln? fans cepend on tne OPERABILITY status of Ccutaanment 5: ras System. ITS LCO 3.6.6 presentation comoines these two functions '1ntc one LCO and allows a format.tnat ooes not require an explicit verification af OPERABILITY status of other systeris. Since tne ITS provides explicit Actions,(Conditions. Required Actions. and Comoie: 1cr Times) for comoins.tlons of inoperable functions. tr.e technical reau1rements consistent with tne CTS are retained. and inis reformat:1n: is an adidnistrative change During this reformatting, no technical
~
changes (either actual or interpretational) were made to the TS unless they were identified and justified. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431. A.' CTS Action 3.6.3.a requires maintaining at least one operable' 1 solation v0 ve in any affected open penetration. The ITS Conditions clarify what is meant by the phrase " maintaining one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration." For penetrations with two isolation valves. ITS LC0 3.6.3 Condition A applies so that only one may oe inoperable. Thus. Condition A inherently ensures maintaining "at'least one isolation valve OPERABLE." a the case of containment penetrations designed with only one isolation valve the system boundary is considered an adequate
' 3 barrier and the penetration is not considered "open" when the single -(V isolation valve is open. ITS LCO 3.6.3 Condition C adequately addresses the requirement for this configuration, g - BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 6 8/13/98 Revision J
! DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ! ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS {
'I Am CTS 3.6.1.2 Actions restrict reactor coolant neatur beyonc 200*: ':e g containment leakage rates are outside establisnea limits. If ine
" reactor coolant temperature were > 200"F (MODE 4) witn tne containmen-k' leakage rates outside established limits, tne actions of CTS L:0 3.C.3 J would apply With ITS SR 3.6.1.1 not met for containment leasaas rate se ' testing, the Recuired Actions of ITS LCO 3.6.1 woulc apply. Since Iness
't?? actions are comparable to CTS LCO 3.0.3. this change is conslaerec l
"i aoministrative in nature. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
o'k Au Consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-52. CTS 1.7. Item d.1s O deleted. Item d simply provided a reference to another TS i (CTS 3.6.1.2). The technical requirements remain the same. Therefore NN this change is considered a presentation preference. During the
?t si reformatting, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) x? r; were made to the TS unless they were identified and justified.
l--), i i. BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS I & 2 3.6 8a 9/1/98 Revision J 7-- V l l l
l l i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS l ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS { TECHNICAL CHANGES RELOCATIONS (R)
~
E None. l j TECHNICAL CHANGES MORE RESTRICTIVE (M) [j M 3 Not used. H, CTS 3.6.1.3 Action a.1 and Action b requires that with the containment airlock inoperable, at least one air lock door must be maintainea closec e within 24 hours. ITS 3.6.2 Required Actions A.1 and C.2 reau1re an air T lork door to be verified closed within one hour. Reducing the u
.a Completion Time for CTS Recuired Actio'is from 24 hours to the ITS 6 Completion Time of I hour for the same Required Actions constitutes a j more restrictive change. This change is cor.sistent with NUREG-1431.
N M3 ITS LCO 3.6.2 Requirec Action Note A.2 allows entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks have an inoperable door.
'g The CTS Action 3.6.1.3 does not have a specific completion time associated with entry and exit conditions when both air lock doors are 3 inoperable. Restricting entry and exit conditions under administrative e controls to 7 days in the ITS. versus an indefinite period in the CTS.
p 1s tnerefore a more restrictive change. This change is consistent with v NUREG-1431. O) l l BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 9 9/21/98 Revision J h
DISCUSSION OF CHANCES TO CTS I ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE " Generic" (LA) l LA.^ CTS Tacle 3.6-1, and various references tc it in CTS LCC 3.6 3 a ; l CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a. are to De relocated from tne Tecnnical See:P car ,- i
; tc tne Bases. Tne specific relocation of comoonent lis:s fro- Te r ":3 l Soecifications is consistent wl:n Ine direction of Generic Le::er 9 -3., l Removal Of Component Lists From Technical Specifications.
Additionally. GL 91-08 specified tr.at aaministrative opening cf 1 solation valves reau1 red to normally be closed. is allowec wnile sta ' - considering that valve OPERABLE. Therefore. ITS SR 3.6.3.3 and SR 3.6.3.4 include an exception to the requirement that all containmen: isolation manual valves required to be closed during accident cono1tions are closed. This exception allows valves to be open under aaministrative control. and is considered a detail of OPERABILITY consistent with the removal of the specific listing of valves. The listing of containment isolation valves in CTS Table 3.6-1 which are subject to the requirements of ITS LCO 3.6.3 are related to design ano are not necessary to be listed in the TS to ensure the containment is maintained Operable. ITS LC0 3.6.3 requires each containment isolation valve to be Operable. These requirements are adequate for ensuring each required containment isolation valve is maintained Operable. ' Therefore. the list of containment 1 solation valves is not necessary to be included
; in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and
'( ! safety. As such, these relocated details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Any change to this list will be made in accordance with the Bases. Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5. LA2 The details of CTS LCO 3.6.1.3.a comprising Operability of the air lock are relocated to the ITS Bases. Air lock interlock Operability requirements are explicit in Surveillance Requirements (ITS SR 3.6.2.2) ! for air lock Operability. The Operability of this interlock ensures one air lock door will be closed when the air lock is being used for normal e transit entry and exit through the containment." The requirement for i both doors to normally remain closed is included in the ITS Bases. Should only one air lock door remain closed. the design of the primary containment and its air lock still provide a sufficient leak tight i barrier for postulated _ events. Therefore, these details are not
- i. necessary to be included in the TS to ensure Operability of the air lock l
1s maintained. As such. these relocated details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and o ~ safety. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5. p BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-10 8/13/98 Revision J Id
't
- DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l j%
l
'O LA, CTS SR 4.6.2.1.b aeta115 tne recuire: oevel:De: nea; 10- :ne ::r:r e-spray pumo and test flow patn ouring performance cf tne Surve: Mance i
inese details are to be relocated to tne Bases. Tnese aetalis are n :
$' necessary to ensure tne Operaollity of the containment spray cars +
; requirements of ITS LCO 3 6.6. " Containment Spray anc Coolln; Sys:e 3
'; and associatec SRs are acecuate to ensure tne containment soray c ars are Operable. As such. Inese details are not reou1 red to De ir :ne 5 j to provide 21eauate protection of the public health and safety e ! Relocating tnese aetails to the Base 3 maintains the consistency w1:r.
NUREG-1431. Any cnange to these details will be maae in accorcance .c - l the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5. LA, CTS SR 4.6.2.1.d requires verification that the spray nozzles are unobstructed, and includes details of how to perform this verification ("by performing an air or smoke flow test"). This detail is relocatec to the ITS Bases. These details are not necessary to ensure the Operability of the Containment Spray System. The requirements of ITS 3.6.6. " Containment Spray and Cooling Systems." and associated SRs are adequate to ensure the Containment Spray System 1s Operable. As such, these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The relocation of this detail maintains the consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to this detail will be made in accordance with the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5. G V LA, CTS LC0 3.6.2.2 details minimum requirements of an Operable flow path for the Spray Additive System. These details are relocated to the ITS Bases. These details of the Operability are not necessary in the LCO. The definition of Operability and the requirements of ITS Specification 3.6.7. " Spray Additive System." suffice. As such, these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The relocation of these details maintains the consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with +.he Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5. LA3 CTS SR 4.6.2.2.d details the required flow rate and equivalency for 30% NaOH for the Spray Additive System (details of the acceptance criteria for the flow rate verification surveillance). These details are to be relocated to the TRM. These details are not necessary to ensure the Operability of the Spray Additive System. The requirements of ITS LCO 3.6.7. " Spray Additive System." and associated SRs are adequate to ensure the Spray Additive System is Ooerable. As such these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Relocating these equivalency details.to the TRM maintains the consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. q v BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 12 8/13/98 Revision J
l l ! DISCUSSION OF CHAN3ES T0 CTS l ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS lO i LAy CTS SR 4.6.4.2 cetails soe:ific acce:tance cr teria fc ny:r:ge-recomoiner testing: 1) rate of neater snearn temoerature increase ar: power consumotion: 2) cnannel calloration of 19strumentatacr an: i controls: 3) attributes of a visual examination: and 41 reau1re: nea:e - l 0 pnase resistance. Tne rate'of neater snearn temperature ine ease ar:
-? cower consumotion. the attributes of tne visual inspection. anc :ne i
recuired heater phase resistance details are relo:ateo to the ITS Sases. Tne cnannel caliDration of instrumentation and controls is relocate: ::
'pl the TRM. These details are not necessary to ensure the Ooerac 11t3 cf
' the Hydrogen Recombiner Systems. The recuirements of ITS LCO 3.6.5.
" Hydrogen Recombiners." and associated SRs are adequate to ensure tne
' Hydrogen Recombiner Systems are OperaDie. As such. these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the l public health and safety. The relocation of these details maintains tne l consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details in the Bases I will be made in accordance with the Bases Control Procram descr10ed in ITS Section 5.5. Any chance to these details in the TRM will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.69.
LA 3 CTS SR 4.6.3.1 requires a demonstration of operability after maintenance or repair on an isolation valve. This requirement is relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual. Any time the Operability of a system or component has been affected by repair, maintenance or replacement of a component. post maintenance testing is reauired to demonstrate 'D Operability of the system or component. After restoration of a d compcnent that caused a required SR to be failed. ITS SR 3.0.1 requires the. appropriate SRs (in this case ITS SR 3,6.3.5) to be performed to : demonstrate Operability of the affected components. As such. the ! requirement of CTS SR 4.6.3.1 is not required to be in the TS to provide ' adequate protection of the public health and safety. The relocation of CTS SR 4.6.3.1 maintains consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to this requirement will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. LA 3 CTS SRs 4.6.1.7.3 and 4.6.1.7.4 detail the acceptance criteria for leakage rate tests. These specific acceptance criteria details are to be relocated to the TRM. These details are not necessary to ensure the Operability of the Containment Purge Valves. The requirements of ITS LCO 3.6.3. " Containment Isolation Valves." and associated SRs are adequate to ensure the containment purge valves are Operable. As such.
.these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The relocation of details to the TRM maintains the consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
l 9 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 14 8'/13/98 Revision J
- V
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS v LA p CTS Action 3.6.1.7a incluces scea fic recuirements rela:1ve te 'st'.a: n: tne 48-incn purge valves. ITS LCO 3.6.3 Recu1rea Action A.1 incluaes a' j list of ways to 1solate penetrations (Required Act1on A.1 acolles to l more than just the 48-inch purge valves). Tne specific recuirements <c-tne 48-1ncn purge valves are relocated to the ITS Bases. Tne ac:1or :: isolate an inocerable 48-inch purge valve penetration is maintainec os As a result, the aetails associa ec ITS LCO 3.6.3 Recu1 red Action A.1. with the method of isolating the 48-inch purge valve penetration are no: necessary to ensure 1 solation is accomplished in a timely manner anc are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the I
@ public health and safety. Any change to the details relocatea to the O Bases will be made in accordance with the Bases Control Program i
described in ITS Section 5.5. s ' d LAu CTS Definition 1.7 includes details with respect to Containment i
- t. '- Integrity. Consistent with NUREG-1431. Definition 1.7 items a. b. c. l N
and e are relocated to the Background section of ITS LCO 3.6.1 Bases. Item d is discussed in ITS Section 5.0. These details (CTS Definition Q 1.7 items a. b c. and e) are attributes of containment Operability. ITS LCO 3.6.?, requires containment to be OPERABLE. ITS 3.6.1 and tha 1 definition of Operability suffice. As such, these relocathi details are l not required to be included in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Any change to the details relocated to the Bases will be made in accordance with the Bases Control Proaram I described in ITS Section 5.5.
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(] v q BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 15 8/13/98 Revision J V
..._ .-.-. .- -.=...... . -.~. ...--.... - -... -..--...-. . - . . . . - .
.(
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i-. ( .
$. TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE "Soecific" (L) l $ ..
y l .L 1 Not used. 3
$, h
- 4. '
.t -
l l hQ ! l 0 l I ^ l j
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e - ) 1 BiRON/BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 16 8/13/98 Revision J 4 i
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS
' ITS SECTION 3.6 C0ljTAINMENT SYSTEMS 1
Qv ~ u.l L, i.o usea. k.
. I i
(-
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l l 1 I BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 17 g-] U 8/13/98 Revision J l I
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS L. CTS SR 4.6.2.1.c. SR 4.6.2.2.c. SR 4.6.2.3.b. an : SR 4.6.3..: nase ese-revised to add tne onrase "an actual or simulatec." in reference :c :ne Containment Soray Actuation, Safety Injection. Pnase "A" anc Pnase "E-Isolation ano Containment Vent Isolation test signals usec tc actua:e the automatic portion of the associateo Containment Systems. Tne - S wording requires tnat a " test signal" be used, wnicn does not alloe, fr an actual-signal to be applied in meeting tne Specification. ine revised wording will, allow the plant to take credit for an actual sicna' to initiate the protective function being surveilled. as well as a ' simulated signal. Tnerefore. this enange is less restrictive. Inis clarification is consistent with NUREG-1431. Along with this, the CTS has been revised to delete the phrase "durina shutdown." or "during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE" consistent ~ with NUREG-1431. Such limitations are not required to be detailed in the Technical Specifications. These SRs are typically performed durina plant shutdown. however, if for instance. an actual signal is generated while operating results should be useable even though the plant is not
" shutdown." Similarly. if testing would be required to complete some y repair or modification made while operating. a shutdown should not be o required. Therefore, the deletion of the limitation more accurately a reflects the intent and allows for the utility to schedule testing more j appropriately.
# l ' L, Not used.
i BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 20 8/13/98 Revision J O- --
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES TO CTS ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ~O l L,,
" CTS SR 4.6.1.1.a. SR 4.6.2.1.c.1). SR 2.6.2.2.:. an: SR 4.6.3._^ re:.. s l periodic verifica 1on tnat all valves are in ine1r corre:: 005 : 1r ITS reautres the same verification. but excluaes valves :na: are ic se:
i sealed or otherwise secured in their Correct pos1:1on. Inis a'lov.s tnese valves, whicn are secured in their requirec position uncer acministrative controls. to be exempted from tne surveillance. Tr:ese l valves are secured in their accident position and are not reautre; :: actuate to perform their safety function. Proper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by the Out of Service Program 1r y conjunction with the Locked Equipment and Caution Card Program. Tnese programs ensure valves are maintained in their proper position by
$. requiring independent verification of safety related or other importan j equipment. documentation of the position of locked equipment in a l surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally '
$ required to be locked. Exempting these valves that are secured in tnelr L.
required position is perceived as th? intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrase more accurately reflects this intent. Lu CTS SR 4.6.3.3 requires the isoidtion time of each power operated or automatic containment isolation valve be determined to be within limits. The ITS Bases define these limits as those assumed in the safety analysis. Since " power operated" valves are remote-manually controlled. and do not receive any automatic isolation signal, the assumed closure q time is dependent on operator action. Operability of these valves would V therefore depend on the operator's ability to effect the isolation as i assumed in the analysis, and not on the individual valve's stroke time. 4 ITS only requires the stroke time of automatic valves be within the times assumed in the safety analysis. The power operated valves are I
" cycled" in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. l I
Lu In the event both valves in a penetration are inoperable. the cts LCO 3.6.3 Actions for inoperable containment isolation valves, which requires maintaining one isolation valve OPERABLE. would not be met and an imediate shutdown (per CTS LCO 3.6.3 Action a. "otherwise1 is required. The ITS Condition B provides I hour for restoration, prior to commencing a required shutdown. This 1 hour period is consistent with time allowed for an inoperable containment and is therefore an , i appropriate allowance. l l 1 BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 22 8/13/98 Revision J
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4
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I DISCUSSION OF CHANGES T0-CTS , ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS fx ! U. i l La CTS 3.6.3 requires that isolation oevices be~ver1 fled to De in Ine ~ correct position. This. verification does not currently allow for i L aaministrative verification. NUREG-1431. Required Actions for. i l' ' Specification 3.6.3 was modified by NRC approved TSTF-269. tne NRC has l . accepted that 1 solation devices that are locked. sealed. or otnerwise .! L '~ ' secured in position can be verified to be closed through acministrative means. This is considered =to be a less restrictive change; ' r 1 l l I l 1 l-l l,
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i l t l l . BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 23a- 9/10/% Revision J t
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. .~ _ . _ - - -
I Enuom. 5 6 '" h&h-4em4Mh6- E hWMNh- 46- -4MAh k i ! LCO MARKUPS !b 4 8 l t 1 i 1 N. I 0 I
\
i I 1
~ - . . .. . .- --.-_ .-- - ~.-. -.. ~ . . - . - - - - - . . - - . - - .. - . - - . - -
[ - Containment Air Locks : n..-..qst.; ei,,.g sFE~rj f, Ice .C== r.nr ami -E
* . {
. 3,6.;
3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS D 3.6.'2 Containment ' Air. Locks J A=c:;;1_ :.L_Ligatmoseheno,-4ce Eendense --anc, . ,M LC0_ 3.6.2 MTwofcontainment air locYc{s]"shall be OPERABLE. qg: APPLICABILITY: . MODES 1, 2, 3,.ano 4. ACTIONS' n
-------------------------------------NOTkS------__ ------_----_--------__---__
- 1. Entry and exit is permissible to perhrm repairs on the affected air lock n components, o k
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed to each air lock. J 4
-3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1,
" Containment, when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall p' :
containment leakage rate. , M. b CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more ------------NOTES------------ , containment air locks. 1. Required Actions A.1,. with one containment A.2, and A.3 are not air lock door applicable if both doors inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C~is entered, a
- 2. Entry and exit is '
permissible for 7 days h under administrative-controls 91fbothair locks are inoperable}*' (continued) i 4 h WOG STS 3.6-3 Rev 1, 04/07/95
- = ~ - - * *
.. .. . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ - . _ . . _ . . , _ . _ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . ...m _ . . _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ . _
m _ Cg_qt310gnt IsMfaign Valves etmomemc.
~
...,....,........m.
Ice-Goncenser7-eno GuaQ 3.6' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ~ i 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves %.mgrieric, Lb.L ~;; nick, lee y j;;nden;;r, .nd O nl) - 1
.LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
h ~
' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,.3, and 4.
-ACTIONS 4
------ - - ----------- - ---- -- - t----- -- N OT E --------------__---------_------
f' 1. Penetration flow path (s) texcept for'$4(inch purge valve flow paths]"may C be'.unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. g A
- 3. Enter applicable Conditions .nd Required Actions for systems'made .
inoperable by containment iso)ation valves. E t
- 4. Enter applicable Conditions.and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, l [y
" Containment," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the 1 overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.I Isolate the affected 4 hours Only epplicable to penetration flow path
. penetration flow paths by use of at least' with two containment one closed and
~ isolation valves. de-activated
---------------------- automaticjvalve, g re.a.b inus closed manual valve, -
One or more - blind flange, or penetration flow paths check valve with flow with one containment through the valve
. isolation valve . secured.
inoperable *:except for purce valve of shigld A_N,Q
.@. -lbfildio6 bvoiss /
leaka e not within
/
o limit . (continued) WOG STS- 3.6-8 Rev 1, 04/07/95 2 tcJ 3 4
I LC0 INSERT (S) (' SECTION 3.6 7 LC0 3.6.3 4 q l: INSERT 3.6 8A 9 . Deleted in Revision J.
. rn 9/25/98 Revision J
. .- , m
. . . . .. . . ~ - . - . - . . - . - - - . - -. - - - . . . . - _ . . - -
' Containmer
- tc 31 Ation vahae (3 n;;;3 ..,
, b 53:: =c:cr.em e. ::: O c ac e n se--1r-et--3:ra 5' J . O .' ,^ ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l
A. .( continued) A.2 -------NOTh------- g Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative m M -eans.-------- ....-- ...
/
[ Verify the affected- Once per 31 days { penetration flow path for isolation is isolated, devices outside L g d. hbebhh cOmht.es md containment 5' tWrtew 54r.vten mg / M.
, heme o, o t
- be de. ween g ww of Prior to '
"""N" ' N - *
) entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if 5 not performed li within the previous 92 days for isolation
' h% )- devices inside containment B. ---------NOTE--------- B.1 Isolate the affected I hour l Only applicable to penetration flow path pt. 3tration flow paths by use of at least with two coitainment one close'd and isolatic:: valves. de-activated (or rv.-ov, ~ ,, s Q
---------------------- automaticAvalve, closed manual valve, One or more or blinc flarge. )
penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves I inoperablelexceptfor
; purge valve w w.m ; d; g>
,. 1;- = r.; w e,,,
leakage not within
. 1.imitK f
(continued) Q
- V l WOG STS 3.6-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l2.cv I
- Containment .lsolation yalves, s @ ..cr:._ :.
,{d f -Subne::;nerie ::: Cent: nee . c.: pai; J . O . .'
ACTIONS (conti nued) ((j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPilTION TIME
~72, C. ---------NOTE---------
Only applicable to C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path
'{ T hours 7 penetration flow paths-by use of at least with only one one closed and containment isolation de-activated valve and a closed automaticAvatve, tor rm : m,.2 p system. closed manual valve, ~-
---------------------- or blind f1ange.
havew e i u s n..n 1 One'or more AN,0. etc w un ,u w4,,, _; penetration flow paths with one containment C2 ------- NOT E --------- S' '*iuwu
' " *nn m '
isolation valve Isolation devices in inoperable. high radiation areas D'nI **""~"_ N - may be verified by use of administrative I# dC means. j Verify the affected . Once per 31 days penetration flow path
/-
is isolated. (3)
,, -l
'D. Shield building bypass 0.1' Restore lealiage 4 hours leakage.not within / withinljdiit. '
g 1 % ~** / ../ . ./ ... -. - 1 C - hOneormore $.1 Isolate the affedted 24 hours l penetration flow penetration flow path paths with one or by use of at least , y more containment J one(closedand o purge valves not de-activated . 3 within purge valve i automatic valve ~, leakage limits. , closed manual valve
'or blind,, flange). . y .
g- r- uiu(mq vitvs c w hi W i. _ le t*.0 -
'i- if Ucontinuea) -
2 O V WOG STS 3.6-10 Rev 1, 04/07/95
. _._ _ ._ . _ _ _ _ - _ . . _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ . - -- m- _ _ _
m Containment isolation Valves FA ..u.etc. 6~ !-Suca ....- 3;.1; r ; . h-6encens**- e.ng_Euai.. 2.5.2
/ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS \s._/
l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 4a 3.6.3.1 Verify eachWP' inch purce valve is sealed 31 cays { closed., except for ne purge valve in a ; penAtration flow th while in Q6ndition E ~l . I of/this LCO. / - s' tP" rase:j o..r v,ev . < s A r-,.,, SR 3.6.3.2 Verify eachi8 finch. purge valve is. closec, 31 days _ exceptwhenthe98Dnchcontainmentpurge u valves are open forbr:=n ce"-ai, u ALAM m .i = ' 'ty c=:id:r: tion- s -fwL p, , personnel. entry, Or f;r Orvei".n= thet ;
.uqn4.- % valves tn h epen. ;
I SR 3.6.3.3 ----------- =----NOTE-------------------- Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative controls.
- /]
o @ an.~m Verify each containment isolation manual 31 days b valve _ and blind flange that is located ' y L anunuvahic 'N outside containment7and required to be
,[
closed during accidgnt conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls. I _ (continued) Cs, ' t int > rei ^^" - k
,n,.. .- s;- ,
1 4 i ^ (3 g . WOG STS 3.6-12 Rev 1, 04/07/95 12cv "J
! 1 l
C Containment Isolation Valves +Atec:;.w .w. T M;: .0 ec ic. Ih anume gc-tual } 2.5.3 A SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
\'" /
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR' 3.6.3.4 -------------------NOTE----------- .-------- Valves and blind flanges in high radiation i areas may be verified by use of I l,a wm._ manaf', administrative means, w ____--____________---______________________ i Verify each containment-isolation manua's Prior to l
, valves and blind flange that is located entering MODE 4 Le T ' . i inside containment +and required to be !
from MODE 5 it
- ;ti' O "c] 98 a ,ei r a:"
closed during accident conditions is not performed jj 1
- closed, except for containment isolation within the i valves that are open under administrative QC controls.
previous 92 days I SR 3.6.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each-power In g ;r;ted ar.dieach automatic containment accordance isolation valve is within limits. q"with the g _ Inservice -
'h ;
Testing O n Program @ Q y, 22'u. m
\
SR 3.6.3.6 Cycle each weight or spring loaded ' check 92 da s valve testable during operation through one complete cycle of full travel, and -. verify each check valve remains closed when kd the differential pressure in the direction
- of flow is s [1.2] psid and opens when the /
. / differential pressure Jf the direction o j flos is 2 [1.2) psidjiind < [5.0) psid.
, , [- l1 (continued)
G WOG STS 3.6-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95 6:V T
e-LCO JFDs. P 4 O C (' t O i
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 LC05 k BRACKETED CHANGES (B) B3 Tne brackets were removed and tne optional wording or pian: spec M : g value was retained. F B2 Tne brackets were removed and the plant SDecific val ' and'or pian: specifi; r3quirement was proviaed and Bases Reviewer's Notes ceis ec B3 .The brackets.were removed and the plant specific details replace tne NUREG optional wording. The purge valve design is such that inolvidua' leakage. rates can not be determined for any single penetration 1 solation device. Leakage testing is performed by pressurizing between the two purge valves in a penetration and measuring the combined leakage through both valves. In order to adopt the NUREG Required Actions with the failure of a single purge valve's leakage limit, confirmation of the remaining purge valve's leak tightness would be required. Since this information can not be obtained. the CTS Actions allowing 24 hours to 8 complete restoration of the leak tightness of the in-series valves. is retained. A. j In conjunction. ITS SR'3.6.3.1 exception for opening one purge valve p while in the Condition for excessive leakage is deleted. This exception gl 15 be adequately addressed by Condition D Required Actions. without the necessity for the complexity introduced by this exception. Q C B, The bracketed SRs were deleted since the plant specific design does not include the associated functions. B3 Not useo. l B. Not used. h BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-1 8/14/98 Revision J O 5
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 LCOS-SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ' n k), GENERIC CHANGES (C) C3 .This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-52. Reviewer's Notes associated with this TSTF are deleted.
. C, This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. at ma ified by TS1F-17
~
. Revision 1 (NRC approved). A minor editorial correction to the Bases as
- 9 ' c -l proposed in TSTF-17 was made, so it was not inferred.that the frecuency
, {f f'y has been 24 months in the past t-
_d...jlC3 Not used. c ._ CE C, This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, as modified by TSTF-30.
.I Revision 2 (NRC approved).
C3 This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, as modified by TSTF.-45. Revision 1 (NRC approved), C. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 as modified by TSTF-46. Revision 1 (NRC approved). C, This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, as modified by TSTF-269 (NRC approved).
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'tYRON/BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2. 3.6 2 9hd/98 Revision J G
.. - . . .. -- - - . - ~ . - - --. . - .
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 LCOS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS O
\/ . ' EA_NT SPECIFIC CHANGES (P)
P3 During the development _certain wording preferences. Englisn language l conventions, reformatting. renumoering. or editorial reworain; i consistent witn plant specific norrenclature were adopted. As a resu'-- 2 the Technical Specifications -(TS) should be more readily reacaole Dy . and therefore understandable to plant operatdrs and other use s. During this reformatting. renumbering. and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were maae to Ine T3 unless they were identified and justified. j P, ITS LCO 3.6.3 Required Actions A. B. cnd C. SR 3.6.3.3. and SR 3.6.3.: are modified by the addition of de-activated remote manual valves to tne list of allowed isolation devices. This provides clarity that remote I manual valves which act as CIVs should be de-activated if used as an isolation device.
- ^ P3 The' Completion Times for ITS LCO 3.6.6 Required Action A.1 and ITS LCO 3.6.7 Required Action A.1. were revised from 72 hours to 7 days.
These changes are consistent with the current licensing basis as presented in CTS LCOs 3.6.2.1. 3.6.2.3. and 3.6.2.2_respectively. ITS Bases also revised for consistency. In addition. the second Completion Time for LCO 3.6.6 Required Actions A.1 and C.1 are extended to 14 days. consistent with the NUREG philosophy of allowing one alternation of inoperabilities. _,_)
'W P, NUREG-14313rovides optional specifications for a variety of containment designs (su] atmospheric, ice condenser. and dual). in addition to specifications for the Byron and Braidwood designs (atmospheric). These Containment section specifications are not included in the NUREG markup q package. Additionally. specification titles and "A"/"B" notations are
'so revised to eliminate the information identifying the applicable design Ay, type.
o ,s
*i d Not used.
3
$N l P ee BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 3 8/14/98 Revision J
. ... ...._ . ..._..... _ ... _ ....._ _ _ ~ _._...._. _. _ . ___. .~.__ _ ._..._ . _. _ ._ .._ _ __ ._. _
. s I: JUSTIFICATION FOR' DIFFERENCES:TO NUREG 1431'LCOS' c-r; SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT. SYSTEMS A . . Pi-j?Pn. -Not used.. ^ g:
-- w Pu -The words '" power operated" are. deleted from ITS SR 3.6.7.1. Tne Byror .. 'and Braidwood Spray Additive Systems only include manual and automa:::
- valves.
e 1:- i I 4-i +
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J v :. ' \ BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 5 8/14/98 Revision J I
> 2,7 l
pa w d. _m p e, e gpu.aw e -. des s.ui. e W- p+'a*44m4 WDd% #5Mem.a-dede.3.4ie-4AaDA-eg-.9448.4*5.W. AdugJe 4 4 M +JEDS M 4-Jte M4 "-
--W ANS.h4 W,.,h.4 4.s A Ja m 4 4h ,m. A,6 sM _4_GmD . Sow.a- hd. .wh 4 Ma.4,_44,5
-5 Se $m F BASES MARKUPS 1
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. _. _ _-_ ._._ _ _ _ -- _.._- ~ _ _ .____ _ _ _ ______._ - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . .
s, . . , ,
- '- % 5?
7 .. ',
. 4 ,. ,
o . . . . BASES INSERT (S)
- 'N
- '
- SECTION 3.6-
- v .
(;.4 ? - 3- !
- c -a.
l? s. ;. Basss :. .c. ..S , t. U> ' INSERT B 3.6 118A'. . (B,) . .
.. the natural: convection processes, containment fan cooler coern:e-
~
i . E
.' containment spray ana;the. Post-LOCA Purge System..
4<- $l 1:. l k W i- .
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d'-,I...,,I',h',...+.c.. m . $. ' A.. w ny.s-, ., m,, --, .e,,, ,,,wsm.,<-,, ir.c -y, .,.. ,,,,,v,w-m,,-h..,__,91,,,,p+,y-,,,,#-s.e, e.-c,pe-. gw.,.,--sy.v,.,-..,
.- 1 7,
Cc.:a n en: ::: -:
~
i 2.i.' . 1 BAi~5 .
,, g u ! .b* BACKGROUND (continued)
- 2. closed by manual valves blinc flanges, or de-activatec automaticAvalves securec in tneie l closed positions, exceot as providet in LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves";
- b. Each air lack is OPERABLE, except as previoet in LCO-3.6.2,." Containment Air Locks";
-r . <
- c. 1!I!!$ equipment hatchu' d closedi,anS f
A [d. The pre m . w J sealing mechanism associated with + % penetration is OPERABLE, except as provided in c -- K. LCO 3.64
,,3,g,,w,, g, g3,, ;,
_ l APPLICABLE .The safety design basis for the containment is that the I SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a M C
!c _ :i r: rrr :ren:l'(.LOCA*,la steam line breaky' :r: ; r::. :
m r
--! '=- ':(Ref. 2). In addition, release of "e
.significant fission product ioactivity within containment A 5 - '7.N,1,l.,7w.'IOf,IJylcan occur from a LOG,19 'cIn
,- the DBA analyses, it is
(,) - assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for the l DBAs involving release of fission product radim.ctivity, release to the environ.nent is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an [O allowable leakage rate of'io.4% of containment air weight /o? per day (Ref. 3). This leakage rate, used to evaluate - offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in b " ~ *' *
, 10 CFR 50, Appendix J+(Ref.1), as L : the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment interna' pressure (P resulting from the
, ""'" *"'* M limitinqM The allowable leak) age rate represented b forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing. L h 90.MY per day in the safety analysi, is (Ref. 3). <o.8 cm at h *-t s at assumed P, = to fpsig be Q
' uet m,o, % , y g Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY. (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-7 Rev 1, 04/07/95 vr
- r. Cc:, a n~eP*. 4Wy]r_ j
- : 2.: ..
BASES
~
ll. ( 5 r, e* *
.i --
A APPLICABLE Jhe containment satisfies Criterion 3 of "- E " ' - ~ V SAFETY ANALYSES #
' Emrent. -
~
(continued) c rk LCO containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to
$ 1.0 L,, except prior to the first startup after performinc
, .3 a recuiredjo m 30. how leakage test. At tnis
~
a . 72.M t h'- time. tne comoined Type 5 anc C leakage must ce < 0.6 L*, *
~*2 T ~' P" ' .-- arid the overall Typt A leakage must .be < 0.75 L.. -
Compliance with this L ensure a c tainment
,0 Pf l configuration,includingiequipmenthatchEg,thatis '
.ie MC mustMMC sc e- l structurally sound and that will limit leakage to tho .
l$ i"* leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LCO 3.6.2)'{and purge valves with resilient seals D (LCO3.6.3)farenotspecificallypartoftheacceptance ' r,,,,,,. , , criteria of 10 CFR 50. Accendix J. Therefore, leakage rates 4 {~V exceedir.g these individual limits only result in the containment being incperable when the leakage results in exceeding thetacceptanceAriteria of em=n J. om .o . .g -g APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a 1,bA eould cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these , MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be ] OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.4, " Containment Penetrations." i ACTIONS A.1 l l In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be ! restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour i Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the I problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining l containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period (continued) l B 3.6-8 Rev 1, 04/07/95 p) WOG STS
^
Kev T i
Containmen; - -r-g. ( - E 2.f..
' BASES ACTIONS 3.J. (continued) i
' also ensures that the probability of an accident (recuring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periocs wnen , containment is inoperable is minimal. ' i i B.! and B.2 - If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within i the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a , MODE in which the LCO does not apply. 'To achieve this J , status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within : j 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed :l Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating , ' experience, to reach the required plant' conoitions from full j, power conditions in an. orderly manner and without .' challenging plant systems - a i , I ' I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 ; REQUIREMENTS . l Maintaining the tontainment OPERABLE requires compliance l with the visual examinations and leakage rate test ; p reouirements ofl10 as modifieg _I l
.() M ':..m el -w% x by/ approved exempt'jCFR 50,-Appendfx ions Failure valve) e -F
- p_d]Fleakage limits specified in to meet air locleiand purgeJ (Rel l D LCO 3.6.27and LCO 3.6.3Pdoes not invalidate.the J acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless 1 their contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required GC UR A k
%Ene: J.) leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L for ccmbined Type B and C leakage, and < 0.75 L, for ov,erall ,
l Type A leakage. At all other times between required leaEage i rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall i Type A leakage limit of 51.0 L*. At s 1.0 L the offsite ! dose consequences are bounded by the assuir.pti,ons of the I
. safety analysis. SR /requencies are as required by O c e - e2.. - 94 ' Apppndix J, as mooified by approved / exemptions. T)cs, !
1 59'3.0.2 (which allows Frequency oftensions) does/not applyj j These periodic testing requirements veri'/y that the ! containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate l assumed in the safety analysis. (continued) ! WOG'5TS B 3.6-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95 wx
p p- '1, .l; i 1 - 5
' BASES INSERT (S)-
- , - SECTION 3.6 !
l Bases 3.6.1 ' 1
- INSERT lB 3.'6i9A - (C )
j f
,,. stne(Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. i W
v~ , o - t 3:
. 4- INSERT B 3.6 9B- .
c' 4 .
)
a, ?! Deleted in Revision J. --
$ f.f : .,'
W ._ .. , t u i' s~
.o. ,
,( .. t
.g.
. .1
. 4 / INSERT B 3.6 9C j 1.e
'j r
I Deleted in Revision J. l l . i-1 i i i t-i 1 4 1 4
.l 1
a 4
..f -
1 l
.1
i 8/14/98 Revision J I
6 e oI 4. . . e- ,' , - , ,-an- r,- e e, -w+a g 4 ..w-n--mmm . - + e ,w -n p ,e ,-w-- r w , m --
)
y --- BASES n SURVEILLANCE SR- 3.6.!.? - Id '
-REQUIREMEi4TS (continued) >
~--;---. -- --~ ---- ---Dhis SR ensures ina:
the structural integrity of the containment will be
*. - maintained in accordance with the provisions of the h Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the 7 ;;...;.. au c.s of Reev4 e x.g i f d; : . 25.'P.:' i;.
f
- to co,e e ] , 4 l REFERENCES 1.. 10CFR50,Appendixd t' r
f 2. !!FSAR, Chapterl1537
~
3 13 3. @FSAR, Sectiun f6.2}f
,g {
~
- 4. Lp'..L , 0 id; ' . :, 5 i;i:r [1] .
6 s . . . r. .~ ..<,.& R , _su w iw .
- 4. toc., Fit SD ca.( 067.UC, Es%.:r;tww G*in6 .no 4%m
~er 3v%s,non hE. acio Luggn gg# ?
S r.enon;A\." E teCFn. SD a,.(.bXtXCU, " g,l3gm,n ,, gn Q O kwin mern 3.
.d l
t
, , . . . . . . . . . . - . . . ~ . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . .... . .
g
.g g 3, rte.(.bX.dtv0'Errc WS Ctmon eo AWa %
. mc wm .hav:x.rian .EL, Set.non x\[ (,.h '0 wo Sc non Mte w c;n.sw
[ 5eensn io ce sd.s,rubx t h.1, " S- namon j - (,w 6. b oserce renoor, t.in-dFr Fou n uM be .e Cam.u w (m atw in nsenn ' i D c. b m ,n e o
\ conmb4 w% mu.nin.,,m nons d byu*m.g Nuu e 13 s .1 C c.e s. t,1 e ( /
-\
l _s 1 li
<j
- l l
l a f WOG STS B 3.6-10 Rev 1, 04/07/95 wr s 1 =
er GsvaranhErrmrr' wmrmaw=w r. . mew-- v m .ew . ,epme-, l
- a.:.. j i
BASE 5 (centinueO !
._. i
. ,- j APPLICABLE The DBAs that result in a feiease jf radioactive mate ia:
() j n SAFETY ANALYSES within containment are a Joss A ecolant iccioenW: _ m: ;
.eus.a.., w n., ch.cox, b u n i r 2r : .m (Ref. 2). In the analysis of eacn of l o m n,.i . o n.w. ."
Inese accioents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE l , Mk
'j such that release of fission products to tne environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The r containment was, designed with an allowatie leakage rate of 3 {0,1% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2). This ,
leakage rate is defined in 10 CFR 50. Accendix J-(Ref. 1); as " - ro " " ~*''--'*->=*a- - ~ the : M PN * * I max $5umallowablecontainmentleakaoerateattnecalculated I
*# M #dt ~ peak containment internal pressurefF h- T ' '] ::ig j h2 following a DBA. This allowable lealage rate forms the t
basis for the acceptance critaria imposed on the SRs j associated with the air locks. 1 Q u at u 1 aTMO i The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of h 'M S - i
~ w a .. e . \
Q._ oew LCO Each containment air lock forms part of the containment ! pressure boundary. As part of ^ containment. the air lock ! safety function is related to control of the containment ' leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the q successful mitigation of such an event. Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into exit from containment. or g APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5.and 6, the (continued) WOG STS B 3.5-22 Rev 1, 04/07/95 hvJ
.r m - "
r y wr-
. . . _ , O._.
E 2.e.: BASES 1 ae' A 1 1
% ACTIONS .A !. A.2. '
h - (continued) Witt one air lock . door in one or more containment air locks inoperable, the OPERABLE door must be. verified closec (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock. This ensures that a. leak tight containment barrier is- 1 maintained by the use of an.0PERABLE air lock door. inis. action must be completed within 1 hour. This scecifiec time , period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, wnien ,
-requires containment be restored to OPERABLE status witnin i 1 hour. ,
i In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be
' isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within l the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hour Comoletion-Time is !
reasonable for locking the OPERABLE -air lock door, j considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is ' being maintained closed'. Required Action A.3 verifics -that' an' air lock with 'an ; inoperable door has been ' isolated by-the use of a locked and I closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an I acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained. The ' Completion Time of once per 31 days -is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the low 1 ' likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls. Required Action'A.3.is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas'and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing ) verification by administrative'means is considered j seceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once'it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small. The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the'same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the-appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does 1 not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial
- entry into Condition A;' only the requirement to comply with the Required Actions.= Note 2 allows use of the . lock for 1
, 1 (continued) <
.L
)
WOG STS B 3.6-24 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l wz -
BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3,6 O ,i seees 2.e.2 l INSERT B 3.6 24A E Deleted in Revision J. cl 8/14/98 Revision J
Containment Air Lccks F n; n' ~ . : :n. - E: i: BASES N%; ACTIONS i.2. and *.' (continued' entry and exit for 7 cays under a=inistrative c:n re:s '# both air locks have an inocerable coer. Inis ' cay res.riction begins wnen Ine sec:nc air lock is c;scove se inoperable. Containment entry may be recu1 red on a cert:c:: basis to perform Tecnnical Specifica-ions (T5; Survei:'.an:e: and Recuired-Actions, as well as ciner activities on ecuipment inside containment that are recuired oy T5 c-activities on equipment tnat support TS-recuirec ecu1:ren:. Tnis Note is not intended to precluce performing otner activities (i.e., non-TS-required activities) if tne containment is entered, using the inoperable air lock t: perform an allowed activity listed above.. This allowance is acceptable due to the low prooability of an event tha: couic pressurizethecontainmentduringtheshotttimethatthe OPERABLE door is expected to be open. ,
, ,. , 6 ,. - W ~
l B.1 B.?. and B.3 I l With ca air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or - more air locks, the Required Actions and associated ! Completion Times are consistent with those specified in i Condition /,. 5 :en a .. 4 l
/.
(1 (p'y D The Required Actions have been modified by two Notet cl Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated ,; Completien Times of Condition C are requirec if both doors c; in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the ; same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available : to be c nsed. Recuired Actions C.1 and C.2 are the N appropriate remedial actions. $ote 2 allows entry into and ' exit from containment under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one 4 door is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the interlock)O ,, -
' ,.u:j {
Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows i these doors to be verified locked closed by use of ' administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the doo , oncem 0been veri'fied to be in the proper position, is small. i K 5 ^7 h" " (continued) (~T - WOG STS B 3.6-25 Rev 1, 04/07/95
%.)
flCV .3~
BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 7 .,, d Bases 3.6.2 INSERT B 3.6d5A '-(P..) The aaministrative controls consist of a dedicatea individuai n .e. n:: involved witn any repair or other maintenance effor-t) assigned to ensure tra-ithe door is opened only for the period of time-required to gain.en:rs in:: :- exit.from the' air lock, and that any OPERABLE door is re-locked prio'r te :ne
,aeparture of the dedicated individual.
INSERT B 3 6;253 (P.)
. . . with the. exception.that both air lock doors may still be OPERASLE. in l which case either door can be used to isolate the air lock penetration.
.. l i
INSERT B 3.6 25C (P::
.. . and one door is re-Hoded prior to the departure of the dedicated
.(f ~): . indi vi dual ..
l i E, q. [- .3 INSERT B 3.6 25D i m E
%' Deleted in Revision J.
! l
. g.
f
)'
V i 8/14/98 Revision J l 1 f]\_/. l L _
]
.-"~ ~-
g L LonT,ainment Air u;;.% rnr -. . n r.:: r:.. .. . r. : . - . r;._1
- S 2.5.:
i l' BASES
. ACTIONS' C.1.~C.2. and C.3 g - .
'(continued);
WithL one or more air locks inoperable.for reasons etner tnar ag. w q :.:ct c .-
.those described in Condition A or Bu Requitec Action C.1 q - r.: :a. . . . ou mN requires action to be initiated ime'diately to evaluate-l
'))., . '7[f[.I'.
.> , f previous combined leakage rates using current air lock test results. An evaluation is acceptable, since it is overly.
conservative to.immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within l
~
limits. In many instances (e.g., only one-seal per door has-failed), containment remains OPERABLE, yet pely 1 hour (per
- LCO 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air _ lock door to L OPERABLE status prior to reauiring a messawsnutdown. In 6 L ' addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be witrin limits.
Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected o ' containment air lock must be verified to be closed within ' the 1 hour Completion Time. This specified time period .is t consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, which _ requires that containment-be restored to OPERABLE status within l 1 hour. f
- Additionally, the affected air lock (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring l t an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, ' assuming that at '
least one door is maintained closed in each affected air l- I O CI'* i : , : e. - I
...,t i
P. . e .< . vi i.re
>> . c it ucwi t . i..
. ,i.e _,.1......, ei.T ---(@
i e." n e i n - .. ... . ri..,,. , c, w, e i , . . , $ :3 -
~
~ ' ~
D.1 and D 2 . If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restured to ! OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the
- j. C estat must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not O L '
apply. To achieve this status, the unansJ must be brought to at least' MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, , based on operating experience, to reach the required g5tmal.F conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. . (continued)
.- WOG STS B 3.6-26 Rev 1, 04/07/95 I_O.
- .__ .~. - - _ _ _ . _ _ , _ . _ , . . . . , __
- . , _ . . . . _ . _ . . - . . _ . . . _ _ , . - _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ . = . . . . _ . _ . - . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . . . _ . -
BASES INSERT (S)
'SECTION 3.6:
r t,,-
' \ f' ,
s 1.- Bases e,e.e If5ERT B 3.6 26AL . (P3 )! l Note;;'an air: lock with only an inoperaDie door (Concition Ai an; Tr. er : (Conditi.on B)' coes.not' require entry into Conditio.n .C. Tne Recuire: A;::
- s -
p ^ i of. Conditions A' and B provide the, appropriate remedial a:tions for :ne
,.aegraced; condition.
P . [. . .p ' t
- a.
- L tJ ;- ,.
4 J - INSERT B 3.6 26B
,M Deleted in Revision-J.
.n .
;V-d i
10 e
'rf a
8/14/98 Revision J y n 4
.= . . - . .-.- .. - -... ..- .
P Containment Air Locks O n zex a o :. R:n u x :-::, ::: ' :-sem- W 'i V: : BASES (continued) I i' n SURVEILLANCE SR 3 . 6 . ') 1 d REQUIREMENTS I Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires l compliance with the leakaoe rate test requirements, of G 10 0FR 50, Apoendix/J (Ref. 1), as modified bLaccrovec l exe' motions. Tnis SR reflects the leakage rate testinc requirements with regarj to air lock leakage (Type B Ieakace I tests). The acceptance criteria were established dur1nc ~ l
< xi.:-i, %-rm initial air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by l l Appendix J (Ref. 1), as modified by approved exemptions.
Thus', SR 3.0.2 (which, allows Frequency extensions) does no,t.. l
,_$ MP Ine SR has been modified by two Notes. Note I states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous !
successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonabic since either air lock door is capable-of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly l accounted for in determining the 6 mii; containment leakage ' rate. .w,t..eb,.een.ac] SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous l opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the ' inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment w pressure, closure of either door will support containment v l OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports " containment OPEMBILITY while the air lock is being used for D] personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interloch will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due m.. m, ,,,., y to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mecnanism is 93 y-) challenged when the containment-air lock door is i;p: : , thi: t::: i: : !y pmue; i.e se perfc.rii.ed ups.. entering er cxitin; ; D. . . e e -A cent:i-- rt zi" leck but it etrequiredmere#"equgt]X _ (continued) i WOG STS B 3.6-27 Rev 1, 04/07/95
%r
, . . . . - . _ ~ _ _ _ . - _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _
y - - . _ . , . _ . . . BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6
.a :
.A--:} Bases e, .e, .;,
. INSERT B 3.6 27A (C:)
. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
y C~ ilNSERT B 3.6 27B-u
.= ' Deleted in' Revision J.
- rx
' INSERT B 3.6 27C (C,)
..,-used for entry'and' exit (procedures require strict adherence-to single E. door. opening). this test ;1s--only required to be performed every 24 months.
4 iThe 24 month Frequency is based on tne need to perform this Surveillance under !-? y the-conditions that apply during a plant' outage. and the' potential:for' loss of-i M '; containment OPERASILITY..-if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor'at
-- a ul pewer, -The-24 month Frequency for the interlock is' justified based on generic-3 :
Jjoperatingexperience. 3 I' [__ , l: E (, _ 8/14/98 Revision J m ,. 4-a .. a. .
Contain1ent ! solation Vaives h e : '.. i E mone m,--, : : w w se- a-: Du _ i 2.:.~
, B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 5 U}
4 S 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Vaives (Atmospneric, Suoatmespr1eric. Ice l Cencenser, anc Dual) 1 BASES ( BACKGROUND The containment isolation form valves'Q part of tnemm: G u..'t-i 9 containment pressure boundary and provide a means for fluic j penetrations not serving accident consequence limiting i systems to be provided with two isolation barriers that are ,! closed on a containment isolation signal. These isolation ! devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual (4 s%% g4 valves, ce-activateo automat 1C valves secured in their closed positionsincNandcheck valves with flow through the valve securedf1 blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action i following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration su that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakaoe that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. Wiw u, U m, t:-m :r: :m-e44esid-system] These barriers ( m ic li,
' containment isolation valvesd make up the Containment Isolation System. j,,, ,,n,,,, _ , , ,3 , , ,,,,f Automatic isolation signals are produced during accident conditions. 'tainment Phase "A" isolation occurs upon receipt of a 'ety injection signal. The Phase "A" isolation sign isolates nonessential process lines in order to minimize leakage of fission product radioactivity.
Containment Phase "B" isolation occurs upon receipt of a O ~" ' containment pressure Ti;F 9::Msignal and isolates the remaining process lines, except systems reouired for _ accident mitication. l ir ddit = :: the i::': tie M ;;t:d :::/ /Ihe purgevnd exhaustgvalves) receive arr rir ': l h M m ......... , w , ,-.. .. . isolation sional/bn a containment high radiation condition N " "
/ As a result, the containment isolation valves (and blind
~
ewem ) flanges) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will be @ isolated from the environment in the event of a release of fission product radioactivity to the containment atmosphere as a result of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
. The OPERABILITY requirements for containment isolation valves help ensure that containment is isolated within the (continued) 13 U WOG ST5 B 3.6-29 Rev 1, 04/07/95
- - - - -..-._ - . . ..~. - ~ - . - - - - - .- - . . -- . - .
Containment Isolan e- Valve; _ 9;... .. T ;.
^
g- m ;;;;;: :n :. ::: 2nre ::- :g.... _g(
- =
r BASES ,. g .
' V time limits assumed in the safety analyses. Inerefore, tne
. BACKGROUND . l
- (continued)- OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that tne '
containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. m[: ) i:r. .oi se ! mm am'Purce Svstem (f4F' inch ource valves) J n.s rr.al Theshtreemer: Purge System operates to supply outside air into the containment for ventilation and cooling or heating and may also be used to reduce the concentration of neole gases within containment prior to and during. personnel access. The supply and exhaust lines each contain two g /P. isolation valves. Because of their large size, the O 'IqpTinch purge valves 3n n.w un tuare not qualified for automatic closure from their open position under DBA o ., conditions. Therefore, theltiPr inch purge valves are S ( ,: r3 m es P ^--'" --i- :: ::Iclosed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure 6'
.L the containment boundary is maintained. I M l r-Miniource System (781 inch ource valves)
The Minipurge System operates to:
- a. Reduce the concentration of noble gases within 1 containment prior to and during personnel acr.ess, and !
- b. Equalize internal and external pressures.
Since the valves used in the Minipurge System are designed l to meet the requirements for automatic containment isolation i valves, these valves may be opened as needed in MODES 1, 2, l 3, and 4. 1
; APPLICABLE The containment isolation valve LCO was derived from the SAFETY ANALYSES assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor 0l coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary ei during major accidents. As part of the containment .;
boundary, containment isolation valve OPERABILITY supports el leak tightness of the containment. Therefore, the safety analyses of any event requiring isolation of containment is 1 J applicable to this LCO. il
)
1 (continued) l O woo sTs 8 3 e-so a v 2. o4/o7/'s w .r
Cont a i nmer.t I s ol A t t er__Y Al ve s : A ....o . c ... p i E rt ::: :-':. :n : :: ::- .._ Jg B AS:...s (continuec! y m v2 g,, m ., , p !' . \ LCO Containment isolation valves' form a part of tne containment boundary. The containment isolation vaives' safety fur.cuer is related to minimi:ing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment bouncary curing a DBA. e i a mi. . e . The automatic?sewet eeere-tetFisolat e 1 valves are recu1 rec to have isolation times within limits and to actuate on an S automatic isolation signal. The W l inen purge valves mus: f-be maintained sealed closedd[or have blocks installeo to j Q d Ipr. event full opening]. [ Blocked purge valves also actuate lon an automatic / signal.) l The valves covered Dy this LCO are 7
/ L openeo ( listed along witn their associated stroke _li_m_e_s_in A- g';
I $ $ c yt e dic Gin %D ' ' 6nw nwen3 ' ' ( Ew r, . m a n # * [ The normally closed (isolation valves are considered OPERABLE 'r s A ste3 u ; wnen manual valves are closed? automatic valves are k
' _. e '
. esa. de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These
")
b.. passive Referenceisolation
- 1. vap**:n' e.s4a p_te listed in CN w~s mmtc r1wmog- @
Purge valves with resilient seals we-seceneery-conianud
" ts,es,-ve4ves4)must meet additional leakage rate requirements. The other containment isolation valve leakage O
U' rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1, " Containment," as Type C testing. Tnis LCO provides assurance that the containment isolation valves and purge valves will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the containnent boundary during accidents. l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5. The requirement for containment , isolation valves during MODE 6 are addres d in LCO 3.9.4,
" Containment Penetrations."
Jrne,u 55.1.3-3 (9 (continued) 'p WOG STS B 3.6-32 Rev 1, 04/07/95 V Rau T
BASES INSERT (S) f SECTION 3.6 (O $ Bases 3.6.3 v , a- INSERT B 3.6 32A 4 g Deleted in Revision J. l (s L) 8/14/98 Revision J I
- _ . _ . _ . _ - - __~ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ .
~ Containmen: 'Isolatie- valves w 5 ::: ::: m :. ::: :: ::~ " :: :_ E E 2.6 : ] I BASES (continued) O . ACTIONS a The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetra:1on fi o., I paths, except for [4G-] inch purge valve penetration flom 1 paths, to be unisolated intermittently unoer acministrative I controls. These administrative controls consist of ' stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, wne ; is in continuous comunication with the control room. In - this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated wnen a l need for containment isolation is_ indicated. Due tc the j size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact 1 that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened uncer administrative controls. l A single pur e valve in a j a q.' penetration flow path may f be opened effect repairfto an inopp'rable valve, as/ allowed by SR .6.3.1. / A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for 'this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is' acceptable, since the Recuired Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actioits for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and :;ubsequent inoperable containment . isolation valves are governed by subsequent Conditien entry and application of associated Required d(N Actions. i i The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which j ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if 1 necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable ! by an inoperable containment isolation valve. '
. u y ,,, ,, c, c a.s , < . s n.
(h In the event the ew-4egirdleakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 4 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1. A.1 and A.2 In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more
., penetration flow paths is inoperabl6[except for p
$; w an;;M Li;cina Laess leakage not within limitjur;,ethe valve affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method
, of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active i.
(Continued) OL w0c sTs e 3.e-33 Rev 1. 04/07ees fm 3
- r .
v ' - =;n..:' : -.. "- m:nt e a i nme n : 7. s c . a t i on.a:ve; -
- y
{ ii n : n.::: : :. ::: :29:: ::- q, } .# __
, : m- : , so 7, ,-
--- i. v
-d .. ~
L BASE 5
. 1 2 !
- t. . ' and A.2 (:entinue
' ACTIONS failure. Isolation barriers that emeet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automaticAcontainmentlisolation
@ valv a closed manual valve, a blind flan a ,,.. , , e , s . p , valv@with e flow through the valve securec.gea rior a anc a :ne:L penetration iriow path isolated in accoraance witn Recu1 red 4
Action 'A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration l should be the closest available one to containment. ! Required Action A.1 must be completed within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative l importance of supporting cont- aent OPERABILITY durino MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. I For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action'A.1, the affected penetration' flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. _ This Required Action does
~.
.not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it L
involves verification, through a system walkdown, that the-E s . isolation devices outside containment and capabl_e of bethg g-mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion W Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside Mi containment" is. appropriate considering the fact that the 4i devices are operated under administrative controls and the *' probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation 4 devices inside containment, the time period specified as ] g.
" prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineerino judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the
~ inaccessibility of the isolation devices'and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those' penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system, Condition C provides the appropriate act. ions. (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-34 Rev 1, 04/07/95
- O c ~_ :r
' y - - - '
*re- -+dv e
,. - . . - . - . . - . . . - . . .. .~. . . . - . - . .. . . . . . .
I BASES. INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 h;,
..j , Bases 3.c. -.:
l C. INSERT B 3.6 34A .(P,i i ;
'^! De-activated remote manual valves may include air coerate valves witr a--
eu. removed. or de-energized motor operated valves. Automatic. valves rs'er :: 1l- 'those valves that require'a motive force to actuate.- such as air or elec: 1:.
"' and receive an automatic actuation signal.- Power-operated valves recaire a i
(5- l motive automaticforceactuation to actuate, signal.such as air or electric, but do not receive an. I l l l LOL I i e 9/9/98 Revision J l u. l
Conta1rre- Isolatier valver-*t-ese e~ ,
.f r i :::.:m :. ::: 2 n:: a-:-
- }.
1 l BASE 3 O ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) @ ' Required Action A.2 is modified by i Nothiahp5ies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by.use of'acministrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is r typically restricted., Therefore,. the probability of Ca.nwerT i.L 3rcs misalignment of tnese devices once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. L.1 With two containment isolation valves in one or more ! penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must. be isolated within I hour. The method of. i isolation must include the use of at least one isolation )
. barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a p r. e .,..v closeo and de-activateo auT.omaticAvalve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flance.. The I hour Completion Time is
("tr.s+ &e !. uD consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in 'accordance with Required Act, ione B.1, == the:affected penetration must-be verified to be
.O i>= t ri eic a >i> r a a ir e actioa ^ 2.
remains in effect. This periodic verification is'.necessary 84c8 to assure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are
' isolated. The Completion Time of3once per 31 days for
..N...', ,$,S f ',7erHirine each aff2cted_penetratinn-finw nath n , em) is ;
appropriate considering the fact that the valves are , operated under administrative control and the probability of
- e. their misalignment is low.^
y .- =s.= -,. en-w , Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two ; containment isolation valves. Condition A of this LCO ! i addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve
, inoperable in this type of penetration flow path.
l (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-35 Rev 1, 04/07/95 f na
~. . _ _
- . --. _- . .. ~ ~ ~ . . . . - . - . . ~
BASES' INSERT (S) ,. SECTION 3.6 D
;n L
Q Bases 3.6.3' H
-INSERT B 3.6 35A (Pn)
. For the isolation devices ins 1de containment. the time perloc specifie; as l 92 days" .is based on engineering" prior to uogment andentering is conslaeredMODE 4 from MODE.5 reasonaole in s ee. if not p of the inaccessibility of the iso ation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an un11Keiy possibility.
.A
? l r.! INSERT B 3.6 35B .(P2 )
' \t b De-activated remote manual valves may include, air operated valves with air i
'y removed, or de-energized motor operated valves. Automatic valves refer to those valves that require a motive force to actuate. such as air or electric. l
-3 and receive an automatic actuation signal. Power operated valves require a motive force to actuate, such as air or electric but do not receive an automatic actuation signal
-INSERT B 3.6 35C (Ce)
Note 2 applies-to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or otherwise securing components is to ensure these devices are not inadvertently mispositioned. 1 I l
)
l i 1 9/9/98 Revision J : O
,V
Cont a i n- ent .sola w Va'ves --2: ::: [. 1 ::;.a : :- ;. ..; ::--- --
,[ 5 :,5.:
a
' B;JE5 ACTIONS C.! and C.2 (continued)
With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve flow :atn must be restored to OPERABLE status or tne affected penetration flow path must be' isolated. The metnoc cf isolation must include the use of at least one, isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active
, failure. *g.olation barriers that meet this criterion are a er remme.G ciosec ano oFamvated automatic;. valve, a closed manual P valve, and a blind flange.i A check valve may not be us d to E
f hun isol. ate the attected penetc wien ' flow path QRequired Q ( B M- 3(.T AJ Action C.I must be completed within the- [A our Comple, on Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence,
' reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of maintaining containment integrity during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying that each
-O V affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under ' administrative g controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed h a _ . .. . m ii system.t This Note is necessary since this Condition is i . 4. , i , s <
- d~
m:i, c - - '- written to specifically address those penetration flow paths i in a closed system. F e ve, s c 3 , w l Required Action C.2 is modified by Not , applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access
.2 6 % " - to thie_ Arm h +ynially restricted.i Therefore, the 1 G 3,s.h $5 - probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
(continued) WOG STS B 3.6-36 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w1 l 1
.e ,
I'
-BASES INSERT (S)'
SECTION 3.6
- ;, g .
- ;() Bases 3.6.3 INSERT B 3.6 36A (P;)
.d De-activated remote manual valves may include. air operated valves nl:r a,-
.. removed, or de-energized motor operated valves. . Automatic valves refer :c '
li .those~ valves that require a motive. force to actuate; such as air or eiectm :.
.. and receive an automatic actuation $4gnal. Power coerated valves'recuire a '
'y motive force to actuate. such as air or electric but do not- receive an
%. automatic actuation signal.
l INSERT B 3.6 36B .(C,) Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked. sealed. or Otherwise - secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of
' administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means 1s considered acceptable, since the function of- locking, sealing. or otherwise securing components is-to ensure these oevices are not: inadvertently: ,
mispositioned. l 1
)
l i l l l: 9/9/98 Revision J j.9 ]
- 1), '
i
,- ,. . . . . - -- . .. ~ ._~ - - . - . - - . . . . - . - - . - . - . . - - - . . . . -
1 _ - Containm?nt Isolatien Va:ves 2: ::: ; :.
;. G_: = __.= :. ':: :_ _a- :-
~ : :L ._
52.i.2-I BASES.
- Q.J.
ACTIONS (continued)
, Wit 'he shield building bypass leakage rate not within limit, assumptions of the safety analyses are not me . ,
Therefore, e leakage must be restored to witnin limit within 4 hours. Restoration can be accomplished by
' isolating the pen ation(s) that caused the limit to be i i exceeded by use of on losed and de-activated automatic I
[ valve, closed manual val or bHnd. flange. When a penetration is isolated the, kage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to4e th tual pathway leakage ! through the isolatioode'vice. If t isolation devices are ' l used to isolate t.ht" penetration, the le ' ge rate is assumed '! to be the lesser' actual pathway leakage o e two devices. The 4 hour.hapletion Time is reasonable cons 1 ing the time required to restore the leakage by isolating e penetration (s) and the relative importance of seconda containment bypass leakage to the overall containment
' function.
-N !
km. . aM . .; ) i m& In the event one or more containment purge valves in one or I more penetration flow paths are not within the purge valve O. leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limitsl, or the affected penetration flow p'ath must be
' is41 ated. The method of isolation'must be by the use of at Mast one isolation barrier tha cannot be advefsely g '
/affected by a s4ngle active fa' .ure. Isolatipn barriers that meet this' criterion are [ closed and de-activated -
./
automatic vafve, closed man al valve, or bl4nd' flange]. A' - purge valve'with resilient / seals utilized /to satisfy Required A'e tion E.1 must/iave been demonstrated to meet'the t 2. ei , e u - e7^2 leakage iequirements of/S R 3.6.3.7. Tbf specified Completion Time is reasonable, conside' ring that one contalinmentpurgeva%eremainsclosedsothatagross breachofcontainme(tdoesnotexip. l In accor ance with Required Action E.2, ):his penetration / - flow p h must be verifded to be isola 4d on a periodig/ basi . The periodic perification is .n)ecessary to ensu're tha containment penetrations required to be isolated f inwino an accident. which are nn innner canahle nf being I, l (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-37 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w
Containment Isciation i'alvet r:
. A..llh[:[ !
,. 8 L_ u : m : _. .: .: :: :e .
g T3.f.3 l [ j BASES A A U SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.3 @_more manvas v awe, ) CE ) . REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires verif cation that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange locatec outsice containment <and required to be closed during accioen: I conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure tnat post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outsice of e j the containment boundary is within design limits. This SR l $ does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Ratner. l
- a. . . . . - u r,e it involves verification, through a system walkdown. tnat i wit- u those containment isolation valves outside containment and :
- . n . d c v. .w.* capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. i
, Since verification of valve position for containment
- isolation valves outside containment is relatively easy, the
! : 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and was ! chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions, h The SR specifies that containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet i g g.g m n p . l wmmw j the SR during the time the valves are open., h o, W edme l Nw s 'wuo The Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high e 1 m m u m ,..n.n, radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified hase et.ar closed by use of administrative means. Allowing {
'd *
- w w se. ,n w verification by administrative means is considered .'
Ed"#ff".'"' ***%, acceptable, since access to these areas is typically ' k es wv,M', restricted during MODES 1; 2,1q)and 4 for ALARA reasons, s4 Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these L containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. E SR 3.6.3.4 wman mov% v.uve). This SR requires verif" cation that each containment i isolation manual valve'and blind flange located inside containment +and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the containment boundary is within design limits. For containment isolation valves inside containment, the
- o Frequency of " prior to entering NODE 4.from MODE 5 if not 4.
performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these containment isolation valves are operated under j' L ,. - tr - (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-40 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i (S%) l . G.O 4 L
Contain unt !sciation Valyfes : :n -: :. T_ 6:C iE:J;.,.L:.G.; r.;;r, - BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3 J (continued) REQUIREMENTS administrative controls and the probability of tneir mi:; alignment is low. The SR specifies that containment
% 5c.. 3 .v 9,q isolation valves that are open under administrative cnntrols
=vs.m - =c are not required to meet the SR during the time tney are l! .
*= o, se.%. o e. open./
**tw< % min !
** ' '*** Pa"* , u re This Note' allows valves and blind flanges located in hien !
** ~u.r radiation areas to be verified closed by use of ~
Nj/*.*'-** ** *c administrative means. Allowing verification by udministrative means is considered acceptable, since access
%-),
m , [ % "A to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is small. SR 3.6.3.5 h Verifying that the isolation time of each ;c.c- ;;; rain W
- automatic containment isolation valve is within limits is-l required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time l
p) y test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.'9The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in act nce with the Inservice Testing Program ee-M-6my x _.x l DRs 3.6.3.6 - In .su atmlispheric containments, the check valves that serve a containment isola. tion function are weight or spring loaded l to provide positive c-losure in the direction of flow. This ; ensures that these checkbins will remain closed when the : tip i inside containment atmosphere returns to subatmospheric conditions following.a-DBA. SR 3.6'.3.6 requires verification of the operation of the check valves that are ! testable dariiig unit operation. The Frequency'efJ l cons,i. stent with the Inservice Testing Program requi.2 rement days is for, valve testing on a 92 day Frequency. N-
/ -i .
, (continued) l WOG STS B 3.6-41 Rev 1, 04/07/95 m7
~ ~ '
- .ontain en: Is:lation vaive5~~ IE".l.'l : . 1
! 6 ...m ..;-- .. : m ::::: : :- :: N:'
.()
a 3-2.i.2 7 BASES tk
~
l h, . ~ SURVEILLANCE SR 3 . 5 . 3 b ,.-- < ..-e'
~
' REQUIREMENTS .
(continued) For containment purge valves with. resilient seals, additional leakage rate . testing beyond the tes: recuiremer.:s of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, is reouired to ensure OPERASILIT). E.i O pS Operating expertence has demonstrated that tnis tyDe cf seal i has the potential to degrade in a shorter time perioc than !
'do other seal types. Based on this observation and the I y importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due .
\_ to.the direct path between containment and the environment),
a Frequency of 184 days was established 4s part of the NRC l-- resolution of Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage e
+ = %. *"~S Cy to Seal Deterioration" (Ref.)). _
Cl AJJ ii. i enell,7, this % a. st t.,e performed-w+ thin ~92 davs after ! egenia; the velve. ' The 92 day Frequency was chosenk4 o.c.... e el recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce-additional seal degradation (beyond that occurring to a valve that has not been. opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure ":e : ;C ;;. x vanve: r. m u e; n -,
;,. . ;,.... ;;;..c. sn.<n. .em+he
. . a ;sq ind
- 6. . . .. e. 4. + u .q inw r vm , -
M SR~ 3.6.3.8 1 l Automatic containment isolation valves close on a
.O. containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic containment isolation valve l will actuate to its isolation position on a containment '
isolation signal. This' surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in th'e requi7ed position under administrative controls. The
'9 1Bf month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually I passthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthel18fmonth L Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concludd to be I acceptable from a reliability standpoint. i L . l [ (continued) WOG STS B-3.6-42 Rev 1, 04/07/95 {
= - - - , . .. . ,- ,
Containment s:.an er V M e_5 .....s.. c.
- 2. . . . .... ; ; n a : ; ::::: ::- ;: :a*
;) .
i 2 . 6 . :- BASES m :- -- b SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,
-SR 3.1 1.l1 (continued) maximWpathway leakage (leakage through the worse of tne two isolation valves) unless tne penetration is isolatec o'.
IE
- use of one W sed and de-activated automatic valve. elosec manual valve, ' blind flange. In this caserthe leakage rate of the isola bypass leakage path if assumed to De ,
the actual pathway 1 kage through thejHiolation oevice. If ; both isolation valves i'n4he penetration are closed, tne i actual leakage rate is the%sserdeakage rate of the two ?
. valves. This method of quant ~'ing maximum pathway leakage !
is only to be used for thlyR (. . ., Appendix J maximum j l pathway leakage limits to be qua ified in accordance ! with Appendix J). T Frequency is req ' red by 10 CFR 50, j AppendixJ,asmoftiedbyapprovedexemp ns (and l therefore, the. frequency extensions of SR 3. 2, may not be j applied), si(ce the testing is an Appendix J, Tf C test. { i This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criter . t
/
[Qy' pass leakage is considered part of L,. [ Reviewer's s j ote: Unless specifically exempted].] 'A 4.- REFERENCES 'l
- E*R EC irm [15] . ]
!. f. D'fSAR, Section'f 6.27.'
7,
' R>
4 1. Generic Issue B-20, " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration." 4.
~
Generic Issue B-24. /
/ i
([ p. he o. .;- ; 3. . .: J i s. . 3 . , .. . , ,, , 1. N w w ' 1 " - ' *. (Q q WOG STS B 3.6-44 Rev 1, 04/07/95 b1 l
' BASES INSERT (S)
SECTION 3.6-Bases 3.6.2
, ,ag. f INSERT B 3.6 44A - (P )
N.) '- j' Ta:a :.e : . .:a;e . :< 9 5- ma 3 :: a m e ! ;s:iat*: .U .es 1 l t . . . ENITRATI0t. NUM3E3 C.~3:CI VA.\i IA3 ICE VA.ki F04:7:C2, ,$i *: .-
)
. 4. ._ :. , ./ .,l,,., l j
l l 7{ IAr:;3;(a) ;4r:;3: 5/G : Isol vit '. l- 99 '2AF;13;(af 2AFC;30 5/G 01501 Vis Aa 1AFC13g(a) 1AF013- 5/G 0 1s01 Viv l 76 A l 99 2AFC13HI8I 2Ar013e 5/3 0 Isol viv A :. l
'l 79 1AF013A(4) 1AFC13A 5/G A ! sol Viv A4
~
l .1CO 2AF013A(a) 2AFC13A 5/G A isol Viv ha *
- l. 79 1AF013!(a) IAF013E 5/G A Isoi Viv N/A : 3 t
l- 10: 2AFC13I a) 2AF013E . 5/G A 1s01 Viv . A/A : l- '84 1AFC13!(a; 1AF0135 5/G B ! sol viv N/A : 1' .id; 2AFC132(a) 2AF013B 5/G B ! sol Viv N/A 3 l - 64 1AFC13rtat 1 AFC13F ' 5/G $ 1501 Viv N/A 3 l
. /G 1:1 2At:13rtai $f; g 3331 yjy
.Q -- -l 74pgy3 ufg 3 l ~ 67 1AFC13:(a) 1AF013 5/G C ! sol Viv N/A 3
- l. 102 2AF013;(a) 2AFC13: 5/G : 15o1 Viv N/A 3
. E7 53I l _IAFC133 1AF013G 5/G : Isol Viv N/A 3 l' IC2 2Ar:13G(a) 2AF0133 5/G r ' sol Viv N/A 3 l 2: C 941: CC9415 CC9414 :: -'. rom R: Pe ps 1s01 Viv 10.0 1 C:9534 CC9416 C: From R: Pumps 1501 Viv 10.0
- l. CC9534 C; From R: Pmp Isol Byp Chect Viv N/A
'l 22 C 94378(a) C 94372 C; From Ex: Ltown Na 1501 Viv 10.0 3 24 CC685 CC943B CC685 CC From RC Pos Tnerm Bar 1501 Viv 10.0 1 CC9518 CC9438 C: Frcm RC Pos Therm Bar 1501 Viv 10.0 CC9516 CC Frm RC Pos Therm Barr 150 Byp Chk N/A teontinued)
(a Not suDje:t to Type C leakage tests. o [. i 1 . d,A r a c/98 Revision J a P l ,. l l .
BASES' INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 Bases 3.6 - g) i INSERT B 3.6 44A ' (F.d (con:1nue:) t 8 O' j. ist i e 3.i.3 . . a;e .' :" ~ q _. h ea i 3 ::.ta ~ ect :s:.at :- .a,.e:
-I i
-l . Er.Itu :*/. -: ~5I:s It3::E M: : '. *:.; v -2 -
r#5E; VA vi - VA. ii '
; .,53
-ll 25 :~94:3A ~94Ei :~94134 ~: Te R: Paes Is: \1v :
*:94Ei ;~ R Support C:S Su: n: *nt Vh .:
i l !! ::9437A(a) ;;g437s Tc Ex: Ltown na Isol vh :: : ;
; C5007A ;5006A ~5007A- Cne. 5: ray Pc A Ho- 1501 Viv 05008A- Cnmt Spray nor A Inco Cnr. Cneet 3: : :
N. A 1 16 C5007B C500EE C50075 Cne. Scray Pc E Her Isol Vh 3: : . C500BS Cnet Spray N:r B Ines Cnet Cnect i. . j 1 25 CVS100 CVB112 CV8100 Seal Wtr Rtrn Cnet Isol Viv a la j CV5113 .CV8112 Seal Wtr Rtrn Cnet Isol Viv 10 0 CVB113 Seal wtr Rtrn Cneen viv e,. A 33 tv8355A(a) ;yg35gA(ai CVB355A . RCP $eal Injection Isol N/A' ! CVB36BA RCP Seal Injection Cnmt isol Viv N/A 33 CVE3550(a)' CVB3680(a) CVB355D RC8 Seal In]e: tion Isol CVB36E: RCP Seal Inje: tion Cnmt Isol Viv NA : N/A A. 37 .Cv8346(a) gyg34g(a) Cv8346 Loco Fill Mcr Outdo Man 15o1 Viv f a l p N/A CVS346 RC Loco Fill Cnmt 1s01 Viv N. A L/ l- 4: CVE152 CV8160 CVE152~ Letcown Line Cnet isol V1v 10- : i CVB160 Letoown Line Cet isol Viv 10 (' 53 Cv8355!(a) CVS368B(a) CVB355B RCP Seal Injectice N/A ': 3 CVB36BE RCP 5eal injection Cnmt 1501 Viv N/A j' 52. Cv8355:(a) CVB368:I83 - CVB355C RCP Seal injection N/A i CVB365; RCP Seal Injection Cnmt Isol Vlv N/A 71 CVS105$ CVB105 Cng Line Cnmt isol Viv 10 10
- CVS106 CVB106 Cng Line Cnmt Isol Viv- 10
( i 32 FC011 FC012 FC011 Dem Loco Rtn To Rfuel Cav Cnmt 15o1 Dem Loop Rtr, To Rfuel Cav Cnmt 1s01 N/A FC012 N/A 57 FC010 FC009 FC010 Po Su:t From Refuel Cav Cnmt 1501 N/A 2 FC009 Pp Sutt from Refuel Cav Cnet 1501 N/A l- 34 FPC10(a) FP345(s) FP010 Fire Protection 0/5 Isol 364 Viv 12.0 2
,_ FP345 Fire Prot Cnmt Isol Viv N/A (Continuedi
-(a) . NCt suoject to TyDe C leakage tests.
o U. 9/9/98 Revision J 1
. . . - . . _ __ ~ __ _ _ _ _ _
L ' BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 Base 5 3.6.3 L INSERT B 1 6 44A (F3 ) ( cn 1nue,1,} l' LL/ 1 a::e 3.i.: : .:a;+ : :< ~ [ S ma j lcatatn e t ;s::a:': .a'.es
~1
- i ,
! FENE :a ;0t, 0, ~3::I - IN5::I 23,: ;;. v; , . . . . , . N'?!!: VA.is VA.VE :5 ,1 ,
- "i i:' ::-~ '
't I
7! FWOO9:(.a) Fm009: F. !s:lation Viv .'o:: : l, 2F.0437,4) ;;,;.3 $7; ; y,;y gyg,33 ig; g, i 7 79 FWOO9A(a) F 0091 Fm Isolation Viv Loco A i-2FW0:3A(s) 2FWC43A 5/G A FWly Bypass isol Vh i' sa '. FWC09BI8I FWOO96 F Isolattoa viv Loco B i i 2FWO439(al- 2 FWD 435 5/G B Falv Bypass 1 sol Wh :.. 67 FWOO9:(a) ' , FWOO9" Fm Isola:1oe V1v Loco C 3-27WO43;(a' 2FWO43 5/G : FW1V Bypass 1 sol Vh 6: 76' 1FWC350!8 IFWO35D 5/G D FW Temorn i0 76 - IFWO393ta IFWO390 ~ 5/G ID Low Flo.gFW1s01 Viv isol viv 99 1Fm:15;ta! i 1FWC150 5/C Rectr: - ic 4: 99 2FWC35 (a) 2WC350 5/G D FW Temorng Isol vh 60 2FW:39;ja) 2FWO39D 5/G D Fm Pntr Bye Viv 377 DWST Isot 2FW:150'a) 60 2F='015D 53 D FW Cnem Feed Isol N.A 79 IFW: 35A{a IFWO35A 5/G A Fn Temorng Isol Vlv 79 1Fm: 39Ataj- 6.0' 3 IFWO39A 5/G 1A Low Flo Fm 1501 Viv 60
. y% 10; IFWO15A(at IFWO15A 5/G Re: ire r-- N/A
) !
t ID: 2FWC35A - 5/G A FW Temorng Isol Viv 60 2FWO35A}a)2 2FWC15Aga' FWD 39A5/Ga)A FW Petr Bye Viv 377 DWST lsol 2FWO39A 6.0 3 1 2FWO15A SG A FW Cnem Feed Isol N/A ; B4 IFWC35B(4) IFWO356 5/G B FW Temorng 1501 Viv 60 *
~
IFm'0392(a B IFWO395 5/G 15 Low Flo. F Isol Viv 60 .! 10; IFWC152('! ' IFWC155 5/G Re: ire N/A 10; 2FWO355 5/G B FW Temorng Isol Vh 2FWO35B(a{ 2FWO39B 2FWO399 5/3 B FW Pnte Bye Vlv 377 DWST 15o1 6.0 3 6.0 i 2FWC152(a) 2 FWD 15B SG B FW Cnem Feed Isol N/A 67 IFWO35: IFWO35* 5/G FW Temorng isol Viv . E? IFWO39: N{ 6.0 3 ; IFWD15 (s, IFWO39: 5/G 10 Low Flow FW 1s01 Viv 6.0
' 102 '
IFWC15: 5/G Recirc N/A 102- 2FWO350 2FWO35C 5/G C FW Temorng Isol Viv 6.0 3 2FWO39 g,3 2 FWD 39C 5/G C FW Pntr Bye Viv 377 DWST 1501 6.0 2FWO15: 2FWO15C SG C FW Chee Feed 1s01 N/A (continued) (a) Net subject to Type C leakage tests'. t l'
;p
\j 9/9/98 Revision J L
BASES INSERT (S) I SECTION 3.6~ 1 i Bases 3.6.3
. jq s iL LNSERT B 3.'6 44A- (P.3) (cor. inued
],
_ .c
. V)
' Tacte 3.f. -; .oa;e A c' i 7 3-1ma . Oca.tainme-! Isciatte . anes
- !AE~ilAT:0!. 0UTS:DE' INSIDE FuA**;0A m:.* -n . )
Np5E: VA Vi VA.VI ,
- !:. A- :- . 1
.g 3,- ;;...
- Ji IA065 IA0:- 4 A055 - O!! Cr . Isol Vh 150' Vh . ;5 : '!
' I AE IA:et Ins:*ument Air Instce Isc' vis 15 : 1
. I AE ' utster ]A Sply Tc A:h.lA06f Ons Vh N: )
l 7*-
'M51010((8) MSIC10 M5013:
MSIV Epass Viv Loco 0 SG C 1.35 Psig Reite' ~ f.: . ) MSC137(a) AA ; M50140 8) a M5014D $3 0 1220 Psig Relief- AA _j M50150((a) M50150 53 0 1205 Psig Reltef A . A -- M50160(a) M50160 SG D 1190 Pstg Relle' AA MSC170 ) l g3gi73 - SG C 1175 Pstg Relie' NA ! M50180(a) M5:160 SG D PORY :3 j MSO210(a) M50210 SG D Dripleg Den DWS ! sol' h.A ' 1 75 -MSICIA(a) M5101A MSIV Byoass Viv Loco A 6: : M5013A(a) M5013A SG A 1235 Psig Relief A.A
*S01AA(a{. g3gj42- -SG A 1220 Psig Re11e' t/A
- M5015A(8f-i8 MS015A SG A 1205 Psig Relief ' k:A
'M5016A M5016A SG A 1190 Psig Relief. N/A "5017A(t a )' ' M5017A SG A 1175 Fsig Relie' M5018A SG A PORV N/A MSC18A(8!
MSC21A a, MSC21A SG A Detoleg D n DWST !sel 2 .C hiA
'E5 MSIC1B(a) MS1015 - MSIV Bvoass Viv Loco E 6.C - 3 MS0132(a) MSO.36 SG B 1235 Ps19 Re11ef 'h/A MSC149!8) MS0 lab SG 5 1220 Pstg Relief N/A
'Q t' 'j .
-MSC152'a! a, MS0155 MSC165 SG S 1205 Pstg Relie' SG E 1190 Psig Relie' N/A N/A -
j M5016E(8! - I M50172 M5017E SG E 1175 Pstg Relief N/A
-M5012!(8 MSCIBE SG B PORY
-j MSO212(a! '
MSC215 SG B Datoleg Den DWS~ Isoi 20.0~ N/A 6t -MSIC10(al- M5101: MSIV Bypass Viv Loco C- 6.0 3 MSC13:!') M5013: SG : 1235 Pstg Rel1P' M5014:!a) M5014: SG : 1220 Pstg Relief N/A ') N/A 1 M5015 (ia) M5015: SG 1205 Ptig Relle? N/A ! M5016:(s) M5016: SG 1190 Psig Relief N/A l M5017 a)- MSC170 SG C 1175 Psig Relle' N/A ' M501E:(a) MS018: SG C PORV 20.0
.I MSC21 ta) M50210' SG : D-1pleg Drn DWS7 1501 N/A
{- 13 OGOS2 OG079 OG062 M2 Recemo Outed Cnm: 1 sol viv 60.0 2 3 OG079 H2 Recomo Disen Cnm Isol Viv 60.0 y , I
' 13 OG084 - OG080 OG084 H2 Recomb Dutbc Cnm Isol Viv 60.0 2 !
0G080 M2 Recomo Suct Cnet 1s01 Viv 60.0 23 OG085 OG081 OG085 H2 Recomb Dutbd Cnm!'Isol Viv 60.0 2 .; OG081 H2 Recemo Suction Cnm! 1501 Viv 60.0 ' 69 OG083 OG057A OG083 H2 Recomo Outoc Cnm! 1s01 Viv 60.0
- l' J. 0G057A H2 Recomo Cnmt 1s01 Viv 60.0 2
- I !
(Continued) i
-. ( 4 ) . Not suDject to Type C leauge tests. '
I
-X/ 4-
, V 9/9/98 Revision J 1 I
=- .- ---_ . _ -- -_-_____-_ _ -__- - -- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ ____-_-_ __ _ _ _ _ - _
BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6
- Bases 3.6.."
i
,- 3. f INSERT B 3.6 44A (P.y (continue:)) !
i ) '
.x' '
T ::e 3.6.3.: .:8;e i :< ; 5-wa*
;e-tainme*t :s: at : .shes
;EP.I?u~ 0. C.T5!:I :?.3::* N?.:T:0?. */.i:v.e -n.-
re!!: va.VE. VA.sE l3:.:-"- p- , .- , 1 I A. PRC33A CR 33A At* Let 426 Irs At* .:t Ra Mr 1s:
- 4 ,
- l. PR033B CR:335 Ate Les 426 Ins At* Les Ka: Mr s: '. A A. PR002E- PR0023 PR002E Air Lect 426 At* r':*. Cutle Isol ?. t.
PR0023 Aia Lock Air Mon 06tlet Cnect Na A. PR033: PR033- Em; At* Lck Ins At* Lek Rac Mon Iso AA - PR;33; PR033; Em; Air Let ins Air Lct Rac Mon Ise NA A. PR0020 PRC02M PR002F Air LcLa 401 Air Mon Outlet Isol PR002H Emerg Maten Air Let Mor. Outlet Cnt ha : La
- 52 PR001A PR001A UPST Cnmt Atmos To PR 0/5 Isol Viv 4E ;-
PR0018 PR001B DmST Cnet Atmos to PR 0/5 1s01 Viv 45 52 PR066 PR032 PR066 Samole Return 0/5 Cnet isol PRC32 . Cnet Process Rac Mon Return Chk 5.0 : N/A 35 PS22SE PS22EE Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt 1501 Viv N/A IDI la PS2296 PS2295 Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt isol Viv h/AIDI (T (
%s j
l 36 - (31)6y* PS230B PS231 PS230B P52312 Post LOCA H2 Mon B Cnmt Isol Viv Post LOCA H2 Mon B Return Cha Viv N/A tb? N/A
'l, 45 P522BA P5229A PS228A PS229A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cnmt Isol Viv N/A(D) 3p Pest LOCA H2 Mon A Cnmt 1501 Viv N/A(Dr i
I 45 PS230A PS231A PS230A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Cnmt 1501 Viv N/A(D' !
-l 12)By* PS231A Post LOCA H2 Mon A Return Cht Viv N/A 70 P593545- P59354A PS93546 Prr 5tm Samole Cnmt Isol Viv 10.0 2 P59354A .Pzr Stm Sample Cnmt Isol viv 10.0
-l 70 PS9355B PS9355A PS9355E Ptr Loc Sample Cnet Isol viv 10 0 2
,., P593s5A Ptr Lod Sample Cnet 1501 Viv 10.0 l 70 PS93566 P59356A PS9356B Loco Sample Cnmt 1501 Viv 10.0 2
.g P59356A Loco Sample Cnmt isol viv 10.0 70 P59357B PS9357A P593578 Accumulator Sample Cnet 1101 Viv 10.0 2 P59357A Accumulator Sample Cnet 1501 Viv 10.0 11 RE9170 RE1003 RE9170 RCDT Punos Outsioe Isol Viv 10.0 2 RE1003 RCDT Pumps Dsen Cnmt inod 1s01 Viv 10.0 (continueos (D)- ProDe* Valve oDeration will De oemonstrated Dy verifying that the valve strokes to Its reoutred pos1 tion.
.' (W V 9/9/98 Revision J
BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 Base 5 3.6.3 i n (cona nued <: 4 1 [INSERTB3.644A ( P.D V. l a: 9 2 1 : . .:s;e e e 9 I
.. I D-es*. . *te ra'e-t :s:'st *: .aS es l-
= m w C1 CaCE Is5C: u.C= . -a: - w..
- f.'p5E: VA.VE VA. ii
- 3,:.1'."'
n
" RE9157 RE9160.* RE915? R CT N2 Suco13 Dutstee :s:' vb *'
RE9160B RE9160! R C T vent Dutsice Iso Yh .: " RE9160A RCT Vent A N2 Su: Insioe 1501 kh .: ! si RE91596 RE9159a RE915EE RC' Tc Gas' Anal Dutsioe 1s0' Yh ,; - : RE9159A R CT To Gas Anal Insloe 1501 K h .;, 4" RF027 RF026 RF027 C ut F1r Den Sume Dsen Her D/S Iso' li . RF026 Cnet Flr Dre Sisto Dsen He' 1/5150'. E: n" RHB701AI8) ~ RHB701A RC Loco A To RH PD A Suct 377 150' La v RHB701B(a) RHB7018 RC Loop A To Re PP A Suct 377 Isol LA 1 75 RHB702A RHB702A R" Loo: C To RH PD B Su:t 3771s01 Aa c. RHB702B RHB7028 R: Loop C To RH FP B Suct 377 Iso? oA I
-l It RYO75 RYD75' D/S CTMT Dead weignt Tester Isol LA E 27 RYB025 RYB026 RYB025 DRT To Gas Anal Cnm Isol Viv RYB026 8RT To Gas Anal Cnm! Isol Viv 10.0 :
10.0 D 27 RYB033 RYB047 RYB033 N2 Supply To PRT 1501 Viv 10.0 : i, )I' RYB047 FRT N2 Supply Line 1/5 Cnmt Chi Viv N/A 4 4: RYB02E l RYB046 RYB028- Ph To PRT Cnmt 1s01 V1v 10.0 :
; RYB046 FRT Soray Line Insloe Cnmt CnK Viv N/A 56 SA032 l SA033 SA032 Service Air Cnet Isol Viv D/S 4.5 :
.i. SA033 Service Air Instoe Isol Viv 4.5 l' BC 53002.(a) 150002- 5/G IC B/D ! sol 7.5 3
; 80/81 SD005B(a)- 250002C Steam Generator 10 upper B/D 1501 7.5 500056 Steam Generator 10 B/D Samole Isol 3.0 B: SD002D(a) 1500020 5/G 10 B/D 15o1 80/81 5D0058(') 7.5 3 25D002D Steam Generator ID Lower B/D 1501 7.5 50005B Steam Generator ID B/D Sample 1501 3.0 B2' 150002A 5/G 1A B/D 1501 B2/83 SD002A(I8) 50005A a) 250002A Steam Generator IA Upper B/D 1501 7.5 3
!' 7.5 50005A Steam Generator 1A B/D Sample 1501 3.0 83 50002B(a) 150002B 5/G 1A B/D 1s01 82/83 SD005A(a) 7.5 3 250002B Steam Generator IA Lower B/D 1s01 7.5 SD005A Steam Generator IA B/D Sample Isol 3.0 (continueos (a) NCt suoje:t to Type C lestage tests, i
'n /
V) 9/9/98 Revision J
- ~ , . -. . .- - -. - . = - . - -- - ..
BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 Bases 3.6.3 Cs j INSERT B 3.6 4 A (P.J - (con inued) k '\. ' ' Ta: e u . .. .:a;e :' 9 satma '*:-ta' w t ;s:'.at :- .a'.es s ,
- ENETRAT:Dr. CLil::I IN5::E F W.~T : D*. L'-- *- . L NL*5in VA.VE VA3i ,,"].1*'{'
- 3 ,
ai 500:2E!a) ;gg ;;; 5.G 15 B/D ise' ' 85/89' SD005:sa) 2SD002E Steam Generate 15 U:ce- 8/2 Ise' i 50005* Stea* Generate 15 8,C Samoie sc: :: l l a) 89 SD002 (la) 150002 5/G 18 8/D ! sol 'i . 88/89 SD005C 250002~- Steam Generate 18 Low r B/D !se' .s 50005: Steam Generate 18 8/T Sammle Ise' :: 90 500:2G(a) 150002G 5/G IC 8/C 1501 9 . 90/91 SDC05D(a) 250002G Steam Generate 10 ucce 8/D 1s0' : SD005D Steam Generator 10 B/D Sammle Isoi 3; 9; 500C2Hja t 150002M S/G IC 8/D 1s01 90/9; SD0050's)
'9 :
250002P Steam Generate- IC Lowe- 8/D 1se1 ~5 50005D Steam Generatoe IC 8/D Sample 1501 . 3. t 26 5!B801A(as gigg 5(al 5fB801A CHG Po To Cold Legs Inj 1501 h / /. i-SIB 8018(a) SIB 843(a) 5188018 .CHG Po To Cold Legs 1501 Viv N/A 518815 Cng Pos Cold Leg Inj Her Cht Viv N/A 516843 Accum Fill Frm SI Tst Line 1501 Viv h!A
]
i
. 50 518809A(a) 5!8690A(a) 518809A RH To Cold Legs A/D 1s01 Viv N/A SIB 818Aja 518890A RHR To Colo Legs 184 Tst Line Iso V1 N/A SIB 818D'a!
(j}
/ SISSIBA 5: Loo: 1 Cola Leg upst Cnk v h h/A 5188180 5: Loco 4 Cold Le9 ups: Cnt Viv N/A 51 SIBB098(a) 518890!'8' 5188098 RH To Cold Legs B/C 1s01 Viv N/A T SI68188(a) 5188908 RHR To Cold Less 2&3 Tst Line Iso V1 N/A 518818 'II 518818B - SI Loco 2 Colo Leg Ucst Cnt Viv N/A 518818: 51 Loop 3 Cola Leg upst Cht viv N/A 55 518964 51887: 518964 SI Test Lines To Raowaste 1s01 Viv l 10.0 4 51888E 518885 5: Pos To Accum Fill Line Isol Viv 10.0 l 518871 Fill / Test Line Isol Viv 10.0 55 518880 518968 518880 51 Accumulators N2 Succly 1s01 Viv 10.0 2 518965 51 Accun N2 Supply Cht Viv N/A 59 518802A(a) a) 518802A 5: To Hot Legs A/D 1501 Viv gjgggi(t N/A 7 518905A a) 518881 51 Test Line Iso Vlv. 51 Pos To A/D Hot legs N/A SI8905D(a) 518905A 51 Loco I Hot Leg upst Cht Viv 518905D SI Loop 4 Not Leg upst Cht Viv N/A N/A 60 518835t a) a) 51 Pos Cold Legs ! sol Viv SIB 823(l 518835 518823 51 Test Line .lso Viv. 51 Pos To Cold Legs N/A 7 518819A(81 518819A 51 Pos Dsch Her To Cold Leg Le I f.hk N/A N/A 518819B{a) 5188190 a) 510819B $1 Pos Dsen Har To Cold Leg Lp 2 Chk 5188190 a) 518819; 51 Pos Dsen Her To Cold Leg Le 3 Chk N/A N/A 518819D 51 Pos Dsen Her To Cold Leg Lo 4 Cht N/A (continuedi (a) Not suDject to Type C leatage tests.
p V. 9/9/98 Revision J
q BASES INSERT (S) SECTION 3.6 l l
)
1 Bases 3.6.3 l l
,- x l- INSERT B 3.6 44A ( F.3 ) (con 1nue:)) l
! t ! l
~ \/ I
*aDi e'3.5.3 . 0a*f 5 ! # f I s-ma ,s ,r :n nae-: :s:iat e iaN es l l 1
.(.
- EAEn: :0'. Ors::I IN5::I 20'.: :02 *:':* * . .
N#5E: VA.Vi VOi .!,5,'.',*,','
-,,2 ,
t. I 66 5!E64pa) 3:5375t ,a i, Sygg : R- T: N: Legs A/: !se' vb *: +
'ai 5!S541*ta, 533575 gg e coje geg3 ;g3 is: ,. ,n,13e y- ,.
518641! SI5541A -St Lee: 1 Mc: .e; u:st Cnt Vh A: SIEB41E i: Loo: 3 Het Leg u s: Cns Vh A
^ 73 SIES02B(a) SIBB2 (.a) SI6802E 5: To Het Legs 6/* 1501 Viv .
A::
- SIE905Bsa) 516824 5: Test Line Iso Viv. 51 Pos Te B/* not Legs A: i SI6905;ta) 5169055 51 Loop 2 ao: Leg upst Cnn Viv h: 1 5!6905: 5: .coe 3 N:: Leg uos: Cna viv A.:
l 9" 518811A(a) SIBEllA Cnm. Sump A ! sol viv A. .
- l. 93 SIBS 11E(a) 518611S Cnm: Sum: B ! sol viv h; ; )
?
l SX016B(a) SX0166 Rx Cnm Fan Coole* B/D SX Inlet N/A 3 , I l' 9 SX027B(a) SX0279 Rx Cnm: Fan Cooler B/D SX Outlet N/A 3 f j 1: t SX027A a) SX027A Rx Cnm: Fan Coole- A/ SX Outlet N/A 3 l 15 $X016A(a) SX016A Rx Cnm Fan Cooler A/C $X Inlet N/A 3
.t k V' I' :3 V0016 V0016 V0016 In: Leat Rate Cnm: Isol- -N/A :
V0015 Int Lean Rate Cnmt 1501 N/A'
- VC019' V0017 V0019 Int Lean Rate Cnmt Isol N/A 0 v0017 Int Leak kate Cnm: Isol N/A 9: V0003 V0005A V0003 Cnmt Post LOCA Purge Isol 5.0 o V0005* v0005* Cnmt Mini Flow Purge Exnaust Isol 5.0 V00053 V0005S Cnet Mint Flow Purge Exnaust 1501 5.0 V0005A Cnmt Nint. Flow Purge Ennaust 1501 50 95 v00028 V0002A V0002B Cnmt Purge Exhaust Isol Viv 50 2(C)
V0002A Cnm: Purge Exnaust 1s01 Viv 5.0
'li 96 V0004B V000AA V00049 V000AA Cnet Mini-Flow Purge Sucol 1s01 Cnmt Mini. Flow Purge Suppi 1501 C.b :
5.0 97 V000l! V0001A V0001B Cnmt Purge Sucoly 1s01 Viv 5.0 2M V0001A Cnet Purge Supply isol Viv- 5.0
--,.l 30 WM190 WM191 WM190 Demin Wtr Her To Cnmt DWST 1s01 N/A . 2 WM191 Demin Wtr Nde To Cnmt Cneck Viv N/A (continueds (af Not subje:: to Type C leakage tests (c) Valve INODERABLE as a result of leakage not within limit refer to Teen Spec 3.6.3. Concition 0 n>
V' 9/9/98 Revision J
BASES INSERT (S) . SECTION 3.6 Bases 3.6.3 o j INSERT B 3.6 44A ( F.3 ) (con 1nue::; (' ,
' i
- 'e : i.:.. ,:a;e F :< F I
L**ra . ;;ettle.ee*; ;s0'!:*0* '4'.nei l :E'.E*: :0'. 0.~ ::E Ifd::i r uh:T:0?. -: . : * -
- 3:
NL*is: V:.VI VA.ti 1 i t 5 WC020A W3:56 - WO:20A Rx Cn : Fn Ccole's A': Cri h:* 0. . E' 60056A Ex Cnm: fn Cociers Ai; Cn1 m
- 0,. i.: ,
5 WC006A WO007A W0006A Ri Cnet Fn Coolers A/C Cni W;* Ir, j; ; , h0:07A A/: R:FC Suspiy N:e inen~: Cne:t ;; 5 WOO 209 WOO 555 WOO 205 WOO 555 Rx Cnm: Fn Coolers B/D thl Wtr Out 5: Rx Cnmt Fn Coolers B/D Cn Wtr.Out 5: ) i i 10 WOC 065 WOOO75 WOOO65 Rx Cnmt Fn Coolers B/D Ch1 Wtr In K: WOOO76 B/D ROFC Supply Mor Inenm* Cneca N t-O i , l 1 I 1 2 1 I l s 1 1 1
\
I n , O 9/9/98 Revision J
,, , , . . - . .. . . - . . . . . . . . - . . . -.-. . - - -.~ . - - . - . . . -
F
. BASES INSERT (S)
SECTION 3.6
,9 ..
i Bases 3.6.3' 4 .] ,+ TINSERT B 3.6' 44A (Ff)- (continued)- . Taoie3.i.3fcoa;e;c". I L
, ' Prima y Cectainmen: .ls:iat*:- talves:
L i-
?
A TIot. ' STATUS 0: 46 TE:E ;CNTAINMENT !!C.AT lA VALVE;5! :::,:::3,
?;p3ER -
.::.;- 2... ..:
l'
. e. Outstee valve E eitnea insice valve INOPERABLE :
- e. B:tn ins 10e vaives INOPERAB.E A lq.
- . Outsioe !!Q eitne-. insioe vaive ING:ERABLE s
<=
-2 ~ a. Dr.sioe valve ' ~ testoe valve INOCERAB'I *
!: c ; Outstoe valve ' ins 10e valve INOPERABLE 3 [ i3 .a. NiveINOPERAB.E ' a a. Insiot valve 2 ettner outstoe valve INOPERABLE. :
- . Betn outsice valves INOPERABLE . - A
- . Instae valve AjQ e1tner er.31ce valve INOPERABLE 6
-5 :a. Eitne* c' tne outstce valves 2 eitne of tre insioe v'alves-]NO:ERABLE - A
.:. 60th Instoe valves 2 Detn outstoe valves INOPERABLE A Eltnea of tne insice valves !!Q eitne cf the outs 10e valves INOPERABLE E
.- 'a.
' E -- 1 3 more or.stce valves INOPERABLE A'
. P ' . ll :-"
.\ l -
- .l Insioe valve INOPERABLE Insice valve AjQ any outside valvels) INOPERABLE A.
E
- 4. I 2 more insice valves INOPERABLE A c, Outstoe valve INO:ERABLE .
A
.t. Outsice valve AjQ any inside valve (s) INOPERABLE -B
'l- 'i a -Va ne INOCERABLE B
t .. 9 a .- 1 instoe valve INO:ERABLE' A
- . Botn instoe valves INOPERABLE 6 u
l
^
10 a. I outs 10e valve !NOPERABLE ' A
- Botn outsice valves INOPERABLE B i .q :
l t ( L 9/9/98 Revision J h l js
~~ ,. _ ..~. - . - _ . - .. _ _ - - - _ _ .-..- - - - - . . -...... .. - . . . . . . _ . . - . . . - _ _. Containment Pressure a ..n:n-dZ:'
~
- --=--~~ -
',:,./ if,
.s
, 5 3.i . u -
B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SY3TEMS B 3.6.4h- Containment Pressure - m .;;;w . . _a . e c .:: := : r-. BASES. BACXGROUND The containment-pressure is limited during nomal operation to preserve the-initial egnditions assumed.in tne accicent (P__ w ,, . e : .,-4 s4 3. analyses for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or. stear line
- break (SLB). These limits'also prevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative '
pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere in the event of inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System. ~ Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored 1 and controlled. The containment pressure limits are derived ;
'from the input conditions used in the containment functional
- analyses and the containment structure external pressure analysis. Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a. Design Basis Accident (DBA), post act:ident containment pressures could exceed calculated values.
APPLICABLE Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used in the DBA' analyses to establish the maximum peak SAFETY ANALYSES
, . containment internal pressure. The limiting DBAs considered, relative to containment pressure,'are the LOCA g,
and SLB, which Ere' analyzed.using computer ^ pressure transients. The worst case LOCA generates larger mass and
**MN energy release than the worst case SLB. Thus, the LOCA g event bounds the SLB event from the containment oeak CB pg wm m s pressure standpoint (Ref. I
< , /' seo M pm ren v.3 p+,u.u.,~.
.t w a w,, e. , , . s .,,1(w a , , +;3 *.% '" *s" w w+,- 2 The initial pressure condit n used in the sn6. .. -
L ' analysis was< ; U., ; ;su ciS-efpsig@. TH: r;;dt:d S : AO i m u imum pean gi=>>wre Trom a Lot . 169-9-] psig. The l h containment analysis (Ref.1) sh calculated containment pressure, P , results from the hat the maximum peak l i limiting LOCA. The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA, ' . ] y..v, does not exceed the l containment _designpressure,[ psig. ' F. p. ' . . mil , for an external pressure The containment was also l load equivalent to'1-66f psig The inadvertent actuation of the Containment SprTay Syste, m was analyzed to determine , 6'
-4 l ; .' e . 2 P7 O.35 /
1 (continued) Rev 1, 04/07/95 ~ WOG STS B 3.6-45 ! W .T
l , Containment Air Temperatu"e i n . r :- ~ ;: .: E' yhg 5 2.i .F BASES (V) APPLICABLE postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard i: Engineered SAFETY ANALYSES SafetyFeature(ESF)fystems,assumingthelossofoneESF ! (continued) bus, which is tne worst case. single active failure, resulting in one train each of the Containment Soray Syste-Residual Heat Removal System, and Containment Cooling Syster being rendered incperable. rww o - _ a tsmuc.,v ec. The limiting DBA for the maximum peak containment air temperature is an SLB. The initial containment average air temperature assumed in the design basis analyses (Ref.1) is h 7 120 ff. This resulted in a maximum containment air temperatureof[4844}*F. The design temperaturefis j. g [{p]'F.1 3M e 'q The; temperature limit is used to establish the environmental I
'D I oualification operating envelope for containment.l Tne maximum peak containment air temperature was cair.ulated to exceed tne containment design temperature for only a few seconds during the transient. {The basis of the containment l
oesign temperature, nowever, is to ensure the performance of safety related eouipment inside containment (Ref 21. l Thermal analyses showed that the time interval during which { the containment air temperature exceeded the containment design temperature was short enough that the :;uipm:rt j (conummeng :;rf::: temperatures remained below the design temperature.D' O V Therefore, it is concluded that the calculated transient containment air temperature is acceptable for the DBA SLB. I 7 he temperature-limit is also used in the depressurization analyses to ensure that the minimum pressure limit is maintained following an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System (Ref. 1). The containment pressure transient is sensitive to the initial air mass in containment and, therefore, to the initial containment air temperature. The limiting DBA for establishing the maximum peak containment internal pressure is a LOCA. -The temperature limit is used in this analysis to ensure that in the event of an accident the maximum containment internal pressure will not be exceeded. Containment average air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of' aa - , a u , i m e e e.. A CPA EC.3L Ca.)(.7)60 l , (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-53 Rev 1, 04/07/95 rs
m - L Qm: Containment Air Temperature J A:mosenem --S -';' E 3.i,59- ! BASE 3 (continued) rh b- SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.541
- - REQUIREMENTS i
l Verifying that containment average air temperature is within the LCO limit ensures that containment operation remains l within the limit assumed for the containment analyses. In order to determine the containment average air tempera.ure, I an arithmetic average is calculated using measurements taken 1 at locations within the containment selected to provice a I e s n ~ ,wi-n:r;;:n:n "f
~' n- 9 1of the overall containment atmoschere, Qs7"~ based on observed slowofrates The 24 hour Frequency this SR is considered acceptacle of temperature increase within !
containment to as a result the large volume of environmental heat sources (due of containment). Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control roomp m c. : n; :!: mxf' l to alart the operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition. I REFERENCEShh 1. GFSAR, Section 16.2-][
- 2. 10 CFR 50.49.
, .e.g. 4,. ~ ,, m. m . . ,
@ e. . . c t ,n i . e ei i t . c i .si , .. . . f > ;
reo eer coa. . - .+ r. ,
..a r ) - l j WOG STS B 3.6-55 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w,
o
WAmment~3 pray anc C: ;in; 5ys:essi 4 #::: :- ._r 3 h,(4p~ ' E 2. 6. W E :3.5 CONTAINMENT' SYSTEMS B 3.5.6TC- Containmen: Sorav and Coolin: Sys ems ;A..... ...=-.. .... ; J ~
~ -(Cr:::: ::::r fr ::: n: == . :: Sr:::- :r: ;w;, ;.;;; '
.O.
i
' BASES' i
BACKGROUND TheContainmentSprayandContainmentCooling[vstems
. provide containment atmosphere cooling.to limit pcs:
accident pressure and temperature in containment t: less l than the design values. Reduction of containment pressure 'l and the iodine removal capability of the spray reau:es tne release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment, in the event of a Design Basis. Accident-- (DBA), to within limits. The Containment Spray and ContainmentCoolingfystemsaredesignedtomeetthe requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, " Containment. Heat. Removal," GDC 39, " Inspection of Containment Heat Removal Systems," GDC 40, " Testing of Containment Heat Removal Systems," GDC 41,: " Containment Atmosphere Cleanup," GDC 42, " Inspection of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems," and GDC 43, "Testino of Containment Atmosphere , Cleanup Systems" (Ref. IM er ;;;;;r d;;;.;;nt; th:t w;re !
$7 i:;pr:;ri:t: It the t4 e c' 14caae4a; (idantified nn e mit
;;;;ift: h:i:'.
-The Containment Cooling System and Containment Spray System are'EngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)fystems They are e
;O .c designed to ensure that the heat removal ca,pability required 9
. - - . . . . . = , . e. during the post accident period can be attained. Th_e #
Lontainment spray systemtene the Containment Cooling System g
~ s ,,. ;e , eLnen: methan t6 limit and mairtain post ;
w w accident conditions to less than the containment design 1pWm values.1 l c o g ,, , . . . . , . , , VF$A6. p.t c,.. ~ 6mm ..ehq(ming . po Lonmn,neny l*"d 4M rmA"yGd.N$.
'"N 0 8*'" k
- Containment Sorav System '
SUT.:rt ums w gommen
' """'- N' " *" M f,oci, eggy]
- The Containment Soray System consists of two separate 4 trains "WM * * ()-L,,m... ;;;;:its each capable of meeting the design bases.
"'"
- N tt Each train. includes a containment spray pump, spray headers,
' M%" m "% '
nozzles, valves, and piping. Each train is powered from a O"'N N WS d i separate ESF bus. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) m A m ed e supplies borated water to the Containment Spray System (.L.ot G c %gu., during the injection phase of operation. In the. t recirculation mode of operation, containment spray pump (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-64 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ke:V 3~ s , _ , _ - , _ ___ _
r T S *' Containment Spray anc Cocling Sys,ers m :::- - : a< . , us .
/ E 2 .3 . fi -
4 BASIS BACXGROUND ' Containment Svav Svstem (continued) controlled by the operator in accorcance with the emergent,. operating procedures. t-Containment Coolino Svstem ' te o, . . ;, . . , g s m n. . u o... ,- , , , c. , Two trains of containmenticooling, eacn[of sufficien: capacity to supply 100% of the design cooling recuirement, sre provided. Each train'of two :f n _ = is supplied witn S cooling water from a separate train of Issent.kl_.Jervice E . ,5X.
" wier sa44f1. Air.is drawn into the coolers through the fan i landdischargedtothesteamgenerator' compartments, ha : .- e .,,-a.Mpressurizer compartment, and instrument tunnel /and outsida l Ithe secondary shield in the lower areas of containment. t During normal operation, = ' ::= tr .n;;; :n ;;r, at m Jhe fans are necee+W operated at high speed with 8W~dq,'
supplied to the cooling coils. The Containment Coolina + Systet oper tinC " :: :::ti:n with th: C;nt;i ;n: I l'!;ntil:ti:n : d "- 00 ditieni : :/:tems.lisn designed to limit the ambient containment air temperature during normal unit operation to less than the limit specified in h LCO 3.6.5@ " Containment Air Temperature." This temperature limitation ensures that the containment temperature does not
-exceed the initial temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs. ,
in post accident operation following an actuation signal, the Containment Cooling System fans are designed to start automatically in slow speed if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, the fans automatically shift to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed from during the higheraccident conditions mass atmosphere. The temperato prevent @hof the SL is SX H. t an important factor in the heat removal { capability of the fan units. , ,, l ,w ,. . ~ ,. . , . . . v . .e . < o . . ...z . , APPLICABLE The Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System SAFETY ANALYSES limit the temperature .nd pressure that could be experienced following a DBA. The limiting DBAs Sonsidered Jre the ieet
@' .. ........ ;;;idn t 'LOCAP and the fteam fine freak (SLB).
The LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed l, (contlaued)
; O .WOG STS B 3.6-66 Rev 1, 04/07/95 N
3, m
,3 Containment Spray anc Cooling Systems.. c ;;; 9 ; g. . g
%, V : 2 . : . :-
BASE 5 APPLICABLE to predict the resultant containment pressure and SAFETY ANALYSES temperature transients. No DBAs are assumed to occur ' (continued) simultaneously or consecutively. The postulate DBAs are analyzed _with regard to containment E5F systems, assuminc the loss of one ESF bus,.which.is the worst case sincie ~ active failure and results in one train of the Containment d ,8 psg ht. 6'" \ ) Spray System and Containment Cooling System being.rencerec inoperable. mo 44 4 fM- 4t hT2, ' J The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case I scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is f @ "'that 44d7 psigcontainment the peak (experienced temperature during The analysi is a LOCA).'{384rsT'F how b (experienced during an SLB). Both results meet the intent of the design basis. (See the Bases for LCO 3.6.4 4
,3
" Containment Pressure," and LCO 3.6.5A-tor a detailed b
._ H r % ) discus.sion.) The analyses and evaluations assume a unit specific power level of THtD1%. one containment spray train and one containment cooling train operating, and initial m I
(pre-Jccident) containment conditions ofil20 ~6 h(h_'h5T osio.. The analyses also assume a respon?'Fseand ~' time ldelayedinitiationtoprovideconservativepeakcalculated containment pressure and temperature responses.
- . Ev f,'ec'.,a.,,.
.,aa.
-N- '-~-
For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, OII. M " ; m > :" -: maximizing the calculated containment pressure.is not conservative. In particular, the effectiveness of the ll pr r< r * -- Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood phase I! % <- << of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations, the containment IIm -8 t, backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the b
- calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.'@.
9 The effect of an inadvertent containment spray actuation has (~s:) 3 9g been analyzed. Ar inadvertent spray actuation results in a [+-9) psig containment pressure and is associated with the sudden cooling effect in the interior of the leak tight containment. Additional discussion is provided in the Bases g for LCO 3.6.44 The modeled Containment spray System actuation from the containment analysis is based on a response time associated
- with exceeding the containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles.
(contMued) WOG STS B 3.6-67 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w
. -. - _ -. ~ _ -- -- - ~. - _ .... _ - _ .-. - . . . - . _ .-
Q Spray Additive Systemt ~- ::::rc-':. m m;;;n: ::: ic :: n .. 2 7 l' -B 2.6' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ! B 3.6.7 Sora._v Additive System; (?::::;n: ::. O:::::::n: ::. ' .;; 2ncen:; , ~ L
- nc a;:.;
l BASES t- , BACKGROUND The Spray Additive System is a subsystem.of the Containment j Spray Syster that assists in reducing the iodine fission i product inventory in the containment atmosphare resulting from a Design Basis Accident (DBA),nd u au., W .s m.; C ,
/r u-.. , ;, .y. x : < . . ' L.
Radiciodine in its various foms is the fission product of ( primary concern in the evaluation of a DBA. It is absorbed by the spray from the containment atmosphere. To enhance the iodine absorption capacity of the spray, the spray solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH that promotes iodine hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile forms. Because of its stability when exposed to radiation and elevated temperature, sodium hydroxide (NaOH) is the [ U ,'.' 7 ~l preferred spray additive. The NaOH added to the spray also l_ pd ensures a>pH value of.aghgge-fzfhdad44rof the s01ution recirculated from the icontainment sump. This pH band minimizes the evolutio'n"of iodine i__ T =ithe occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosionnon mechanical systems and component _s,. Le. 4-- 3. j
- g. 15 c - a
_] '
' { i w Teed L;t::: Onl
- l. The Spray Additive System consists of one spray additive i
tank that is shared by the two trains of spray additive equipment. Each train of equipment provides a flow path E from the spray additive tank to a containment spray. pump and ; consists of an eductor for each containment-spray pump, valves, instrumentation, and connecting piping. Each eductor draws the NaOH spray solution from the common tank using a portion of the borated water discharged by the , containment spray pump as the motive flow. The eductor L mixes the NaOH solution and the borated water and discharges j- the mixture into the spray pump suction line. The eductors are designed to ensure that the pH of the spray mixture is L. ,
@ between 8.5 and .
it.B f
- (continued) 1 fh WOG STS B 3.6-109 Rev 1, 04/07/95
%s
-i._ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __. _ _ _ _ l 4 8 4 f 4 h g BASES JFDs I s 4 A d e d e l' a l b I l s 4 A 7 s i-r M h-n , l 1 i
- O .
)
l L
l JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG-1431 BASES SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS f BRACKETED CHANGES (B) B3 The brackets were removed and the optional woroing or plant soe: m : value was retained. ' B, The brackets were removed and the plant specific value and/or olan: specific requirement was provided, and Bases Reviewer's Notes celete:. l B3 The brackets were removed and the plant specific details replace tne L NUREG optional wording. The purge valve design is such that indivioual leakage rates can not be determined for any single penetration isolat,on device. Leakage testing is performed by pressurizing between the two purge valves in a penetration, and measuring the combined leakage through both valves. In order to adept the NUREG Required Actions with l the failure of a single purge valve's leakage limit, confirmation of the ! remaining purge valve's leak tightness would be required. Since this , e information can not be obtained. the CTS Actions allowing 24 hours to l ? complete restoration of the leak tightness of the in-series valves.1s l e o retained. ! *1 In conjunction. ITS SR 3.6.3.1 exception for opening one purge valve y while in the Condition for excessive leakage is deleted. This exception uj is be adequately addressed by Condition D Required Actions, without the necessity for the complexity introduced by this exception. O V B, The bracketed SRs were deleted since the plant specific design does not include the associated functions. B3 The bracketed discussion of design is not applicable to Byron /Braidwood. and is therefore deleted. l l l l n BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 1 8/14/98 Revision J !b
-JUSTIFIC? TION FOR. DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 BASES
._ SEC~ ION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS lf N- f : GENERIC CHANGE'/ E
.C2 - This chinge is consistent with NUREG-1431. ' as modified by TSTF-52.
Minor f.ditorial corrections to the Bases as proposed in TSTF-52 nave been made. Reviewer's Notes associated with.this TSTF are celetec. Bases /SR 3.6.3.11 is not applicable as-described in B2 . therefore ' TSTF-52 changes to that SR.are not applicable.
' k'f
- LC2 This change is. consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-17 Revision 1 (NRC approved).
.at g l 5 ..
'i j. [; ' ! : .C3 -Not used.
Y li - C, This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-30. L .4 - l Revision 2'(NRC approved). l .C 5 This. change is consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-45. L ' Revision 1 (NRC approved). L C, This change.is consistent with NUREG-1431.. as modified by TSTF-46. Revision 1 (NRC approved). C, This change to Reference 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). is consistent with
.NUREG-1431. as modified by an editorial change submitted to and approved.
f .- by the NRC. i C, . This change is consistent with NUREG-1431. as modified by TSTF-269 (NRC-approved). r s
.I 4
L l 3
. ' BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 2 9/10/98 Revision J 1
a v - ~ . . rm -
l JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 BASES SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
\
(V PLANT SPECIFIC CHANGES (P) P3 During_the development certain wording preferences. English language conventions, reformatting. renumbering, or editorial rewording consistent with plant specific nomenclature were adopted. As a result. the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily reaaaele 03 and therefore understandable to. plant operators and otner users. During this reformatting, renumbering. and rewording process. no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were maae to tne TS unless they were identified and justified. P2 Consistent with the modification made to Required Actions A. B. and C. SR 3.6.3.3. and SR 3.6.3.4 of ITS LCO 3.6.3. the Bases are revisea to reflect the use of de-activated remote manual valves. P3 ITS LCO 3.6.6. Completion Times for Required Action A.1 and Required Actions D.1, and ITS LCO 3.6.7. Completion Time for required Action A.1. were revised from 72 hours to 7 days. These changes are consistent with the current licensing basis as presented in CTS LCOs 3.6.2.1. 3.6.2.3. and 3.6.2.2. respectively. ITS Bases also revised for consistency. In addition, the second Completion Time for Required Actions A.1 and C.1 are extended to 14 days. consistent with the NUREG philosophy of allowing one alternation of inoperabilities. P, NUREG-1431 provides optional Specifications for a variety of containment tQ
-V designs (subatmospheric. ice condenser, and dual) in addition to Specifications for the Byron and Braidwood designs (atmospheric). These
~ Containment SECTION Specifications are not included in the NUREG markup 9 package. Additionally. Specification titles and "A"/"B" notations are M "avised to eliminate the information identifying the applicable design
.3 type.
M pl P 3 Not used. a i 1
~
l l l ! BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 3 8/14/98 Revision J L
\
,. U L i JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 BASES SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS p
-() P, .Tne following NUREG-1431 Specifications anc associate: Bases a s c::
included in the ITS-for the statec reasons: a -. ITS LCO 3.6.6B. " Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (Atmospheric and Dual)." ITS LCO 3.6-6C. " Containment Scray Sys:er (Ice Condenser)." ITS LCO 3.6.6D. "0S System (Suoatmospneric '
- and ITS LCO 3.6.6E. "RS System (Subatmospheric)"- These syste s are not in'the Byron and Braidwood designs, b; . ITS LC0 3.6.9, " Hydrogen Mixing System": :The mixing. fans are
- already addressed (with more conservative actions) in LCO 3.6.6.
" Containment Spray and Cooling Systems."
- c. ITS LC0 3.6.10. "HIS (Ice Condenser)"i This system'is not in tne Byron and Braidwood design,
- d. ITS LCO 3.6.11. " Iodine Cleanup System": This system is not in the Byron and Braidwood designs,
- e. ITS LCO 3.6.12. " Vacuum Relief Valves"- These valves are not in W
the Byron and Braidwood designs. l
^'-
. P-7 The bases were revised to reflect the Byron /Braidwood plant specific
;. design. analysis, and terminology details.
[lP. Not used. P, Reference 4 to~ITS LCO 3.6.3 Bases was eliminated due to revisions in
.the Bases content that referred to this reference. !
P io The rod ejection accident is not identified in the UFSAR as a limiting accident in UFSAR Section 15.4 as stated in Applicable Safety Analyses section of the Bases. Also-UFSAR Section 6.2 states that fission products mioht be released from a rod ejection accident. Therefore. references to this event are deleted. P ii Details are added to ITS LC0 3.6.2 Bases datailing the appropriate administrative controls, for opening an air lock door, when the air lock is inoperable. l' i l l h BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 4 8/14/98 Revision J s s
i l Y JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 BASES S SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (3 V lP g; w u hor usec. Pn Consistent with the cnance to the LCO 3.6.3 Actions (JFD 5 ' :ne allowance to open a single purge valve is celeted. ITS SR'3.6.3.1 exception for opening one purge valve while in the Condition for excessive leakage is deleted. This exception.1s be adequately aqaresse: l by Condition D Required Actions without the necessity 'or tne ' compi,exity introduced by this exception. Pu CTS LCO 3.6.1.7.b details when the 8-inch purge valves are allowed tc De open (i.e., "for PURGING or VENTING operations under aoministrative control."). The Comed letters and the Safety Evaluation Report associated with Amendments 76 (Byron) and 68 (Braidwood) incluoed specific revisions to the Bases and commitments with respect to under which circumstances the valves would be open. Consistent with tne o Amendment philosophy and ITS philosophy, these details are included in 3 the Bases for SR 3.6.3.2. 4 cy P 3 Not used, i. 6P 3 Information is added to the Bases for LC0 3.6.2 Condition C to clarify that Condition C need not be entered if an air lock has an inoperable ' door _ and an inoperable interlock. In this case. Condition A and B are both entered. '
/T k/
Pn The LCO 3.6.6 Bases are revised to reflect the CTS allowance for one or two trains of containment cooling to be inoper ule for 7 days. The discussion of the 7 days Completion Time is revised to reflect that both trains may be inoperable. P,1 CTS LCO 3.6.1.7 Action a provides specific requirements for isolating the 48 inch purge valve penetrations. This information is included in l the Bases for Required Actions A.1 and A.2 of ITS LC0 3.6.3 L P3 The Byron and Braidwood Spray Additive Systems only include manual and
- automatic valves. Therefore references to " power operated" are ,
l removed. P u The ITS LC0 3.6.3 Bases discussion associated with Action B.1 is revised to accurately reflect the requirements of Required Action. A.2 which is referenced in the Bases discussion. l BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 5 8/14/98 Revision J kJ
L JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TO NUREG 1431 BASES SECTION 3.6 CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS Ps Tne Bases are revised to reflect plant specific oesign anc analyses associated with tne Containment Spray and Cooling Systems. P u The word "Once" is added to the Frequencies which specify a frecuenc,s c' "Within" a particular time frame (e.g.. "Within 4 hours prior to criticality") . This change provides a better understanding of tne usage of the word "once" and'is necessary for compliance with the SR. Freauencies beginnina with "Once within.. " indicate that a s1nale performance will satisfy the specified Frecuency. and that the 25; extension allowed by SR 1.0.2 does not apply. In addition. adding tne word "once" is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording. and n therefore, the revised. wording more accurately reflects this intent. O - A Pu Consistent with the hydrogen concentration flammability limit stated in 4 the UFSAR. the Applicability SECTION of the. Bases for ITS LCO 3.6.8 is ai modified to state 4.0 v/o.
.w-5l Pu Not used.
Fu CTS 3.6.3. Table 3.6-1 provides a list of containment isolation valves which have been relocated to the ITS LCO Bases Table 3.6.1-1. Based on relocation of the table. the ITS Bases were revised. i i l
- .--, - BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 6 8/14/98 Revision J
----=--- - .--== - - - - - _ _----- -
MN hA4h A A --h WAwa.4m .-- " - 4 NSHC lg i e i i h N
- 9 t
't i e l l 4 I l 4 4 4 e 1 i 1 I - 1
- 9 ,
e d
,.,..,,.,-,.,--,~,-----y._.., - , - .. ,, - . .,- , , , - -..,.- .- -.-r ,
- . - . . - . _ - , - - . - . . . . - . - . _ . - . - . - - . . . . - - . . . . . . . - . - - . . . . - . ~ - . . - . -
1
. NO SIGNIFICANT HAIARDS EVALUATION 4
. ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS A w-V o.
I TECHNICAL' CHANGE LESS RESTRICTIVE "Soecific"
-4 ("L( Labeled. Comments / Discussions) m.
;pl Not used. ,
.w HO.
i l 4 , gn.- BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 7 8/14/98 Revision J U
. _ , - . - - _ . . .. _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . ~ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ -
u . . J;
- - .-- NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION
. ,. LITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4 4
'la
- . Deleted in Revision'J.
tl-e I . i ( j j '. 1-4- t: e,
)-
j. i 1: 3-3 1 ;
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NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ITS SECTION 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l TECHNICAL CHANGE LESS RESTRICTIVE "Soecific" [ ("Lg Labeled Comments / Discussions) i i Commonwealth Edison Company'(Comed) has evaluated each of the proDosec i Technical Specification changes identified as " Technical Change - Less l Restrictive (Specific)" in accoraance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that tne proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. l The bases for the determination that the proposed changes do not involve a i
.significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes acainst )
.each of theare criteria in 10below.
CFR 50.92. The criteria and the conclus1 oils of the i l evaluation presented ! i 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or ' consequences of an accident previously evaluated? The proposed change would allow verification of isolation devices that are locked sealed, or otherwise secured by administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable. since the function of locking, sealing, or otherwise securing components is to ensure these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. The
. proposed change does not have a~ detrimental impact on the integrity of ;
any plant structure, system. or component beyond that previously [
-v evaluated because the required actions are consistent with those provided for other loss of containment integrity situations and help i
ensure the plant is maintained in a stable condition. This relaxation will not alter the operation of any plant equipment, or otherwise
. increase its failure probability. In the event the subject isolation devices are repositioned, applicable administrative controls, in addition to ITS 3.6.3 Conditions and Required Actions, provide adequate assurance that there would not be any degradation in containment integrity. The probability that equipment failures resulting in an analyzed event will occur is unrelated to this change. As such, the l probability of occurrence for a previously analyzed accident is not L significantly increased.
The consequences of a previously analyzed event are dependent on the initial conditions assumed for the analysis, and the availability and successful functioning of the equipment assumed to operate in response to the analyzed event, and the setpoints at which these actions are initiated. This change does not affect the performance of any credited equipment, since this change provides an administrative verification that isolation devices that are locked, sealed. or otherwise secured are in their required position. As a result, no analyses assumptions are violated. Based on this evaluation there is no significant increase in
- the consequences of a previously analyzed event.
,es BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS _1 & 2 3.6 39a 9/10/98 Revision J O
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ! ITS SECTION 3.6 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or differen kin c' ,
accident from any accident previously evaluated? I The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of Ine clar.: i No new equipment is being introduced, and no installed equipment is ! being operated in a new or different manner. There is no alteratior to e the parameters within which the plant is normally operated or in tne setpoints which initiate protective or mitigative actions. No change.is being proposed to the procedures governing normal plant operation or those procedures relied upon to mitigate a design basis event. Tne proposed change does not have a detrimental impact on the manner in i which plant equipment operates (when compared to other loss of containment integrity situations) or responds to an actuation signal. l As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. In addition, the change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously l evaluated.
- 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The margin of safety is determined by the design and qualification of ; the plant equipment. the operation of the plant within analyzed limits, i and the point at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated. Q C Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable. since the function of locking, sealing. or otherwise securing components I is to ensure these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. There are no design changes or equipment performance parameter changes associated with this change. No setpoints are affected and no change is being proposed in the plant operational limits as a result of this change. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. I s 4 ~ BYRON /BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 & 2 3.6 39b 9/10/98 Revision J v.
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ATTACHMENT 1 O ITS SECTION 5.0 RAI REVISED RESPONSES j J ] i I j l i J 1 1 s + 4
i l R2sponSe to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-sen-98 i NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status !.O 5.0-01 6/12/98 Closed V NRC Description of Issue l 5.0-01 j l CTS 6.2.2.b, Facility Staff, page 6-2 l DOC A28 l [ JFD C2 i ! CTS 6.2.2.b is deleted. To paraphrase C2, " ..The requirements for control room manning in the CTS are consistent with and l duplicative of the manning requirements delineated in 10 CFR 50.54 (m)(2)(iii)....this change is consistent with NUREG- 1 l 1431 as modified by WOG-56 (BWOG-13) which was withdrawn." Comment: DOC A28 and JFD C2 should be revised
- because WOG 56 was withdrawn and therefore, is not applicable as a reference.
l Comed Response to issue 9/17/98 Revised Response: JFD C2 was changed to JFD P21 which states,"NUREG Specification 5.2.2.b has been deleted. This Section contains information that is duplicative of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii) requirements and is not required in the TS to ensure the public health and safety." This change is provided in our ITS Section 5.0 submittal Revision M. Original Response: CTS DOC 5.0-A28 will be revised to delete the reference to WOG-56. In addition. LCO JFD 5.0-C2 will be changed to a 'P' JFD and will be revised to delete the reference to WOG-56. The change is consistent with TSTF-258 which is the traveler based on recommendations in the April 9,1997 letter from C. Grimes (NRC) to J. Davis (NEI). This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. Comed continues to pursue this change. 1 NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status 5.2-01 6/12/98 Closed O V NRC Description of issue 5.2-01 ITS 5.2.2, Facility Staff, page 5.0.3 CTS 6.2.2.c and Footnote *, page 6-2 DOC A2 (Not Used) The CTS markup for this material contains changes and references DOC A2 for the discussion. However, DOC A2 is listed as not used. Comment: Revise the submittal to provide the DOC for these proposed changes. Comed Response to issue Comed will revise the CTS Markup by replacing DOC 5.0-A2 with DOC 5.0-LA28. DOC LA28 includes a discussion that includes CTS 6.2.2 for replacing plant specific management position titles with generic titles. As stated in DOC LA28, this approach is consistent with Generic Letter 88-06 which recommended, as a line item improvement, the relocation of corporate and unit organization charts to licensee controlled documents. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closeout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. Comed continues to pursue this change. l lp
4 R:sponse to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-Sep-98 NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status 5.4-01 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description of issuc 5.4-01 ITS 5.4.1.d, Procedures, page 5.0-5 CTS 6.8.1, Procedures, pages 6-16 STS 5.4.1.e Procedures, page 5.0-6 STS 5.4.1.e requires that written procedures shall be established. implemented. and maintained that cover all programs specilled in Specification 5.5. This requirement has been adopted in conesponding ITS 5.4.1.d. However, the markup of corresponding CTS 6.8.1 does not show this requirement and no justification is provided. Comment: Revise the CTS : markup to show the addition of this material to the ITS and provide justification. l Comed Response to issue 9/17/98 Revised Response: See DOC 5.0-A46. This change is provided in our ITS Section 5.0 submittal Revision M. Original Response: An 'A' DOC has been written and states, " CTS 6.8.1 and 6.8.4 require that written procedures and programs, respectively, shall be established, implemented, and maintained. Consistent with STS 5.4.1.e, written procedures I shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering all programs specified in Specification 5.5. Sint this is ste.ndard practice and does not add or delete any requirements, this change is considered to be an administrative change, and is consistent with NUREG-1431," This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closeout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAI.
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NRC RAI Numbe. NRC Issued Date RAI Status 5.5-01 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description ofIssue U 5.5-01 ITS 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual CTS 6.8.4.e.5, Procedures and Programs, page 6-19 DOC A37 JFD C8 CTS 6.8.4.e.5 states, Determination of cumulative [ strikeout on] and projected [strikout off] dose contributions from radioactive efiluents for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year ia accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM. [ strikeout on] at least every 31 days. [strikout off] [ redline on] Determination of projected dose contributions from radioactive efiluents in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM at least every 31 days, [ redline ofi)" DOC A37 states, that this change is " .. consistent with NUREG-1431, as modified by WOG-72.. " This change editorially clarifies projected dose distributions to be performed every 31 days and cumulative dose distributions for the quarter and current calendar year to be performed in accordance with the ODCM. "This change is consistent with current interpretation and is considered administrative." C8 states, this change is consent with NUREG-1431 as modified by WOG-72, which is pending. Comment: The change to CTS 6.8.4.e.5 is not reflected in ITS 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual," therefore, the staff concludes that this change will not be included in the ITS unless WOG-72 becomes a TSTF change and is approved by the NRC. Comed Response to issue Comed will adopt the STS wording for ITS 5.5.4.e and will delete CTS DOC 5.0-A37, LCO JFD 5.0-C8, and associated markups. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closeout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. 2
I Response to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-sep 98 NRC RAI Number NRC issue [1 Date RAI Status l 5.5-02 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description of Issue 5.5-02 ITS 5.5.9.d, SG Tube Surveillance Program, page 5.012 CTS 4.4.5.3, Reactor Coolant System, page 3/4 4 15 l The introductory sentence for CTS 4.4.5.3 states that the " .. required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes shall be l performed at the following frequencies." Corresponding ITS 5.5.9.d contains an additional parenthetical phrase l "...(dependant upon inspection results classification).. " No justification has been provided for this proposed change. l Comment: Revise the submitta! with ajustification for the proposed change or conform to the CTS. l Comed Response to issue 9/17/98 Revised Response. See DOC 5.0-A47. This change is provided in our ITS Section 5.0 submittal Revision M. l Original Response: Comed will revise the CTS Markup to add the parenthetical phrase, "(dependent upon inspection results classification)." in addition, an 'A' DOC has been written and states, " CTS 4.4.5.3 has been revised to state. "The above required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes (dependent upon inspection results classification) shall be performed at the following frequencies." Since testing frequencies and sample selections are currently changed based on inspection results and criteria the addition of the parenthetical phrase is considered to be an administrative change providing clarification and does not alter the intent of CTS." This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closeout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAI. NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status 5.5-03 6/12/98 Closed jr NRC Description ofissue ' \ 5.5-03 ITS 5.5.9.b Note, SG Tube Sample Section Inspection, page 5.0-12 , CTS 4.4.5.2 Footnote *, Steam Generators, page 4/4 4-13 i I The note for CTS 4.4.5.2 refers to tube repair per Specification 4.4.5.4.a.10. The corresponding note for ITS 5.5.9.b refers to Specification 5.5.9.e. The complete ITS reference is Specification 5.5.9.e.10, page 5.0 20. Comment: Revise the submittal to provide the complete reference. Comed Response to issue Comed will revise the ITS submittal to provide the complete reference to 5.5.9.e.10 for CTS SR 4.4.5.2. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RA!. l l l l f3 . V 3
Response to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-sen-98 NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status (~~) 5.5-04 6!!2/98 Closed NRC Description of Issue 5.5-04 ITS 5.5.9.d.4.i, inspection Frequencies, page 5.017 CTS 4.4.5.3.c.1, Reactor Coolant System, page 3/4 4 15 CTS 4.4.5.3.c.1 refers to Specification 3.4.6.2.c. Corresponding ITS 5.5.9.d.4.i refers to LCO 3.4.13. "RCS Operational Leakage." The complete reference is *LCO 3.4.13.d,"RCS Operational Leakage." Comment: Revise the submittal to provide the complete. reference. Comed Response to issue Comed will revise the ITS submittal to provide the reference to "LCO 3.4.13.d" and "LCO 3.4.13.e" in place of "Speci0 cation 3.4.6.2c" for CTS SR 4.4.5.3.c.l. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 i closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAI. NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status 5.5-05 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description of Issue j 5.5-05 ITS 5.5.ll.c. Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP), page 5.0-29 CTS 4.7.6.c.2, d, h(2), and j, Plant Systems, page 3/4 7-17 CTS 4.7.7.b.2, Plant Systems, page 3/4 7-19 CTS 4.7,7.c Plant Systems, page 3/4 7-20 CTS 4.9.12.c, Refueling Operations, page 3/4 9-15 A l V These surveillances address methyl iodide penetration testing. The CTS surveillances specify that the tests be performed at a specide temperature and relative humidity. The corresponding program description in the ITS specifies that these tests be l perfonned at or below a specific temperature and at or above a specific relative humidity. The CTS markup shows neither the changes nor thejustification. Comment: Revise the submittal to identify these changes and providejusti0 cation. Comed Response to issue The LCO Markup for STS 5.5.ll.c will be revised to delete the "less than or equal to" for the temperature restriction and the
" greater than or equal to" for the relative humidity. ITS 5.5.ll.c will read, " . at a temperature of 30'C and a relative humidity specified below.. . " This change wiIl be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revi ion upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl.
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ReSponS2 to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-sep-98 NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAl Status O 5.5-06 6/12/98 Closed d NRC Description of issue 5.5-06 ITS 5.5.13.c. Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program, page 5.0-16 CTS 4.1.1.2.e, Electrical Power Systems, page 3/4 8 4 DOC LAIS JFD P7 STS 5.5.13.c specifies that the diesel fuel oil shall be tested for total particulate concentration in accordance with ASTM D-2276, Method A 2 or A-3. CTS 4.1.1.2.c references Method A. ITS 5.5.13.d states," .. Total particulate concentration of the fuel oil is 10 mg/l when tested every 31 days in accordance with ASTM D-2276.", but does not include the reference to l Method A-2 or A 3. Comment: P7 states "The details of the method to be used shall be speci6ed in the " Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program." ITS 5.5.13.c states, " . particulate concentration of *he fuel oil is < 10 mg'l when tested every 31 days in accordance with a ASTM D-2276.. " but does not specify Method A.2 or A.3 Providejustification for not specifying Method A.2 or A.3. Comed Response to issue l 9/17/98 Revised Response: The CTS Markup was revised to reflect the NUREG wording for 1TS 5.5.13.c. CTS DOC 5.0-A48 justifies this change and states, " CTS 4.1.1.2.e was revised to read, " . when checked in accordance with ASTM- I D2276, Method A-2 or A 3." This is considered to be an Administrative change since the CTS currently reads," . when checked in accordance with ASTM D2276-78, Method A." Comed always considered Method A as including subsections A-2 and A-3 when referencing ASTM-D2276-78. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431." This change will This change is provided in our ITS Section 5.0 submittal Revision M. l 1 Original Response: Comed will revise ITS 5.5.13.c (not 5.5.13.d), Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program, to comply with the CTS by specifically stating that the fuel oil will be tested in accordat.ce with ASTM D-2276 Method A. This change will be
- O provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl.
NRC RAI Number NRC lssued Date RAI Status 5.5-07 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description of issue 5.5-07 ITS 5.5.16 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, page 5.0-35 CTS, Operations Mode, item 1.20.a Pa, page 1-4 The definition for Pa provided by CTS 1.20.a states, " ..l.20.a Pa shall be the maximum calculated primary containtaent press tre (44.4 psig) for the design basis loss of coolant accident." Corresponding ITS 5.5.16 contains this CTS sentence and adds an additional sentence, " . The containment design pressure is 50 psig " No justification was provided for this proposed change to the CTS. Comment: Revise the submittal with a justification for this proposed change or conform te the CTS. Comed Response to issue Comed will revise the ITS submittal to conform to the CTS by deleting the sentence, "The containment design pressure is 50 psig." This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses io the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. O 5
R spons to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-Sep-98 NRC RAI Number NRC Issued Date RAI Status
, 5.5-08 6'12/98 Closed NRC Description of issue 5.5-08 ITS 5.5.17 Battery inspection Program CTS 4.8.2.1.2 and Table 4.8-2 DOC LA25 JFD C6 CTS 4.8.2.1.2 and Table 4.8-2 contain requirements for battery inspections. DOC LA25 states, " ..This information is to be relocated to the Batterv Inspection Program and the ITS contains a more generic prop am description. The requirements ofITS 5.5.17, Battery inspection Program, and SR 3.8.6.1 ofITS 3.8.6 require certain battery inspections and tests to be performed in accordance with the Battery inspection Program and ITS 5.5.17 provides the programmatic requirements for battery inspections. The relocation of this information maintains consistency with NUREG-1431, as modified by TSTF-ll5)." TSTF 115 was withdrawn by NEl. Comment: TSTF-115 was withdrawn by NEI and replaced by TSTFs 198 through 202 and none of these TSTFs have been approved by NRC. Otherjustification must be provided or return to CTS without a Battery inspection Program.
Comed Response to Issue No change. Comed submitted ITS Revision C by letter dated February 26,1998. ITS Revision C deleted ITS 5.5.17, Battery inspection Program, and placed the battery equirements in ITS Section 3.8, thereby conforming to NUREG-1431. NRC RAI Number NRC lssued Date RAI Status 5.6-01 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description of Issue L/ 5.6-01 ITS 5.6.2 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, page 5.0-39 CTS 6.9.1.6, Radiological Environmental Operating Report, page 6-22 DOC A9(Not used) DOC L6 CTS 6.9.1.6 requires in part that the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report be submitted by May 1 of each year. Corresponding ITS 5.ti.2 specifies May 15. The CTS markup references DOC A9 for this change. DOC A9 was "Not Used." DOC L6 is the correct reference. Comment: Revise the submittal with the correct justification reference. Comed Response to Issue . Comed will revise the CTS Markup for CTS 6.9.1.6 to replace CTS DOC 5.0-A9 with DOC 5.0-L6. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. (
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Rhspon~se to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-Sep-98 NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status h a 5.6-02 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description of Issue 5.6-02 ITS 5.6.2, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, page 5.0-39 CTS 6.9.1.6, Radiological Environmental Operating Report, page 6-22 STS 5.6.2 Note, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, page 5.0-18 DOC A9(not Used) STS 5.6.2 contains a Note that states in part that a single submittal of the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report may be made for the facility. This Note has been adopted in corresponding ITS 5.6.2. However, the markup for corresponding CTC 6.9.l.6 indicates DOC A9. DOC A9 was "Not Used" Comment: Revise the submittal to (1) include the change of date from May I to May 15 with justification. And (2) revise the submittal to address the addition of this Note to the CTS and provide justification. Comed Response to Issue No change. Regarding NRC Comment 1: The change of date from May 1 to May 15 is discussed in RAI 5.6-01. Comed will revise the CTS Markup for CTS 6.9.1.6 to replace CTS DOC 5.0-A9 with DOC 5.0-L6. Regarding NRC Comment 2: The addition of the Note to ITS 5.6.1 isjustified by CTS DOC 5.0-A10 and is annotated on CTS Markup page 6-21 as INSERT 6-21 A. Comed continues to purcue this change. NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status 5.6-03 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description ofIssue 5.6-03 - (Q ITS 5.6.3, Radioactive Effluent Release Report, page 5.0-40 () CTS 6.9.1.7, Radioactive Effluent Release Report. page 6-22 JFD C4, NUREG 1431, as modified by TSTF-152 (approved?) ITS 5.6.3 refers in part to the Radioactive Effluent Release Report covering the operation of the facility "during the previous year." The phrase "during the previous year" is not contained in corresponding STS 5.6.3. The markup for corresponding CTS 6.9.1.7 shows this phrase being deleted without an accompanying justification. Comment: JFD C4, states, " ..These changes are consistent with NUREG -1431, as modified by TSTF-152." TSTF 152 was approved which states, " ..The Radioactive Effluent Release Report covering the operation of the unit in the previous year shall be submitted prior to May I of each year in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36a." Revise the submittal to eliminate the inconsistencies between ITS 5.6.3 and the markup for CTS 6.9.1.7. Comed Resp (mse to Issue Comed will revise the CTS Markup for CTS 6.9.1.7 to retain the CTS words "during the previous year" to eliminate the inconsistency between the CTS Markup and the LCO Markup. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closeout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. 7
RzSponse to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-sep-98 NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status O- 5.6-04 6/12/98 Closed NRC Description ofissue 5.6-04 ITS 5.6.9.d.5, Steam Generator (SG) Tube inspection Report, page 5.0-45 ITS 5.6.9.d.6, Steam Generator (SG) Tube inspection Report, page 5.0-45 CTS 3.4.5, Steam generators DOC A24 On 8/19/97, the licensee requested an amendment to revise CTS 3.4.5, Steam Generator, with an insert (3.4.17c). The revised CTS would include: 5.6.9.d.5 "If cracking is observed in th- tube support plates." 5.6.9.d.6 "If any tube which previously passed a 0.610 inch diameter bobbin coil eddy current probe currently fails to pass a 0.610 inch diameter bobbin coil eddy current probe." These changes to the Byron /Braidwood CTS are contingent upon the 8/19/96 amendment being approved by NRC. Comment: The amendment was approved, but it is only applicable until Braidwood I shuts down in September 1998. Comed Response to issue Comed will revise the ITS submittal to replace affected pages in Sections 3.4 and 5.0 (CTS Markups) as a result of the issuance of Amendment 92 for Braidwood and Amendment 101 for Byron. This change will be provided in our comprehensive ITS Section 5.0 closcout submittal revision upon NRC's concurrence with the Comed Responses to the ITS Section 5.0 RAl. NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status 5.6-05 6/12/98 Closed
/~% NRC Description of issue 5.6-05 5.6, Reporting Requirements TSTF-37 R.I affects NUREG-1431. TSTF-37, R.1 deletes STS 5.6.7, EDG Failure Report and the deletion of this report in turn affects numbering of 5.6.8, PAM Report; 5.6.9, Tendon Surveillance Report; and 5.6.10 Steam Generator Tube inspector Report.
Sections 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instruction 3.R.1 AC Sources - Operabilitiy Comment: TSTF-37 R.] is still pending (5/27/98). No DOC or JFD is identified with the use of TSTF-37, R.I. Unless TSTF-37, R.I is approved,5.6.7, EDG Failure Report, should be included in Byro draidwood ITS. Comed Response to lasue The changes associated with TSTF-37 are consistent with our current licensing basis. The diesel generator reporting requirements were deleted from CTS by Amendment 71 (Braidwood) and Amendment 79 (Byron). Therefore, since this change is current licensing basis, this change is not contingent upon the NRC approval of TSTF-37. Comed continues to pursue this change. { l l l /^ ( l
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Response to NRC RAI For ITS Section 5. 16-sep-98 i NRC RAI Number NRC issued Date RAI Status A) t V 5.7-01 NRC Description of issue 6/12/98 Closed 5.7-01 5.7, High Radiation Area L2 Pt1 CTS 6.12 (L2) and NUREG-5.7 (Pl 1) make use of the same quote, " ..which provides high radiation area access control alternatives pursuant to 10 CFR 20.203(c)(2)(revised to Section 10 CFR 20.1601(c)), has been signincantly revised as a result of the change to 10 CFR 20, the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 838," Control of Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power Plants," and current industry technology in controlling access to high radiation areas. The changes include additional requirements for groups entering high radiation areas, clarification of the need for communication and control of workers in high radiation areas, clarification of definition of high radiation areas, and the clarification that an equivalent document to a Radiation Work Permit is acceptable. This change provides acceptable alternate methods for controlling access to high radiation areas. As a result, this change will not decrease the ability to provide control of exposures from external sources in restricted. These changes are consistent with recently approved Amendment requests for other Commonwealth Edison stations." Comment: Has an amendment been submitted for Byron /Braidwood in this area of High Radiation? Comed Response to Issue 9/17/98 Revised Response: ITS 5.7.2.a has been revised to change ". . detecting unauthorized entry . " to " preventing unauthorized entry . ." This change is provided in our ITS Section 5.0 submittal Revision M. Original Response: A CTS License Amendment Request (LAR) was not submitted for Byron and Braidwood. Hov.ever, per telecons with Section 5.0 NRC Reviewer, Jim Wiggington. ITS Revision D (to ITS Section 5.7, High Radiation Area) was submitted to the NRC by Comed letter dated February 24,1998. Bottom of Report I E 0
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ATTACHMENT 3. bV ITS SECTION 5.0 CTS AMENDED PAGE LIST L -SECTION/ TAB AFFECTED CTS PAGE/ AMENDMENT # 5.0 BYRON CTS 3/4 4-14 3/4 4-15 3/4 4-16 3/4 4-17 3/4 4-17b 3/4 4-17d L 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-36 3/4 6-3 3/4 6-5 l 5-4 5-5 l- 6-20 l ~3 6-20a l (V - 6-22 6-22a 6-22b 6-23 l l l l l E' O - 1
9 ATTACHMENT 3 ITS SECTION 5.0 CTS AMENDED PAGE LIST SECTION/ TAB AFFECTED CTS PAGE/ AMENDMENT # 5.0 BRWD CTS 3/4 4-14 3/4 4-15 3/4 4-16 3/4 4-17 3/4 4-17b 3/4 4-17c 3/4 4-17d 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-36 3/4 6-3 3/4 6-5 5-4 5-5
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V V V Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussiort Description ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement ITS Section 5.0, Administrative Controls i 5.0 A1 Editorial rewording, reformatting, and renumbering changes were made to conform with 5.0 1.0, 4.0, 3/4.3.3.6, conventions used in Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications NUREG-1431(STS). 3/4.4.5, 3/4.4.9, 3/4.6.1.2, 3/4.7.6, 3/4.7.7, 4.8.1.1.2 6.0 50 A2 Obsolete, Unit 1 cycle-specific applicability statements regarding nrximum calculated 5.5.16,5.5.6 1.20.a 6.8.4.g containment accident pressure and containment vessel tendon sheathing filler grease voids were deleted. ] 5.0 A3 Explicit requirement for a licensed operator with sole responsibility for Core Alterations was N/A 6.2.2.d Table ; deleted since this requirement is contained in 10 CFR. 6.2-1 Footnote (e) , 5.0 A4 Explicit requirement to notify and submit a report to the Commission of any Reportable Event N/A 6.6.1.a l was deleted since this requirement is contained in 10 #FR. i 5.0 AS Explicit requirements to establish and maintain procedures for implementation of the Security N/A 6.8.1.c, 6.8.1.d Plan and the Emergency Response Plan were deleted since these requirements are contained in 10 CFR. 5.0 A6 Not used. (By)- Byron spectre (Bw)- Braidwood specific , Byron and Braidwood A_TBLS0 1
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x_/ I \v ) Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussion Deecription ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement 5.0 A7
- s" was used to characterize the pressure for testing the overall air lock leakage rate to clarify 5.5.16.b.1 3.6.1.3.b CTS intent.
5.0 A8 (By) Obsolete requirement for submittal of the initial Annual Reports fo!!owing initial criticality was 5.6.1 6.9.1.4 deleted. 5.0 A9 Not used. 5.0 A10 Notes were included to clanfy that separate Annual Reports need not be submitted for each 5.6.1 Note 6.9.1.5 unit. 5.0 A11 A reference to 10 CFR 50.36a was included for the submittal of the Radioactive Effluent 5.6.3 6.9.1.7 Release Report. 5.0 A12 Explicit distribution requirements for the Monthly Operating Report, Core Operating Limits 5.6.4, 5.6.5.d 69.1.8,6.9.1.9, Report, and Special Reports were deleted since these requirements are contained in 10 CFR. 6.9.2 5.0 A13 Notational information conceming units with separate radwaste systems was deleted as 5.6.3 6.9.1.7 nonapplicable. 5.0 A14 Not used. References to 10 CFR 20 were revised consistent with the current recodification. 5.7.1, 5.5.1.c.1.ii 6.12.1, 6.14.1.a.2 5.0 A15 (By) - Byron specific (Bw)- Brax!woco specific Byron and Braidwood A_TBL5.0 2
V N. , Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement 5.0 A16 Not used. 5.0 A17 Explicit requirement to perform inservice inspection and testing in accordance with Section XI of N/A 4.0.5.a the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was deleted since this requirement is contained in 10 CFR. 5.0 A18 A definition for " biennially or every 2 years" was included for inservice inspection and testing 5.5.8.a 4.0.5.b activities specifying this frequency. 5.0 /.19 Statement that inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified N/A 4.0.5.d SRs was deleted as an unnecessary iteration of current requirements. 5.0 A20 A statement was included to clarify that the ellowance for a delay period of up to 24 hours upon 5.5.8.c 4.0.3 ; discovery of a missed surveillance applies te inservice Testing Program activities. This explicit statement is necessary to retain the current afowance where this allowance is not generally applicable. 5.0 A21 A statement was included to clarify that the allowance for a 25% surveillance interval extension 5.5.9.d 4.0.2 does not apply to Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program activities. This explicit statement is necessary to retain the current requirement where this requirement is not generally applicable. 5.0 A22(By) "a" and "s" were used to characterize the flow range for testing Nonaccessible Area Exhaust 5.5.11 4.7.7 Filter Plenum Ventilation System trains. t (By)- Byton speofic (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood A_TBLS.0 i 3
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Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement 5.0 A23 Filter testing requirements for the Control Room Ventilation Filtration, the Nonaccessible Area 5.5.11 4.7.6, 4.7.7, Exhaust Filter Plenum Filtration, and the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenum 4.9.12 Ventilation systems were reformatted and incorporated as the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). 5.0 A24 Not used. 5.0 A25 Cross reference to SRs for testing purge valves was deleted. N/A 4.6.1.2.f , 5.0 A26 A statement was included to clarify that the allowance for a delay period of up to 24 hours upon 5.5.16 4.0.3 discovery of a missed surveillance applies to Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program l activities. This explicit statement is necessary to retain the current allowance where this , allowance is not generally applicable. 5.0 A27 A statement was included to clarify that the allowance for a 25% surveillance interval extension 5.5.12 4.0.2, 4.0.3 and the allowance for a delay period of up to 24 hours upon discovery of a missed survei!!ance app 8y to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radicretivity Monitoring Program activities. This explicit statement is necessary to retain the current allowance where this allowance is not generally applicable. 5.0 A28 Explicit control room manning requirements by licensed operators was deleted since these N/A 6.2.2.b requirements are contained in 10 CFR 50.54(m)(iii) and 50.54(k). (By)- Byron specife (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood A_TBL5.0 4
O O U V(m . Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement 5.0 A29 (By) Reference to the activities to be reported was changed from the " unit" to the " facility" since 5.6.1 6.9.1.4 separate Annual Reports need not be submitted for each unit. 5.0 A30 Information indicating the Specification to which each methodology applies was deleted from 5.6.5 6.9.1.9 the listing of approved topical reports for the Core Operating Limits Report. 5.0 A31 Reference to the Shutdown Margin Specification was included for completeness. 5.6.5.a 6.9.1.9 5.0 A32 Reference to WCAP-10216 for the Fo Surveillance Frequency was included for completeness. 5.6.5.b.11 6.9.1.9 5.0 A33 Explicit requirement to notify the Commission of certain steam generator degraded / defective Table 5.5.9-2 Table 4.4-2 conditions was deleted since this requirement is encompassed by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2). 5.0 A34 Explicit requirement to perform inservice inspection and testing of steam generators in N/A 4.0.5 accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was deleted since this requirement is encompassed by 10 CFR 50.55a(g). 5.0 A35 Not used. 5.0 A36 Cross reference to a Specification limiting containment leakage rates was deleted. N/A 1.7.d 5.0 A37 Not used. (By)- Byron specific (Bw)- Braidwood specifc I Byron and Braidwood A_TBLS.0 , 5 i
m O . Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS of Change of Change , Requirement Requirement 5.0 A38 A statement was included to clarify that the allowance for a 25% surveillance interval extension 5.5.6,5.5.11 6.8.4.g. r and the allowance for a delay period of up to 24 hours upon discovery of a missed surveillance 4.0.2, 4.0.3 apply to the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program and VFTP Program activities. This explicit statement is necessary to retain the current allowance where this allowance is not generally applicable. 5.0 A39 ANSI N510-1980 was included as a reference in the VFTP for the applicable testing protocol for 5.5.11 4.7.6, 4.7.7 the Control Room Ventilation Filtration, the Nonaccessible Area Exhaust Filter Plenum 4.9.12 r Filtration, and the Fuel Handiing Building Exhaust Filter Plenum Ventilation systems. 5.0 A40 The CTS programs and reporting requirements were marked up to reflect the Pre-Stressed 5.5.6 6.8.4.g, 6.9.1.11 Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program changes requested in an Amendment request dated June 17,1997. 5.0 A41 Clarification was added to differentiate the methods for controlling access to high radiation 5.7 6.12.1 areas from those to very high radiation areas. 5.0 A42 Clarification was added to describe the minimum content of a Radiation Work Permit. 5.7.1, 5.7.2.b 6.12.1,6.12.2 5.0 A43 Clarification was added regarding the practice of disseminating dose rate information to 5.7.2.e 6.12.2 individuals entering high radiation areas. I (By)- Byron specific (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood A_T8L5.0 r 6
V d V Table A - Administrative Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement 5.0 A44 A listing of pertinent reguiations, codes, and standards for conducting the activities of the Pre- 5.5.6 6.8.4.g Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program was included to clarify current requirements. 5.0 A45 The method and content for submitting a Tendon Surveillance Report of any abnormal 5.6.8 6.9.1.11 degradation of the containment structure was changed from a separate report to the i Commission within 30 days to inclusion of the report in the inservice inspection Summary Report for consistency with current requirements. 5.0 A46 All programs specified ;n ITS 5.5 were explicitly listed as requiring written procedures to be 5.4.1.d 6.8.1 estab!ished, implemented, and maintained. 5.0 A47 The Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Program was reviseo ,, - ify that the 5.5.9.d 4.4.5.3 inspection frequency depends on previous inspection results. 5.0 A48 The surveillance for verifying the total particulate contamination of diesel generator fuel oil was 5.5.13.c 4.8.1.1.2.e revised to more specifically cite the ASTM method for testing this parameter. 5.0 A49 All requirements and references to Unit 1 SGs were deleted since these Westinghouse 5.5.9, 5.6.9 3/4.4.5 t Model D4 SGs have been replaced. (By)- Byron specific i (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood A_TBLS0 7
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Table R- Relecated CTS Discussion Relocated Description of New Control of Change CTS Relocated CTS Location Process ITS Section 6.0, Administrative Controls 5.0 LA14 3/4.6.1.6 Containment Vessel Structural Integrity TRM %50.59 (meets criteria of Relocated , CTS) 4
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(By) - Byron specific (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood 1 R_TBL50 i
(m ,~. k Table M - More Restrictive Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS of Change of Change Requirement Requirement 11S Section 5.0, Administrative Controls 5.0 M1 Not used. 6.0 M2 Two new programs are required by STS. The TS Bases Control Program is provided to denote 5.5.14, 5.5.15 N/A the appropriate methods and reviews necessary to change the Bases. The Safety Function Determination Program is provided to support implementation of the support system Operability characteristics. 5.0 M3 The performance of a pressure drop test across the combined High Efficiency Particulate Air 5.5.11.d 4.7.6.e.1, 4.7.7.d.1, (HEPA) filters and charcoal adsorber banks of the associated ventilation systems was revised to 4.9.12.d.1 ; specify that the tests be performed in general conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 and ANSI N510-1980. 5.0 M4 A requirement was added that individuals escorted into high radiation areas will receive a pre-job 5.7.2.e 6.12.2 briefing prior to entry. (By)- Byron specirc (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood 1 M_TBLS0
g3 O Table LA - Details Relocated from CTS Discussion CTS Description of New Control of Change Reference Relocated Details Location Process Type ITS Section 5.0, Administrative Controls 5.0 LA1 6.2.2.a. Descriptive information regarding minimum requirements for shift crew TRM $50.59 3 Table 6.2-1 composition. Descriptive information and functional requirements regarding the Independent UFSAR 550.54(a) 3 5.0 LA2 6.2.3 Safety Engineering Group. Descriptive information regarding the requirements for facility staff training and UFSAR 550.59 3 5.0 LA3 6.4 retraining. Requirements for plant review of each Reportable Event. UFSAR 550.54(a) 3 5.0 LA4 6.6.1.b 6.8.1.e, Requirements for procedures for implementing and controlling changes to the TRM 50.59 3 5.0 LA5 6.13 Process Control Program. 6.8.2, Requirements for technical review and control of procedures and procedure UFSAR 50.54(a) 3 5.0 LA6 6.8.3 changes. Elements to be included in the In-Plant Radiation Monitoring Program. TRM $50.59 3 5.0 LA7 6.8.4.b Requirements for implementation of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) TRM 50.59 3 5.0 LA8 6.8.1.f, 6.8.4.f and the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. information to be included in an annual report regarding any excedance of primary TRM $50.59 3 5.0 LA9 6.9.1.5.b coolant specific activity limits. Relocated Detail Types 1 Details of System Design 3 Procedural Details for Meeting TS Requirements 2 Description of System Opration (By) - Byron spectre (Bw) - Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood 1 LA_TBL50
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Table LA - Details Relocated from CTS Discussion CTS Description of New Control of Change Reference Relocated Details Location Process Type 5.0 LA10 6.10 Retention requirements and listings of pertinent records of activities important to UFSAR 50.54(a) -3 , safety.. 5.0 LA11 6.11 Requirements for procedures for implementing the Radiation Protection Program. TRM $50.59 3 5.0 LA12 4.7.6, Details of the testing criteria for the Control Room Ventilation, Non-accessible Area TRM $50.59 3 I 4.7.7, Exhaust Filter Plenum Ventilation, and Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Systems ! 4.9.12 filters 5.0 LA13 6.14.1.b Requirement for the Onsite Review and investigative Function to review and UFSAR $50.54(a) 3-approve changes to the ODCM. 5.0 LA14 4.6.1.2.g Requirement for periodic visual inspection of the containment vessel. 5.5.16 $50.59 3 , Program ; 5.0 LA15 4.8.1.1.2.d. Detailed requirements for sampling and analyzing diesel fuel oil. TRM $50.59 3 - 4.8.1.1.2.e 5.0 LA16 5.7.1, Listing of component cyclic or transient limits. TRM $50.59 1 Table 5.7-1 5.0 LA17(By) 4.0.5.b Specific edition and addenda of the ASME Section XI Code for inservice TRM $50.59 3 inspection and testing surveillance intervals. 5.0 LA18 6.9.1.1, 6.9.1.2, Requirements for a Startup Report to be submitted following certain specified .TRM 50.59 3 6.9.1.3 events. Relocated Detail Types 1 Details of System Design 3 Procedural Detads for Meeting TS Requirements ; i 2 Description of System Operabon (By)- Byron speciric (Bw) - Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood 2 LA_TBLS0
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Table LA - Details Relocated from CTS Discussion CTS Description of New Control of Change Reference Relocated Details Location Process . Type 5.0 LA19 Not used. 5.0 LA20 Specifications Detailed requirements for explosive gas and storage tank radioactivity monitoring. 5.5.12 50.59 3 3.11.1.4, Program 3.11.2.5, 3.11.2.6 5.0 LA21 Not used. Reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimen examination schedule. 5.6.6 $50.59 1, 3 5.0 LA22 SR 4.4.9.1.2 Report Details of volumetric and visual inspection techniques for reactor coolant pump 5.5.7 550.59 3 5.0 LA23 4.4.10 flywheels. Program 4.6.1.2, Detailed requirements for containment leakage rate and containment air lock 5.5.16 50.59 3 5.0 LA24 4.6.1.3.a. testing. s Program 4.6.1.3.d 5.0 LA25 Not used. Responsibility of the Shift Engineer for directing the Control Room command TRM $50.59 3 5.0 LA26 6.1.2 function and the daily operations of the facility. Administrative procedures to limit the working hours of facility staff who perform TRM 50.59 3 5.0 LA27 6.2.2.e safety-related functions. Relocated Detail Types 1 Details of System Design 3 Procedural Details for Meeting TS Requirements 2 Desenption of System Operation (By) - Byron specific (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood 3 LA_TBL5 0
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Table LA - Details Relocated from CTS Discussion CTS Description of New Control of Change Reference Relocated Details Location Process Type ; 5.0 LA28 6.1.1, 6.1.2, Use of plant specific position titles. UFSAR 550.54(a) 3 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.14.1.b , i l t I Relocated Detail Types 1 Detads of System Design 3 Procedural Details for Meeting TS Requirements 2 Description of System Operation i (By) - Byron specific (Bw)- Braidwood specirc Byron and Braidwood 4 LA_TBL5.0 ; ___-_- _ . _ - _ _ _ . - __ a._.- - - . _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ - - _ .
N Table L - Lese Restrictive Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS Change of Change of Change Requirement Requirement Category ITS Section 5.0, Administrative Controls 5.0 L1 With less than the required channels of Post Accident Monitoring high range area 3.3.3 Action H, 3.3.3.6 Action c til radiation or main steam line radiation instruments Operable, the action to initiate an 5.6.7 attemate method of monitoring the affected parameter within 72 hours was relaxed such that if the channel is not restored within 7 days, then the requisite Special Report to the Commission shall provide an outline of the preplanned attemate method of monitoring. 5.0 L2 For consistency with current radiation protection regulations and industry standards 5.7 6.12 Unique and practice, controls were relaxed to provide attemate methods for controlling personnel access to high radiation areas. 5.0 L3(Bw) The requirement to verify flow distribution through each bank of Nonaccessible Area 5.5.11 4.7.7.b 4.7.7.d, 111 Exhaust Filter Plenum Ventilation System trains when testing the High Efficiency 4.7.7.e, 4.7.7.f Particulate Air (HEPA) and charcoal adsorber filters was deleted, except after structural maintenance on the filter housings, since flow distribution between banks is a fixed parameter. 5.0 L4 Not used. L- ."estrictive Change Categones i Relaxation of LCO requirements V Relaxation of SR acceptance crderia 11 Relaxation of Applicabihty VI Relaxation of Surveillance Frequency til Relaxation of Action requirements Vil Deletion of requirements redundant to regulation IV Relaxation of completion time Vill Deletx>n of Surveillance requirements (By)- Byron specific (Bw) - Braidwood speceric Byron and Braidwood 1 L_TBL5 0
\.) %.) O Table L - Less Restrictive Changes to CTS Discussion Description ITS CTS Change of Change of Change Requirement Requirement Category 5.0 L5 The required contents of the annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Report were 5.6.1 6.9.1.5.a Unique relaxed to allow inclusion of only those personnel for whom monitoring was performed, use of current dose terminology, a later submittal date, and additional acceptable ,
methods of estimating dose assignments. 5.0 L6 The required submittal date for the Annual Report covering occupational radiation 5.6.1, 5.6.2 6.9.1.4, 6.9.1.6 IV exposure was relaxed from March 1 to April 30 of each year and the required submittal date for the Armuel Radiological Environmental Operating Report was relaxed from May 1 to May ' 5 of each year to allow additional time for report preparation. 5.0 L7 Ventilation filter testing performed "in accordance with" applicable Regulatory Guides 5.5.11 4.7.6, 4.7.7, V or ANSI Standards was revised to state that the testing be performed "in conformance 4.9.12 with...with any exceptions noted in Appendix A of the UFSAR* so that justified variances from strict compliance with the Guides or Standards may be applied as necessary. 5.0 L8 A specific allowances were included such that credit may be taken for verification of 5.5.11 3/4.7.6, 3/4.7.7, V stated flow rates during the performance of other specified ventilation filter system 3/4.9.12 surveillances consistent with current practice. Also, the methyliodine penetration limits were relaxed for each system. Less Restrictive Change Categories i Relaxation of LCO requirements V Relaxation of SR acceptance enteria il Relaxation of Applicability VI Relaxation of Surveillance Frequency l Ill Relaxation of Action requirements Vil Deletion of requirements redundant to regulation IV Relaxation of completion time Vlil Deletion of Surveillance requirements (By)- Byron specific (Bw)- Braidwood specific Byron and Braidwood 2 L_TBLS 0
i ENCLOSURE 2 - ITS REVISION M ITS SECTION 5.0 O d i b 4
me. sea 7 eme acJpsJ A Amses.arpm W m 44 4.m46*E. du m d4LN.484 --M M.4 M *h4 MJ eMN*h M Jsa 5 M h -
" -" " ' - " "'" M M4 h 8prd M4she&%24A M.5.mp.J N M 4e h M.hEOd.M OJ.p dO _ddJa.hsq 1
4 e a BYRON ITS i9 3 5-i (. l 4 4 4 i' i-t d l l 4 l I 1 5 i I l@ ia i t l . 6 4 l' i 4 f i 3' I 4 f-o 4 i 1, ) 4 4 i@
- f i.
1 3' i 1 1 f .
i I- 45: c. : - l l ) 5.. ADYIh.'5TR ~I .'E :0NTROL5
\ 5.1 Rescons10111ty l l
5.1.1 The station manager snall be responsible for overall fa:: 17 : operation and shall celegate in writing the successior. ic :n : responsibility auring his aosence. 5.1.2 A Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be responsiole for :ne i control room command function while eitner unit is in MODE 1. :.
- 3. or 4 For each unit. an SRO may be deslanated as responsiale ,
for the control room command function. While botn units are in MODE 5 or 6. or defueled, an individual with an active SRC license or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume tne l control room command function. - 1 l l l l l 1 i l l ( i BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.1 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A l i i
- ..;3.. 3 - . -
E.C :Dv:N:STR C .E '0!.TR^;5
- .: Organization 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Oraanizations l Onsite and offsite organizations shall De establisnec fer f ac- "
operation and corporati. management. respectively. Tne ens"e an: offsite organizations snall include tne positions for at mpes affecting safety of the nuclear power plant.
- a. Lines of authority. responsibility. and communication snail be defined and established throughout h1gnest management levels. intermediate levels, and all' operating organization positions. These relationships shall be documented and updated, as appropriate. in organization charts. functional descriptions of departmental responsibilities and relationships, and joo descriptions for key personnel positions. or in equivalent forms of documentation. These reou1rements. including the plant-specific titles of tnose personnel fulfilling the respor.h"i' ties of the positions delineated in these Technici " ai cations. shall be documented in the Quality As. +5nce Program;
- b. The station manager shall be responsible for overall safe p operation of the plant and shall have control cver those g onsite activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant:
- c. A corporate officer shall be responsible for overall plant nuclear safety and shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable performance of the staff in operating.
maintaining. and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nuclear safety: and
- d. ~The individuals who train the operating staff. or perform health physics or quality assurance functions. may report to the appropriate onsite manager: however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.
V'O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.2 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
Drga :a ] :- { q 5.2 Organization V 5.2.2 Far h tv Sta## Tne facility staff organization shall inciuae tne follor.3ng.
- a. A total of three non-licensed operators for the tv.c un *s s reauired in all conditions. At least one of tne reauirec non-licensed operators shall be assigned to each unit.
- b. Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and 5.2.2.a and 5.2.."..'
for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crev, memDers provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift cren composition to within the minimum requirements. c, A radiation protection technician shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor. The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours. in order to provide for unexpected absence. provided immediate action is taken to fill the reau1 red position.
- d. The amount of overtime worked by unit staff members performing safety related functions shall be limited and controlled in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement on O working hours (Generic Letter 82-12).
- e. The operations manager or the supervisor in charge of the operations shift crews shall hold an SRO license.
- f. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory l technical support to the Shift Manager in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering. and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the facility. In addition. the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift.
0 v BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 2 - 2 2/14/98 Revision D
Fa::1"3 5: ? " :..e ' " c e
- m E.C ADMINISTRATIJE CONTR0'3_
( 5.3 Facili- Staff Qualifica:1ons 5.3.1 Each member of the facility staff snall mee or excesc :ne mp" .m qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971. with the folio ;1n;: ex:ec: c" either the senior nealth physics supervisor or ieac nea':- ohysicist. snall meet or exceed the cualifications for "Rac15; c" Protection Manager" in Regulatory Gulce 1.8. September 19~5. O v 1 . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.3-1 8/19/98 Revision A
- g ,, . _. .
I n 5.0 CDMIN:5TRATIVE :0NTRC_5 5.' Procedures 5.4.1 Written procedures shall be established. 1mplementec. anc maintained covering the following act1vities:
- a. The applicaDie procedures recommencec in Reculato .
Guiae 1.33. Revision 2 Appendix A. Feoruari 197E:
- t. The emergency operating procedures required to implement :ne reau1rements of NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0737. Supplement 1. as stated in Generic Letter 82-33. Section 7.1:
C. Fire Protection Program implementation; and
- d. All pmrams specified in Specification 5.5.
O l rr U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5 . 4 -- I 8/19/98 Revision A
Drograms e' % ..g _ I ,n* E.C ADMINISTRATIE CONTRCL5 kJ 5.5 Programs and Manuais The following programs shall be establisned. 1mplemented. anc main:a,ne:- 5.5.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
- 8. The ODCM shall contain the methodology and parameters usec in the calculation of offsite doses resulting from radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents. in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring alarm and trip setpoints.. and in the conduct of the radiological environmental monitoring program;
- b. The ODCM shall also contain the radioactive effluent controls and radiological environmental monitoring activities, and descriptions of the information that should be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating. and Radioactive Effluent Release Reports requirea by Specification 5.6.2 and Specification 5.6.3: and
- c. Licensee initiated changes to the ODCM:
( 1. Shall be documented and records of reviews performed shall be retained. This documentation shall contain:
- 1. sufficient information to support the change (s) together with the appropriate analyses or evaluations justifying the change (s), and ii. a determination that the change (s) maintain the levels of radioactive effluent control required by 10 CFR 20.1302. 40 CFR 190. 10 CFR 50.36a.
and 10 CFR 50. Appendix I, and not adversely impact the accuracy or reliability of effluent. dose, or setpoint calculations:
- 2. Shall become effective after the approval of the station manager; and O
(V e BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
1 Program $ 3": Ma%.! 3 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.1 offsite Dose Calculan on Manual (ODCM1 (continuec'
- 3. Shall be submitted to the NRC in the form of a complete. legible copy of the entire ODCM as a car: c' or concurrent with tne Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period of the report in wnicn any change in the ODCM was made. Each change snall be identified by markings in the margin of the affected pages, clearly indicating the area of the page inat was changed. and shall indicate the date (i.e. mcnth and year) the change was impl_emented.
5.5.2 Primarv Coolant Sources Outside Containment This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. The systems include the recirculation portions of the Containment Spray. Safety Injection. Chemical and Volume Control, and Residual Heat Removal. The program shall include the following: '( a. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements; and
- b. Integrated leak test requirements for each system at.
refueling cycle intervals or less. 5.5.3 Post Accident Samolina This program provides controls that er.sure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents. and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following:
- a. Training of personnel: l
- b. Procedures for sampling and analysis: and j
- c. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.
l O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5-2 8/19/98 Revision A
Programs'ar.: Ma%f j , 5.5 Programs and Manuals V 5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Procram This program conforms to 10 CFR 50.36a for the control of radioactive effluents and for maintaining the doses to memoers cf the public from radioactive effluents as low as reasonaolv achievable. The program shall be contained in the ODCM. 'shall be implemented by procedures, and shall include remedial actions to be taken whenever the program limits are exceeded. The program shall include the following elements:
- a. Limitations on-the functional capability of radioactive liquid and gaseous monitoring instrumentation including surveillance tests and setpoint determination in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM:
- b. Limitations on the concentrations of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 times the concentrations stated in 10 CFR 20. Appendix B. Table 2. Column 2 (to paragraphs 20.1001 - 20.2402);
- c. Monitoring, sampling, and analysis of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1302 and with the methodology and parameters in the 00CM:
- d. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses or dose commitment to a member of the public from radioactive materials in liquid effluents released from each unit to unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 CFR 50. Appendix 1:
dl b
- e. Determination of cumulative and projected dose contributions from radioactive effluents for the current calendar quarter 4 and current calendar year in accordance with the methodology
[] and parameters in the ODCM at least every 31 days: C) V l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 3 8/19/98 Revision M i l l
)
Programs anc Mar f s b: es ' 5.5 orograms and Manuals l U 5.5.4 Radioactive Ef'iuen: Con rcis Drocram (continued)
- f. Limitations on the functional capability and use o' ine liquid and gaseous effluent treatment systems to ensure ina; appropriate portions of these systems are used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected ooses in a period of 31 days would exceed 2' of the guidelines for :ne annual dose or dose commitment. conforming to 10 CFR 50 Appendix 1:
- g. Limitations on the dose rate resulting from radioactive material released in gaseous effluents to areas beyond tne site boundary conform 1rg to the following:
- 1. For noble gases: s a dose rate of 500 mrem /yr to the whole body and 5 a dose rate of 3000 mrem /yr to the skin. and 1
- 2. For Iodine-131. Iodine-133. Tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half lives
> 8 days: s a dose rate of 1500 mrem /yr to any organ:
- h. Limitations on the annual and quarterly air doses resulting from noble gases released in gaseous effluents from each )
i n unit to areas beyond the site boundary, conforming to ig 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1:
- 1. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses to a member of the public from Iodine-131. lodine-133. Tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half lives > 8 days !
in gaseous effluents released from each unit to areas beyond the site boundary, conforming to 10 CFR 50. Appendix I: and
- j. Limitations on the annual dose or dose commitment to any member of the public due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources. conforming to 40 CFR 190.
5.5.5 Comoonent Cyclic or Transient Limit This program provides controls to track the UFSAR. Section 3.9. cyclic and transient occurrences to ensure that components are maintained within the design limits. O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 5 - 4 8/19/98 Revision A
y , I [l Programs ar: v.e .( j i l _g 5.5 -Programs anc Manuals Ljj 5.5.6 Dra-Stressed concrete Conreinment Tencor Surveillance D x,a-This program provides controls for monitoring any tencon i degradation in pre-stressed. concrete containments. inclucing effectiveness of its corrosion protectior medium. to ensure l' l l containment structural integrity. The program shall inclua I
- baseline measurements prior to. initial. operations. The Tencor l Surveillance Program. inspecticn frequencies, and acceptance {
criteria shall be in conformance with requirements of. I 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(2)(vi) 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(2)(ix). ASME Boller anc L Pressure Vessel Code Subsection IWL. 1992 Edition with the 1992 i . Addenda and Regulatory Guide 1.35.1. July 1990. ! ) The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the . Tendon Surveillance Program inspection frequencies.
)
5.5,7- Reactor Coolant PumD Fivwheel InsDection Proaram This program shall provide for the inspection of each reactor coolant pump flywheel in general conformance with the ) recommendations of Regulatory Position c.4.b of Regulatory l
. Guide 1.14, Revision 1. August 1975.
l 4 2 4 l ,- -. ~
- l. ' BYRON . UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 5 9/2/98 Revision M
Drogramse*:3..p: l
,5.5. Programs and Manuals 4 : -
N.) l
.o.o.8 Inservice Testino Drocram i
- This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Ccce i l . Class 1. 2. and 3 components. The program snall incluae :na l following:
]
- a. Testing freauenciesL specified in Section XI of the ASME j
' Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Adcenaa as J follows: l ASME Boiler and Pressure
. Vessel Code and !
applicable Addenda terminology for Required Frequencies inservice testing for performing inservice j activities testina activities. ) 1 Weekly At least once per 7 days l Monthly At least once per- 31-days !
'Ouarterly or every 3 months At least once per 92 days Semiannually or every 6 months At least once per 184 days Every 9 months At least once per 276 days .(Y Yearly or annually At least once per 366 aays V Biennially or every 2 years At least once per 731 days
- b. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the above required Frequencies for performing inservice testing !
activities: l
- c. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities: and
- d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.
l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5-6 9/9/98 Revision M
. , - - , -. . - . ~ . - - .. - -
Programs an; Mara 3 , ,. 5.5 Programs and Manuals l ! ! V 5.5.9 Steam Generator (SG) Tuce Surveillance proaram l Each SG shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of an augmented inservice inspection program. ( a. SG Samole Selection and Insoection Each SG shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown by selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number of SGs specified in Table 5.5.9-1. l n b. SS_TpbeSamoleSelectionandInsoection I O 4 NOTE g When referring to an SG tube. the sleeve shall be considered y a part of the tube if the tube has been repaired per gl Specification 5.5.9.e.10. ~ The SG tube minimum sample size. inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Table 5.5.9-2. The inservice inspection of SG tubes shall be performed at the frequencies specified in Specification 5.5.9.d and the inspected tubes shall be (., verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of V) Specification 5.5.9.e. When app ying the expectations of ; Specification 5.5.9.b.1 through .5.9.b.3. previous defects : l or imperfections in the area repaired by the sleeve are not considered an area requiring reinspection. The tubes selected for each inservice inspection shall include a 3% of the total number of tubes in all SGs. The tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:
- 1. Where experience in similar plants with similar water chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected, then a 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas:
i f \ U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5-7 8/19/98 Revision M i l l
Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and. Manuals-5.5.9 - Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Proaram (continued)
'2. The first sample of tubes selected for each inservice inspection (subsequent to the preservice inspection)
, of each SG shall include:
- 1. All' tubes that previously had detectable tube
- wall penetrations > 20% that have not been-
, plugged or sleeved in the affected area, and all l tubes that previously had detectable sleeve wall penetrations that have not been plugged, ii. Tubes in those areas where experience has indicated potential problems, ' iii. A tube inspection (pursuant to Specification 5.5.9.e.8) shall be performed on each selected tube. If any selected tube-does-not permit the passage of the eddy current probe for a tube inspection, this shall be recorded , and an adjacent tube shall be~ selected and
' subjected to a tube inspection:
- 3. The tubes selected as the second and third samples-(if p required by Table 5.5.9-2) during each inservice A inspection may be subjected to a partial tube i inspection provided:
- i. The tubes selected for these sam)les include the tubes from those areas of the tu)e sheet array where tubes with imperfections were previously found and ii. The insaections include those portions of the tubes w1ere imperfections were previously found.
i 1 i- 1 i O w
- BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 5 - 8 9/25/98 Revision M L
i 1
f l Programs and Manuals . 5.5 ! 3 5.5 Programs and Manuals (V 5.5.9 Steam Generator (SG) T W Surveillance Procram (continued) 4; A random sample of a 20% of the total number of laser ) weided sleeves.and a 20% of the total number of Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) welded sleeves installed shall be inspected for axial and circumferential l indications at the end of each cycle. In the event that an imperfection exceeding the repair limit is detected, an additional 20% of the unsampled sleeves I shall be inspected and if an imperfection exceeding i the repair limit is detected in the second sample, all- l remaining sleeves shall be inspected. These inservice ' inspections will include the entire sleeve, the tube . at the heat treated area, and the tube-to-sleeve ! joints. The inservice inspection for the sleeves is [ required on all types of sleeves installed in the SGs to demonstrate acceptable structural integrity.
- c. Insoection Results Classification The results of each sample inspection shall be classified i into one of the following three categories: !
NOTE
^\ Previously degraded tubes or sleeves must exhibit (V significant (> 10% of wall thickness) further wall
. penetrations to be included in the percentage calculations. j
.Cateaorv Insoection Results ]
C-1 < 5% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes and none of the inspected tubes are defective. C-2 One or more tubes. but s 1%.of the total tubes inspected are defective. or = 5% and s 10% of l the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes. C > 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes or > 1% of the inspected tubes are defective. lO
- y L BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 5 - 9 9/22/98 Revision M
. _ . . -_ ~ . . _ ~.- - . . . _ - - . . -. .-
? rgg ran: 3r- '.* 3 ,
p 5.5 Programs anc tianuals 3.5.9 Ste3n 690eP8tC# I534 IuM SU'VC ll?P 0 U"00"SF i. c c9! 1 n,.90 l d. Insoection ;recuencies The inservice inspections of SG tubes (cepencer; uccr inspection results classification) snall De performe: 3: :ng following frequencies:
- 1. The first inservice inspection shall be performea after 6 Effective Full Power months but s 24 calendar months of initial criticellty.
Subsequent inservice inspections shall bc performea at intervals a 12 calendar months and s 24 calendar months after the previous inspection:
- 2. Extension Criteria: If two consecutive inspections.
not including the preservice inspection. result in all inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if two consecutive inspections demonstrate that previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred. the inspection interval may be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months: , n
- 3. If the results of the inservice inspection of an SG I
' conducted in accordance with Table 5.5.9-2 at 40 month j intervals fall in Category C-3. the inspection '
frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall aoply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specificat un 5.5.9.d.2: the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months: l and l l l 1 - O) t BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 10 8/19/98 Revision A
. . . . . . . . - . - . - - - . - - _ _ . . - . ~ . - .. -.-. .- - . - _- . -
r reg-3 3 3.-- v3. ,, c : t
- :;. Drcgrams anc Manuals
- A V 5 5.9 Steam Generate- (SG
- Ture Surve 11ance Droc am (continaec i 4. Additional unscheduled inservice inspections snal' De performed on each SG in accoraance witn tne #1rst l'
sample inspection specified in Table 5.5.9-2 cu in: ' the shutdown subsequent to any of tne following 1 conditions: o , fy 1. Reactor to secondary tube leaks (not 1ncluaing i leaks originating from tube to tube sheet welcs' in excess.of the limits of LCO 3.4.13.d and d LCO 3.4 13.e. "RCS Operational LEAKAGE" E I t
- 11. A seismic occurrence greater than the Operating I
- Basis Earthquake (OBE).
l iii. -A Condition IV l.oss Of Coolant Accident (LOCAP l requiring actuation of the Engineered' Safety Features. or i- iv. A Condition IV main steam line or feedwater line break.
]
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not applicable to SG Tube Surveillance Program inspection frequencies. , .f'N V h l ()
- . - V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 4
5.5 - 11 8/19/98 Revision M w yL --p. t W- -- 4t M M
_....._m .- .. _ m _ ... - ~ ~ -. ----- - . - - - - - - - I '1 Prc::Fam! 39 - "F .e. .
. e l
I' : - Drograms anC Ma'1uals. L; n U 5. :n 9 : Steam Generator (SGi Tuos Surve'11ance Drocrar (cor.tinue; ' i e; - AcceDtance Criteria- ,
- 1. - Imoerfection means an exception to tne dimensions.
finisn or contour of.a. tube or sleeve from tna: : required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy current testing indications < 20% of the nomina: L tube or sleeve' wall thickness. if detectable, may De considered as imperfections:
- 2.
Dearadation means a service induced cracking. wastage,
wear or general corrosion occurring on either insioe or outside of a tube or sleeve: '
- 3. Decraded Tube means a tube or sleeve containina unrepaired.1mperfections = 20% of the nominal tube or .
sleeve wall thickness caused by degradation; ,
- 4. % Dearadation means-the percentage of the tube or sleeve wall thickness affected or removed by degradation:
- 5. Defect means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the_ plugging or repair. limit. A tube or sleeve containing an unrepaired defect is defective:
l' 6 .~ Pluacina or Reoair Limit means the imperfection depth at or Deyond wnich the tube shall be removed from e service by plugging or. repaired by sleeving in the affected area. The plugging or repair limit-imperfection depth for the tubing and laser welded sleeves-is equal to 40% of the nominal wall thickness. The plugging limit imperfection depth for TIG welded sleeves is equal to 32% of the nominal wall thickness:
- 7. Unserviceable describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an OBE. LOCA. or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified in Specification 5.5.9.d.4:
1 [ , l L L, , f BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 12 9/2 C Revision M i N G t*-- 4-V7 4r-'- y = * -
Progra 3 ar: va .a a : 5.5 Programs anc Manuals (_3 ,
\m) 5.5.9 Steam Generato- (SG) Tube Surve m ance Decorar (continaec
- 8. Tube insoection means an inspection of tne SG tuce from tne point of entry (hot leg side) completeh around the U-bend to the top support of tne coic' leg.
For a tube that has been reDalred by sleeving. tne tube inspection shall include the s teeved portlen c" the tube:
- 9. Preservice Insoection means an inspection of the full length of each tube in each SG performed by eddy current techniques prior to service to establish a baseline condition of the tubing. This inspection shall be performed prior to initial MODE 1 operation using the equipment and techniques expected to be used during subsequent inservice inspections:
- 10. Tube Reoair refers to a process that reestablishes tube serviceability. Acceptable tube repairs will be performed by the following processes:
- i. Laser welded sleeving as described in a Westinghouse Technical Report and subject to the limitations and restrictions as approved by the NRC. or g .
O
~ ii. TIG welded sleeving as described in ABB Combustion Engineering Inc.. Technical R.eports:
Licensing Report CEN-621-P. Revision 00..
" Commonwealth Edison Byron and Braidwood Unit 1.
and 2 Steam Generators Tube Repair Using Leak Tight Sleeves. FINAL REPORT." April 1995: and Licensing Report CEN-627-P. Operating Performance of the ABB CENO Steam Generator Tube Sleeve for Use at Commonwealth Edison Byron and Braidwood Units 1 and 2." January 1996: subject to the limitations and restrictions as noted by the NRC Staff. Tube repair includes the removal of plugs that were previously installed as a corrective or preventative measure. A tube inspection per Specification 5.5.9.e.8 is required prior to returning previously plugged tubes to service. p , t i V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 13 9/2/98 Revision M
I > Programs ac: 'Gm.y 1; : L 5,5 orograms an:: Manuals [ 5.5;9 Steam Generator (SG) Tuoe Surveillance Drocram (continuer l- ~
- 11. The SG'shall be determined v.7RABLE after completin: '
the corresponding actions (pl.ig or repair in the l affected area all tubes exceeding the plugging or ! > repair limit) required by Table 5.5.9-2. l l- 1 5.5.10 Secondarv Water Chemistrv Proaram This. program provides controls for monitoring secondary water ! chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation. T;1e program-shall :
. include: *
- a. Identification of a' sampling schedule for the critical variables and. control points for these variables: l
- b. ' Identification of the procedures used to measure the values I
.of the critical variables: '
- c. Identification of process sampling points.'which shall !
include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for : a- evidence of condenser inleakage:
- P- d. Procedures for the recording and management of data: I
%l Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control l
- e. )
point chemistry conditions: and
- f. A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.
t
'/~%
L c; U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 14 9/2/98 Revision M a .
Program.s . ar:: Ma' ..a ' ,: ,. 3 EE !
-I L-... J5 Proarams and Manuals l p.
bd - 5.5.11-ventilation Filter Testinc Procram (V{ { i
- A program shall be established to.imolement the following recu ve: 1
.y testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation .;
- systems at the frequencies specified in conformance with i M . Regulatory Guide-1.52.. Revision 2;'and ANSI N510-1980. witn an)' i
- exceptions noted in: Appendix A of the UFSAR'
..f .
1 i i i l i Q ..
)
l i J 6 1 Ly . . - p -J
- i. .. ' BYRON'- UNITS'l & 2 5.5 - 15 9/22/98 Revision M l~
l Procrats arc Mcr..?. I i l i
- .: Programs anc Manuais
, (,/ 5.5.11 Ventilation c'lte- Tes:1nc Drocram IV:TD' (cont,nuect
)
- a. Demonstrate for eacn of the F.SF filter systems trat an I inplace test of the High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA' filters shows a penetration specified below wnen testec in y conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. anc ANS:
N510-1980. with any exceptions noted in Appendix A of tne 4 UFSAR. at the system flow rate specified below. y Verification of the specified flow rates may be accomplisnec , during the performance of SRs 3.7.10.4. 3.7.12.4. and 1 3.7.13.5. as applicable: ESF Ventilation Flow Rate Penetration System Control Room a 5400 cfm and < 0.05% l Ventilation (VC) s 6600 cfm l Filtration System i (makeup) Nonaccessible Area a 55.669 cfm and < 1% Exhaust Filter s 68.200 cfm per Plenum Ventilation train, and System (after a 18.556 cfm and structur61 s 22.733 cfm per
,o maintenance of the bank i ) HEPA filter housings)
Nonaccessible Area a 55.669 cfm and < 1% Exhaust Filter s 68.200 cfm per Plenum Ventilation train System (for reasons other than structural maintenance of the HEPA filter housings) Fuel Handling a 18.900 cfm and < 1% Building Exhaust s 23.100 cfm Filter Plenum (FHB) Ventilation System p V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 16 9/22/98 Revision M
T Programs anc Mar..:^- o ,, 5.5 Programs anc Manuais 5.5.11 Vent,1ation ;'lter Test,nc Proaram 1V TD1 (continuec.) :
- b. Demonstrate for each of the ESF filter systems Inat an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows a DyDass specified below when tested in conformance with Regulator'. J
.u Guide 1.52 Revision 2 and ANSI.N510-1980. with anv '
exceptions noted in Appendix A of the UFSAR. at tne' system d flow rate specified below. Verification of the spec 1flec 6 flow rates may be accomplished during the performance of SRs 3.7.10.4. 3.7.12.4. and 3.7.13.5. as applicable: l ESF Ventilation Svstem Flow Rate Bvpass l VC Filtration System a 5400 cfm and < 0.05% (makeup) s 6600 cfm-VC Filtration-System a 44.550 cfm and < 0.1% (recirculation.-charcoal s 54.450 cfm bed after complete or partial replacement) VC Filtration System a 44.550 cfm and < 2%
-(recirculation for- s 54.450 cfm reasons other than complete or partial charcoal bed replacement)
.]#
( j Nonaccessible Area a 55.669 cfm and < 1% Exhaust Filter Plenum s 68.200 cfm per Ventilation System train, and' (after structural = 18.556 cfm and ! maintenance of the s 22.733 cfm per ; charcoal adsorber bank i housings) Nonaccessible Area a 55.669 cfm and < 1% Exhaust Filter Plenum s 68.200 cfm per Ventilation System (for train reasons other than structural maintenance of the charcoal adsorber , housings) ' FHB Ventilation System a 18.900 cfm and < 1% s 23.100 cfm per ' train . l j. (~ ~ BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 17 9/22/98 Revision M f-
Programs ar.: ' ' a . - l 5.5 Programs anc Manuais 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Test,nc Drocrarr (V TD) (continued;
- c. Demonstrate for eacn of tne ESF filter systems tna; a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal aosorcer. nner.
obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revis1or _. ^ shows the methyl iodide penetration less than Ine value specified below when tested in conformance with Reculators Guide 1.52. Revision 2. ANSI N510-1980. and ASTM D3803-1939 with any exceptions noted in Appendix A of the UFSAR. at a temperature of 30 C and a Relative Humidity (RH) spec 1flec below: ESF Ventilation System Penetration RH l VC Filtration System 0.5% 70; (makeup) l VC Filtration System 4% 70% (recirculation)
-l Nonaccessible Area 4.5% 70%
v1 Exhaust Filter Plenum g Ventilation System FHB Ventilation System 10% 95%
/~'s d. Demonstrate for each of the ESF filter systems that the L/ pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers is < 6 inches of water gauge when tested ;
in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. and ANSI N510-1980. with any exceptions noted in Appendix A of
~ the UFSAR. at the system flow rate specified below. i Verification of the specified flow rates may be accomplished during the performance of SRs 3.7.10.4. 3.7.12.4. and 3.7.13.5. as applicable. 1 i
ESF Ventilation System Flow Rate VC Filtration System a 5400 cfm and s 6600 cfm (makeup) Nonaccessible Area a 55.669 cfm and Exhaust Filter Plenum s 68.200 cfm per train l Ventilation System - 1 FHB Ventilation System a 18.900 cfm and l 5 23.100 cfm V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 18 9/22/98 Revision M
Programs ar. 1'a . ..{ l . 5,5l Programs and Manuais L 5.5.11- 'ventila*1on Filter Test,no Proccam n TDi Tcontinued)
- e. Demonstrate'for each of the ESF filter systems tnat a Dyoass ,
test of the comDined HEPA filters and damper leakaae snows a i t total bypass specified below at the system flow rate ! specified below. Verification of the specified flow rates may be accomplished during the performance of SRs 3J.1:.a and 3.7.13.5. as applicable:
.ESF Ventilation System Flow Rate Bvoass
! Nonaccessible Area a 55.669 cfm - s 1: Exhaust Filter Plenum and -
. Ventilation System 5 68.200 cfm per train FHB Ventilation System = 18.900 cfm s 1%
and L 5 2d.100 cfm g f. Demonstrate that the heaters for each of the ESF filter _. systems-dissipate the value specified below when tested in , L 4 conformance with ANSI N510-1980. with any exceptions noted E in Appendix A of the UFSAR. f( ESF Ventilation System Wattaae l VC Filtration System a 24.0 kW l l The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies. l f ! f i. n ,
,/ '
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 . 5.5 - 19 9/22/98 Revision M i
~, . , ,-- -- - , , . . . . -
l l 3rograms at:van , l l E.5 3mgra s an: Manuals 3 . (d l c-5.5.12 Exolos,ve Gas and Storace Tani Ram oar ,e w ov m w n-This program provides controls for potentially exDiosn e gas mixtures contained in tne waste gas system. tne cuantity 0-radioactivity contained in gas oecay tanks or fed inte tr.e ce gas treatment system, and the cuantity of radioactivity containe: 'n unprotected outdoor liquid storage tanks. The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5.
" Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure." The liquid radwaste quantities shall be'aetermined in accordance with the ODCM.
The program shall include:
- a. The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the waste gas system and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained. Such limits shall be appropriate to the system's design criteria (i .e. . whether or not tha system is designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion):
- b. A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas decay tank and fed into n '
the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that ( would result in a whole body exposure of a 0.5 rem to any k individual in an unrestricted area. in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents: and
- c. A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in all outdoor liquid radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls. capable of holding the tanks' contents and that do not have tank ,
i overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the liquid radwaste treatment system is less than the amount that would result in concentrations less than the limits of 10 CFR 20. Appendix B. Table 2. Column 2. at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program j surveillance frequencies. i l l l (3 l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 20 8/19/98 Revision A a i l
Programs ar: Ma m..j ' ,$ r-5.5L Procrams and Manuais
,O g
5.5.13 Diesel Fuel 011 Testino Procram A' diesel fuel oil testing program to implement required testinc c' both new fuel oil and stored' fuel oil shall be estaDilsned. ine ; program shall include sampling and testing requirements anc ! acceptance criteria, all in accordance with applicable ASTM
' Standards. The purpose of the program is to establish tne following:
- a. Acceptability of new fuel oil'for use prior to addition to storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has:
- 1. an API gravity or an absolute specific gravity within limits.
2, a flash point and kinematic viscosity within limits, and
- 3. a clear and bright appearance with proper. color;
- b. Other properties of new fuel oil are within limits within 30 days. following sampling and addition to storage tanks:
i and i 4 i N M c. Total particulate concentration of the fuel oil is s 10 mg/l (d y e when tested every 31 days in accordance with ASTM D-2276 Method A-2 or A-3. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program test frequencies, L i.
~
I f}' v , BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 21 8/19/98 Revision M
. . _ - . _ . _ _ . _ . . = . _ _ . . - - --
DrCg"am! 3".2 Ma'u - f E.E Programs ar,: Manuals i G 5.5.14 Techn, cal Soec, fica: 1ons PS) Bases Contro' Dro a- ; 1 Tnis program provides a means for processing changes to :ne Bases l Of these Technical Specifications. l a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.
- b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of tne following:
- 1. a change in the TS incorporated in the license: or l
- 2. a change to the UFSAR or Bases that involves an l l unreviewed safety question as defined in 10.CFR 50.59 l l c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure l that the Bases are maintained consistent with the UFSAR. {
- d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of Specification i 5.5.14.b above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented ,
n without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a l ( ) frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e) as modified by V approved exemptions. l l l I BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 22 8/19/98 Revision A [-
Programs ar; "-
~
l E.5 ;rograms and Manuais 5.5.15 Safetv ; unction Determ,na*10<' Drocra- f5:nn This program ensures loss of safety function is detecte: an: l appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6. an l evaluation shall be made to oetermine if loss of safey 'ur : ce exists. Additionally. Otner appropriate actions may be taker as e result of the support system inoperability and corresponcing exception to entering supported system Condition and Reou1 rec Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. , The SFDP shall contain the following: I
- a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the l capability to perform the safety function assumed in the l accident analysis does not go undetected: l
- b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists:
- c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and
- d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory n actions.
U A loss of safety function exists when. assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and: l
- a. A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by i the inoperable support system is also inoperable: or l
- b. A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system 1s also inoperable, or
- c. A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 23 8/19/98 Revision A
?rc;rars ar: a..
5.5 Programs an; Manuals b 5.5.15 Safetv Funnlor Determ'nerlor Drocrar 'S:Dr (con:1nue: The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. Ma loss of safety function is determined to exist Dy this Drogram. the appropriate Conditions and Reoaired Actions of tne LCO in wnicn the loss of safety function exists are reau1 rec tc te entered. 5.5.16 Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Procram A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment a> required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50. Appendix J. Option B. as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163. September 1995 and y NEI 94-01. Revision 0. 9 The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design A basis loss of coolant accident. P,. is 47.8 psig for Unit 1 and g 44.4 psig for Unit 2. ; u ! g The maximum allowable containment leakage rate. L,. at P,. shall
,~.
be 0.10% of containment air weight per day. (_,) Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:
- a. Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is s 1.0 L,.
During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are <A 0.60 L, for Type tests:L,an dfor the Type B and C tests and < 0.75 l V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 24 9/9/98 Revision M
Dregrams arc *a ..- - i E.5 crc: rams an Ma %31s a 5.5.16 Con a,nmen- !.eakace Ra:e Tesnn: Dma a scen:1nuer
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
- 1. Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 , ;ner :es:e:
at a P,. and
- 2. For each coor. Seal leakage rate is:
- 1. < 0.0024 L, when pressurized to a 3 psig. and
- 11. < 0.01 L,. when pressurized to a 10 psig.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test freauencies specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. 19 j BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 25 12/17/98 Revision C
- l. .
Orograms ar: ac.2 l Table 5.5.9-1 (cace 1 o' M Minimum Numoer of Steam' Generators to ce Inspected During Inservice inspectior. Preservice Inspection 'er No. of Steam Generators per Unit Four First Inservice Inspection Two Second & Subsequent Inservice Inspections One" (a) The inservice inspection may be limited to one steam generator on a rotating schedule encompassing 3 N % of the tubes (where N is the number of steam generators in the unit) if the results of the first or previous inspections g) indicate that all steam generators are performing in a like manner. Note that under some circumstances. the operating conditions in one or more steam generators may be found to be more severe than those in other steam generators. Under such circumstances the sample sequence shall be modified to inspect the most severe conditions. Each of the other two steam generators not inspected during the first inservice inspections shall be inspected during the second and third inspections. The fourth and subsequent inspections shall follow the instructions described above. n b BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 5 - ?6 8/19/98 Revision A
I Drcera 3 arc a ..i i TaDie 5.5.9-2 (page ; cf 1) Steam Generator Tuoe Inspection 1st Sample Inspection (a) 2nd Sampie Inspection 3ra Sample Insee::ler Result Action Required Result Action Reouired Result Action Reca: re: C-1 None N/A N/A N/A N/A C-2 Plug or repair C-1 None N/A N/A defective tubes. and inspect C-2 Plug or repair C-1 None additional defective tubes. 25 tubes in this and inspect C-2 Plug or repair SG. additional defective tubes. 45 tubes in this SG. C-3 Perform action for C-3 result of first sample. C-3 Perform action N/A N/A for C-3 result of first sample. C-3 Inspect all All None N/A N/A O tubes in this other-V SG. plug or SGs repair defective C-1 tubes. and inspect 25 tubes Any Perform action N/A N/A in each other other SG for C-2 result i SG. C-2 but of second no other sample. SG C-3 Any Inspect all N/A N/A other SG tubes in each SG l C-3 and plug or ' repair defective tubes. (a) Sample size shall be a minimum of S tubes per SG: S=3S% n Where: N = The number of SGs in the unit (4). and n = the number of SGs inspected during an inspection. O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 27 8/19/98 Revision A
i Repr o g Re:.. e e; : 5.0 ADMIN:5TRATIVE C0"TR0_5 V 5.6 Reporting Recu1rements Tne following reports shall be submittec in acceroance witn 10 CFR 5: 4 5.6.1 Occuoational Radiation Evoosure Reoort NOTE-- -- = -------- A single submittal may be made for the facility. The submitta' should combine sections common to both units. A tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station. utilits . and other personnel (including contractors). for wnom monitoring' was performed. receiving an annual deep dose equivalent > 100 mrem and the associated collective deep dose equivalent (reported in person-rem) according to work and job functions (e.g. reactor operations and surveillance. inservice inspection. routine maintenance. special maintenance (describe maintenance) waste processing. and refueling). This tabulation supplements the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2206. The dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on pocket ionization fm i cnamber tnermoluminescence dos 1 meter (TLD). electronic dos 1 meter. \~') or film badge measurements. Small exposures totallino < 20% of the individual deep dose equivalent need not be accouilted for. In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total deep dose equivalent 1 received from external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions. The report covering the previous calendar year shall be submitted by April 30 of each year. O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 6 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
;ec y ~ ng :e:.. u g-l l
g m, : e me;c t ng meauirener.t5 5.6.2 Annua' Red'Olo:1:31 Environmen 2, rmer=~ r- Reper- ' NOTE--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l A single submittal may be made for tne facility. Tne sur-~; snould comoine sections common to born units. l The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report cover 1rc l the operation of tne facility during the previous calencar year shall be suomitted by May 15 of each year. The report snall include summaries interpretations. and analyses of trenos o' the results of the radiological environmental monitoring program for the reporting period. The material provided shall be consisten ! with the objectives outlined in the Offsite Dose Calculation i Manual (ODCM). and in 10 CFR 50. Appendix 1. Sections IV.B.2. ' IV.B.3. and IV.C. 5.6.3 Radioactive Effluent Release Reoort
-NOTE - -
A single submittal may be made for the facility. The submittal ! r3 shall combine sections common to botn units. ) G 1 The Radioactive Effluent Release Report covering the operation of the facility during the previous year shall be submitted prior to . May 1 of each year in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36a. The report shall include a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents and solid waste released from the facility. The material provided shail be consistent with the objectives outlined in the ODCM and Process Control Program and in conformance with 10 CFR 50.36a and 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix I. Section IV.B.1. 5.6.4 Monthlv Operatina Reoorts Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience. including documentation of all challenges to the pressurizer power operated relief valves or pressurizer safety valves. shall be submitted on a monthly basis no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report. ,r-) V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.6 - 2 8/19/98 Revision A
Recy:'n; Re:.. ev - g 5.6 Repcrting Recairements V 5.6.5 CORE ODER. TING LIMITS REPORT (COLPi
- a. Core operating limits snall be estaD11sne: prior Ic ea:-
reload cycle, or orlor to any remaining cor icr c' a re :ar cycle, and snall be documented in tne COLR for toe folicxing: LCO 3.1.1. "$HUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)". LCO 3.1.3. " Moderator Temperature Coefficient LCO 3.1.5. " Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits" LCO 3.1.6. " Control Bank Insertion Limits". LCO 3.1.8. " PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2". LCO 3.2.1. " Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (F:(Z))" LCO3.2.2."NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(FlV LCO 3.2.3. " AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)" and LCO 3.9.1. " Boron Concentration",
- b. The analytical methods used to determine th'e core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by
! the NRC. specifically those described in the following l documents:
- 1. WCAP-9272-P-A. " Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluations i f m, Methodology." July 1985.
iQ 2. WCAP-8385. " Power Distribution Control and Load ! Following Procedures-Topical Report." September 1974. l
- 3. NFSR-0016. " Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report on Benchmark of PWR Nuclear Design Methods." July 1983.
- 4. NFSR-0081. " Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report l on Benchmark of PWR Nuclear Design Methods Using the Phoenix-P and ANC Computer Codes." July 1990.
- 5. Comed letter from D. Saccomando to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated December 21. 1994. ,
transmitting an attachment that documents applicable sections of WCAP-11992/11993 and Comed application of i the UET methodology addressed in " Additional Information Regarding Application for Amendment to i Facility Operating Licenses-Reactivity Control l Systems." l.
- O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.6 - 3 8/19/98 Revision A
-. . . - .. - - . . - - - .- .- - = .
crcerams a : y . 5.5 Dro: rams anc Manuals 5.5.lc Containment Leakace Ratc Test,nc ornc a tcen:1nuec'-
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
- 1. Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 _, wner :es:ec ,
at a P,. and
~
l
\
1
- 2. For each door, seal leakage rate 15: i l
- 1. < 0.0024 L,. when pressurized to 2 3 psig. anc 1
ii. < 0.01 L,. when pressurized to a 10 psig. l l The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test freouencies ! specifieo in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. ; The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment I Leakage Rate Testing Program. 1 l l
.R
(--) ! l O
'% J BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 25 12/17/98 Revision C
Drograms aria -g g
' O. .Taole.5.E;9-1 Joage 1-of l'
-Minimum NumDer-of Steam Generators to De Inspected During Inservice Inspection Preservice Inspection ser !
No.-of Steam Generators per Unit Four , First Inservice Inspection Two Second & Subsequent Inservice Inspections -
. One'*
(a) The inservice inspection may be limited to one steam generator on a rotating scheoule encompassing 3 N % of-the tubes (where N is the number of steam generators in the
. unit) if the results of the first or previous inspections indicate that all steam generators are performing in a like manner.
(-- Note that under some circumstances. the operating conditions in one or more steam generators may be found to be more' severe than those in other steam generators. Under
.such circumstances the sample sequence shall be modified to inspect the most severe conditions. Each of the other two steam generators not inspected during the first inservice inspections shall be inspected during the second and third inspections. The fourth and subsequent inspections shall follow the instructions described above.
4 i' . BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 26 8/19/98 Revision A
I pecgra i ac: % .a l l (* k Taole 5.5.9-2 (page ; cf : , Steam Generator Tuoe Inspe:: Ton 1st Sample Inspection (a) 2nd Sample Inspection 3rc Sampie insce:v ~ Result Action Recuired Result Action Reauired Result Actior Rea w e: i C-1 None N/A N/A N/A N/A C-2 Plug or repair C-1 None N/A N/A defective tubes, and inspect C-2 Plug or repair C-1 None additional defective tubes. 25 tubes in this and inspect C-2 Plug or repair 1 SG. additional defective tubes. 45 tubes in this SG. C-3 Perform action for C-3 result . of first sample. 1
- C-3 Perform action N/A N/A l for C-3 result i of first sample. '
C-3 Inspect ali All None N/A N/A ) tubes in this other A) ( SG. plug or repair defective SGs C-1 1 l tubes. and inspect 25 tubes Any Perform action N/A N/A in each other other SG for C-2 result SG. C-2 but of second no other sample. SG C-3 Any Inspect all N/A N/A other SG tubes in each SG C-3 and plug or repair defective tubes. (a) Sample size shall be a minimum of $ tubes per SG: l S=35% n Where: I N - The number of SGs in the unit (4). and n - the number of SGs inspected during an inspection. O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 27 8/19/98 Revision A i I
l ReDer:'r: r ec/ re e'~ - l l l
- .; -DMIN:5TR ~I.'E :0NTRC_5
~"s (V
l 5.6 Reporting Recu1rements 1 Tne following reports snail be submitted in accorcance etn 10 : R 5^ 4 5.6.1 Occuoational nadiation Excosure Reoort NOTE -- -------- A single submittal may be made for the facility. The submittal should comDine sections common to both units. A tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station. utility. and other personnel (including contractors). for wnom monitorina was performed, receiving an annual deep dose equivalent > 100 mrem and the associated collective deep dose equivalent (reported in person-rem) according to work and job functions (e.g. reactor operations and surveillance. inservice inspection routine ' maintenance. special maintenance (describe maintenance). waste processing. and refueling). This tabulation supplements the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2206. The dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on pocket ionization cnamber, thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD). electronic cos1 meter. (a') or film baage measurements. Small exposures totalling < 20% of the individual deep dose equivalent need not be accounted for. In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total deep dose equivalent received from external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions. The report covering the previous calendar year shall be submitted by April 30 of each year.
~h (G BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.6 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
Recc- r: :e:, #- -
,, 5.6 Report,nc Recuirements
/ 1 V 5.6.2 Annua' Rad'olocical Envi ronment a' OD=ra* ' n: Reno -
- N 3T E --- -- - = -----------------
A single submittal may be made for tne facility. Tne suo- : . snould comoine sections common to born units.
. = _ . - -
The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report coverarc the operation of tne facility during the previous calencar year shall be submitted by May 15 of eacn year. The report snall include summaries interpretations. and analyses of trenas of the results of the radiolog1 Cal environmental monitoring program for the reporting period. The material provided shall be consisten* with the objectives outlined in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). and in 10 CFR 50. Appendix 1. Sections IV.B.2. IV.B.3. and IV.C. 5.6.3 Radioactive Effluent Release Reoort i NOTE - A single submittal may be made for the facility. The submittal q shall combine sections common to both units. The Radioactive Effluent Release Report covering the operation of the facility during the previous year shall be submitted prior to May 1 of each year in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36a. The report shall include a summary of the quantitles of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents and solid waste released from the facility. The material provided shall be consistent with the objectives outlined in the ODCM and Process Control Program and in ! conformance with 10 CFR 50.36a and 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix 1. Section IV.B.1. 5.6.4 Monthlv ODeratino ReDorte Routine reports of ope ating statistics and shutdown experience. including documentati A1 of all challenges to the pressurizer power operated relief valn_s or pressurizer safety valves. shall be submitted on a mon'Aly basis no later than the 15th of each. month following the cal.ndar month covered by the report. O - U BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.6 - 2 8/19/98 Revision A
Reo r: r; :.e:.. e : -
,- 5.6 Repo-:1ng Rece rements
\ 5.6.5 COPE ODER TIN.3 LIMITS REpop- (COLP'
- a. Core operating limits snall De estaDilsnec prior tc eacr reloac cycle. or prior Ic any remaining cor" on c' a re :a cycle, and snall be occumented in tne COLR for t r.e following:
LCO 3.1.1. " SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)". LCO 3.1.3. " Moderator Temperature Coefficient" LCO 3.1.5. " Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits" LCO 3.1.6. " Control Bank Insertion Limits". LCO 3.1.8. " PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2". LCO 3.2.1. " Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (F:(Z))" LCO 3.2.2. " Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F2 )" LCO 3.2.3. " AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)" and LCO 3.9.1. " Boron Concentration",
- b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits snall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC specifically those described in the following documents:
- 1. WCAP-9272-P-A. " Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluations i g Methodology." July 1985.
k# 2. WCAP-8385. " Power Distribution Control and Load 1 Following Procedures-Topical Report." September 1974.
- 3. NFSR-0016. " Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report on Benchmark of PWR Nuclear Design Methods." July 1983.
j
- 4. NFSR-0081. " Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report I on Benchmark of PWR Nuclear Design Methods Using the Phoenix-P and ANC Computer Codes." July 1990.
i
- 5. Comed letter from D. Saccomando to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated December 21. 1994.
transmitting an attachment that documents applicable sections of WCAP-11992/11993 and Comed application of the UET methodology addressed in " Additional Information Regarding Application for Amendment to Facility Operating Licenses-Reactivity Control Systems." (O BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 6 - 3 8/19/98 Revision A
Reporting Rec.m e e 5 5.6 Reporting Recu1rements 1 5.6 5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REDORT (COLR) (continued) l ~
.6. WCAP-9220-P-A. " Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation
!- Model-1981 Version," February 1982.
- 7. WCAP-9561-P-A. Add 3. "BART.A-1: a Computer Coce for Best Estimate Analysis of Reflood Transients - Soe:1a1 l Report: Thimble Modeling in Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model .". July 1986.
- 8. WCAP-10266-P-A "The 1981 Version of Westinghouse 1 Evaluation Model using BASH Code." March 1987 1 including Addendum 1 " Power Shape. Sensitivity Studies." Revision 2-P-A. dated December 15. 1987. and Addendum 2." BASH Methodology Improvements and Reliability Enhancements." Revision 2. Dated May 1988.
- 9. WCAP-10079-P-A. "NOTRUMP. A Nodal Transient Small Break and General Network Code." August 1985.
- 10. WCAP-10054-P-A. " Westinghouse Small Break ECCS Evaluation Model using NOTRUMP Code." August 1985.
- 11. WCAP-10216-A. Revision 1. " Relaxation of Constant
- Axial Offset Control - Fa Surveillance Technical Specification." February 1994:
c '. The core operating limits shall be determined such that all-applicable limits.(e.g.. fuel thermal mechanical limits. core thermal hydraulic limits. Emergency Core Cooling Systems -(ECCS) limits. nuclear limits such as SDM. transient-analysis limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met: and
- d. The COLR. including any midcycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.
v . t c l l . i i-p'd BYRON - UNITS 1 &'2 5. 6 - 4 9/22/98 Revision M
. ,- - . - . . . ~ . . - - . . - - - - . . . . _ . - - . . . - . . - - . - .
Reporting Re::tre ey8 5.6 Reporting. Requirements- , p. L '5.6.6 Reactor Coolant Svstem (RCS1 PRESSUPE AND TEMPERATURE 0 9- 3 REPORT (PTLR)
- a. RCS pressure and temperature limits for heat up, cooloowr low temperature operation.' criticality. and hyorostatic testing as well as heatup and cooldown rates, and Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) lift settings shall be established and documented in the PTLR for the following:
LCO 3.4.3. "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits". anc LC0 3.4.12. " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection-(LTOP) System".
- b. -The analytical methods used to determine the RCS pressure and temperature limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. specifically those described in NRC letter dated January 21. 1998. " Byron Station Units 1 and 2.
and Braidwood Station. Units.1 and 2. Acceptance for-Referencing of Pressure Temperature Limits Report."'
- c. The PTLR~shall be provided to the NRC 'upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluence period and for any revision or supplement thereto.
D 5.6.7- Post Accident Monitorino Reoort When a report is required by Condition C or'H of LCO 3.3.3. " Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation." a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status. 5.6.8 Tendon Surveillance Reoort Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected d during the tests required by the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be reported in the Inservice
-D Inspection Summary Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a and G
ASME Section XI. 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda. I l L' r BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.6 - 5 8/19/98 Revision M
Repor:1 r.: Rec.c e e; 5 I 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.9 ' Steam-Generator-(SGi-Tube insoectior Recorts
- a. Following each inservice' inspection of SG tuDes. tne numoe-of tubes plugged or repaired. in each SG shall De recorte: tc the NRC within 15 days. i
- b. The complete results of the SG tube inservice inspectior.
shall be submitted to the NRC within 12 months fol' 'r, tne completion of the inspection The. report shall it.
- 1. Number and extent of tubes inspected. l
- 2. Location and percent of wall thickness penetration for-each indication of an imperfection. and
- 3. Ident'ification of tubes plugged or repaired. .
- c. Results of SG tube inspections that fall into Category C-3 shall be reported to the N_RC within 30 days and prior to resumption of unit. operation. The report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to determine cause of the . tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.
1
-BYRON -UNITS 1 & 2 5.6 - 6 9/2/98 Revision M i i
i m g- Ray a-- _.y e.G ADMINISTRATIt!E CONTRC.S O 5.7 Hagn Radiation Area This Specification provides alternate metnods for controlling access te nig-radiation areas and does not apply to very high radiation areas as ce'inec w 10 CFR 20. 1 1 5.7.1 Pursuant to 10 CFR 20. paragraph 20.1601(c). in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1601. each nign radiation area. as ! defined in 10 CFR 20, in which the intensity of radiation is )
> 100 mrem /hr but 5 1000 mrem /hr at 30 cm (12 inches) from tne ,
radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates, shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a h1gn radiation area and entrance thereto shall De controlled by l requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) or equivalent ! document that includes specification of radiation dose rates in the immediate work area (s) and other appropriate radiation protection equipment and measures. Individuals cualified in radiation protection procedures or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals may be exempt from the RWP 1ssuance requirement during the performance of their assigned duties in high radiation areas with exposure rates s 1000 mrem /hr provided
/
they are otherwise following plant radiation protection procedures for entry into such high radiation areas. l ( j Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the j follovnng:
- a. A radiation monitoring device that continuously indicates ,
the radiation dose rate in the area. l
- b. A radiation monitoring device that continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate <
levels in the area have been established and personnel are aware of them. b) V BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.7 - 1 2/14/98 Revision D
I higr. Ra:1 a - ,~- e3
- 5. Hign Rac1ation Area
! r. \_) 5.7.1 (continued)
- c. An individual cualifleo in radiation protection proteaures with a radiation dose rate monitoring aevice, wno is responsible for providing positive control over tne activities within tne area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency spec 1flec in tne R J or equivalent document.
5.7.2 In addition to the requirements of Specification 5.7.1. areas accessible to personnel with radiation levels > 1000 mrem /hr at 30 cm (12 inches) from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall require the following:
- a. Doors shall be locked to prevent unauthorized entry and shall not prevent individuals from leaving the area. In place of locking the door, direct or continuous electronic surveillance that is capable of preventing unauthorized entry may be used. The keys shall be maintained under the 4 administrative control of the Shift Manager on duty or health physics supervision:
~ b. Personnel access and exposure control requirements of (7 -
activities being performed within these areas shall be () ' specified by an approved RWP or equivalent document that l includes specification of radiation dose rates in the !
, immediate work area (s) and other appropriate radiation protection equipment and measures:
- c. Each person entering the area shall be provided with an alarming radiation monitoring device that continuously integrates the radiation dose rate (such as an electronic dosimeter). Surveillance and radiation monitoring by health physics personnel may be substituted for an alarming dosimeter; i ud bl BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.7 - 2 8/19/98 Revision M
. --- ..- _ - - . . . . , . . - - - . _ - . . . - .. - . _ ~ - .-
i nig" Rac 5- ' " a i n 5.~ M g" EaClation Area i \ V E. .2 (continued)
- d. For ind1Vicual hign radiation areas access 1cle IC Dersc~e l
witn radiation levels of > 1000 mremenr at 30 cr J: ' r es that are located witnin laroe areas sucn as reac cr containment, wnere no enciciure exists for curposes c' locking. and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the inalvidual area. Inat indivlaua' area snall be barricaaed. conspicuously postec. and a flasnin; l l light shall be activated as a warning device: and ,
- e. Except for individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures. or personnel escorted by such indivicuals. en 9 into such areas shall be made after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. Individuals escorted will receive a pre-joo briefing prior to entry into such areas.
O ,U i l l 1 i i I l f C
- d BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.7 - 3 2/14/98 Revision D l
i l
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l 1 1 '4 l 1 i l O ( e 1 9 G
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- 5.0 ADMIf!!STR!TIVE CDf,TR0_5 7
U 5.1 Respons10111ty I l i 5.1.1 Tne station manager snall be responsible for overall fa:1 ' ::, l coeration ano shall delegate in writing the succession :: :ms responsibility during his aDsence. 5.1.2- A Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be responsible for the ; control room command function while either unit is in MODE 1. _^. l
- 3. or 4. For each unit. an SRO may be designated as responsible for the control room command function. While both units are in MODE 5 or 6. or defueled an individual with an active SRO license I or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume tne control room command function. i l
O N) I a l l 1 l l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.1 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A l l
- .r;3 r ;,: . - .
~ E.; ADM!t!!STR CIVE :Ci,TRC 5 5.2 Organization 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Oroanizat7ons Onsite and offsite organizations shall De establishec for far m operation and corporate management, respectively. The ens'te arc offsite organizations shall include the positions for activities affecting safety of the nuclear power plant.
- a. Lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shai:
be defined and establisned throughout hignest management levels. intermediate levels, and all operating organizatler positions. These relationships shall be documented and updated, as appropriate. in organization charts, functional descriptions of departmental responsibilities and relationships, and job descriptions for key personnel positions. or in equivalent forms of documentation. These requirements, including the plant-specific titles of those personnel fulfilling the responsibilities of the positions delineated in these Technical Specifications. shall be documented in the Quality Assurance Program:
- b. The station manager shall be responsible for overall safe o operation of the plant and shall have control over those
(') onsite activities necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the plant:
- c. A corporate officer shall be responsible for overall plant nuclear safety and shall take any measures needed to ensure acceptable performance of the staff in operating.
maintaining and providing technical support to the plant to ensure nuclear safety: and
- d. The individuals who train the operating staff. or perform health physics or quality assurance functions. may report to the appropriate onsite manager: however, these individuals shall have sufficient organizational freedom to ensure their independence from operating pressures.
b BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 2 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
- ;a" :5: a
,- 5.2 Orgam zatler, L
5.2.2 Faci 11tv Staf' The facility staff organization shall incluoe the folloe,1ng:
- a. A total of three non-licensed operators for tne tac un': !s requireo in all conoitions. At least one of the reaalrec non-licensed operators snall be assigned to each un1:
- b. Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum reau1rement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(1) and 5.2.2.a anc 5.2.: f for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.
C. A radiation protection technician shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor. The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours, in order to provide for unexpected absence. provided immediate action is taken to fill the requirea l position. j
- d. The amount of overtime worked by unit staff members ;
performing safety related functions shall be limited and l (q , controlled in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement on working hours (Generic Letter 82-12). l j
- e. The operations manager or the supervisor in charge of the operations shift crews shall hold an SRO license.
- f. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory l technical support to the Shift Manager in the areas of thermal hydraulics. reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the facility. In addition. the STA shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift.
(h
\
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.2-2 2/14/98 Revision D
t Fa:111ty Staf# Caa e :3-, i : i s, 5.C ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 7
'-' 6.E Facility Staff Qualificatiens l
5.3.1 Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceec the minimar qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971. witn the follon1ng excectier either the senior health physics supervisor or leac healtr physicist, shall meet or exceed the qualifications for "Ra018 tion Protection Manager" in Regulatory Guide 1.8. Septemoer 1975. l l I I tO U l i i l l 1 l l 1 l I l Oi BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.3 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
- ::e:.. ~ -
,- 5.0 ADMIN:5TRATIVE CONTROLS i .C ' 5A Pro;ecures 5.4.1 Written proceaures shall be establisned. 1molemente:. an:
maintained covering the following activities:
- a. The applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33. Revision 2 Appendix A. February 1978:
- b. The emergency operating procedures required to implement :ne requirements of NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0737. Supplement 1. as stated in Generic Letter 82-33. Section 7.1:
- c. Fire Protection Program implementation: and
- d. All programs specified in Specification 5.5.
t N 1 1 i l 1 l l O v l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.4-1 8/19/98 Revision A
l Drc; ars at: >a . -
, 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTET 5 b 5.5 Procrams and Manuals l
Tne following programs shall be established. 1mplemented. anc maintainec. I l 5.5.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
- a. The ODCM shall contain the metnodology and parameters usec in the calculation of offsite doses resulting from i radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents. in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring alarm and trip setooints. and in the conduct of the radiological environmental monitoring program:
l
- b. The ODCM shall also contain the radioactive effluent <
controls and radiological environmental monitoring ) activities, and descriptions of the information that should , be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental I Operating. and Radioactive Effluent Release Reports requirea by Specification 5.6.2 and Specification 5.6.3: and
- c. Licensee initiated changes to the ODCM: l O 1. Shall be documented and records of reviews performed l shall be retained. This documentation shall contain: '
'1.
~
sufficient information to support the change (s) I together with the appropriate analyses or l evaluations justifying the change (s). and : l
- 11. a determination that the change (s) maintain the levels of radioactive effluent control required by 10 CFR 20.1302. 40 CFR 190. 10 CFR 50.36a.
and 10 CFR 50. Appendix 1. and not adversely impact the accuracy or reliability of effluent. dose, or setpoint calculations:
- 2. Shall become effective after the approval of the station manager: and i
l l A V BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 5 - 1 8/19/98 Revision A
Programs a c Mar,q _ 5.5 Programs and, Manuals O' 5.5.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) (continuec)
- 3. 'Shall be submitted to Ine NRC in tne form of a complete. legible copy of tne entire ODCM as a pa-: c" 1 or concurrent with the Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period of the report in wnicn any change in the ODCM was made.' Each cnange shall De ident1 fled by markings in the margin of the affected pages clearly-indicating the area of the page inat was changed. and shall indicate the date (i.e.. montn and year) the change was implemented.
1 5.5.2 Primarv Coolant Sources Outside Containment This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to
-levels as low as practicable. The systems include the recirculation portions of the Containment Spray. Safety injection.
Chemical.and Volume Control, and Residual Heat Removal. The : program shall include the followi1g: p a. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection g requirements : and
- b. Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.
l 5.5.3 Post Accident Samolino This program provides controls that ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents. and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following:
- a. Training of personnel;
- b. Procedures for sampling and analysis
- and i
- c. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.
BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5. 5 - 2 8/19/98 Revision A i 1
Programs a c A'ar.; ; l/V I m i 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Procram This program conforms to 10 CFR 50.36a for the control of radioactive effluents and for maintaining the doses to memoers of the public from radioactive effluents as low as reasonably achievable. The program shall be contained in the ODCM. snall De implemented by procedures and shall include remedial actions to be taken whenever the program limits are exceeded. The program shall include the following elements:
- a. Limitations on the functional capability of radioactive liquid and gaseous monitoring instrumentation including surveillance tests and setpoint determination in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM:
- b. Limitations on the concentrations of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to unrestricted areas.
conforming to 10 times the concentrations stated in 10 CFR 20. Appendix B. Table 2. Column 2 (to paragraphs 20.1001 - 20.2402):
- c. Monitoring, sampling and analysis of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1302 and with y the methodology and parameters in the ODCM:
1-( v' d. Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses or dose commitment to a member of the public from radioactive 3 materials in liquid effluents released from each unit to g unrestricted areas, conforming to 10 CFR 50. Appendix I: 4l L
- e. Determination of cumulative and projected dose contributions from radioactive effluents for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year in accordance with the methodology r} l and parameters in the ODCM at least every 31 days: ,
t BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 3 8/19/98 Revision M
Programs an: var .3 l 1 E.5 Programs anc Manuals ! 5.5A Radioactive Effluen Controle Drocram (continuedt
- f. Limitations on the functional capability and use of tne liquid and gaseous effluent treatment systems to ensure ina appropriate portions of these systems are useo to recute releases of radioactivity when the projected doses-1r e period of 31 days would exceed 2% of the guidelines for :ne annual dose or dose commitment. conforming to 10 CFR 50.
l Appendix I:
- g. Limitations on the dose rate resulting vom radioactive E
material released in gaseous effiuents to areas beyond the site boundary conforming to the following:
- 1. For noble gases: 5 a dose rate of 500 mrem /yr to the whole body and s a dose rate of 3000 mrem /yr to the skin and
- 2. For Iodine-131. Iodine-133. Tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half lives
> 8 days: s a dose rate of 1500 mrem /yr to any organ:
- h. Limitations on the annual and quarterly air doses resulting from noble gases released in gaseous effluents from each j unit to areas beyond the site boundary, conforming to- '
Ly 10 CFR 50. Appendix I:
- 1. Limitations on tne annual and quarterly doses to a member of the public from Iodine-131. Iodine-133. Tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half Nes > 8 days in gaseous effluents released from each unit to areas beyond the site boundary, conforming to 10 CFR 50. Appendix I; and j Limitations on the annual dose or dose commitment to any member of the public due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources, conforming to 40 CFR 190.
5.5.5 Comoonent Cyclic or Transient Limit l This program provides controls to track the UFSAR. Section 3.9. l . cyclic and transient occurrences to ensure that components are maintained within the design limits. O BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 4 8/19/98 Revision A l i
ProgamsacMa...; 5.5 Programs anc Manuals 5.5.6 Pre-Stressed Concrete 'Contaircnent Tenoc.n Surve411ance Drc~ar This program provides controls for monitoring any tenoon degradation in pre-stressed concrete containments, inclucing effectiveness of its corrosion protection medium, to ensure containment structural integrity. The program shall incluae baseline measurements prior to initial operations. The Tenoon Surveillance Program. inspection frequencies. and acceptance criteria shall be in conformance with requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(2)(vi). 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(2)(1x). ASME Boiler anc Pressure Vessel Code Subsection IWL. 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and Regulatory Guide 1.35.1. July 1990. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Tendon Surveillance Program inspection frequencies. 5.5.7 Reactor Coolant Pumo Flywheel Insoection Procram This program shall provide for the inspection of each reactor
. coolant pump flywheel in general conformance'with the recommendations of Regulatory Position c.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14. Revision 1. August 1975.
.( ( . O-. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 5 '9/2/98 Revision M
- .. . . .. . . - . . - .- - - . - . _ . - . - . ~ . ~ . - - . . - . - . - . . .
Programs a'.: vs%h 5 ii
'5.5..-Programs and Manuals ufx '
~
l 5.5.8: Inservice Testina proaram This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Coae
-[ Class 1. 2..and 3 components. The program shall include the.
.fol. lowing:
h
- a. Testing frecuencies specified in Section XI of the ASME .!
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenaa as ! follows: 1
'ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and- ^
applicable Addenda - terminology.for Required Frequencies inservice testing. for performing inservice 1
)
activities testina activities i Weekly At least once per 7 days Monthly At least once per 31 days Quarterly or every
-3 months At least once per 92 days ,
Sem1 annually or every 6 months ) At least once per 184 days- ; Every 9 months . At least once per 276 days > L Q Yearly or annually At least once per 366 days-t/ Biennially or'every 2 years At least once per 731 days 3 b 'The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the above required Frequencies for performing inservice testing y activities: l' c. The provisions of'SR 3.0.3 'are applicable to inservice testing. activities; and
- d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical j- . Specification, j l
u L ! i' i U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5-6 9/9/98 Revision M c ti
Programs anc Ma'u s 55 5.5 Programs and Manuals V
'5.5.9 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Procram-Each SG shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of an l
augmented inservice inspection program. '
- a. SG Samole Selection and Insoection Each SG shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown bs selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number o'f SGs specified in Table 5.5.9-1. j M b. SG Tube Samole Selection and Insoection o
'A NOTE ----
6> When referring to an SG tube. the sleeve shall be considered 4 a part of the tube if. the tube has been repaired per
$l Specification 5.5.9.e.10.
The SG tube minimum sample size. inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Table 5.5.9-2. The inservice inspection of SG tubes shall be performed at the fregyencies specified in Specification 5.5.9 d and the inspected tubes shall be
. verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of L~ Specification 5.5.9.e. When applying the expectations of Specification 5.5.9.b.1 through 5.5.9.b.3. previous defects or imperfections in the area repaired by the sleeve are not j considered an area requiring reinspection. The tubes .
selected for each inservice inspection shall include a 3% of the total number of tubes in all SGs. The tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:
- 1. Where experience in similar plants with similar water !
chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected. then a 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas: l: L l n. U BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 7 8/19/98 Revision M i l
Programs and Manuals ( 5.5 > f'
- d.5 Programs'and Manuals
,Q
. ex*
5.5.9 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Proaram (continued)
. 2. The first sample of tubes selected for each inservice l^ inspection (subsequent to the preservice inspection)
I of each SG shall include:
- 1. All tubes that previously'had detectable tube wall penetrations > 20% that have not'been l plugged.or sleeved in the affected area, and all
-tubes that previously had detectable sleeve wall penetrations that have not been plugged.
ii. Tubes-in those areas where experience has indicated potential problems, iii. A tube-inspection (pursuant to Specification 5.5.9.e.8) shall be performed on each selected tube _ If any selected tube does t not permit the passage of the eddy current probe for a tube inspection. this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be selected and subjected to a tube inspection:
- 3. The tubes selected as the second and third samples (if A required by Table 5.5.9-2) during each inservice V inspection may be subjected to a partial tube inspection provided:
- i. The tubes selected ~for these samales include the tubes from those areas of the tu)e sheet array _
where tubes with imperfections were previously found, and ii. The ins)ections include those portions of the i tubes w1ere imperfections were previously found. BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1--& 2 5. 5 - 8 9/25/98 Revision M 1 i. n < . - - - , , e-. e , ,
. . ... - - - . . - = . _- - - -
i' i l Programs and Manuals l o.o 5.5 Programs and Manuals L-hm t 5.5 9-Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Prooram (continued) 4, A random sample of a 20% of the total number of laser welded sleeves and a 20% of the total number of Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) welded sleeves installed shall be inspected for a'xial and circumferential i indications at the end of each cycle. In the event that an imperfection exceeding the repair limit is i detected, an additional 20% of the unsampled sleeves shall be inspected and if an imperfection exceedin the repair. limit is detected in the second sample,g all remaining sleeves shall be inspected. These inservice inspections will include the entire sleeve. the tube i at the heat treated area, and the tube-to-sleeve joints. The inservice inspection for the sleeves is
- l. required on all types of sleeves installed in the SGs to demonstrate acceptable structural integrity, l
- c. Insoection Results Classification.
The results of each sample inspection shall be classified into one of the following three categories: NOTE Previously degraded tubes or sleeves must exhibit , _(G) significant (> 10% of wall thickness) further wall penetrations to be included in the percentage calculations. Cateoory Insoection Results C-1 . < 5% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes and none of the inspected tubes are-defective. C-2 One or more tubes, but s 1% of the total tubes inspected are defective, or a 5% and s 10% of i' the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes. C--3 > 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes or > 1% of the inspected tubes are defective. j l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 9 9/22/98 Revision M
Programs an; Man u ft
- rr 5.5 Programs and Manuals D 5.5.9 l
Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Proaram (continuec)
- d. Insoection Frecuencies The inservice inspections of SG tubes (dependent upon l inspection results classification) shall be performed at tne )
l l following frequencies:
- 1. The first inservice inspection shall be performed after 6 Effective Full Power months but s 24 calendar months of initial criticality.
Subsequent inservice inspections shall be performed at intervals a 12 calendar months and s 24 calendar months after the previous inspection:
- 2. Extension Criteria: If two consecutive inspections. !
not including the preservice inspection. result in all I inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if ) two consecutive inspections demonstrate that ' previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred, the inspectit' interval may be extended to a maximum of once per ! 40 months: (N q)
- 3. If the results of the inservice inspection of an SG conducted in accordance with Table 5.5.9-2 at 40 month l
intervals fall in Category C-3. the inspection frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall apply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specification 5.5.9.d.2: the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months: and i
- O
! BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 5.5 - 10 8/19/98 Revision A
DrogramsarcMar.fj - 5.5 'Prcgrams anc Manuals 5.5.9 Steam Generator (SG1 Tuoe Surveillance procram (continue; 4-. Additional unscheduled inservice inspections snall os l performed on each SG in accordance witn tne first L sample inspection specified in Table 5.5.9-2 curin: ~
- the shutdown subsequent to any of the following i- conditions:
1 7 0, i. Reactor.to secondary _ tube _ leaks (not includin:
.- g ' leaks originating from tube to tube sheet weihsi q
in excess of the limits of LCO 3.4.13.d ana 4 LCO 3.4.13.e. "RCS Operational LEAKAGE" ii. A' seismic occurrence greater than the Operating _ Basis Earthquake (OBE). iii. A Condition IV Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) requiring actuation of the Engineered Safety Features, or iv. A Condition IV main steam line or feedwater line ' break, The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not applicable to SG Tube Surveillance Program inspection frequencies.
.()~
se b BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2- 5.5 - 11 8/19/98 Revision M
Drogram aC a ' - ,
- l. '
5.5' Programs and Manuals { 5}}