ML20078D434
| ML20078D434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1983 |
| From: | Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| 82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8310040518 | |
| Download: ML20078D434 (89) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:% ~ . 2 DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR BEGULATOBY COMMISSION 3 h*h3 CFFICE nr BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAp3CXET M.{ Glenn O. Bright H Dr. James H. Carpenter James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of
) Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. ) 50 401 OL (Shearor Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 ani 2) ) ASLBP No. 82-k66-01
) OL Wells Eddleman's Response re 2.758 Petition of 6-30-83 on Need for Power and Alternatives to Shearon Harris Plant Purasuant to an oral order of Judge Kelley 9-22 83, this resnonse and the attached affidavit of Dr. Reeves are now filed. Dr. Weinstraub's letter in support of the original petition is also attached.1 Staff (8-26-83 Re'uonse at 8-9) and Applicants (8-31-83 Resnonse at k) make the same fundamental error about analysis:
Both say we have not conoared the fuel cost savirg s f rom Harris with l the benefits of the alternative. But that 's exactly what we DID do, at CP&L's ER amendment 5 assumntions of 70% canacity factor and 25- l year unit life. That analysis is su-unarized in the Eddleman affidavit of 6-30-83 at nage 10; calet.lation of the 1982 constant dollar fuel savings from Harris oneration (at CP&L assumntions, including CP&L's l 1 discount rate) is shown in the Eddleman 6-30-83 Aspendix, item 15, nn 3-la, as cited on mge 10 of the affidavit. 1This verification was promised in the 6-30-83 filing. Dr. l Blackburn has not been avaimlable to make his affidavit yet; it will be filed as soon as practicable.
$ h 8310040518 830930 PDR ADOCK 05000400 G PDR
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( I hnvo examinod Dr. Roovas ' 9-29-83 affidavit, attoched, and its numbers and analysis are correct. That leaves the alternative with a net
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benefit of $6.855 billion (1982 dollars) vs. cn&L's claimed fuel savings of 143 billi~on. The difference in favor of the alternative is over l
$2.8 b_illion dollars.
Staff also argues (6-26-83 at 9,10) that establishing the environmental superiority of the alternative is not enough. Quite so. The 3 Reeves affidavits and the first part of the Eddleman affidavit (all filed 6-30-83) demonstrate in detail the economic suneriority of the alternative, which is explained further below. lA Staff, as to environmental effects, comoletely ignores the conclusion of Holdren et al (Eddleman 6-30 affidavit at 1h-15) that alternatives generally have less environmental inonet than nuclear power plants (for comnarable energy nroduced). Our argument begins from this foundation, and goes on to show, via connavison with the Medsker analysis, that the alternative to Harris as set out by Dr. Reeves has even less environmental imnact than Kost alternatives. (W.E affid at 15-19: Thus the alternative is environmentally sunerior to the Harris plant in operation. l At the end of their filing, Staff faults Dr. Reeves for not explaining how his alterne.tives would be imniemented; in fact, Reeves I affidavits #1 (7-14-82) at 12-16 re financing, and #3 (6-28-83) at 1-3 , re cost-effectiveness, and 3-14 explaining how the further savin i his ( beyond affidavits 1 and .J would be implemented, cover this. See
- his 9-29-83 affidavit, item h, p.3 The only institutional barrier to the program that I know of is CP&L management. Staff (p.11) fails to show that any barriers to the program exist, thus Dr. Reeves ' original analysis remains uncontradicted.
- Ree es fridavit #1,7-14-82,po2-8 and 29-31 re CP&L system loads $1
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- st-ben *eb re of"h's""Y3*litMhhiMs ef cost-effectiveness pp 1-3; pp3-lk further soecific alternga
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i - Both CP&L (footnoto 2, pp 5-6, 8-31-83) and Staff (8-26-83 at 9) t l are simply wrong to suggest that CP&L's current load management or conservation are included in any of Dr. Feeves ' analysis . See Reeves 9-29-83 affidavit, item 3, p.3. In fact, at my instruction, Dr. Reeves ONLY analyzed conservation and load management measuaes beyond CP&L's j existing programs, as stated in his affidavits filed 6-30 Dr. Reeves
- had a complete summary of CP&L's 1982 load management orogram in hand when he made his affidavitas.
l Staff claims [pp 7-8) thal we didn't consider O&M (operation and maintenance) and canital charges in our analysis. O&M is included in CP&L's fuel savings estimate which we did use. Canital charges were ( not considered since they relate to sunk costs per NRC rulings. l l However, f or the sake of argument, consider that less than
$2.1 billion is as yet sunk in Harris. Add that cost to the k.03 billion fuel savings (CP&L estimate) and you have $6.13 billion.
The alternative, however, saves 6.855 billion, and remains sunerior. l (See Eddleman 6-30-83 affidavit, p.10 and notes thereto; Feeves 9-29-83 affidavit, item 2, pp 2-3). CP&L suggests that we should do both the alternative and run l Harris to save on fuel. It is illogical to combine Harris with the alternative to it, particularly when that alternative shows that Harris' capacity and one unit's generation will not be needed. That is why we argue that fuel savings are the only possible benefit of Harris. As shown above, the alternative is superior even if fuel savings at CP&L's estimate AND sunk costs of Harris are added to comnane to it. l Staff asks why we used consumer rates (8-26 at 7), The consumers 1 are the ones who pay the costs and receive the benefits (if any, net) from power plants, as the late Shearon Harris himself used to say. 2 See Reeves affid #1, 7-14-82, pp 2.-$ and 30-31; Eddleman affid. 6-30-83 pp 3-5 and citations therein.
( Dr. Reeves explains this in his 9-29 affidavit, item 1, p.2, citing his 2/1$/83 affidavit page 1, line 10. To this I only add that any fuel savings would flow through to consumers, as do the savings from the Reeves alternatives. The Reeves alternative simoly allows the customers to gain the savings without consuning as much electricity. They still get just as much useful work and service under the alternative, but they save more money. Even if consumers were forced to pay off the sunk investment in Harris, they come out ahead under the alternative. (see p.3 above). Staff also argues (pp5-6) that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had rejected the claim that it was cheaper and environmentally sunerior not to operate a nuclear vower plant because the Lovins analysis
" lacked sufficient analysis and documentation to runnort it." Here, Dr. Reeves and I have produced extensive analysis and documentation specific to CP&L showing why the Harris plant is economically and environmentally inferior to the Reeves alternative. Significantly, neither Staff nor Anolicants uresent evidence contradicting this.
Thus, our prima facie case reouired by 10 CFR 2.758, is still intact after Staff and Anplicants had 2 months to resnond to it. Staff also claims (p.4) that we have shown no"snecial circumstances" l unique to Harris. There are 2: The existence of an environmentally and l l economically superior alternative to operating Harris, fully documented; and the fact that Harris is the only nuclear plant I know of where 2 units were scrapped by the utility in favor of alternatives, and the official State consumer advocate proposes that a third unit be scranned and the fourth and final unit be delayed until 1992 because it isn't needed now. l (NCUC Public Staff 1983 report, excerpts attached to 6-30-83 filing) l In sum, neither CP&L nor NRC Staff has been able to contradict the case made in my 2.758 petition and suonorting affidavits (with ! documentation) filed 6-30-83, that Harris should not operate because l there is an environmentally and economically sunerior alternative to it.
l Department of Economics Duke University Durham, North Carolina, 27706 Mr. Wells Eddleman 718-A Iredell Street Durham, NC, 27705
Dear Mr. Eddleman,
Persuant to our phone conversation, I am indeed able to submit the following statement to you for the use of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: To Whom It May Concern: I am a Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Department of Economics at Duke University. I received my Ph.d from the University of Pennsylvania in Applied. Mathematics in 1969, and I have been on the faculty at Duke University since 1970. I have - written four books and numerous articles in economics, primarily on topics related to economic theory. I have on three occasions prefiled testimony, and testified, before the North Carolina Utilities Commission as a public witness. These filings all concerned electricity load forecasts, and the methodology of the
-load forecasts, by the Public Staff of the Commission.
Based on my own research which was directed to an informed criticism of the methods by which forecasts of the demand for electricity in North Carolina were to be generated by an econometric model of the demand for. electricity, it is my informed professional opinion that the most sensible point estimate of the elasticity of demand for electricity is .20 in , the short run and -1.0 in the long run. l l Yours truly, l f/ h - Dr. E. Roy Weintraub , Professor of Economics i l
r-STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF WAKE Today Dr. G. George Reeves appeared before me and affirms that the attached information is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief and was prepared by him for Wells Eddleman. 4 hist ADay of September 1983 Dr. G. George Fe6ves
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wA cg ,tw A M u My Commission Expires October 26,1985
. *., 3 If SH 1 not licensed to operate and construction ceates 12/31/83 Sunk construction cost 12/31/83 $1,763,116,000 Annualcapitalchargecosp* $202,758,340 l Annual depreciation cost ,262,320 Total annual cost 238,020,6T6 1 Comparing the two options $583,273,200
- 238,020,660 Net a.nnual saving from not licensing and operating SH 1 ,$2 }g3)2 g g a from CP&L's 1983 construction budget b 20% of total capital cost of SH 1 in commercial operation c 4% of total capital cost to allow for wear out of SH 1 in operation d) computed using 60% capacity factor and 0.8 g/kWH fuel saving according to NCUC public staff estimates e) 11 3% of sunk 12/31/83 cost. A non-operating SH 1 would not be included in CPE's rate base but would probably be allowed capital costs at the long term debt. rate which for CPE is 115%.
f) A non-operating plant in a preservation mode would not be subject to the wearout, corrosion anel radiation damage of an operating plant. It would have a much longer useful life as standby generstion that could be brought on line in a few years if needed at some time in the future due to increase in load or retirement of present operating plants. The 2% annual depreciation rate is my estimate of the cost to bring a preserved plant up to then current safety standards in preparation for operation. It would, for example, allow for the expenditure of $352 million to modify SH 1 if it is needed after 10 years of preservation. 3 page 9, lines 11-24: The staff missed the discussion of my method of estimating system air conditioning load reductions due to increased EER. This is on page 18, line ; 15-20 of my 7/14/82 affidavit. Also on page 27 of the same affidavit I make clear that all system air conditioning is considered, not just the room air conditioner used as an example. The same page has the rationale for estimating market penetration of high EER units by 1995 My estimated peak load reduction due to higher EER was 1000 MW, 200 MW from CPE's present program plus a further 800 MW due to better promotion and no-net-cost financing. 4 page 11, lines 11-19: There are no institutional or legal tarriers to the no-net-cost loan program. It is merely an extension of the low interest rate conservation loan program that CPE already offers.
r 3 y .- - CP&L's response dated August 31, 1983 erroneously asserts that my estimates of future load reductions are based upon nothing more , than my opinion (their footnote 2 on pages 5 and 6), In fact my three affidavits simply apply existing proven technologies to the problem at hand; outline an attractive means for financing and implementations and assume that people will act to reduce their electric bills if they are shown how to do so without cost, inconvenience or loss of comfort. t . .
I have examined the Affidavit in Support of 2 758 Petition by Wells Eddleman dated June 30, 1983 I find the information, analysis and conclusions it presents are true and correct except for the 5 minor corrections listed below. None of these corrections change the resulting conclusion that neither Shearon Harris reactor should be licensed for operation. The sooner their construction is stopped the.better for CP&L, its customers and the society at large.
- 1. page 5, line 5: "6200Mv" should be 5700 MW
- 2. a) page 8, line 1 of Table 2: "800 GWH/yr saved" should be 686GWH/yrsaved b) line 1 of Table 2: "$24,160,000" should be $20,717,200 c) line 2 of Table 2: "7,840,000" should be 7,929,600 d) line 4 of Table 2: "6,768,000" should be 6,937,500 e) line 8 of Table 2: "1994 GWH/yr" should be 1880 GWH/yr;
"$75,658,000" should be $73,674,300 3 page 9, line 10: "$1.891" should be 1.842 line 12: "$6.905" should be 6.855
- 4. page 12, line 8: "314" should be 312 line 10: "8.75" should be 8.73 5 Appendix page 5, item 21: "75,658,000" shouad be 73,674,300 and "314,038,000" should be 312,054,300 I have examined the NRC Staff Responso dated 8/26/83 and find that it contains the following 4 major errors and misconceptions relative to my three affidavits dated July 14, 1982: Feb. 10, 1983; and June 25, 1983
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- 1. page 7, line 21:
ret. ail rates were used The staff in .the doesn't seem analysis. to understand As stated in my 2 why/10/83 affidavit page 1, line 10 it was assumed that existing electric rates reflect true costs. They will if the utilities commissions are doing their jobs. True. costs are the only reasonable basis on which to make economic comparisons. Thus electric costs and costs of alternatives are compared 'at the same retail billing point.
- 2. page 7, line 25: The staff has overlooked my discussion of the economic benefits of not liscensing the plants for operation.
In my 7/14/82 affidavit, pages 9-10 I showed that even under the most favorable possible assumptions the future fuel savings do not pay back the cost of-licensing the plants for operation. - I assumed that if licensed both plants would be completed by spending $2 billion in 1984-1990s that if operating license is denied then future construction expenses cease at the end of 1983; that all past and future construction costs are carried into rate base at 20% capital charge rates that both plants could operate at 70% capacity factor; that the NC Utilities Commission public staff numbers for fuel costs saving of uranium over coal are valid; that these plants will not have the high maintenance costs of other similar plants. Under these assumptions ratepayers save 400 $312 million per year if license is denied. Since it is so obvious that the construction and operation of the plants cannot be justified on fuel cost savings no further analysis was pre sented. t Since there is apparently a misunderstanding of the savings from operating one of these plants, consider the following details with more reasonable assumptions about- unit 1 which is nearest completion. , If SH 1 licensed to operate and completed
- Sunk construction cost 12/31/83" $1,763,116,000 Cost to complete 824,869,000 Total capital cost $2,587,985,000 b
Annual capital charge cost $517,597,000 Annual depreciation coste d 103,519,400 Less fuel and operating saving -37.843,200 Net annual cost $583,273,200 i ~ .-_..-- - -..'.- -- - - - - . - . . - - - - - - - . - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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STRONTIUM-90 RELEASED IN TMI VENTING ETI,kflf,0 BRAyc Joan Harvey, Pt.D., Yeshiva University Consultant, Accord Research and Educational Associates 314 West 91st Street, New York, N.Y. 10025 Richard G. Piccioni, Ph.D., Rockefeller University Assistant Professor, Department of Biological Sciences Hunter College of the City University of New York 695 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10021 Staff Scientist, Accord Research and Educational Associates 314 West 91st Street, New York, N.Y. 1002f Daniel M. Pisello, Ph.D., Columbia University Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Hunter College of the City University of N.Y. 695 Park Avenue 10021 i New York, N.Y. Director of Research, Accord Research and Educational Associates, 241 West 97th Street #8K New York, N.Y. 10025 i l l ! This study was condraf d under the auspices of Accord Research and Euu. 'nal Associates, Inc. l l I l l
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INTRODUCTION Between 28 June.and 11 July 1980, Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed) vented the containment building of their damaged Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit-2 nuclear reactor near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Prior to the venting Met Ed reported that the building atmosphere contained approximately 57,000 curies of krypton-85, a.few curies of tritium, and far smaller amounts
. of.other isotopes present as suspended particulates, e.g.
radioactive cesium and strontium. Me. Ed claimed that the amount.of suspended particulate radioactivity was very small
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- and that-the exhnust stack filtration system was good enough .
to keep emission of radioactive particulates below detectable l limits.- The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) i . waived the ' required' environmental impact statement for the venting. The NRC further compromised public health by tempor-arily suspending-the-federal regulations limiting the concentration of airborne isotopes that may result offsite from plant releases. Finally, the releases were made without the NRC requiring immediate check on the amount of beta activity that was being released in the form of suspended particulates, specifically leaving them blind to strontium-90, one of the most abundant and letha1' isotopes in the reactor. . 1 Accord Research and Educational Associates (AREA), a New . York City based environmental group, set up 24 hour monitoring i
L . in the field during this entire two week period, to measure radiation levels and collect air particulate samples in the vicinity of TMI. AREA detected the released krypton as far away as two miles from the plant and often observed ground level concentrations of krypton-85 substantially greater than the maximum permissible concentration (MpC) of 300,000 picocuries per cubic meter. In addition, AREA sampling of air particulates yielded a positive result for strontium-90, indicating that the release of this hazardous isotope was approximately four million times greater than what Met Ed had estimated as. possible. METHOD
' 2 Radiation levels were measured with a thin (1.4mg /cm ) mica window (total area 16 cm 2) Geiger-Mueller (GM) ' pancake' probe connected to a Victoreen "Thyac III" portable rate meter. The audio output of the rate meter was fed into a digital accumulator-timer. This arrangement detects changes in the count rate of 10 counts per minute (cpm), using a one minute counting period.
The total counts registered on the accumulator were recorded at intervals of from one to five minutes, along with the real time and location of the detector. Hourly average count rates were computed and plotted as a function of time. The background count rate in the Three Mile Island area consistently averaged around 30 cpm except for brief periods of rain during which the background count rate may have risen by approximately 20. cpm. Excess counts above background were converted to krypton concen-
tration using a calibration factor determined from laboratory . experiments with a similar detector performed at Pennsylvania State University (Jester et al., 1980a). In these experiments the detector was placed in a large test chamber containing 6.7 microcuries per cubic meter of krypton-85 in air. The observed count rate was between 2000 and 2200 cpm above a back-ground of about 50 cpm,-yielding a factor of 310 cpm above background per microcurie of krypton-85 per cubic meter. Comparison of field measurements made by the Penn State group with measurements made by the AREA group at the same time and location during the venting confirmed this calibration factor (Jester et al., 1980b). Round-the-clock monitoring was performed during the TMI - venting. Monitoring teams in the field used the GM detector to locate the point of maximum ground level activity. This point l is directly downwind from the containment building exhaust l stack and somewhat further away than the point at which the spreading cloud or ' plume' of effluent gas and aerosol first touches the ground. Low-lift helium balloons were released frequently both up- and downwind of the stack in order to study the local wind patterns and locate the plume centerline. Air particulate samples were collected on one-inch diameter Millipore membrane filters (pore size 0.45 microns), at a flow l rate of 10 liters per minute. These samples were collected in the i . plume at the point of maximum ground level activity, and that activity was recorded continuously. While one monitoring team tended the air sampling pump and recorded radiation levels during l . sample collection, a second team continued surveying the surrounding - L
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area with a second radiation detector in order to verify that the pump had indeed been set up at the point of maximum ground level activity and to detect, as quickly as possible, any shift in the location of this maximum. This method of sampling air particulates, i.e. always keeping the filter and pump at the most active point in the plume, was designed.to maximize our sensitivity to radioactive particulates released during the venting. After aging for several weeks, each filter was counted for gross beta activity using a low background thin plastic phosphor scintillation detector. Subsequently, all filters were conbimed and analyzed for gamma emissions using a Ge(L1) detector. In order not to miss a significant finding we also combined all the filters and subjected them to radiochemical analysis for strontium-90 and strontium-89, obtaining the positive result discussed below. This procedure is contrary to the typical government and industry practice of dividing the monitoring region into sectors,
-employing fixed samplers and not pooling samples, all of which is designed to allow significant releases of radionuclides to.go undetected and unreported.
The gamma analysis and the measurement of strontium-90 deposited on the combined filters was performed by Teledyne Isotopes, of Westwood, New Jersey. Their method of determining strontium is a standard one involving chemical separation and low level beta counting. The result was independently checked by measuring the ingrowth of yttrium-90.
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RESULTS Figure 1 shows the measured ground level activity averaged over one hour-intervals-for the entire monitoring period. Gaps in the graph indicate periods during which no data was recorded. Figure 2 is a map of the TMI area showing the sixteen sectors around the plant stack. The scale of distance is indicated on the map by concentric circles centered on the stack with radii of 1, 2, 3 and 4 kilometers respectively. Table I lists the total number of excess counts accumulated above the nominal background count rate of 30 cpm in each sector for each day of monitoring. However, excess counts were not included in Table I unless they were accumulated during periods for which the - observed count rate was greater than 35 cpm. From Figure 1 it is evident that the NRC-specified maximum permissible concentration for krypton-85 was exceeded for several hours around midnight 30 June, 2 July and 5 July and for ten daylight hours on 8 July. The results in Table 1 show that most (63%)of the radioactive emissions were distributed among sectors 5 and 6. The ground level measurements of krypton-85 concentration provided an estimate of the rate and pattern of the releases. Using a simple atmospheric dispersion model (Turner, 1970) one calculates a release rate of 100-150 curies per hour for most of the daylight hours 30 June through 7 July. This value is consistent with Met Ed's data for that period, given in NRC
' purge status reports', obtained from the Middletown office of the NRC during the venting. However, for late night and
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-early morning hours during this period and for the daylight hourslof.8 July one calculates release rates 3 to 4 times higher.
These higher release rates were acknowledged in the available purge status reports only for the daytime releases of 8 July. To date no. release-rate data has been made available by Met Ed or the NRC for nighttime venting. The high rate of nighttime venting is evidenced by the peaks of activity observed around midnight on 30 June, 3 July and 5 July. The abssnce of such midnight peaks on other nights is probably due to conditions of atmospheric stability and low wind speed that caused the plume to rise very high resulting in low ground-level activity. Other periods of low activity in Figure 1 may,be due to the occurrence of similar atmospheric conditions or interruptions in the venting. At times the monitoring teams were not in the centerline of the plume; for example, when the wind was blowing down the river. Figure 1 also shows the time periods during which air particulate samples were taken. The volume of air sampled and the amount of krypton-85 in each sample is shown in Table II for each filter. A total of 6.3 microcuries of krypton-85 in a sampling volume of 51 cubic meters passed
-through the set of 12 filters. No filter disc showed gross beta activity above the detection limit of 1.2 picocuries. .
The average gross beta background in the Harrisburg area is 0.02 picoeuries per cubic meter (reported as cesium-137). Thus background gross beta activity deposited on each filter is well below the detection limit. The gamma scan of the combined filters showed no radio-
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_7_ . i nuclides above the detection limits shown in Table III. However,
- the radiochemical analysis of the combined filters for strontium-
.90 yielded 0.95+0.45 picocuries or 0.018 picocuries of strontium-90 per cubic meter of sampled air. The error on the measurement includes an estimated 10% error associated with the chemical procec ures and a two sigma, 95% confidence, counting error.
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The amount of strontium-90 measured in the collected air particulates is at least 9 times above that expected from bomb test fallout (Toonkel, 1980). This result indicates an average
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strontium-90 to krypton-85 activity ratio of 1.6 x 10 for the effluent vented from the TMI Unit 2 containment building. According to Met Ed's reported containment atmosphere inventory given in Table IV, the maximum ratio of strontium-90 to krypton- . 10 85 in the plume, assuming no filtration at all, is 2.1 x 10 , approximately 800 times less than our result. Assuming the claimed particulate filtration efficiency of 99.98%, one calculates that Met Ed released 4 million times as much strontium-90 as they had originally predicted possible. The measured limits on gross beta activity for individual filter discs are consistent with the result of the strontium analysis and provi an upper limit to the ratio of gross beta
-6 activity to krypton-85 activity of 2.0 x 10 in the filtered air. This limit is consistent with the results of the gamma analysis.
HEALTH IMPACT On the basis of our field observations we conclude that
. an individual located on the plume centerline and at the distance of maximum ground level activity throughout the entire venting received a krypton-85 skin dose of approximately 2 millirems.
Doses due to inhalation and direct. exposure to other components of the plume'are apparently negligible. However, the long term health effects of particulate radionuclides deposited on the surrounding farmlands are much more serious. Using Met Ed's post-venting estimate of 43,000 curies of krypton-85 released and our measured ratio of strontium-90 to krypton-85 activity, we calculate a total of 7 millicuries of strontium-90 released. A reasonable estimate of cesium-137 released is approximately 20 mil 11 curies. This estimate is
- consistent with our strontium, gamma emission and gross beta measurements and with the higher volatility of cesium. Based on the relative inventories of strontium-89 and -90 given in Table IV we estimate that 1.5 millicuries of strontium-89 was also released. We calculate here only the effect of strontium-i 90, the most important isotope.
I About 40% of the land in the TMI area is cropland including pastureland for milk cows. We assumed therefore that 40% of the released strontium-90 is deposited on crops or pasture, and of this amount, 1% is ingested by humans every year. Allowing l for radioactive decay, the result is a total of 1.1 millicuries L of strontium-90 eventually ingested by humans, resulting in a l population dose of 2000 person-rems to the whole body from ingested strontium-90. In order to estimate the biological effects of this population dose, we utilize the dose /effect relationship observed for the exposure of radiation workers to
low levels of ionizing radiation over long periods of time, published by Kneale et al. (1978). Using doubling doses derived
-by these authors of.34 rem and 9 rem for all forms of cancer in adult males and females, respectively, we find approximately 100 doubling doses delivered t'o the population. Since 28%
of the people in the Ha risburg area are expected to die of cancer, this much radiation will yield 28 additional cancer deaths. Children, infants and the unborn are much more vulnerable to the effects of radiation. Studies on the carcinogenic effect of x-rays (Bithell, 1975) indicate a doubling dose for the unborn of approximately 1 rem. Thus, the additional risk of cancer and other radiation-induced effects may be 10-30 times greater in the unborn than in adults. . CONCLUSION I l AREA's resuls show that a significant amount of strontium-90 was released to the environment from TMI during the 28 June - 11 July venting period. Significant releases of strontium-89 i l and cesium-137 must also be inferred. As AREA wished to know l the ratio of strontium-90 to krypton-85 in the TMI releases, and to measure specifically the amount of strontium-90 in those l releases, we drew air samples from the plume centerline and at l the distance of maximum ground level activity whenever possible. I i In this way, background strontium-90 from global fallout was I , _ - . _ __ _
. ~ only a small fraction '(less than 10% or .10 picoeuries) of the-reactor effluent strontium-90. Therefore, background strontium-90 1 did not limit the sensitivity of our measurement, and we were able to measure the strontium-90 activity to krypton-85 activity ration in the reactor effluent to be 1.6 parts in 10 million.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), using their fixed air samplers, relied on chance to blow the narrow plume their way. This design also increased the volume of air ratio to the reactor effluent strontium-90, and resulted in collection of significant and variable amounts of background strontium-90 from fallout. This background deposit substantially reduced the sensitivity of their measurement of the crucial strontium-90 to krypton-85 activity ratio. The significant and remarkable quantity of strontium-90, released to this agricultural region and measured by AREA, was not reported by the USEPA.
SUMMARY
, Accord Research and Educational Associates monitored the l venting of Metropolitan Edison's damaged Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor containment building and found toxic radionuclides J
including significant amounts of strontium-90 were released in the.two week venting period 28 June - 11 July 1980. The quantity of strontium-90 released is four million times greater than the published predictions of Metropolitan Edison that were accepted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- at the time. The airborne toxic radionuclides patterned
themselves in.a pie shaped wedge called a plume, with the highest concentrations observed downwind of the reactor at the
' distance of maximum ground level activity. The long tarm health effects of strontium-90 released as particulates to the surrounding farmlands were calculated yielding 28 a.dditional fatal cases of cancer to adult humans eventually ing'; sting food from this area. It is noted that children are much more vulnerable to the effects of radiation. No reports of deposits of strontium-90 or other-particulate radionuclides, released as a result of the venting, have been made by the Metropolitan Edison or the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
6 l f I t i l i
e . REFERENCES Bithell, J.F., and A.M. Stewart (1975),' Prenatal irradiation and childhood malignancy: a review of British data from the Oxford survey, British Journal of-Cancer, 31, pp. 271-87. Jester, W. A. , A.J. Baratta, R.W. Granlund, and F.R. Eidam (1980a), Evaluation of radiation monitor effectiveness for the detection of krypton-85, Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, Proceedings of Winter Meeting, November, 1980, 35,, pp. 57-58. Jester, W.A., A.J. Baratta, K.E. Rudy, B.C. Ford, J:J. Bonner, Jr., E.W. Okyere (1980b), Monitoring krypton-85 during TMI-2 purging using the Penn State Novel Ga's Monitor, Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, Proceedings of Winter Meeting, l November, 1980, 31, pp . 61-62. l Toonkel, L.E. (1980) Environmental Quarterly, Environmental Measurements Laboratory, EML-381 Appendix, pp. c-76, c-77. Turner, D.B. (1970), Workbook of atmospheric dispersion estimates,
- l. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air
-- Programs, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, revised 1970.
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FIGURE 1 hicasured Ground Level Activity at TIII During Venting of Unit 2 Containment June 28 to July 11, 1980 2 y 3 microcurses per meter cr.M. } 8 i5 } hNN N 8 y i,o y i,2 K'-85 conc 240 - ' I 88 AIR SAMPLE 22D - MEASURED GROUND LEVEL ACTIVeyY FILTER NUMBERS HOURLY AVER AGES .
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TABLE I Accumulated excess counts by sector SECTORS . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 28 June 902 0- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 55 0 195 29 June 3,136 2,963 409 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 June 0 285 5 0 466 34,472 1,784 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 July 50 1,079 143 0 78 28,487 269 245 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 2 July 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 July 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 6 866 6 224 297 0 0 4 July 156 0 0 0 282 4,800 21,903 1,025 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 July 698 1,020 1,029 0 19,895 2,452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 196 6 July 0 0 0 904 1,335 8,498 277 8,367 141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 July 185 30 10 189 1,473 1,529 0 198 78 0 0 0 0' 0 0 77 8 July 1,972 8,933 1,118 16,938 30,458 2,356 390 560 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 July 0 37 .130 50 1,124 213 749 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 July 35 0 0 0 213 61 30 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 July 0 0 0 0 353 234 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tctals 7,194 14,347 2,844 18,081 55,677 83,102 25,402 10,422 319 6 866 31 224 352 0 468 Percent. 3.3% 6.7% 1.3% 8.3% 25.4% 38.0% 11.6% 4.8% .1% 0% .4% 0% .1% .2% 0% .2% Excess counts are counts above the nominal background count rate of 30 ctm accunulated during periods when the observed count rate is gre.ater than 35 cpm.
TABLE II Sample volumes and krypton-85 activity for each air particulate sample Volume Krypton ."5 Filter No. Filtered Filtered (cubic meters) (nanocuries) 1 2.1 97 2 0.9 16 3 4.3 nd* 4 2.7 180 / 5 1.9 130 ) 3 6 3.2 830 i. l 7 14 290 i - ! 8 1.6 nd 9 4.2 710 10 12 1,700 f 11 5.0 50 t 12 16 2,900 TOTAL: 51 6,300 o
*no data l-I .'
TABLE III Results from combined filters
- Gamma-ray emission Total activity Ge(Li) Spectroscopy ** -(picocuries) bery11ium-7 -
LT 30 potassium-40 LT 60 manganese-54 LT 2 cobalt-58 LT 2 cobalt-60 LT 3 zirconium-95 LT 3 ruthenium-103 LT 20 iodine-131 LT 6 cesium-134 LT 3 - t cesium-137 LT 3 barium-140 LT 4 cerium-141 LT 4 cerium-144 LT.20 i radium-226 LT 50 f thorium-228 LT 5 Radiochemical analysis ** strontium-89 LT 2 strontium-90 0.95 0.45
- Total filtered volume of 51 cubic meters containing 6.3 microcuries Krypton-85. LT = less than. ,
** Measurements performed by Teledyne Isotope , Westwood,
- New Jersey.
; TABLE IV . Reactor building air sample results (Met Ed)
Nuclide Half-Life Concentration (Curies per cubic meter) Hydrogen - 3 12.26y , 5 1 x 10 -5 Carbon - 14 5730y 4 1 x 10 ~7
< 6 x 10 -11 Iron - 55 2.6y Cobalt - 58 71.3d < 1 x 10 -11
-11 Cobalt - 66 5.26y < 1 x 10 Kryton - 85 . 10.76y 0.931.07 Strontium - 89 52d 1.12.5 x 10
-10 Strontium - 90 28.ly 2.2 . 2 x 10 -10 Ruthenium - 103 39.6d 4 2 x 10 ~9 Ruthenium - 106 367d < 2 x 10 -10 Silver - 110m 253d < 2. 5 x 10 -11
- 1. 7 x 107y 622 x 10 -11 Iodine - 129 Cesium - 134 2.05y 1.7 .1 x 10 -10
-10 Cesium - 137 30.23y 9 . 3 ! . 3 'x 1 0 8 -12 Uranium - 235 7.1 x 10 y < 5 x 10 Uranium - 238 4. 51 x 109y < 2 x 10 -11
< 2 x 10
-12 Plutonium - 238 86y
-12 Plutonium - 239/240 24,400y/6580y < 2 x 10 l
All nuclide concentrations listed with a less'than symbol indicate that those nulcides are below the listed instrumentation sensitivity for those nuclides. Note: Sample taken April 1980 through containment penetration R-626. ,. Approximate inventories can be calculated by multiplying the con-4 l centration by the free . volume of the containment building, 5 x 10 I cubic meters. ,
.3 l ,
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m 2- D Xf SD'4Od Accord Research d Education:I Associ:tes,Inc, 00CMETED 314 WE5Y91st Street New York, N.Y.10024
'85 bCT-3 P A:d3 Phone:(212) 580-3889 MOBILE MONITORING OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT FROM 'IHE OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DnNIEL PISELLO, Ph.D.
Director of Pesearch, Accord Research and Educational Associates, Inc. Department of Physics, New York Institute of Technology New York, New York RICHARD PICCIONI, Ph.D. Senior Pesearch Scientist, Accord Research and Educational Associates, Inc. Departrent of Biological Sciences, Hunter College of CUNY New York, New York Pesearch conducted under the auspices of Accord Pesearch and Educational Associates, Inc.
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E .
, INTRODUCTION -
j- Nuclear power plants release radioactive materials into the environment in the course of normal operations. , . Federal regulations require the. licensee to monitor all such releases at the point of discharge and to limit these releases so that the total dose delivered to individuals off-site through - all exposure pathways is kept as low as reasonably achievable.1 . This dose, which includes both external and internal contributions, is not measured. Instead, it'is calculated from the measured release rates using an approved set of formulas that model the 4
- dispersion of plant' effluent in the environment. Large uncer-tainties inherent in such modeling may cause significant discrep-ancies between the' actual and the calculated dose.2 The licensee is also required to carry out an approved off-site environmental monitoring program for the purpose of checking the model'used to calculate off-site dose. 'Such a
~
program usually consists of.a fixed array of thermoluminescent dosimeters and a set of sampling stations from which environmental samples are collected for laboratory analysis. The typical environmental monitoring program is not designed-to provide prompt discovery of significant changes in off-site dose rates.3 Excessive
'off-site dose rates due to plant effluent could therefore persist for weeks without being detected.
An even greater lag exists between the time monitoring re-l sults are obtained'and the time they are made available to the pub-t lic. The results of environmental monitoring by the licensee may
- not be available for a year or more after the monitoring was g ..ws , -,v- -0 ,-g .,,,-----rwm -v -- - - -, - . , - , ,- ----y-- -w,, -.---,--,y.--,. ,,,.y,w c----, -,,,, ,.. -
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2 performed. The results of on-site monitoring of releases at point of discharge are also available only after a similar delay. Then only the total amount of each isotope released during a three month i period is reported. Data on specific releases, including time of - release, are published only in the case of unplanned releases. Detailed data on routine releases are not available. Therefore, reliance on the licensee's monitoring program for protection against excessive doses is unwarranted. Independent monitoring is needed both as a check during routine operation and for early warning at the onset of a radiological emergency. One form of independent off-site monitoring carried out by 4 a group of concerned citizens living near the Maine Yankee nuclear power plant in Wicasset, Maine, was to manufacture and deploy a network of continuously recording electronic radiation monitors.4 Another method is to actively track and measure the plume of air-borne effluent using a mobile radiological monitoring unit. This type of monitoring was carried out by AREA researchers at TMI during the venting of the Unit 2 containment atmosphere during the summer of 1980 5 and in routine monitoring of several nuclear power plants. I In this paper the equipment and procedures developed by AREA for mobile monitoring are described and the results of monitoring ! in the vicinity of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in Tom's River, New Jersey are reported. The monitoring method was I designed to determine the external dose rate due to gamma radiation from the plume, to measure the short-lived air particulate activity
3
~
in the field, and to sample airborne particulates for laboratory analysis for long-lived radionuclides. A novel and important feature of the method employed in this study is the ability to detect the radioactive plume without prior background measurement by observing fluctuations in the environmental radiation field caused by the meandering motion of the plume. THE OYSTER CREEK NGS The Oyster Creek plant is a boiling water reactor (BWR) manufactured by the General Electric Company for the Jersey Central Power and Light Company. The station began operating in 1969 and reached its present maximum power level of 1930 megawatts thermal in 1971. The station is located in a relatively flat marshland area of Ocean County, New Jersey, about 3.2 km inland from the shore of Barnegat Bay. The site is situated 14.5 km south of Tom's River, New Jersey, and 56 km north of Atlantic City. It is bounded on the east by U.S. Route 9, on the west by the Garden State Parkway, on the north by the south branch of Forked River, and on the south by Oyster Creek. The station is located approximately 100 km south of New York City. Figure 1 is a map of the Oyster Creek vicinity showing 43 numbered i locations where measurements were made. Several pathways exist for the' discharge of airborne effluent from the Oyster Creek plant.6 The main sources of gaseous waste are (1) offgas from the main steam condensers, (2) leakage from the turbine gland seals, (3) building ventilation air, and (4) exhaust l from the mechanical vacuum pump.
4 The mechanical pump is used during reactor startup to remove offgas from the main condenser. The offgas is vented through a short (1.75 minute) delay line to the plant stack without filtra-tion. Building ventilation air from the reactor building, the radwaste building, the turbine building, and the offgas building is vented to the stack without delay or filtration. The turbine, radwaste, and offgas buildings are also ventilated through roof-top vents. In a 1971-73 study of the Oyster Creek plant by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), it was found that the turbine building was the second largest source of airborne emissions, due to leaks in the steam systems.7 The steam leakage rate was found to be substantially greater than the 770 kg/hr value assumed in the plant Environmental Statement;8 Xenon-133 and Xenon-135 emission release rates from the turbine building were measured at 31 and 94 microcuries per second, 25 times greater than the rate predicted in the Environmental Statement. The main condenser offgas is the largest source of radioactive gas. Prior to 1977 the main condenser offgas was passed through a 30-minute delay line, followed by particulate air filters, before being discharged through the 112 m high plant stack. , In August 1977 the augmented offgas treatment system (AOG) - was put into operation at Oyster Creek.6 Its purpose is to reduce airborne radioactive releases and to reduce the volume of offgas pro-cessed and eliminate the possible explosion hazard of hydrogen and oxygen formed by the radiolytic decomposition of the reactor water. The AOG system consists of a series of subsystems: hydrogen recombiner subsystem, water removal subsystem, charcoal absorber
5 subsystem, and high efficiency particulate air filters. Offgas from the main condenser is diluted with air, passed through the AOG, and then vented through the plant stack. The charcoal absorption system, which consists of a series of four six-ton beds of activated charcoal, is designed to increase the delay time for Kr isotopes to 26 hours and for Xe isotopes to 20 days. When functioning according to specifications, the AOG eliminates virtually all short-lived noble gas isotopes from the main condenser offgas discharge, reducing the total gaseous activity released by a factor of 150. The AOG has no effect on emissions from other sources in the plant. A bypass valve may be opened in order to shunt the offgas waste stream around the AOG. During start-up the bypass valve is kept open until the power level gets above 50% of the rated capacity. When the power level decreases, the bypass valve is opened when the power level goes below 45%. The AOG cannot be operated at low power level because of the difficulty in controlling water level flow in the recombiner condenser. (This problem is specific to the design of the AOG at Oyster Creek in which the condenser offgas is diluted with air prior to passage through the AOG. AOG's at other BWR's typically l employ dilution of offgas with steam and may be operated down to
- zero power level.) The bypass valve also opens automatically if i excessively high temperature, high hydrogen concentration, or
! high radiation level is detected in the AOG system. Table I contains a list of radionuclides reported released in the airborne effluent from the Oyster Creek plant during the third and fourth quarters of 1979.9 During most of this period l
6 the reactor was operating at nearly maximum power and it may be assumed that the AOG was functioning most of the time. METHOD A specially modified Volkswagen Rabbit containing radiation detectors, a high-rate portable vacuum pump, and other equipment r carried a two man crew. Gamma radiation was detected using a 1" x 1" sodium iodide high-energy gamma scintillation probe (HEGSP) (Ludlum Measurements, Sweetwater, Tx., Model No. 44-2) connected to a portable digital ratemeter/ scaler (Ludlum Model No. 2200). The probe was sealed inside a foam rubber-lined Lucite housing that was mounted on the roof of the monitoring vehicle. Air particulate samples were collected on 47 mm membrane filters (Millipore Corporation, Bedford, MA, Cat. No. HAWP-047-00) having a pore size of 0.'45 microns. Filters were held in "Sterifil" filter holders (Millipore No. XXII-047-02, -04, and -07). Tygon tubing was used to connect the outlets of three filter assemblies 1 in parallel to three "rotamer" flow meters graduated to 120 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) (Matheson Instruments, Horsham, PA) and then to the intake ports of a portable high-volume constant displacement air pump (Gast Mfg. Co. , Benton Harbor, MI, Model No. 12x2440-101A) driven by a 3 horsepower gasoline engine (Briggs and Stratton, Milwaukee, WI). The pump was capable of maintaining 120 scfh through each filter. One of the filter holders was-modified to clamp onto the front i [ face of a Geiger-Muller " pancake" probe (GMP) (Victoreen, Cleveland, OH, Model No.-489-110) with a thin mica window (1.4-2.0 mg/cm 1 , _ . _ - . _ _ . _ . _ .,,,,._,. _, _ __ ___ _
7 thickness, 4.45 cm diameter). Holes were cut in the sides of the filter holder to allow unimpeded air flow as shown in Figure
- 2. The distance between the filter and the probe window was 2.7 cm. A similar filter holder assembly, not connected to the air pump, was clamped to a second identical reference " pancake" probe.
Each GM probe was connected to a separate portable ratemeter (Victoreen, Model No. 490, Thyac III) coupled to digital accumulator / timer. The counts accumulated by the reference probe were subtracted from the counts accumulated by the probe facing the pump filter in order to determine the net activity due to particulate radioactive material accumulating on the filter. The following procedure was used to detect the radioactive plume. Small helium-filled balloons were released near the plant to determine local wind direction. Using the roof-nounted gamma detector, a search for the plume was made downwind from the plant. If the presence of the plume at a particular location was suspected 5 consecutive 2 minute readings were taken. The mean, X, of these readings Xf (i=1,5) was calculated according to: 5 E = _Xi 5 1,1 and the standard deviation, c- of the five readings about the mean was calculated using 5 [= (X g - E) i=1 The ratio of the standard deviation to the square root of the
8 mean was calculated. This ratio is known as the reliability factor, RF = cr- [ . The counts recorded by a properly functioning radiation detector exposed to a constant source of radioactivity obey Poisson statistics and the expected standard deviation of a series of readings equals the square root of the mean. The meandering motion of the radioactive plume causes a variation in the radiation intensity at the detector on a time scale of minutes, while changes in background radiation intensity occur on a time scale of hours.10 Thus the motion of the plume tends to increase the standard deviation of the series of 2-minute readings above the expected value predicted by Poisson statistics. This is reflected in an RF which is significantly greater than 1. As a practical criterion adopted in this study an RF greater than 2 was taken as indication of the presence of the radioactive plume. The gamma detector count rate was measured in several plumes while simultaneous measurements were made with a calibrated high-pressure argon-filled ionization chamber, (Reuter/ Stokes, Cleveland, Ohio, Model RS-lll) on loan from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. It l was found.that the excess gamma dose rate in the plume could l be estimated using: DR = 2.7 x 10 -3 T, where T is the count rate above background in counts per minute (cpm), and DR is the dose rate in microroentgens per hour (pR/h).11 l l w
E 4 9 Routine verification of the response of the GMP and HEGSP 4 probes was performed using low-intensity, depleted uranium and 60 Co check sources, respectively.
~
'0.01 microcurie After locating-the plume, the air filtration system was set up to draw air through three membrane filters. In order to measure short-lived particulates present in-the plume, one of the filters was monitored with a GMP, using the modified
- filter holder described above, while simultaneous readings were t
made with the reference GMP. The number of counts accumulated on each GMP was recorded in consecutive two-minute intervals for at least ten minutes before starting the pump in order to check the relative response of the two probes. Then counts accumulated by the HEGSP and both GMP's were recorded every two minutes during the~ pumping. If significant particulate activity I was measured on the monitored filter, the monitored filter was disconnected-from the pump. Readings of both GMP's were i-continued for at least one hour in order to determine the rate of decay of the short-lived particulates. During the measurement, wind direction was periodically observed and recorded by release of a helium-filled balloon. Flow rates through each filter were r recorded, and start and finish times of pumping were noted. When L ! the HEGSP count rate indicated that the plume had moved, pumping i was discontinued, and the search for the plume began again. ( Except for~five upwind reference samples, all samples were i collected in the plume in order to increase the possibility of detecting long-lived particulates in the plant effluent. All the j . downwind samples were combined and subjected to gamma-ray emission spectroscopy. The composited sample was also subjected to a ! i.
'"~T- "-W---~- ww yw-ym w.i3 -.m - - - ,y,.y 9 y. , , , , . _ , , , _ ,
I J l 10 9 radiochemical analysis for strontium-89 and -90. Laboratory analyses were performed by Teledyne Isotopes, Westwood, N.J. I RESULTS Figure 3 shows two series of two-minute HEGSP readings taken in the early morning of 25 June 1981 on Haines Road near Route 9 aoout three miles north of the plant. In the first series taken at site 12 the first five readings averaged 2378 cpm with an RF of 13.8. Then as the wind shifted to a few degrees to the west carrying the plume away, the readings decreased. The average of the last five readings was 861 cpm with an RF of 3.6. At 0340 the monitoring vehicle moved along Haines Road and the plume was i found again at site 8. By 0450 the plume had again drifted out of range of the detector. Table II contains a record of radiation measurements taken at each of the sites shown in Figure 1. The date and time of each measurement are given along with the average HEGSP and GMP count rates for a selected ten minute period. The HEGSP readings were recorded as a series of five two-minute readings, and the RF for this series is also entered in Table II. The ara gle between the local wind vector and the vector drawn from the stack to the site is also listed. A zero angle signifies that the site was directly downwind from the stack relative to the observed wind direction. Figure 4 shows the HEGSP count rates recorded at the 4 intersection of Light House Road and Route 9 (site 31) on 19 July 1981 from 0827 to 1208 (EDST). Figure 5 shows the filter t
11 GMP and reference GMP count rates for the same period. The pump was started at 0827 and pumping was continued during the period of highest plume activity as indicated by the large HEGSP count rates. .Following the sharp drop in gamma activity the monitored filter was disconnected from the pump at 0913. At this point, the filter GMP count rate stopped increasing and began to decrease at a rate determined by the decay of the accumulated particulate radioactivity. Figures 6 and 7 show data taken later the same day when the site was upwind from the plant. Both the HEGSP and reference GMP count rates were constant at their background values with variation accounted for by expected statistical. fluctuations. The rise in the filter probe count. rate is very small compared to that observed when the plume was present. The results of ten such measurements are summarized in Table III. The date and location of each measurement is given, along with the start time, duration of pumping and the HEGSP count rate averaged over the entire pumping period. The logarithm of the difference between the monitoring GMP and reference GMP (two minute counts) was plotted versus time, for the first i half hour of decay for the two upwind cases and for the two s highest activity filters. Using the method of least squares, the best straight line fit to this plot was obtained and the slope of this line yielded the effective half-life given in Table III. Gamma spectroscopic analysis of the combined filters detected no gamma emitting isotopes. The minimum detectable activity and minimum detectable air concentration for each
1- 12 p
' isotope is given'in_ Table IV. -Radiochemical analysis yielded ,
i .
-1ess thanLO.7 picocuries (pCi) in the combined filters corres-4 ponding to a minimum detectable average air concentration of 19 femtocuries per cubic meter (fCi/m 3). The strontium-89
. content in the combined filters was 1.9 1.0 pCi, corresponding to'an average air concentration (after correction for decay) of 17.5 i 9.'2 fCi/m3 4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS It has been demonstrated that the radioactive plume from the-t Oyster Creek plant can be tracked and measured using a 1" x 1" sodium iodide-scintillation detector. Analysis of the temporal variation of the radiation field proved to be an effective means
. of detecting the plume when prior knowledge of background radia-tion was not available.
j Using the conversion factor obtained by comparison of the scintillation. detector with the calibrated ionization chamber (Methods), it is possible.to' convert scintillation detector count rates to. external gamma dose rates. ' The lower limitLof detection ! _ for radiation form the plume corresponded to a dose rate of lpR/hr. A maximum ten minute dose rate above background of'21,uR/hr was
- observed 1 km northwest of the plant (site 40,-7/18/82, . Table II).
An average dose rate of 11 pR/hr above background over a period of'
~
46 minutes was observe ~d in a populated area 1.9 km from the plant (site 31, 7/19/82). Using the air filtration system with filter and reference (D( probes, it was possible to observe the buildup and decay of radioactive airborne particulate on the air filters. The effective f half-lives for the upwind particulate samples are about one hour r- mry - . -,,.,-yeer,w...-,,,v--- ..,,.+,y-,e. -w.- .,-y.,.,.e, .,.-c36----,- .er ,,,~m -.,.w,.e-,---w..-, ---.,v, . e ep. ,,, e-.g-c-.mn--v--.m-w.,.~m n-,a
13 for pumping times of approximately 1.5 hours. The effective half-lives of the two highest activity particulate samples collected in the plume (37 minutes and 25 minutes) are significantly shorter and indicate that a significant portion of the effluent airborne particulate radioactivity is probably a mixture of rubidium-88 (half-life 17. 2 minutes) and cesium-138 (half-live 32.2 minutes). These isotopes are produced in abundance by the decay of krypton-89 and xenon-138. Krypton-88 and xenon-138 constitute a significant fraction of gaseous releases that have been reported (see Table I). Because of the half-lives of the
. krypton-88 and xenon-138 parents of the observed particulates are only 2.80 hours and 14.2 minutes, utilization of the AOG with design hold up times of 26 hours for krypton and 20 days for xenon, should eliminate these isotopes from the effluent stream. Thus, the results reported here indicate that a significant portion of the Oyster Creek gaseous effluent was not being processed through the AOG. On the day these results were obtained the plant was operating at between 50% and 60% of its rated capacity.12 The low power level indicates that the AOG had been bypassed, accounting for the presence of short-lived noble gases and their particulate daughters in the plume.
By positioning the air filtration system in the plume, effluent airborne particulates were collected at a maximum rate along with a minimum quantity of background particulates. This method yields a sample with the best plume volume to background air volume ratio in the shortest possible time. The concentration of
l 14
- strontium-89 in air measured by the New Jersey Department of
, Environmental Protection at several locations in'the state, during the same period, was comparable to the value reported here. This background concentration of strontium-89 is due to an atmospheric nuclear bomb test carried out by the People's Republic of China in October 1980. Thus, the strontium-89 in the sample could not be attributed to plant effluent.
In conclusion, mobile radiological monitoring units can lue used effectively to monitor routine discharges of radioactive airborne effluent from nuclear facilities. Such units can also 4- be used to monitor possible offsite releases of airborne' radio-activity during_an emergency. Detection of the radioactive _ plume can be accomplished without prior survey of background radiation 11evels in-the plant vicinity. The results of such measurements can reveal changes in the operating status of the plant such as changes in power level or abnormal occurrences. They can also_ provide the fastest way for-a community to discover a gradual increase in released, long-lived radioactivity from
- a. nuclear facility.
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REFERENCES
- 1. Code of Federal' Regulations. 10 CFR 50.36a, p. 334.
- January-1, 1981 ed.
12A Franke, Bernd. :" Radiation Exposure and Health Damage Due to Nuclear Power-Production: The Question of Standards and the Need.for Comparative Health Damage Analysis." Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American , - Association'for the Advancement of Science, Washington,' D.C., 3-8 January 1982.
- 3. Beck, Harold L.,' McLaughlin, James E..and Lowder,' Wayne M.
" Shielding and Dosimetry: Environmental Radiological
- Monitoring." ANS Transactions 23 (1976) :597-598; and Beck, Harold L. " Techniques for Monit'oring External Environmental Radiation Around Nuclear Facilities."
Paper presented at the.8th Annual Conference on .. Nuclear Safety Research, Tokyo, Japan, May 12-13, 1975.
- 4. '
King, Elizabeth. " Citizen's Monitoring Network." Environmental Impact Assessment Review 2, 2-(1981):198-201.
-5. Harvey, Joan, Piccioni, Richard and Pisello, Daniel. " Strontium-90 Released in TMI Venting." Sicherheit in Chemie und Umwelt, March 1982.
[ 6.- Oyster Cr.eek Nuclear Generating Station. " Augmented'Offgas' System. (AOG) Handout." ' Xerox copy of Oyster Creek-AOG Lesson Guide Series.
- 7. Blanchard, Richard L., Brinck, William L., Kolde, Harry E.,
Krieger, Herman L., Montgomery, Daniel M., Gold, Seymour, Martin, Alex and Kahn,~iBernd. " Radiological Surveillance > Studies at.the Oyster Creek BWR Nuclear Generating Station." EPA-520/5-76-003. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
- June 1976.
- 8. -
.S. Atomic Energy Commission, " Final Environmental Statement Related to' Operation of Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station." AEC Docket No. 50-219 (1974).
19 . . Oyster Creek ~ Nuclear Generating Station Semi-Annual Radioactive
-Effluent Release Report, 79-2.
- 10. Miller, Kevin M., Gogolak, Carl V. and Raft, Peter D. " Final Report on Continuous Monitoring with High Pressure Argon Ionization Chambers near the Millstone Point Boiling u .Water Power Reactor." HASL-290. February 1975.
y r-e.c - y n,.,_,m.,-v ._,..y,. +.--, , +,-. , .sw
,,,.w-,-~.
4 i 11. Pisello, Daniel, Piccioni, Richard and Putz , Robert.
" Calibration of the Sodium Iodide HEGSP with the RE-lll
' Ionization Chamber in Environmental Radiation Fields-in the Vicinity of the Oyster Creek NGS." Accord Research and Educational Associates, AREA-TR-82-1, 15 July 1982.
- 12. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Licensed .'
Operating Reactors, Status Summary Report. NUREG-0020. Vol. 5, No. 8. August 1981. i i 4 4 .g -
TABLE I Reported airborne radionuclides released from - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station during the third and fourth quarters of 1979. Nuclides Released Half-Life + Third Quarter Fourth Quarter (Curies) (Curies) Noble Gases: 3 4.4h 9.04x10 g krypton-85m 1.07x10f 3.34x10 4 krypton-87 76.0m 3.60x10 4 krypton-88 2.8h 3.56x10 4 3.13x10 3 xenon-133 5.27c 1.15x10 - 8.54x10 xenon-135 9.2h 6.10x10 5.45x10 xenon-135m 15.6m 2.70x10 4 2.28x10 4 xenon-138 17.0m 9.03x10 7.59x10 krypton-89 3.2m 8.16 5.65 - xenon-133m 2.26d <1.47x102 <1.47x10 xenon-137 3.9m 1.78x10 1.33x10.2 5 5 Total for period: 2.72x10 2.36x10 Iodines: iodine-131 8.05d 2.G7 1.44 21.0h 9.26 4.46 iodine-133 iodine-135 6.7h 1.31x101' 5.55 1 1 Total for period: 2.50x10 1.15x10 Particulates:
-2 -2 50.4d 1.08x10 -2 1.52x10 -5 strontium-89 5.25x10 -5 strontium-90 28.2y 5.22x10 10 2.19y 3.20x10 cesium-134 4.1.32x10[4 cesium-137. 30.0y 8.77x10 -2 5.43x10[42 12.8d 8.89x10 -2 4.40x10 -2 barium-140 lanthanum-140 40.2h 7.08x10 -4 3.56x10 -10 27.8d 4.59x10 -3 <. 7.14x10 -4 chromium-51 4.03x10 -10 manganese-54 291.0d 2.91x10 -3 cobalt-58 71.0d 4.96x10 <1.67x10 iron-59 45.0d 43.65x10j0 2.98x10[43 5.27y 2.15x10 2.93x10 cobalt-60 -
strontium-91 9.7h 6.22x10j 2.61x10_110 niobium-95 35.0d 6.65x10 (2.07x10 molybdenum-99 66.0h < 5.99x10j0 1.19x10[2 4.73x10 -11 technetium-99m 6.0h 6.16x10_4 46.05x10 -3 ruthenium-103 40.0d 1.27x10 -3 8.05d 7.81x10 -2 7.97x10 -2 iodine-131 6.49x10 -2 iodine-133 21.0h 6.66x10 6.7h 1.49x10[14 9.82x10 -4 iodine-135 1.24x10 cerium-141 32.5d 1.82x10 -4 285.0d 4.64x10 -10 1.38x10-4 -3 cerium-144 1.55x10 protactinium-233 27.4d <1.38x10 -3 35.0m 1.01x10 1.33x10-3 neptun,ium-239 Total for period: 1.14 5.93x10-1 y= years, d= days, h= hours, m= minutes.
TABLE II Ten minute radiation readings at monitoring sites near the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. 10 minute GMP counts, 10. minute HEGSP counts and 5x(2 minute) HEGSP-R.F. ' s. Time of Stack Bearing Site No. (Stack Date of Observation HEGSP HEGSP- GMP Minus Surface Bearing) Observation (EDST) (cpm) R.F. (cpm) Wind Direction Sector (*10) 1630 5238 64.2+ 0 I 1 7/18/82 52.9
-20 2- 6/21 0327 810 2.7 --
0616 676 0.8 26.0 -40 3 4/5 0230 3346 13.7 56.6 0 II 4 4/5 0659 1584 3.1 33.2 0 4 4/5 0222 3036 33.8+ 0 4 7/18 4.4 0 5 4/5 0430 4066 9.7 80.5 0422 2382 9.9 48.6 0 5 4/11 0122 1259 0 6 6/22 13.4 --
-10 7 6/21 0436 1788 6.8 --
0451 2507 2.4 -- 0 7 6/28 0408 2679 1.8 -- -10 8 6/25 0100 732 1.2 -- -40 8 7/1 2000 2249 8.2 36.8+ -10 9 7/18 0421 3423 4.3 47.7 0 10 4/7 0 11 4/7 0516 1798 3.4 29.0 0315 2450 -10 12 6/25 7.7 --
-70 12 7/1 0344 793 1.0 --
0300 2362 'O 13 4/11 5.9 -- 0142 2371 13.6 48.7 0 III 14 4/11 15 4/17 0722 2455 3.3 45.2* O 0745 1789 37.7% 0 16 4/17 5.6 0 17 6/6 0214 3036 3.4 -- l 0655 3370 1.3 -- 0 17 6/6 18 4/17 0651 2680 2.8 40.0* +10 2132 2489 42.0 -20 19 7/18 20.1
+120 20(239*) 4/14 0320 1558 0.9 31.6 0348 4372 31.2 -30 20(239*) 4/17 1.4
-10 0528 4916 4.1 52.9%.
20(229*) 4/17 0 20(234*) 6/4 0245 3634 1.2 -- 0304 3959 2.1 -- -10 20(234*) 6/22 48.2+ 0 20(231*) 7/19 0053 4517 2.5 0209 3113 -15 IV 21 6/12 1.2 -- 0414 774 0 V 22 6/26 4.3 -- 0 23 6/11 0345 1863 0.5 -- 0355 1867 1.5 -- 0 23 6/11 +90 23 6/19 0130 2936 1.3 -- 0137 2820 1.8 -- 0 23(271*) 7/9 0103 492 1.4 27.7+ 0 VI 24 7/11 0 25 7/9 0248 524 1.4 -- 0633 543 1.0 -- 0 26 6/5
Site No. Time of Stack Bearing (Stack Date of Observation HEGSP HEGSP- GMP Minus Surface Sector Bearing) Observation (EDST) (cpm) R.F. (cpm) Wind Direction ( 10) 27 6/5 0329 1683 1.3 -- 0 VII 28 7/15 0320 3124 2.2 47.7+ +10 29 6/19 0436 656 1.2 -- +100 VIII 30 7/12 0428 758 1.2 28.3+ +20 31 7/11 0628 973 1.6 28.3+ -30 31 7/19 0849 7097 6.1 92.0+ 0 31 7/19 1645 682 1.6 26.9+ +180 32 7/7 0336 1092 1.8 29.5+ 33 7/8 0312 905 3.0 -- 0 IX 34 6/18 0158 757 1.0 -- -20 35 6/1 0218 1714 6.6 -- -10 36 6/1 0333 2174 12.2 -- 0 X 36 6/18 0325 1014 5.0 -- 0 37 6/8 0204 1066 3.9 -- 0 38 4/16 0312 1622 8.1 34.7 0 XI 38 5/10 0346 628 1.0 31.5 +15 . XII -- t . XIII -- XIV 39 4/14 0603 1629 10.8 33.8 _10 40 4/14 0436 3462 13.7 49.0 0 XV 40 7/18 1250 8560 34.4 214.0+ 0
.41 7/1 0344 628 0.6 -- +40 42 7/15 0103 611 1.3 26.3+ -200 43 7/19 2100 644 0.8 25.9 +100
+ GMP shielded by " dummy" filter holder.
+ GMP shielded with lucite and aluminum during part of the 10 minute count.
1
+
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TABLE III Measurement of shortlived air particulate activity. Effective Start of Duration Average Maximum Half-life Site Pumping of Pumping + HEGSP Excess Filter First i Hr. Date No. (EDST) (min) (cpm) Activity (cpm) of Decay (min) 7/11 31 0520 201 802 51.2 -- 7/11 42 1637 58 636 36.9 -- 7/18 4 0143 92 2380 80.6 -- 7/18 4 0430 161 1278 92.9 -- 7/18 40 1144 67 5989 433.4 37.0 7/18 1 1633 75 4038 92.9 -- 7/19 20(231') 2353 97 2985 39.3 -- 7/19 31 0827 46 4874 595.5 25.3 7/19 31 1623 100 683 49.3 55.7* 7/19 43 2116 92 641 67.3 62.4*
+ Flow rate was 120 scfh for all samples.
- Upwind sample.
TABLE IV Gamma Spectroscopic detection limits and minimum detectable average air concentrations for long-lived gamma emitters in air particulate samples collected downwind from Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Minimum detectable average air Detection concentration ** Isotope Half-life limit (pCi) (fCi/m3) beryllium-7 53.6d 10 58 potassium-40 1.3x109y 40 110 manganese-54 291d 1 3.1 cobalt-58 71d 1 4.8 iron-59 45d 3 20 cobalt-60 5.27y 2 5.5 zinc-65 245d 3 9.6 zirconium-95 65d 2 10 ruthenium-103 40d 2 15 ruthenium-106 1.0y 10 30 iodine-131 8.0d 2 470 cesium-134 2.19y 2 5./ cesium-137 30y 2 5.4 barium-140 12.8d 2 103 cerium-141 32.5d 2 19 cerium-144 285d 9 28 radium-226 1622y 30 81 thorium-228 1.91y 3 86
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m b l QU REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES
"( OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1981 TEO C
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 5 007 -.3 N @ TheNRCisreviewingeventsreportedatthenuclearpowerplantg^l(icensedtop$this.R operate during the fourth calendar quarter of 1981. Asofthhat report, the NRC had determined that the following were abnormal Ic'cuj @ esfi i' 81-7 Blockage of Coolant Flow to Safety-Related Systems and Components Preliminary information pertaining to this event was reported in-the Federal Register (Ref. 1}. Appendix A (Example 12 of "For All Licensees") of this i report notes that recurring incidents, and incidents with implications for i similar facilities (generic incidents), which create major safety concern can t be considered an abnormal occurrence. ' Date and Piace - The NRC has received notifications from several nuclear power
, plant licensees indicating that the heat transfer capabilities in some safety-related and nonsafety-related cooling systems were degraded by unanticipated blockage of the coolant flow paths. Table 1 lists several incidents of a generic nature with varying degrees of safety significance. The incidents are listed by dates of discovery. The incident discovered at Brunswick Unit I was the most significant from the safety standpoint due to the total loss of both '
redundant trains of the residual heat removal system. The other incidents, ; which were of lesser safety significance, are other recent examples of the I recurrent nature of flow blockage problems which have been experienced. The t principal cause for the flow blockages in many of these situations was a [ buildup of biological organisms, g L Nature and Probable Consequences - In a nuclear power plant, it is imperative l that the heat generated by the nuclear reactor and the components of safety , systems be dissipated ho the environs. This process is usually performed by l transferring the heat being generated to various cooling systems via heat ; exchangers and then to a heat sink such as a river, lake, or cooling tower. ! These processes are utilized during normal operations and subsequent to normal i plant shutdowns or accidents. Failure to provide adequate cooling could result , in severe damage to the safety-related components or systems designed to safely shut down the plant and to mitigate the consequences of a major occurrence ' (such as a loss of coolant accident, LOCA). I The events described in Table 1, although limited in actual consequence, clearly i are precursors to a possible common cause failure that could lead to more serious , consequences, particularly in conjunction with postulated accidents. The nature of aquatic fouling in piping systems is such that it may go unnoticed, or not , severely degrade normal system performance, until the system is called upon to , function following an incident. Some of the ways that this can be postulated ; to occur are described below. i i. i
, a f 5
. ~
f 2 Table 1 Incidents Involving Coolant Blockage to Safety Systems and Components Date/ Plant / Location / Licensee Event Description
- 1. September 3, 1980; Coolant flow in the service water systems Arkansas Nuclear One, Ur.its 1 and 2; was blocked due to debris frcm asiatic clams growing in the system and from a buildup of Pope County, Arkansas; silt and corrosion products. Containment Arkansas Power and Light coolers, high pressure safety injection pump Company. (See Note 1) bearing and seal coolers, and containment spray and low pressure injection pump seal water coolers were most significantly a f fected. Clam shells were also found in the Auxiliary Cooling Water System (ACWS) which serves nonsafety-related equipment in the turbine building. Due to design differences, Unit 2 had more severe problem than Unit 1.
- 2. ' March 18, 1981; During a refueling outage, the licensee Rancho Seco Unit 1; observed that the inlet plenum of the Sacramento County, safety-related lube oil cooler on each of California; the high pressure injection pumps was 80 to Sacramento Municipal 90% clogged with corrosion products. The Utility District.
cause was attributed to excessive corrosion (See Note 2) of the lube oil cooler cast steel heads. Routine surveillance testing did not pre-
'l viously verify performance of this equipment.
- 3. April 25, 1981; Coolant flow in~the service water systems i Brunswick Units 1 and 2; was blocked due to debris from marine Brunswick County, organisms growing in the system. Species North Carolina; present included American oysters, blue Carolina Power and mussels, barnacles, and tubeworms. The Light Company. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) systems, which (See Note 3) provide decay heat removal capability following normal shut downs and during post-accident recirculation cooling, at both !
units were affected. Some shells were also i found in other safety and nonsafety related i component coolers such as the diesel generator \ heat exchangers, core-spray pump room cooler j and the turbine building component cooling water heat exchangers. Three RHR heat exchangers (both of those on Unit 1 and one on Unit 2) had their baffle plates displaced, as a result of the high differential pressure ! caused by the change in flow rate, allowing the service water to bypass the heat exchanger tubes. Therefore, the heat exchangers were inoperable.
r 3 Table 1 (Continued) Date/ Plant / Location / Licensee Event Description
- 4. June 9, 1981; Growth of gooseneck barnacles on the salt-San Onofre Unit 1; water discharge pipe of the safety-related San Diego County, component cooling water heat exchangers California; caused i low coolant flow and the malfunc-Southern California tioning of a butterfly valve. This growth Edison Company. was noticed while making preparations to (See Note 4) restart the plant following a 14-month protracted shutdown. No problems were noted previously when the plant was in normal oper-ation with routine flushings of the system with heated water.
- 5. August 28, 1981; While conducting an inspection in conjunc-Pilgrim Unit 1; tion with an NRC Information Notice 81-21 Plymouth County, (Ref. 2), the Reactor Building Closed Cool-Massachusetts; ing Water (RBCCW) heat exchanger "B" was Boston Edison Company. discovered to be inoperable. A water bypass (See Note 5) condition existed because the heat exchanger baffle plates had deformed allowing water to bypass the heat exchanger tubes. Although the heat exchanger problem involved a design deficiency, the growth of mussels in the Salt Service Water (SSW) system contributed to the degradation of the SSW system capabili-
,l ties. Pilgrim had experienced problems with mussels growing in the cooling system for several years. The RBCCW system cools both nonsafety- and safety-related systems. The degradation of the RBCCW heat exchanger affects the heat removal capability of the residual heat removal system, as well as safety-related pump lube oil and bearing
. coolers and safety-related area coolers.
(NOTE - The RBCCW heat exchanger design deficiency is being reviewed separately for generic implications as a possible common mode failure mechanism.)
- 6. January 14, 1982; While the plant was shut down, a weekly Arkansas Nuclear One, surveillance flow test was being conducted Unit 2; of the containment fan cooler heat Pope County Arkansas; exchangers. For the "C" cooler, flow Arkansas Power and dropped from about 1800 gpm to about 600 gpm Light Company. within five minutes. A normal flush did not (See Note 1) increase flow; however, a high velocity flush
4 Table 1 (Continued) Date/ Plant / Location / Licensee Event Description did get the flow through the "C" cooler back to about 1300 gpm (technical specification value is 1250 gpm). The "C" and "D" coolers were disassembled and about five gallons of Asiatic clams were removed from the "C" cooler inlet water box; some clams were also found in the "D" cooler inlet water box. Most of the. clams were dead. Other coolers were inspected, but no significant amount of clams were found. Notes to Table 1:
- 1. Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 utilize pressurized water reactors designed by Babcock & Wilcox and Combustion Engineering, respectively.
- 2. Rancho Seco Unit 1 utilizes a pressurized water reactor designed by Babcock & Wilcox.
- 3. Brunswick Units 1 and 2 both utilize boiling water reactors designed by-General Electric.
. 4. San Onofre Unit 1 utilizes a pressurized water reactor designed by Westingbouse.
- 5. ' Pilgrim Unit 1 utilizes a boiling water reactor designed by General Electric.
'l
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- a. During normal operation, particularly if an adequate control program is not being followed, fouling organisms can grow in large diameter piping i if the flow velocity is low. A quantity of fouling organisms, sufficient \i to cause severe flow blockages in Safety-related coolers under accident conditions, could accumulate in such piping without causing significant flow degradation under normal operating conditions. Therefore, a situation such as this could go undetected for a long time since a large accumulation '
of fouling organisms would be required before any noticeable flow degrada-tion was observed. These fouling organisms may potentially be slowly swept , into components requiring cooling water causing tube plugging and degraded performance. If additional service water pumps are started following an incident, the tendency for live organisms, marine shell fragments, and other debris to be swept down the piping into heat exchangers would increase due to the higher flow velocity.
- b. Fouling organisms also thrive in stagnant runs of piping in operating systems or in piping systems which have been inactive for long periods of time. Particularly during initial construction or extended maintenance
f~ 6 h 5- 1
. i Q
outages, systems that would normally be operating may be laid up for months or even years without the implementation of an adequate control program, allowing fouling organisms ample time to become established in systems that otherwise might be unaffected during operation. The concern here is that plants could begin operation without the operators being aware of the fouling that could exist. An example of this, that did not go undetected by the licensee, is the described occurrence at San Onofre Unit 1. This plant had been shut down for steam generator tube repairs for over one year. During this time, the periodic flushing of the system with heated water (heat treatment) normally used by the licensee to control the growth of marine organisms, was curtailed. Due to the lack of periodic heat treatment, the licensee discovered, after observing a low saltwater coolant flow rate, that goose-neck barnacles were present on the component cooling water heat exchanger discharge tubesheet and in the saltwater discharge piping. The growth of the barnacles effectively (1) reduced the flow area of the piping causing low flow and (2) caused the malfunctioning of a butterfly valve. Fire protection systems using service water are also a prime candidate for fouling by aquatic organ. isms since they inherently contain stagnant branch lines that are conducive to marine grouth. Branch lines in fire protection sprinkler systems can be as small as one-inch nominal pipe size, and sprinkler heads ganerally have orifices of one-half inch. These would be susceptible to pP'qging. In addition, live organisms or marine shell fragments would be swept toward the open sprinkler head in the event of a fire.
- c. Seismically diked emergency ponds utilized by some power plants as the ultimate heat gink could also support the growth of Asiatic clams. If makeup to the pond is from a waterbody in which the Asiatic clams are known to be present, then it is likely that the clams will be found in the ultimate heat sink and possibly in the service water supply header leading to the plant from the ultimate heat sink.
Under design heat loads (e.g., post-LOCA) ultimate heat sink temperatures could reach 110 to 120 F during summer months. This is hot enough to
,cause a substantial mortality of the clam population. Dead clams may be more of a problem than live organisms, since they are more easily swept along by the flow. Therefore, following a LOCA that resulted in high pond temperatures, service water system performance could be gradually degraded if the dead clams are swept into the system. Even if the temperature of the ultimate heat sink does not reach the point that causes clam mortality, clams residing in the service water supply header could still be swept along the piping if the flow velocity is sufficiently high. Since the service water supply headers can be quite long, even a moderately dense infestation may translate into a large volume of clams.
A small percentage of these, if swept along the piping, could overburden automatic backwash service water strainers.
f 6
- d. Although all nuclear power plants are designed to withstand a seismic event, the vibratory motion induced by such an event may cause fouling organisms such as oysters, that attach themselves to piping walls by a strong but brittle bond, to be broken loose in sufficient quantities by the pipe flexure to cause flow blockage in cooling water systems. In a similar manner, during a seismic event, piping severely encrusted with corrosion products may release a substantial amount of debris which can collect in equipment bearing or seal coolers blocking the cooling water flow. In both cases, the buildup of fouling organisms or corrosion products may not noticeably degrade system performance during normal operation; however, the performance of redundant systems could be simultaneously-degraded following a seismic event. Since the reactor coolant system is sei.mically designed, a LOCA is not postulated to result from a seismic event. A degradation of the service water system, in this case, would not be an immediate safety concern but may lengthen the time required to go to cold shutdown as a result of the unavailability or diminished heat removal capacity of the shutdown cooling system.
- e. Seal coolers are generally provided on pumps that may be called upon to pump heated water from the containment sump following a LOCA; for example, such pumps include the high and low pressure injection pumps, containment spray pumps or residual heat removal pumps. Surveillance testing of these pumps is, by necessity, performed with water at ambient temperature. This is not representative of the temperatures of water encountered during the post-LOCA recirculation mode of operation. Therefore, if flow blockage existed in the pump seal coolers due to the growth of fouling organisms or a buildup of silt or corrosion products, it could go unnoticed during pump surveillance testing unless flow measurements through the coolers were part of the test. There are two reasons for this: (1) since the pumped fluid is,at ambient temperature, seal cooling may not be necessary and no seal degradation would be observed even after hours of running without cooling water; and (2) generally, surveillance testing is of such a short duration that no noticeable seal degradation would occur even if cooling flow were necessary for sustained operation. Since pumps required during the, post-LOCA recirculation are generally located outside primary
-containment (in the auxiliary building) degraded pump seals would result in the leakage of radioactively contaminated water outside containment.
Similarly, pumps provided with bearing lube oil coolers could be susceptible to flow blockages due to fouling organisms or the accumulation of corrosion products or silt deposits. Flow blockages in these coolers could also go unnoticed during surveillance testing unless the cooling water flow was monitored. This could result in premature bearing failure when the pumps are needed to run for an extended period of time, e.g., following a LOCA. The safety concern identified by these events is the possible degradation of the heat transfer capabilities of redundant safety systems to the point where system function is lost. Preventive measures and methods of detecting gradual degradation have been inadequate in certain areas to preclude the occurrence. The above postulated events involve a common cause failure I
l' I 7 mode that can affect redundant systems. Aquatic organisms, mud silt, and , corrosion products have Deen the main source of flow blockage in the coolant _ piping system and associated heat exchangers where events have occurred. Cause or Causes - A variety of causes led to the events reported in Table 1. At Arkansas Nuclear One, for the first event discovered September 3, 1980, the , growth of Asiatic clams was unar.ticipated in the design, and appropriate , operational control features were not provided. The design and operational { control features that did exist were inade*quate to prevent the buildup of mud, l silt, and corrosion products from becoming a major problem. . I The second event at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 on January 14, 1982 assumes { additional significance as compared to the other described events since it indicates that (1) although the corrective actions taken to prevent buildup of [ s marine organisms may not be totally effective, the increased frequency of ' surveillance implemented as a result of the previous event al. lowed the licensee ft to detect the clam intrusion in its early stages,* and (2) the rate of accumu-lation of the organisms can be rapid. During the surveillance test, the flow dropped from 1800 gpm to approximately 600 gpm over a five-minute interval l indicating a sizable blockage. About six buckets of clams were removed. The event remains under investigation. The licensee is studying the service water piping to identify for inspection any portions of piping that may be conducive to Asiatic clam growth, and other long-term preventative measures; this study is planned to be complete prior to the refueling outage scheduled for October } 1983. At Rancho Seco, the corrosion occurred because the heads were cast steel. A corrosion-resistant coating such as epoxy or copper / nickel cladding would have prevented the problem. Existing surveillance testing procedures, however, were also deficient in that the safety-related heat exchanger performance was not verified under appro'priate accident conditions. At Brunswick, the chlorination program, which was part of the program to control the growth of marine organisms, was stopped for approximately 14 months due to V potential operational problems and environmental effects. Although operational and administrative controls were inadequate at Ar'ansas K Nuclear One and Brunswick to detect early signs of the problem, the plants were shut down when the technical specification limits could no longer be met. As previously discussed, the incident at Brunswick had the most safety significance of the incidents described in this report. Unit 1, which was shutdown on April 17, 1981 to begin a
. scheduled maintenance outage, experienced a total loss of the residual heat removal system on April 25, 1981. In order to provide residual heat removal capacity during the plant shutdown, an alternate cooling flow path had to be established. Because of the problems found on tiie Unit 1 RHR heat exchangers, the similar heat exchangers on the operating Unit 2 were examined. For RHR heat exchanger 2A, a higher than normal differential pressure at design flow was discovered; however, the baffle plate was not displaced. The baffle plate was found displaced for RHR heat exchanger 28. Therefore, Unit 2 was shutdown
- Inspection of other safety-related coolers showed only traces of Asiatic clams with no significant accumulation.
[ 8 using heat exchanger 2A at reduced capacity. After the Unit was in cold shutdown, an alternate cooling flow path was established (as in Unit 1 described above) and the heat exchangers were taken out of service for repair. At San Onofre, the growth of gooseneck barnacles was attributed to the termination of a heat treatment procedure that controls their growth. The treatment was terminated during a protracted plant shutdown of 14 months. The system problems were noted during routine opera.tional checks. At Pilgrim, the mussels apparently grew in the Salt Service Water System even though a backflushing and cleanout program was instituted to control their growth. Routine surveillance indicated a continuing problem due to decreasing heat transfer capabilities. In general, the causes of the incidents above related to an inadequate surveillance and monitoring of the heat exchanger performance characteristics such as flow rates, fouling factors, heat transfer coefficients, etc. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence Licensee - The licensees of Arkansas Nuclear One, Rancho Seco, Brunswick, San Onofre Unit 1 and Pilgrim have cleaned and flushed the affected cooling water systems. The licensees have also committed to improving design features and detection techniques which are intended to preclude the development of significant fouling of safety-related cooling systems in the future.
-NRC - The NRC conducted special inspections regarding the events at the facilitics noted above. In addition, on April 10, 1981, the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued IE Bulletin 81-03, " Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components 1by Corbicula sp. (Asiatic Clam) and Mytilus sp. (Mussel)"
(Ref. 3). The Bulletin requested licensees to determine whether either species was present in the vicinity of their station and the extent of any fouling these , organisms may have caused in fire protection or safety-related systems. The responses to the Bulletin have been received from all of the operating plants. The responses received represent 48 sites. Of these, 21 sites reported positive findings either in the plant or in the source or recaiving waterbody. Eight sites have seen some evidence of Asiatic Clams in tne plant and six sites have seen evidence of mussels in the plant. This has ranged from occasional findings of a few shell fragments in the main condenser to major infestations. An - additional seven sites have reported that while Asiatic clams were not yet present in the plant, they were present in either source or receiving waterbodies and infestations at the plant were possible in the future. The Bulletin also asked licensees to describe their methods for preventing and
~
detecting any future fouling at their plants. A combination of chlorination, heat treatment, flushing, backflushing, and the installation of strainers were the preventative actions taken by most of the affected plants. Many of them routinely inspect the intake canal, the pump discharge strainers, and the main condenser, cleaning them out as needed. Detection methods included surveillance programs comprised of visual inspections and measurements of flow, differential pressure, and temperature at various system locations. These actions by the L
l 9 licensees can be expected to have varying degrees of effectiveness depending on the frequency with which they are performed and the severity of the infestation present at and around the plant. IE Bulletin 81-03 addressed fouling by Asiatic clams and mussels only. There-fore, most plants discussed only these two species in their response. Some plants however, mentioned the presence of other fouling organisms such as other species of clams, oysters, barnacles, tubeworms, and algae to name a few. In addition, a number of plants reported problems caused by mud and silt. In some cases, they claimed this to be a bigger problem at the plant than marine fouling. In July 1981, NRC issued IE Information Notice 81-21, " Potential Loss of Direct Access to Ultimate normal decay Heat Sink" heat removal system(Ref. 2). iThe Notice described the loss of the at Brunswick. It also emphasized the need for licensees to initiate appropriate actions, as described in IE Bulletin 81-03, for any marine organisms that could cause fouling at their plant. A case study entitled " Report on Service Water System Flow Blockages by Bivalve Mollusks at Arkansas Nuclear One and Brunswick was issued by the NRC's Office for Analyses and Evaluation of Operational Data in February 1982 (Ref. 4). The NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) is conducting a generic study of service water system malfunctions. This study is being assisted through the Special Studies program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In the program, ORNL will investigate licensee event reports (LERs) from January 1979 through June 1981 on the partial or complete loss of service water systems and organize these results systematically. From this collection of events, ORNL will evaluate the safety significance of service water malfunctions and provide their recommendations for any corrective measures that they believe may be needed. NRR will attempt to correlate specific plant design features, surveillance progr&ms and preventive measures with the magnitude and types of service water problems reported in LERs and the responses to IE Bulletin 81-03. Based on the results of this study, corrective actions will be recommended in order to improve the reliability of service water systems. In addition to the service water study, NRR is reviewing the design of baffle plates in "U" tube heat exchangers similar to those used at Brunswick. This review is to determine if a generic problem exists and if the design is appro-priate for the gi'ven application. Future reports will be made as appropriate. 81-8 Seismic Design Errors at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Preliminary information pertaining to this event was reported in the Federal Register (Ref. 5). Appendix A (one of the General Criteria) of this report notes that major deficiencies in management controls for licensed facilities can be considered an abnormal occurrence.
7- ~ 2 Kr50 mod a ' fc J 00CKETED 6 Uw .- SSIN No.: e T5 gAcces
.sion No.: -
IN W' ~3 P4:03 UNITED STATES g!CE OF SECRETo - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION HETmG & SEPyla' 3 RANCH OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 21, 1981 IE INFORMATION NOTICE N0. 81-21: POTENTIAL LOSS OF DIRECT ACCESS TO ULTIMATE HEAT SINK Descriction of Circumstances:
*E Bulletin 31-03, issued April 10, 1981, requested licensees to take certain actions to prevent and detect ficw blockage caused by Asiatic clams and mussels.
Since then, one event at San Onofre Unit 1 and two events at the 3runswick Station have incicated that situations not explicity discussed in Bulletin 31-03 may occur and result in a loss of direct access to the ultimate heat sink. These situations are:
- 1. Cebris from shell fish other than Asiatic clams and mussels may cause ficw blockage problems essentially identical to those described in the bulietin.
- 2. Flow blockage in heat exchangers can cause high oressure dr:cs that, in turn, deform baffles, allowing bypass flow and reducing the pressure crop to near nomal values. Cnce this cccurs, heat exchanger ficw blockage may net be detectable by pressure drop measurements.
- 3. Change in cperating conditions. ( A lengthy cutage with no flow through seawater systens aopears to have permitted a buildup of mussels in systems where ;revious periodic inspecticns over more than a ten year pericd showed no apcreciable problem.)
We are currently reviewing these events and the responses of the licensees to IES 31-03. Te expect licensees are ::erfoming the actions specified in *EB S1-03 such tnat cooling water flow bicckage fr:m any shell fish is prevented or minimized, and is detected bef;re safety c:Toonents beco :e inocerable. On June 9,1981, San Cnofra Nuclear Generating Staticn Unit No. I recerted that as a resuit of a icw saltwater coolant flow rate indicaticn and an apoarent need for valve maintenance, a oicing elbow on the saltwater discharge line frem component ecoling heat exchanger E-20A was recoved by the licensee just upstream of butterfly valve 12"-50 415 to pemit visual inspection. An examination revealed growth of scme form of sea coliusk such that the cross-sectional diameter of the pioing was reduced. The movement of the butterfly-valve was imaaired and scme blockage of the heat exchanger tube sheet had occurred. Evaluation of the event at San Onofre is continuing. However, the prolonged (since April 1980) reactor shutdown for refueling and steam generator repair is believec to have caused the proolem since crevicus routine inspections conductad since 1968 at 18 month intervais had not revealed mollusks during nomal seriods of operation.
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- caer IN 81-21 July 21, 1981 Page 2 of 3 Two events at 3runswick involved service water ficw blocka of redundant residual heat removal (RHR) _ heat exchangers,primarily ge and inoperability due to , oyster shells blocking On April 25, 1981, the service water ficw through the heat exchanger tubes.
a' at Brunswick Unit 1, while in cold shutdown during a
- aintenarce cutage, the normal decay heat remeval system was lost when the single RHR heat exchanger in service failed.
The failure cccurred when the starting of a second RHR service water pump caused the failure of a baffle a in the the tubewaterecx bundle. of the RHR heat exchanger, allcwing cooling water to bycass inlet and outlet separated by a baffle.The heat exchanger is U-tube type, with the s i The copper-nickel baffle which was welded to the copper-nickel tubesheet deflected and failed when increased l pressure was procuced by starting the second service water pumo. The redundant i heat exchanger was inoperable due to maintenance in progress to recair its
- baffle wnich nad previously deflected (LER 1-81-32, dated May 19,1981). The licensee prcepcly established an alternate heat removal alignnent using the scent fuel pool pumps and heat exchangers.
As a result of the problems discovered with Unit 1 RHR heat exchangers, a special Unit inspection 2 aas at pcwer. of the Unit 2 RHR heat exchangers was cerfomed while technicues incicated no baffle displacement but flow testing indicated excessiveinoperable. declared cressure dr00 across the heat exchanger. This heat exchanger was Examinaticn and differential pressure measuremof the 2B RHR heat exchanger using ultrasonic damaged. ents indicated that the baffle plate was at reduced capacity (LER 2-31-49, ay dated .vThe licensee initiated a shutdcwn us 20, 1981). The failure of the baffle was attributed to excessive differential pressure caused by blockage of the heat exchanger tubes. The blockage was caused by the shells of oysters with minor amounts of other types of shells wnich were swept the serviceinto the heads water of the heat exchangers since they are the icw point in system. growing building. primarily in the 30" ' eader frcm the intake structure to the rea r the RHR heat exchangers where they collectec.As the oysters died their upp found in other heat exchangers cooled by service water.Small amounts of shells were SWRs use U-tube heat exchangers in the RHR system. (The heat Most of the ccerating exchanger! usec at 3runswick were type CEU, si:e 52-2-144.) manufactured by Perflex Corscration and are identified as The observed failures raise a cuestion on the adecuacy cf the baffie design long tem post accident operation.to withstand differential pressures that eculd the baffles at Brunswick ar However, it should be noted that since the water boxes are cccper e solid copper-nickel as are the tubeshee:s and nickel clad, the strength of the baffles and the baffle welds is somewnat less tnan similar heat exchangers made frca carbon steel. Therefore, heat exchangers in other SWR's may be able to tolerate higher differential cressure tnan that at Brunswick without caffle deflecticn (Srunswick opted fcr ccpcer-nickel due to its high corresten and fouling . resistance in a salt water environment.1 J
qgg. . - - . -- Atta, IN 8 IN 81-21 July 21, 1981 Page 3 of 3
-The use of differential pressure (do) ' sensing between inlet and outlet to determine heat exchanger operability should consider that baffle failure could give an acceptacle dp and flow indications and thereby mask incapability for heat removal. However, it is noted that shell blockage in a single-pass, straight-through heat exchanger can readily be detected by ficw and dp measurement.
Evaluation of the events at Brunswick is still continuing. Under conditions s of an inoperable RHR system, heat rejection to the ultimate heat sink is i typically through the main condenser or through the scent fuel pool coolers. i This latter path consists of the spent fuel pool pumps and heat exchanger with , the reactor building closed cooling water system as an intermediate system which transfers the heat to the service water system via a single pass heat l exchanger. These two means (i.e., main condenser or scent fuel pool) are not considered to be reliable long tern systam alignments under accident conditions. This information is provided as a notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. The events at Brunswick and San Cnofre emchasi:e the need. for licensees to initiate appropriate actions as requested by IES SI-03 for any credible type Jof sheli fish or other marine organisms; e.g., fresh water sponges, (not only asiatic clams and mussels). In case the continuing NRC review #inds that specific licensee actions would be accrocriate, a sucplement to IE3 Bulletin 31-03 may be issued. In the interim, we excect that licensees will review this infcrmation for applicability to their facilities. . No written response to this information is recuired. *f you need additional informaticn regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appro-priate NRC Regional Office. 9
Attachment:
Recently issued IE Information Notices
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Genti et,en : . The enclosec infor ration nctice is proviced as an early notific aticn Of a cossi::iy signif t ant matter. It is excected that recicients will review :ne infor ation f:r ;cssible acclicability to tr.eir facilities. "o spe:1f t action er res:ense-is eevested at :nis time. If f;rtne- %RC evaluations so incicate, an t
*E ci : lar er Oulletin wi'il te issuec to re: :: enc or ecuss; s:ecific i:ensee actions.
If you have cuesti:ns regarding-this ratter. ?iease ::ntact tnis 3f#'ce. Sircerely,
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- 2. IE Information Notice .N'c. 31-21
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140' t-. D Onss, rt ,J. 141 l interdisciplinary task rorce was r rmed within TVAa and an effort cas put CONTROL STUDIES ON Corbicula * "" FOR STEAM-ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANTS i ,$i[iN* "' L n coss. L ht. husow, it. a. R oma, p. c. Isou, c. Goocn, S. A. hiumury,
- c. c. punios. na w. s. tius DESCRil' TION OF TIIE BIOFOULING PROBLEM In order to understand the biofouling problem, a thorough assessment was INTRODUCTION made at TVA's Johnsonville Steam Plant. From this a determination was Vast quantities of water are removed daily from rivers, lakes, and streams made as to what systems were affected, how they were affected, and what for use m mdustrial processes. The greatest single industrial use of water is methods were being used to control the problem. Results of the Johnsonville for cooling purposes, and the greatest noncomsumptive industrial demand assessment will be used to describe the Corhicula fouling problem as-for water as a heat transfer medium comes from the steam-clectric generating sociated with fossil-fueled power plants.
mdustry. This water supports an untold diversity and quantity of biological There are typically two water systems in a fiissil. fueled pt mt -which use forms, a number of which cannot be segregated from process water befi>re it raw river water, the condenser cooling water (CCW) system and raw service is uwd. If these aquatic life fiirms remain in process water, both the aquatic water (RSW) system. The CCW system is used to condense spent turbine life and the mdustrial pmcess can potentially be affected (Goss and Cain, steam. The RSW system pmvides water for machinery cooling, plant service 1975). This paper deals with the adverse effects the biofouling organism, water, and firelines. Corbiculaf7mninen ( = m<milensis), has on power pla'nt water systems and Corhicula adversely affects the CCW system by fouling condensers. Typ-methods currently under study and being practiced to control Corbicula ical Corhicula control methodologies for condenser cooling water systems at biofouling at Ternessee Valley Authority steam-electric generating plants. fi>ssil-fueled plants include backflushing and mechanical and manual clean-ing of condensers. Due to both the high now velocities in the intake tunnels BACKGROUND (approximately 2.I m/s) preventing clam attachment and growth and the use of intake screens with a smaller mesh than the condenser tube size, con-TVA first experienced Corhicula fi>uling pmb! cms in condensers and ser. denser fouling by Corhicula is normally not a serious pmblem. Ilowever, any vice water systems at its Shawnee Steam Plant on the Ohio River in 1957 dead spaces where velocities are decreased allow for attachment and growth Smce then, the Asiatic clam has spread across the Tennessee Valley region of clams within the tunnel to a siec which can bh>ck condensers. and is fi>und at virtually all of TVA's steam-clectric and hydroelectric The RSW system components of finssil-fueled plants can be adversely generating stations. affected by Corbicula partially or totally blocking water flows in lines and
, In 1974 TVA became concerned that there might be a significant biofoul. equipment. Control methodologies typically applied fiir fi>ssil-fueled plant mg prob em due to reports of fouling at Browns Ferry Nu; lear Plant located RSW systems include screening (typically % in or 0.32 cm), mechanical on Wheeler Reservoir (Tennessee River), approximately 10 miles northwest clam traps on branch water lines, flushing lines such as typically stagnant of Decatur Alabama. Browns Ferry unit I began commercial operation in fire hydrant lines on a routine basis, chemical treatment of the water supply Augu i 1974. In October of that year, substantial numbers of clams were and manual c! caning. Strainers and traps help to forestall the Cmbirula liiund m the mlet water boxes. It was not until later when an Amertap system biofiiuling prob!cm and reduce it to a nuisance Icvel in the RSW system, but installed fiir condenser tube cleaning was first used that the extent of the Corhicula larvae are not prevented from passing to farther points within the condenser biofi>uling was realized. The majority of approximately 4500 system. Use of straining alone eventually results in the need for manual Amerrap baffs released into the system remained in condenser tubes blocked cleaning of the RSW system compi nents.
y debos and clams. The liiuling was so extensive that condensers had to be As opposed ta a typical fisssil. fuel plant's two raw water systems, a dismantled and cleaned with brushes. Loss of unit efficiency associated with nuclear plant typically has si>ur discrete raw water systems. These include such severe biofouling was substantial. the: (1) condenser cooling water system (CCW) (2) raw cooling water sys-It is suspected that the majority of clams finuling condenscr tubes at tem (RCW) O) essential raw cooling water system (liRCW)(4) raw service Hmwns Ferry, which has % inch (0.95 cm) vertical traveling screens, had water /high-pressure lire pmtection system (RSW-ilpl:p) actually grown w ulun the intake tunnel. The intake system had been llooded The purlwe of nuclear plant condenser cooling water systems is the same
'r more than tuo years beli>re unit startup, thereby, providing a suitable as fi>r lossil-fueled plants, to condense turbine steam. This system is charac-enuronment for Corbicula attachment and growth. terized by a high flow volume (1,060,000 gal / min or 4.0 x 10' 1/ min for Due to the nature and extent of the biofi>uling pmblem at Browns Ferry, an TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant). Clams again can affect the efficiency and
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t 18. t bss. .; ut. g a.s 1 14 L Il G m.csu/. ing on clam size. Larger cl ms (1.9 to 2.6 cm) secmed to be more susceptible chhiride may be an effective control for adult and young Asiatic clams at to low chkirine dioxide concentrations (less than 20 ppm), accounting for 20 concentrations of less than I mg/I. to 30 percent mortality. whereas smaller clams (1.0 to I.2 cm) were more susceptible to higher concentrations (greater than 20 ppm). accounting for 19 Control /cd Rc/c<nc Surfaces percent mortality. Veliger mortality (60 to 88 percent) was more pronounced than that of adults at high concentrations (greater than 60 ppm) with shorter Laboratory and licid studies were conducted on controlled release (CR) exposures. surfaces using triphenyt lead acetate and tributyltin oxide in vinyl and rubber A significant difference in residuals was found for each Clos concentra- based paints. The composition of these paints is shown in Tables I and II. tion. Generally, there was a greater percentage of residuals with progres- Lalwiratory binassays were conducted on three types of substrates - steel sively less concentrations. The presence of clams in the chlorine dioxide plates. cement. and stone -each painted with a 3 mil coating of base. coat solutions reduced the residuals by 3 to 18 percent. depending on clam size. primer over which a 5 mil coating of the candidate CR finish was applied. Under the conditions used in these studies. chlorine dioxide does not seem Laturatory panels were identical with those used in fieldstudies except for to be a powerful molluscide and does not offer promise for use in power plant siec. Small pancis (15.2 cm x 15.2 cm) wcre used in the laboratory to raw water systems. facilitate microscopic observation during exposures. Laboratoty bioassays Bromine Chloride Gross evaluations of bromine chloride (BrCl) were conducted on Asiatic Amount hlade: Two gallons clams in August and September of 1977. Tests were conducted on larval Paste: 475 grams eine oxide (XX604) before use ground finely clams taken from gravid adults. 95 grams amorphous silica (aerosil 380) A continuous. flow multiple diluter was used to control dilution of bromine 3 grams embon black (monarch 74) chloride which was in the range of 0.5 to 3.0 mg/l. 594 grams TPLA containing 109 dust depressant (Irgarol BI 547) The results of this study including chemical methodologies are being 800 grams methyl iso-huryl Letone and additi< mal completed at the present time. Preliminary results indicate that bromine _3(X) grams methyl iso. butyl Letone to get a smoother paste 2267 gram paste To: 3938 grams "four-rubber dispersion" made from: 2068 grams polyisopn:ne (natsyn 400)12.59 in toluene Ingredient Parts by Wt. Lbs. Cal. 990 grams chlorosulfonated polyethylene (hypalon-30) Red Iron Oxide (sof tex Red 1410) 4.58 54.95 1.34 25% in bentene zno 2 (xx631)2 21.18 253.77 5.43 330 gr ms styrene-dutadiene-styrene polymer (kraton ll01) Tate 3 (1313 canadian talc) 7.85 93.99 3.38 25% in tohiene Bentone 27 4 550 grams polymer resin (versalon i140) 33% m, : 0.45 5.42 0.34 g Methanol 0.12 1.45 0.20 ygg, gy Parlon S20 11.40 136.65 10.55 6205 grams W Cum Resin 6.10 23.02 8.14 Wanned to about 50*C. (122 I) to facilitate filtration xylene 33.95 407.19 56.30 Filiered through cheesecloth bloMeT TBTP Antifoulant 2.87 14.41 3.30 Contains approsimately 9% TPl.A in wet paint, CR about 28% in dry paint bioMeT 204 Antifoulant 11.50 137.73 11.02 Thimier supplied: 1500 hlilliliters containing two parts tohiene and one part 100.00 1.198.58 100.00 methyl iso-butyl ketone Viscosity 95 K.u.
- 1. Reichard; 2. N.J. Zinc; 3. W.C.& D., 4. N.L. Industries;5. Bercules Table 1. Composition of CR-1. See text.
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rFi eTv msih ht F r iic a h a r a r wPinf oa r e t ot opp mre re4 l l h ope oo t r d h uBt ah r udu n yse seoll et e a t c n eh t ote n re ates ybl n yce se ef c eil C l h u4C mht 2 etx h mp s r J l f o M mf a s r c ai sb r loht w
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. t.. n. o m.rr.,r. 't3 clam spawning season may later be required if clam pmblems develop with this reduced chlorination schedule. fliofouling Wo:Lshop held at Johns !!opkins University, llaltimore Alary Iand, June 16-19, 1975.
.o D. Raw Cooling Water System The RCW system initially shall also be treated for two three-week Alount, D. I. and W. A. Ilrungs.1967. A simplified dosing apparatus for periods a year. If the RCW system is supplied water by the heat rejection lish toxicology studies. Water Research, Pergamon Prew 1967. o system, the two three-week periods should be established by the river Sickel, J. II.1976. An ecologica! study of the Asiatic clam, Corhicula temperature rather than the temperature in the heat rejection system. m<milen3ii (Philippi, ILil)in the Altamaha River, Georgia, w ith emphasis Continuous chlorination during the spawning period may be required if on population dynamics, productivity and control methods.1976. Thesis, operating experience so dictates. Emory University, E. Condenser Cooling Wa er The heat rejection system shall have complete drainage capability for the purpose of cleaning the system in case an excessive population of clams develop. In addition for closed cycle heat rejection systems, provisions ' shall be made to strain the incoming makeup water and to ensure that the makeup water passes through the condenser prior to entering the cooling tower basin. Preliminary test results have shown that clams in the I.5 mm site range cannot withstand the high temperatures found at the main condenser discharge during the summer months. Directing the strained makeup water to the cooling tower discharge fiume rather than the cool-ing tower basin will quickly subject the incoming clam larvae to a lethal cycling thermal stress. SUNIN1ARY Corbicula fouling problems were first noted at TVA's Shawnee Steam Plant in 1957 and have since spread to virtually all of TVA's steam-c!cetric generating facilities. For the past two years TVA has been involved in a comprehensive research program to evaluate various existing and potential clam control methods and to develop systems which will ensure a Iequate and reliable water supplies for its electric generating facilities in an econom-ical manner. Control methods currently under laboratory and ' field investiga-tion include mechanical straininF, controlled release surfaces, chemical biocides and heat treatment. Controlled releases being studied include tributyl tin oxide (TIITO) and triphenyt lead acetate (TPLA). Chemicals being tested include chlorine, chlorine dioxide and bromine chlorine. Proposed design standards for future plant facilities have been developed based on current information availabic on Corhicula biofouling and methods of its alleviation. These standards currently represent the most feasible and prxtical methods for the control of the Asiatic clam in raw water systems and may be revised in the future depending on results obtained from research currently underway or by changes in federal or state regulations. LITERATURE CITED Goss, L.11. and Carl Cain, Jr.1975. Power plant condenser and service water system fouling by Corbicula, the Asiatic clam. Presented at the,
.)g 3 8.
g g at _
. Evalisation and Control of Macroinvertebrate !!uisance 1
Ork in Freshwater Industrial Supply Systems
. Billy G. Isora
_. y fisr/islod-Environrr.cntal t tnytrennentatBiology nencarch Drarch and nevelopment
^$ $UCH Tcanescue Valley Authorfty Muscle Shoals, Alabarna 35660 Introduction Reports of nacroinvertebrate nuisance prob 1cir.s in water supplies are not new. KracpelinJ1SSS,) reported raacroinvertebrates inhabiting water pipes at llamburg and enu:acrated 60 species including cponges, niussels, snaila, cocienterates, and bryozoa.
':hipolc t at . (1927) cited li.cidenecn of biological nuisaace in Itotterdeia, !!artford, bouton, and Brooklyn. !!ninance problens ucrc.ur.ually concerned with native f::ena and, in general, with problemc arising from invasion of open aqueducts, open clarifying bacius, or unce.vered reservoirs acccasibic to the fauna.
The 1:ational Elcetric I,ight Accociation (1926) reported on
" restrictions in ficw due to vegetabic and animal growths in conduits."
They reported problenu uith ccddieflies and hellgruneaites. The only means of control used uas teriodic nanual cicaning of condensern and pipen and, in I one instance, backwaahing of condonnern. l t Currently there are fcu probicais with biological nuinance organi:.u.s l in icnneuoce Valley arca do:a".t ie water supply nystctas. A few probicets have been reported with 49 f atic clams in inw.p intnke ,tructures and in unchlor!nited
-~
l - _ l 1. To be presented at the 10t!. Annual 1:ceting of the Miduest Bentholonical Society, Univ rr.iiy of fotre Inne, ! ot re it.ine , Indiana, ittrch 2',-06, 1973-000004 I
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delivery pipes to water treatment facilitics. Uater planto that provido pre-chlorination at the pump intoke site have no probicms with biological nuisance. One exception is a_ TVA facility at Ifuocle Shoals, Alabama, which provides reu water from corr =on intake pumps for both industrial and domestic uses. Water is chlorinated (1 ppm total residosi) at the intake structure two to three times each day for continuous periods of approximately 35 minutes for olid control. During the Asictic clam breeding season, which extends from May to Septe:cher at longitude 87* and latitude 34', chlorination (1 ppm) is practiced
- . - - ..~ ._ . _ _ _ ..--
twice for 21 days--on May 15 and again on September 15--with good results. Ifowever, the domestic treatment facility has experienced the presonen of - _- ~
-Asiatic clams in- .the .
scration - basin. Veligern or young Aniatic clams
~ ~ .-- --
reaching the aeration basin arc apparently protected from the chlorination procedure by the ceration . . - - - process. Some Current Control Practicer, for P.toior leal 1:uicance In January 1971 a curvey of biological nuinance control practices uns unde at 10 TVA cloc:ric power stations. Some power stations were using
- no antifouling procedures except brushing and cicaning of condensers during "cutuges." Other p15.nts cicaned condenscra manually during outcgco and used "olug" chlorination (1 ppm total residual) for continuous periodo of 30 to 60 minutco one to three timco during a 24-hour o . crating period for elima centrol. Only one plant used continuous chlorinatica (1 ppm total residual) i for slime control. Sene planta discontinuo chlorination for edime control when the water temperature in Icas than 65' r (10.3* C).
Beauchan:p (1969) han reported that introduction of 0.5 ppm chlorine continuously in a coastal povar otation unter supply has proved to be an , effective control for marine fouling that 1.s coupatibic vith rearing of plaico and sole in the diocharged water. Sincluir (1964) reported the use of
- _ 0.5 ppn chlorine r tdual for the control of larval Aniatic clares.
. . - . _ , m.. _ , . _ _ . , . _ , _ _ - _ . --..
. .m - . , _ - . . . , _ _ , . _ - . _ . . . , _ . , . . . . _ . . . . _ . , _ , , - , _ _ _ _ , , . _ _ , _ . _ _ _ . , , _ _ _ _ _ _
* ,a
_ Sundberg (1971) indicated that the use of self-c1 caning, rotating, 16-mesh screens did not prevent intrusion of Asiatic clam veligers into water storage facilities where they grew to maturity. lie noted that voligers
-~~ ,_.- . - - _. -
are released fro:n the adult clams when the temperature reaches 62-65' F
-(16.7-18.3* C) in the spring and early sueter. !!c also indicated that "If
. - . - ~ . .
a low chlorine residual of 0.25 to 0.35 ppm is maintained continuously for a period of 48 hours when the water temperature is above 65* F (18.3* C), the young clams aro killed." Continuous low residual chlorine is now used to control Asiatic clams in cooling water systems at five pumping stations ' on the Colorado River aqueduct. Elsewhere, general practice for Asiatic clam control is continuous administration of 0.5-1.0 pptr. total chlorine residual for one or tuo 3-ucch periods during the breeding season. I'ay a ***6 I *' ** (* # 3 b** CI?I.*.* *"! ?? * !"I t'tt E * 'f ? .* t
- Green en1 Stumpf (1964) found that the mode uf action of chlorine on organisms is by reaction of hypochlorous acid (I!OC1) with an enzyme (triosepl osphoric dehydrogenaae) s hich is essential as a catalyst for glucose oxidation. Electrical neutrality and small molecular size of HOC 1 probably accounts for its cuperior capability to kill organisms (Fair et al. ,
1948). I.cubusch (1962) noted that the negative charge of OCl accounts for its low bactericidal effect. As inferred above, biocidal capacity of chlorine is due to !!OC1. IIOC1 concentration resulting fron hypochlorites or chlorc:ninec is due to the undissociated l'OCl concentration of the solution (Fair et al. ,1948; Sawyer,1960; I.aubusch,1962). Concentration of undiscociated !!0C1 is a function of pil as will be shown. When gaccous chlorine or hypochlorite in 1 i
'4 added to water, hypochlorous acid (!!OC1) and hypochlorite iona (OC1~) are formed.
- 1. Chlorine gas, C12 + !!2 0 , ' IIOC1 + !!+ + Cl-
- 2. Ilypochlorites, Ca(OC1)2 + 1120 ' Ca" + ll 02 + 2 OCl-
- 3. OC1' + 11+ , '110C1
!!001-0C1~ equilibrium is pli dependent (Satryer, 1960; Laubusch, 1962). Sat:jer (1960) noted the same equilibria are re'ali::cd in water regardless of whether chlorine or hypochlorites are added; however, ". . . chlorine tends to decrease the pil whereas hypochlorites tend to increase the pl!." Percent
!!OC1 is 100 and OCl is 0 at pII 4.0 and 207. C; 757.110C1 and 24.8'7 OC1' occur about pil 7.0; and 0.37,110C1 and 99.77. OC1~ occur at approxitaately pli 10.0 (Fair et al. ,1948).
Power stations or industrics associated with productive uaters or polluted waters carrying an organic load will nearly aluays experience combined chlorine residuata (chlorr.mine renidual) duc to reactions of chlorir.: with nitrogen containing organic compounda (Sawyer, 1960). I.aubusch (1962) noted that as an operating guide in water treatment plants about 25 times core chlorauine than free chlorine is required to obtain 1007. disinfection; to achicyc the same disinfection uith the same dosages of chlorino, chloramines require approxireately 100 times the exposure period of free forrs. Kinman and Layton (1969) noted that despite relatively low toxicity of chlornminos (Ill!2C1, :;ildI 2) and nitrogen trichloride (1 C1 3) compared with free availabic chlorine (!!OC1) 30 of 100 largest citico in the 11. S. in 1962 used chlora:aines to disinfect their water r.upplies. Chloramine dir: infection is practiced because of the inability to maintain free availabic chlorine residual in the water distri-bution systems. It scens reasonable that ac r. nut power station sites tic a e
5 would be dealing with chloramine (cor.bined) releases to the environment; however, most chemical evaluations have been for total chlorine residual. Data show that the use of chlorinc and chlorinated compounds in treatment of biological nuisance organistas poses a definite threat to the aquatic ' environ:aent. Chlorinacion practicca racy be injurious not only to target organisms but also to the aquatic environ:nonts with which they are i associated. Arthur and Eaton (1971) indicate chloramines are detrimental to fathead minnows (Pimephales prom 31as Rafinesque) and amphipods (Gamarus pseudolimnaeus Bousficid) in very low concentrations. Total residual chloramines having no effect were 16 and < 3.4 ag/1, respectively, trutaber O of spawnings per fathead minnow female was reduced at 43 pg/l (P = 0.05), and the 9?-hour TLm was in the range of 35-154 ag/l total chloramine under conditions of tests. The 96-hour Tin total chloramine toxicity to amphipods was 220 pg/1; reproductive success was tauch Iccs in concentrations of 3.4' and 16 eg/l than in controls. Zillich (1970) ha: chown that chloramines annocia:ed 4 with chlorinsted sewage had a 96-hour threshold toxicity of 0.04 pp:a and a 96-hour tim average of 0.05-0.16 ppm to the fathead minnow. Coventry et al. (1935) found chloramine concentrations of 0.4 ppm killed trout and sunfish; 0.05-0.06 ppm killed trout fry in 48 hours. Other data show similar results, but more research is needed to adequately define the current and potential effect of chlorination practices associated uith water treatnant, control of biological nuisance in industrial cooling vater systems, postehlorination, and tertiary treatment of sewage effluents. Application of chlorine or chloramines for the control of biolos;ic:1
- nuisance may result in pollution of the aquatic environment if measures are not taken to restrict tteatrent to target organtems by dcchlorination.
Dechlorination can be accomplished with the .nh!1 tion of sodium thiosulfate. t
- - . - - - - . - . - y -. ,s. _ . - ,w- _.vo-+_,,,-m - - , -r n-------,-w,.,_-,..--_,,.m.,.,-,--- ,m- , -., m ,w---,,,,,_,,s
m '
.4 , !
, '7- ,,
4 , i sodium bisulfate, sodica 'sulphite, or activated carbon (Hoever,1943). '
, i However, none of these rocasurca would be practical at power stations because ji of the large volumes of water used. ,
o
~
Alternativo control'hanures ' - Alternatives to,' chlorination for biological nuisance control are numerous. Some of them are metal ions, ultrasonic vibration, onetric ficids, ozonation, and hnt water. Morton (1969)-has reviewed a nunber of methods for the control of mussels (Drcinsena), vrostly. Russian experience. - Lyakhov (1964) has noted that of extensive rescarch with metal fons, copper proved most effective for the control of Orei :nona. Ingri.m
- .- - - ~ _ __
(1956) noted that of molluscacidos available only chlorine and copper would be allowabic as delineated by drinking water standards. Itukar.in ( 9 4) no:cd :ha: due to hidh cencentEations of C dO,, 5Hz0 and relatively long retention time required to kill pref snen. th"at heated water is a more practical control of Drein::ena in thenaal power plant % Lyakhov (1964) noted the use of heated unter experimentaticn to determinc - optimum water temperature required to kill molluck but did not note optimum found. Akramouski (personal communication) 'iodicated that a revicu of current _ s USSR malacolo$ical literature revealed that use of hot uater is enphasized for centrol of Dreissona. l Recent experiments in our laboratory shawed virtually instantancoas i mortality of Asiatic clams (Corbicula manilensinL15111ppi) placed in 43-30" C (109.4-122.0* F) water. Fiftcen minutes was chosen arbitrarily as a reasonable exposure period that might be considerett for power ctatica practico. cnrbicula ucre taken from Wilson Reservoir with a water te: perature of 10' C (50' r) + and accilmated to 21' C (69.8' F) in the laboratory. 'No animals vera use I in each experiecnc in oi:cs ranging from 22.3 inn to 43.5 rr.; and the test was l l l l
,.-.- - - , . . - . -. , . . _ . , - - , , - . . - . - , , , - , . - - , - . , , - , . , - - . - - . , - , ,......u.
7 replicated. Following exposure periods of 15 minutes, overnight recovery in lake water was allowed for final determination of mortality at cach temperature (Table 1). More research is needed on non-chemical methods and procedures for~ biological nuisance control. Discuanton Present methods for control of Asiatic clams (C_. manflensis Philippi) includo ucchsnical procedures and chlorination. Domestic water . supply systems using prochlorination (0.5 ppm residual) at pump intakes experience no prob 1 cms with Asiatic clams - - or other biological nuisance organisms. Control of biological nuisance in industrial water supplies is principally by chic.cfonica. "Sloo" cht w fanti..a ( r.c.c.) for pm f od s ..i 30-60 minutes one to three times daily is of ten used for slime cor'itrol. Continuous chlorination (1 ppm) for up to 21 days once or twice during the _ Asiatic clam breeding season provides adequate control of Asiatic clams at associated biological nuisance organisms. Vettgers usually begin to appear when water temperatures reach 62-65* P 6.7-13.3
- C) in the spring or early sumner. Another successful practice for the control of Asiatic clams is 0.25 to 0.35 ppm chlorine applied continuounty for 48 hours.
Efficacy of chlorine or chloramines for the control of biological nuisance is in question at this time. Many data in the literature indicate chloramine toxicity to sc1ceted aquatic animals in concentrations Icss than 0.1 ppm and interference with ' reproduction capacity at 1 css than 20 ppb. Use of hot water for the control of biological nuisance associated with themal electric stations may be an effective alternative to chlorination. _ . . . . . . . . - - - . _ - _ ~ . . . . ... _ - - . Increasing retention time of water passing through the condensers would cle. ate f
..c . , ,., , . , _ _ , , - , , - - - .. -,-, , .-.-, .e ,. - - . - - - , , - . _ . , - - , , , , , . + , ., , , . . . .
~
8 the water temperature for control of biological nuisance. If only one condenser was treated per unit time and the treatment water mixed with the total effluent, there would be no appreciabic increase in water. temperature discharged to the environment. If the condenser treatment water could be used to ' flush other servicc~ water conduits perhaps a system could be evolved to climinate biological nuisance from thermal electric stations. Fiftcen-minute treatment of Asiatic cisms with water in the 43-50' C (109.4-122.0* F) temperature range proved lethal under laboratory conditions. Conclusions
- 1. Data show that chloramine releases to aquatic environmental
. systems may be lethal or reduce reproductive capacity of fish and macro-invertebrates at concentrations of 0.1 ppm to Ics9 than 70.0 pph.
- 2. Asiatic clama (C. manilensin) exposed to water temperature of 43-50' C (109.4-122.0* F) for 15 minutes proved Icthal. Use of heated water may be an effective alternative to chemical control of aquatic nuisance organisms.
- 3. Procent general practice for control of Asiati.c clam is continuous chlorination for maintenance of 0.5-1.0 ppm total chlorine residust for one or two 3-week periods during the breeding season or uhen v.:ter temperature is above 18.3* C (65.O' F). Chlorine residual of 0.25 tc. 0.35 ppm maintained for 48 hours when the vator temperature is above 18.3' C (65.0* F) has proved to be an effective control fcr younC Asiatic clam: In one unter system.
. - , - n . - , - - - - - - - . - - , ,
. ~,
Table 1. Fiftcon-minuto exposure of Asiatic clams (corbicula panilensin Philippi) to various water teinparatures Apparent Surviva). Real Survival Renlicate No. Sneef:en No. 24 lirs. Af ted Taw ernterc *: Tir:e (nin. ) Tronten: t 1 1 2 21* / 2i4
; eg 15:00 47gy, 15:00 2 1 i 21* * /-;d, cg/ 15:00 2 21* gggy, 15.:00 1 1 37 2 37[cfyjaf 15:00 15:00 gggy, 2 1 37 15:00 2 37 [rf {t /,'/ gggy, 15:00 1 1 2 40 fp/cg) 40 2:00 gggyo 4:10
[/09 #/ Alive 1 1 43 2 43 [jg,<f.jr) 1:30
,,g 1:30 2 / b'/C < 1 30 Dead 1 1 45 2 45[j73eg} :35
- 40 Dead 2 1 45 j 3 gj-)p :40 2 45 Dead
- 45 1 1 47 2 47 / ~/ '/] :45
- 35 Dead 2 1 45 / / $' :40 2 47 / /~/ i*[/
/ :40 Dead 1 1 50 2 50 ') 7'/h :05 Dead
- 07 2 1 s
2 50 / ']J) <[~' :10 50 Dead
- 15
*Cc ntrels
Literatura Cited Arthur, John W. and John C. Eaton. 1971. Toxicity of chlorcmines to the amphipod Gammarus pseudolimnaeus Dousfield and the fathcad minnow Pimephales promelas Rafinesque. FWQA, Duluth, 17 pp. 9.tbis. (llas been submitted for publication.) Beauchamp, R. S. A. 1969. The use of chlorine in the coolina water systems of coastal power stations. Second Thermal Workshop, IDP, Chesapeake Sci. 10(3 & 4):280. Coventry, F. L. , '!. E. Shelford, and L F. Miller. 1935. The conditioning of a chloramine treated water supply for bioicgical purposes. Ecology 16: 60-66 (Af ter Jones, J, R. E. 1964, Fish and River Pollution). Fair, Cordon M., J. Carrell Morris, Lu Shih Chang, Ira Well, and Robert P. Burden. 1948. Chlorinc as a water disinfectant. JAWRA 40(10):1051-1061 , Green, D. E and P. K. Stumpf. 1944. The code of action of chlorine. JAWWA 38:1301. Noover, Charles P. 1943. Water supply and treatmant. Bull. 211', Natl. Lime Assoc. 206 pp. Ingram, William Marcus. 1956. Snail and clam infestations of drinking-water supplies. JAWWA 48(3):258-268. Kinman, Riley N. and Ronald P. Layton. 1969. New methods for water disinfection. 157th Mect. ACS, Div. Water, Air, and Waste Chem., prcprints of papers, pp. 131-136. (Used by permission of the authors). Kracpelin, K. 1885. Fauna der llamburger Wassericitung. Abh. d. Nat. vor, llamburg. 9. (from Uhipplc et al. ,1927) . Laubusch, Edmund J. 1962. Water chlorination. In: Chlorfac. Edited by J. S Sconce. Reinhold pub. Co. , Ucw York, pp. 457-484. Lukanin, V. S. 1964. Survival of adult Dreisnena in copper sulfato solution of different concentration and temperature. In: nf olony end control of Decinsena. Edited by D. K. Shtcgman. Israel program for Scientific Transistion, 1960, pp. 69-70.
i Lyakhov, S. M. 1964. Work of the institute of biology of inland waters. Acad. Sci. USSR. In: Biolony and control of Dre19aena. Edited by B. K. Shtegman. Israel Program for Scientific Translation,1968, pp. 55-59. Horton, B. S. 1969. Studies on the biology of Dreiscena polymorpha Pall. 4 Rabits, habitats, distribution, and control. Water Treat. ;;xam. 18:233-240. National Electric Light Association. 1926. Restriction in flou due to vegetable and animal Crowths in conduits. Proc. 49th Cony. 83:801-803. Sawyer, clair N. 1960. Chemistry for Sanitary Engincors. McGraw-Hill Book Co . Inc. 367 pp.
- Sinclair, Ralph M. 1964. Clam pests in Tennessco water supplies. JANWA 56(5):
592-599. Sundberg, Harold W. 1971. Control of Asiatic cisms in metropolitan water system. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Laverne, 2 pp. (rcrse.r.a1 cou..wi. ation). Whipple, George Chr.ngler, Cordon Masters Fair, and Melville Cenicy Whipple. 1927. .The Microscopy of lirinking Water. John U11cy and Sons, New York. 505 pp. 19 plates. Zillich, John A. 1970. A discussion of the toxicity of combined chlorine to lotic fish populations. (Unpublished). Mich. Unter Resources Comm., Bur. Water Mgmt. , Dept. Nat. Resources, 13 pp. t
/
e-Additional Bibliography Anon. 1963. Littic creatures clog big canals. The Reclamation Era, November, pp. 96-98. Anon. 1967. Water quality and biologic conditions South Bay aqueduct 1962-1966. Calif. Dept. Water Resources, 180 pp. I plate. Butterficid, C. T. 1948. Bactericidal propertion of free and combined availabic chlorine. JAWA 40(12):1305-1312. Charebers, Cecil W. and Nortnan A, Clarke. 1966. Control of bacecria in nondomestic water supplies. Advances in'Apolled llicrobiolony 8:105-143, Acadenic Press. Derby, Ray L. 1947. Control of slime growths in transmission lines. JAWA 39(11):1107-1114. Faber, Harry A. 1948. Developments in water chlorination practice during , 1947. JAWWA 40(5):1943 nc.tard, Mar =a= J. 1947. Super-chlorinatien and de'chlorinntion. - JAWA 39 l (12):1241-1244. Ingram, William M. 1959. Asiatic clams as potential pests in California water supplics. JAWA 51(3):363-370. Jacobson, S. and M. S. Wellington. 1947. Chlorination experiences with surface supplics. JAWA 39(1):65-69. Jennings, C. A. 1948. The significance of the Bubbly Crock experiment. JAWA 40(10):1037-1041. Lachner, Ernest A. , C. Richard Robbins, and Ualter H. Courtenay, Jr. 1970. Exotic fiches and otbcr aquatic organisms introduced into !! orth America. Smithsonian Contr. to Zool. No. 59:29 pp. Lautcr, Carl J. 1947. De-chlorination at the Washington Aqueduct. JAWA 39
.(12):1237-1240.
!!orton, Brian S. 1969. Studies on the biology of Dreinr:cna polworpha Pall.
III. Population dynamics. Proc. Malac. Soc. Lond. 38:471-481.
..,, - ,---.- ,, -m-_.,y -
s.-. . . . , , , . - , , - - -
~
Z UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATOEY COMMISSION DOCKETED USNR" In the matter of CAROLIKA POWER k LIGHT CO. Et al. ) Dockets 50-1400 SN.earon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2. ) and 501:L01 0.L. CEltrIFICATEOF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of wennnm. m A @ f4 fit Qesnonding to Anplicants and Staff on Eddleman 2.758 Petition (s hk s *below) HAVE been served this 30 day of sentomb,,, 1983,_, by deposit in the US W il, first-class postage prepe.id, upon all parties whose names are listed below, except those whose names are marked with
- an asterisk, for whom service was accor:plished by including a nacket of the larger documents referenced in 9/27 resnonses on summary disuosition (1 Board, 3 Dktg & Sve, 1 Anns, 1 Staff), which nrocedure
- Ju ges James ell ,G g *8 N 1 7 '"
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555
- George F. Trowbridge (attorney for Applicants)
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ILuthanne G. Miller 1800 M St. NW ASLB Panel Washington, DC 20036 USNRC Washington DC 2C55 5 t ' *0ffice of the Executive Legal Director Phyllis Lotchin, Ph.D. l Attn Dacke ts 50-400/401 0.L. 10B Bridle Run USNRC Chanel Hill NC 2751h Washington DC 20555 Dan Read I
- Docketing and Service Section[3K) CEA N .
Attn Docke ts 50-h00/h01 0.L. Box 52 Office of the Secretary Chapel Hill NC 2751h USNBC ufashington DC 20555 Robert 9Puber, Exec. Dir. Public Staff,Aox 991 Runkle Raleigh, RC'27602 , 307 Granville Rd . Chapel Hill We 2751k Bradley W. Jones USNRC Region II
~Travia Fayne 101 Marietta St.
Edelstein & Payne Atlanta GA 30303 Mox 12607 Raleigh NC 27605 Richard Wilson, M.D. Certified by h 729 Hunter St. Apex NC 27502 l
. - . . - , - - . . - . - - - L. .. - - . . - - - - . - - - - . - . . . . . . . . - - - - , .}}