Text

2015-09-Final-Operating Test
	ML15264A719
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/09/2015
From:	Vincent Gaddy; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Entergy Operations
References
	Download: ML15264A719 (435)
	v • d • e

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Date of Examination: 08/24/2015 Examination Level: RO X SRO Operating Test Number: 2015-1 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Determine CEA#1 Upper Gripper Coil Temperature A1. Conduct of Operations D/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-XTCEA 2.1.23 RO (4.3)

Determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure A2. Conduct of Operations N/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 2.1.25 RO (3.9)

Evaluate Containment Atmospheric Conditions.

A3. Equipment Control D/P/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT 2.2.12 RO (3.7)

Determine condenser off gas radiation monitor setting.

A4. Radiation Control M/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON 2.3.15 RO (2.9)

Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Revision 0

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Date of Examination: 08/24/2015 Examination Level: RO SRO X Operating Test Number: 2015-1 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Determine which operators are available for call out.

A5. Conduct of Operations N/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK 2.1.5 SRO (3.9)

Determine Shutdown Operations Protection Plan Condition A6. Conduct of Operations D/P/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 2.1.40 SRO (3.9)

Verify RPS trip set point determination for M/R inoperable MSSV A7. Equipment Control ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-MSSVINOP 2.2.40 SRO (4.7)

Calculate expected dose for Re-entry during an D/R emergency and determine if entry is allowed.

A8. Radiation Control ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-EMGRESPSRO 2.3.4 SRO (3.7)

Determine protective action recommendations A9. Emergency Plan M/R ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-PAR2 2.4.44 SRO (4.4)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Revision 0

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-XTCEA A1 PAGE 1 of 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 01 DATE:

SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System TASK: Determine CEA#1 Upper Gripper Coil Temperature JTA#: ANO2-RO-CEDM-NORM-10 Alternate Path Yes: No: X Time Critical Yes: X KA VALUE RO: 3.9 SRO: 4.0 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.23 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: BOTH: X SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 Minutes REFERENCE(S): OP 2105.009 EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time Stop Time Total Time

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-XTCEA A1 PAGE 2 of 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is at full power.

Both Main Chillers have tripped and cannot be started.

I&C is not available to obtain CEDM Coil temperatures.

OP 2203.012M, 2K13 ACA, for window C4, CEDM Cooling coils Water Flow Low is in alarm.

CEA #1 is not on the Hold Bus.

Readings obtained from the CEDM coil using a calibrated DVM are:

Upper Gripper coil voltage (Terminals #4 and #5 on TBC4C6) is equal to 44V.

Upper Gripper shunt voltage (across pins C and D) is equal to 7.12 mV.

TASK STANDARD:

Calculated CEA #01 coil amperage, resistance and determined coil temperature to be 400.042°F and 420.043°F.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

1. OP-2105.009 Exhibit 2

2. Calculator EXAMINER NOTES:

OP-2105.009 should be completed up to step 4.3.1.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-XTCEA A1 PAGE 3 of 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

The SM directs, As directed by OP 2203.012M, 2K13-C4, CEDM Cooling coils Water Flow Low ACA, calculate the Upper Gripper temperature for CEA 01 using 2105.009, Exhibit 2.

START TIME:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

Examiners Cue:

OP-2105.009 Exhibit 2 should be completed up to step 4.3.1 (with values filled in).

(C) 1. Utilize ohms law to calculate Examinee calculated current to N/A SAT UNSAT (Step 5) coil current (Icoil) as follows. be between 3.56 to 3.6 amps.

(Icoil) = (Vshunt) ______V ÷

.002 ohms.

(Icoil) = ______ amps (C) 2. Calculate coil resistance Examinee calculated resistance N/A SAT UNSAT (Steps (Rcoil1) as follows: of the coil to be between 12.2 6 and and 12.36 ohms.

6.1)

(Rcoil1) = (Vug)______V

÷ (Icoil) ______ amps (Rcoil1) = ______ ohms Procedure Note Lead resistance must be subtracted to obtain accurate reading. Lead resistance for CEA #1 is provided in this calculation. However, a lookup table for lead resistance is provided when using WO# 50654677 to calculate other CEA coil temperatures.

(C) 3. (Rcoil2) = ______(Rcoil1) - Examinee calculated resistance N/A SAT UNSAT (Steps .525 ohms(CEA #01 lead of the Rcoil2 to be between 6.2 and resistance). 11.675 and 11.835 ohms.

6.3)

(Rcoil2) = ______ ohms (C) 4. Obtain CEA #01 coil Examinee calculated correct N/A SAT UNSAT (Steps temperature as follows: CEA 01 upper gripper coil 7.0 and temperature to be 413.376°F.

7.1)

Use the following to obtain Acceptable range ( 400.042°F CEA #01 coil temperature: and 420.043°F)

Coil resistance (Rcoil2) calculated in step 6.0 Table below END STOP TIME:

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-XTCEA A1 PAGE 4 of 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Examiners COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is at full power.

Both Main Chillers have tripped and cannot be started.

I&C is not available to obtain CEDM Coil temperatures.

OP 2203.012M, 2K13 ACA, for window C4, CEDM Cooling coils Water Flow Low is in alarm.

CEA #1 is not on the Hold Bus.

Readings obtained from the CEDM coil using a calibrated DVM are:

o Upper Gripper coil voltage (Terminals #4 and #5 on TBC4C6) is equal to 44V.

o Upper Gripper shunt voltage (across pins C and D) is equal to 7.12 mV.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to calculate the Upper Gripper temperature for CEA 01 using 2105.009, Exhibit 2 starting with step 5. Table interpolation not required.

Acceptable Temperature Range: ( 400.042°F and 420.043°F)

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-XTCEA A1 PAGE 5 of 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Examinees COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is at full power.

Both Main Chillers have tripped and cannot be started.

I&C is not available to obtain CEDM Coil temperatures.

OP 2203.012M, 2K13 ACA, for window C4, CEDM Cooling coils Water Flow Low is in alarm.

CEA #1 is not on the Hold Bus.

Readings obtained from the CEDM coil using a calibrated DVM are:

o Upper Gripper coil voltage (Terminals #4 and #5 on TBC4C6) is equal to 44V.

o Upper Gripper shunt voltage (across pins C and D) is equal to 7.12 mV.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to calculate the Upper Gripper temperature for CEA 01 using 2105.009, Exhibit 2 starting with step 5. Table interpolation not required.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 18 of 44 2105.009 CEDM CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION CHANGE: 032 EXHIBIT 2 2105.009 Revised 04/24/13 CEA #01 UPPER GRIPPER COIL TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT PAGE 1 OF 2 Exhibit provides Operations ability to measure and trend CEA-01 upper gripper coil temperature. Other historically hot CEAs (2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 18, 55, 63, and 72) can also be measured by referring to WO# 50654677 CR-ANO-2-1999-0433-004.

1.0 Obtain currently calibrated Handheld Digital Voltmeter (DVM) or equivalent multimeter (Refer to 2OPG-012 for DVM usage).

NOTE Hold Bus voltage prevents obtaining proper temperature readings.

Record absolute values of voltage readings obtained.

2.0 Check CEA #01 NOT on Hold Bus.

3.0 Obtain CEA #01 Upper Gripper coil voltage (Vug) as follows:

3.1 Locate CEA #1 power cables in panel on TBC4C6, (behind access panel to left of 2C72 door).

3.2 With DVM scale set on 200, take voltage reading across Black and White cables located on TBC4C6, terminals #4 and #5. (A typical reading is 44 VDC).

44 V (Vug) = ______

4.0 Obtain CEA #01 Upper Gripper shunt voltage (Vshunt) as follows:

4.1 Locate CEA #01 coil monitor connector on front side of 2C72. (This is a round, capped connector with (#1) located directly above it.

4.2 Remove connector cap by unscrewing.

4.3 With DVM scale set on 200mV, take voltage reading across pins C and D. (A typical reading is 8 millivolts DC.)

4.3.1 7.12 Record DVM reading = _______mV 7.12 0.00712 Convert mV to Volts:_______ mV X 1 V = ________V 1000 mV 0.00712 V Record (Vshunt) = ______

4.4 Screw connector cap back on CEA #01 coil monitor connector.

5.0 Utilize ohms law to calculate coil current (Icoil) as follows.

5.1 (Icoil) = (Vshunt) ______V ÷ .002 ohms.

5.2 (Icoil) = ______ amps

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 19 of 44 2105.009 CEDM CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION CHANGE: 032 EXHIBIT 2 2105.009 Revised 04/24/13 CEA #01 UPPER GRIPPER COIL TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT PAGE 2 OF 2 6.0 Calculate coil resistance (Rcoil1) as follows:

6.1 (Rcoil1) = (Vug)______V ÷ (Icoil) ______ amps (Rcoil1) = ______ ohms NOTE Lead resistance must be subtracted to obtain accurate reading. Lead resistance for CEA #1 is provided in this calculation. However, a lookup table for lead resistance is provided when using WO# 50654677 to calculate other CEA coil temperatures.

6.2 (Rcoil2) = ______(Rcoil1) - .525 ohms(CEA #01 lead resistance).

6.3 (Rcoil2) = ______ ohms 7.0 Obtain CEA #01 coil temperature as follows:

7.1 Use the following to obtain CEA #01 coil temperature:

Coil resistance (Rcoil2) calculated in step 6.0 Table below RESISTANCE TEMP RESISTANCE TEMP RESISTANCE TEMP RESISTANCE TEMP 5.6 0.022 7.5 126.695 9.4 253.368 11.3 380.041 5.7 6.689 7.6 133.362 9.5 260.035 11.4 386.708 5.8 13.356 7.7 140.029 9.6 266.702 11.5 393.375 5.9 20.023 7.8 146.696 9.7 273.369 11.6 400.042 6 26.69 7.9 153.363 9.8 280.036 11.7 406.709 6.1 33.357 8 160.03 9.9 286.703 11.8 413.376 6.2 40.024 8.1 166.697 10 293.37 11.9 420.043 6.3 46.691 8.2 173.364 10.1 300.037 12 426.71 6.4 53.358 8.3 180.031 10.2 306.704 12.1 433.377 6.5 60.025 8.4 186.698 10.3 313.371 12.2 440.044 6.6 66.692 8.5 193.365 10.4 320.038 12.3 446.711 6.7 73.359 8.6 200.032 10.5 326.705 12.4 453.378 6.8 80.026 8.7 206.699 10.6 333.372 12.5 460.045 6.9 86.693 8.8 213.366 10.7 340.039 12.6 466.705 7 93.36 8.9 220.033 10.8 346.706 12.7 473.365 7.1 100.027 9 226.7 10.9 353.373 12.8 480.025 7.2 106.694 9.1 233.367 11 360.04 12.9 493.345 7.3 113.361 9.2 240.034 11.1 366.707 13 500.050 7.4 120.028 9.3 246.701 11.2 373.374 13.1 506.665 All applicable steps are complete.

Expected system response obtained.

KEY PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 18 of 44 2105.009 CEDM CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION CHANGE: 032 EXHIBIT 2 2105.009 Revised 04/24/13 CEA #01 UPPER GRIPPER COIL TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT PAGE 1 OF 2 Exhibit provides Operations ability to measure and trend CEA-01 upper gripper coil temperature. Other historically hot CEAs (2, 4, 8, 14, 15, 18, 55, 63, and 72) can also be measured by referring to WO# 50654677 CR-ANO-2-1999-0433-004.

1.0 Obtain currently calibrated Handheld Digital Voltmeter (DVM) or equivalent multimeter (Refer to 2OPG-012 for DVM usage).

NOTE Hold Bus voltage prevents obtaining proper temperature readings.

Record absolute values of voltage readings obtained.

2.0 Check CEA #01 NOT on Hold Bus.

3.0 Obtain CEA #01 Upper Gripper coil voltage (Vug) as follows:

3.1 Locate CEA #1 power cables in panel on TBC4C6, (behind access panel to left of 2C72 door).

3.2 With DVM scale set on 200, take voltage reading across Black and White cables located on TBC4C6, terminals #4 and #5. (A typical reading is 44 VDC).

44 V (Vug) = ______

4.0 Obtain CEA #01 Upper Gripper shunt voltage (Vshunt) as follows:

4.1 Locate CEA #01 coil monitor connector on front side of 2C72. (This is a round, capped connector with (#1) located directly above it.

4.2 Remove connector cap by unscrewing.

4.3 With DVM scale set on 200mV, take voltage reading across pins C and D. (A typical reading is 8 millivolts DC.)

4.3.1 7.12 Record DVM reading = _______mV 7.12 0.00712 Convert mV to Volts:_______ mV X 1 V = ________V 1000 mV 0.00712 V Record (Vshunt) = ______

4.4 Screw connector cap back on CEA #01 coil monitor connector.

5.0 Utilize ohms law to calculate coil current (Icoil) as follows.

5.1 (Icoil) = (Vshunt) 0.00712

______V ÷ .002 ohms.

3.56 to 5.2 (Icoil) = ______

3.6 amps

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 19 of 44 2105.009 CEDM CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION CHANGE: 032 EXHIBIT 2 2105.009 Revised 04/24/13 CEA #01 UPPER GRIPPER COIL TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT PAGE 2 OF 2 6.0 Calculate coil resistance (Rcoil1) as follows:

3.56 6.1 44 (Rcoil1) = (Vug)______V ÷ (Icoil) to 3.6 amps 12.2 to (Rcoil1) = ______

12.36 ohms NOTE Lead resistance must be subtracted to obtain accurate reading. Lead resistance for CEA #1 is provided in this calculation. However, a lookup table for lead resistance is provided when using WO# 50654677 to calculate other CEA coil temperatures.

12.2 to 6.2 (Rcoil2) = ______(R 12.36 coil1) - .525 ohms(CEA #01 lead resistance).

11.675 to 6.3 11.835 ohms (Rcoil2) = ______

7.0 Obtain CEA #01 coil temperature as follows:

7.1 Use the following to obtain CEA #01 coil temperature:

Coil resistance (Rcoil2) calculated in step 6.0 Table below RESISTANCE TEMP RESISTANCE TEMP RESISTANCE TEMP RESISTANCE TEMP 5.6 0.022 7.5 126.695 9.4 253.368 11.3 380.041 5.7 6.689 7.6 133.362 9.5 260.035 11.4 386.708 5.8 13.356 7.7 140.029 9.6 266.702 11.5 393.375 5.9 20.023 7.8 146.696 9.7 273.369 11.6 400.042 6 26.69 7.9 153.363 9.8 280.036 11.7 406.709 6.1 33.357 8 160.03 9.9 286.703 11.8 413.376 6.2 40.024 8.1 166.697 10 293.37 11.9 420.043 6.3 46.691 8.2 173.364 10.1 300.037 12 426.71 6.4 53.358 8.3 180.031 10.2 306.704 12.1 433.377 6.5 60.025 8.4 186.698 10.3 313.371 12.2 440.044 6.6 66.692 8.5 193.365 10.4 320.038 12.3 446.711 6.7 73.359 8.6 200.032 10.5 326.705 12.4 453.378 6.8 80.026 8.7 206.699 10.6 333.372 12.5 460.045 6.9 86.693 8.8 213.366 10.7 340.039 12.6 466.705 7 93.36 8.9 220.033 10.8 346.706 12.7 473.365 7.1 100.027 9 226.7 10.9 353.373 12.8 480.025 7.2 106.694 9.1 233.367 11 360.04 12.9 493.345 7.3 113.361 9.2 240.034 11.1 366.707 13 500.050 7.4 120.028 9.3 246.701 11.2 373.374 13.1 506.665 All applicable steps are complete.

Expected system response obtained.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 (A2) PAGE 1 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 002 DATE:

SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations TASK: Determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure JTA#: ANO2-RO-EOPAOP-OFFNORM-186 Alternate Path Yes: No: X Time Critical Yes: No: X KA VALUE RO: 3.9 SRO: 4.2 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.25 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: BOTH: X SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Classroom: Perform POSITION EVALUATED: RO: X SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 10 Minutes REFERENCE(S): OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, Containment Evacuation Checklist EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Stop Total Time Time Time

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 (A2) PAGE 2 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured and not available.

Shutdown Cooling is lost at 0605 today.

CETs and RVLMS ATS are operable.

RCS conditions @ 605 after SDC was lost:

RCS CET temperature is 172 0F RCS pressure is 240 psia PZR level is 41%

RCS heatup rate is 4.33 degrees per minute.

TASK STANDARD:

Determined Saturation temperature the RCS pressure to be between 397.405 and 397 0F Determined time to boil to be between 51to 52.1 minutes.

Determined time to start containment evacuation between 0626 and 0627.1 TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 32, Containment Evacuation Checklist.

Steam tables.

SIMULATOR SETUP:

NA EXAMINER'S NOTES:

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 (A2) PAGE 3 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure using OP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, by performing step 2.

Start Time:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

Procedure Note:

CETs and ATS will NOT be operable with Reactor Vessel Head removed.

1. Determine time to start CNTMT Examinee determined Step is N/A SAT UNSAT (Step evacuation and closure as follows: not applicable.

2.A)

A. IF RCS in reduced inventory AND CETs NOT available, THEN perform the following:

2. IF CETs or RVLMS ATS operable, Examinee documented the N/A SAT UNSAT (Step THEN determine time to boiling as heatup rate give in the initial 2.B.1) follows: conditions.

1) Determine and record RCS heatup rate.

F/min heatup rate (C) 3. Using the steam tables and N/A SAT UNSAT (Step 2) Determine and record saturation current RCS pressure Examinee 2.B.2) temperature using steam tables determined that the staturation and temperature for 240 psia is present RCS pressure. between 397.405 0F and 397 0F F

saturation temperature (TSAT)

(C) 4. 3) Solve for time to boiling: Examinee calculated the time to N/A SAT UNSAT (Step boiling to be between 52.1 and 2.B.3) {TSAT} - {RCS temp} 51 min.

= time to boiling {t3}

{heatup rate}

{ F} - { F} = minutes

{ F/min}

5. 4) Record time to boil (t3) in step Examinee recorded time N/A SAT UNSAT (Step 2.E. calculated in step 2.B.3 in step 2.B.4) 2.E.

6. C. Record time SDC was lost {t1}. Examinee recorded time from N/A SAT UNSAT (Step initial conditions in step 2.E.

2.C)

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 (A2) PAGE 4 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

7. D. IF time to boiling can NOT be Examinee determined step is N/A SAT UNSAT (Step calculated, not applicable.

2.D) THEN record time to boil (t3) from Control Room logs in Step 2.E.

(C) 8. E. Calculate time to start CNTMT Examinee calculated to time to N/A SAT UNSAT (Step evacuation and closure as follows: start CNTMT evacuation and 2.E) closure to be between 0627.1

{ t1 } + [ { t3 } - 30 minutes] and 0626.

= { time to start Step 5 }

+ [ - 30 minutes] = .

END

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 (A2) PAGE 5 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERS COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured and not available.

Shutdown Cooling is lost at 0605.

Current time is 0610.

CETs and RVLMS ATS are operable.

RCS conditions @ 605 after SDC was lost:

RCS temperature = 172 0F RCS pressure is 240 psia PZR level is 41%

RCS heatup rate is 4.33 degrees per minute.

INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure using OP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, by performing step 2.

Time to Start evacuation and closure:_________627.1 to 626.0_____________________

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2 (A2) PAGE 6 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEES COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured and not available.

Shutdown Cooling is lost at 0605.

Current time is 0610.

CETs and RVLMS ATS are operable.

RCS conditions @ 605 after SDC was lost:

RCS temperature = 172 0F RCS pressure is 240 psia PZR level is 41%

RCS heatup rate is 4.33 degrees per minute.

INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure using OP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, by performing step 2.

Time to Start evacuation and closure:____________________________________________

ATTACHMENT 32 CNTMT EVACUATION CHECKLIST Page 1 of 3

1. IF Outage Desk manned, THEN notify Shift Outage Manager of the condition.

2. Determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure as follows:

NOTE CETs and ATS will NOT be operable with Reactor Vessel Head removed.

A. IF RCS in reduced inventory AND CETs NOT available, THEN perform the following:

1) Verify CNTMT purge secured using 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control.

2) GO TO Step 5.B of this Attachment AND initiate CNTMT evacuation and closure.

B. IF CETs or RVLMS ATS operable, THEN determine time to boiling as follows:

1) Determine and record RCS heatup rate.

F/min heatup rate

2) Determine and record saturation temperature using steam tables and present RCS pressure.

F saturation temperature (TSAT)

3) Solve for time to boiling:

{TSAT} - {RCS temp}

= time to boiling {t3}

{heatup rate}

{ F} - { F} = minutes

{ F/min}

4) Record time to boil (t3) in step 2.E.

(Step 2 continued on next page)

PROC NO TITLE REVISION PAGE 2202.010 STANDARD ATTACHMENTS 022 104 of 204

ATTACHMENT 32 CNTMT EVACUATION CHECKLIST Page 2 of 3

2. (continued)

C. Record time SDC was lost {t1}.

D. IF time to boiling can NOT be calculated, THEN record time to boil (t3) from Control Room logs in Step 2.E.

E. Calculate time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure as follows:

{ t1 } + [ { t3 } - 30 minutes] = { time to start Step 5 }

+ [ - 30 minutes] = .

3. Verify CNTMT purge/ventilation secured using 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control.

4. WHEN RCS temperature greater than 180°F, THEN perform the following:

A. Locally verify "RWT RECIRC AND TEST LINE" valve (2BS-26) open.

B. Place ONE HPSI pump handswitch in NORMAL AFTER STOP.

C. WHEN RCS temperature greater than 195°F, THEN verify the following on PPS inserts:

1) HI/LO SG Level Bypass Permissive lights extinguished.

2) IF HI/LO SG Bypass Permissive lights do NOT extinguish, THEN place associated handswitch in NORMAL.

3) Verify NORMAL lights are ON.

4) Verify at least 3 channels operable.

PROC NO TITLE REVISION PAGE 2202.010 STANDARD ATTACHMENTS 022 105 of 204

ATTACHMENT 32 CNTMT EVACUATION CHECKLIST Page 3 of 3 NOTE The following are examples of events where SDC may NOT be able to be restored.

A rupture exists in the SDC system that would prevent SDC from being returned to service.

No SDC pumps available due to equipment or electrical failure.

SDC suction line valves can NOT be opened by any means.

SW flow can NOT be established to at least ONE SDC HX.

5. IF time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure reached OR SDC can NOT be restored, THEN perform the following:

A. Obtain SM concurrence for CNTMT evacuation and closure.

B. Perform 1015.008, Attachment F, Setting Containment Closure.

C. IF Refueling Canal empty OR RCS level lowering, THEN locally perform the following:

1) Verify Traveling Sheave Assembly retrieved, refer to 2503.003, Operation of Fuel Handling Equipment.

2) Verify "FUEL TRANSFER TUBE" valve (2CV-5432) closed.

D. Notify Radiation Protection to evacuate CNTMT of all personnel NOT involved with CNTMT closure.

E. Make the following announcement on Plant Page system:

Attention all personnel. Attention all personnel. A Unit 2 CNTMT evacuation is required. All personnel except those performing CNTMT closure evacuate CNTMT.

F. Actuate CNTMT Evacuation alarm on 2C22.

G. Repeat Steps 5.E and F one time.

H. Attempt to establish CNTMT cooling using 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control.

I. IF CNTMT coolers operating, THEN verify chilled water or Service Water aligned to CNTMT coolers.

PROC NO TITLE REVISION PAGE 2202.010 STANDARD ATTACHMENTS 022 106 of 204

KEY ATTACHMENT 32 CNTMT EVACUATION CHECKLIST Page 1 of 3

1. IF Outage Desk manned, THEN notify Shift Outage Manager of the condition.

2. Determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure as follows:

NOTE CETs and ATS will NOT be operable with Reactor Vessel Head removed.

A. IF RCS in reduced inventory AND CETs NOT available, THEN perform the following:

1) Verify CNTMT purge secured using 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control.

2) GO TO Step 5.B of this Attachment AND initiate CNTMT evacuation and closure.

B. IF CETs or RVLMS ATS operable, THEN determine time to boiling as follows:

1) Determine and record RCS heatup rate.

4.33 F/min heatup rate

2) Determine and record saturation temperature using steam tables and present RCS pressure.

397.405 to 397 F saturation temperature (TSAT)

3) Solve for time to boiling:

{TSAT} - {RCS temp}

= time to boiling {t3}

{heatup rate}

{ 397.405 to 397 F} - { 172 F} = 51 to 52.1 minutes

{ 4.33 F/min}

4) Record time to boil (t3) in step 2.E.

(Step 2 continued on next page)

PROC NO TITLE REVISION PAGE Page 1 of 3 104 of 204

ATTACHMENT 32 CNTMT EVACUATION CHECKLIST Page 2 of 3

2. (continued)

C. Record time SDC was lost {t1}.

D. IF time to boiling can NOT be calculated, THEN record time to boil (t3) from Control Room logs in Step 2.E.

E. Calculate time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure as follows:

{ t1 } + [ { t3 } - 30 minutes] = { time to start Step 5 }

0605 + [ 52.1 to 51 - 30 minutes] = 0627.1 to 0626.

3. Verify CNTMT purge/ventilation secured using 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control.

4. WHEN RCS temperature greater than 180°F, THEN perform the following:

A. Locally verify "RWT RECIRC AND TEST LINE" valve (2BS-26) open.

B. Place ONE HPSI pump handswitch in NORMAL AFTER STOP.

C. WHEN RCS temperature greater than 195°F, THEN verify the following on PPS inserts:

1) HI/LO SG Level Bypass Permissive lights extinguished.

2) IF HI/LO SG Bypass Permissive lights do NOT extinguish, THEN place associated handswitch in NORMAL.

3) Verify NORMAL lights are ON.

4) Verify at least 3 channels operable.

PROC NO TITLE REVISION PAGE Page 1 of 3 105 of 204

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT (A3) PAGE 1 OF 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 003 DATE:

SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations TASK: Evaluate Containment Atmospheric Conditions JTA#: ANO2-RO-CVENT-NORM-7 Alternate Path Yes: No: X Time Critical Yes: No: X KA VALUE RO: 3.7 SRO: 4.1 KA

REFERENCE:

2.2.12 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: BOTH: X SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Classroom: Perform POSITION EVALUATED: RO: X SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 10 Minutes REFERENCE(S): OP-2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Stop Total Time Time Time

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT (A3) PAGE 2 OF 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 1.

PMS printer is broken and TS surveillance 4.4.6.1 needs to be completed.

The following values were recorded from PMS:

T5605-5 is 130.57 degrees F T5606-6 is not available P5601-1 is 14.02 psia P5602-2 is 13.95 psia P5603-3 is 14.01 psia P5604-4 is 14.16 psia TASK STANDARD:

Determined that Containment Temperature and Pressure are not in the acceptable region of operation.

Calculated Containment Temperature was 134.5 to 135 F.

Calculated Average Containment Pressure was 14.0 to 14.03 psia.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2104.033 Containment Atmosphere Control, Supplement 4, Containment Atmospheric Conditions Using Computer SIMULATOR SETUP:

NA EXAMINER'S NOTES:

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT (A3) PAGE 3 OF 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to perform an evaluation of containment atmospheric conditions using OP 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control, Supplement 4.

Start Time:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

1. Record containment Recorded containment N/A SAT UNSAT temperature. temperature readings in OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 Step 2.1.

(C) 2. Calculate containment Used formulas provided in N/A SAT UNSAT temperature. OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 and given temperatures to calculate containment temperature.

(134.5 to 135 F)

Recorded containment temperature on OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 Step 2.1.

3. Record containment pressure. Recorded containment pressure N/A SAT UNSAT readings in OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 Step 2.2.

(C) 4. Calculate average containment Used table provided in N/A SAT UNSAT pressure. OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 Step 2.2 and given pressures to calculate average containment pressure. (14.0 to 14.03 psia)

Recorded average containment pressure on OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 Step 2.2.

5. Plot average containment Plotted calculated parameters N/A SAT UNSAT pressure vs containment on OP 2104.033 Supplement 4, temperature. Figure 1.

(C) 6. Compare containment Used containment N/A SAT UNSAT Atmospheric parameters to pressure-temperature point Technical Specification plotted on Figure 4-1 and requirements. determined containment atmospheric conditions were not within the region of acceptable operations.

Completed OP 2104.033 Supplement 4 Section 3.0 to indicate Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 non-compliance.

END

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT (A3) PAGE 4 OF 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERS COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 1.

PMS printer is broken and TS surveillance 4.4.6.1 needs to be completed.

The following values were recorded from PMS:

T5605-5 = 130.57 degrees F T5606-6 is not available P5601-1 = 14.02 psia P5602-2 = 13.95 psia P5603-3 = 14.16 psia P5604-4 = 13.99 psia INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to perform an evaluation of containment atmospheric conditions using OP 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control, Supplement 4.

Containment temperature: ____134.5 to 135 F______

Average Containment pressure: _____14.0 to 14.03_psia__

Is the plotted point in the Acceptable Region of Figure 1? Yes / No .

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT (A3) PAGE 5 OF 5 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEES COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 1.

PMS printer is broken and TS surveillance 4.4.6.1 needs to be completed.

The following values were recorded from PMS:

T5605-5 = 130.57 degrees F T5606-6 is not available P5601-1 = 14.02 psia P5602-2 = 13.95 psia P5603-3 = 14.16 psia P5604-4 = 13.99 psia INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to perform an evaluation of containment atmospheric conditions using OP 2104.033, Containment Atmosphere Control, Supplement 4.

Containment temperature: _________________

Average Containment pressure: __________________

Is the plotted point in the Acceptable Region of Figure 1? Yes / No .

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 80 of 85 2104.033 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL CHANGE: 074 SUPPLEMENT 4 PAGE 1 OF 2 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS USING COMPUTER This supplement provides method to determine Containment Atmospheric conditions.

A PMS printout is obtained or Supplement 4 or 6 performed at least once each 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 per TS 4.6.1.4. Curves in Figure 1 bound area that is Tech Spec limit with instrument error calculations incorporated. Region 1 of curve is acceptable region when only three computer points are used. Region 2 of curve, which includes Region 1, is acceptable region when all four computer points are used.

1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS Verify at least one CNTMT temperature AND at least three CNTMT pressure Computer Points available.

2.0 TEST METHOD 2.1 Use one of the following to determine Containment temperature based on availability of computer data points T5605-5 and T5606-6:

Average CNTMT Temp = (T5605-5 + T5606-6) 2 = _________ °F T5605-5 + 4 = _________ °F (If using only T5605-5)

T5606-6 = _________ °F (If using only T5606-6)

NOTE Average CNTMT pressure should be maintained between 13.9 and 14.2 psia to maintain cushion for loss of chill water unless raising pressure to 14.7 prior to outage.

2.2 Calculate average Containment pressure as follows:

(N/A point if not available)

P5601-1 _________ psia P5602-2 _________ psia P5603-3 _________ psia P5604-4 _________ psia Add points and divide by total number of points used.

Average CNTMT pressure = __________ psia 2.3 Plot average Containment pressure vs temperature on Figure 1.

3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1 Did plotted point fall within bounds of Figure 1? YES NO Performed By __________________________________ Date __________ Time __________

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 81 of 85 2104.033 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL CHANGE: 074 SUPPLEMENT 4 PAGE 2 OF 2 4.0 SUPERVISOR REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4.1 Have Containment Atmospheric conditions been proven YES NO acceptable using ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA?

4.2 IF NO answered to 4.1, YES NO N/A THEN has Supplement 6 been performed?

4.3 Are all administrative requirements of this test satisfied? YES NO Supervisor __________________________________________ Date __________

FIGURE 1

{4.3.1}

17 UNACCEPTABLE R E G IO N 16 AVERAGE CNTMT PRESSURE (PSIA)

R e g io n 2 B o u n d a ry 15 AC C E PT ABLE R E G IO N R e g io n 1 B o u n d a ry 14 13 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 R e g io n 1 P o in ts A V E R A G E C N T M T T E M P E R A T U R E (OF ) R e g io n 2 P o in ts 6 1 , 1 5 .2 6 1 , 1 5 .2 5 1 3 9 , 1 5 .2 1 3 9 , 1 5 .2 5 1 3 9 ,1 4 .6 3 1 3 9 , 1 4 .5 8 1 2 5 .5 6 , 1 3 .5 1 2 5 .5 4 , 1 3 .4 5 6 1 , 1 3 .5 6 1 , 1 3 .4 5 Region 1 acceptable region when 3 computer points are used.

Region 2 includes Region 1 and area between curves and is acceptable region when all 4 computer points are used.

KEY PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 80 of 85 2104.033 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL CHANGE: 074 SUPPLEMENT 4 PAGE 1 OF 2 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS USING COMPUTER This supplement provides method to determine Containment Atmospheric conditions.

A PMS printout is obtained or Supplement 4 or 6 performed at least once each 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 per TS 4.6.1.4. Curves in Figure 1 bound area that is Tech Spec limit with instrument error calculations incorporated. Region 1 of curve is acceptable region when only three computer points are used. Region 2 of curve, which includes Region 1, is acceptable region when all four computer points are used.

1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS Verify at least one CNTMT temperature AND at least three CNTMT pressure Computer Points available.

2.0 TEST METHOD 2.1 Use one of the following to determine Containment temperature based on availability of computer data points T5605-5 and T5606-6:

Average CNTMT Temp = (T5605-5 + T5606-6) N/A 2 = _________ °F 134.57 °F T5605-5 + 4 = _________ (If using only T5605-5)

N/A T5606-6 = _________ °F (If using only T5606-6)

NOTE Average CNTMT pressure should be maintained between 13.9 and 14.2 psia to maintain cushion for loss of chill water unless raising pressure to 14.7 prior to outage.

2.2 Calculate average Containment pressure as follows:

(N/A point if not available) 14.02 psia P5601-1 _________ 13.95 psia P5602-2 _________

14.16 psia P5603-3 _________ 13.99 psia P5604-4 _________

Add points and divide by total number of points used.

14.03 Average CNTMT pressure = __________ psia 2.3 Plot average Containment pressure vs temperature on Figure 1.

3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1 Did plotted point fall within bounds of Figure 1? YES NO Performed By __________________________________ Date __________ Time __________

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 81 of 85 2104.033 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL CHANGE: 074 SUPPLEMENT 4 PAGE 2 OF 2 4.0 SUPERVISOR REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4.1 Have Containment Atmospheric conditions been proven YES NO acceptable using ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA?

4.2 IF NO answered to 4.1, YES NO N/A THEN has Supplement 6 been performed?

4.3 Are all administrative requirements of this test satisfied? YES NO Supervisor __________________________________________ Date __________

FIGURE 1

{4.3.1}

17 UNACCEPTABLE R E G IO N 16 AVERAGE CNTMT PRESSURE (PSIA)

R e g io n 2 B o u n d a ry 15 AC C E PT ABLE R E G IO N R e g io n 1 B o u n d a ry 14 13 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 R e g io n 1 P o in ts A V E R A G E C N T M T T E M P E R A T U R E (OF ) R e g io n 2 P o in ts 6 1 , 1 5 .2 6 1 , 1 5 .2 5 1 3 9 , 1 5 .2 1 3 9 , 1 5 .2 5 1 3 9 ,1 4 .6 3 1 3 9 , 1 4 .5 8 1 2 5 .5 6 , 1 3 .5 1 2 5 .5 4 , 1 3 .4 5 6 1 , 1 3 .5 6 1 , 1 3 .4 5 Region 1 acceptable region when 3 computer points are used.

Region 2 includes Region 1 and area between curves and is acceptable region when all 4 computer points are used.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON A4 Page 1 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 3 DATE:

SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Radiation Control TASK: Determine Condenser off gas radiation monitor setting.

JTA#: ANO2-RO-RMS-OFFNORM-13 Alternate Path Yes: No: X Time Critical Yes: No: X KA VALUE RO: 2.9 SRO: 3.1 KA

REFERENCE:

2.3.15 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: BOTH: X SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform CLASSROOM: Perform POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: CLASSROOM:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 Minutes REFERENCE(S): 2105.016, Radiation Monitoring and Evacuation system. Unit 2 OPS B2 CBO Log.

EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time Stop Time Total Time

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON A4 Page 2 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 is in Mode 1.

2K11-A10 Secondary System radiation hi alarm is locked in due to 2RITS-0645 Condenser off gas radiation monitor.

Crew has entered Primary to Secondary leakage AOP due to a small primary to secondary leak that does not require a shutdown.

The 2RITS-0645 was logged reading 375 CPM on the OPS-B2 CBO log.

SM has given permission to adjust the alarm setpoint for 2RITS-0645.

TASK STANDARD:

Determined the new potentiometer setting for the alarm setpoint of 2RITS-0645 (potentiometer setting: 3.45) and the new voltage setting for 2RR-1057 (1.778 to 1.835) Secondary Radiation Recorder.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

2105.016, Radiation Monitoring and Evacuation system, and Unit 2 OPS-B2 CBO Log

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON A4 Page 3 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

Determine the highest allowable new potentiometer setting of 2RITS-0645, Condenser Off Gas Radiation Monitor, and highest allowable new voltage setting for 2RR-1057, Secondary Radiation Recorder, IAW 2105.016, Radiation Monitoring and Evacuation System, and OPS-B2 CBO log. Inform examiner when ready to adjust 2RITS-0645 alarm setpoint IAW step 11.3.2.

START TIME:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

1. Determine new high alarm Examinee reviewed the Unit 2 N/A SAT UNSAT (Step setpoint for 2RITS-0645 from OPS-B2 CBO Log and 2105.016 11.1) Unit 2 CBOT Electrical log and determined that the new (OPS-B2). alarm set point should be 675 cpm.

Verify setpoint within the following limits:

- Minimum high alarm setpoint of 250 cpm

- Smaller of 2 times background or 300 cpm above background

2. Obtain SM permission to adjust Examinee determined SM N/A SAT UNSAT (Step alarm setpoints for 2RITS-0645. permission was given from the 11.2) initial conditions.

(C) 3. Perform the following to change Examinee determined the new N/A SAT UNSAT (Step 2RITS-0645 high alarm setpoint setting for 2RITS-0645 is 3.45 11.3 on 2C25: from Table 1.

and 11.3.1) Determine potentiometer dial Examiner Note: 675 cpm is setting which corresponds to between the values listed in desired high alarm setpoint from table 1 and the applicant Table 1 below. should select the value for 600 cpm to comply with step 11.1

4. Adjust 2RITS-0645 high alarm Examinee told examiner they N/A SAT UNSAT (Step setpoint potentiometer to were ready to adjust the 11.3.2) required setting. potentiometer per the initiating cue.

Examiner Cue: Report that the Potentiometer has been adjusted the desired setting.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON A4 Page 4 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

(C) 5. Perform the following to change Examinee determined the new N/A SAT UNSAT (Step 2RITS-0645 high alarm on voltage setting for 2RR-1057 is 11.4 Secondary Radiation Recorder 1.778 from Table 2.

and (2RR-1057) on 2C14 and SEC 11.4.1) SYS RADIATION HI (2K11-A10):

Determine voltage setting which Examiner Note: The value for corresponds to desired high 675 cpm is not in Table 2 and alarm setpoint from Table 2. the applicant should select the value for 600 cpm to comply with step 11.1 Examiner note: Either step 5 or step 6 is critical based on the which method the examinee chooses to determine the new voltage setting but the voltage setting must in the following band. 1.778.

(C) 6. IF desired setpoint NOT in Examinee determined the new N/A SAT UNSAT (Step Table 2, voltage setting to be between 11.4.2) THEN perform the following to 1.813 and 1.835 for 675 cpm.

calculate corresponding voltage:

[ln(x) - ln(10)] x = desired counts y= Examiner Note: Either step 5 or step 6 is critical based on ln(10) y = required voltage setting the which method the examinee chooses to determine the new voltage setting but the voltage setting must in the following band.

1.813 to 1.835 END STOP TIME:

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON A4 Page 5 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERS COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 is in Mode 1.

2K11-A10 Secondary System radiation hi alarm is locked in due to 2RITS-0645 Condenser off gas radiation monitor.

Crew has entered Primary to Secondary leakage AOP due to a small primary to secondary leak that does not require a shutdown.

The 2RITS-0645 was logged reading 375 CPM on the OPS-B2 CBO log.

SM has given permission to adjust the alarm setpoint for 2RITS-0645.

INITIATING CUE:

Determine the highest allowable new potentiometer setting of 2RITS-0645, Condenser Off Gas Radiation Monitor, and highest allowable new voltage setting for 2RR-1057, Secondary Radiation Recorder, IAW 2105.016, Radiation Monitoring and Evacuation System, and OPS-B2 CBO log. Inform examiner when ready to adjust 2RITS-0645 alarm setpoint IAW step 11.3.2.

2RITS-0645 potentiometer setting: ______3.45_______________________

2RR-1057 voltage setting: _____(1.778) or (1.813 to 1.835)_______________________

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CRADMON A4 Page 6 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEES COPY

`INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 is in Mode 1.

2K11-A10 Secondary System radiation hi alarm is locked in due to 2RITS-0645 Condenser off gas radiation monitor.

Crew has entered Primary to Secondary leakage AOP due to a small primary to secondary leak that does not require a shutdown.

The 2RITS-0645 was logged reading 375 CPM on the OPS-B2 CBO log.

SM has given permission to adjust the alarm setpoint for 2RITS-0645.

INITIATING CUE:

Determine the highest allowable new potentiometer setting of 2RITS-0645, Condenser Off Gas Radiation Monitor, and highest allowable new voltage setting for 2RR-1057, Secondary Radiation Recorder, IAW 2105.016, Radiation Monitoring and Evacuation System, and OPS-B2 CBO log. Inform examiner when ready to adjust 2RITS-0645 alarm setpoint IAW step 11.3.2.

2RITS-0645 potentiometer setting: ______________________________

2RR-1057 voltage setting: ______________________________

UNIT 2 CBOT ELECTRICAL OPS-B2 1/9/2012 Unit Two OPS 10/30/2014 Unit Two Rounds Page 13 of 42 CNTM PURGE MON SETPT REQUIRED Seq: 50 138 Equip. 2-RMS -SWITCH-2RITS-8233 Location: CR2-386-2C25 ID:

Short Instr: TS 3.3.3.1, ODCM L2.2.1 SEE LONG INSTRUCTIONS Long Instr: IF IN VENTILATE MODE, THEN MAX SETPOINT IS SMALLER OF 2X AVG BKGRD OR 3500 CPM. IF SETPT >2X AVG BKGRD, THEN ADJUST USING 2104.033. REFER TO TS 3.3.3.1, ODCM L2.2.1. b) IF CNTMT PURGE IS IN PROGRESS, THEN 2104.033 ATT C SATISFIES THE <2X BKGRD REQ.

Units: CPM Minimum: >= 10 Maximum: <= <EXPR>

Shift Time Reading Notes Recorded By Days 200 Joe RO Nights Extra Set 1 Extra Set 2 Order Description Expression Text Color 1 SETPOINT EXCEEDS 2 X BACKGROUND N(STA(138)) > N(AveLastX( 137 , 4 ))*2 SETPOINT EXCEEDS 2 X BACKGROUND 255 2 SETPOINT EXCEEDS 3500 N(STA(138)) > 3500 IF IN VENTILATE MODE, THEN MAX SETPOINT IS 255 SMALLER OF 2X AVG BKGRD OR 3500 CPM SEE LONG INSTRUCTIONS Max. Expr.: N(AveLastX( 138 , 4 ))*2 Appl. Expr.: N(STA(57))>4 2RITS-8233 READING REQUIRED Seq: 51 137 Equip. 2-RMS -SWITCH-2RITS-8233 Location: CR2-386-2C25 ID:

Short Instr: MAX=2X BACKGROUND TS 3.3.3.1 ODCM L2.2.1.

Units: CPM Shift Time Reading Notes Recorded By Days 105 Joe RO Nights Extra Set 1 Extra Set 2 SETPOINT FOR 2RITS-0645 REQUIRED Seq: 52 136 Location: CR2-386-2C25 Short Instr: SEE LONG INSTRUCTION FOR MAX CRITERIA Long Instr: IF COND VAC PUMP IS IN OPERATION, THEN THE HIGH ALARM SETPT SHALL BE THE SMALLER OF 2X BACKGROUND OR APP 300 CPM ABOVE BKGRD. MINIMUM SETPOINT IS 250 CPM.

Units: CPM Minimum: >= 250 Shift Time Reading Notes Recorded By Days 250 Joe RO Nights Extra Set 1 Extra Set 2 2RITS-0645 READING COND VAC REQUIRED Seq: 53 135 Equip. 2-RMS -SWITCH-2RITS-0645 Location: CR2-386-2C25 ID:

Short Instr: 2RITS-0645 Units: CPM Maximum: <= <EXPR>

Shift Time Reading Notes Recorded By Days 375 Joe RO Nights Extra Set 1 Extra Set 2 Order Description Expression Text Color 1 EXCEEDS HIGH ALARM SETPOINT n(sta(135))>N(STA(136)) EXCEEDS HIGH ALARM SETPOINT 255 Max. Expr.: N(STA(136))

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 14 of 36 2105.016 RADIATION MONITORING AND EVACUATION SYSTEM CHANGE: 029 11.0 HIGH ALARM SETPOINT ADJUSTMENT FOR MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS MONITOR (2RITS-0645).

11.1 Determine new high alarm setpoint for 2RITS-0645 from Unit 2 CBOT Electrical log (OPS-B2).

Verify setpoint within the following limits:

- Minimum high alarm setpoint of 250 cpm

- Smaller of 2 times background or 300 cpm above background 11.2 Obtain SM permission to adjust alarm setpoints for 2RITS-0645.

11.3 Perform the following to change 2RITS-0645 high alarm setpoint on 2C25:

11.3.1 Determine potentiometer dial setting which corresponds to desired high alarm setpoint from Table 1 below.

11.3.2 Adjust 2RITS-0645 high alarm setpoint potentiometer to required setting.

TABLE 1 Alarm Alarm Alarm Alarm Setpoint Dial Setpoint Dial Setpoint Dial Setpoint Dial CPM Setting CPM Setting CPM Setting CPM Setting 250 = 2.77 800 = 3.78 5000 = 5.24 10000 = 5.82 300 = 2.85 900 = 3.87 6000 = 5.42 20000 = 6.35 400 = 3.10 1000 = 4.00 7000 = 5.56 30000 = 6.66 500 = 3.30 2000 = 4.51 8000 = 5.68 40000 = 6.94 600 = 3.45 3000 = 4.82 9000 = 5.74 50000 = 7.09 700 = 3.62 4000 = 5.06 11.4 Perform the following to change 2RITS-0645 high alarm on Secondary Radiation Recorder (2RR-1057) on 2C14 and SEC SYS RADIATION HI (2K11-A10):

11.4.1 Determine voltage setting which corresponds to desired high alarm setpoint from Table 2 below.

TABLE 2 Alarm Alarm Alarm Alarm Setpoint Voltage Setpoint Voltage Setpoint Voltage Setpoint Voltage CPM Setting CPM Setting CPM Setting CPM Setting 250 = 1.398 425 = 1.628 1000 = 2.000 8000 = 2.903 275 = 1.439 450 = 1.653 2000 = 2.301 9000 = 2.954 300 = 1.477 500 = 1.699 3000 = 2.477 10000 = 3.000 325 = 1.512 600 = 1.778 4000 = 2.602 20000 = 3.301 350 = 1.544 700 = 1.845 5000 = 2.699 30000 = 3.477 375 = 1.574 800 = 1.903 6000 = 2.778 40000 = 3.602 400 = 1.602 900 = 1.954 7000 = 2.845 50000 = 3.699 11.4.2 IF desired setpoint NOT in Table 2, THEN perform the following to calculate corresponding voltage:

[ln(x) - ln(10)] x = desired counts y =

ln(10) y = required voltage setting

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 15 of 36 2105.016 RADIATION MONITORING AND EVACUATION SYSTEM CHANGE: 029 11.4.3 At 2RR-1057 on Panel 2C14, open recorder front cover.

11.4.4 Press MENU key and hold for three seconds to enter SET mode.

11.4.5 Select ALARM display by using UP/DOWN keys (Display shows SET = ALARM) and press ENTER key.

11.4.6 Select Channel 3 for 2RITS-0645 using UP/DOWN keys (Display shows "3:Level=") and press ENTER key.

11.4.7 Select Level of the alarm using UP/DOWN keys (Display shows 3:LEVEL = 1) and press ENTER key.

11.4.8 Select status of alarm to ON by using UP/DOWN keys (Display shows 3/1:ALM = ON) and press ENTER key.

11.4.9 Select Type alarm by using UP/DOWN keys to select H for high alarm. (Display shows 3/1:Type = H) and press ENTER key.

11.4.10 Enter desired alarm setpoint voltage value by using UP/DOWN and RIGHT keys. (Display shows 3/1:X.XXX) and press ENTER key.

11.4.11 Display which appears should show output relay to be ON (Display shows 3/1:RLY = ON) and press ENTER key.

11.4.12 Enter relay number I03 for 2RITS-0645 using UP/DOWN keys (Display shows 3/1:R.N = I03) and press ENTER key.

11.4.13 Verify display shows SET OK.

11.4.14 IF alarm setpoint satisfactorily changed to desired setting, THEN press MENU key AND hold for three seconds to return to Operation mode.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK (A5) PAGE 1 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 001 DATE:

SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations TASK: Determine which operators are available for call out.

JTA#:

Alternate Path Yes: No: X Time Critical Yes: No: X KA VALUE RO: 2.9 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.5 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO: X TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: BOTH: X SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO: X ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 20 Minutes REFERENCE(S): EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program.

EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time Stop Time Total Time

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK (A5) PAGE 2 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Today is August 29th.

Unit 2 has been online for 300 days.

An operator for the next shift has called in sick and coverage is required from 6 am to 6 pm on Sunday August 30th.

eSOMS PQ&S and any other work hours calculators are not available due to a network outage.

All scheduled hours are required to be worked.

Four Operators are available for the watch.

Operators have averaged hours per week over previous 4 weeks prior to Aug. 23rd:

Operator A = 40 Operator B = 53 Operator C = 46 Operator D = 43 N = Nights, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shift, 6 pm to 6 am.

D = Days, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shift, 6 am to 6 pm.

T = Training, 8.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months shift 7:30 am to 4 pm.

= number of hours for off-shift operator who starts work at 7 am.

Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat. Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat.

Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 1 2 3. 4. 5 Operator A 8 8 8 8 D 10 10 10 10 Operator B D T T T T N N N N Operator C N N N D D D D D D Operator D D D D D D D N N N TASK STANDARD:

Determined that operator B and D are available and operator A is not available due to <34 hour break in any 9-day period and operator C is not available due > 72 work hours in any 7 day period.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

EN-OP-123 Fatigue Management program.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK (A5) PAGE 3 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

CRS/SM directs you to determine which operator(s) can cover without violating working hours using EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program.

If an operator(s) would violate working hours, then state how they would violate the working hour limits.

Start Time:_________________

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

Procedure Note:

Work hour tracking is accomplished using the eSOMS PQ&S software. Use of an alternate compliance tool, such as by contractors / vendors, requires approval of the site SME.

Work hour limits for covered workers may only be exceeded during Exceptions (Section 5.3) or when evaluated and approved using the Waiver Process (Section 5.9).

Procedure Step for Work hour limits:

Work hour limits for individuals performing Covered Work consist of the following:

(a) Maximum of 16 work hours in any 24-hour period.

(b) Maximum of 26 work hours in any 48-hour period.

(c) Maximum of 72 work hours in any 7-day period..

(d) Minimum 10-hour break between successive work periods, except that an 8-hour break is allowed when necessary to accommodate a crews scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts.

(e) Minimum 34-hour break in any 9-day period.

(f) 54-hour rolling average, as described in 5.2[3].

(g) Minimum Days Off (MDO), as described in 5.2[4]

[2] Limits 5.2[1](a) through (e) apply for online and offline plant conditions. Limit 5.2[1](f) must be used when the plant is online and limit 5.2[1](g) is typically applied when the plant is offline, for individuals working on outage activities. However, limit 5.2[1](f) may also be used in lieu of limit 5.2[1](g) when the plant is offline.

[3] The 54-hour rolling average limit (5.2[1](f)) is a maximum average of 54 work hours per week calculated using a rolling average period of up to 6 weeks. The requirements of the averaging calculation are modeled in the PQ&S software and include the following characteristics:

1. Review work hour limitations Examinee reviewed the limitation N/A SAT UNSAT in EN-OM-123. of section 5.2 of EN-OM-123.

(Step 5.2 (C) 2. Using EN-OM-123 Reviewed the schedule for N/A SAT UNSAT (Step requirements review operator operator A to determine if any 5.2) A schedule to determine if he work hour limitations would be can provide coverage with violated.

out violating working hour limits. Critical: Determined that Operator A can not cover the th watch on August 30 with out violating working hour limits due to not having a Minimum 34 hour3.935185e-4 days 0.00944 hours 5.621693e-5 weeks 1.2937e-5 months break in any 9 day period.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK (A5) PAGE 4 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

(C) 3. Using EN-OM-123 Reviewed the schedule for N/A SAT UNSAT requirements review operator operator B to determine if any (Step B schedule to determine if he work hour limitations would be 5.2) can provide coverage with violated.

out violating working hour limits. Critical: Determined that Operator B can cover the watch on August 30th with out violating working hour limits.

(C) 4. Using EN-OM-123 Reviewed the schedule for N/A SAT UNSAT requirements review operator operator C to determine if any (Step C schedule to determine if he work hour limitations would be 5.2) can provide coverage with violated.

out violating working hour limits. Critical: Determined that Operator C can not cover the watch on August 30th with out violating working hour limits due to > 72 work hours in any 7-day period.

(C) 5. Using EN-OM-123 Reviewed the schedule for N/A SAT UNSAT requirements review operator operator D to determine if any (Step D schedule to determine if he work hour limitations would be 5.2) can provide coverage with violated.

out violating working hour limits. Critical: Determined that Operator D can cover the watch on August 30th with out violating working hour limits.

END Stop Time:__________________

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK (A5) PAGE 5 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERS COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Today is August 29th.

Unit 2 has been online for 300 days.

An operator for the next shift has called in sick and coverage is required from 6 am to 6 pm on Sunday August 30th.

eSOMS PQ&S and any other work hours calculators are not available due to a network outage.

All scheduled hours are required to be worked.

Four Operators are available for the watch.

Operators have averaged hours per week over previous 4 weeks prior to Aug. 23rd:

Operator A = 40 Operator B = 53 Operator C = 46 Operator D = 43 N = Nights, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shift, 6 pm to 6 am.

D = Days, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shift, 6 am to 6 pm.

T = Training, 8.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months shift 7:30 am to 4 pm.

= number of hours for off-shift operator who starts work at 7 am.

Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat. Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat.

Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug. Sept Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 .1 2 3. 4. 5 Operator A 8 8 8 8 D 10 10 10 10 Operator B D T T T T N N N N Operator C N N N D D D D D D Operator D D D D D D D N N N INITIATING CUE:

CRS/SM directs you to determine which operator(s) can cover without violating working hours using EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program.

Operator A: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:__Minimum 34 hour3.935185e-4 days 0.00944 hours 5.621693e-5 weeks 1.2937e-5 months break in a 9 day period____.

Operator B: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:_______________________________________.

Operator C: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:____ > 72 work hours in any 7-day period _______.

Operator D: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:________________________________________.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK (A5) PAGE 6 OF 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEES COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Today is August 29th.

Unit 2 has been online for 300 days.

An operator for the next shift has called in sick and coverage is required from 6 am to 6 pm on Sunday August 30th.

eSOMS PQ&S and any other work hours calculators are not available due to a network outage.

All scheduled hours are required to be worked.

Four Operators are available for the watch.

Operators have averaged hours per week over previous 4 weeks prior to Aug. 23rd:

Operator A = 40 Operator B = 53 Operator C = 46 Operator D = 43 N = Nights, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shift, 6 pm to 6 am.

D = Days, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shift, 6 am to 6 pm.

T = Training, 8.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months shift 7:30 am to 4 pm.

= number of hours for off-shift operator who starts work at 7 am.

Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat. Sun. Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat.

Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug. Sept Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31 .1 2 3. 4. 5 Operator A 8 8 8 8 D 10 10 10 10 Operator B D T T T T N N N N Operator C N N N D D D D D D Operator D D D D D D D N N N INITIATING CUE:

CRS/SM directs you to determine which operator(s) can cover without violating working hours using EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program.

Operator A: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:_________________________________________.

Operator B: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:_________________________________________.

Operator C: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:_________________________________________.

Operator D: Can provide coverage with out exceeding limits: Yes/No.

If No what limit is exceeded:_________________________________________.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 1 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 006 DATE:

SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations TASK: Determine Shutdown Operations Protection Plan Condition JTA#: A2LP-RO-SDCC Alternate Path Yes: No: X Time Critical Yes: No: X KA VALUE RO: 2.8 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.40 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO: X TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: BOTH: X SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO: X ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 25 Minutes REFERENCE(S): OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time Stop Time Total Time

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 2 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 6, RCS temperature is 90 0F.

Fuel Transfer Canal level is 401 6 and connected to the SFP RCS boron is 2701 ppm Both Start Up Channels and Boron Dilution Monitors are operable RCS dilution tagout is in place Time to Boil is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months Containment equipment hatch is open and personnel hatch door interlock has been defeated. Both are capable of being closed within 30 min. Escape hatch is closed.

OPS-B33 CNTMT Closure Log and OPS-B40 SDC Log/Task Checklist are being maintained by CRS Admin.

Red train is protected IAW OP 1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control and OP 1015.008 Att. J, Protected Train and Operations Controlled Areas, is complete for the Red train.

Plant safety index is Yellow.

ANO switchyard gate and London Line substation gates are posted with a sign that reads ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 2 AT RISK.

Core offload is currently in progress.

The following is the plant equipment alignment:

2P-60A, LPSI pump, running and SDC train A operable 2P-60B, LPSI pump, running 2P-40A, SFP cooling pump, in service 2P-40B, SFP cooling pump, available 2E-27, SFP heat exchanger, available and in service All RCS Thot indicators are in service 2P-89C, HPSI pump, aligned to Red train and protected as the RCS make up source 2P-89A, HPSI pump, is available but in Pull-to-Lock 2P-89B, HPSI pump, is tagged out for maintenance Charging pump heaters are removed for the RCS dilution tagout

1 EDG and AAC diesel are available SU#3 transformer is in service, SU#2 transformer is tagged out for maintenance Loop 1 SW is operable with 2P-4A supplying the loop Loop 2 SW is out of service with 2P-4B and 2P-4C tagged for bay inspection 2P-66, Spent Fuel Pool Purification pump, is available with sufficient RWT inventory 2P-109A and 2P-109B, Reactor make up water pumps, are both available for makeup from the RMWT Both 2P-35A and 2P-35B, Containment Spray pumps, are tagged out for maintenance TASK STANDARD:

Determined that SOPP condition was Condition 3 and that SOPP Condition 3 was NOT MET due only to Decay Heat Removal.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 3 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

CRS/SM directs you to determine Shutdown Operations Protection Plan (SOPP) condition for the current plant alignment IAW OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan. Inform examiner of current condition after you have determined the condition.

INITIATING CUE #2:

CRS/SM directs you to complete appropriate attachment to determine if requirements are met for the condition identified using OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan. (If they are not met, then state why)

Start Time:_________________

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

1. Determine the status of the N/A SAT UNSAT following RCS variables:

(Step 8.2)

Fuel Location Determined that fuel was located in the Reactor Vessel and Spent Reactor Coolant System Fuel Pool.

Integrity Determined that RCS was open.

Reactor Coolant System /

Fuel Transfer Canal Inventory Determined FTC flooded >23 (C) 2. Based upon the RCS Determined that SOPP Condition N/A SAT UNSAT (Step variables, determine the 3 was applicable for Unit 2 8.3) correct SOPP.

Examiner Note: The following steps are in Att. I.

(C) 3. Determine if the Determined that Decay Heat N/A SAT UNSAT requirements are met for Removal conditions were NOT (Step SOPP condition 3 for Decay met.

2.1)

Heat Removal.

Examiner note: This is due to having only one service water pump available for Spent Fuel Pool cooling.

4. Determine if the Determined that Inventory Control N/A SAT UNSAT requirements are met for conditions were met.

(Step SOPP condition 3 for 2.2)

Inventory Control.

5. Determine if the Determined that Electrical Power N/A SAT UNSAT requirements are met for conditions were met.

(Step SOPP condition 3 for 2.3)

Electrical Power.

6. Determine if the Determined that Reactivity N/A SAT UNSAT requirements are met for Control conditions were met.

(Step SOPP condition 3 for 2.4)

Reactivity Control.

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 4 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)

7. Determine if the Determined that Containment N/A SAT UNSAT requirements are met for conditions were met.

(Step SOPP condition 3 for 2.5)

Containment.

8. Determine if the Determined that Miscellaneous N/A SAT UNSAT requirements are met for items conditions were met.

(Step SOPP condition 3 for 2.6)

Miscellaneous items.

END Stop Time:__________________

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 5 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERS COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 6, RCS temperature is 90 0F.

Fuel Transfer Canal level is 401 6 and connected to the SFP RCS boron is 2701 ppm Both Start Up Channels and Boron Dilution Monitors are operable RCS dilution tagout is in place Time to Boil is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months Containment equipment hatch is open and personnel hatch door interlock has been defeated. Both are capable of being closed within 30 min. Escape hatch is closed.

OPS-B33 CNTMT Closure Log and OPS-B40 SDC Log/Task Checklist are being maintained by CRS Admin.

Red train is protected IAW OP 1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control and OP 1015.008 Att. J, Protected Train and Operations Controlled Areas, is complete for the Red train.

Plant safety index is Yellow.

ANO switchyard gate and London Line substation gates are posted with a sign that reads ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 2 AT RISK.

Core offload is currently in progress.

The following is the plant equipment alignment:

2P-60A, LPSI pump, running and SDC train A operable 2P-60B, LPSI pump, running 2P-40A, SFP cooling pump, in service 2P-40B, SFP cooling pump, available 2E-27, SFP heat exchanger, available and in service All RCS Thot indicators are in service 2P-89C, HPSI pump, aligned to Red train and protected as the RCS make up source 2P-89A, HPSI pump, is available but in Pull-to-Lock 2P-89B, HPSI pump, is tagged out for maintenance Charging pump heaters are removed for the RCS dilution tagout

1 EDG and AAC diesel are available SU#3 transformer is in service, SU#2 transformer is tagged out for maintenance Loop 1 SW is operable with 2P-4A supplying the loop Loop 2 SW is out of service with 2P-4B and 2P-4C tagged for bay inspection 2P-66, Spent Fuel Pool Purification pump, is available with sufficient RWT inventory 2P-109A and 2P-109B, Reactor make up water pumps, are both available for makeup from the RMWT Both 2P-35A and 2P-35B, Containment Spray pumps, are tagged out for maintenance

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 6 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERS COPY INITIATING CUE #1:

CRS/SM directs you to determine Shutdown Operations Protection Plan (SOPP) condition for the current plant alignment IAW OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan.

Inform examiner of current condition after you have determined the condition.

Current SOPP condition: _______3__________

INITIATING CUE #2:

CRS/SM directs you to complete appropriate attachment to determine if requirements are met for the condition identified using OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan.

(If they are not met, then state why)

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 7 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEES COPY INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 6, RCS temperature is 90 0F.

Fuel Transfer Canal level is 401 6 and connected to the SFP RCS boron is 2701 ppm Both Start Up Channels and Boron Dilution Monitors are operable RCS dilution tagout is in place Time to Boil is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months Containment equipment hatch is open and personnel hatch door interlock has been defeated. Both are capable of being closed within 30 min. Escape hatch is closed.

OPS-B33 CNTMT Closure Log and OPS-B40 SDC Log/Task Checklist are being maintained by CRS Admin.

Red train is protected IAW OP 1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control and OP 1015.008 Att. J, Protected Train and Operations Controlled Areas, is complete for the Red train.

Plant safety index is Yellow.

ANO switchyard gate and London Line substation gates are posted with a sign that reads ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 2 AT RISK.

Core offload is currently in progress.

The following is the plant equipment alignment:

2P-60A, LPSI pump, running and SDC train A operable 2P-60B, LPSI pump, running 2P-40A, SFP cooling pump, in service 2P-40B, SFP cooling pump, available 2E-27, SFP heat exchanger, available and in service All RCS Thot indicators are in service 2P-89C, HPSI pump, aligned to Red train and protected as the RCS make up source 2P-89A, HPSI pump, is available but in Pull-to-Lock 2P-89B, HPSI pump, is tagged out for maintenance Charging pump heaters are removed for the RCS dilution tagout

1 EDG and AAC diesel are available SU#3 transformer is in service, SU#2 transformer is tagged out for maintenance Loop 1 SW is operable with 2P-4A supplying the loop Loop 2 SW is out of service with 2P-4B and 2P-4C tagged for bay inspection 2P-66, Spent Fuel Pool Purification pump, is available with sufficient RWT inventory 2P-109A and 2P-109B, Reactor make up water pumps, are both available for makeup from the RMWT Both 2P-35A and 2P-35B, Containment Spray pumps, are tagged out for maintenance

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-SOPP1 (A6) PAGE 8 OF 8 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEES COPY INITIATING CUE #1:

CRS/SM directs you to determine Shutdown Operations Protection Plan (SOPP) condition for the current plant alignment IAW OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan.

Inform examiner of current condition after you have determined the condition.

Current SOPP condition: _________________

INITIATING CUE #2:

CRS/SM directs you to complete appropriate attachment to determine if requirements are met for the condition identified using OP 1015.048, Shutdown Operations Protection Plan.

(If they are not met, then state why)

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 1 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 NOTE All sections and attachments of this procedure are REFERENCE USE except where specifically stated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 of 2 SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................ 3

3.0 DESCRIPTION

..................................................................................................................... 3

4.0 REFERENCES

..................................................................................................................... 4 5.0 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................... 5 6.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................................................ 14 7.0 LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS ............................................................................................... 20 8.0 INSTRUCTIONS (INFORMATIONAL USE) .......................................................................... 21 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT A - SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 1 ................................................. 22 ATTACHMENT B - SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 2 ................................................. 24 ATTACHMENT C - SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 3 ................................................. 29 ATTACHMENT D - SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 4 ................................................. 35 ATTACHMENT E - SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 5 ................................................. 39 ATTACHMENT F - SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 6 ................................................. 43 ATTACHMENT G - SOPP FOR UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 1 ................................................ 48 ATTACHMENT H - SOPP FOR UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 2 ................................................. 50 ATTACHMENT I - SOPP FOR UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 3 .................................................. 54 ATTACHMENT J - SOPP FOR UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 4 ................................................. 58 ATTACHMENT K - SOPP FOR UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 5 ................................................. 62 ATTACHMENT L - SOPP FOR UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 6 ................................................. 66

PROC./WORK PLAN N

O. PROCEDURE

/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 2 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENTS PAGE ATTACHMENT M - APPROVAL FOR DEPARTURE FROM SOPP REQUIREMENTS ....................... 70 ATTACHMENT N - CONTINGENCY PLANS ..................................................................................... 71 ATTACHMENT O - ACTIONS FOR UNPLANNED KEY SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHANGES AND/OR CHANGES TO PROTECTED TRAIN BOUNDARIES ............................................. 72 ATTACHMENT P - TEST TEAM EXPECTATIONS ............................................................................ 75

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 3 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure is the site-specific document for implementation of Entergys Shutdown Safety Management Program (EN-OU-108). It provides the detailed guidance for implementation of shutdown safety at ANO.

2.0 SCOPE The attachments and minimum equipment requirements contained in this document provide guidance for scheduled, forced (unscheduled), and refueling outages. This procedure is only applicable when the unit is at Cold Shutdown, Refueling Shutdown, or Defueled. EN-OU-108 has additional information for Training, Planning, General Implementation and Post Outage Requirements.

3.0 DESCRIPTION

This procedure was designed to maintain all KEY SAFETY FUNCTIONS in an N+1 condition where N is defined as the minimum number of trains or methods that are capable of satisfying those functions. An example of this would be the Unit 1 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System. It consists of two 100% capacity trains of DHR equipment that are each capable of satisfying the DHR safety function independently. The SOPP will maintain both trains AVAILABLE during all shutdown conditions except when the Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC) is flooded to maintain a defense in depth perspective. When the FTC is flooded, defense in depth is provided by the additional inventory above the fuel. This large water inventory is noted in the applicable safety analyses sections of Tech Specs as providing a backup means of decay heat removal which allows us to maintain the N + 1 condition and remove one train of DHR from service. This philosophy is applied to all 5 KEY SAFETY FUNCTIONS for each ANO unit by the controls laid out in this document coupled with other station operating procedures.

The shutdown conditions dealt with by this procedure are divided into six conditions based on three Reactor Coolant System variables listed below:

Fuel Location Any fuel in the reactor vessel, REFUELING in progress Any fuel in the reactor vessel, no REFUELING in progress All fuel seated in the spent fuel pool Reactor Coolant System Integrity OPEN INTACT Reactor Coolant System / Fuel Transfer Canal Inventory RCS level LOWERED INVENTORY RCS level > LOWERED INVENTORY, but FTC not flooded >23 above the core FTC flooded > 23' above the core Attachments with equipment listed to protect the KEY SAFETY FUNCTIONS are developed from these variables. These attachments are intended to effectively address industry concerns regarding shutdown safety during Modes 5 and 6 and defueled conditions.

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4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 References Used in Procedure Preparation NRC Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal NUMARC 91-06 Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management ANO-1 Technical Specifications ANO-2 Technical Specifications INPO 06-008 Guidelines for the Conduct of Outages at Nuclear Power Plants INPO 92-05, Guidelines for the Management of Planned Outages at Nuclear Power Stations (June of 1992)

Shutdown Safety Management Program (EN-OU-108)

SOER 09-01, Shutdown Safety IER L1-11-2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance Based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 5048(c)

NFPA 805 FAQ 07-0040, Non-Power Operations Clarifications 2CNA021502, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Issuance Of Amendment Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (TAC NO. MF0404)

CALC-09-E-0008-01, ANO-1 NFPA 805 Non Power Operations Assessment CALC-09-E-0008-02, ANO-2 NFPA 805 Non Power Operations Assessment 4.2 References Used in Conjunction with this Procedure Unit 2 SDC Control (1015.008)

Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002)

Reactivity Balance Calculation (1103.015) 4.3 Commitments 4.3.1 P16465, Equipment Hatch capable of closure in 30 minutes of determining the need to evacuate containment. (Attachments C and I) 4.3.2 P11922, Inform the NRC if plans are made to operate in a reduced inventory condition with only one operable onsite Diesel Generator AC power source. (Attachments F and L).

4.3.3 P19240, 2CAN121202, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA-805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2. (Risk management activities)

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PAGE: 5 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 4.3.4 P19412, 1CAN011401, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA-805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1. (Risk management activities) 5.0 DEFINITIONS 5.1 AVAILABLE - For purposes of risk determination, A system, structure, or component along with its necessary auxiliary systems, controls, instrumentation, and power supplies is capable of performing its intended function and can be placed in service by immediate manual or automatic means. [SOER 09-01 Rec 4]

A system does not need to be operable as defined in the Technical Specifications and other License Basis Documents to be considered available.

Credit may be taken for reasonable actions both in the Control Room and in-plant.

A reasonable action would include an operator closing a breaker outside of the control room. Actions with implementing times approaching the time to boil are not reasonable.

Credit may also be taken for temporary modifications (e.g., power supplies),

contingency plans, and line-ups, provided site approved guidance is available.

Credited temporary power or temporary backup equipment will be installed and tested versus only staged to consider a component available.

Systems drained and/or out of service for maintenance are not credited as being available.

Systems and components required to be available for shutdown safety shall not be isolated under a clearance, partially disassembled for maintenance, or otherwise unable to perform their intended function (i.e., power available, system filled and vented, support systems, available, etc.).

Breakers that are racked down, racked out, or in the TEST position are NOT considered AVAILABLE.

5.2 CONTAINMENT CLOSURE - The action to secure primary containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under existing plant conditions.

5.3 CONTAINMENT CLOSURE CONTROLS - Controls established by applicable site procedures to track any impaired containment penetration so that at least one barrier to the release of radioactive material can be quickly achieved in the event of a loss of Decay Heat Removal or a fuel handling accident.

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PAGE: 6 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 5.4 CONTINGENCY PLAN - A plan of compensatory actions to:

Maintain Defense-in-Depth by alternate means when pre-outage planning reveals that specified systems, structures, or components will be unavailable.

Restore Defense-in-Depth when system availability drops below the required Defense-in-Depth during the outage.

Minimize the likelihood of a loss of Key Safety Functions during higher risk evolutions Provide response to actions for postulated events that would present a challenge to Key Safety Functions.

5.5 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY - The ability to maintain RCS and SFP temperature and/or pressure below specified limits following a shutdown.

5.6 DEFENSE IN DEPTH - For the purpose of managing risk during shutdown, defense in depth is the concept of:

Providing systems, structures and components to ensure backup of KEY SAFETY FUNCTIONS using redundant, alternate or diverse methods; Planning and scheduling outage activities in a manner that optimizes safety system availability; and Providing administrative controls that support and/or supplement the above elements.

5.7 DEFUELED - All fuel assemblies have been removed from the reactor vessel and placed in the Spent Fuel Pool.

5.8 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES - Administrative controls, fire barriers, means of egress, industrial fire brigade personnel, and other features provided for fire protection purposes.

5.9 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - Fire Detection, notification, and fire suppression systems designed, installed and maintained in accordance with the applicable NFPA codes and standards.

{4.3.3, 4.3.4} 5.10 FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT ACTIONS - specific activities to prevent fire damage in plant locations where a single fire could potentially result in the loss of components needed to maintain a KEY SAFETY FUNCTION during a HIGHER RISK EVOLUTION (HRE). One set of actions involves pre-outage identification of activities that could result in an increase in fire risk in any plant location (i.e.,

fire damage in a given fire area could result in the loss of a KSF) and establishing appropriate compensatory actions (e.g., rescheduling activities outside the HRE window, procedure changes, requirements for additional fire watches, protected equipment postings). Another set of actions involves evaluations conducted prior to and during a HRE to further ensure no fire damage can occur in locations where a single fire could result in the loss of KSF components.

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PAGE: 7 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 5.11 FLEX EQUIPMENT - Portable equipment that provides means of obtaining power and water to maintain or restore key safety functions in case of an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP).

5.12 FUNCTIONAL (FUNCTIONALITY) - The ability of a system or component to perform its intended service with considerations that applicable technical specification requirements or licensing/design basis assumptions may not be maintained.

5.13 HIGHER RISK EVOLUTIONS - Activities, plant configurations, or conditions during outages where the plant is more susceptible to an event causing a loss of Key Safety Function.

5.14 HIGHER RISK EVOLUTION REVIEW - An evaluation of all planned or emergent activities outlined in the Entergy Corporation Shutdown Safety Management Program (SSMP) procedure EN-OU-108 for the purpose of determining the effects of these activities on the Key Safety Functions 5.15 INVENTORY CONTROL - Measures established to ensure that irradiated fuel assemblies remain adequately covered to maintain heat transfer and shielding requirements.

5.16 KEY SAFETY FUNCTION -

Decay Heat Removal Capability (includes SFP Cooling)

Inventory Control Electrical Power Availability (includes both on-site and off-site)

Reactivity Control Containment Closure 5.17 LOWERED INVENTORY - the condition of the Reactor Coolant System when fuel is in the reactor vessel and the water level is at or below the reactor vessel flange.

[SOER 09-01 Rec 5]

Unit 1 Reactor Vessel flange level is 376.5 Unit 2 Reactor Vessel flange level is 377 10.5 5.18 OPERABLE -

5.18.1 For Unit 1, OPERABLE is defined as the ability of a system to perform its specified function with all applicable Technical Specification requirements satisfied.

5.18.2 For Unit 2, see the definition of OPERABLE as delineated in 1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control.

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PAGE: 8 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 5.19 OUTAGE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM (ORAT) - Group represented by members of the organization not directly responsible for development of the outage schedule, which reviews the outage schedule to assure that the plan is in compliance with the Entergy Corporation Shutdown Safety Management Program (SSMP) procedure EN-OU-108, the site specific Shutdown Safety Management Program, Technical Specifications and other License Basis Documents.

The ORAT Chairman shall be an individual who has plant systems expertise on the same reactor type and is designated by the Director NSA.

The ORAT consists of a minimum of one currently licensed or certified SRO, one previously (or currently) licensed or certified SRO, and one supervisor or manager with technical plant knowledge, to conduct business during the pre-outage planning phase.

Additional Team members such as Nuclear Engineer/Reactor Engineer for Reactivity Control Issues, Fire Protection Specialist or Fire Marshal for Fire Risk Management issues, and the Outage Computer Risk Monitoring Program Owner will supplement as necessary 5.20 PROTECTED EQUIPMENT/TRAIN - Key plant equipment or systems whose failure would substantially increase the risk of core damage or containment failure if it were to become unavailable while redundant or related equipment is out of service.

5.21 REACTIVITY CONTROL - Measures established preclude inadvertent criticality, power excursions, or losses of shutdown margin, and to predict and monitor core behavior.

5.22 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY - The ability of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary to function as a principal safety barrier.

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PAGE: 9 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 5.23 RCS OPEN 5.23.1 For Unit 1, the RCS is considered OPEN if any of the following conditions are met:

Rx Vessel head is removed.

SG Primary Manway is removed, and:

Unobstructed by filter or ventilating devices.

If shield door is installed, then door shall be free to swing open without assistance and door opening path shall be free of obstructions.

SG Primary hand hole cover is removed, and:

Unobstructed by filter or ventilating devices.

May have FME cover installed per 1402.096.

Pressurizer Code Safety is removed, and:

Unobstructed by filter or ventilating devices.

May have FME cover installed per 1402.018 or 1402.149.

Pressurizer Manway is removed, and:

Unobstructed by filter or ventilating devices.

No FME cover installed.

All CRD top closure assemblies are removed, excluding RV level probe.

5.23.2 For Unit 2, the RCS is considered OPEN when the following conditions are met:

RCS Peak Equilibrium Pressure will remain 300 psia based on LOSDC2 Computer Program AND Any of the below listed RCS vent paths aligned/removed:

Reactor Vessel head removed SG primary manway removed not isolated by Nozzle Dams Pressurizer Code Safety removed Pressurizer Manway removed ECCS Vent Valves open

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PAGE: 10 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 5.24 REFUELING - An operation involving a change in core geometry by manipulation of fuel or control rods (Unit 2 CEAs) when the Reactor Vessel head is removed.

5.25 SHUTDOWN SAFETY MANAGER - A person designated by the Outage Manager that is familiar with the site Shutdown Safety program and the defense in depth strategies contained in this document.

5.26 SAFETY STATUS COLORS - The Safety Status Colors (Green, Yellow, Orange, and Red) are discussed in more detail in the Entergy Corporation Shutdown Safety Management Program (SSMP) procedure (EN-OU-108).

GREEN is considered a minimal risk configuration.

YELLOW is considered a medium risk configuration.

ORANGE is considered a higher risk configuration.

RED is considered a unacceptably high risk configuration.

ANO uses a shutdown EOOS model as one method to determine safety status colors during the outage. Qualitative methods are also used, in conjunction with EOOS, as outlined in this procedure to determine the safety status color. The following definition, taken from EN-OU-108, outlines the relationship between the Key Safety Functions and the applicable Safety Status Color:

Safety Status Colors: The results of the safety assessment qualitatively and/or quantitatively as applicable. These assessments are made in the individual Key Safety Functions (KSF). The overall outage safety status is based upon the most limiting KSF status color. The presence of a Higher Risk Evolution (HRE) activity will result in a non-GREEN color even if all the requirements for that Safety Function are satisfied. For instance, an activity that has a potential for a loss of decay heat removal will be YELLOW during its scheduled time span even if N+1 exists.

The goal for the outage is to be in the "N+1" condition, where "N" is the minimum number of trains or methods that are capable of satisfying the function as defined by site-specific procedures.

Discussion:

The ANO Technical Specifications for Mode 5 and Mode 6 operations do not require maintenance of N+1 conditions for all Key Safety Functions at all times (e.g. only one train of ES vital Switchgear and one Decay Heat Removal System are required with Fuel Transfer Canal Level 23 ft above the Fuel). Alternately, maintaining N+1 conditions in Mode 5 and Mode 6 does not assure compliance with Technical Specifications. Two sources of Off-Site Power with no Emergency Diesel Generators available will satisfy N+1 criteria but does not satisfy Technical Specification requirements.

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PAGE: 11 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 Some stations have defined N as the minimum Technical Specification required equipment with the intent of maintaining one additional train of equipment available to meet the N+1 condition. It is also common practice for stations to enter a yellow risk color when a Key Safety Function has been reduced to the minimum equipment required to fulfill the applicable function.

At ANO, due to our current plant design, this would result in a yellow safety status color condition for a large portion of the outage. This condition would also apply during the Defueled condition as well due to the appropriate inclusion of Spent Fuel Pool cooling in the ANO Defense in Depth strategy.

The intent of applying a safety status color to an applicable plant configuration and/or during a higher risk evolution is to heighten station awareness on a reduced margin to nuclear safety with a desire to place additional emphasis on the station activities during that period. As safety status colors move toward higher risk configurations, additional actions may be required to protect or regain margins as well.

Fuel Transfer Canal water inventory, when raised to allow refueling operations, represents a significant margin increase to core damage frequency.

Based on the above discussion, ANO considers the water inventory in the Fuel Transfer Canal (when 23 ft above the core) to be a passive means of core cooling that satisfies the +1 requirement outlined above. For this reason the check lists found in this procedure can be considered to represent the ANO defense in depth equivalent to N+1.

While plant configurations allowed in this procedure represent acceptable defense in depth is maintained it is still prudent to identify and manage elevated risk situations that can occur within the limits of the allowed configurations. The following examples indicate situations that should be reviewed by the Outage Risk Assessment Team (ORAT) and documented for station managers (in the ORAT report) to ensure risk informed decisions are made during outages:

Work during LOWERED INVENTORY conditions at the front end of the outage with high decay heat loads should be reviewed to ensure the benefit of performing the work is prudent to perform during this elevated risk condition.

Maintenance and evolutions that take place with short times to Reactor Coolant System boiling (< 30 minutes) should be reviewed to ensure the benefit of performing the work is in line with the elevated risk during this condition Maintenance on redundant Key Safety Function Systems such as Service Water and Vital Switchgear should be evaluated and compared to predicted time to boiling in the Fuel Transfer Canal and the Spent Fuel Pool.

Plant Design limitations that require configurations for maintenance that severely limit or remove Key Safety Functions from service [i.e. the single Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Heat exchanger or Unit 1 Service Water return header maintenance requiring SW-12 (SW System Loop Outage Separation Valve) to be closed] should be evaluated for actions to reduce risk. Actions such as elevating safety status color, contingency planning, temporary modifications, plant modifications, etc. should be considered to help manage risk in these cases.

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PAGE: 12 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 5.27 SCHEDULE CHANGES - A schedule change as it relates to the SOPP is an alteration in the sequencing for removal/restoration of equipment or an alteration in the sequencing of plant configuration changes for those activities that support Key Safety Functions thus alters their relationship from the previously approved schedule.

Shifting of equipment removal/restoration or plant configuration changes forward or backward in times does not constitute a schedule change as long as their relationship to the previously approved sequence in the outage network remains intact. Examples include:

Any change to the schedule logic that moves an activity into or out of a System Window that could impact EOOS.

Any change to the schedule logic for an activity that is not in a System Window but was a risk significant activity.

Any change to the schedule logic for a System Window that is an input to the EOOS program.

Any scope addition or deletion to the outage schedule for an activity related to a KEY SAFETY FUNCTION.

A change in the outage schedule logic that alters a previously approved work activity associated with a KEY SAFETY FUNCTION such that the activity now overlaps another KEY SAFETY FUNCTION system window.

A change in the outage schedule logic that affects the planned DEFENSE IN DEPTH associated with a KEY SAFETY FUNCTION, or a reduction in the actual DEFENSE IN DEPTH for these functions.

A change in the outage schedule logic that alters the previously approved sequencing or method of filling or draining the RCS, Fuel Transfer Canal or Spent Fuel Pool.

A change in the outage schedule logic that causes a color change for a KEY SAFETY FUNCTION in the EOOS Shutdown model results.

5.28 SPENT FUEL POOL AREA CLOSURE - The Spent Fuel Pool area is closed when the following conditions are met (IER L1-11-2 Rec 1):

Fuel Handling Area to Train Bay Hatch (HTC-504) installed.

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Building elevators are NOT on 404.

Fuel Handling Area from RB Purge Room (Door 92) closed.

Unit One Fuel Handling Area Access Door (Door 89) closed.

Unit One Fuel Handling Area (Penthouse) (Door 190) closed.

Unit One Fuel Handling Area (Penthouse) (Door 191) closed.

Unit One Fuel Handling Area (Penthouse) (Door 192) closed.

U2 Spent Fuel Pool Area (Door 310) closed.

CNTMT Purge Room to SFP (Door 319) closed.

MSIV Room to SFP Area (Door 317) closed.

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PAGE: 13 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 6.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 6.1 Director - NSA Acts as the Outage Risk Assessment Team sponsor Designate the Outage Risk Assessment Team chairman.

6.2 Shutdown Safety Manager Implement the stations Shutdown Safety Program, responsible for the day-to-day performance when the unit is in a mode where the program is applicable.

Chair the Outage Risk Assessment Team for Pre-Outage activities and may/may not be the same person when designated by the Outage Manager for Outage implementation.

Tracks duration of time at LOWERED INVENTORY conditions, and elevated risk conditions against originally planned and approved durations and takes appropriate actions to limit time in these conditions.

6.3 Manager of Planning, Scheduling, and Outages Oversight of the stations Shutdown Safety Program.

Oversight of site communication for the following items (accomplished through Refueling Outage Execution EN-OU-105, through the Shift Daily Status Report)

[SOER 09-01 Rec 6C]:

Protected equipment Planned protected equipment changes

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PAGE: 14 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 6.4 OUTAGE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM (ORAT) 6.4.1 During the pre-outage planning phase, perform a review of the outage schedule. The following aspects should be considered:

Ensure that schedule activities that effect risk are identified in the outage schedule using proper coding.

Major work activities and their relationships to each other so that key systems and components are available to support the Key Safety Functions.

The planned Safety Status assigned to each plant configuration during the outage.

Identification of risk impact of outage activities to the opposite unit and of the risk impact of opposite unit activities to the outage unit.

Verify that abnormal or emergency operating procedures (AOPS/EOPS) for mitigating challenges to shutdown safety can be performed as written based on the outage schedule and resultant system/equipment configurations. Develop contingency plans when equipment required by the procedures will not be available.

[SOER 09-01 Rec 7]

6.4.2 During pre-outage planning and preparation, complete the following as applicable:

Approve the Higher Risk Evolution Review performed for the outage and specify any additional measures to be taken.

Identify activities or configurations that require contingency plans.

Approve any contingency plans that were developed to support Shutdown Safety Program requirements prior to approval of the final safety assessment.

Specify any training requirements needed to support Shutdown Safety Program activities.

Specify any meetings at which selected Shutdown Safety information is required to be communicated.

Ensure any needed process changes (work orders, procedure revisions, engineering change documents for example) are tracked appropriately and Condition Reports are initiated, if required.

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PAGE: 15 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 6.4.3 The following specific reviews shall be performed by the ORAT during the ORAT review process.

A. LOWERED INVENTORY Reviews The ORAT should specifically review the outage period from the time RCS drain is commenced (loops no longer available for cooling) until Fuel Transfer Canal fill is commenced.

Outage activities occurring during this period should be reviewed for unnecessary extensions of this time period.

Review should include the following:

Basis for extensions in the particular windows.

Can work be performed when there is a lower decay heat load?

Was performing this work during defueled window utilizing the Temporary Reactor Vessel Closure Head (Unit 2) or Shield Blocks (Unit 1) evaluated? (SOER 90-1 Rec 5)

The ORAT should specifically review the initial (hot)

LOWERED INVENTORY condition. This is the outage period between the first time the RCS reaches a LOWERED INVENTORY condition and when the Fuel Transfer Canal fill is commenced. Outage activities occurring during this period should be reviewed for unnecessary extensions of this time period.

The ORAT should specifically review the final (cold)

LOWERED INVENTORY condition. This is the outage period between the final time the RCS reaches a LOWERED INVENTORY condition following core reload and RCS fill is commenced. Outage activities occurring during this period should be reviewed for unnecessary extensions of this time period.

B. Additional Risk Related Reviews The ORAT should review the outage time to boil profile. The profile should be compared to previous outage time to boil profiles to ensure no significant changes have occurred that have an impact on this profile.

The ORAT should specifically review new Preventive Maintenance activities being performed this outage for potential impact on Key Safety Functions.

The ORAT should specifically review the HREs to identify the need to establish FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT ACTIONS.

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PAGE: 16 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 C. Single Point Vulnerability Reviews The ORAT should review plant configurations during the outage that result in Single Point Vulnerability with respect to loss of a Key Safety Function. These are conditions where the sustained loss of a single component (e.g. Service Water Pump, Service Water Loop, ICW Pump, SFP Cooling Pump or Heat Exchanger, etc.) or offsite power could result in reactor core or Spent Fuel Pool boil off occurring. FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT ACTIONS should be considered for the areas where a Single Point Vulnerability is present.

D. Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) Vulnerability Review In cases where FLEX equipment would need to be deployed in locations that would quickly become inaccessible following a loss of decay heat removal from an ELAP event, pre-staging of the equipment is required.

Based on the shutdown risk, determine whether FLEX equipment should be deployed or pre-staged to support maintaining or restoring the key safety functions in the event of a loss of shutdown cooling.

Sources of borated water and methods to vent the containment, if necessary, should be identified to support the shutdown risk reduction.

E. The results of the reviews performed for this section shall be included in the ORAT report.

6.4.4 During the outage execution phase review impact of schedule changes on Key Safety Function status. Approve such changes and/or impose additional changes/requirements as needed. Approval during the outage will be required from at least one member of the ORAT outside of the Outage Scheduling Group.

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PAGE: 17 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 6.5 Shift Manager Responsibilities Field authorization of planned entries into safety status ORANGE. The authorization ensures that the actual plant configuration is consistent with planned configuration when the activity was originally approved.

Ensures the appropriate contingency plans are in place when they are required.

Ensures that the actual plant configuration is consistent with the planned plant configuration.

Take prompt action to restore systems and components to service whenever a RED risk configuration is entered or take action to minimize operation in the unacceptable risk configuration.

Maintains overall responsibility and oversight for control of the KEY SAFETY FUNCTIONS. [SOER 09-01 Rec 3]

Ensures Test Team Expectations attachment of this procedure completed when applicable.

Concurs with the release and closure of outage and system work windows that have an impact on the shutdown safety functions. [SOER 09-01 Rec 3]

6.6 Outage Computer Risk Monitoring Program Administrator Owns the outage risk assessment computer model and ensures model accuracy.

Ensures the appropriate documentation is completed for outage-related model changes.

Works with the on-line risk assessment model owner to maintain accuracy of those model components shared between outage and on-line.

Ensures model availability and functionality as required to support SOPP needs during both the planning and execution phases of the outage.

Provide guidance in developing PSA-related processes and in assuring reasonable standardization between the sites. Provide guidance for transferring PSA best practices between the sites.

Provide support in the performance of quantitative and/or qualitative assessments of plant risk when necessary, in conjunction with ORAT expertise.

Provide guidance to computer risk monitoring tool users on its limitations and how to qualitatively evaluate External Events, Level 2 impacts, and SSCs outside of the tools scope, in conjunction with ORAT expertise.

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PAGE: 18 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 6.7 All Organizations and Personnel Responsible for providing risk insights in proportion to their knowledge and familiarity with affected plant systems and the specific maintenance activity under consideration.

Ensure all emergent conditions found while activities are in progress are reported to the Control Room for additional risk assessment as needed.

Communicate to the appropriate personnel the relative risk and mitigating strategy relevant to planned maintenance.

6.8 Manager - Outage Coordinates the independent review of ORAT preliminary shutdown safety assessment.

Incorporates or resolves ORAT recommendations prior to issuance of the final schedule.

Ensures the ORAT final shutdown safety assessment report is communicated to the appropriate plant staff.

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PAGE: 19 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 7.0 LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS 7.1 Avoid any system alignment changes, maintenance or testing that could cause perturbations to the Spent Fuel Cooling System.

7.2 Operations crew briefings should be conducted prior to any activity that could affect the following:

DECAY HEAT REMOVAL System performance Reactor Coolant System inventory Spent Fuel Pool inventory.

7.3 Time spent in LOWERED INVENTORY conditions shall be minimized. If extended operation in this condition is required (i.e., longer than seven consecutive days), an assessment comparing risks of performing a full core off load to continued operation in LOWERED INVENTORY should be performed.

7.4 As of spring 2015, the ANO-2 fire protection license basis is NFPA 805, while the ANO-1 license basis is Appendix R. The ORAT will use the NFPA 805 criteria for their review of both units schedules.

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PAGE: 20 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 NOTE The following section is designated INFORMATIONAL USE per Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence (EN-HU-106).

8.0 INSTRUCTIONS 8.1 This procedure shall be performed to satisfy EITHER of the following conditions:

8.1.1 Once per shift to verify the availability and/or operability for the minimum required equipment for the current SOPP condition.

8.1.2 Prior to entering a new SOPP condition to verify the availability and/or operability of the minimum required equipment.

8.2 Determine the status of the following RCS variables:

8.2.1 Fuel Location Any fuel in the reactor vessel, Refueling in progress.

Any fuel in the reactor vessel, no Refueling in progress.

All fuel seated in the spent fuel pool.

8.2.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity OPEN INTACT 8.2.3 Reactor Coolant System / Fuel Transfer Canal Inventory RCS level < LOWERED INVENTORY.

RCS level > LOWERED INVENTORY, but FTC not flooded >23 above the core.

FTC flooded > 23' above the core.

8.3 Based upon the RCS variables, determine the correct SOPP.

8.4 Perform the SOPP attachment to determine if requirements are met.

8.5 IF all requirements for the specific SOPP NOT met, THEN notify Shift Manager of respective unit.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 21 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT A Page 1 of 2 SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 1 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.1 Reactor Vessel Defueled 1.2 All Fuel located in the Spent Fuel Pool 2.0 REQUIREMENTS NOTE Cooling Water for BOTH trains of SFP cooling can be supplied by one ICW pump and one ICW Cooler being supplied by Service Water from its normal source.

2.1 Decay Heat Removal Equipment (Both Trains shall be AVAILABLE) 2.1.1 SFP Cooling Train A consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40A SFP HX E-27A Adequate supply of cooling water 2.1.2 SFP Cooling Train B consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40B SFP HX E-27B Adequate supply of cooling water 2.2 Two AVAILABLE SFP makeup sources (circle AVAILABLE sources): (IER L1-11-2 Rec 1)

BWST via P-66 BWST via SF Purif. DI Water Loop 1 SW Loop 2 SW Boric Acid Pumps T-12 2.3 AVAILABLE electrical power sources should be minimum of the following (Circle AVAILABLE sources):

At least 1 DG: .............. DG1 DG2 AACG At least 1 offsite source: .. SU1 SU2 UA (backfed from 500KV) 2.4 SFP boron concentration > Refueling Shutdown requirement.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 22 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT A Page 2 of 2 3.0 MISCELLANEOUS 3.1 Both trains of Spent Fuel Cooling posted as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP Control (1015.002).

3.2 WHEN KEY SAFETY FUNCTION defense in depth is reduced by ANY of the inoperable train/components listed below [SOER 09-01 Rec 2],

Inoperable Decay Heat Removal Train Inoperable offsite power source Inoperable Diesel Generator Plant Safety Index is Orange (High Risk)

THEN ensure Switchyard Access Controls are in place by performing the following:

3.2.1 Use sign headed "ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 1 AT RISK".

3.2.2 Install sign ON GATE LOCK at the following locations:

Switchyard Main Entrance Gate London Line Substation Yard Gate 3.3 EITHER of the following (except when performing fuel handling or operator checkouts):

Transfer Tube Isolation Valve (SF-45) closed.

Gate between SFP and Tilt Pit installed.

Performed By: Date: Time:

Send Copy of this checklist to Shift Outage Manager if the OCC is manned.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 23 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT B Page 1 of 5 SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 2 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.1 FTC flooded > 23 above core (> 390 elev.)

1.2 Fuel in Reactor Vessel 1.3 No REFUELING operations in progress 2.0 REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Equipment 2.1.1 One DHR Train shall be OPERABLE (circle OPERABLE Train)

A Decay Heat Pump B Decay Heat Pump NOTE One complete train of SFP cooling shall be AVAILABLE if less than 59 fuel assemblies have been transferred from the Reactor Vessel to the SFP.

Two complete trains of SFP cooling shall be AVAILABLE if more than 59 fuel assemblies have been transferred from the Reactor Vessel to the SFP.

Cooling Water for BOTH trains of SFP cooling can be supplied by one ICW pump and one ICW Cooler being supplied by Service Water from its normal source.

2.1.2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Cooling. (circle AVAILABLE trains).

A. SFP Cooling Train A consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40A SFP HX E-27A Adequate supply of cooling water B. SFP Cooling Train B consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40B SFP HX E-27B Adequate supply of cooling water

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 24 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT B Page 2 of 5 2.2 AVAILABLE Inventory Control Makeup Flow Paths (Check two available flow paths):

2.2.1 DECAY HEAT TRAIN A

( )

Decay Heat Pump P-34A available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1414 available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1405 available LPI Block valve CV-1401 available Decay Heat Cooler E-35A Outlet (CV-1428) available P-34A Suction from BWST CV-1436 available Flowpath manual valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

2.2.2 DECAY HEAT TRAIN B Decay Heat Pump P-34B available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1415 available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1406 available LPI Block valve CV-1400 available Decay Heat Cooler E-35B Outlet (CV-1429) available P-34B Suction from BWST CV-1437 available Flowpath manual valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

2.2.3 Two AVAILABLE SFP makeup sources (circle AVAILABLE sources):

(IER L1-11-2 Rec 1)

BWST via P-66 BWST via SF Purif. DI Water Loop 1 SW Loop 2 SW Boric Acid Pumps T-12

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 25 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT B Page 3 of 5 NOTE Test recirc header may be in use for other purposes such as BWST recirc for sampling or purification but shall not be tagged out for maintenance.

Loss of Decay Heat Removal System (1203.028) provides guidance on use of RCS inventory makeup systems.

Spray pump breaker must be racked up to be considered available.

Danger tagging flowpath manual valves in test recirc header not required.

CAUTION Do not open both BS-2A and BS-2B. Overpressurization of RB Spray pump suction piping will result when Spray Pump is started.

2.2.4 RB SPRAY TRAIN A RB Spray Pump P-35A available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1414 available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1405 available Test recirc header available for crossconnecting RB Spray pump discharge to the LPI system.

Flowpath manual valves except test recirc header valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

2.2.5 RB SPRAY TRAIN B RB Spray Pump P-35B available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1415 available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1406 available Test recirc header available for crossconnecting RB Spray pump discharge to the LPI system.

Flowpath manual valves except test recirc header valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 26 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT B Page 4 of 5 2.3 Electrical Power Distribution 2.3.1 At least three electrical power sources AVAILABLE (circle those AVAILABLE):

DG1 DG2 AACG SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.2 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one DG OPERABLE (circle those OPERABLE):

DG1 DG2 AACG (AACG operable per ANO1 TS 3.8.2 Bases) 2.3.3 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one offsite power source OPERABLE (circle those OPERABLE):

SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.4 An OPERABLE vital electrical distribution train (AC and DC) associated with an OPERABLE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL pump able to be powered from an on-site power source.

2.4 Reactivity control requirements:

2.4.1 One source range Nuclear Instrument shall be OPERABLE.

2.4.2 RCS boron concentration maintained greater than that required for Refueling Shutdown.

2.4.3 Reactor Coolant System dilution flow paths administratively controlled (e.g. caution tags, danger tags, locks, etc.).

A. Implement dilution flow path controls until entering Mode 5 with all reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

2.5 Containment requirements 2.5.1 Ensure CONTAINMENT CLOSURE can be accomplished within time to boil in the event of a loss of DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. (Review Form 1015.002D, Containment Closure Breach List, for all currently breached penetrations.)

2.5.2 One Reactor Building Cooling fan and Service Water supply shall be AVAILABLE.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 27 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT B Page 5 of 5 3.0 MISCELLANEOUS 3.1 PROTECTED TRAIN signs and barriers (ropes, flagging, etc.) installed.

3.1.1 Post one train of Decay Heat Removal Cooling as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.1.2 Post at least one train of Spent Fuel Cooling as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.1.3 Post common train areas as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.2 WHEN KEY SAFETY FUNCTION defense in depth is reduced by ANY of the inoperable train/components listed below [SOER 09-01 Rec 2],

Inoperable Decay Heat Removal Train Inoperable offsite power source Inoperable Diesel Generator Plant Safety Index is Orange (High Risk)

THEN ensure Switchyard Access Controls are in place by performing the following:

3.2.1 Use sign headed "ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 1 AT RISK".

3.2.2 Install sign ON GATE LOCK at the following locations:

Switchyard Main Entrance Gate London Line Substation Yard Gate 3.3 AVAILABLE temperature indication on the operating DHR train.

3.4 Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation (SF-45) should be closed when fuel transfer operations are complete or are significantly delayed (may be open when performing fuel handling or operator checkouts).

Performed By: Date: Time:

Send Copy of this checklist to Shift Outage Manager if the OCC is manned.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 28 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT C Page 1 of 6 SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 3 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.1 FTC flooded > 23 above core (> 390 elev.)

1.2 Fuel in Reactor Vessel 1.3 REFUELING operations in progress 2.0 REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Equipment 2.1.1 One DHR Train shall be OPERABLE (circle OPERABLE Train)

A Decay Heat Pump B Decay Heat Pump NOTE One complete train of SFP cooling shall be AVAILABLE if less than 59 fuel assemblies have been transferred from the Reactor Vessel to the SFP.

Two complete trains of SFP cooling shall be AVAILABLE if more than 59 fuel assemblies have been transferred from the Reactor Vessel to the SFP.

Cooling Water for BOTH trains of SFP cooling can be supplied by one ICW pump and one ICW Cooler being supplied by Service Water from its normal source.

2.1.2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Cooling A. SFP Cooling Train A consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40A SFP HX E-27A Adequate supply of cooling water B. SFP Cooling Train B consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40B SFP HX E-27B Adequate supply of cooling water

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 29 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT C Page 2 of 6 2.1.3 Sufficient SFP Cooling Pumps and Heat Exchangers in-service during core offload such that the SFP cooling capacity meets the requirements of the heat load per TRM 3.7.3.

2.2 AVAILABLE Inventory Control Makeup Flow Paths (Check two available flow paths):

2.2.1 DECAY HEAT TRAIN A Decay Heat Pump P-34A available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1414 available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1405 available LPI Block valve CV-1401 available Decay Heat Cooler E-35A Outlet (CV-1428) available P-34A Suction from BWST CV-1436 available Flowpath manual valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

2.2.2 DECAY HEAT TRAIN B Decay Heat Pump P-34B available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1415 available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1406 available LPI Block valve CV-1400 available Decay Heat Cooler E-35B Outlet (CV-1429) available P-34B Suction from BWST CV-1437 available Flowpath manual valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

2.2.3 Two AVAILABLE SFP makeup sources (circle AVAILABLE sources):

(IER L1-11-2 Rec 1)

BWST via P-66 BWST via SF Purif. DI Water Loop 1 SW Loop 2 SW Boric Acid Pumps T-12

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 30 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT C Page 3 of 6 NOTE Test recirc header may be in use for other purposes such as BWST recirc for sampling or purification but shall not be tagged out for maintenance.

Loss of Decay Heat Removal System (1203.028) provides guidance on use of RCS inventory makeup systems.

Spray pump must be racked up to be considered available.

Danger tagging flowpath manual valves in test recirc header not required.

CAUTION Do not open both BS-2A and BS-2B. Overpressurization of RB Spray pump suction piping will result when Spray Pump is started.

2.2.4 RB SPRAY TRAIN A RB Spray Pump P-35A available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1414 available RB Sump Line A Outlet CV-1405 available Test recirc header available for crossconnecting RB Spray pump discharge to the LPI system.

Flowpath manual valves except test recirc header valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

2.2.5 RB SPRAY TRAIN B RB Spray Pump P-35B available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1415 available RB Sump Line B Outlet CV-1406 available Test recirc header available for crossconnecting RB Spray pump discharge to the LPI system.

Flowpath manual valves except test recirc header valves danger tagged or controlled by Category E controls.

Clearance # if applicable _____________

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 31 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT C Page 4 of 6 2.3 Electrical Power Distribution 2.3.1 At least three electrical power sources AVAILABLE (circle those AVAILABLE):

DG1 DG2 AACG SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.2 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one DG OPERABLE (circle those OPERABLE):

DG1 DG2 AACG (AACG operable per ANO1 TS 3.8.2 Bases) 2.3.3 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one offsite power source OPERABLE (circle those OPERABLE):

SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.4 An OPERABLE vital electrical distribution train (AC and DC) associated with an OPERABLE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL pump able to be powered from an on-site Power source.

2.4 Reactivity control requirements:

2.4.1 Two source range Nuclear Instruments shall be OPERABLE.

2.4.2 RCS boron concentration maintained greater than that required for Refueling Shutdown.

2.4.3 Reactor Coolant System dilution flow paths administratively controlled (e.g. caution tags, danger tags, locks, etc.).

A. Implement dilution flow path controls until entering Mode 5 with all reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

2.4.4 RCS boron concentration shall be maintained greater than that required for a Misplaced Fuel Assembly when reloading fuel into the reactor vessel or performing an incore fuel shuffle.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 32 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT C Page 5 of 6 2.5 Containment requirements 2.5.1 At least one door on the containment personnel hatch and the emergency hatch shall be capable of being closed.

2.5.2 One Reactor Building Cooling fan and Service Water supply shall be AVAILABLE.

{4.3.1} 2.5.3 The containment equipment hatch shall not be opened unless it can be closed within thirty minutes or the estimated time to boil, whichever is least.

3.0 MISCELLANEOUS 3.1 PROTECTED TRAIN signs and barriers (ropes, flagging, etc.) installed.

3.1.1 Post one train of Decay Heat Removal Cooling as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.1.2 Post at least one train of Spent Fuel Cooling as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.1.3 Post common train areas as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.2 WHEN KEY SAFETY FUNCTION defense in depth is reduced by ANY of the inoperable train/components listed below [SOER 09-01 Rec 2],

Inoperable Decay Heat Removal Train Inoperable offsite power source Inoperable Diesel Generator Plant Safety Index is Orange (High Risk)

THEN ensure Switchyard Access Controls are in place by performing the following:

3.2.1 Use sign headed "ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 1 AT RISK".

3.2.2 Install sign ON GATE LOCK at the following locations:

Switchyard Main Entrance Gate London Line Substation Yard Gate

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 33 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT C Page 6 of 6 3.3 AVAILABLE temperature indication on the operating DHR train.

3.4 Fuel Handling Area ventilation in operation with OPERABLE filters.

3.5 Spent Fuel Pool Area floor equipment hatch in place.

3.6 Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation (SF-45) should be closed when fuel transfer operations are complete or are significantly delayed (may be open when performing fuel handling or operator checkouts).

Performed By: Date: Time:

Send Copy of this checklist to Shift Outage Manager if the OCC is manned.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 34 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT D Page 1 of 4 SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 4 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.1 RCS level > 376.5 1.2 Fuel in Reactor Vessel 1.3 RCS INTACT 2.0 REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Equipment 2.1.1 Two of the following four reactor DHR Trains shall be OPERABLE per procedure 1015.002, Attachment A (circle OPERABLE trains):

A Decay Heat System B Decay Heat System Reactor Coolant System Loop A Reactor Coolant System Loop B 2.1.2 Steam Generator should be AVAILABLE (circle SG AVAILABLE):

A. SG-A with the following:

1. Associated Atmospheric Dump Valve.

2. One of the following capable of supplying feedwater:

P-7B P-7A Any Condensate Pump B. SG-B with the following:

1. Associated Atmospheric Dump Valve.

2. One of the following capable of supplying feedwater:

P-7B P-7A Any Condensate Pump

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 35 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT D Page 2 of 4 NOTE Cooling Water for BOTH trains of SFP cooling can be supplied by one ICW pump and one ICW Cooler being supplied by Service Water from its normal source.

2.1.3 One SFP Cooling Train shall be AVAILABLE: (circle AVAILABLE train):

A. SFP Cooling Train A consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40A SFP HX E-27A Adequate supply of cooling water B. SFP Cooling Train B consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40B SFP HX E-27B Adequate supply of cooling water 2.2 AVAILABLE Inventory Control Makeup Flow Paths 2.2.1 Two HPI pumps and flow paths from the BWST to the RCS AVAILABLE (circle AVAILABLE pumps):

P-36A P-36B P-36C 2.2.2 EITHER of the following:

A. Two independent Loop B hot leg level instruments AVAILABLE (except during calibration).

OR B. RCS filled and vented with a steam bubble in the PZR.

2.2.3 Two AVAILABLE SFP makeup sources (circle AVAILABLE sources):

(IER L1-11-2 Rec 1)

BWST via P-66 BWST via SF Purif. DI Water Loop 1 SW Loop 2 SW Boric Acid Pumps T-12

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 36 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT D Page 3 of 4 2.3 Electrical Power Distribution 2.3.1 At least three electrical power sources AVAILABLE (circle those AVAILABLE):

DG1 DG2 AACG SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.2 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one offsite power source OPERABLE (circle those OPERABLE):

SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.3 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one EDG OPERABLE with automatic tie-on capability to the protected decay heat removal train (circle OPERABLE DG(s) with auto tie-on capability):

DG1 DG2 2.3.4 Is the AACG also OPERABLE per ANO1 TS 3.8.2 Bases? .... YES NO 2.3.5 Both vital electrical distribution trains (AC and DC) AVAILABLE, with one vital electrical distribution train (AC and DC) OPERABLE.

2.4 Reactivity control requirements:

2.4.1 One source range Nuclear Instrument shall be OPERABLE.

2.4.2 Reactor Coolant System dilution flow paths administratively controlled (e.g. caution tags, danger tags, locks, etc.).

A. Implement dilution flow path controls until entering Mode 5 with all reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

2.4.3 RCS boron concentration maintained greater than that required by Reactivity Balance Calculation (1103.015).

2.5 Containment requirements 2.5.1 Ensure CONTAINMENT CLOSURE can be accomplished within the time to boil in the event of a loss of DECAY HEAT REMOVAL. (Review Form 1015.002D, Containment Closure Breach List, for all currently breached penetrations.)

2.5.2 One Reactor Building Cooling fan and Service Water supply shall be AVAILABLE.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 37 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT D Page 4 of 4 3.0 MISCELLANEOUS 3.1 PROTECTED TRAIN signs and barriers (ropes, flagging, etc.) installed.

3.1.1 Post one train of Decay Heat Removal Cooling as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.1.2 Post at least one train of Spent Fuel Cooling as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.1.3 Post common train areas as PROTECTED TRAIN per Protected Area and Interconnecting System Valve Control, Attachment J of Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control (1015.002).

3.2 WHEN KEY SAFETY FUNCTION defense in depth is reduced by ANY of the inoperable train/components listed below [SOER 09-01 Rec 2],

Inoperable Decay Heat Removal Train Inoperable offsite power source Inoperable Diesel Generator Plant Safety Index is Orange (High Risk)

THEN ensure Switchyard Access Controls are in place by performing the following:

3.2.1 Use sign headed "ATTENTION LOSS OF POWER COULD PLACE UNIT 1 AT RISK".

3.2.2 Install sign ON GATE LOCK at the following locations:

Switchyard Main Entrance Gate London Line Substation Yard Gate 3.3 Two independent Core Exit Thermocouples AVAILABLE.

3.4 Decay Heat Suction Valves (CV-1050, CV-1410, CV-1404) should not be cycled unless SGs are capable of removing decay heat.

Performed By: Date: Time:

Send Copy of this checklist to Shift Outage Manager if the OCC is manned.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 38 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT E Page 1 of 4 SOPP FOR UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN CONDITION 5 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.1 RCS level > 376.5 1.2 Fuel in Reactor Vessel 1.3 RCS open 1.4 FTC NOT flooded 2.0 REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Equipment 2.1.1 BOTH DHR Trains shall be OPERABLE per procedure 1015.002, Attachment A:

A Decay Heat System B Decay Heat System NOTE Cooling Water for BOTH trains of SFP cooling can be supplied by one ICW pump and one ICW Cooler being supplied by Service Water from its normal source.

2.1.2 One SFP Cooling Train shall be AVAILABLE (circle AVAILABLE train):

A. SFP Cooling Train A consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40A SFP HX E-27A Adequate supply of cooling water B. SFP Cooling Train B consisting of the following:

SFP Cooling Pump P-40B SFP HX E-27B Adequate supply of cooling water

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 39 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT E Page 2 of 4 2.2 AVAILABLE Inventory Control Makeup Flow Paths 2.2.1 Two AVAILABLE flow paths from the BWST to the RCS (circle AVAILABLE pumps):

P-36A P-36B P-36C P-35A P-35B 2.2.2 Two independent Loop B hot leg level instruments AVAILABLE (except during calibration).

2.2.3 Two AVAILABLE SFP makeup sources (circle AVAILABLE sources):

(IER L1-11-2 Rec 1)

BWST via P-66 BWST via SF Purif. DI Water Loop 1 SW Loop 2 SW Boric Acid Pumps T-12 2.3 Electrical Power Distribution 2.3.1 At least three electrical power sources AVAILABLE (circle those AVAILABLE):

DG1 DG2 AACG SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.2 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one offsite power source OPERABLE (circle those OPERABLE):

SU1 SU2 UA (UA 500KV backfed) 2.3.3 Of the AVAILABLE power sources, at least one EDG OPERABLE with automatic tie-on capability to the PROTECTED DECAY HEAT REMOVAL train (circle OPERABLE DG(s) with auto tie-on capability):

DG1 DG2 2.3.4 Is the AACG also OPERABLE per ANO1 TS 3.8.2 Bases? .... YES NO 2.3.5 Both vital electrical distribution trains (AC and DC) AVAILABLE, with one vital electrical distribution train (AC and DC) OPERABLE.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

PAGE: 40 of 75 1015.048 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROTECTION PLAN CHANGE: 017 ATTACHMENT E Page 3 of 4 2.4 Reactivity control requirements: