05000333/LER-2016-003

LER-2016-003, Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock Doors

James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Event date:	06-07-2016
Report date:	08-03-2016
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
Initial Reporting
ENS 51985	10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
3332016003R00 - NRC Website

LER 16-003-00 for James A. FitzPatrick Regarding Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock Doors

ML16216A162
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	08/03/2016
From:	Brian Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JAFP-16-0123 LER 16-003-00
Download: ML16216A162 (4)

Infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to the information collection

Background

The Secondary Containment [EIIS identifier: NG] boundary surrounds the primary containment and refueling equipment. The boundary forms a control volume to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products. The Secondary Containment consists of four systems which include the Reactor Building, the Reactor Building Isolation and Control System, the Standby Gas Treatment System, and the Main Stack. Secondary Containment is designed to provide containment for postulated design basis accident scenarios: loss-of- coolant accident and refueling (fuel handling) accident. Since pressure may increase in Secondary Containment relative to the environmental pressure, support systems are required to maintain a differential pressure vacuum such that external atmosphere would leak into containment rather than fission products leak out.

The systems which maintain a differential pressure vacuum inside Secondary Containment include the normal Reactor Building Ventilation and Cooling (RBV) System [VA] (during normal plant operations) and the safety- related Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System [BH] for post-accident conditions.

Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 requires one Secondary Containment access door in each access opening to remain closed. Failure to meet this SR results in the Secondary Containment Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) not being met, and requires the Secondary Containment to be declared Inoperable.

Event Description

On June 7, 2016, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100 percent power, members of the Maintenance and Security departments simultaneously entered the northeast Secondary Containment airlock on Reactor Building Elevation 272'. This resulted in the concurrent opening of the airlock doors. This condition was corrected within approximately two (2) seconds. At the time of the closure of either door, secondary containment integrity was restored as the SR for one door closed was met, and no other SRs (such as negative pressure) were being exceeded.

For the condition in which Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 for at least one door in secondary containment access opening being closed, the TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.6.4.1 required action was to restore secondary containment to Operable status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

An NRC notification was made via ENS 51985. This Licensing Event Report (LER) is being submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety function to control the release of radioactive material.

Event Analysis

Timeline of Events on 6/7/2016 1030 Personnel entered the northeast Reactor Building Elevation 272' airlock simultaneously, and the condition was corrected within approximately two (2) seconds.

1110 Condition Report (CR-JAF-2016-01996) initiated.

1307 NRC notified via ENS 51985 lessons leamed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments Infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.

used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number the NRC may not conduct or sponsor and a person is not required to respond to, the rnformabon collection James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 05000 — 333

3. LER NUMBER

— 003 2016 — 00

Cause

Secondary Containment access openings are equipped with green indicating lights that are lit when the opposing access opening door is fully shut. None of the parties involved indicated they observed the green indicating light not being lit prior to opening the airlock door. Therefore, the cause of this condition was determined to be simultaneous opening of the doors.

Similar Events Internal Events CR-JAF-2015-04146, September 17, 2015 External events:

Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station: LER 2015-008, Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously Cause Loss of Secondary Containment Duane Arnold Energy Center: LER 2015-003-01, Both Doors in Secondary Containment Airlock Opened Concurrently

Corrective Actions

Completed Actions

• Both airlock doors (24R-272-5 & -6) on the northeast Reactor Building Elevation 272' Secondary Containment airlock were closed within approximately two (2) seconds.

• Condition Report initiated (CR-JAF-2016-01996); NRC notified via ENS 51985.

• Installed cameras and monitors on both sides of the northeast Reactor Building Elevation 272' Secondary Containment airlock. This will allow verification that the opposing door will not be simultaneously opened.

Safety Consequence and Implications Actual Consequences There were no actual consequences of this event relative to nuclear, industrial, or radiological safety.

Potential Consequences The Secondary Containment differential pressure remained more negative than 0.25 inches of water vacuum while this condition existed. Therefore, there are no potential consequences of this event relative to nuclear, industrial, or radiological safety.

References

• Condition Report: CR-JAF-2016-01996, June 7, 2016, Concurrent Opening of Secondary Containment Access Airlocks

• Technical Specification 3.6.4.1