05000333/LER-2016-005, Regarding Degraded Damper Actuator Prevented Control Room Ventilation Exhaust Fan Start
| ML16323A201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/2016 |
| From: | Brian Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| JAFP-16-0175 LER 16-005-00 | |
| Download: ML16323A201 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3332016005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
"'P Entergy JAFP-16-0175 November 17, 2016 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Northeast Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
James A. FitzPatrick NPP P.O. Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093 Tel 315-349-6024 Fax 315-349-6480 Brian R. Sullivan Site Vice President - JAF
Subject:
LER: 2016-005, Degraded Damper Actuator Prevented Control Room Ventilation Exhaust Fan Start
Dear Sir or Madam:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this report.
Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. William Drews, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (315) 349-6562.
Sincerely//1~(_ A 1 k gc-~ "'"' iJ.{.,, >~l(;v._., j Brian f.s~ullivan Site Vice President BRS/WD/mh
Enclosure:
JAF LER 2016-005, Degraded Damper Actuator Prevented Control Room Ventilation Exhaust Fan Start cc:
USNRC, Region I Administrator USNRC, Project Manager USNRC, Resident Inspector INPO Records Center (ICES)
NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (06-2016)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 05000 - 333 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV N0.
2016
- - 005
- - 00 Page 3 of 4 provide the permissive signal. The corrective actions were to make a minor adjustment to the damper linkage, lubricate and clean moving parts, and re-calibrate 70-62-1CRVA04. The damper was tested and 70FN-4A started successfully with appropriate Control Room damper position indication. The damper actuator 70MOD-108A(OP) was not replaced at that time.
After the event on September 19, 2016, the damper actuator 70MOD-108A(OP) was replaced.
Troubleshooting identified that the old damper actuator was slow / degraded compared to the new damper actuator. If 70MOD-108A(OP) were slow or did not fully actuate the internal position switch then 70FN-4A would not receive a permissive signal to start.
The inconsistent and degrading damper actuator performance began to affect system operability on August 16, 2016. This deficiency prevented the reliability of one of two redundant subsystems of the Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4 Control Room AC System and TS 3.7.3 CREVAS system. If one CREVAS subsystem is inoperable then Required Action A.1 of TS 3.7.3 requires that it be restored within 7 days. If the completion time of Condition A were not met then Required Action C.1 requires that the plant be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and subsequently be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Similarly, if one Control Room AC System is inoperable then Required Action A.1 of TS 3.7.4 requires that it be restored within 30 days. If the completion time of Condition A were not met then Required Action C.1 requires that the plant be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and subsequently be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. In both cases, the allowed out-of-service time was exceeded. This is a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications; reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Cause
Degraded damper actuator 70MOD-108A(OP) affected the ability of the Control Room Ventilation recirculation
/ exhaust fan 70FN-4A to start reliably.
Similar Events
There were no other identical failures of 70MOD-108A(OP) historically. However, similar ventilation damper actuator problems have occurred on other components.
April 8, 2005: The relay room exhaust isolation damper 70MOD-102A did not reach full open before the time delay relay timed out. A new damper actuator was installed. (CR-JAF-2005-01396)
June 7, 2007: The Control Room air handling unit 70AHU-3A starts but the damper 70MOD-106A did not appear to be opening. This was caused by the damper actuator and was corrected when it was replaced. (CR-JAF-2007-02124)
August 5, 2011: The control room supply fan 70AHU-3A discharge damper 70MOD-106A will not open on initiation of fan start. This was caused by inadequate damper and damper linkage lubrication which increased the resistance to proper damper actuator performance. (CR-JAF-2011-04043)
FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION:
Manufacturer:
Honeywell Inc Manufacturer Model Number:
M8185D1006 NPRDS Manufacturer Code:
H260 NPRDS Component Code:
VALVOP FitzPatrick Component ID:
70MOD-108A(OP) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (06-2016)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 05000 - 333 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV N0.
2016
- - 005
- - 00 Page 4 of 4
Corrective Actions
Completed Actions 70MOD-108A(OP) replaced and tested.
A manual Operator action was evaluated and incorporated into procedure OP-55B and ST-18.
Future Actions Evaluate changes to the preventative maintenance activities for 70MOD-108A(OP).
Evaluate the need to replace similar damper actuators.
Safety Significance
There was no actual radiological or nuclear safety consequence during this event.
The condition where 70FN-4A would not reliably start existed between August and September 2016. During this time, the B Control Room exhaust fan remained available to perform the required safety function. This deficiency affected the redundant A Control Room exhaust fan to start reliably; either, manually or automatically in response to a failure of the B exhaust fan.
If the A Control Room exhaust fan was needed, and did not start, a plant Operator could manually correct the deficiency by traveling to the damper actuator location and locally assisting the damper linkage. When the deficiency was identified in September 2016, this manual Operator action was evaluated and accepted as a compensatory measure. Based on the calculated accumulated doses which could be received in these areas for the various design basis accidents combined with the relatively short period of time needed to perform this compensatory action, the increase in dose that could be incurred during the performance of this compensatory action would be negligible when compared to the dose that would be received by maintaining continuous occupancy in the Control Room.
References Condition Report: CR-JAF-2016-03593, September 19, 2016 Condition Report: CR-JAF-2016-03116, August 16, 2016