IR 07200039/2022401

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company - NRC Independent Spent Fuel Storage Security Inspection Report No. 07200039/2022401

ML22272A503
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	10/05/2022
From:	Daniel Schroeder Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
To:	Desmarais R Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co
References
IR 2022401
Download: ML22272A503 (8)

Text

October 5, 2022

SUBJECT:

CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY - NRC INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT NO. 07200039/2022401

Dear Mr. Desmarais:

On September 15, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security inspection at the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company in East Hampton, Connecticut. The inspection covered the licensees physical security plan and the October 16, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures for Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Order and was conducted using NRC Inspection Procedure 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff, on September 15, 2022.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Daniel Daniel L. L. Schroeder Date: 2022.10.05 Schroeder 12:04:59 -04'00'

Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Security, Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 07200039/2022401

REGION I==

INSPECTION REPORT Docket No. 07200039 License No. SFGL-21 Report No. 07200039/2022401 Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Address: 362 Injun Hollow Road, East Hampton, CT 06424-3099 Location Inspected: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

Inspection Dates: September 14 - 15, 2022 Inspectors: Kenneth Hussar, Senior Physical Security Inspector Michael Ordoyne, Physical Security Inspector Thomas Eck, Physical Security Inspector Approved by: Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Security, Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Branch, Division of Radiological Safety and Security Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.

The inspectors: (1) reviewed the access authorization program for the ISFSI; (2) verified and assessed the licensees testing and maintenance program to assure the functionality and reliability of security equipment; and (3) verified that a rapid, capable response to safeguards contingency events had been appropriately developed and effectively implemented.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA)

were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and

(u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

Exit Meeting Summary On September 15, 2022, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Rob Desmarais, ISFSI Manager, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

A-1 ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel R. Desmarais, ISFSI Manager J. Lenois, Security Program Manager S. Hemingway, Asst. Director of Operations LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Opened and Closed None Closed None INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures SP-2, PA Access Authorization Program, Revision 13 SP-8, Personnel Access Controls, Revision 25 SP-10, Security Force Patrols, Revision 11 SP-11, Testing and Maintenance of Security Equipment, Revision 39 SP-13, Lock and Key Control, Revision 15 SP-16, Application of Safeguards Compensatory Measures, Revision 8 SP-17, Weapons Control and Training Program, Revision 14 SP-18, Contingencies, Revision 15 Other Documents CY-22-A03-01 - Quality Assurance Audit Report Connecticut Yankee Physical Security Plan, Revision 4 Calc 24265-000-C-C00036 LLEA MOU, 2/15/2022 Condition Reports CY-CR-20-161 CY-CR-20-164

A-2 CY-CR-21-081 CY-CR-21-082 CY-CR-21-111 CY-CR-21-162 CY-CR-22-031 CY-CR-22-162 Condition Reports Generated CY-CR-22-250 CY-CR-22-251 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADAMS Agencywide Documents and Access Management System CFR Code of Federal Regulations IDS Intrusion Detection System ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Protected Area PARS Publicly Available Records