ML20202H754
| ML20202H754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202H744 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-97-25, NUDOCS 9802230014 | |
| Download: ML20202H754 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000461/1997025
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 111
Docket No: 50-461
License No: NPF-S2
Report No: 50-461/97025(DRP)
Licensee: lilinois Power Company
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Facility: Clinton F'ower Station
Location: Route 54 West
Clinton, IL 61727
Dates: November 25,1997 - January 22,1998
inspectors: T. W. Pruett, Senior Resident inspector
K. K. Stoedter, Resident inspector
K. N. Selburg, Radiation Specialist
D. E. Zemel, Illinois Department of Nudear Safety
Approved by: Thomas J. Kezak, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
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9802230014 900213 *
{DR ADOCK 05000461
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Clinton Power Station
NRC inspection Report No. 50-461/97025(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant
support. The report covers an eight-week period of resident inspection.
Operations
. One violation was identified due to the failure to implement required Technical
Specification actions to restore isolation capability to secondary containment penetrations
between October 18 and December 16. Additionally, on-shift operations personnel were
unfamiliar with how to implement licensing department guidance on acceptable
administrative contrels associated with Technical Specification 3.5.2.D.3.
(Section 01.1.b.1)
. One violation war, identified due to the failure to implement required Technical
Specification actions to restore either the Division I or 11 inverter to service. Specifically,
operations personnel failed to recognize that declaring all 480VAC motors inoperable
required an entry into Technbal Specification 3.8.8, " inverters-Shutdown."
(Section 01.1.b.2)
+ Fourteen examples of the faiivre of operations personnel to implement the Technical
Specifications since January 1996 were identified by NRC inspectors and/or the licensee.
The multiple failures represent a weakness in the ability to implement the requirements of
the Technical Specifications and a poor awareness of plant conditions which impact
Technical Specification requirements. (Section 01.1.b.3)
. The decision to continue work even though three out of four source range monitors
(SRMs) were exhibiting unexpected responses indicated a poor awareness of conditions
with the potential to impact Technical Specifications, and was an example of a poor
questioning attitude and oversight of maintenance activities by operations personnel.
(Section 01.'..b.4)
awareness of plant conditions and a lack of operations personnelinvolvement in restoring
Technical Specification equipment to a fully operable status. The avoidable delay in
restoration resulted in an unnecessary entry into plant Technical Specification 3.3.1.2,
" Source Range Monitor Instrumentation." (Section 01.1.b.5)
- Implementation of Technical Specifications for SRM channel functional testing was poor
in that operadons personnel were unable to initially explain the basis which allowed
tran:,fer of the reactor mode switch from shutdown to run. Additionally, operations
personnel did not document the applicable Special Operation Technical Specification
which allowed the deviation from the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.1.2 prior
to man;pulating the reactor mode switch. (Section 01.1.b.5)
. The failure to notice or provide a reason for the abnormally low cooling water inlet and
outlet temperature indication associated with Rasidual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat
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Exchanger A following a transfer of shutdown cooling was an example of poor awareness -
of plant indications by operations personnelin the c sin control room. (Section 01.1.b.6)
. The failure to notine or provide a reason for the abnormal vent velve position indication
associated with RHR Heat Exchanger A was an example of poor awareness of plant
Indications by operations personnel in the main control room. (Section 01.1.b.7)
-. The inability to explain the status of the normally operating fuel building ventilation system
was an example of poor awareness of plant conditions by operations persone.
- (Section 01.1.b.8)-
. Several deficiencies were ident;fied involving the operations mode restraint tracking '
system, which included: condition reports and engineering evaluations which were not
identified as mode restraints; condition reports and engirieering evaluations which were -
classified as mode restraints but not tracked on a mode restraint list; ineffective
implementation of corrective actions for previously identified mode restraint issues; and
multiple departmer.tal tracking systems for mode restraints. (Section 01.2)
. During the transfer of shutdown cooling from RHR Train B to RHR Train A, r.,perations
personnel appropriately referenced procedures, acknowledged annunciators, and
performed the transfer without any significant complications. (Section 01.3)
-* An auxiliary operator was knowledgeable of systems and provided good respot'ses to
questions during a tour of the containment, fuel, control, and auxiliary buildings.
(Section 01.4) -
Several discrepancies were noted during a walkdown of the altemate source of control
room ventilation including: incorrect revisions of procedures, an uncontrolled vendor
manual, and a lack c,f implementation of vendor recommended preventive maintenance -
items.- (Section O2,1)
Maintenance
-. Maintenance personnel demonstrated good procedure usage during functional testing of -
the Division ill 4.its KV Bus under voltage relay in that they reviewed each step prior to
performance, exhibited good independent verification techniques, were aware of the
purpose of the surveillance test, and understood problems which could be encountered if
the surveillance was not successfully completed. (Section M1.2)
.. Maintenance personnel did not effectively plan work activities for the initial 480VAC motor
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inspections in that work began on the Shutdown Service Water (SSW) Pump Room A
Supply Fan motor without having the appropriate parts on site, without having all parts .
approved through an accredited quality assurance program, and without having a method
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for grossing the motor bearings prior to installation. (Section M1.4)
. One example of a non-cited violation was identified for the failure to follow procedures
invulving the installation of an isolation transformer riuring testing of SRMs. Two
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examples of a poor questioning attitude were identified which involved the continuance of
a maintenance activity even though there was an unexplained increase in test parameters
and an unexplained increase in main control room SRM indications. (Section M1.5)
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. 'An audit conducted by qualit/ assurance involving receipt inspections and shelf life
determinations identified several weaknesses in the material management program and
represented a continued improvement in the quality assurance organization's ability to
perform thorough evaluations. (Section M7.1)
Pla 4 Sucoort
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One example of an individualincorrectly processing through a PCM-1B was identified.
(Section R4.1)
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No deficiencies were noted during a lighting tour of the protected area. (Section S2.1)
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Report Details
Summantol_PlanLRtatua
The plant remained shut down during the inspection period. Major activities included the removal
of sitt from the service water intake structures, a Division li olectrical bus outage, and the -
init!ation of team assignmes,ts for the licensee's Plan For Excellence. On January 6,1998, the
- licensee announced that a three-year contract had been signed, which would allow the facility to-
be managed by PECO Nuclear, a division of PECO Energy Company of Philadelphia,
l. Operations
- 01 Conduct of Operations
- 01.1 Operators' Awareness of Plant Conditions and Technical Specifications
a. Inspection Scoce (717.QI)
The inspectors performed frequent observations of control room activities and questioned
operations personnel on the statu2 of plant equipment, indications, and Technical
Specifications (TS). ,
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b. Observations and Findinas
Several examples of poor awareness oi TS entry mditions or plant conditions by
operations personnel were identified which invu . _ the failure to verify that automatic -
containment isolation signals were operable, the automatic transfer of the Division 11
. Inverter, the impact of Source Range Monitor (SRM) Channel A maintenance on SRM
Channels B, C, and D, the performance of SRM channel functional testing, low cooling
water inlet and outlet temperature indications on RHR Heat Exchanger A, incorrect valve
position indication on RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Valves E12-R609B and E12 R608A, .
and the status of the Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) system,
b.1 Failure to Maintain Containment isolation Signal Operable
Technical Specification 3.5.2, Required Action D.3, specified that actions ce initiated to
. restore isolation capability in each secondary containment and secondary containment
bypass penetration flow path that was not isolated. The Bases for TS 3.5.2 stated that
secondary containment penetration isolation capability must be ensured by verifying at
least one isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other
. acceptable administrative controls are in place to assure isolation capability for each
~ effected penetration. A description of what constitutes "other acceptable admhistrative
controls".was not provided in the TS Bases.
On November 26, due to the inability to maintain at least one isolation valve operable for
each effected penetration, licensing personnel provided the operations department with a
letter which specified the steps necessary to comply with "other acceptable administrative
controls," pursuant to TS 3.5.2.D.3 Bases. The letter required that operations personnel:
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1. Maintain a list of secondary containment penetrations that
remain open,
~ 2. Idantify which of these penetrations are auto-closed upon
receipt of an isolation signal, and
3. In the event of an auto-Isolation signal, monitor the
response of these valves and take manual action to isolate
any penetrations that fail to close.
On December 17, the inspectors verified that a list of effected secondary containment
penetrations had been developed which identified those penetrations that auto-closed ;
upon receipt of an isolation signal. The inspectors questioned on shift operations
personnel to determine which auto-isolation signals were required to be operable (e.g., all
secondary containment auto isolation signals or those isolation signals which pertained to
the valves being left open). The individuals questioned were not familiar with the auto-
- isolation signals which were required to be operable in order to comply with the
requirements for other administrative controls. The inspectors considered the
unfamiliarity with implementation of other acceptable administrative controls associated
with TS 3.5.2.D.3 an example of a poor questioning attitude and poor implementation of
the TS 3.5.2.D.3 requirements.
On December 18, after consultation with licensing personnel, operations personnel
determined that circuits associated with core alters'.lons, movement of irradiated fuel, and
operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, which also provided an auto-
isolatioti signal to secondary containment isolation valves that remained open, were
required to be operable. Additionally, operations personnel informed the inspectors that a
review of tests and surveillances for the associated auto-isolation circuits had been
performed to ensure operability of the required circuits.
On December 19, the inspectors independently verified the auto-isolation instruments
associated with valves which remained open and determined that the Containment
Building Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilati6n Plenum Radiation - High instruments were
inoperable because surveillance testing on Plant Radiation Ms. . ors 1-RIX-FR008A, -B,
-C, and -D were overdue. The 1-RIX-PR008 Monitors provided an auto-isolation signal to
Secondary Containment isolation Dampers 1VF04Y, " Fuel Building Supply Outboard
Isolation," 1VF06Y, " Fuel Building Supply Inboard Isolation," 1VF07Y, " Fuel Building
Exhaust inboard Isolation Damper," and 1VF09Y, " Fuel Building Exhaust Outboard
isolation Damper." Consequently, the auto-isolation capability of Dampers 1VF04Y, -6Y,
-Y, and -9Y were not maintained in accordance with the provisions establish for other
administrative controls pursuant to TS 3.5.2.D.3.
The inspectors performed a review of plant conditions and determined that as of
g September 2,1997, the licensee was required to maintain the auto-isolation circuity for
. the 1-RIX-PROO8 monitors operable. However, on October 18 operations personnel
unknowingly allowed the surveillance testing on the 1-RIX-PROO8 monitors to lapse
(exceed the 1.25 frequency). On December 16, operations personnel closed De opers
1VF04Y,- 6Y, -7Y, and -9Y in preparation for a Division ll electrica! bus outage. The
1-RIX-PROO8 monitors wero restored to an operable status on December 22, p'ar 'o
reopening Dampers 1VF04Y, -6Y,-7Y, and -9Y. The failure to implement requirst.
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actions to restore isolation capability to secondary coretainme,rit penetrations between
October 18 and December 16, demonstrated a poor awareness of plant systems and is a
violation of TC 3.5.2.D.3 (VIO 50 46119702541).
- b.2 ' Failure to Recognize T8 Conditions for inoperable inverters
On December 25,1997, at 12:45 p.m., operations oorsonnel received an annunciator due
to the Division 11 Nuclear Steam Protection System Inverter transferring from its normal to
its attemate power supply. Both operations and electrical maintenance personnel
responded, but were unable to determine the cause of the inverter transfer.
Subsequently, operations personnel considered the invertor inoperable.
On December 28, at 8:30 p.m., operations personnel made an entry into the main control-
room logs which specified that as of 4:00 p.m. on December 28, TS Lim!iing Concluion for
' Operation (LCO) 3.8.8, " inverters-Shutdown," was entered due to the Division I and 11
inverters being inoperable.
The inspectors questioned operations personnel to de: ermine: (1) why th6 TS 3.8.8 entry
condition was not noted on December 25, and (2) following identification on
December 28, why didn't operations personnel specify the time of entry as 12:45 p.m. on
December 25. Operations personnel stated that they initially bsileved the required
actions to be taken in response to two inoperable inverters were adequately covcred by
TS 3.8.2, ?AC Sources - Shutdown" and TS 3.8.10, "Distribuilon - Shutdown." In addition,
multiple operating crews failed to recognize that the actions to be taken when the
Division I and 11 inverters were inoperable were clearty delineated in TS 3.8.8. Operations -
- personnel stateo that the date and time of entry on Cecember 28 had been based on
recognition of the Division ! inverter being inoperable and that + hey should have predated
- the LCO entry time to 12:45 p.m. on December 25.
On December 29, operations perso_nnel informed the inspectors that the Division I
inverter was inoperable because the 480VAC motor which supplied power to the inverter
room cooler was out of service due to motor over grossing concems. The inspectors ,
questioned operations personnel to determine why TS 3.0.8 hed not been entered on
November 8,1997, when the 480VAC motors for both the Division I and 11 inverter room
coolers were out of service since the inoperable room coolers resulted in both inverters -
being inoperable. After reviewing TS and other associated documentation, operations
personnel determined that they had missed entry into TS 3.8.8 when the 48"VAC motors
for the inverter room coolers were declared inoperable on November 8. As a result, the
required actions for TS 3.8.8 were not performed until 50 days after the inverters were
initially inoperable. The failure to recognize an entry into a condition prohibited by TS
demonstrated a poor awareness and questioning attitude by operations personnel.
Technical Specification 3.8.8, inverters - Shutdown, requ;res, in pari, that one divisional
inverter capable of supplying one division of the Division I or 11 onsite Class IE
uninterruptible AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems required by L.CO 3.8.10,
" Distribution Systems - Shutdown," shall be operable. With one or more required
divisional inverters inoperable, the LCO requires tnat actions be initiated to declare the
affected required features inoperable immediately or suspend core alterations, suspend i
handling of irradiated fuel assemblies in primary and secondary containment, suspenc;
operations with the potential to drain the vessel, and initiate actions to restore required
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divisionallaverters to an operable status immediately. The inspectors determined that
the failure to implement the Required Actions of the associated Conditions for -
approximately 50 days a violation of TS 3.8.8 (VIO 50 461/9702542),
- b.3 Adverse Trond involving implementation of T8
The inspectors noted that there have been multiple examples det m in NRC
inspection reports and Licensee Event Reports (LER) which involved inadequate
implementation of the TS. The following examples were previously noted by the
inspectors between the period of January 1996 and December 1997:
NRC Report 50-461/97022: Two examples of the failure to implement TS Required
- Actions involving immediate actions and attemate shut
uown cooling.
NRC Report 50-461/97015; One example involving the installation of a non qualified
portable battery charger to the Division 11 Battery.
NRC Report 50-461/96006: Two examples involving the plant not being placed in -
MODE 4 and not locking the mode switch in the refuel
position.
NRC Report 50-461/96005: Two examples involving control room ventilation and
reactor water cleanup room floor plugs.
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LER 50-461/97011: One example involving the failure to verify breaker position
every seven days.
LER 50-461/97007: One example involving seismia qualification of circuit
breakers.
LER 50-461/97002: One example involving EDG testing.
LER 50-461/96019: One example involving surveillance testing of SRMs.
LER 50-461/96003: One example involving a breach of secondary containment.
. The inspectors noted that the mu4iple examples of inadequate TS implementation was an
adverse cendition which the licensee had not previously recognized. On January 5,1998,
the inspectors discussed the TS deficiencies with senior licensee personnel. In response
to the inspectors' concem, the licensee initiated condition report (CR) 198-01-059 on
January 7,1998, to document an adverse trend in TS awareness and implementation.
The Assistant Plant Manager- Operations stated that emergent training on TS, a review
- of existing TS applicable to the plant conditions, and discussions with shift supervisors
would be performed as an interim measure until a more thorough review could be
initiated.
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b4 McIntenance on SRM Channel A
On December 2,1997, during preventive maintenance to perform current to voltage (1/V)
plots on SRM Channel A, the SRM Channel B, C, and D count rate increased and a short
- period alarm annunciated in the main control room. Operations personnel questioned
control and instrumentation (C&l) personnel to deterrr.ine if the maintenance activity
caused the unexpected increase in count rates. C&l responded that they were not the -
cause of the increased counts end resumed work.
Upon resumption of the maintenance activity operations personnel observed a second
increase in count rate on SRM Channels B,_C, and D. Once again o; erations personnel
questioned C&l personnel regarding the impact of the SPM A activity on SRMs B, C, and
D. Again, C&I responded that they did not believe they were responsible, but
recommended that the test voltage be adjusted a third time on SRM A to check the
response on SRMs B, C. and D. As the test voltage was raised, operations personnel
noted an increase in the count rate on SRM Channels B, C, and D. Following the third
unexpected and unexplained increase in count rate, operations personnel directed that
C&l stop the work activity on SRM Channel A. _The inspectors considered the delay in
work stoppage until a third unexpected response occurred an example of poor
questioning attitude and overs;ght of maintenance activitie; by operations personnel.
On December 3, the inspectors questioned operations personnel to determine the
applicellity of SRM TS. Operations personnel stated that SRMs B, C, and D were
operable since the maintenance activity on SRM Channel A had been stopped. The -
inspectors questioned operations and engineering personnel to determine if the
operability review assessed whether or not adequate separation existed between the
SRM channels, given the unexpected and unexplained response on SRM Channels B, C,
and D. Engineering personnel discussed the issue with the vendor and were unable to
determine if adequate separation existed between the SRM Channels. Because the
response to SRM Channels B, C, and D was unexpected, and because engineering was
unable to determine if adequate separation existed between SRM Channels, operations
personnel declared all four channels of SRM inoperable and verified the required actions :
of TS 3.3.1.2, "Cource Range Monitor Instrumentation."
On December 10, engineering personnel completed an evaluation of the unexpected
response on SRMs 0, C, and D, and determined that the event was related to noise -
generation created due to the setting of the discriminator threshold level and improper -
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isolelion of the 120 Vac power supply to the measuring and test equipmem (See
Section M1.5). Even though the licensee eventually demonsteated that adequate
e separation existed between the SRM channels, the inspectort. considered the lack of :
recognition of conditions with the potential to impact TS ari example of poor awaraness
and questioning attitude by operations personnel,
b.5 Channel Functionel Testing of SRMs
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On December 22,1907, SRM Channels A, B, and C were inoperable end operations
personnel were imp'emeoting the required actions of TS 3.3.1.2 wnich rpecihd that witn
less than two operable SRM channels, fully insert all inv rtable control rodt and pkce the
N rentor mode switch in the shutdown position. SRM A was consbered inoperable
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because operations personnel had allowed the channel functionc' test to Irpse on
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December 10. SRM B was considered inoperable because operations personnel had not
completed post maintenanca testing following maintenance completed on December 15.
SRM C was considered inoperable on December 22, due to uner.plained inteimittent
spiking. Prior to December 22, SRM C had been placed on the main control room
deficiency list due to intemdttent spiking.
- The licensee initially attempted to restore SRM C to service on December 23, prior to
performir4 testing on the remaining SRMs.- However, trouble shooting activities on
SRM C_ wore unsuccessful, and operations personnel decided to complete channel
functional testing on SetMs A, B, and D.
The inspectors questioned operations personnel to determine: (1) why testing had been
deferred to the point that an unnecessary entry into TS 3.3.1.2 was required, and (2) why
- reliance was placed on a suspect monitor to meet the TS 3.3.1.2 requirements for two
operable SRMs. Operations personnel stated that a lack of operations involvement in the
schMuling process resulted in an unacceptable delay in restoring SRMs to service in a ,
timstj manner. The inspectors considered the delay in restoring the SRMs to operable
status an example of poor awareness of plant conditions ared a lack of operations
involvemem in restoring TS equipment to a fully operable status.
During a review of the December 23 station logs, the inspectors noted a log entry at
12:35 p.m. which specified that SRM channel functional testing had commenced, that all
. rods were inserted, and that there were no core alterations in progress. The inspectors
noted that SRM channel functional testing required that the reactor mode switch be
placed in the run position, which was contrary to the TS 3.3.1.2 required action to
maintain the reactor mode switch in the shut down position.
The inspectors questionod on shift operations personnel to determine why it was
acceptable to transfer the reactor mode switch from the required position. Operations
personnel involved in the SRM channel functional testing were initially unable to explain .
the rational for transferring the reactor mode switch. Upon further review, operations
personnel stated that the actions taken were consistent with implementation of Special
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Operations TS 3.10.2, " Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing," which allows transfer of
the reactor mode switch to other positions to allow testing provided all control rods
remain fully inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies; and no core
alterations are in progress.
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The inspectors noted that the station logs indicated that tha control rods were fully
inserted and that no core alterations were in progress.' However, no entry had been
made specifying that the provisions of TS 3.10.2 were being invoked in order to perform 4
testing. Operations personnel acknowledged that an entry in the station log should have
been made which specified the applicable TS being utilized for the plant condition. The
r inspectors determined that implementation of the TS for SRM channel functional testing
by operations personnel was poor in that they were unable to initially explain the basis
- which allowed transfer of the reactor mode switch and because operations personnel did
not document the applicable TS prior to manipulating the reactor mode switch.
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b.6 Cooling Water Temperature Indication for Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger
On December 17, following the transfer from RHR B to RHR A, the inspectors noted that
the cooling water inlet and outlet temperature indications for RHR Heat Exchanger A were
, pegged low. On shift operations personnel questioned by the inspectors had not noticed '
the abnormal indication and were unable to provide an explanation for the low reading.
Operations personnel stated that the temperature indicators were typically not used since
a separate instrument for the parameter was normally referenced. The inspectors
considered the failure to notice or provide a reason for the abnormally lov/ Indication an
example of poor awareness of plant indications.
Approximately 30 minutes later, during subsequent discussions with operations
personnel, a reactor operator recalled that the cutlet temperature indicator may have
been a main control room deficiency. Through a search of MWR tags in a storage bin in
the control room and a review of the MWR database, the on shift operators were able to
= locate documentation which described the deficiency on the outlet temperature indication.-
The inlet temperature indication did not have a separate deficiency tag but was described
in the remarks section of the MWR database for the outlet temperature indication. The
inspectors noted that nothing existad on the contrd room panel to prompt the operators
of a main control room deficiency and a log of main control deficiencies was not
maintained in the control room (See Section 02.1).
b.7 RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Valve Position Indication -
The inspectors questioned operations personnel to determine why the main control room
valve position indication for RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Valves E12-R609B, and .
E12-R608A did not indicate full closed even though the valves were fully closed. j
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E12-R609B indicated approximately 2 percent, and E12-R608A indicated approximately
5 percent open even though both valves were tagged in the fully closed position.
Operations personnel stated that the valve indications are not utilized and therefore the
discrepancy had not been noted or documentsd as a deficieacy. The inspectors
considered the lack of recognition of the inaccurate valve position indication an example
of poor questioning attitude and awareness of plant systems by operations personnel,
b.8 Status of Fuel Building Ventilation System
On Oncember 19,1997, on shift operations personnel noted an increase in fuel building
fire alarms due to the normal ventilation system being secured to support maintenance
involving the Division 11 bus outage. The inspectors questioned on shift operations
personnel to determine why the fuel building ventilation (VF) system was out of service
and received different reasons.-
The first individual stated that he was unsure why W was inoperative but speculated that
it was because sensing instruments powered from Division 11 were deenergized. The
second individual stated that there was only one train of VF which was powered from
Division ll.
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Upon further review, the inspectors detcrmined that the in' series VF system isolation
dampers are powered from both Division I and 11. Securing Division I or ll electrical
busses removes pnwer from the dampers which actuate to the fail close position. The
inspectors noted that Procedure CPS 3514.01C006, " Bus / Unit Sub outages,4160V Bus
(1 AP09E) Outage," required that the VF system be secured as a prerequisite.
Nevertheless, the inspectors determined that inability of on shift operations personnel to
explain the status of the normally operating VF system an example of poor awareness of
plant conditions.
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c. Conclusions
The inspectors identified that since January 1996, on at least 14 occasions, operations
personnel failed to properly implement the TS. The multiple failures represent a
weakness in the licensee's ability to property implement the requirements of the TS and a -
poor of awareness of plant conditions which impact TS requirements,
Two violations involving the failure to impicment the TS associated witi1 secondary
containment and inverters were identified. Additionally, several examples of a poor
awareness of plant conditions and poor questioning attitude were identified, which
involved the performance of maintenance and testing on SRMs, the status of control
room indications for RHR heat exchanger temperature and valve position and the
- operational status of the fuel building ventilation system.
01.2 ' Trackina of Plant Mode Restraints
a. Inspection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the program for tracking mode restraints to ensure that all items
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had been entered into the mode change restraint list (MCRL) or ott'er appropriate tracking
method,
b. Observations and Findinos
The inspectors determined that the means for tracking condition reports or maintenance
work requests identified as mode restraints were inconsistent in addition, multiple lists
between the operations, planning,- engineering, and corrective action program
departments made retrievability and tracking of mode restraint items cumbersome. For
. example, at the inspector's request, the licensee identified at least 31 CRs which were
classified as mode restraints but were not listed in the official MCRL The inspectors
were also unable to cross reference severalitems between the system status file, the
MCRL, the shift supervisor restraint list, the corrective action review board restraint list,
= and the engineerhg list.
Because'of the cumbersome process, the inspectors reviewed CR 1-97-05-024, "Failura
to Propedy identify Mode Restraints," initiated May 2,1997, to determine the status of
corrective actions from previously identified deficiencies involving CRs which were either
not identified as mode restraints or were not in a tracking system. During the review of
the CR, the licensee noted that the informal processes were cumbersome, prone to
human error, and that tools needed to be developed to effectively and officiently track
mode restrs!nts. Examples of deficiencies included new mode restraints identified during
12
o - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ .
- - _
,
- engineering reviews'which were not communicated to operators, shift supervisors and
shift resource managers, CRs which were incorrectly identified as not being a mode -
restraint, and engineering evaluations which identified mode restraints but were not .
specified on the MCRL
Corrective actions included revisions to procedures to improve awareness of mode
restraints and the development of a mode restraint database. During discussions with
operations personnel, the inspectors were informed that the MCRL database was not-
utilized as the official restraint list because it was difficult to use and the information in the
database did not include all of the mode restraints,
in response to the inspectors' observations, the licensee reinttiated an effort to improve
the identification and tracking of mode restraints._ Nevertheless, the inspectors -
considered the inability to implement actions to improve the cumbersome processes of
tracking mode restraints an example of the licensee's continued inability to implement
effective corrective actions. Improvements in the corrective action program are being
reviewed as part of the NRC's oversight of improvement initiatives at the facility,
c. Conclusions
Several problems were identified involving the mode restraint tracking system which
included: condition reports and engineering evaluations which were not identified as
mode restraints, condition reports and engineering evaluations which were classified as
mode restraints but not trackert on a mode restraint list ineffective implementation of
corrective actions for previously identified mode restraint issues, and multiple
departmental tracking systems for mode restraints.
01.3 Transfer of Shut Down Coolina Systems (71707)
- On December 17,1997, the inspectors observed control room operators transfer
shutdown cooling from RHR Train B to RHR Train A. Operations personnel appropriately .
'
referenced procedures, acknowledged annunciators, and performed the transfer without
a
any significant complications.-
=01A Non Licensed Operator Tour (71707)
On January S,1998, the inspectors accompanied a rion-licensed operator on tours of the
containment, fuel, control, and auxiliary buildings during the performance of Procedure
CPS 3800.02C001, "C-Area Daily Rounds." The auxiliary operator was knowledgeable of
systems contained within the C-Area and provided good responses to questions asked by
the inspectors involving equipment operation.
13
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - .
4
. 02 Operational Status of Foollities and Equipment
02.1 Walkdown of Backuo Control Room Ventilation Fans
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the altomate source of main control room
ventilation which is utilized in the event of a station blackout,
b. Ooservations and Findinos
On December 3,1997, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the altemate source of -
main control room ventilation. The altemate source requires the installation of prestc.ged
gasoline powered fans and ducting and the repositioning of MCR doors in accordance
'
with Procedure CPS 4200.01C001,"MCR Cooling During a SBO." The altemate
ventilation source was originally rsquired to maintain MCR temperature betow 107"F at
the end of a S80 event. However, during a subsequent engineering review in
January 1996, the licensee determined that the altemate source would not be required
and revised CPS Procedure 4200.01 to place gasoline powered fans in service only if
temperatum reaches 107*F.
The inspectors noted the foisowing discrepancies during the walkdown: (1) the incorrect
- revision of Procedure 4200.010002, "DC Load Shedding During a 880" was located in -
the 800' Turbine Building locker, (2) an uncontrolled copy of the vendor manual for the
gasoline engines was located in the 800' Turbine Building locker, and (3) the vendor
preventive maintenance recommendations for the gasoline engine were not being
implemented.
, The licensee initiated CRs 1-g7-12-087 and 197-12114, replaced the incorrect revision
of CPS Procedure 4200.01C002, and commenced a review of the vendor recommended
preventive maintenance items. The inspectors noted that the discrepancies were typical
of previous NRC findings and that corrective actions were been developed as part of
several restart initiatives to address concems with procedure quality, vendor manuals,
and implementation of preventive maintenance items describe in technical manuals,
c. Conclusions
Several discrepancies were noted during a walkdown of the attemate source of control
room ventilation including; incorrect revisions of proceduies, uncantrolled vendor
'
manuals, and a lack of implementation of vendor recommended preventive maintenance
items.
,
)
14
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II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments (62707 and 61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed the following maintenance and surveillance
activities:
CPS Procedure #"3.40 Division til 4.16 KV Bus Under Voltage Relay (Degraded
Voltage) Functional Test"
CPS Procedi w ; ,. 12 Neutron Monitor Detector testing
CPS Procedure 9061.03 VR!VQ Valve Operability
.
Various MWRs involving 480 VAC Motor inspections
M1.2 Division 1114.16 KV Bus Under Voltaae Relev (Dearaded Voltaae) Functional Test (61726)
The inspectors observed the Division ill 4.16 KV Bus under voltage relay functional test
and concluded that maintenance personnel demonstrated good procedure usage in that
they reviewed each step prior to performance, exhibited good independent verification
techniques, were aware of the purpose of the surveillance test, and understood problems
which could be encountered if the surveillance was not successfully completed.
M1.3 Fix-It-Now Team ,
a. Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Fix-It-Now (FIN) process.
This included a review of applicable procedur3s and the Updated Safety Analysis Report
(USAR), interviews with various FIN team members, and observations of work performed
by the FIN team. The FIN team consisted of personnel from Operations, Clerical,
Maintenance Planning, Radiation Protection, Control and Instrumentation, Electrical
Maintenance, and Mechanical Maintenance departments,
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee implemented the FIN team in accordance with CPS Procedure 1029.03,
" Implementation of the FIN Process." One d;fference between the FIN team process and
the description in the procedure involved the experience of the FIN team leader (FTL).
CPS Procedure 1029.03 required the FTL to have experience as an on-shift senior
reactor operator, however, the current FTL had no such experience. The licensee had
submitted a request for a procedure change, however, the procedure revision had not
occurred since there was also a USAR change pending which regarded the FIN team.
The USAR stated that the FTL would report to the maintenance planning supervisor. The
USAR change would remove the responsibilities of FIN team oversight from the
15
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,
,
maintenance planning supervisor and add them to the maintenance improvement team
leader. Once this change request w'.s accepted, the procedure could be updated, and 3
the FIN team would be adequately described in licensee documents. The inspectors
verified that the licensea had submitted the appropriate revisions,
c. Conclusions
The FIN team's work process was in accordance s ith licensee procedures.
M1.4 480 Volt Motor inspections
a. Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans and implementation of the plans for
480VAC motor removal, inspection, and reinstallation. The inspectors interviewed
various personnelinvolved with the planning and implementation of these activities,
reviewed various documents, and performed inspections of some of the motors after they
had been disassembled.
b. Observations and Findinas
On November 8,1997, the operations department declared all 480VAC motors inoperable
when they determined that the motors could be degraded due to potential over greasing
during maintenance activities. Excessive grease on the motor windings could result in
motor damage from heat degradation. The licensee decided that 96 480V motors would
be inspected for signs of over greasing. The scope of these inspections included
disassembly, inspection, cleaning of each motor, replacing the bearings, and reinstalling
the motor.
On November 21, the licensee initiated work on the first motor,1VH01CA S.utdown
Service Water Pump Room A Supply Fan) on an "at risk" basis. The licensee considered
the activity to be "at risk" because several issues necessary to support motor reassembly
had not been resolved. Specifically, replacement bearings had not been received, the
bearii g supplier did not have an approved quality assurance program, and the initial
lubrication method had not been estelished. The bearing parts were received on
5 November 24, the review of the beanng suppliers QA program was completed on
December 1, and the initiallubrication method was approved on December 5.
The inspectors were concamed that the licensee started work on a component without
having appropriate reassembly instructions or the necessary parts. The inspectors
cqnsidered the licensee's decision to begin work on equipment needed to support
availability of the Divis;on i Shutdown Service Water Pump without having appropriate
instructions or the necessary parts an example of non-conservative decision making. The
inspectors noted that a delay in reassembly of the motor and restoring the pump to an
operable status would have occurred had it not been for the identification of
discrepancies requiring shipment of the motor to the vendor for inspection.
16
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ .
c. Conclusions
The inspectors noted that the licensee had not effectively planned work activities for the
initial 480 volt motor inspection. Specifically, the licensee began work on the 1VH01CA
motor without having the appropriate parts on site, without having all parts aporoved
through an accredited quality assurance plogram, and without having a method for
greasing the motor bearings prior to installation.
]
M1.5 SRM Current to Voltece Testina
a. insoection Scope (62701)
The inspectors reviewed the results of C&l maintenance activities on SRM A performed in
accordame with CPS Procedure 8731.12, " Neutron Monitoring Detector Testing."
b. Observations and Findinas
On December 2,1997, during the performance of current to voltage (t/V) testing on SRM
A, C&l technicians stopped work to rearrange measuring and test equipment (M&TE).
The last measurement taken prior to rearranging the test equipment was an input voltage
of 300V, output voltage of 12mV, and output amperage 0.12 microamps.
The C&l technicians unknowingly reconnected the test me,ter to a 120VAC power supply
without installing an isolation transformer. The isolation transformer is used when
connecting to an AC source to prevent ground noise from impacting the test results. The
T st measurement taken after resuming testing indicated an approximate 50 fold increase
'h an input voltage of 450, the output voltage was 575mV, and output amperage was
b. d microamps). The C&l technicians performing the test did not question the significant
rise in parameters and as such, did not note that the M&TE was improperty installed. The
insoectors determined that the C&l technicians demonstrated a poor questioning attitude
by . et determining the cause of the significant increase in parameters following the
resumption of the maintenance activity. The inspectors noted that the licensee did not
question the significant rise in parameters during their review of the event.
When the C&l technicians raised the input voltage to 1000V, the control room indication
for SRMs B, C, and D increased causing a short period alarm. The C&l technicians
responded th t they were not the cause of the short period alarm when questioned by
operations anc res umed testing. The C&l technicians increased voltage a second time
and once again, the short period alarm annunciated in the main control room. The C&l
technicians responded that they did not believe they were responsible and had operations
personnel monitor SRM indication while they increased the input voltage a third time.
Once again, SRM indication increased. Following the third increase operators dir6::ted
that C&l technicians cease the maintenance activity. The inspectors determined that the
C&l technicians demonstrated a second example of a poor questioning attitude b; not
determining the cause of the increase in SRM B, C, and D, indications prior to resuming
the maintenance activity.
17
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_ . .
-
_ _
.
On December 12, engineering personnel determined that the increase in indication on
SRMs B, C, and D was attributed to the failure to install an isolation transformer between
the test meter and the 120VAC power supply. The lack of the isolation transformer
allowed noise generation from the ground path to be radiated from the unshielded
portions of the SRM A detector ceble to the other unshielded SRM detector cables.
CPS Procedure 8713.12, Section 8.3.3, "l/V Plot for SRMs," requires, in part, that an
isolation transformer be used if the test meter is powered from an AC source. The failure
to install the isolation transformer when connecting the test meter to a AC source is
considered a violation of TS 5.4.1. This licensee identified and corrected violation is
being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (NCV 50 461/97025-03).
c. Conclusions
_ One example of a failure to follow procedures involving the installation of an isolation
transformer during testing of SRMs was identified. Two examples of a poor questioning -
attitude were identified which involved the continuance of a maintenance activity even
though there was an unexplained increase in test parameters and an unexplained
increase in main control room SRM indications.
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities
M7.1 Material Manaaement and Procurement / Materials Quality Assurance Audit (62707) -
The licensee's quality assurance department performed an audit (Q38-97-15) of the 7
Material Management department and the Procurement / Materials department from
October 20, through November 7,1997. The inspectors noted that Quality Assurance
(QA) performed a thorough audit based on findings involving inadequacies in the receipt
inspection process and shelf life detemlinations. The inspectors determined that the
audit findings were indicative of improved performance in QA audits.
M8' Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
- M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report No. 50-461/96-008: Loose term!nal connection causes
reactor recirculation pumps to trip from fast to slow resulting in a manual scram. On
June 13,1996, control room operators received alarms indicating that both reactor
recirculation (RR) pumps had downshifted to slow speed due to sensing a falso Level 3 ,
signal on two RR low level trip units. The licensee initially developed corrective actions to
install special lugs at certain terminal points to allow easy installation of temporary
electrical test equipment. After further investigation, the licensee changed the corrective
actions to a revision of preventive maintenance work documents and briefings to
maintenance personnel. The inspectors considered the corrective actions appropriate for
this issue.
M8.2- (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-461/97011-08: Failure h complete an impact matrix.
On May 14,1997, a C&l technician improperly lifted the leads between terminals
associated with the feedwater low trip unit and caused an unexpected run back of the "A"
RR flow control valve. The licensee evaluated the task, technical specification
surveillance procedures, and other PM tasks for systems which could significantly impact
18
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. .. . . _ _ _
.
. .
.
_
plant operations. These procedures were annotated with waming statements which
indicated the !mpact on plant systems should steps in the procedure be deviated.
Training was performed for Cal technicians to ensure they understood the importance of
procedure adherence. Finally, the licensee installed electrical test and monitoring
equipment on certain electrical terminal points to ease the completion of preventive
maintenance. Th inspectors considered the corrective actions appropriate for this issue.
. M8.3 (Closed) Licangp.e Event Report 97013-00: Failure to adequately verify no trips exist
during surveillance test results in inadvertent actuation of standby gas treatment system.
On May 8,1997, operations and maintenance personnel failed to establish and verify that
plant protective logic was in the appropriate condition, resulting in an inadvertent
actuation of the standby gas treatment system during a channel functional test c( process -
radiation Monitor PR006A. Corrective actions included revisions to plant procedures to
- require notifications to supervision if incorrect switch positions were observed and to
improve procedure clarity. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions were
sopropriate for this issue.
M8.4 (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-461/97011-06: This violation was closed during
review of LER 97013.
M8.5 (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-461/96009-07: Untimely Completion of Use History
Analysis (UHA). The inspectors reviewed Procedure CPS No.1512.01, " Calibration and
Control of Measuring and Test Equipment," and determined that the licensee had
incorporated the criterion to generate a condition report for any UHAs which are not
s generated in 21 dasys. A report of UHA's status was compiled weekly by a C&l technician,
with a copy provided to the C&l group leader for review. Yhe inspectors reviewed UHAs
which were required to be completed from January through November 1997, and noted
- that the majority of the UHAs were completed within 21 days, and those which were not
ccmpleted were documented in a condition report.
Quartetty assessments of UHAs were performed by C&I technicians. These
assessments constituted intemal audits of the measurement and test equipment (M&TE}
program, including a ininimum requirement to review completed UHA forms for accuracy
and completeness and to review a sample of completed MWRs for proper documentation
and M&TE usage. From these units, the licensee determined whether a supervisory
evaluation or a condition report needs to be issued. The inspectors considered the
- corrective actions appropriate for this issue.
M8.6 (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50 461/97011-09: Preconditioning of breakers. The
inspectors verified that procedures had been revised to ensure that field installed molded
case circuit breakers are not preconditioned prior to functional testing. The inspectors
considered the corrective actions appropriate for this issue.
.
19
.
.
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--__-- _______ - __ - __ ____-__
-
- -
Ill. Ennineerina
E8- Miscellaneous Engineering issues
E8.1 -(Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-461/95003-01a: Failure of Division 111 Emergency
Diesel Generator Bearing Due to inadequate Lubrication, As part of the licensee's -
corrective actions to prevent recurrence, Plant Manager's Standing Order (PMSO)- 078,
" Plant Component Oil Consumption," was developed to track oil consumption for
- permanent plant components between scheduled maintenance intervals to ensure that
any chronic oil leaks or excessive oil consumption were identified and tracked.
- The inspectors reviewed the implementation of PMSO-078 and determined that current
practices for tracking and trending oil consumption were not meeting the intent of the -
c corrective action. For example, PMSO-078 directs that an oil consumption form be
-
completed any time oil is added to a plant component outside of a scheduled -
maintenance interval. The inspectors interviewed engineering and maintenance
personnel and determined that the oil consumption forms were only being utilized by the
operations department. Although maintenance personnel were allowed to add oil to plant
components outside of a scheduled maintenance interval, they used a MWR or activated
'
a PM task to perform the oil addition. Due to the maintenance department's use of
MWRs and PMs to add oil, the oil consumption form included in PMSO-078 was not
completed. Engineering personnel stated that they were unsure how oil added via a PM
or MWR was tracked but believed that the system engineers tracked the performance or
PMs and MWRs for their respective systems.
The inspectors were concemed that having two means of tracking oil consumption which
were not all inclusive could result in the mis-identification of a chronic oil leak or
excessive oil consumption. The inspectors discussed their concem with licensee :
- management and were informed that changes would be made to ensure that any addition
6f oil to a component would be tracked to verify there was not an increase in oil
consumption.- Deficiencies in the licensee's equipment trending program have been
- identified in previous NRC Inspection Reports and licensee asussments, improvements
' in the trending program will be reviewed as part of the NRC's oversight of licensee
improvement initiatives.
E8.2 (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-461/96015-05a: Failure to have appropriate ECCS
response time testing acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation
and USAR change package developed in response to this violation and had no further
concems.
E8.3 (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-461/96015-05b: Failure to have safety evaluation for
-
manual operation of the component cooling water (CCW) expansion tank. The inspectors
reviewed safety evaluation 96-082 which documented the manual operation of the CCW
expansion tank and had no concems. The licensee's co Tective actions for improving the
10 CFR Part 50.56 safety evaluation program appeared appropriate.
20
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
f
.
IV. Plant Support
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C
R4.1 : Imoroner Use of the Exit Portal MonbgIn
a. losendon Scope (71750)
The inspectors performed routine observations of radiation worker practices upon _ ogress
from radiologically controlled areas. ;
b. ObseNations and Findidas
On December g, igg 7, prior to entering the control room from the radiologically controlled
area (RCA), the inspectors observed a non-licensed operator (NLO) processing through
the PCM-18. : The inspectors noted that the PCM-13 unit had a trouble light illuminated >
with a contaminated detector indication. The individual processed through the PCM-1B
and received the " count clear-you may pass" signal. The NLO noted the inspectors
obsewing the top of the detector, tsoticed the contaminated detector indication, but
assumed that since the PCM 1B indicated that he was not contaminated, he could exit
the radiologically controlled area (RCA). The inspectors contacted the radiation 1
protection (RP) desk to determine whether individuals could process through tt,e PCM-1B
with a contaminated detector. RP stated that the PCM-1B could not be used when a
trouble light was illuminated.
- The technician contacted the operations shift supervisor who discussed the improper use
of the PCM-1B during the operations shift briefing. The NLO identified himself to the shift
supervisor as the indivioual who had incorrectly processed through the monitor. - The - ,
inspectors interviewed the NLO and noted that he did not recall receiving training on
appropriate actions for processing through a PCM 1B when it indicated a contaminated
detector. Through a review of the Control of Radioactive Material Handbook, the
inspectors noted that on Page 7-25, Step 2, under personnel contamination monitors,
were the instructions, "Do not use the PCM if the TROUBLE light is illuminated." While
this information was relayed to the NLO during radiation worker training, the individual did
not recall loaming this information. The inspectors considered processing through a
PCM-1B with a contaminated detector annunciator an example of a poor questioning
attitude and poor awareness of plant indications by operations personnel.
,
c. Conclusions
Processing through a PCM-1B with a contaminated detector annunciator was an example
of a poor questioning attitude and poor awareness of plant indications ty operations
personnel.
82 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
S2.1 - Liahtina Tour of Protect Area (71750)
No lighting deficiencies were noted during a tour of the protected area on December 29,
.1997.
21
s
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-
j 4
.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on January 22,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the ,
'
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
X3- Management Meeting Summary
On January 8,1998, NRC members of the Clinton Restart Panel met with lilinois Power
management to discuss the development of the Plan For Excellence and engineering design
reviews.
K
22
.
PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
W. MacFarland IV Chief Nuclear Officer
__
G. Baker, Manager - Quality Assurance
J - W. Bousquet, Director - Plant Support and Services
J. Gruber, Director Corrective Action
} J. Hale, Director - Flanning & Scheduling
B. Joyce, Assistant Plant Manager- Maintenance
M. Lyon, Assistant Plant Manager- Operations
R. Phares, Manager - Nuclear Safety and Performance improvement
J. Place, Director- Plant Radiation and Chemistry
W. Romberg, Assistant Vice President
J. Sipek, Manager - Regulatory interface
L. Wigley, Manager- Nuclear Station Engineering Department d
I
.
O
23
- _ _ _ _
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Engineering Observations
IP 61726: Survelilance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations ,
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92902: Follow up . Mair.tenance
IP 92903: Follow-up Engineering
ITEMS OPENtiD, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opentd
97025-01 VIO Failure to implement required Tc actions for maintaining secondary
containment isolation capablF,.
2 97025-02 VIO Failure to implement required TS actions for maintaining either the i
Division I or ilinverters.
97025-03 NCV Failure to install test meter isolation transformer.
Closed
96 008-00 LER Loose terminal connection causes reactor recirculation F.u.nps to trip from
fast to slow resulting in operation in the restricted zone and manual scram.
96006-07 VIO Untimely Completion of Use History Analysis.
9701106 VIO Restoration of caution tag.
9701108 VIO Failure to complete an impact rnatrix.
9701109 VIO Pr(conditionirig of breakers.
97013-00 LER Failure to adequately verify no trips exist during surveillance test results in
inadvertent actuation cf standby gas treatment system.
95003 01a V'" Failure of Division lli EDG bearing due to inadequate lubrication,
96015-05a VIO Failure to have appropriate ECCS response time testing acceptance
criteria.
96015 05b VIO Failure to hr.ve safety evaluation for manual operation of the CCW
expansion tank.
, 97025-03 NCV Failure to install test meter isolation transformer.
_ _ _ _ . =
24
.
t
i
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CAL Confirmatory Action Letter
CCW Component Cooling Water
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
C&l - Controls and Instrumentat!on
CPS Clinton Power Station
, CR Cor.dition Rorort
FIN Fix It Now
FTL FIN Team Leeder
1/V Current to Voltage
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report .
MCR Main control Room
MCRL Mode Change Restrain List
MWR Maintenance Work Request
M&TE Measurement and Test Equipment
NLO Non Licensed Operator
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSED Nuclear Station Engineering Department
PMSO Plant Managers Standing Order -
'
RCA Radiologially Controlled Area
RP Radiation Protection
SBO Station Blackout
SRM Source Range Monitor
F. TS- Technical Specification
UHA . Use History Analysis
URI Unresolved item .
USAR Updated Safety Anatysis Report
VF Fuel Building Ventilation
- = _.. == =_
25
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m.m. m.. .. .__.__._____a- _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ . . _ _