ML17229B084

Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines.

ML17229B084
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/07/1999
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML17229B083	List: ML17229B082 ML17229B084
References
PSL-ENG-SEMS-98, PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, NUDOCS 9904120110
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{{#Wiki_filter:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389L-99-90Enclosure Attaclunent lPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page1of15ENGINEERING EVALUATION OFECCSSUCTIONLINESSTLUCIENUCLEARPLANTUNIT2PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-1 02REVISION2FLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYNUCLEARENGINEERING DEPARTMENT SAFETYRELATED 9904i20ii0 990407PDRADQCK050003898PDR~ PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page2of15REVIEWANDAPPROVALRECORDNTSTLUCIEUNIT2TITLEEngineering Evaluation ofECCSSuctionLinesLEADDISCIPLINE Mechanical ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION FPLEnineerinREVIEW/APPROVAL: GROUPINPUTREVIEWN/AINTERFACE TYPEPREPAREDVERIFIEDAPPROVEDFPLAPPROVED* MECHELECT1&CCIVILDesignBasis**CSIFUELSOTHERN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/ApyyN/Az/sgN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AForContractor EvalsAsDetermined ByProjects"*ReviewInterface AsAMinOnAII10CFR50.59 EvalsandPLAsFPLPROJECTSAPPROVAL: DATE:OTHERINTERFACES: AtechEnineerinServices, Inc.Form24,Rev2(7/97) ibL-i=Nb-bCM5.50 IV@Rev2Page3of15I.PURPOSE/SCOPE

Background:

AR960294identified stresscorrosion cracking(SCC)concernswithregardtoweldsintheUnit1ECCSsuctionpipinglocatedinthetrenchbetweentheRWTandRAB.AspartoftheSTAR'scorrective actions,PMAI96-11-222 wasissuedtoinspectasampleofweldsontheUnit2ECCSsuctionpipingduringthe1998Cycle11Refueling Outage.Inarelatedissue,CR98-0047waswrittentoaddressexternalcorrosion depositsidentified ontheUnit2ECCSsuctionpipinglocatedintheoutsidepipetunnel.ThisCR'scorrective actionsincludedWorkOrder98002077toinspecttheUnit2AandBECCSpipingbeforethespringof1999.Sixcircumferential weldsontheECCSsuctionpiping(3/train) inthepipetunnelwerescheduled forinspection duringtheCycle11Refueling Outage.Ofthethreecircumferential weldsinspected onTrainA,oneweldhadarejectable indication whichwassuccessfully removedbybuffing.Following trainswap,threecircumferential weldsweretheninspected onTrainB.Allthreeweldshadmultiplerejectable indications; ofthetotal9indications, 8wereremovedbybuffingandonewasrepaired. Basedontheseresults,Engineering requiredexpansion oftheinspection sampletoincludetheremaining fourweldsintheTrainBpipingwithinthetrench.Threeoutoffouroftheseweldshadrejectable indications. Ofthetotal8indications, 6wereremovedbybuffingand2indications wererepaired. Basedontheseresults,FPLmanagement alsodecidedtoinspectasampleoftheECCSpipingforexternalorrosiondepositspursuanttoCR98-0047.Supplement 2toCR98-0047identified two5-footsectionsofstraightpipingonI-24"-CS-2 (BTrain)exhibiting theworstvisualcorrosion appearance beaddedtotheinspection scope.Threeareaswithineachofthe5-footsectionsofstraightpipewereselectedtorepresent theworstcorrosion attack.Allidentified indications withintheseareaswerebuffedout.Purpose:Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoreviewtheoverallcondition oftheECCSsuctionpipinglocatedinthepipingtunneljustdownstream oftheRefueling WaterTank(RWT)todemonstrate itwillmeetitsdesignrequirements duringoperation untiltheCycle12Refueling Outage.Scope:Thescopeoftheevaluation isprincipally the24"diameterUnit2ECCSsuctionpipingbetweentheRWTandtheRABcontained, withintheunderground trench.Theevaluation alsoidentifies othersafetyrelatedunderground pipinginthesametrenches. Resolution ofthesespecificlineswillbeaddressed inCR98-1944.Stainless steelpipinginotherplanttrencheswillbeaddressed asafollowupactionforthespecificECCSrepairCR's.Revision1wasissuedtoincorporate theverifiedAPTECHanalysis. Revision2wasissuedtoincorporate changesmadebyAptechtotheircalculation inputsandtoboundthepipingsupportmodifications resulting fromCR99-0445. PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page4of15II.EVALUATION sinReuirements: ThesubjectRefueling WaterTank(RWT)suctionpipingprovidesaflowpathfromtheRWTtotheEmergency CoreCoolingSystempumpsforuseduringtheInjection Phasefollowing aDesignBasisAccident. Thisfunctionissafetyrelatedandisaddressed intheplant'sFSARandTechnical Specifications. FSARAsdiscussed inFSARSection6.3.2.2.4, theRWTisanatmospheric tankcontaining waterboratedbetween1720and2100ppm.Redundant linesareprovidedfromasinglenozzleonthetanktoprovidesuctiontotheAand8TrainsofEmergency CoreCoolingSystemPumpslocatedintheRAB.ThesuctionlinesareroutedtotheRABinabelowgradetrenchwhichisopentotheatmosphere. Technical Specifications PerT.S.3.5.2inModes1,2,and3(withpressurizer pressuregreaterthanorequalto1750psia)twoindependent ECCSsubsystems shallbeOPERABLEwithindependent flowpathscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWT.PerT.S.3.5.3,inMode3(withpressurizer pressurelessthan1750psia)andMode4,aminimumofoneECCSsubsystem shallbeOPERABLEwithaflowpathtotheRWT.erT.S.3.1.2.1inModes5and6,aminimumofoneboroninjection flowpathshallbeOPERABLEwhichincludesflowpathfromtheRWTviaeitherachargingpumporaHPSIpump,meetingtherequirement inT.S.3.1.2.7bifonlytheRWTflowpathisOPERABLE. DesignBasisTheRWTSuctionlinesmustbeabletopassdesignflowatadesignpressureof60psigandadesigntemperature of300FtotheECCSpumps,have'theabilitytomaintainthepressureboundaryandtheRABintegrity. Operating pressures aredefinedbythecolumnofwaterwithintheRWTtankandoperating temperatures aredefinedbyatmospheric conditions. AsdetailedwithintheTotalEquipment Databaseandplantdrawings, LinesI-24"-CS-3 (TrainA)andI-24"-CS-2 (TrainB)areconnected toasinglenozzleontheRWTandprovidesuctionfortheECCSsystems.Thepipingdesignpressureis60psigat300F,withanoperating pressureof30psigat120F.Thepipeis24"schedule10(wallthickness of0.250")inaccordance withEbascoPipeCodeSS-5.Linesl-24"-CS-2 and-3aredesignedinaccordance withASMESectionIII,Class2requirements andareconstructed ofASTMA-358,Class1,Type304material. Unit2iscurrently intheSecondTenYearln-Service Inspection (ISI)Interval. ThecodeofrecordforRulesforIn-ServiceInspection inthisintervalisASMESectionXf1989.SafetyClassification: Thisevaluation isclassified asSafetyRelatedastheContainment SprayandSafetyInjection systemsperformessential functions tomitigatetheeffectsofaDesignBasisAccident. PSI.-EN(3-Si Mb-Jii-'iVdRev2Page5of15SeuenceofDiscove/Examination Events:cedingActivities STAR960294identified stresscorrosion cracking(SCC)concernswithregardtoweldsintheUnit1ECCSsuctionpipinglocatedinthetrenchbetweentheRWTandRAB.TheSTARidentified SCCwithinaweldinline24"-CS-3whichresultedinaweepingthrough-wall leak.AspartoftheSTAR'scorrective actions,allremaining horizontal circumferential weldswereinspected inUnit1andPMAI96-11-222 wasissuedtoinspectasampleofweldsontheUnit2ECCSsuctionpiping(3welds/train) duringthe1998Cycle11Refueling Outage.Inarelatedissue,CR98-0047waswrittenon1/7/98toaddressexternalcorrosion depositsidentified ontopquadrantofUnit2ECCSsuctionpipinglocatedintheoutsidepipetunnel.ThisCR'scorrective actionsincludedWorkOrder98002077whichwasgenerated to:1.Clean24"-CS-283ofcorrosion products2.Pressurewashthepipingwithdemineralized water3.Performavisual(VT)andliquidpenetrant (PT)inspection ofsuspectpitareasonpipingsections4.Performavisual(VT)andliquidpenetrant (PT)inspection of6circumferential welds5.Application ofanon-leachable chlorideprotective coatingsUnit2OutageActivities fthethreecircumferential weldsinspected onTrainA,oneweldhadarejectable indication whichwasuccessfully removedbybuffing.Nofurtherinspections weremadeonTrainA.Following trainswap,threecircumferential weldsweretheninspected onTrainB.Allthreeoftheseweldshadmultiplerejectabte indications. Ofthetotal9indications, 8wereremovedbybuffingand1wasrepairedthroughtheinstallation ofabranchconnection perPCM98135.Basedontheseresults,Engineering requiredexpansion oftheinspection sampletoincludetheremaining fourweldsinthehorizontal runofTrainBpipingwithintheRWT-RABtrench.Threeoutoffftheweldshadrejectable indications. Ofthetotal8indications, 6wereremovedbybuffingandtwoM8135.indications wererepairedthroughweldrepairsandtheinstallation ofabranchconnection underPCM9Basedontheseinspection resultsandtheoutage'smobilization ofinspection andmaintenance forces,FPLmanagement rescheduled theinspection ofaportionoftheECCSpipingforexternalcorrosion deposits(WO98002077) totheCycle11Outagewindow.Supplement 2toCR98-0047identified two5-footsectionsofstraightiinon1-24"-CS-2 (BTrain)exhibiting theworstvisualcorrosion appearance tobeaddedtotheinspection scope.Threeareaswithineachofthe5-footsectionsofstraightpipewereselectedtorepresent theworstcorrosion attack.Allidentified indications withintheseareaswerebuffedout.Asummaryofalltheinspections madetodateandtheirresultsisprovidedinTable1. Wold¹TrainCondition ReportInitialInitialAfterReworkRepairBasollnoFinalRo]ectCharacter RoworkCharacter DocumentWallWall(inches){inches)PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page6of15Table1:SummaryofUnit2ECCSWeldindications andPipeWallCorrosion CellsExcavation Aroa{inches)S-3-FW-904 NoneCS-3-3-SW-1 CR98-1821CS-3-FW-8 NoneNone¹1RoundAcceptNone0.2580.196NotAvailable BTrainCS-2-FW-901 CS-2-FW-3 CS-2-3.SW-1 Cs-2-6-SW-3 CS-2-FW-2 CS-2-FW-4 Cs-2-4-SW-1 CR98-1879¹1<<5¹6¹7CR98-1878¹21¹22¹23CR98-1877¹6¹16NoneNoneCR98-1897¹10CR98-1898¹2¹8¹12CR98-1906¹11¹13¹14¹15SeeNote4Area1,¹1Area1,¹2Area2Area3,<<2Area3,¹3Area3,¹4Area3,¹5Area3,¹6Area3,¹7ThreeSampleAreason5footBTrainpipesectionwithinEast/West TrenchSeeNote4Area4,¹1Area4,¹2Area4,¹3Area5,¹1Area5,¹2Area6,¹1Area6,¹2NF=NotFoundCR98.0047Supplement 2ThreeSampleCR98-0047Areason5footSupplement 2BTrainpipesectionwithinNorth/South TrenchRoundLinearLinearLinearRoundLinearRoundRoundRoundRoundRoundLinearRoundRoundRoundRoundLinearLinearRoundNoneRoundRoundLinearLinearRoundLinearLinearLinearRoundRoundRoundLinearRoundAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptREJECTAcceptAcceptAcceptAccept(1)REJECTREJECTAcceptAcceptAccept(1)Accept(1)AcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAccetAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptAcceptLinearLinearLinearPCM98135CRN.8233CRN-82330.2890.2710.2590.2410.2610.2410.2650.2490.2620.2340.2620.2340.2820.10.4280.4030.3750.3080.2590,25NF0.272NF0.083NF0.1090.275>0.2350.275>0.2350.275>0.2350.2750.2350.283>0.2610.282>0.2610.28>0.2450.2810,2450.281>0.2450.28>0.2450.28>0.2450.281>0.2450.2710.2170.271>0.2170.271>0.2170.270.2610.273>0.2610.2660.2180.266>0.2180.5x1.70.3x1.60.7x1.81.0x2.12.7x1.2Note21.5x1.50.75x0.31.0x0.31.0x0.71.7x0.91.0x1.82.25x1.81.25x1.00.75x1.01.0x1.251.25x1.751.35x1.101.27x2.631.25x1.251.0x1.01.5x1.51.6x1.61.0x1.01.0x2.151.0x1.01.3x1.01.0x1.01.0x1.01.0x1.02.3x1Note5Notes:1.OmissionofIndication fromthere-examination Liquid2.Excavation area]oined to¹21...3,Initialinspection scopeonUnit24.SeeTable2fordescription ofpipeareas.5.Excavation areaoinedto¹1."I)Penetrant Examination DataSheetindicates AcceptSelection oflnsectionAreas:WeldsAugmented inspections wereperformed ontheUnit2ECCSpiping'shorizontal fieldweldssincepreviousleakageonUnit1wasassociated withacircumferential fieldweldonahorizontal run.Thefailureanalysisperformed ontheUnit1flaw(STAR960294)concluded thattheleakagewastheresultofODinitiated stresscorrosion

cracking, associated withstressesfromthefieldweld(andpossiblyarepair)andthepresenceofanexternalcontaminant tattributed tothepresenceofchlorides.

PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page7of15Inspections wereinitially targetedtoaddresspipingfieldweldssincethe24"pipingismanufactured toA-358Type304SS,whichreceivesa1900'Fstressrelieving solutionannealafterformingofthepipeandweldingoftheaxialearn.Asregionsofincreased stress(necessary topromotestresscorrosion cracking) wouldbeassociated withfieldwelds,theareasselectedforinitialinspection consisted ofthreecircumferential welds.Ofthethreecircumferential weldsinspected onTrainA,oneweldhadarejectable indication whichwassuccessfully removedbybuffing.Nofurtherinspections weremadeonTrainA.Following trainswap,threecircumferential weldsweretheninspected onTrainB.Allthreeoftheseweldshadmultiplerejectable indications withonebeingrepairedthroughtheinstallation ofabranchconnection perPCM98135.Duetotherejectable PTindication foundontheseBTrainfieldweldswhichcouldnotberemoved,Engineering requiredexpansion oftheinspection sampletoincludetheremaining fourweldsinthehorizontal runofTrainBpipingwithintheRWT-RABtrench.Attachment 3,Figures182showsthelocations oftheinspected welds.PipingDuetotheTrainSwaptoTrainB,thepipingsectioninspections forpittingcorrosion centeredontheBTrain.Althoughthisdecisionwastimingbased,thisapproachwasconsistent withthevisualcomparison betweentheAandBTrainswhichshowedthattheBTrainappearedtohaveagreaterbuildupofcorrosion productsatthecorrosion cells.Bothpipeshavemultipleroundcorrosion cellsorpitting(<3/8"indiameter) whichareconcentrated withintheupper120ofthepipe'shorizontal run.Itwasnotedthatcorrosion appearstobegreaternearthemanholecoverovertheEast-West trenchwhichisoffcenteredovertheBTrainpiping:themanholemaybeasourceofwaterrunoffcontamination. Concentration ofcorrosion inthisareaispresumedtobetheresultoffallingdebris,dirtbuildup,orcontaminants. ItisnotclearwhetherthepresenceofadegradedThermalox coatingsystemontheTrainiscontributing tothecorrosion bytrappingcontaminants againstthepipewall.Toselectarepresentative inspection sampleoftheexternalcorrosion depositsontheUnit2BTrainECCSsuctionline,Engineering visuallyinspected theentiresectionofECCSsuctionpipinginthepipingtunnel.Two5-footsectionswereinitially selectedforfurtherinspection. Withinthesesectionsofpiping,sixregionsweresubsequently identified (3/section) andpreparedforPTexamination. Theareaswerechosenonthehorizontal runsofI-24-CS-2 intheNorth/South tunnelandtheEast/West tunnel.Attachment 3,Figure3showsthelocations ofthesixexternalcorrosion regionsidentified forPT.Thepipingregionwiththemostsevereindications wasconfinedtotheareaapproximately 12"eithersideoftopdeadcenter(TDC).Thebottomhalfofthepipeonbothpiperunswasrelatively freeofcorrosion cellscomparedtothetopregionofeachsection.Tworegionsineachrunwereselectedfromthemostseverecorrosion indication intherolledplateandoneregionineachsectionwaschosenontheaxialshopweld.Theregionsselectedwerejudgedtobeeitherrepresentative oftheothercorrosion cellsorhadthemostsevereappearance basedonpittingorcorrosion buildup.Althoughtheselectedregionswereselectedtoincludeaxialshopwelds,elevatedstressesattheselocations werenotexpectedsincethepipefabrication specification (A-358Class1)requiresa1900'Fannealaspartofthefabrication oftherolledandseamweldedpipe.Theareasoneachsectioninthepipetrenchareidentified inTable2. PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page8of15Table2:SummaryofSampleAreasforExternalCorrosion DepositsSampleAreaLocationDescription ofSampleAreaExternalCorrosion DepositSampleAreasintheNorth/South PipeRun2"x2"areaat11:00,-6'pstream fromsupportSI-2407-17(8weldedlugs).2"x4"areaat3:00ontheaxialweld,-3'pstream fromsupportSI-2407-17 (8weldedlugs).2"x2"areaat12:00,-5'ownstream fromsupportSl-2407-17(8weldedlugs).ExternalCorrosion DepositSampleAContained 4corrosion cellswithonehavingvisiblepits.Contained 4corrosions cellsontheweldand5abovetheweldontheplate.Areaofdarkeststainwithnovisibledepthtopits.Contained alargecorrosion cellwithaclusterofvisiblepits.reasintheEast/West PipeRun1"x6"areaat12:00,-6'pstream fromweldCS-2-FW-4.1"x5"areaat11:30ontheaxialweldseam,-4'pstream fromweldCS-2-FW-4. 1"x3"areaat10:00,-3.5'pstream fromweldCS-2-FW-4.Contained 3corrosion cellswithlargeclustersofvisiblepits.Contained 6corrosion cellswithclustersofvisiblepits.Contained 4corrosion cellswithathickbuildupofcorrosion depositundertheThermalox 70coatin.FailureMechanism: TheFigurebelowisaphotomicrograph illustrating preliminary resultsofametallographic examination performed onasampleremovedfromUnit2Linel-24"-CS-2 intheregionofWeldCS-2-FW-3. Thehighlybranched, O.D.initiated, through-wall crackistypicalofchlorideinducedstresscorrosion cracking. Furthermetallographic analyseswillbeperformed toevaluatetheproximity ofthecracktotheweldandHAZ,andtodetermine ifthebasematerialissensitized. Thebasematerialisspecified asA-358,Class1,Type304SS.Photomicrograph ofSectiontakenatWeldCS-2-FW-3 onLinel-24"-CS-2 Themechanism istypicalofchlorideinducedODstresscorrosion cracking(ODSCC).Thismechanism isidentical tothatpreviously identified intherootcauseanalysisassociated withSTAR960294(PMAI96-03-249). WithanySCCmechanism, therearethreerequirements forcrackingtooccur:1)Asusceptible

material, 2)Atensilestress;nd,3)Anenvironment withacontaminant (forexample,thechlorideinsaltair).AlthoughchlorideSCCdoesnottypically occurattemperatures below140'F,anelevatedstresscondition canlowerthistemperature "threshold".

PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page9of15Thismayexplainwhyindications atthefieldweldsareseverebycomparison tothoseintherolledandaxialweldedpipethatwassolutionannealed. ctionXIConsiderations: IJnit2iscurrently intheSecondTenYearIn-Service Inspection (ISI)IntervalandthecodeofrecordforRulesforIn-Service Inspection inthisintervalisASMESectionXI1989.SincethesubjectpipingisClass2,therulesofArticleIWCapply.Theflawsandindications described abovewereidentified duringinspections ofsampleareasconducted inaccordance withcorrective actionsfromSTAR960294andCR98-0047.Whiletheflawsandindications werenotidentified duringascheduled ASMESectionXIinspection, therulesforexamination andrepairs/replacements applysincethesubjectpipingisSafetyRelatedandwithinthejurisdiction oftheASMEcode.ArticleIWC-3120providesacceptance andevaluation criteriaforsurfaceorvolumetric examinations. Therearefourprimarymethodsofacceptance whichincludeExamination, Repair,Replacement, orEvaluation: ~IWC-3122.1 AccetancebExamination "Components whoseexamination reconfirms theabsenceofflaws,revealsflawsthatdonotexceedtheacceptance standards listedinTableIWC-3410-1, orrevealsflawsthatareacceptable inaccordance withIWC-3121(b) shallbeacceptable forcontinued service.~IWC-3122.2 AccetancebReair"Components whoseexamination revealsflawsthatexceedtheacceptance standards listedinTableIWC-3410-1 shallbeunacceptable forcontinued serviceuntiladditional examination requirements ofIWC-2430aresatisfied, andtheflawshallbeeitherremovedbymechanical methodsorthecomponent repairedtotheextentnecessary tomeettheacceptance standards ofIWC-3000~IWC-3122.3 AccetancebRelacement"Asanalternative tothereplacement requirement ofIWC-3122.2, acomponent ortheportionofthecomponent containing theflawshallbereplaced. ~IWC-31224AccetancebEvaluation "(a)Components whoseexamination revealsflawsthatexceedtheacceptance standards listedinTableIWC-32410-1 shallbeacceptable forservicewithouttheflawremoval,repair,orreplacement ifanevaluation

analysis, asdescribed inIWC-3600, meetstheacceptance criteriaofIWC-3600.

"(b)Wheretheacceptance criteriaofIWC-3600aresatisfied, theareacontaining theflawshallbesubsequently reexamined inaccordance withIWC-2420(b)and(c)Penetrant inspections performed ontenweldswithinthe24"-CS-2and24"-CS-3pipingidentified 18indications outsidetheacceptance criteriaofIWC-3122.2. Asindicated byTable2,15oftherejectable indications weresuccessfully buffedoutwithoutviolating minimumwallrequirements. Attwoweldlocations, 3indications couldnotberemovedinthismannerasthesizeoftheindications exceededIWC-3122.2 acceptance criteria. Inordertoeliminate theseremaining indications, thefollowing repairswereperformed. PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page10of15Table3:SummaryofWeldRepairsonECCSLinesWeldcationRepairMethodology CodeAcceptance CS-2-FW-3 CS-2-FW-4 Indication ¹23wasremovedbydrillingahole>>4inchesindiameter. EdgesofmachinedsurfacewerePTinspected andabranchconnection installed IWC-3122.3 inaccordance withPCM98135.Indication ¹12wasremovedbydrillingahole-4inchesindiameter. EdgesofmachinedsurfacewerePTinspected andabranchconnection installed IWC-3122.3 inaccordance withPCM98135(CRN-8233) Indication ¹8wasremovedbyexcavation/weld repair.Branchconnection allowedaccesstothebacksideoftheweldforpurgingandfinishgrinding. IWC-3122.2 FinalsurfaceswerePTinspected. SeePCM98135{CRN-8233) Whilealloftheidentified weldflawswererepairedasindicated withinTable3,SectionXldoesallowAcceptance byEvaluation (IWC-3122.4). Anacceptance byevaluation approachwaspursuedinparallelwiththedevelopment oftheaboverepairmethodologies. Thiseffortwaspursuedtoaddresstheremotepotential thatarepairmodification wouldnotbephysically

possible, orthattheneedforarepairwasidentified lateintheoutagescheduleorthatalargenumberofsmallflawswereidentified whichwouldprecludeashort-term cost-effective repairapproach.

Inanticipation ofthepossibility ofadverseinspection results,Engineering electedtoperformtheadditional evaluations inparallelwiththeon-goingexaminations andreworkmethodologies. AstheSectionXICoderulesspecified withinSectionIWC-3600wereunderdevelopment inthe1989code,theguidancecontained withinIWB-3600wasutilized. Thisactivityisdiscussed inthenextsection.tructural InteriReview:Preliminary resultsofflawsizeswereforwarded toAPTECHEngineering Servicesfortheirassistance inevaluating aleak-before-break approach. Thisentailsidentifying thecriticalflawsizethatwouldbeunstableforthedesignconditions ofthepipingnodewiththehigheststress.AnalysismethodsinASMESectionXlunderParagraph IWB-3640andAppendixCwereusedtocomputetheallowable through-wall flawlengthandpredicted growthasafunctionofoperating time.GrowthbySCCandfatiguemechanisms wereconsidered intheflawgrowthassessment. Thispreliminary analysiswasperformed usingthefollowing inputs:~DesignConditions of60psigand300Ffora24"nominalpipesizeSchedule10constructed of304SS~Maximummembraneandbendingstresseswereidentified fromthepipingstressanalysisforthenodesoftheECCSAandBTrainpipingcontained withinthetrenches. Maximumvaluesforeachequationwereselectedtoboundallnodes.{SeeAttachment 2)~Assumedmaximumflawlengthof1.35inchesbasedonpreliminary fieldinspection results.Forthepreliminary

analysis, theallowable through-wall flawsizewasdetermined fornormal/upset conditions withaSectionXICodesafetyfactorof2.77forcircumferential flawsand3.0foraxialflaws.Theallowable circumferential flawlengthwascomputedtobe-26inchesandtheallowable axialflawlengthwascomputedtobe-12inches.Bothofthesestructural limitsarefargreaterthanthesurfaceindications observedduringtheinspection andrepairoftheaffectedpiping.Forthefinalanalysis, themaximuminitialflawlengthtobeusedinthecalculation wasdetermined tobe1.18,basedonactualrecordedindications.

Theallowable circumferential flawlengthwascomputedtobe32.2inches)andtheallowable axialflawlengthwascomputedtobe13.6inches.Bothofthesestructural limitsarefargreater

PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page11of15thanthesurfaceindications observedduringtheinspection andrepairoftheaffectedpiping.Theaboveanalysisdemonstrates thattheECCSpipingwouldleak-before-break, therebyproviding sufficient arningofcrackpropagation longbeforeanyimminentfailure.Forthemaximumstresses,a through-wall rcumferential flawof32.2inches(13.6inchesforanaxialflaw)wouldsatisfytheminimumsafetyfactors.Aconservative flawgrowthevaluation indicates thatadequatesafetymarginswillbemaintained foratleastonecycleofoperation. Itisconcluded thatthestructural integrity ofthepipingisadequateforalldesignloadsperASMESectionXI.Additionally, leakdetection byperiodicwalkdownshallbemaintained intheareasaffectedbycorrosion degradation. Thisanalysisapproachisconsidered conservative asthissystemisnormallyinastandbymodewithatmospheric tankpressureheadonthesystem(-30psivs.60psigdesign)andoperating atenvironmental temperatures (<100'Fvs.300'Fdesign).Additionally thepipingisnotsubjecttoanyofthefollowing: vibratory loading,periodicpumpstartsandstops(cyclicloading), thermalcyclicloading,windloadings, etc.Basedonevaluation oftheidentified flawsandtheanalysisofcriticalcracksize,Engineering concludes thatmonthlyvisualsurveillances oftheECCSsuctionlinesforleakswouldbeadequatetoprovideleak-before-break detection. TheaboveAPTECHevaluation isfinalandhasbeencheckedandverifiedinaformalcalculation underAPTECH'sQualityAssurance Program.Theresultsoftheflinalanalysisdonotchangetheconclusions oftheSafetyEvaluation. ConseuencesofAccidental Leakae:Theaboveevaluation hasdetermined thattheUnit2ECCSsuctionpipingisacceptable tooperateuntiltheCycle2refueling outage.However,intheunlikelyeventthataleakdoesdevelopintheECCSsuctionpiping,anadditional evaluation wasdonetoshowtheradiological consequences wouldbeboundedbytheradiological consequences oftheaccidentanalysisofrecord.Thefollowing discussion presentsarguments whyasinglepointleakisboundedbythelossofacompletetrainoftheECCSorLPSIpump.Toconformtotherequirements of10CFR50.46(b)andpart50,AppendixK,ItemD.1,Post-Blowdown Phenomena; HeatRemovalbytheECCSSingleFailureCriterion, analysesofLossofCoolantAccidents (LOCA)atSt.LucieUnit2typically assumethateitheronecompletetrainofECCS(forsmallbreakanalyses) oroneLPSIpumpisunavailable toprovideinjection (andsubsequent recirculation) flowtothecore.Theseassumptions areutilizedbecausebreakspectrumandhistorical analysesapplicable toSt.Luciehavedemonstrated thattheseparticular failuresmaximizethefuelcladdingtemperature andproducethelimitingsiteboundarydosevalues.Ofcourse,avarietyofothersinglefailuresinvolving bothactiveandpassivecomponents canbepostulated tooccurduringanyLOCAevent.Asanexample,checkvalveV07174whichseparates theRWTmakeuppipingfromthecontainment sumprecirculation lineintheAECCStrain(Ref.5)canbepostulated tofailtoremainclosedtotheenvironment duringthepost-injection phaseofaLOCA,potentially leadingtothereleaseofliquideffluentandradionuclides tothelocalenvironment. However,anassumption thatthisfailedvalveconstitutes aviablesinglefailurewouldprecludeconsideration ofanECCStrainoraLPSIpumpasinoperable duringtheinjection phaseoftheevent.Theavailability ofasecondtrainofECCSorasecondLPSIpumptoprovidecoremakeupduringtheinjection phaseoftheLOCAreducesboththeextentanddurationofcoreuncovery, therebyreducingthecalculated fuelrodadiabatic heatupandtheexothermic zirconium-steam reaction. Thisreducedfuelrodheatupubstantially lessenstheresulting fueldamageandfissionproductreleaseascomparedtothecasewhereonetrainofECCSoroneLPSIpumpisunavailable. Asaresult,aLOCAeventscenariothatassumesfailureofa PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page12of15 injection traincheckvalvetoremainclosedduringtherecirculation phaseoftheeventwillyieldamorebenignsiteboundarydosethanthatresulting fromalossofECCSinjection capability suchasisassumedintheSt.Lucie2alysesofrecord.eviewofOtherLinesLocatedinECCSPiinTrench:Basedontheidentified degradation oftheECCSpipingwithintheEast-West andNorth-South trenchesareviewwasmadeoftheotherpipingwithinthesetrenchesforsusceptibility toODSCC.Pipingwithinthesetrenches, assummarized withinTable4,wasidentified byinspection ofplantlayoutdrawings. Ofinterestforthisreviewwerelineswithasafetyrelatedfunctionthatareconstructed ofstainless steel.Table4:SummaryofPipingContained WithinECCSPipeTrenchPipingLocatedin,th',EastlWest ECCS.'Pipe',Trench,':'l",.'l NorthSideSouthSideLineNumberCLI-20"-CC-17 I-20'-CC-27 I-24"-CS-3 4"-PMW-63"-DWS-14 3"-FS-556 TpeServiceCSSupplLoop8CSReturnLoop8SSRWTToECCSASSPMWtoRABSSDMWfromU-1SSFPlonExtoRWTLineNumberI-20-CC-16I-20-CC-261-24"-CS-2 I-3"-CH-9386"-CS-500 3"-WM-A29 CLType3CS3CS2SS2SSNSSNSSServiceSupplLoopAReturnLoopARWTToECCSBBAtoRWTSl8CSPumpRecircWMtoCWDischPipingLocatedirithe.North/South-ECCS Pipe~Trench".:.-.':,...;.NorthSideSouthSideLineNumberCLTypeServiceLineNumberCLTpeServiceI-20-CC-161-20"-CC-17 -20"-CC-26 20"-CC-27 I-30-CW-78I-30"-CW-79 2"-DWS-63"-DWS-14 3-FS-5133"-FS-556 4"-PMW-63"-PMW-163"-WM-A29 3CSSupplLoopA3CSSupplLoop83CSReturnLoopA3CSReturnLoop83CSCCWHx2AInlet3CSCCWHx28InletNSSDMWtoDGBNSSDMWfromU-1NSSRWTtoFPPPumpNSSFPlonExtoRWTNSSPMWtoRABNSSPMWtoRWTNSSWMtoCWDisch.1-24"-CS-2 I-24"-CS-3 I-30-CW-78I-30"-CW-79 l-30"-CW-90 I-30"-CW-91 I-3"-CH-938 6"-CS-500, SSRWTToECCS8SSRWTToECCSACSCCWHx2AinletCSCCWHx28InletCSICWtoCCWHx2ACSICWtoCCWHx28SSBAtoRWTSSSl8CSPumpRecirc.ReviewofTable4indicates theonlysafetyrelatedlinesconstructed ofstainless steelaretheECCSSuctionLines(24"-CS-2 and24"-CS-3) andlinetosupplyboricacidtotheRWT(3"-CH-938). The3"boricacidsupplylineisconstructed ofSchedule10perSA-312Type304.Walkdownofthislineiswarranted basedontheinspection oftheECCSpiping.Apreliminary visualinspection ofthispipingbyEngineering showsasignificant numberofcorrosion cellsonthispipeintheECCStunnel.Thiscondition isbeingaddressed byCR98-1944.Interaction ofothernon-safety relatedstainless steellinesinthetrenchwillalsobeaddressed inthisCR.ReviewofLinesinOtherPlantPiinTrenches: Basedontheidentified degradation oftheECCSpipingwithintheECCStrenchesareviewwasmadeofthepipingwithinothertrenchesforsusceptibility toODSCC.Thisreviewwillbecompleted asafollowupactivityinCR98-1898. 0 FuturePeriodicFieldlnsections/Walkdowns: PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page13of15asedonthediscussions above,theidentified rootcauseisattributed tothepresenceofchlorides thatattachtheoutsidesurfaceofthepiping.Thisiscorroborated bythefactthattheinspections doneonpipingoutsiderthetrenchthatisexposedtotheatmosphere andrainwater hadfarfewerindications (removable) thanthepipingwithinthetrench.Rinsingoffthepipingonaregularintervalwouldprovideadditional lifetothepiping.Thisshouldbeaccomplished byalightdutypressurewashersuchasa1500PSIunit.Largerunitscanbeused,however,itisintenttonotdisturbanycoatingsonexistingpiping/pipesupports, orstructural components. Accordingly, aMandatory Preventative Maintenance (PM)activitytoperiodically pressurewashthepipinghasbeeninitiated. Therequesthasbeensubmitted inaccordance withPlantProcedure AP-0010431andaPMAIinitiated toPlanningtoensureissuanceofaPWOandinitiation ofplanningactivities. Basedontheevaluations above,thefracturemechanics evaluations demonstrate that,withthelowstresses, theidentified flawsareacceptable foratleastanothercycle.Theanalysesalsodemonstrate thatthepipingwould"leak-before-break" (LBB),therebyproviding sufficient warningofcrackpropagation longbeforeanyimminentfailure.Inordertoensurethevalidityoftheanalysis, periodicmonitoring willbeimplemented toinspectthepipingforleakage.Thiswillbeaccomplished viathePMdiscussed aboveandwillbedonepriortotheperiodiccleaning. ThePMwillbeaccomplished oncepermonthuntilthepipingiscoated.Basedonwalkdowns ofthetrenchandpiping,twoobservations weremade:firstisthattheworstpittingappearstobeinthemiddlesectionoftheeastwesttrench,andsecondly, withthetrenchmanwaycoveroff,rainwater collectsonthepavementandflowsintothemanway.Althoughthemanwayisnormallyinplace,itdoesnotprovideawatertightseal.Whenitrains,somewatercouldbeenteringthroughthemanwayandsplashdownoverthevariouspipingsystemswithinthetrench.Basedondiscussions withtheFPLmetallurgists, thepresenceofchlorides inthewatertogetherwiththelowflow(leakagethroughmanwayonly)couldbedepositing chlorides onthepipingsurfaceaswell.Inordertoeliminate thispotential source,oneofhecorrective actionsbelowisforservicestoinstalladrippocketunderneath themanwaywithatygonhoseowntothefloor.Thiswilldirectthewatertothefloorandultimately toberemovedbythesumppump.Actionsneedtobeconsidered forlongtermcondition ofthepiping.Theactionsmayincluderecoating and/orpipingreplacement. Inaddition, theremaining weldsintheAtrainpipingshouldbeinspected duringtheCycle12refueling outage.Finallyotherstainless steellinesenclosedintrenchesshouldbereviewedforthissamecondition. III.CONCLUSION Thisevaluation demonstrates thattheSt.LucieUnit2ECCSsuctionlinesarecapableofperforming theirdesignfunctionconsidering thecorrosion attackidentified andrepairedduringtheCycle11refueling outage.Thepipinghasbeenevaluated tomeetitsdesignloadingconsidering crackgrowthdurations throughtheCycle11operating cycle.IV.PLANTRESTRICTIONS Plantoperation isjustified foroneoperating cycleuntiltheCycle12Refueling Outage.Thisevaluation willrequirerevisiontoallowfurtheroperation beyondtheCycle12Refueling Outage.I V.ACTIONSREQUIREDPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page14of15Thesecorrective actionshavebeenassignedPMAI'sperCR98-1898:Implement actionstominimizewaterenteringthetrenchandcontacting theenclosedpiping.Implement aPMformonthlyinspections ofCS-2andCS-3inthepipingtrenchforthrough-wall leakageandpressurewashingofthestainless steelpipinginthetrench.3.Developalongtermplanforthispiping(i.e.piperecoating, replacement, etc.)Perform100%inspection ofremaining circumferential weldswithintheUnit2ATrainECCSsuctionpipinglocatedinthehorizontal runswithintheEast-West andNorth-South trenchesduringtheCycle12outage.Updatethisevaluation toaddressoperation ofSt.LucieUnit2beyondCycle11.Addressothersafetyrelated,stainless steellinesinothertrenchesinbothUnit1andUnit2.TheUnit1ECCSpipingshouldbeincludedduringthisreview.VI.REFERENCES 1.St.LucieUnit2FSAR,Amendment 112.St.LucieUnit2Technical Specifications, Amendment 983.REGGuide91-18,Rev1Drawing2998-G-088 Sheet2,Rev.29Drawing2998-G-125 SheetCS-K-2,Rev.186.Drawing2998-G-125 SheetCS-K-3,Rev.217.Drawing2998-G-172, Rev.148.Drawing2998-G-173, Rev.199.CR98-182110.CR98-187711.CR98-187812.CR98-187913.CR98-189714.CR98-189815.CR98-190616.STAR1-96029417.PMAI96-03-249 18.CR98-004719.Calculations PSL-1FSM-98-002, Rev08PSL-2FSM-98-012, Rev020.APTECHEngineering ServicesLetterdatedNovember25,199821.APTECHEngineering ServicesLetterdatedDecember1,199822.APTECHEngineering ServicesLetterdatedApril7,1999 VII.VERFICATION SUMMARYPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 Rev2Page15of15ethodofVerification eSDCSystemDesignBaseswerereviewedtoensurethatthesystemdesignwasproperlyevaluated gainstapplicable FSAR,NRCRegulatory Guides,and10CFRPart50requirements. ThePlantTechnical Specifications werereviewedtoensurethatnochangetothePlantTechnical Specifications wasrequired. Referenced inputsandguidancedocuments werereviewedtoensurethattheinformation incorporated w'asproperlyutilizedanddocumented. Thesafetyclassification (SafetyRelated)hasbeencorrectly chosenandadequately addressed inthisEngineering Evaluation. Conclusions Assumptions requiredtoassesstheacceptability oftheECCSsystemconsidering thecondition ofthepipingwereadequately described andreasonable. Designinputswerecorrectly selectedandincorporated intheAPTECHcalculations whichwerethencorrectly translated intotheconclusions oftheevaluation. DrawingsandmanualsusedinthismodiTication werecheckedtoensurethatthelatestrevisions wereutilized. Interface requirements weredemonstrated tobesatisfied. Theevaluation hasbeenproperlydocumented andcorrectly concludes thattheECCSsystemwillcontinuetomeetitsdesignrequirements asaresultofthiscondition andnochangetotheTechnical Specifications isrequired. heconclusions providedbythisevaluation arereasonable whencomparedtotheinputs.Theacceptance riteriaforthedesignwasadequately documented toallowverification thatthedesignrequirements havebeensatisfactorily accomplished. VIII.ATTACHMENTS 1.APTECHEngineering ServicesLetterdatedNovember25,1998,Preliminary FlawEvaluation ofCorrosion Degradation ofECCSuctionPipinginSt.LucieUnit2,rev.0.2.StressAnalysisreviewofmaximumstressesforCS-2andCS-3withinthetrench,rev.1.3.SketchesofECCSpiping,inspected weldsandpipinginthetrench,rev.0.4.APTECHEngineering ServicesLetterdatedApril7,1999Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24"ECCSPipingatSt.LucieUnit2,rev.2. tSAPPLIEDTECHNPl.QGY PsL-Eo~-Mn~-98-l<< R,ci4ovember 25.l99SPyIoc:PFlondaPowerEL)ihtCompan>St.LuciePlant6501S.OceanDriveJensenBeach,Floridai4957Attention: iblr.4itike4!oran

DearSir:

RE:Pre.iminary FlawEvaluation orCorrosion De~radatio: ofECCSSuctionPipinginSt.Lucie.tJni:2~Vehavecompleted apreliminary analysisnfthcstrt(c(ural capacityotthe24-inchsuctionpipingcontaining outsidesurfacecorrosion. Thcanalysisconservatively assinesthccorrosion iscon)prised ofpittingandcrackingwiththeprimarycrackingnechn:91nbein@.stresscorrosion cracking(SCC).Bothcircumferenti'l andaxialflaworientations wereevaluated. Aleak-before-break approachwasusedtoestablish thelargestacceptable flawlcng;hf'rthpipe.Ana!ysismethodsinASMESectionXIunderParagraph l4'8-~640 andAppc:Idix Cwereusedtocomoutethcallovablethrouoh-wall flawlengthsandpredicted fiawgrovaha>>afunctionOIoperating time.GrowthbySCCandfatiguemechanisms wascon>>idercd inthefiaw6owthasscsstrlcnt. P3P}IKEORMAT30iM Thepipingis24-inchnominalpipesize,Schedt)lc l0whreD=2"inchesandavailthickness, t=0.25inch. Thepipemateria}isType30"stainless s'eel.Thede>>inconditions are:p=60ps)gT."100!Thepipin~systemisdesignedtoASMESec:ion3II,Class2.APTECHENGINEERING

SERVICES, INC,1282REAhllVOOD AVENuE1'sUNNYvALE

>'AUFORNIA 94089(408)745.7000: FAX(408)73"04451'.MAIL;:ptec!isuSix.nelcom.coii1 HOUSON,iX((713)S."-00'lrrSBUFGH,PAL(412)siC88:."CALANAGA~j(770)78;.37:-; BErHL.EH"-l.L pA~(8'l0)888-7&7)'I cHARLGlE,Nc(01)8854318-':rN=(.q,,9:,a;<<-pIHINGTQN. DC~(301)888-1".o~~c'~~J~J FloridaPower8'ightNovember25,l993Page2P7L-E'g&-S-795-V-l02.Rilog,lK<VoPg.z,oV3PIPINGSTRESSESThcmaximummembraneandbe d'bndingstressesfortneltneinareasaf}'ected bycorosion~~~de@adationwerecompiledbyFloridaPower8.'tght(FPL)asdncun]cnted inCalculations PSL-lFSWf-98-002 and2FSM-9S-012. Thesestressesarc:PDIVOBEDBETHERli95psi3056psi3022psl3900psln!t40psiChcsestresscomponents yieldthefollowinz serviceloadingconditions useintl;eSt~revefociformal/Uoset Emereqpcv!/'solaced l4-".060736962PcSS403NCOTheprimarymembranestress(Pm)isbasedondesignprcssure. Theprimarybendingstressisthcsumof'eadweight(DN)andseismic(Oi3EorDBE).Theexpansion stress(e)isbasedonthermalandSAMloads,Forevaluating axialflaws,thehoopstressisrequired. Thehoopstressiscalculated astwicePmor2880psi.ALLO'BUYABLE FLA~VLD'GTHTheallowable through-wall flawsizewasde;ermired "ornorm;l/upset co~"'on-wi'n-.X~tSectionXlCodesafetyfactorof2.77forcircumferential llawsandi.0I'oraxialflaws.Theflowstressfort'repipematerialwsassumedtobe4".2}si.Theallowable circumferential flawlenyhiscomputedtobcapprox'mately 26inches.Foraxialorientedcracks,theallowable throuoh-wall flawIcn"thi'12'.,8'sanutince>>.Bothof'thesestructural limitsaremuchgreaterthanthesurfaceindications observeddurin~inandrepairof'aftected piping.tnsoserveur>n~inspection ~~~~~ FloridaPower8:Liehtnovember25,I993Page~f'SL-CH&-sE~s gg>>Rli<.lRcv.03o$aFLA~tt'ROV,'TH ANALYSISThegros,qhofsuracef'v,flcv'5willbelimitedtotn<eweldareasvherclocalr-'dl~pipexteriorisrecoatedtopreventfurhcrenvironmeiital .'tack,thepotential forfurhe.SCCwillbcsignit"- atiy'-'.Il,fl~'<<cniyreuceo.Ilowever, afla.vgrowthevauationv'aspe<ormcdassurnin<<SCC willbeoperative andflawscouldcontin"etopropa"=ate f<o<<ma<<'xisti."~n<y.-.>esurtacindicationslpittin<<. Basedonaninitial tl-wl.2*<<sumcdt<<rough-wal!, theserviceperiodrequiredtogrowtotheallow'able sizeexceeds'ars. i,'i'years.Initialflawlengthsclosertothemaximumobservedsurtace(i.e..=.>5inches)v:ouldhaveanacc~tableo~cratlonal pcrioo't~earst'i.~~<<<in<<pcrlo0<aout2years.Itisexpectedthatlor<gdeeptlawsw'llbedetectedbyevidenceofboratcdwaterleakagebecomingvisiblefromthepipe.Std&IARYA~DCOVCLUSIOUSApreliminary calculation divascompleted todctcrrnir<e theacc)tablesizeofsurfaceindications basedonaleak-before-break strate~'.AS~f2<-'Il.ectionXIllawevaluation methodsandacceptanc. crite.iawereused.Forthes:resscsprovidedbyFPLathrou~'h-waawof26inchesvould'dsatisfythemiiiimums-e'.yfactors.Acorservative tlawgrowthevaluation indicates thatadequatesafetymarginsu:illbemaintained l'oratlcas:onecycleofoperation. 1tisconcluded thatth-stoic'-l'f'diut<olalldesignlo;--:perASWlESectionXIpl'ovided that'ea'tctivie.tnat'eaoetcction ismaintained intheareasatrectedbycorrosion dmaraca:ion Thisevaluation iscurr<ently beingdocumcntcd (chckd-d-"dearvritied)inaformlcalculation underourQualityAssurance Proerain. 1fuh!yosou!dhavequestions regarding theseresults,pleasedonothesitatetocall.Sincerely, 0g...gRussellC.CipollaProject5fanau<er~IP~~<~~i<'.v7",6'"'" PreparedBy:~~v-~VerifiedBy:MAXIMUMSTRESSES(NOTINTENSIFIED) FORSIPIPINGINTHEPIPETUNNELAREAA8'cBTRAINS)1,395PSI2,704PSIPRESSUREDEADWEIGHT (D1,580PSIOBEINERTIAOBE1,618PSIDBEINERTIA(DBE2,026PSIP+DWSTRESSCOMBINATIONS P+DW+OBEP+DW+DBE4,099PSI5,717PSI6,125PSI1,580PSI

References:

1)StressCalculation 2412,Run2,Rev.8(Train"A")2)StressIsometric SI-199-74, Rev.8g'rain"A")3)StressCalculation SI-2407AC, Rev.0(Train"B")4)StressIsometric SI-19941, Rev.8(Train"B") RNT2f.L.21'RENCl.l OPENiNGPrrg+()rrrLQ..~rr~~rrr~rr~1%4r)C'L~r~go~~rr8(QrWg>>Cr+)C'r~\rr~,s.AFFECTEDAREAF'IGUREtECCSSUCTlONPlPlNG +4~g4~i-'Q(ooo4ppooC'CZ-JCuO4v7v<L%$+JC'%JvJllyr4opop44popooppre~QXZ~J~lvl~+INspccfcn lvcLn50<onicnlIccnsFIGURE2ECCSSUCTIONPIPINGINTRENCH0$ÃP18 t=!GUREECCSSUCTIONPIPINGBTRAlNSTRAlGHTPlPFltl~p~l-7~>~~ Is'APPLIED TECHNOLOGY 'IMr.CarlBibleFloridaPower8t'ightCompanySt.LuciePlant6501S.OceanDriveJensenBeach,FL34957April7,1999Psi-EZ(-S,&AS,-'t8-IONATTACHMENT REV.pgoploF~3Attention: Mr.MkeMoranRE:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2(Ref.FPLP.O.00034916, Rev.4)(APZECHProjectAES98113566-1Q, Rev.1)

DearSir:

Wehavecompleted Revision1toCalculation AES-C-3566-1 regarding theflawevaluation fortheECCSsupplypipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2.Thecalculation wasrevisedtoincorporate newmaximumstressesforthemodifiedpipingsupportarrangement. Enclosedisacontrolled copyofthefinalcalculation thatdocuments therevisedevaluation. Insummary,aQawevaluation wasperformed toASMESectionXI,AppendixC,methodsandacceptance criteria,. Theallowable through-wall Qawlengthsandestimated Qawgrowthduringservicewerecomputed. %heconservative Qawgrowthanalysisindicates thatadequatesafetymarginswillbemamtaincd foratleastonecycleofoperation. The'tructural integrity ofthepipingisacceptable forthedesign-basis loadingconditions basedonleak-before-break. 'Therefore, Codesafetymarginsvrillbemaintained intheareasaffectedbycorrosion degradation whendetectable through-wall leakageisexpectedtooccur.'.Ihavealsoenclosedadocumenttransmittal form.Kindlysignandreturntheformtothe'ddress indicated ontheform.RCC/sjhEnclosures Sincerely, I~c'.p~RussellGCipollaProjectManagerAPTECHENGINEERING

SERVICES, INC.1282AEAMWOODAVENUESSUNNYVALE PCALIFORNIA 940891C3566C2,DOC (408)745.7000E3FAX(408)7S44445pEMAIL:eptechsuolanetcom.corn HOUSTON,TX0(281)55842000PITTSBURGH, PAP(412)9206633PATLANTA,GA0P70)7814756BETHLEHEM, PAP(610)866.7347PCHARLOTTE, NCP(704)865.6318ieeceiveg gime"")pi.y.p.4~pgsHINGTok,Dcp(301)&&4899 f'SL,-t=nh&-5&nS-'i'E-io2CALCULATION COVERSHEETATfACHMENT Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 QUncontrolled Controlled Title:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2HoridaPowerEcLightCompanyProjectNo.:AES98113566-1Q APTECHOffice:Sunnyvale SheetNo.DocumentControlNo.:I-2Purpos~:Thepurposeofthiscalculation istodetermine theallowable through-wall flawlengthsandexpectedservicelifeofECCSsupplypipingsubjecttocorrosion ontheoutsidesurface.Theallowable Qawlengthisbasedontheacceptance criteriaofASMESectionXI,IWB-3640foralldesignloadingconditions.

Assumptions: Assumptions aregiveninSection2.0.Results:Asummaryofresultsispresented inSection6.0.Thestructural integrity ofthepipeisadequateforalldesignloadsunderleak-before-break conditions. RevisionNo.PreparedByDatellgyBCheckedByDateVortrtodBy'7Af'RApprovedByDater<rpgRevisionDescription InitialReleaseUpdatedanalysisforrevised(unintensified) stressinputforSIpipingIRPTNNENGIHEERlhQ

SERVlCES, tNC.ReceivedTimeApt.7.1:38PMQAN45REV.8196

~~~~~'~~gIQ~~~I~II~~I~I~I~~~0~0~~~ Calculation Vo.:Aos.c~56o.[Title:Eva[ua'ion ot'Cot-,osion OcgRadono[I4-[IIchECCSPi[line.atSt.Lucio,Unit".S'I'cbvCI:ccI:cd. IFy:~~(ttcvtI[CII io.!Oo;cj/ys[>ac.99OocvFocnt Cnntyo[Yo['ICalCIII;FPL.LProjectYo.:Als0$[[s56o'QSIIcctYZ.:iol'~1.0liiTRODUCTtOYi Surfa-eindications werefoundonth"emergentcorecoolingsystem(ECCS)supplypiping(l.".),'ghesu;Lceindications tveredetecteddurhinspection andar"teeresultofpittinocracl;ing du;;osuracecorrosion. Etisbelievedthattheobserv"dpitrinnjcracl< n"occt:rrcd over'.L.":!i.--. ",:-".".-)lant.astheinstatedpipinglstheorlgUlalmLaterial. Toemajorityofthcindica:ions werclocatedintheneighborhood ofweldsandwercprizariiy czcunfcrntiaUyoriented. TheECCSsupplypipingandfittingsarefaoricated hotnType"=0!st=inlcss steel.Tlusalloyisknovztobcsusceptible tost.esscorrosion cracking(SCC).Of:thesurfaceindications

examined, mostpitting!'cracks'ng wasinthebasemetalnearwclds,bu[.sotnewasobservedatthcweld.Theprozirnitv ofcrackstoweidsindicates thatweldresidualstress'sarecontributing tothccracL'qg.

Thepurposeosthiscalculation isto'dctenPze theallowable flatvlengthsandacceptabl-s."i'ite12ofECCSsupolvpipinFcontin~thouh-wallcracks.AIcal'-bfore-break approachisfodtotved toverLythattheobservedindications willnotsignificantly affectpipeintegrity prioroleakdetecrion. Thiscalculation includesacriticalflawsi=cevaluation toestablish theallowabl0=-tvlen<<chfortheaf.'ected piping.Thiscalculation alsoincludesaf'[awgrowthanalysisthatquanti.'ies thegrowthrteofcracksovertirrc.Thisgrowtthanaly'.:s isbasedonexpectdcrackpropaationmcchanislws offaL[guecrackgrotvth(FCG)andSCC.Theflawevaluation rulesprovidedinAppendsCofAmericanSociet'fiVfechanical Engineers (ASIA/E)CodeS.ctionXI(~)areusedasguidanceincompleting thiscalculation. psL-Pl&-seals-9'E-lo"- PViACHh'EHl QAE1VR~S/96~~~f~~FI+'~~~~s~-IliI~I~-u ~~~~~~~I~~~~~~I~~~~~I~~Cl~~~0Il~1'~'C~~IS40~I~ISO~~~~~II~~~~0~0~~~~~~~t~0~~lIs~~~~t~~~~4 III~~~~~~~l~~~~~~~~~~4~~~II~~II~~I~I~I~I~~~I~~I~~~~'I\I~~I'I~II~~I~~~-~s~~~I~~~ Qlculntion >0.:A:.S-C-3566-1 Madebiti/i/~8CliconFP8:I.Title:Fvzluztion ofCor;osion Dcg~Monof2-"-IncaLCCSPipingztS~Lucic,t:ni;2ChcckcJ'pRcwA!ooNo.:0Doaia)co< Control5'n.:Siic=:so.:6of23Dwo:PEojcoEIO.:C'Wc.f6~gES9f1,1356MaterialProperties TncpipingmaterialisSA-353,Class1,Tge304stah!esssteel(-".,5).Thcmechanical propertis-troomternperaturc ar(6):S=30L~iS=75ksiwhereS,isthespecified minimutt1 yieldstrengthandSisthespeci-."ied minimumtensilestrength. TheCoderninitt1utn properties forthedesi'emperature oE300'Fare:S=22.5J'siS=66.0ksiThedeQ11ition fortlowstress(o,)assumedinthelimitloadanalysisistousetheaverageoryieldplusultimatesznatl'.s:G,=(S-:S,)/2Thetefore, atdesigntemperature: a',=(22.S.66.0)/2=~.~wksisL-EH&-sEM5-96-lo2-~or!>BE'J.FACE~OFQAE17REV8'96o~~IBg~~~Ik~I.!3:l;.'!1 QS-6'--S~gATTACHMENT REV.Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 \Title:Evaluation ofCorrosion Dcyadation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucic,Unit2'adeb:Checkedby.Revision5o.:1DateDoeutncnt ControlNo.:I-2FP&LProjectNo:.AES98113566-1 SheetNo.:7of2334Operating andAccidentStressesThenormaloperating stresseswereconservatively takenasdesignpressure(P)anddeadweight(DW).Themaximumstressforaccidentconditions wastakentoincludedesignbasisearthquake (DBE)loadsP+DW+DBE.Thermalstressesareassumedtobenegligible becausethesystemismaintained byFP&Latambientconditions. Theaxialpressure(P)stressbypipesizeiscomputedfrom:a=p,D./4twiththestressresultsgivenas:o.=60(24)/4(0.25) =1440psiTheDW,OBE,DBE,andTHER"unintensiQed" stressesweresuppliedbyFP&Lfromdesigncalculations for24-inchpiping(11).Themaximumtabulated unintensified stressesare:CodeEuationEq.8Eq.9Eq.9~LoadinP+DWP+DW+OBEP+DW+DBETHERStresssi1,3954,0995,7176,1251,580QAE17REV8/96ReceivedTimeApr.7,1:38PM Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 Title:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2MadebvChcckcdby:RegionNo.:1DateDoctnnent ControlNo.:SheetNo:.1-28of23PSL-E~t->tWS-lR-ic,2ATTACHhtiENT REY.FAas3srFCUcnt:FPScLProjectNo.:AES98113566-1 Fromthismaximumstresscase,themembrane(P),primarybending(P,),andexpansion (P,)stressesfornormalandupset(N/U),andemergency andfaulted(E/F)conditions aredetermined. ~StresssiPP,~N1,4404,3221,580~E1,4404,7301,5803.5ResidualStressesLocalresidualstressesatweldareaswillbedominated bytheweldresidualstressfromfabrication. Localweldresidualstressesaresecondary (displacement controlled) stressesthatareself-equilibrating. Therefore, asconstraint isrelaxed,stresseswilltendtoattenuate away.Peakstressesatsocketwelds(fillets) andbuttweldstypically areyieldorderinmagnitude. Stressestransverse toweldsaretypically lessthanlongitudinal stresses(7).Transverse stressesaretheprincipal stressofconcernsincetheyareperpendicular tothecircumferential planecontaining thecracks.Useof1/2yieldstrengthforpeaktransverse residualstresshasbeenrecommended forfractureanalysisofwelds(7).Sincecracksareobservednearweldments andnotoriginating withinweldmetal,theuseof1/2yieldstrengthwillbeconservative. Thispeakstressisconservatively assumedtobeuniformthxoughthethickness. Becausethestresswillattenuate asthrough-wall cracksdevelopandgrowinsignificant lengthwithrespecttothepipecircumference, theresidualstressisassumedtodecayinalinearrelationship withcracklengthandpipecircumference. Therefore, thefollowing equationisusedforweldresidualstress:(3-3)whexe,eisthehalfcrackangle.Itis,therefore, assumedthatwhenathrough-wall crackexistshalf-wayaroundthepipe,only50%oftheoriginalweldresidualstressxexnainsduetorelaxation. QAE17REV8/96ReceivedTimeApr.V.1:38PM @m'acNENGIIIEERINtr SERVICESIICATI'ACHMENT REV.PAGF~OOF~!"alculntioa No.:AES-C-3566-1 M~by:'"'+~/sQieat:FP&LTitle:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipirtgatSt.Lucio,Unit2Checkedby:RevisionNo.:Date:8ProjectNo.:AES9si13566-1DocumentControlNo,:SheetNo.:I-29of234.04.1ALLOWABLE FLAWLENGTHIntroductioaTheallowable QawlengthsfortheECCSsupplypipingwereestablished bythelimitloadanalysisforQawed(Class1)pipingcontained inAppendixCofASMESectionXI.Thepipingmaterial, beingausteaitic stainless steel,ishighlyductileandnet-section plasticbehaviorwillbeexpectedtobecontrolling. Further,crackiagisnotdirectlyassociated withweldmetalorisawayfromtheweldzonessothatbasemetalpropeities willberelevant. 4.2LimitLoadEvaluation -Circumferential FlawsTheabilityofthepipingtotolerate. through-wall crackshasbeenevaluated basedoaanet-section plasticcollapse. Thelimitloadanalysisequations fromASMESectionXIforthrou'-wall cracks(a/t=1)wereused,Figure1isaschematic illustration oftheQawmodel,FromASMESectionXI,thecrackangleandappliedstresslevelrequiredtocausetheremaining pipecross-section tobecomefullyplasticisgivenby:ZcrfP'-(2siaP-sine)'rtp=-[1-(e/n)-{P /err)](4-1)When(8+P)57c,and2tyfPb=-singrtpP~ITItyt(4-2)QAE17REV8/96ReceivedTimeApr.V.i:38PM I~~I~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~'I~~I~~~~~~II~I~~~~~~~I~~'III~~I~~II~I~I~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~I~III~I~~~'I~~I~I~~I~~~~~~II~~~I'~~~~'I~~~~I~~ Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 all'Ln,4n ol6'1eVALJ'~Pgi-EWggP~g'l[Oz.~""'TTACHMENT REV.PAGE1~OFQienttFPALTitle:Evalvation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucio,Unit2Checkedby:RevisionNo.:Date:Docutneat ControlVo.:1-2ProjeaNo.:ES9S113566-1 sbcctNo.:llof23where,o=Pipehoopstress=pD,/2tM,=[1+1.61$/(4Rt)]'~ ct,=Howstress=TotalcracklengthSolvingforcracklength,theallowable axialcracksizeisgivenby:=3..576(Rt)"' -1SF'1/2(4-5)wherethepipehoopstress,ty,is2880psi.TheSFsforaccepting axialflawsarespecified inArticleC-3420ofAppendixCofSectionXLTheQawacceptance SFsare:SF=3.0SF=15(normal/upset conditions) (emergency/faulted conditions) 4.4ResultsForcircumferential flaws,thelimitloadequations weresolvedbytheiterative process.Equation4-3wassatisfied forthefollowing through-mall cracklengths:CrackAnge~em0.43130.5394Length,ij~inch32.1840.25Z,4~0.032540.842220.032540.67236~Ssi43224730ReceivedTimeApt.'t,i:38PhiQAE17REVS/96 Calcttlatioa No.:AES-C-3566-1 Madeb:f'sl-a&t-bcvna-g9lo~ATTACHMENT REV.PAGE13Client:FPRLTitle:Evaluation ofCort'oaion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucio,Unit2'heckedby:MRevisionÃo.:Date:DocumentControlKo.:I-2ProjectNo.:AES98113566-1 SheetNo:.12of23where(=28R(R=meanpiperadius).Thesmallestcomputedcircumferential flawlengthiscomputedforN/Uconditions withI=32.2inches.Foraxialflaws,theallowable flawlengthiscomputeddirectlyfromEq.4-5.N/UE/FLength,5~inches13.6427.69a~SFaf5.12210.243ThesmallestcomputedaxialflawlengthiscomputedforN/Uconditions withk=13.6inches.ReceivedTimeApt'.7,1:38PMQAE17REV8/96 ~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~S~0~~~~~I~)'~~~~I~0I4I~~'~~~.~~0~~~~I~~~I~~~~~~~~ ~8~~~~~~I~~0~~t~~II0~~~~~I.~I~~I~~c~~~I~~~~~~~~I'IeII~~~~~ C~%%\me~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~I~I'~~~~IoI~~S~s~'~~~Ii~~\lE~~~~~~~~~.'~II~~~00~~ N@YMMEttQNEMHQ SHKCES.tNc.Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 Title:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2Madey:Chccttcdby:RevisionNo.:1'ccppealDateCbcnt:FP&LFrojectNo.:AES98113566-1 DocumentCorttrolNo.:SheetNo:,1-216of23VS1-eWC-S~S-33-lo~ATIACHMENTREV.PAGf'I+OP~XFromthisinformation, areasonable butconservative boundwasestablished as$,=0.62inchbasedona95%probability ofoccurrence levelat95%coaQdeace (seeAppendixA).Likewise, aworstcaseinitialQawlengthwasdetermined fromthe95%/95%probability ofthemaximumobservedindication lengthsfromeachinspection location. Forthiscase,/j;=1.18inches.Therefore, twocaseswereevaluated, aslistedbelow:Case1Case2InitialLength,2a;~inch0.621.18FinalLength,2at~inch32.232.25.5AnalysisResultsThecrackgrowthanalysiswasperformed inaniterative processfollowing Eq.5-1.InsolvingEq.5-1,theincrements ingrowthwerecomputedfromEqs.5-2and5-3foreachgrowthmechanism whereaada=-ZNFCGAnincrement intimeof20dayswasassumed,sothatN=2'yclesandt=480hoursinthesummation. Foreachincrement, anewvalueofKwascomputedfromEqs.5-4and5-5,asthecracklengthwasupdatedforeachincrement ofgrowth.Theanalysisresultsaresummarized. inAppendixB.TheresultsfromthisanalysisareplottedinFigure3.Theseresultsshowthechangeinflawlengthasafunctionofservicetime.Byreplottingthelawgrowthasafunctionofinitiallawlength($,.),theremaining servicetimeforagiveninitialthrough-wall lengthcanbedetermined. ThisplotisgiveninFigure4.QAE17REV8/9GReceivedTimeAPI,7.1:38PM ENGINEERNQ SERVICES. HC.Y'hL-Cdte -4BVl5ATTACMjwa ENTRB'.PAGE1803Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 Title:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.l.ttcie, Unit2Madeby:Chcckcdby:RevisionVo.:Detc:DocumentControlNo.:1-2Qicat:FPALProjectYo:.AES98113566-1 ShcctYo.:17of23Foraninitiallawlengthof0.62inch(Case1),theacceptable operational timeisabout2,630days,or7.2years.TheCase1'analysis isforaflawlengththatrepresents the95%/95%boundtotheobservedsurfaceflawindication lengthsandisconservatively assumedtobethrough-mall. Fortheworstcaselawlength(Case2),takenasthe95%boundtothe.maximumrejectedflaws,where<;=1.18inches,theacceptable servicetimeisabout5.4years.Finally,thelongestlawthatcouldgrowtotheallowable sizeinoneoperational cycle(1.5years)wasdetermined. FromFigure4,thisflawlengthis6Ainches.Itisexpectedthatinitialflawslengthswillbedetectedbyevidenceofboratedwaterleakagebecomingvisible.~QAE17REV8/96ReceivedTimeApr,7.1:38PM mIPVMHENolHEERM

SERVICES, IhC.P51-EW(-St:yvlS-

'tK-lp2ATTACHihtiENT REV.PAGE~~OFCalculation No.:ABS-C-3566-1 Titie:Evaluation ofCorrosion Deyadation of?A-Inch ECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2Madeb.Chcckcdby:RmsiottNo.:1""'+/~vDate:-1A-emDocumentControlNo.:1-2ClicnttFPScLProjcotNo.:AES98113566-1 ShcctNo.:18of236.0SUMMARYOFRESULTSAfiawevaluation fortheECCSsupplypipinghasbeencompleted foHowingthegeneralmethodsandacceptance criteriaofIWB-3640andAppendixCofASMESectionXI,Aleak-before-break approachhasbeenusedtoassessacceptable limitsonthrou+-wall flawsizesandacceptable servicetimefortheaffectedpiping.Theallowable flawlengthforpostulated through-wall crackshasbeenestablished as32.2inchesforcircumferential flawsand13.6inchesforaxialflaws.Theseallowable flawlengthsaresignificantly largerthantheobservedsurfaceindications. AQawgrowthanalysiswasperformed forcircumferential fiaws.Thecircumferential flaworientation willbelimitingbecausebendingandresidualstresswillbecontrolling forSCCatcircumferential welds.Thesestressesarenotgloballypresentforaxialflaws.Forareasonable butconservative initialflawlengthof0.62inch,theacceptable servicetimeforthepipingis7,2years.IfaworstcaseQawlengthof1.18inchesisassumed,theacceptable servicetimeis5.4years.Thelongestthrough-wall Qawthatcouldgrowtotheallowable sizein1.5years(oneoperational cycle)iscomputedtobe6.4inches.Therefore, theresultsindicatethatadequatesafetymarginswillbemaintained foratleastoneoperational cycle,Thestructural integrity ofthepipingisadequateforalldesignloadsperASMESectionXI,providedthatleakdetection ismaintained intheareasaffectedbyexternalcorrosion degradation. QAE17REV8/96ReceivedTimeApt.7.i:38I'M Pcl-hHtn-bevtS-1K-10~ENGINEEfcHtt SERYlcea. INC.ATlACHhiENTREV.PAGEZOOF~+Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 Tjtle:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2lvhdby;Checlccdby;RevisionNo.:1Docutncnt ControlNo.:1-2CUent:FPZcLProjectNo.tAES98113566-1 Shect;Vo;t 19of237.01.Inspection SummaryData,FloridaPower&LightCompany(ECD<).2.Unit2ECCSInspection Data,FloridaPower&LightCompany(ECD-5).3.ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,AppendixC,"Evaluation ofHawsinAustenitic Piping,"1989Edition.Calculation PSL-2FSM-98-012, Rev.0,"MinPipeWallCalculation for24"CS-2RWSTSuctiontoCSPumpsQCS-2-3-SW-1, CS-Z-FW-3, CS-Z-FW-901," FloridaPower&LightCompany(November 22,1998)(ECD-2).5.Calculation PSL-1FSM-98-002, Rev.0,"MinPipeWallCalculation for24"CS-2andCS-3intheOutsidePipeTunnelperCR-98-0047," FloridaPower&LightCompany(February 9,1998)(ECD-3).6.ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,"Appendices," Division1,1989Edition.7."Requirements andGuidelines forEvaluating Component SupportMaterials UnderUnresolved SafetyIssueA-12,"EPRINP-3528,AppendixIV,Figure8-5,ElectricPowerResearchInstitute (June1984).8."Evaluation ofFlawsinAustenitic SteelPiping,"EPRINP-4690-SR, SpecialReport,ElectricPowerResearchInstitute (July1986).9.NUREG-0313, "Technical ReportonMaterialSelection andProcessing Guidelines forBWRCoolantPressureBoundaryPiping,"Revision2,USNuclearRegulatory Commission (June1986).10."DuctileFractureHandbook," EPRINP-6301-D, Volume1,ElectricPowerResearchInstitute (June1989).11.RevisedStressResultsforSIPipinginPipeTunnel(A&BTrains),FloridaPower&LightCompany(April7,1999)(ECD-10). QAE17REV8/96ReceivedTimeApr,V.l:38PM ~+~ERvmsuvcas.Ihc.Calculation iso.:AES-C-3S66-I Title:Evaluation ofCortosion Dcyatjation of24-InchI-:CCSPipin"atSt.Lucie,Unit".igsdc':Chccccdhy:~McRcvt:ictt .'vn.:Date(z/i/PgDoctttttcnt Cootrol.a>0.: I-2Clicttt:ProjectVo.:AES98IIi566-IShcctiitt.:20of23r/2l///Neutralaxis'Figee1-Circumferential Hamivfodel-Net-Section Collapsehfodel.St-CNe.SrM5-9S-[o2- "OF~3QAEl'7REV8!96'ec.}.10:l5Plt ~~~~~~~~I~~ rat"~~t-~~ms-1Y-lo~ATTACHMENT REV.Z33Calculation No.:AES-C-3566-1 Madeb:v~/~vCUcoc;FP&LTitle:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucio,Unit2Checkedby; RcvisiooNo.:Date:projectÃo.;AES98113566-1 DocumentControlle.:SheetNo.:I-222of23FLAWGROWTHEL/ALUATION RESLILTS~'5025ECCSSUPPLYPIPINGt=0.25"201510005001000150020002500500035004000ServiceTime,T[daysjFigure3-FlarvGrowthAnalysisResultsforECCSSupplyPiping.Q~I7REV8/96ReceivedTimeApr.V,1:38PM g;tnttaatttttQ 56AcES,at"ATTACHhiENT REV.FAGE+A0F~~Calculation No.:-AES-C-3566-1 Title:Evaluation ofCorrosion Degradation of24-InchECCSPipingatSt.Lucie,Unit2M3dcby.Chcckodby:RevisionNo.:1'"'~F/ryDate:Docotncnt ControlNo.:'-2Giant:PALProjectNo,.AES98113566-1 SheetNo.:23of23240022002000m1800l600i-l400El200~l000.-800~~6004002000FLAWGROWTHEVALUATION RESULTSECCSSUPPLYPIPING0=24"t=0.25"10152025303540InitialFlawLength,Li(inchesjFigure4-Remaining ServiceLifeVersusInitialCrackLength.QAE11REv8/96ReceivedTimeAP1,7,1:38PbI

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HHlkiHBKIK'ZHHHXEBH ~\ St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389L-99-90Enclosure Attaclunent 2C.~30calendardaysD.gOtherCONDITION REPORTDUE:DateCRNO.PTNOPSLtKJBQPAGE1OF0COr/I)..SYSTEM¹/NAMEUNIT0~COMPONENT NAMEECC,5&C77()~gfyg5DISCOVERY DATF/TIME C'OCRORIGINATOR ~EYENTDATBTIME~I ~'7///IIr/DEPT/PHONE~~< (L0)-z2.(ATTACHADDmONALPAGESASNECESSARY) (A)CONDAIONDESCRIPTION MO~TL('L'7 5p@ImSPt=<PDs@(I/Qt~<(Of/IcLD/etc/Lc.'IbrEFsr5~r=mAsITIVE-mme r=itb.onC5"ggGCC,55L/I-TlC)~ ILI(&i)~K A~M(.5-2.PgC(4/IpVCTL0~4W)IPP.(B)CAUSEg&QNo~4(C)IMMEDIATEACRONSTAKEN 7+I~~PSC>I5I+I~QI)+/rc(Tt/L pLE(D)RECOMMENDED ACTIONSISUGGESTED ASSIGNEEEVE/Ot~~~/('OgI('W/P7'gt-ftC~OHK0I-zGCC0(E)ADDITIONAL REFERENCES (PWONumber(s). Procedure Number(s). PersortsCo/NecterL etc)3.ORIGINATOR REQUESTSCOPYOFCLOSEDCONDITION REPRTSUPERVISOR NOTIFICATION: 5'Fry<YESQN/A4.OPERABILITY/REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION: AOPERABIUTY ASSESSMENT'EQUIRED (3WORKDAYS)QB.POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE (ATTACHENSWORKSHEET. IFUSED)Q~NOOPERABIUTY CONCERN/NOT REPORTABLE D.OTHEROUTAGERELATED7~YESMODEHOLD?QYES~NOFORENIRYINTOMODECOMMENTS: NPSNPNEPRINTSIGMAEDATEtTIME f47)~l535.CONDmONREPORTASSIGNEDTO;COMMENTS: CIROOTCAUSEANALYSISPGM/VPNEINVESTIGATE &CORRECTDATEr~~C,'~IJT)to:-~~>crDsroOoD(9z(LLULUz8LUELLUODz(0ILI(LD.LUO)Formsss3(Dort.stocked)CA'SAAECAAECCAOSV/HENCLOSEO.PLEASEENSIIAESLLAESPCNSES ANOATTACHMENTS AAELEQ2LEREV:422/98

CONDITlON REPORT¹PAGE2OF6.NONCONFORMANCE (NCR):ElYESFUNCTIONAL FAILURE:Q,YESCINOCINOBY:PRINTGNATURE7.INVESllGAlloN: ANALYSIS. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS,GENERICIMPUCATIONS. DISPOSITiON DETAILS,WORKINSTRUCTIONS (ATTACHAODmloNA. PAGESASNECESSARY) 5<<<sYrcCr//rtp"Voprogrl,)/rr5rgmpAWArversa&ru 3/C~plgbC.9I-//8rrV.I.&SDSc&o*huA"CHIC.gu pyT"h)99FRry~~,Ffrg>>,,9(/yljr~w,CAUSECODES:I)2)3)8.DOCUMENTATION INITIATED: 0N/APWORPCMOTHEREVALUATION REOUIREDFOR:EO10CFR50.59 10CFR21~ASMESECTIONXIGYESCINO0YESCINOCIYES0NOYESNO9.NCRDISPOSmON: QN/AQREWORKQREPAIRUSEAS.IS~OTHER10.DISFOSmON SIGNATURES: ('/Ai!notappEcablo) PREPARERSIGNATURE DEPTPIIONEOTHERDEPT.HEADCONCUR'ATE DATEANII/SECXIREVIEWERPNSC/FRGREVIEW?PYESDEPARTMENT HEADPRINTPRINTPNOSIGNATURE SIGNATURE SIGNATURE DATDATE11.OLosEDUT/PRoeLEM sUMMARY:EYENTINmATolLMODERESTRICTION RELEASED: QYESQN/APRINTSIGNATURE DAQYESQNo12.FRG/PNSCREVIEW(ifrequiredinBlock10)MTG¹CHAIRMANDATE13.APPROVALPGMIVPNE/MGRDATEulcczto>42Form8483(Non-slocket0 CITaAREOARECORDSWHENCLOSED.PLEASEENSUREALLRESPONSES ANDATTACNMENTS ARELEGI8LE.REV:4I22S8 CR99B0445Attachment 1Page1of4INTERIMENGINEERING DISPOSITION: Backround/Event Descrition:CR99-0445concernsthroughwallleaksonbothUnit2Emergency CoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)TrainslocatedwithintheRefueling WaterStorageTank(RWT)trenchasindicated intheattachedsketch(Attachment 3).Theleakratesareextremely smallandnotquantifiable; theywerediscovered bythepresenceofasmallmoundofboricacidcrystalsonthepipe.Theunitiscurrently performing adownpowerinaccordance withTS3.0.3.~DiBThesubjectRWTsuctionpipingprovidesaflowpathfromtheRWTtotheECCSpumpsforuseduringtheInjection Phasefollowing aDesignBasisAccident. Thisfunctionissafetyrelatedandisaddressed intheplant'sFSARandTechnical Specifications. Accordingly, thisCRisclassified assafetyrelated.Asdiscussed in'Unit2FSARSection6.3.2.2.4, theRWTisanatmospheric tankcontaining waterboratedbetween1720and2100ppm.Redundant linesareprovidedfromasinglenozzleonthetanktoprovidesuctiontotheAandBTrainsofECCSPumpslocatedintheRAB.ThesuctionlinesareroutedtotheRABinabelowgradetrenchwhichisopentotheatmosphere. PerT.S.3.5.2,inModes1,2,and3(withpressurizer pressuregreaterthanorequalto1750psia),twoindependent ECCSsubsystems shallbeOPERABLEwithindependent flowpathscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWT.PerT.S.3.5.3,inMode3(withpressurizer pressurelessthan1750psia)andMode4,aminimumofoneECCSsubsystem shallbeOPERABLEwithaflowpathtotheRWT.PerT.S.3.1.2.1,inModes5and6,aminimumofoneboroninjection flowpathshallbeOPERABLEwhichincludesaflowpathfromtheRWTviaeitherachargingpumporaHPSIpump,meetingtherequirement inT.S.3.1.2.7bifonlytheRWTflowpathisOPERABLE. TheRWTsuctionlinesmustbeabletopassdesignflowatadesignpressureof60psigandadesign-temperature of300'FtotheECCSpumps,havetheabilitytomaintainthepressureboundaryandtheRABintegrity. Operating pressures aredefinedbythecolumnofwaterwithintheRWTtankandoperating temperatures aredefinedbyatmospheric conditions. AsdetailedwithintheTotalEquipment Database(TEDB)andplantdrawings, LinesI-24"-CS-3 (TrainA)andI-24"-CS-2 (TrainB)areconnected toasinglenozzleontheRWTandprovidesuctionfortheECCSsystems.Thepipingdesignpressureis60psigat300'F,withanoperating pressureof30psigat120'F.Thepipeis24"schedule10(wallthickness of0.250")inaccordance withEbascoPipeCodeSS-5.LinesI-24"-CS-2 and-3aredesignedinaccordance withASMESectionIII,Class2requirements andareconstructed ofASTMA-358,Class1,Type304stainless steelmaterial. Unit2iscurrently intheSecondTenYearIn-Service Inspection (ISI)Interval. ThecodeofrecordforRulesforIn-Service Inspection inthisintervalisASMESectionXI1989. CR99-0445Attachment 1Page2of4Evaluation/0 erabilit: CR99-0445concernsthroughwallleaksonUnit2Emergency CoreCoolingSystem (ECCS)ATrainsuctionlineI-24"-CS-2 nearatackweldforthespoolnameplate betweensupports2412-23and2412-20andonTrainBsuctionlineI-24"-CS-3 adjacenttosupport2407-17withintheRefueling WaterStorageTank(RWT)Trench.Theleakratesareextremely smallandnotquantifiable; theywerediscovered bythepresenceofasmallmoundofboricacidcrystalsonthepipe,therefore, operational leakageisnotanissue.PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 wasissuedinNovember1998toreviewthecondition oftheUnit2RWTsuctionlines.Thisevaluation developed thesystempipingdesignrequirements, summarized pastidentification ofindications andexamination results,andidentified thefailuremechanism aschlorideinducedstresscorrosion cracking. Theevaluation developed amethodforaccepting theidentified flawsforlimitedcontinued operation basedontheAcceptance byEvaluation rulesoftheASMESectionXICodeanddemonstrate thatthepipingissuitableforoperation untiltheCycle12Refueling Outage.APTECHanalysisAES-C-3566, Revision0waspreparedtodetermine theallowable throughwallflawlengthsandexpectedservicelifeofECCSsupplypipingsubjecttocorrosion ontheoutsidesurface.Theallowable flawlengthisbasedontheacceptance criteriaofASMESectionXI,IWB-3640foralldesignloadingconditions. Theevaluation concluded thattheallowable flawlengthforpostulated throughwallcracksis27.8inchesforcircumferential flawsand13.6inchesforaxialflaws.Asaresult,thestructural integrity ofthepipingforalldesignloadsisadequateperASMESectionXIIWC-3122.4 Acceptance byEvaluation criteriaprovidedthatflawlengthsaredetectedpriortotheirgrowthtotheabovesizecriteria. Toprovidefortherequireddetection, monthlyinspections ofthesubjectpipingareconducted tolookforthroughwallleakage.Experience indicates thatflawsdonotgrowtogreatlengthspriortotheirpropagation throughwall.Experience alsoindicates thatthroughwallflawsresultinsmall,butdetectable leaks.Accordingly, theApTechreportrequiresmonthlysurveillances ofthesubjectpipingtodetectthroughwallleakage.Itwasunderthisinspection surveillance thattheboricacidcrystalswereidentified onbothl-24"-CS-2 andI-24"-CS-3. Theleakratesareextremely smallandnotquantifiable. Sincethroughwallleakagewasidentified, anoperability determination isrequired. GenericLetter91-18,"Information toLicensees Regarding NRCInspection ManualSectiononResolution ofDegradedandNonconforming Conditions," containsguidanceforresolution ofdegradedandnonconforming conditions andOperability determination. PerthisGenericLetter,andtheNRCInspection Manual,Part9900,section6.15,Operational leakage,leakagethroughClass1,2or3pipewallisnotacceptable forcontinued operation (exceptinthecaseofmoderateenergyClass3pipinginaccordance withGenericLetter90-05).Becauseofthis,theClass2ECCSsuctionpipingwasdeclaredinoperable. Assuch,theplantdeclaredbothtrainsoftheECCSsuctionpipingOOS.Inaccordance withTS3.5.2,theplanthasnoactionstatement forthelossoftwoindependent ECCSsubsystems. Therefore, thecontrolroomenteredApplicability specification 3.0.3,a1hourLCOtoinitiateactiontoplacetheunitinaMODEinwhichthespecification doesnotapplybyperforming aplantshutdown. CR99-0445Attachment 1Page3of4AverbalrequestwasmadetotheNRCregarding application ofGenericLetter91-18criteriatoClass2moderateenergysystems.Thisisdocumented inaphoneconversation withtheNRCconducted on4/6/1999. ThebasisforthisrequestisthedesignoftheECCSsuctionpipingwhichisrecognized asbeingsimilartolowpressure, lowenergyClass3piping.Asdocumented inattachment 2tothisCRtheNRChasverballyapprovedtheuseoftheGL91-18criteriaforClass3throughwallleaksapplicable totheUnit2ECCSsuctionpipingClass2system.Thefollowing isprovidedwhichsupportsOperability oftheECCSsuctionpiping:AreviewofPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 determined thattheindications identified aboveareboundedandwithinthescopeoftheevaluation andtheAptechReport.Operational leakageissmallandnotquantifiable. MeetingTSrequirements forRWTinventory assuresacceptance ofanyoperational leakage.Consequences ofaccidental leakageareboundedbythediscussion providedinPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Rev.1.Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 providesthecurrentbasisforcontinued operation ofSt.LucieUnit2ECCSpipingbasedonthedetermination ofthestablethroughwallflawlength.Theanalysisrecognizes thatthecalculated stableflawlengthiswellinexcessofanyflawlengthlikelytobeobservedinthefieldpriortoidentification byleakage.Theevaluation recognizes thatnotallaxialandcircumferential weldswithinthe1-24"-CS-2 andCS-3lineshavebeenpenetrant inspected. Shouldflawsbepresentintheseareas,theyareandwillremainboundedbytheevaluation madeunderSectionXIcriteriawithinPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102. Engineering mayrecommend additional inspections duringthecurrentcycleduetotheserecentindications. SecificCorrective Actions:1.PerNRCphonecall,areliefrequestwillbesubmitted totheNRCperASMEXI1989AdditionIWA5250(3),within24hours.GenericCorrective ActionsNecessartoPreventRecurrence: GenericCorrective Actionswillbeaddressed later. CR99-0445Attachment 1Page4of40erabilitStatement: TheEmergency CoreCoolingSystemisSafetyRelatedasitisrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofadesignbasisaccident.,The condition, asdiscussed above,whichincludesverbalapprovalbytheNRC,allowscontinued operation. 7'4cNcc55ysce~,~c~s;/~~Pups4le<l~l<<

References:

1.St.Lucie2FSAR,Amendment 122.St.Lucie2Technical Specifications, Amendment 983.GenericLetter91-184.Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Rev1,including AptechReport.Prepedeviewd:Date/7rrpwi&~ From:E.J.WeinkamTo:File)APPIac4~l2cuV~-oVZslok9

Subject:

TELCONSummaryDate:Apri16,1999Time:1334untilabout1420hParticipants: FPLStallKundalkar WestMoranBladowWeinkamNRC/RIIPliscoMcCreeBlakeRudisailRogersRossLanyiWarnicketal.NRC/NRRBerkowPetersonWichmanGleavesMcClellan etal.Purpose:FPLcalledtheNRCtodiscusstheleaksdiscovered ontheUnit2ECCSsupplylines.Unit2enteredT/S3.0.3forbothECCStrainsinoperable at1100on04//06/99. FPLdiscussed potential relieffromGL91-18(i.e.,therequirement todeclarethelinesinoperable) basedonthefactthatFPLhadaboundingflawanalysis. Summary:ThecallwasmadetoabridgelinethroughtheNRC'sOperations Center.Thephonecallwasrecorded. ArtStallsummarized thesituation ofgridstability concernsandTurkeyPointUnit4startup;healsodiscussed FPL'scommitment tofixtheflawsinatimelymanner.RustyWestsummarized plantstatus;thatUnit2shutdownhadcommenced at1100andthattheunitwouldbeofflineby1700.RajKundalkar summarized thetechnical issue.Wichmanaskedserviceconditions ofpipe;Kundalkar responded andWichmanstatedthatthepipingwas,therefore, Class2moderateenergy.WichmanaskedifwehaddoneNDE;FPLsaidno,wewouldbedoingitASAP.

TELCONSummary-04/06/99~Hrrr4,p pCg9Q~g4ff/5P<~ao)Z.WichmanstatedthatGL90-05andCodeCaseN513hadbeenappliedinregulatory applications tomoderateenergyClass2piping.4Kundalkar statedthatwewouldfixtheleaksASAPbutinnocaselaterthantwoweeks.Stallstatedthatwewouldbereplacing thepipingatthenextoutage(April2000).Afteradditional discussion onwhatwasneeded,NRRconcluded (withtheinterpretation andNRRpositionthathasbeenappliedinthepast)thattheGL91-18limitation insections6.13.and6.15thatClass3flawevaluations IAWGL90-05canberelaxedtoapplytoOPERABILITY evaluations formoderateenergyClass2pipes.WichmanstatedthatFPLwouldneedareliefrequesttooperateforthetwo-weekperiodwiththroughwallleaksinClass2piping.FPLstatedthatonewouldbesubmitted within24hours.NRC/NRR(BerkowandWichman)statedthatNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforthe'PERABILITY call.FPLstatedthatitwouldcharacterize theflaws.WichmansaidthatusingGL91-18,licensees couldsubstitute thewords"Class2"for"Class3"inpipingflawcharacterizations conducted IAWGL90-05.Wichmanisexpecting areliefrequesttomorrow(tobesenttoGleavesandRegionII).ItshouldaddressGL90-05andCodeCaseN-513.FPLwasrequested, baseduponaquestionfromMcCree,tosharewiththeSeniorResidentthenumberofpriortimesthatFPLhashadtoentertheACTIONStatement torepairthrough-wall leaksonUnit2ECCSsuctionpiping. ECCSWalkdownDetails:P8sc4~/SWC~W7-dY~/>P>PeIof+1."A"Header-Drywhiteboricacidcrystalsontheupperrightfilletweldthatattachesthecodenameplatetothepipingspool,approximately i/~"longcrack.Someweepageafterplatewasremovedandareacleaned.2."B"Header-Dry whiteboricacidcrystalsonlowersoutheastlugfilletweldadjacenttothepipeclampforsupport2407-17,approximately '/4"indiameter. Noactiveleakage3."B"Header-Drywhiteboricacidcrystalsonuppernorthwestlugforsupport2407-17,adjacenttothelugfilletweld,lessthen'/4"indiameter. Noactiveleakage.Linearindication approximately i/~"long.4."B"Header-Drywhiteboricacidcrystalsfoundonasupportmemberjustbelowsupport-2407-19. Noactiveleakage.(Noevidenceofleakageorboricacidonthepipingcouldbefound).ThoCoste-VT-2LindaughVT-2 BII5Lv&~rcAcroLl/IQuvcw OF~icAC/Ql4'locaok8<tc8ctQ

Cg5/lr+qtPc$cs/p')(Qr~(PtI.ipSCZ-24-CS'252<OT-180~I./I5II~~8"3r.l~4.o.')"~~~% CR99-0445Attachment4, Page1of4INTERIMENGINEERING DISPOSITION: Backround/Event Descrition:CR99-0445concernsthroughwallleaksonbothUnit2Emergency CoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)TrainslocatedwithintheRefueling WaterStorageTank(RWT)trenchasindicated intheattachedsketch(Attachment 3).Theleakratesareextremely smallandnotquantifiable; theywerediscoveredby thepresenceofasmallmoundofboricacidcrystalsonthepipe.Attachment 4tothisCRisissuedtocapturetherevisiontoAptechCalculation AES-C-3566 andEngineering Evaluations PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102identiTied inAttachment 1,statethattheoperating pressureandtemperatures forI-24-CS-2 andI-24-CS-3 areclassified asmoderateandtoaddresstheasfoundcracklengthonl-24-CS-3. ~OiBThesubjectRWTsuctionpipingprovidesaflowpathfromtheRWTtotheECCSpumpsforuseduringtheInjection Phasefollowing aDesignBasisAccident. Thisfunctionissafetyrelatedandisaddressed intheplant'sFSARandTechnical Specifications. Accordingly, thisCRisclassified assafetyrelated.Asdiscussed inUnit2FSARSection6.3.2.2.4, theRWTisanatmospheric tankcontaining waterboratedbetween1720and2100ppm.Redundant linesareprovidedfromasinglenozzleonthetanktoprovidesuctiontotheAandBTrainsofECCSPumpslocatedintheRAB.ThesuctionlinesareroutedtotheRABinabelowgradetrenchwhichisopentotheatmosphere. PerT.S.3.5.2,inModes1,2,and3(withpressurizer pressuregreaterthanorequalto1750psia),twoindependent ECCSsubsystems shallbeOPERABLEwithindependent flowpathscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWT.PerT.S.3.5.3,inMode3(withpressurizer pressurelessthan1750psia)andMode4,aminimumofoneECCSsubsystem shallbeOPERABLEwithaflowpathtotheRWT.PerT.S.3.1.2.1,inModes5and6,aminimumofoneboroninjection flowpathshallbeOPERABLEwhichincludesaflowpathfromthe,RWTviaeitherachargingpumporaHPSIpump,meetingtherequirement inT.S.3.1.2.7bifonlytheRWTflowpathisOPERABLE. TheRWTsuctionlinesmustbeabletopassdesignflowatadesignpressureof60psigandadesigntemperature of300'FtotheECCSpumps,havetheabilitytomaintainthepressureboundaryandtheRABintegrity. Operating pressures aredefinedbythecolumnofwaterwithintheRWTtankandoperating temperatures aredefinedbyatmospheric conditions. AsdetailedwithintheTotalEquipment Database(TEDB)andplantdrawings, LinesI-24"-CS-3 (TrainA)andI-24"-CS-2 (TrainB)areconnected toasinglenozzleontheRWTandprovidesuctionfortheECCSsystems.Thepipingdesignpressureis60psigat300'F,withamaximumnormaloperating pressureof30psigat120'Fwhichareclassified asmoderateenergylines(275psig/200'). Thepipeis24"schedule10(wallthickness of0.250")inaccordance withEbascoPipeCodeSS-5.LinesI-24"-CS-2 and-3aredesignedinaccordance withASMESectionIII,Class2requirements andareconstructed ofASTMA-358,Class1,Type304stainless steelmaterial. Unit2iscurrently intheSecondTenYearIn-Service Inspection (ISI)Interval. ThecodeofrecordforRulesforIn-Service Inspection inthisintervalisASMESectionXI1989.

CR99-0445Attachment 4,Page2of4Evaluation/0 erabiliCR99-0445concernsthroughwallleaksonUnit2Emergency CoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)ATrainsuctionline1-24"-CS-2 nearatackweldforthespoolnameplate betweensupports2412-23and2412-20andonTrainBsuctionlineI-24"-CS-3 adjacenttosupport2407-17withintheRefueling WaterStorageTank(RWT)Trench.Theleakratesareextremely smallandnotquantifiable; theywerediscovered bythepresenceofasmallmoundofboricacidcrystalsonthepipe,therefore, operational leakageisnotanissue.PSL'-ENG-SEMS-98-102 wasissuedintoreviewthecondition oftheUnit2RWTsuctionlines.Thisevaluation developed thesystempipingdesignrequirements, summarized pastidentification ofindications andexamination results,andidentified thefailuremechanism aschlorideinducedstresscorrosion cracking. Theevaluation developed amethodforaccepting theidentified flawsforlimitedcontinued operation basedontheAcceptance byEvaluation rulesoftheASMESectionXICodeanddemonstrate thatthepipingissuitableforoperation untiltheCycle12Refueling Outage.APTECHanalysisAES-C-3566, Revision1waspreparedtodetermine theallowable throughwallflawlengthsandexpectedservicelifeofECCSsupplypipingsubjecttocorrosion ontheoutsidesurface.Theallowable flawlengthisbasedontheacceptance criteriaofASMESectionXI,IWB-3640foralldesignloadingconditions. Theevaluation concluded thattheallowable flawlengthforpostulated throughwallcracksis32.2inchesforcircumferential flawsand13.6inchesforaxialflaws.Asaresult,thestructural integrity ofthepipingforalldesignloadsisadequateperASMESectionXIIWC-3122.4 Acceptance byEvaluation criteriaprovidedthatflawlengthsaredetectedpriortotheirgrowthtotheabovesizecriteria. Toprovidefortherequireddetection, monthlyinspections ofthesubjectpipingareconducted tolookforthroughwallleakage.Experience indicates thatflawsdonotgrowtogreatlengthspriortotheirpropagation throughwall.Experience alsoindicates thatthroughwallflawsresultinsmall,butdetectable leaks.Accordingly, theApTechreportrequiresmonthlysurveillances ofthesubjectpipingtodetectthroughwallleakage.Itwasunderthisinspection surveillance thattheboricacidcrystalswereidentified onbothI-24"-CS-2 andI-24"-CS-3. Theleakratesareextremely smallandnotquantifiable. Sincethroughwallleakagewasidentified, anoperability determination isrequired. GenericLetter91-18,"Information toLicensees Regarding NRCInspection ManualSectiononResolution ofDegradedandNonconforming Conditions," containsguidanceforresolution ofdegradedandnonconforming conditions andOperability determination. PerthisGenericLetter,andtheNRCInspection Manual,Part9900,section6.15,Operational leakage,leakagethroughClass1,2or3pipewallisnotacceptable forcontinued operation (exceptinthecaseofmoderateenergyClass3pipinginaccordance withGenericLetter90-05).Becauseofthis,theClass2ECCSsuctionpipingwasdeclaredinoperable. Assuch,theplantdeclaredbothtrainsoftheECCSsuctionpipingOOS.Inaccordance withTS3.5.2,theplanthasnoactionstatement forthelossoftwoindependent ECCSsubsystems. Therefore, thecontrolroomenteredApplicability specification 3.0.3,a1hourLCOtoinitiateactiontoplacetheunitinaMODEinwhichthespecification doesnotapplybyperforming aplantshutdown. TheAptechanalysis, AES-C-3566, originally issuedinDecember1998identifies thatforaworstcaseflawof1.18",forthereferenced ECCSpiping,theacceptable servicelifewouldbe2.7years.ThethroughwallcrackonI-24-CS-3 wasidentified asaseriesofcrackswithatotallengthof1.5"andanassumedlengthontheIDofthepipeof2".ThisexceedstheinitiallengthassumedbyAptech,butbasedupontheconfiguration foundandthe4monthsthathavepassedsincetheanalysis, thiscrackisconsidered boundedbytheanalysis. Additionally, thiscrackleakedbeforefurtherpropagation

occurred, CR99-0445Attachment 4,Page3of4hasanticipated, andwillberemovedpriortoclosureofthisCRandwithinthereliefperiodrequested fromtheNRC.AverbalrequestwasmadetotheNRCregarding application ofGenericLetter91-18criteriatoClass2moderateenergysystems.'his isdocumented inaphoneconversation withtheNRCconducted on4/6/1999.

ThebasisforthisrequestisthedesignoftheECCSsuctionpipingwhichisrecognized asbeingsimilartolowpressure, lowenergyClass3piping.Asdocumented inattachment 2tothisCRtheNRChasverballyapprovedtheuseoftheGL91-18criteriaforClass3throughwallleaksapplicable totheUnit2ECCSsuctionpipingClass2system.Thefollowing isprovidedwhichsupportsOperability oftheECCSsuctionpiping:AreviewofPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 determined thattheindications identified aboveareboundedandwithinthescopeoftheevaluation andtheAptechReport.Operational leakageissmallandnotquantifiable. MeetingTSrequirements forRWTinventory assuresacceptance ofanyoperational leakage.Consequences ofaccidental leakageareboundedbythediscussion providedinPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Rev.2.Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102 providesthecurrentbasisforcontinued operation ofSt.LucieUnit2ECCSpipingbasedonthedetermination ofthestablethroughwallflawlength.Theanalysisrecognizes thatthecalculated stableflawlengthiswellinexcessofanyflawlengthlikelytobeobservedinthefieldpriortoidentification byleakage.Theevaluation recognizes thatnotallaxialandcircumferential weldswithinthel-24"-CS-2 andCS-3lineshavebeenpenetrant inspected. Shouldflawsbepresentintheseareas,theyareandwillremainboundedbytheevaluation madeunderSectionXIcriteriawithinPSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102. Engineering mayrecommend additional inspections duringthecurrentcycleduetotheserecentindications. SecificCorrective Actions:1.PerNRCphonecall,areliefrequestwillbesubmitted totheNRCperASMEXI1989AdditionIWA5250(3),within24hours.GenericCorrective ActionsNecessatoPreventRecurrence: GenericCorrective Actionswillbeaddressed later. CR99-0445Attachment 4,Page4of40erabiliStatement: TheEmergency CoreCoolingSystemisSafetyRelatedasitisrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofadesignbasisaccident. Thecondition, asdiscussed above,whichincludesverbalapprovalbytheNRC,allowscontinued operation. TheECCSsystemisconsidered operable.

References:

1.St.Lucie2FSAR,Amendment 122.St.Lucie2Technical Specifications, Amendment 983.GenericLetter91-184.Engineering Evaluation PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Rev2,including AptechReport.repare:ReviewedDae

FLORIDAPOWERANDLIGHTFACILITYREVIEWGROUPMINUTESAPRIL6,1999(StartTIme1600)FRG499-053ST.LUCIEPLANTTo:Distribution Chairman: BobEnfingerMembers:KrisMohindroo ArtSingerWesBladowGregPustoverFRGconvenedontheabovedateandtimewithmembership asshown.IthasbeenverifiedalegalquorumexistsoftheFRGChairman, orhisdesignated alternate, andfour(4)members,including nomorethtwo(2)alternates. VerifiedbyFRGSecretaFRGSecretary: HelgaBaranowsky FRGObservers: NRCInspectors, EdWeinkam(Licensing), RickWalker(Training -Protection Services), RustyWest(PGM)TheFRGaddressed thefollowing itemswithdispositions asshown:.CR99-0445InterimSafetyRelatedSponsor:RickNobleUnit2Att8ECCSSuctionHdrsDuringmonthlySPGinspection, evidenceolBoricAcidresiduewasidentified onCS-3,'A'CCSsuctionheaderandCS-2CCS suctionheader.BothECCSheadersdedaredOOSat1190.YESItwasdetermined thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59,didnotexist.Also,therewere'no10CFR21concernsunlessstatedabove.Havingnofurtherbusinesstoconduct,FRGadjourned at1645.FRGrecommends disposition asshownabovePapprovesFRGrecommendation 4FRGChairmnDatePlantGeneralManagerateDistribution: R.Acosta,CNRBT.Plunkett, President-Nuclear

Division, W.Bladow,QAR.West,PlantGeneralManagerA.Stall,SiteVicePresident Page1of1'Walk-initemaddedtoagenda}}