ML17263A828

Requests Enforcement Discretion W/Respect to TS 3.4.2.1.a. Request Background Info & Justification Encl

ML17263A828
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/30/1994
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	MARTIN T T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML17263A826	List: ML17263A825 ML17263A827 ML17263A828
References
NUDOCS 9411030360
Download: ML17263A828 (7)

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tI'u7($@<j~IIWZROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~8944P'<<EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y.14649.0001August30,1994TCLEPHONCi~rAcoo@.vie546.2700U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionalAdministrator,RegionIMr.ThomasT.Martin475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406

Subject:

RequestForEnforcementDiscretionR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Martin,

Inaccordancewith10CFRPart2,AppendixC,andusingtheguidancecontainedinNRCInspectionManualPart9900,RG&ErequestsEnforcementDiscretionwithrespecttoGinnaStationTechnicalSpecification3.4.2.1.a.Therequest,backgroundinformation,andjustificationisattached.ThisrequestwasinitiallydiscussedwiththeNRCduringaconferencecallonAugust20,1994at1600EST.RG&EreceivedverbalapprovaloftheenclosedEnforcementDiscretionduringaphoneconversationbetweenMr.WilliamLazarusNRC,RegionI,andRobertMecredy,VicePresident,NuclearProductionatapproximately1720ESTonthatsamedate.Thisletterprovidesallnecessaryinformationrequestedduringthesetwophoneconversations.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MecryXC:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationAssistantDirectorforRegionIReactorsMr.JoseA.CalvoWashington,D.C.20555GinnaStationSeniorResidentInspector'P4ll03036094i027PDRADaCK05000244PPDR~T~

I.-DCRIPTIONFTECHNICALPECIFICATINREUIREMENTGinnaStationTechnicalSpecification(TS)3.4.2.1requiresthatbothmotor-drivenAuxiliaryFeedwater(MDAFW)pumpsbeoperablewiththeRCStemperatureM350'F.ActionStatement3.4.2.1.astatesthatifoneMDAFWpumpisinoperable,thepumpmustberestoredtooperablestatuswithin7daysortheplantshallbeinatleastHotShutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperature<350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.2.DCRIPTINOFREOnAugust24,1994at0530hours,MDAFWPumpBwasremovedfromservicetoperformscheduledtestingandmaintenanceoftheassociatedservicewatercoolingsupplystrainerandtheAClubeoilpump(ProceduresEM-785andM-44.13,andWorkOrder¹19400838).ThemaintenanceactivitieswerecompletedonAugust25,1994andalimitedtestwassubsequentlyperformedonMDAFWPumpBbeginningat1430hourstoverifytheoperabilityoftheAClubeoilpumpbreaker.At1432hours,theoperatorsnoticedthatthenormallyclosedrecirculationlineair-operatedvalve(AOV4310)forMDAFWPumpBdidnotopenasrequired.ThepumpwasthensecuredandatroublecardwasinitiatedforAOV4310at1435hours.PreparationsweretheninitiatedtoperformtherepairofAOV4310.Thevalvewasrepairedandafullpumptest(ProcedurePT-16Q-B)wasthenperformedonAugust26,1994toverifypumpandvalveoperability.At2220hours,itwasdeterminedthattheMDAFWpumpdidnotmeetthe~prequirementsandatroublecardwasinitiatedforthepump.MajorrepairsonMDAFWPumpBweresubsequentlyinitiatedwhichincludedcompletedisassemblyofthepump.ItisnotedthatProcedurePT-16Q-BwassuccessfullyperformedonMDAFWPumpBonAugust18th.RGB'asconservativelyassumedthatMDAFWPumpBhasbeeninoperablesinceAugust24,1994at0530hourswheninitialworkactivitiesbeganandtheLCOwasentered.However,sincerepairactivitiesofthepumpwerenotinitiateduntillateonAugust26,1994,andduetotheleadtimeforreplacementpartsandtheneedtoperformpost-maintenancetesting,RG&Edoesnotanticipatethatthenecessaryrepairs'andtestingcanbeaccomplishedwithintheTSrequired7days.EnforcementDiscretionisthereforerequestedtograntRGB'elieffromcompliancewiththerequirementsofTS3.4.2.1.a.ThisEnforcementDiscretionisrequestedtobeginonAugust31,1994at0530hourswhenthecurrentLCOforTS3.4.2.l.awillexpire.TheEnforcementDiscretionisrequestedtoendonSeptember2at0800hourswhenallnecessaryrepairandtestingactivitieswillbecompleted.Thisisanextensionof50.5hours. 3..BASTFORRKTThereareatotaloffiveAFWpumpsinstalledatGinnaStation.ThepreferredAFWsystemhastwo100%capacityMDAFWpumpsandone200%capacityturbinedriven(TDAFW)pump.TheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwater(SAFW)systemhastwo100%capacityMDAFWpumpswhicharemanuallystartedbytheoperatorsifnormalAFWislost(e.g.,highenergylinebreaksintheIntermediateBuilding).Thesafety-relatedfunctionoftheAFWsystematGinnaStationistomitigatethefollowingaccidentsorevents(UFSARSection10.5.2.1):a.b.C.d.e.f.g.h.Lossofmainfeedwater(MFW)withoffsitepoweravailableLossofMFWwithoutoffsitepoweravailableMFWlineruptureMainSteamlineruptureLossofallACpower(onsiteandoffsite)LOCASteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)CooldownItemscanddhavebeenevaluatedforGinnaStationassumingthatonlytheredundantSAFWsystemisavailable(UFSARSection15.2.7.3)whileitemeonlyrequirestheTDAFWpump(UFSARSection15.2.5).ItemsaandbareboundedbytheanalysisforthehighenergylinebreaksintheIntermediateBuilding(i.e.,itemscandd)duetotheavailablewaterinventoryintheintactSGs.TheSAFWsystemcanalsobeusedforcooldownevents(itemg)duetothetimewhichwouldbeavailableasaresultoflowdecayheatlevels.Consequently,onlyLOCAsandSGTRs(i.e.,itemsfandg)mustbeconsideredwithrespecttotheinoperableMDAFWpump.FollowingaLOCAorSGTR,thepreferredAFWsystemwillreceiveanautomaticstartsignaltoprovidecoolingwatertothesteamgenerators.However,forallLOCAs,boththeTDAFWpumpandMDAFWPumpAwillbeavailabletoprovidethenecessarycoolingwater.ThereisnosinglefailurewhichcanresultinthelossofbothofthesepumpsduringaLOCA.InthecaseofaSGTR,itcanbepostulatedthataruptureoccursinSGAwhichwouldresultintheisolationofautomaticAFWflowfromMDAFWPumpAandtheTDAFWpump(toS/GAonly).OnlyautomaticflowfromtheTDAFWpumpto'GBwouldbeavailableinthisinstance.OperatoractionisalreadyrequiredforaSGTReventtodepressurizetheRCS.Sincethistenminutedelayisalreadyassumedintheaccidentanalysis,itcanbeassumedthattimeisalsoavailabletousetheSAFWsystemorcross-tieMDAFWAtoSGBiftheTDAFWpumpweretofail.Inaddition,itisnotedthattheincreasedSGlevelintherupturedSGprovidesadditionaltimebeforeAFWwouldberequired. AreviewoftheGinnaStationPRAindicatesthatatuberuptureinSGAwithasubsequentfailureoftheTDAFWpump,thusrequiringtheneedforSAFW,isofverylowprobability(-1.4E-06fortheadditional2dayMDAFWPumpoutage).Inaddition,theAFWsystemisinstandbyduringnormalpoweroperations.ItisnotconsideredprudenttorequireaplantshutdownthroughmodesinwhichthepreferredAFWsystemisusedtoprovidenormalSG'coolingwaterneedswithoneMDAFWpumpinoperable.ThepotentialforplanttransientsandthesubsequentneedforAFWduringthesemodetransitionsisalsoincreased.MPENSATRYACTINRG&EwillnotperformanytestingormaintenancerelatedtotheremainingAFWandSAFWpumpsandtheirnecessarysupportsystemsduringtherequestedtwodayextension.Inaddition,operatorawarenessofRCSleakagehasbeenincreasedsinceleakagecanbeusedasanindicationofapotentialLOCAorSGTR.TheOperationsPlanoftheDay(POD)hasalsobeenrevisedtoenhanceoperatorawarenessoftheuseoftheMDAFWpumpcross-tielinesifrequired.TIFICATINFRDURATINOFREUESTTherequestedtwodayLCOextensionisnecessarytoensurecompletionrepairsonMDAFWPumpBandtoperformtherequiredtesting.Thetwodayextensionisbasedontheneedtocompletethealignmentofthepumpincludingthespeedincreaser.Basedonpreviousexperience,theseactivitiesmayrequiremultipleiterations.Duringthisrequestedextension,three100%capacityAFWpumpsandone200%capacityTDAFWpumpareavailabletoprovidethenecessarycoolingwatertotheSGsfordecayheatremoval.AsdiscussedinSection3,theprobabilityofanaccidentwhichrequirestheAFWpumpsduringthetwodayextensionisverysmall.MDAFWPumpAwassuccessfullytestedonAugust16,1994(ProcedurePT-16Q-A)~TestingoftheTDAFWpumpwasalsosuccessfullyperformedonAugust22,1994(ProcedurePT-16Q-T)providingadditionalassurancethecontinuedoperabilityofthesepumps.AttachmentAprovidesasummaryofthemostrecentAFWandSAFWpumptests.IGNIFICANTHAZARDSEVALUATIONRG&EhasevaluatedtheEnforcementDiscretionrequestandconcludedthatthereisnopotentialdetrimenttothepublichealthandsafetyandthatasignificantsafetyhazardisnotinvolved.Thisbasisforthisconclusionissummarizedbelow:

-4,a"ExtendingthecurrentoutageofMDAFWPumpBforapproximatelytwodaysdoesnotresultinasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheremainingAFWandSAFWpumpsprovidesufficientredundancytomitigateallpotentialaccidents.b.ExtendingthecurrentoutageofMDAFWPump8forapproximatelytwodaysdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluated.TheonlyaccidentwhichcanbeinitiatedbyAFWisanovercoolingeventcausedbyspuriousactuation.SinceMDAFWPumpBisnotoperable,thisaccidentisnotcredibleduringtherequestedextension.Noothernewordifferentkindsofaccidentarecreatedbytheplantconditionduringthetwodayextension.C.ExtendingthecurrentoutageofMDAFWPump3forapproximatelytwodaysdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheremainingAFWandSAFWpumpsprovidesufficientredundancytomitigateallpotentialaccidents.Inaddition,operatorsaresufficientlytrainedandproceduresaddresstheresponsetoalossofMFW.7.NVIRNMKNTALIMPACTTherearenoenvironmentalreleasesassociatedwiththecurrentplantcondition.TheprobabilityofrequiringuseoftheinoperableMDAFWpumpisverysmall.Inaddition,sufficientguidanceiscurrentlyavailabletotheoperatorstorespondtoany,postulatedscenariowhichwouldrequireAFWortheSAFWsystem.Therefore,therearenoenvironmentalconsequencesassociatedwiththisrequest.8.REVIEWBYRCTheGinnaStationPORChasreviewedandapprovedthisrequestforEnforcementDiscretion.ThomasMarlowGinnaStationPORCChairmanDate OVERALLAFWPUMPSTATUSCEMENT4P/4PLIMITVIBRATIONS"A"MDAFWP1150/1120<'>NoAdverseTrends"B"MDAFWP(PendingRebaselineTestFollowingCorrectiveMaintenance-8/30/94)TurbineAFWP1160/1131">NoAdverseTrends"C"SBAFWP1250/1122~~NoAdverseTrends"D"SBAFWP1267/1152NoAdverseTrends(1)-BasedonNSSLDesignAnalysis(2)-BasedonASMESectionXZCodeFormula

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