IR 05000390/2025004
| ML26033A468 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/2026 |
| From: | Renee Taylor NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB5 |
| To: | Erb D Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26033A468 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2025004 AND 05000391/2025004
Dear Delson Erb:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. On January 21, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Chris Reneau, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green), both involving violations of NRC requirements, are documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
February 9, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ryan C. Taylor, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000390 and 05000391 License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000390 and 05000391
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000390/2025004 and 05000391/2025004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0027
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
Facility:
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Location:
Spring City, TN
Inspection Dates:
October 1 to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
W. Deschaine, Senior Technical Training Program Specialist
S. Hamilton, Resident Inspector
C. Kline, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Lei, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
M. Rich, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Walker, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:
Ryan C. Taylor, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Implement NPG-SPP-18.4.8 Control of Ignition Sources Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000391/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.7.1.1, "Procedures," for failure to implement quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources. Specifically, the licensee left an energized welding machine unattended in a controlled combustible zone without obtaining a hot work permit or establishing a fire watch.
Failure to Maintain Material Traceability Prevents Removal of a Nonconforming Part from a Safety-Related System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000390/2025004-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when the licensee failed to identify and correct defective material installed in a safety-related system.
Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that a closing spring motor that was subject to subsequent 10 CFR Part 21 reporting had been installed in a safety-related system.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 was at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On December 4, 2025, the unit was reduced to 92 percent rated thermal power due to a trip of the 2B hotwell pump. On December 18, 2025, Unit 2 was returned to rated thermal power and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1A-A centrifugal charging pump on November 25, 2025 (2)2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) starting air system on December 3, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2 centrifugal charging pump rooms on November 4, 2025
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 480V board rooms on November 12, 2025
- (3) Refueling room on November 20, 2025 71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations and biennial written examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered in September 2025 and the biennial written examinations completed in August 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during 2B hotwell pump interference and motor removal on December 9, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification as-found simulator sets for cycle 25-03 Crew A1 on October 14, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)1B EDG output breaker failure on October 8, 2025
- (2) EDG flow damper under condition report (CR) 2048359 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 elevated risk due to B control room chiller maintenance on October 22, 2025 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)1B EDG following output breaker failure on October 8, 2025 (2)2B-B coolant charging pump unit cooler high vibrations on October 21, 2025 (3)1A EDG air compressor breaker tripped on December 4, 2025 (4)2B EDG battery connection high resistance on December 17, 2025 71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)1B EDG breaker retest on October 9, 2025 (2)2B-B centrifugal charging pump room unit cooler retest following shaft replacement on November 4, 2025 (3)1A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following packing replacement on November 26, 2025 (4)2A containment spray pump following EQ-2-MTR-072-0027, "Containment Spray Pump 2A-A Motor Clean, Inspect and Lubricate Motor," on December 9, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)2SI-61-6, "Weekly Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Visual Inspection," on October 16, 2025
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated submitted Emergency Action Level, Emergency Plan, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure changes during the week of December 15, 2025. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.07 - Exercise Evaluation - Hostile Action (HA) Event
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors conducted a post-exercise evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise during the week of December 15, 2025, in accordance with IP 71114.07. The evaluation was based on a thorough review of all available documentation.
The exercise scenario began with a simulated confirmed security condition, prompting the declaration of an Unusual Event. Shortly thereafter, a simulated land-based attack occurred within the protected area, meeting the criteria for a Site Area Emergency. As the scenario progressed, a loose part caused a reactor coolant pump seal failure, resulting in reactor coolant system leakage inside Unit 1 containment. Following a reactor trip, a series of equipment failures ensued. A steam generator tube failure occurred concurrently with a power-operated relief valve on the steam generator failing to open, meeting the threshold for a General Emergency declaration.
This scenario provided offsite response organizations the opportunity to demonstrate their ability to implement emergency actions during a hostile action event.
71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated in-office, the proposed scenario for the biennial emergency plan exercise at least 30 days prior to the day of the exercise.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025 EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER) (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in ice condenser performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Implement NPG-SPP-18.4.8 Control of Ignition Sources Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000391/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.7.1.1, "Procedures," for failure to implement quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources. Specifically, the licensee left an energized welding machine unattended in a controlled combustible zone without obtaining a hot work permit or establishing a fire watch.
Description:
On September 23, 2025, NRC inspectors identified an unattended and energized welding machine in the refueling room in the auxiliary building, resting against the Unit 2 auxiliary instrument air holding tank and piping. The welders disconnect switch was in the ON position, the machine was not fully de-energized, and no active work was in progress. The area is a controlled combustible zone (CCZ), and the introduction of an energized welder without a hot work permit or fire watch violated fire protection program requirements. NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Section 3.1.2.k, specifically requires welding machines to be de-energized when left unattended.
NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, and NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work), defines the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. Compensatory measures must be implemented when transient combustibles or ignition sources are in a room.
The area around and between the auxiliary air compressors are CCZs in accordance with Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part II, Sections 10 and 11. The approval of an evaluation must be obtained before any transient combustible can be introduced into the area or hot work performed in the area.
Licensee records indicate the last fire watch was secured on September 17, 2025, the fire permit was closed on September 18, 2025, and the energized welder was discovered by NRC inspectors conducting routine tours on September 23, 2025. This occurred on the opposite unit in the same physical location as a similar violation (documented in NRC inspection report 05000390,05000391/2024003-04, June 2024), where an energized welder was found in the vicinity of the component cooling system expansion tank and auxiliary compressed air system piping. The prior event was treated as an NCV for failure to implement NPG-SPP-18.4.8 and FPR Part II.
Corrective Actions: On September 23, 2025, the licensee de-energized the welder following NRC notification. Site services walked down all welders in the auxiliary building and identified that approximately half had dual power switches (front and rear). Craft personnel were coached to ensure both switches are turned off with leads disconnected when welders are unattended.
Corrective Action References: CR 2040191
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency:
Failure to implement the requirements of NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Revision 16, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement Section 3.1.2.k, which requires welding machines to be de-energized when left unattended.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee had an uncontrolled ignition source in a CCZ.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post-Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Using Appendix F, the inspectors categorized the finding under Fire Protection and Administrative Controls. In Step 1.4.1, the inspectors answered Yes to 1.4.1-A in that the finding increased the likelihood of a fire. The inspectors answered No to 1.4.1-B in that the area did not have adequate automatic fire suppression and detection. Therefore, the inspectors continued to Step 1.5, in which the inspectors answered Yes to question 1.5.1-A in that the licensee did have a fire PRA capable of adequately evaluating the risk. The inspectors also answered Yes to question 1.5.1-B thus screening this issue to very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee's risk-based evaluation for this fire finding reviewed by the regional senior risk analyst indicated a change in CDF of less than 1E-6.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. A similar issue was documented in NRC inspection report 05000390,05000391/2024003-04 (June 2024). CR 1964405 details corrective actions which included briefing welders and reviewing training process for hot work.
Enforcement:
Violation: Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.7.1.1 requires in part that written procedures shall be implemented covering the following activities: d. Fire Protection Program implementation. FPR Part VII, Section 2.9.10.2.c states in part that NPG-SPP-18.4.7 and NPG-SPP-18.4.8 define the fire preventive measures to preclude introduction of significant quantities of combustible material or ignition sources into the rooms. NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Section 3.1.2.k states that all welding machines and portable hand tools are to be deenergized when left unattended, such as breaks, lunch, and end of shift. Contrary to the above, from September 17 to September 23, 2025, the licensee failed to implement the requirements of NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Section 3.1.2.k.
Specifically, the licensee placed and subsequently energized a welding machine in the vicinity of safety-related equipment without establishing a fire watch.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Material Traceability Prevents Removal of a Nonconforming Part from a Safety-Related System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000390/2025004-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when the licensee failed to identify and correct defective material installed in a safety-related system. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that a closing spring motor that was subject to subsequent 10 CFR Part 21 reporting had been installed in a safety-related system.
Description:
On October 7, 2025, following a monthly run of EDG 1B-B in accordance with 0-SI-82-11-B, "Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test DG 1B-B," the EDG was shut down. With the EDG output breaker open, the white disagreement light would not clear on the EDG shutdown board 1B-B hand switch. An operator was dispatched and found that the breaker's closing springs were not charged. Operations declared the diesel inoperable and entered limiting condition for operations (LCO) 3.8.1 condition B.
Troubleshooting in the field identified that the closing spring motor had failed and a substitute breaker was installed in the 1B-B EDG output breaker location. The failed breaker was quarantined for troubleshooting. Testing on the quarantined breaker identified inconsistent high resistance readings on the motor and motor brush binding.
Further investigation into the maintenance history of the breaker found that the closing spring motor was replaced on August 18, 2020, under a work order issued to inspect the fast transfer switch. During the fast transfer switch inspection, maintenance personnel discovered signs of overheating in the closing spring motor. The closing spring motor was then replaced under the revised fast transfer switch work order. The closing spring motor used was originally issued under a different work order number. Contrary to NPG-SPP-04.004-1, Material Issue, Control and Return, a material transfer document was not generated for the part transfer to the new work order.
On February 11, 2021, the licensee issued CR 1670974 to document receipt of safety communications (SC-020-07) from GE Hitachi. The safety communications documented excessive torque on the set screws that maintain the brush holder assembly in position. This resulted in the set screw damaging the insulation around the metal brush holder and caused a narrowing of the brush holder internal dimensions. The brush would be trapped in place as the spinning commutator wore away the surface of the brush. When the contact point between the brush and commutator was gone, the spring did not have enough force to move the brush forward, causing the motor to fail. The excessive torque was attributed to motor assembly errors which impacted brush performance on the applicable closing spring motors. The CR documented actions required to identify applicable parts installed or in inventory and identify appropriate remedial actions.
On February 16, 2021, the licensee issued CR 1671764 which detailed 10 motors in stock that were not affected by the adverse condition and identified 32 motors that had been issued for installation in the previous 5 years. The CR identified specific components with the applicable motors installed and created actions to generate work orders to inspect the applicable components for signs of degradation during the next scheduled maintenance interval. The 1B-B EDG output breaker was not identified because the chain of traceability was broken when material transfer procedures were not executed as required by NPG-SPP-04.004-1, "Material Issue, Control and Return." As a result of the broken traceability chain, the defective motor was not identified for remedial action.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the failed breaker and quarantined the failed breaker for failure analysis.
Corrective Action References: CR 2042858, WO 125674054
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failure to identify and correct deficient material in the emergency diesel generator output breaker was a performance deficiency. Specifically, failure to meet the requirements of NPG-SPP-04.004-1, Material Issue, Control and Return," resulted in lost traceability of the breakers closing spring motor. As a result, subsequent information indicating the part was defective was not remediated as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions."
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee's failure to maintain material traceability in a safety-related system prevented appropriate action to remove the nonconforming part from the output breaker of the 1B-B emergency diesel generator, resulting in breaker failure and unplanned inoperability.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The issue was screened to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered No to all the screening questions in Exhibit 2, Section A, "Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality."
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the error in maintaining material traceability occurred in August 2020.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, requires in part that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as defective material and equipment and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, on February 16, 2021, the licensee failed to identify and correct defective material installed in the emergency diesel generator output breaker.
Specifically, the licensee failed to identify a nonconforming closing spring motor in a safety-related 6.9kV breaker, which was identified to be defective in a 10 CFR Part 21 report. The closing spring motor subsequently failed, causing unplanned inoperability of the 1B-B emergency diesel generator.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 21, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Chris Reneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 17, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Walter Lee, Emergency Preparedness Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
2-47W839-1C
Flow Diagram Diesel Starting Air System
Drawings
2-47W839-1G
Flow Diagram Diesel Starting Air System
Procedures
0-SOI-82.04 ATT 1V
Diesel Generator (DG) 2B-B Valve Checklist 82.04-1V
0014
Fire Plans
Aux-0-692-02
Fire Plans
Aux-0-757-04
Fire Plans
Aux-0-772-02
Fire Plans
Aux-0-772-03
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
2054915
71111.11Q Work Orders
25794422
Engineering
Evaluations
EPMAMP081789
Cooling Load, Static Pressure and Equipment
Performance for Diesel Generator Building
2
Engineering
Evaluations
EWR125072760
Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator Room
Temperatures at Design Basis Outside
Air Temperature with Reduced Flow Through Exhaust
Fans Due to Intake Damper Failure
01/14/25
Work Orders
25672514
Corrective Action
Documents
2045877
Work Orders
25693536
Corrective Action
Documents
2042858
Corrective Action
Documents
2043116
Corrective Action
Documents
2043157
Corrective Action
2054752
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
2057223
Procedures
0-SI-215-34-B
Diesel Generator 2B-B Battery Connection Integrity
Inspection
009
Work Orders
25146353
Work Orders
25672514
Work Orders
25793840
Corrective Action
Documents
2042858
Corrective Action
Documents
2043009
Corrective Action
Documents
2043116
Corrective Action
Documents
2053143
Corrective Action
Documents
2054752
Procedures
WBN-2-MTR-072-
27
Containment Spray Pump 2A-A Motor Clean, Inspect and
Lubricate Motor
Procedures
0-SI-82-11-B
Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test DG 1B-B
0068
Procedures
0-SOI-30.05
Auxiliary Bldg HVAC Systems
041
Procedures
2-SI-61-6
Weekly Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Visual
Inspection
009
Procedures
2-SOI-72.01
Containment Spray System
0007
Procedures
PM# 620720017
Bearing Lube Oil Sampling of Containment Spray Pump
Work Orders
25044492
Work Orders
25144404
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
25145839
Work Orders
25146168
Work Orders
25275457
Work Orders
25690622
Work Orders
25774466
Work Orders
25794022
Work Orders
25794209
Work Orders
25794387
Procedures
REP-Appendix C
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan
Revision 117
Procedures
REP-Generic
Radiological Emergency Plan (Generic Part)
Revision 117
Procedures
EPIP-1
Emergency Plan Classification Logic
Revision 61
Procedures
EPIP-1, Attachment 1
WBN Hot Wallboard
Revision 61
Self-Assessments 2024 WBN October
Training Drill Report
24 WBN October Training Drill Report QA Record
24 October
Self-Assessments 2024 WBN Sept
Training Drill Report
24 WBN Sept Training Drill Report QA Record
24
September
Self-Assessments 2025 WBN February
Training Drill Report
25 WBN February Training Drill Report QA Record
25
February
Self-Assessments 2025 WBN May
Training Drill Report
25 WBN May Training Drill Report QA Record
25 May
Self-Assessments 2025 WBN November
Graded Exercise
Report
25 WBN November Graded Exercise Report
25
November