ML23129A782
| ML23129A782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/2023 |
| From: | Alexander M Constellation Energy Generation |
| To: | Brian Fuller NRC/RGN-I/DORS/OB |
| References | |
| EPID L-2023-OLL-0006 | |
| Download: ML23129A782 (1) | |
Text
Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Date of Examination: April 2023 Examination Level:
RO Operating Test Number: 2023-1 Administrative Topic (Step 1)
Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)
Type Code (Step 3)
Conduct of Operations Determine Containment Water Level K/A 2.1.25 (3.9), N2-EOP-6.23 P, D, R 2019 NRC Conduct of Operations Determine Personnel Overtime Availability K/A 2.1.5 (2.9), LS-AA-119 M, R Equipment Control Develop a Tagout Boundary for a Standby Liquid Control Pump K/A 2.2.13 (4.1),OP-AA-109-101 D, R Radiation Control Determine Worker Exposure for Emergency Work K/A 2.3.12 (3.2), RP-AA-203 N, R Emergency Plan
Location:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:
(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)
(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)
Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Date of Examination: April 2023 Examination Level:
SRO Operating Test Number: 2023-1 Administrative Topic (Step 1)
Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)
Type Code (Step 3)
Conduct of Operations Determine the Significance of a Reactivity Event and Actions Required K/A 2.1.37 (4.6), OP-AA-300, N2-OP-96 P, D, R 2019 NRC Conduct of Operations Determine Personnel Overtime Availability and Actions for Waiver K/A 2.1.5 (3.9), LS-AA-119 M, R Equipment Control Review a Tagout Boundary for a Standby Liquid Control Pump and Determine Technical Specification Impact K/A 2.2.13 (4.3), OP-AA-109-101, Technical Specifications D, R Radiation Control Determine Worker Exposure for Emergency Work K/A 2.3.12 (3.7), RP-AA-203 N, R Emergency Plan Determine NRC and On-Site Notification Requirements K/A 2.4.30 (4.1), LS-AA-1400, OP-AA-106-101, EP-AA-1013 Addendum 4 Appendix 1 D, R
Location:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:
(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)
(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)
Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Date of Examination: April 2023 Operating Test Number: 2023-1 Exam Level: RO / SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems
- a. Secure Control Building Special Filter Train K/A 290003 A4.01 (3.8), N2-OP-53A N, EN, S 9
- b. Main Steam Line Warmup Operation K/A 239001 A4.02 (3.4), N2-OP-1, N2-OP-83 P, D, L, A, S
2019 NRC 3
- c. Initiate RCIC and Respond to Overspeed Trip K/A 217000 A4.02 (4.0), N2-EOP-HC, ARP 601305, N2-OP-35 D, EN, L, S 4
- d. Swap Mechanical Vacuum Pumps K/A 256000 A4.05 (3.6), N2-OP-9 D, L, S 2
- e. Drywell Sprays with Service Water using RHR B K/A 226001 A4.02 (4.1), N2-EOP-6.5 D, EN, S 5
- f. Parallel and Load 2EGS*EG2, Loss of Cooling Water K/A 264000 A4.04 (4.1), N2-OP-100B, ARP 852300 N, EN, A, S 6
- g. Upshift Recirc Pump, High Vibrations K/A 202001 A4.01 (4.0), N2-OP-29, N2-SOP-29.1 N, A, L, S 1
- h. Isolating a Single Cooling Tower Zone to Perform Maintenance On-Line K/A 510001 A4.02 (3.1), N2-OP-10A N, S 8
In-Plant Systems
K/A 212000 A2.19 (4.2/3.9), N2-SOP-97 P, D, A 2019 NRC 7
- j. Align Fire Water to RHR B K/A 203000 A2.02 (4.0/3.9), N2-EOP-6.6 D, E, R 2
Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9
8 4
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1
1 1
(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1
1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1
1 1
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2
1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3
2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1
1 1
(S)imulator
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline
Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario #:
NRC-1 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #:
2023-1 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
The plant is operating at approximately 100% power. WCS pump B is out of service for maintenance.
Turnover:
Swap RDS pumps per N2-OP-30 section F.2.0. The procedure is in progress up to step F.2.3. Then, lower Reactor power to 95% per the provided ReMA.
Critical Tasks:
CT-1: Given a coolant leak inside the Containment and a failure of injection systems to maintain Reactor water level, the crew will restore and/or maintain Reactor water level above the Top of Active Fuel, in accordance with N2-SOP-101C and/or N2-EOP-RPV. Injection must be established such that Reactor water level does not lower below -39. (Note: This CT is to be evaluated after the scram, but before the trip of HPCS. After the trip of HPCS, this CT no longer applies.)
CT-2: Given a coolant leak, a loss of high-pressure injection systems, and the inability to restore and maintain Reactor water level above the Top of Active Fuel (TAF), the crew will initiate actions for an Emergency RPV Depressurization, in accordance with N2-EOP-RPV. Reactor water level must be restored and maintained above TAF within 30 minutes of lowering below TAF.
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N - BOP, SRO Swap RDS Pumps N2-OP-30 2
N/A R - ATC, SRO Lower Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow N2-OP-101D 3
CW:SA:
BK:I CW10E C - BOP, SRO TS - SRO MC - BOP Service Water Pump Trip with Failure of Discharge Valve to Automatically Open ARPs, N2-OP-11, Technical Specifications 4
RD05 C - All TS -
SRO Control Rod Drift Out N2-SOP-08, Technical Specifications 5
FW:CB(
A)(C):B K:I C - All Sequential Loss of All Condensate Pumps N2-SOP-101C, N2-EOP-RPV 6
CS02 RC06 C - All MC -
BOP HPCS Fails to Automatically Start, RCIC Trips N2-EOP-RPV 7
RR20 M - All MC -
CS:HP:
MT C - All HPCS Trips N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-C2
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Op-Test No.: 2023-1
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Events 6 & 8 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4)
Events 3, 4, 5 3
- 3. Major transients (1-2)
Event 7 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-PC 2
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (1 per scenario set)
N2-EOP-C2 1
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2
Copy of
TrainingId: April2023NRCScenario1 Revision:
0.0 Title
April2023NRCScenario1
Signature/PrintedName Date DevelopedBy SignatureonFile/MikeAlexander 4/4/23 ValidatedBy N/A/BenBrenon 1/4/23 N/A/JeremyTitus 1/4/23 N/A/JimLai 1/4/23 FacilityReviewer SignatureonFile/JohnToothaker 4/4/23
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page2of42
References
- 1.
N2OP30,ControlRodDrive
- 2.
N2OP29,ReactorRecirculationSystem
- 3.
N2OP101D,PowerChanges
- 4.
N2SOP08,UnplannedPowerChanges
- 5.
N2OP11,ServiceWaterSystem
- 6.
N2SOP101C,ReactorScram
- 7.
N2EOPRPV,RPVControlFlowchart
- 8.
N2EOPPC,PrimaryContainmentControlFlowchart
- 9.
N2EOP6.1,LowRPVWaterLevel/HighDrywellPressureActuations
- 10. N2EOP6.22,ContainmentSprays
- 11. N2EOPHC,NMP2EOPHardCardsProcedure
- 12. N2EOPC2,RPVBlowdownFlowchart
- 13. NMPUnit2EALWallboardEPAA1013Addendum4Appendix1
- 14. N2TSPEC,NMPNSUnit2ImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(Volume1,2,3)
- 15. OPAA112101,ShiftTurnoverandRelief
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page3of42
InstructorInformation A. ScenarioDescription
- 1.
SequenceofEvents/ExpectedCrewResponse
- a.
Thescenariobeginsatapproximately100%reactorpower withWCSpumpBoutofservice.
- b.
Event1isthenormalevolutionperformedbytheBOP operatortoswapControlRodDrivepumpsperN2OP30.
- c.
Event2isareactivityevolution.TheATCoperatorwill lowerReactorpowerusingRecirculationflowto approximately95%pertheprovidedReMA.
- d.
Event3occurswhenServiceWaterPump2SWP*P1Atrips onmotorelectricalfault.Thecrewwillperformthe actionsofN2ARP01andN2OP11torestartthestandby divisionIservicewaterpump(SWP*P1E).WhenSWP*P1E isstarted,thedischargevalve(SWP*MOV74E)willfailto open.Thecrewwilltakeactiontomanuallyopen SWP*MOV74EormaychoosetostartSWP*P1F.This eventrequiresdiagnosticsofpumpstartindicationsto determinethefailure.
- e.
Event4occurswhenacontrolroddriftsout.Thecrewwill enterN2SOP8andN2SOP101D,takeactiontoinsert thedriftingcontrolrod,reduceReactorpowerto85%,and removetheHCUfromservice.TheSROwillevaluate TechnicalSpecifications3.1.3and3.1.5.
- f.
Event5beginswhenCondensatepumpBtrips.
CondensatepumpsAandCwillsequentiallytripoverthe next20seconds.Reactorwaterlevelwilllowerand necessitateaReactorscram.Followingthescram, CondensateandFeedwaterwillbeunavailableforReactor waterlevelcontrolduetothelossofallCondensate pumps.Thiswillcombinewithsubsequenteventsto complicateReactorwaterlevelcontrol.Thecrewwill respondafterthescrambyexecutingN2SOP101Cand N2EOPRPV.
- g.
Event6,7&8occurfollowingtheReactorscram.HPCS willfailtoautomaticallystartandRCICwilltrip.Thecrew
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page4of42
willmanuallystartHPCStocontrolReactorwaterlevel (criticaltask).AcoolantleakintheDrywellcausesprimary containmentparameterstodegrade.TheDrywell pressurerisewillrequireentryintoN2EOPPC.Thecrew willspraytheSuppressionChamberandpossiblythe Drywell.HPCSwillsubsequentlytrip.Withthelossof highcapacity,highpressureinjectionsourcesandthe coolantleak,Reactorwaterlevelwilllower.Thecrewwill determinethattheycannotrestoreandmaintainReactor waterlevelabove14.ThecrewwillthenenterN2EOP C2,performanRPVBlowdown,andrestoreandmaintain Reactorwaterlevelwithlowpressureinjectionsystems (LPCSand/orLPCI)(criticaltask).
- 2.
TerminationCriteria
- a.
RPVhasbeenblowndown.
- b.
Reactorlevelbeingcontrolledinassignedband.
- 3.
CriticalTasks CT1.0Justification:
SafetySignificance:
CriticalTask1.0isidentifiedascriticalbecause,withoutoperatoractiontoraiseinjection,Reactorwater levelwouldlower,adequatecorecoolingwouldbelost,andfueldamagewouldoccur.
InitiatingCue:
MultipleannunciatorsandindicationswillprovideevidencethatReactorwaterlevelislowering.N2EOP RPVprovidesdirectiontoinjecttoraiseReactorwaterlevel.
SuccessPath:
ThecrewwillutilizeHPCS,RDS,and/orSLStoinjecttotheReactor.
PerformanceFeedback:
Reactorwaterlevelandinjectionsourceflowrateswillprovideperformancefeedbackregardingthe successofinjection MeasurablePerformance Standard:
ManuallystartingHPCS,aswellaspossiblyraisinginjectionwithRDSandSLS,willprovideobservable actionsfortheevaluationteam.
BoundingConditions:
AdequatecorecoolingwouldbelostifReactorwaterlevelloweredbelow39.
- a.
CT1.0,GivenacoolantleakinsidetheContainmentanda failureofinjectionsystemstomaintainReactorwater level,thecrewwillrestoreand/ormaintainReactorwater levelabovetheTopofActiveFuel,inaccordancewithN2 SOP101Cand/orN2EOPRPV.Injectionmustbe establishedsuchthatReactorwaterleveldoesnotlower below39.(Note:ThisCTistobeevaluatedafterthe scram,butbeforethetripofHPCS.AfterthetripofHPCS, thisCTnolongerapplies.)
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page5of42
CT2.0Justification:
SafetySignificance:
CriticalTask2.0isidentifiedascriticalbecause,withoutoperatoractiontolowerReactorpressure,Reactor waterlevelwouldlower,adequatecorecoolingwouldbelost,andfueldamagewouldoccur.
InitiatingCue:
MultipleannunciatorsandindicationswillprovideevidencethatReactorwaterlevelislowering.N2EOP RPVprovidesdirectiontoperformanRPVBlowdownandinjecttoraiseReactorwaterlevel.
SuccessPath:
ThecrewwillopenSRVsbyarminganddepressingADSlogicinitiationpushbuttonsormanipulatingSRV controlswitches.
PerformanceFeedback:
Reactorpressureandlevelindications,aswellaslowpressureinjectionsystemflowrates,willprovide performancefeedbackregardingthesuccessoftheRPVblowdown.
MeasurablePerformance Standard:
ArminganddepressingtheADSlogicinitiationpushbuttonsormanipulatingSRVcontrolswitcheswill provideobservableactionsfortheevaluationteam.
BoundingConditions:
TimelimitbasedonOperationsrepresentativerecommendation.
- b.
CT2.0,Givenacoolantleak,alossofhighpressure injectionsystems,andtheinabilitytorestoreandmaintain ReactorwaterlevelabovetheTopofActiveFuel(TAF),the crewwillinitiateactionsforanEmergencyRPV Depressurization,inaccordancewithN2EOPRPV.
Reactorwaterlevelmustberestoredandmaintained aboveTAFwithin30minutesofloweringbelowTAF.
- 4.
Length
- a.
60minutes
- 5.
MitigationStrategyCode
- a.
DMSRL02,LOCAand/orlossofhighpressureinjection; RPVlevelcannotbemaintainedaboveTAF;RPV blowdown;restoreandmaintainRPVlevelaboveMSCRWL withpreferredand/oralternateinjectionsystems
- 6.
TechnicalSpecifications(Applicableactionsforinitialconditions only)
- a.
None
- 7.
EALClassification
- a.
Alert,EALFA1:
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page6of42
- 1)
B.
InitialConditions
- 1.
ICNumber
- a.
IC021orequivalent(IC221forILT221)
- 2.
Presets/WithTriggers
- a.
Malfunctions
- 1)
CU:PB:BK:I,RWCUPumpBBreakerFailure,Final=
trip Inserted
- 2)
RD053443,ControlRodFailure-DriftOut,Final=
True TRG2
- 3)
CW:SA:BK:I,ServiceWtrPump1ABreakerFailure, Final=trip TRG1
- 4)
CW10E,SWP*MOV74EFailstoAutoopen,Final=
True TRG1
- 5)
FW:CB:BK:I,CondPump1BBreakerFailure,Final=
trip TRG3
- 6)
FW:CA:BK:I,CondPump1ABreakerFailure,Final=
trip,Delay=10sec TRG3
- 7)
FW:CC:BK:I1,CondPump1CSWG011Breaker Failure,Final=trip,Delay=20sec TRG3
- 8)
FW:CC:BK:I2,CondPump1CSWG013Breaker Failure,Final=trip,Delay=20sec TRG3
- 9)
CS02,HighPressureCoreSprayFailstoAutoStart, Final=True Inserted
- 10) RC06,RCICTurbineTrip,Final=True TRG4
- 11) RR20,RRLoopRupture-DBALOCA,Initial=0.5, Final=1,Delay=4minutes,Ramp=3minutes TRG5
- 12) CS:HP:MT:I,HPCSMotorFailure,Final=short TRG6
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page7of42
- 13) RH08,Group5IsolationFailure-(RHS*MOV122/113),Final=true TRG7
- b.
Remotes
- 1)
RD083443,HCUDrive/ExhaustWaterIsolation, Final=Close TRG20
- c.
Overrides
- 1)
None
- d.
- 1)
None
- e.
EventTriggers Event#
EventAction Command 4
rcnturb>0.1 LeftBlank 5
zdrps1d==1 LeftBlank 6
None mmfrr201.1
- f.
EquipmentOutofService
- 1)
WCSpumpB
- g.
SupportDocumentation
- 1)
ProvideN2OP30,sectionF.2.0completedupto step2.3.
- 2)
ProvideReMAforloweringReactorpowerto95%
withRecircflow.
- 3)
ProvideN2OP101DcompleteduptostepF.3.6.b.3.
- h.
Miscellaneous
- 1)
PlaceclearancereferencetagontheWCSpumpB controlswitchinPTL.
- 2)
PlaceProtectedpathwaysignsontheWCSpumpA controlswitch C.
ShiftTurnoverInformation
- 1.
ReactorPower:100%
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page8of42
- 2.
Rodline:Above100%
- 3.
TechnicalSpecificationLCOsineffect:
- a.
None
- 4.
SignificantProblems/Abnormalities/EquipmentOutof Service:
- a.
WCSpumpBoutofserviceformaintenance
- 5.
Evolutions/MaintenanceScheduledforthisShift:
- a.
SwapRDSpumpsperN2OP30sectionF.2.0.The procedureisinprogressuptostepF.2.3.
- b.
Then,lowerReactorpowerto95%pertheprovided ReMA.N2OP101DisinprogressuptostepF.3.6.b.3.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page9of26
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 100%.
WCS pump B is out of service for maintenance PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Swap RDS pumps per N2-OP-30 section F.2.0. The procedure is in progress up to step F.2.3. It is desired for the BOP operator to perform this evolution.
Then, lower Reactor power to 95% per the provided ReMA. N2-OP-101D is in progress up to step F.3.6.b.3. It is desired for the ATC operator to perform this evolution.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page10of26
Event#1-SwapRDSPumps Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions Reactoratpower 2RDSP1Arunningand2RDSP1Bshutdown
- VerifiableActions SwapRDSpumps
- Final(expected)operatingresult 2RDSP1Brunningand2RDSP1Ashutdown
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions SRO
- DirectsBOPtostart2RDSP1Bandshutdown2RDS P1AperN2OP30sectionF.2 RolePlay:
Ifaskedabout2RDSP1Bstart,reportthatallindications areSATforstartof2RDSP1B.
RolePlay:
Ifaskedabout2RDSP1Astop,reportthatallindications areSATforstopof2RDSP1A.
RolePlay:
AsEOsdirectedtomonitorandverifyWCSparameters (F.2.5F.2.10),respondthatallindicationsarenormaland noadjustmentsarerequired.
- Acknowledgesdirectiontostart2RDSP1Band shutdown2RDSP1A
- Starts2RDSP1Bbyplacingthecontrolswitchat PNL603inSTART
- Stops2RDSP1Abyplacingthecontrolswitchat PNL603toSTOP
- ContactsEOanddirectshimtomonitorWCSseal cavitytemperatures
- ContactsEOanddirectshimtoverifyWCSsealflows arebetween1and4gpm
- ContactsEOanddirectshimtoverifynoexcessive leakagefromWCSpumpseals
Event Termination Criteria
- 2RDSP1Bisrunningand2RDSP1Aissecured
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page11of26
Event#2-LowerReactorPowerwithRecirculationFlow Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions Reactorat~100%power
- VerifiableActions LowerRecirculationflow
- Final(expected)operatingresult Reactorpowerat~95%
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- DirectsATCtolowerReactorpowerto95%using RecircflowperReMAandN2OP101D
Note:
T.S.3.4.1requiresthatloopflowmismatchbemaintained
<5%ofratedcoreflow(108.5mlbm/hr)whenoperating ataneffectivecoreflow>70%ofratedcoreflow.Inthis casetheloopflowmismatchallowablewouldbe5.425 mlbm/hr.
- AcknowledgesdirectiontolowerReactorpowerto 95%usingRecircflow.
- Lowerspowerto95%byloweringcoreflowas follows:
Moves2RCS*HYV17A&Bindividuallyintheclose direction,maintainingloopflowdifferentialata minimalvaluebyalternatingbetweenthetwo valves.
- MonitorsAPRMsandrateofpowerchange.
- Monitorsplantparameterstoverifyproper operations.
- Providespeerchecksasneeded.
Event Termination Criteria
- ReactorpowerhasbeenloweredsufficientlyasdeterminedbytheLeadEvaluator
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page12of26
Event#3-ServiceWaterPumpTripwithFailureofDischargeValvetoAutomatically Open Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions PlantonlinewithSWP*P1A,C,B&Drunning
- VerifiableActions StartSWP*P1EorSWP*P1F ManuallyopenSWP*MOV74E,ifapplicable
- Final(expected)operatingresult Operatingwith4operableservicewaterpumpsrunning
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertthefollowing malfunctions:
TRG1 CW01A,ServiceWaterPump Trip(P1A),FINAL=True
CW10E,SWP*MOV74EFailstoAutoopen, FINAL=True Theplantrespondsasfollows:
SWP*P1ATripsonmotorelectricalfault SWP*MOV74A(servicewaterpump'A'discharge valve)closes SWP*P1Cdischargeflowexceedstheallowable 10,000gpm Thefollowingannunciatorsalarm:
601113,ServiceWaterPump1A/1C/1EAutoTrip/
FailToStart
Thefollowingcomputerpointsaregenerated:
SWPUC07,SWPPP1A/P1C/P1EAT/FTS(Tripped)
- Silences,acknowledgesandreportsannunciator 601113
- ProvidescrewupdateforthetripofSWP*P1A
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page13of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Thisapplieswhenonly3SWpumpsarerunning:
Spec Condition ApplicableActions 3.7.1 E
E.1 Action Description E.1 RestorerequiredSWpumptooperation.
(72hours)
ThisappliesafterSWP*MOV74Efailstoautomatically open:
Spec Condition ApplicableActions 3.7.1 C
C.1 Action Description C.1 RestoreSWsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.
(72hours)
- Acknowledgesreports
- DirectsBOPtostartSWP*P1E
- AcknowledgesfailureofSWP*MOV74Eto automaticallyopen
- DirectsROtoattempttomanuallyopen SWP*MOV74E
- MaydirectSWP*P1EsecuredandSWP*P1Fstarted
- ReviewsTech.Spec.3.7.1,ConditionE,required actionE.1andTechSpec.3.7.1,ConditionC,action C.1(Whentimepermits)
- ReviewsN2OP78,Attachment10andentersaction
- 1&2 RolePlay:
Asoperatordispatchedtoperformtheprestartchecksof SWP*P1E(F),wait4minutesandthenreportthatthepre startcheckshavebeencompletedsatisfactorily.
SWP*P1Estarts,butSWP*MOV74Efailstoopen
ThefollowingannunciatoralarmsafterSWP*P1Eis started:
601116,ServiceWaterPump1A/1C/1EDiscFlow Low
Thefollowingcomputerpointisgenerated:
SWPFC05,SWPmp1EDischFlow(Low)
BOP PerformsARP601113actions:
Ifrequired,throttlesSWP*MOV74C,B&D closedtomaintainSWPpumpflows<10,000 gpm Iftimepermits:
ReviewsN2OP11sectionE.2.0 VerifiesSWP*MOV74Eisshut DispatchesanEquipmentOperatortoperform prestartchecksforthe'E'SWPpumpin accordancewithN2OP11sectionE.2.0,steps E.2.4thruE.2.6 Acknowledgesreportfromthefieldthatpre startcheckshavebeencompletedsatisfactorily forthe'E'SWPpump Verifiesthatsufficientsystemflowexiststo allowatleast2500gpmforeachpumpthatwill berunning StartsSWP*P1E Verifiesthefollowing:
Redrunninglighton Pumpcurrentis<76amps SWP*MOV74Eopensfully
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page14of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
RolePlay:
IfdispatchedasEquipmentOperatortoinvestigate SWP*P1A,wait3minutesandthenreportthatthepump looksfine,butbreakerindicationsshow2outof3phases havinginstantaneousovercurrentflagsandtheassociated 86devicerolled.
RolePlay:
Ifdispatchedtodeterminewhetherthestrainerfor SWP*P1Eisrunningornot,wait4minutesandverifythat thecrewhasstartedSWP*P1Eandthenreportthatthe strainerisrunning.IfSWP*P1Eisnotrunningreportthat thestrainerisnotrunning.
Silences,acknowledgesandreportsannunciator 601116andreportsthatSWP*MOV74Efailedto autoopen Ifdirected,manuallyopensSWP*MOV74E IfdirectedtosecureSWP*P1EandstartSWP*P1F:
PlacesSWP*MOV74Econtrolswitchinnormalafter stop
- Ifdirected,startsSWP*P1F:
Iftimepermits:
o ReviewsN2OP11sectionE.2.0 o
VerifiesSWP*MOV74Fisshut o
DispatchesanEquipmentOperatorto performprestartchecksforthe'F'SWP pumpinaccordancewithN2OP11section E.2.0,stepsE.2.4thruE.2.6 o
Acknowledgesreportfromthefieldthatpre startcheckshavebeencompleted satisfactorilyforthe'F'SWPpump o
Verifiesthatsufficientsystemflowexiststo allowatleast2500gpmforeachpumpthat willberunning StartsSWP*P1F Verifiesthefollowing:
- Redrunninglighton
- Pumpcurrentis<76amps
- SWP*MOV74Fopensfully
- ContinueswithARP601113actions:
PlacesSWP*P1AcontrolswitchinPTL InformsShiftManagertoreviewtechnical specifications Ifthrottled,throttlesfullopenSWP*MOV74Cto establishfullSWPflow
- DispatchesEquipmentOperatortoinvestigate SWP*P1Apumpandbreakerforfaultindications
Event Termination Criteria
- SWP*P1ErunningwithSWP*MOV74EopenorSWP*P1Frunning
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page15of26
Event#4-ControlRodDriftOut Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions Plantonlinenearratedpowerwithcontrolrod3443notfullout
- VerifiableActions Drivecontrolrod3443fullin Reactorpowerreducedto~85%
Controlrod3443hydraulicsisolated
- Final(expected)operatingresult Operatingatreducedpowerwithcontrolrod3443fullyinsertedandhydraulics isolated
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insert thefollowing malfunction:
TRG2 RD053443,ControlRodFailureDriftOut, Final=True
ControlRod34-43slowlydriftsoutofthecore Thefollowingannunciatoralarms:
603443,CONTROLRODDRIFT
Thefollowingcomputerpointsaregenerated:
RDSBC09,CONTROLRODDRIFT(ALARM)
Rodworthminimizerdisplayscontrolrod34-43drifting Fullcoredisplayindicatesdriftforcontrolrod3443
- Silences,acknowledgesandreportsannunciator 603443
- Selectscontrol3443ontherodselectmatrixto allowindicationonthe4roddisplay
- Providescrewupdatethatcontrol3443isdrifting
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page16of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions RolePlay:
WhenReactorEngineeringnotified,reportthatfuel thermallimitsarebeingevaluated.Ifrequested, recommendnorodwithdrawoperationsuntilevaluation iscomplete.
RolePlay:
AsReactorEngineering,5minutesafterinitialrequestto evaluatethermallimits,reportbackthatthermallimits havebeenevaluatedassatisfactory.
RolePlay:
Ifrequested,asreactorengineering,reportthattherodis stillconsidereddriftinguntilanevaluationisconducted.
Evaluationwilltakeapproximately30minutes.
Spec Condition ApplicableActions 3.1.3 C
C.1&C.2 Action Description C.1 Fullyinsertinoperablecontrolrod.(3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />)
C.2 DisarmtheassociatedCRD.(4hours)
- ProvidesCrewupdateforN2SOP08entry
- DirectsATCtoenterandexecuteN2SOP08
- MaydirectATCtomaintainreactorpower3988 MWth
- AcknowledgesATCreportthatN2SOP08requiresa powerreductionto~85%
- ProvidescrewupdateforentryintoN2SOP101D
- DirectsATCtoenterandexecuteN2SOP101Dand reducereactorpowerto~85%usingrecircflow and/orCRAMrods
- Directsreactorpowerband
- NotifiesReactorEngineerandrequeststhermallimit evaluation
- MayrequestthatReactorEngineeringperformthe evaluationofcontrolrod3443stillbeingconsidered adriftingcontrolrod
- EvaluatesplantconditionsagainstTechSpecsand determinesthefollowingapply:
ITS3.1.3ConditionC,ActionC.1andC.2
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page17of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator:
WhendirectedastheEquipmentOperatortoclose RDS*V103andRDS*V105forcontrolrod3443,wait2 minutesandtheinsertthefollowingremote:
TRG20 RD083443,HCUDrive/ExhaustWater Isolation,FINAL=Close
ThenreporttothecontrolroomthatRDS*V103and RDS*V105forcontrolrod3443havebeensuccessfully closed ATC
- ExecutesN2SOP08
- Determinespowerchangeisduetodriftingcontrol rod
- Usinginsertpushbutton,insertscontrolrod3443
- Determinesthatcontrolrod3443willinsertand maintainsinsertpushbuttondepressed
- CoordinateswithBOPtomonitorOffgasandMain SteamLineRadMonitorsforevidenceoffuelfailure
- ReleasestheINSERTpushbutton
- Determinescontrolrod3443doesNOTremainfully inserted
- DepressesandholdsINSERTpushbutton
- ProvidesupdatetocrewthatN2SOP08requiresa powerreductionperN2SOP101Dusingrecircflow and/orCRAMrodsto85%
- AcknowledgesSROdirectiontoenterandexecute N2SOP101Dandreducereactorpowerto~85%
usingrecircflowand/orCRAMrods
- CoordinateswithBOPtoreducerecircflowandor insertCRAMrodstoachieve~85%reactorpower
- DispatchesanEquipmentOperatortoclose RDS*V103andRDS*V105forcontrolrod3443
- ContinueswithN2SOP08actions:
Releasestheinsertpushbutton Determinesthatthecontrolrodisnolonger driftingout
- CoordinateswithATCtoreducerecircflowandor insertCRAMrodstoachieve~85%reactorpower.
Event Termination Criteria
- Reactorpowerhasbeenreducedto~85%
- ControlRod3443hasbeenhydraulicallydisarmed
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page18of26
Event#5,6,7,and8-SequentialLossofAllCondensatePumps;CoolantLeakin Drywell;HPCSFailstoAutomaticallyStart,RCICTrips;HPCSTrips Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions PlantoperatingatpowerwithallCondensatepumpsoperating
- VerifiableActions Reactorscrammed
- Final(expected)operatingresult Reactorscrammed
- MitigationStrategycode(ifapplicable)
DMSRL02,LOCAand/orlossofhighpressureinjection;RPVlevelcannotbe maintainedaboveTAF;RPVblowdown;restoreandmaintainRPVlevelaboveMSCRWL withpreferredand/oralternateinjectionsystems
CriticalTasks (Ensurethetaskactionis boldedanditalicizedinthe "OperatorActions"column wherethecriticaltaskis performed)
- 1. GivenacoolantleakinsidetheContainmentandafailureofinjectionsystemsto maintainReactorwaterlevel,thecrewwillrestoreand/ormaintainReactorwaterlevel abovetheTopofActiveFuel,inaccordancewithN2SOP101Cand/orN2EOPRPV.
InjectionmustbeestablishedsuchthatReactorwaterleveldoesnotlowerbelow39.
(Note:ThisCTistobeevaluatedafterthescram,butbeforethetripofHPCS.Afterthe tripofHPCS,thisCTnolongerapplies.)
- 2. Givenacoolantleak,alossofhighpressureinjectionsystems,andtheinabilityto restoreandmaintainReactorwaterlevelabovetheTopofActiveFuel(TAF),thecrew willinitiateactionsforanEmergencyRPVDepressurization,inaccordancewithN2 EOPRPV.ReactorwaterlevelmustberestoredandmaintainedaboveTAFwithin30 minutesofloweringbelowTAF.
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator:
Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertthefollowing malfunctions:
TRG3 FW01B,CondensatePumpTrip(P1B),Final=
True FW01A,CondensatePumpTrip(P1A),Final=
True,Delay=10seconds
FW01C,CondensatePumpTrip(P1C),Final=
True,Delay=20seconds RPVwaterlevelstartstolower
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page19of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions Allcondensate,booster,andfeedpumpstripoff ThefollowingmalfunctionispresettopreventHPCSfrom automaticallystarting:
Preset CS02,HighPressureCoreSprayFailstoAuto Start,Final=True
Thefollowingmalfunctionwillautomaticallyinsertwhen RCICstarts:
TRG4 RC06,RCICTurbineTrip,Final=True Crew
- Silences,acknowledges,andreportsannunciators
- Recognizes/reportssequentiallossofall CondensateandFeedwaterpumps
BoothOperator:
Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertthefollowing malfunction(thisshouldbedoneafterHPCSisstarted andtheexamteamhasseenenoughoftheotherscripted actions):
TRG6 CS:HP:MT:I,HPCSMotorFailure,Final=
short SRO Acknowledgesreports MaydirectATCtolowerpowerusingRecircflow IAWwithN2SOP101D DirectsmanualReactorscram DirectsentryintoN2SOP101C EntersN2EOPRPVonlowReactorwaterlevel AcknowledgesfailureofHPCStoautomaticallystart DirectsmanualstartofHPCS(CT1.0)
AcknowledgestripofRCIC
- PerformsN2EOPRPVactions:
Directsscramprocedureentered(N2SOP101C)
Performslevelcontrolactions:
- Verifiesneededautoisolations,ECCSstartsand dieselgeneratorresponseoccurredperEOP 6.1
- DeterminesthatRPVwaterlevelisknown
- DeterminesthatRPVwaterlevelcanbe restoredandmaintainedbetween159.3and 202.3inchesusingHPCS
- DirectsanRPVlevelbandof160-200inches
- MaydirectHPCSlevel8interlocksdefeatedper N2EOP6.20 PerformsPressurecontrolactions:
- DeterminesthatnoSRVsarecycling
- DeterminesthatRPVpressurecanbestabilized below1052psigusingthemainturbinebypass valves
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page20of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions Directsapressurebandof8001000psig BoothOperator:
IfdirectedtodefeattheHPCSLevel8interlocksbyplacing HPCSINJVLVLEVEL8BYPASSTESTSWITCHintheTEST position,manuallyinsertthefollowingremotefunction:
- CS14,OPSCSH01PNL625TST.SWCSH*MOV107, Final=Test
Wait1minute,thenreportthattheHPCSLevel8 interlockshavebeendefeated.
- AcknowledgesSROdirectiontoscramthereactor
- ArmsANDdepressesBOTHManualScram pushbuttonsoneithersideof2CEC*PNL603.
- PlacestheReactorModeSwitchintheSHUTDOWN position
- Providesscramreport,byreporting:
Reactormodeswitchinshutdown APRMsdownscale Reactorpressureandtrend Reactorlevelandtrend MSIVsopen FeedwaterpumpsareNOTrunning Allcontrolrodsfullyinserted ReportsEOPentryconditiononlowRPVwaterlevel
- PerformsN2SOP101Cactions:
Verifies:
- Allrodsfullin
- Reactorpowerlowering
- Turbinetripped/TSVs&TCVsshut
- Generatortrippedandhouseloadstransferred
- SDVV&DValvesclosed
- RCSpumpsdownshift
- RPVpressureonTBVsorSRVsFWLCcontrolling level>159.3 FullyinsertsIRMsandSRMs Energizes2WCSMOV107 Ifrequired,securesmakeuptothecoolingtower ShutsdownHWC PerformsLevelcontrolleg:
- Recognizesthatlevelwillbestabilizedusing HPCS
- IfdirecteddefeatsHPCSLevel8tripsby directingafieldoperatortoperformthe actionsofN2EOP6.20
ATC/BOP
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page21of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Note:
ThecandidatemayalsostartHPCSbystartingthepump andopeningCSH*MOV107,ratherthanusingthemanual initiationpushbutton.
BoothOperator:
Ifdirectedtodefeatgroup5isolationsforRHRAandB, wait2minutes,theninsertmalfunction:
TRG7 RH08,Group5IsolationFailure-(RHS*MOV122/113),Final=true Thenreporttaskcompletion.
- MayattemptmanualstartofRCIC
- ReportstripofRCIC
- ManuallystartsHPCS(CT1.0):
At2CEC*PNL601,ARMANDDEPRESSMANUAL INITIATION At2CEC*PNL601,VERIFYthefollowing:
CSH*P1,HPCSPUMP1,started.
CSH*MOV107,PMP1INJECTIONVLV,open.
WHENsystemflowisgreaterthan634gpm, THENVERIFYCSH*MOV105,MINIMUMFLOW BYPASSVLVclosed.
FlowtoRPVasindicatedby2CSH*FI104flow risingANDindicationthefollowingvalvesare closed:
- CSH*MOV111,TESTRETURNTOSUPPRESSION POOL
- CSH*MOV110,TESTRETURNTOCONDENSATE TK
- CSH*MOV112,TESTRETURNTOCONDENSATE TK At2CEC*PNL852,VERIFYDIVISION32EGS*EG2 started Thefollowingmalfunctionwillautomaticallyinsertonce theReactorisscrammed:
TRG5 RR20,RRLoopRupture-DBALOCA,Initial=
0.5,Final=1,Delay=4minutes,Ramp=3 minutes Crew
- Recognize/reportdegradingPrimaryContainment parameters SRO
- EntersN2EOPPConhighDrywellpressureand temperature
- ReentersN2EOPRPVonhighDrywellpressure
- PerformsN2EOPPCprimarycontainmentpressure legactions:
- Determinescannotmaintaincontainmentpressure below1.68psig
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page22of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- Determinesthatsuppressionchambersprayis requiredbeforesuppressionchamberpressure reaches10psig
- Determinesthatsuppressionpoolwaterlevelis belowEL217ft.
- Determinesthatsuppressionchamberspraysare warranted
- DirectsROtoplaceRHRBinsuppressionchamber sprays
- DirectspneumaticsrestoredtotheDrywell
- Establishesabenchmarkforclosingtheoutboard MSIVstocontrolcooldownrate
- MaydirectlowpressureECCSpumpsterminated andpreventedwithahighdrywellpressureand reactorpressurelowering(N2EOPRPV,stepP1)
- DirectsSuppressionChamberSpraysecuredpriorto SuppressionChamberpressureloweringto0psig
- Waitsuntilsuppressionchamberpressureisabove 10psig
- Determinesthatsuppressionpoolwaterlevelis belowEL217ft.
- DirectsROtoverifythefollowing:
- Bothrecirculationpumpstripped
- Alldrywellunitcoolerstripped
- DirectsROtoplaceRHRA/'B'indrywellspraysin accordancewithN2EOP6.22,astimepermits
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page23of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator:
IfrequestedtoplaceSWPradiationmonitorRE23Ain service,insertthefollowingremotes:
RM02040,SWP23ASWPFromRHRAHtExchRadMonit Online,Final=Online RM03040,SWP23ASWPFromRHRAHtExchRadMonit Power,Final=On
IfrequestedtoplaceSWPradiationmonitorRE23Bin service,insertthefollowingremotes:
RM02041,SWP23BCurrentRadiationLevelOnline,Final
=Online RM03041,SWP23BCurrentRadiationLevelPower,Final
=On
Thenreport2SWP*RE23A(B)isinservice ATC/BOP
- InitiatesSuppressionChambersprayperN2EOP 6.22:
OpensSWP*MOV90A(B)(maybedelayeduntil afterspraysareinservice).
VerifiesRHS*MOV24A(B)overriddenclosed.
VerifiesRHR*P1A(B)running.
OpensRHS*MOV33A(B)toestablishsuppression chambersprayflow.
OpensRHS*FV38A(B)andestablish approximately7450gpm-Ifsuppressionpool coolingisdirected.
ThrottlesopenSWP*MOV33A(B)toestablish flownottoexceed7400gpmStarts5thSWP pump(postLOCA).
ClosesRHS*MOV8A(B)after10minutetime delay.
DirectsRPtoplaceSWP*RE23A(B)inservice
- RestorespneumaticstothedrywellusingN2EOPHC attachment7panel601:
At2CEC*PNL851:
PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV166to OVERRIDE OPENSIAS*SOV166 PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV184to OVERRIDE OPENSIAS*SOV184 At2CEC*PNL601 PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV164to OVRD OPENSIAS*SOV164 PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV165to OVRD OPENSIAS*SOV165
- Ifdirected,terminatesandpreventsLowpressure ECCSinjectionusingN2EOPHCattachment4:
PLACESCSL*P1,PMP1,controlswitchinPULL TOLOCK
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page24of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions IFaLPCIA/LPCSinitiationsignalisNOTpresent, THENARMSANDDEPRESSESLPCIA/LPCS MANUALINITIATIONpushbutton CLOSESAND,IFpossible,OVERRIDES:
2RHS*MOV24A,LPCIAINJECTIONVLV 2CSL*MOV104,PMP1INJECTIONVLV PLACESRHS*P1C,PMP1C,controlswitchin PULLTOLOCK.
IFaLPCIB&CinitiationsignalisNOTpresent, THENARMSANDDEPRESSESLPCIB&CMANUAL INITIATIONpushbutton CLOSESAND,IFpossible,OVERRIDES:
2RHS*MOV24B,LPCIBINJECTIONVLV 2RHS*MOV24C,LPCICINJECTIONVLV
- ClosestheoutboardMSIVsatpreestablished pressurevalueandshiftspressurecontroltothe SRVs
- Recognizes/reportstotheSROthatsuppression chamberpressurehasreached10psig
- Verifiesandreportsthatbothrecirculationpumps aretripped
- Verifiesandreportsthatalldrywellunitcoolersare tripped
- InitiatesDrywellsprayperN2EOP6.22,astime permits:
OpensSWP*MOV90A(B)(maybedelayeduntil afterspraysareinservice).
VerifiesRHS*MOV24A(B)overriddenclosed.
VerifiesclosedRHS*FV38A(B)
VerifiesRHRA(B)pumprunning.
OpensRHS*MOV33A(B)andverifiesflow(If suppressionchambersprayisrequired concurrentlywithdrywellsprays).
OpensRHS*MOV15A(B)
OpensRHS*MOV25A(B)
VerifiesproperoperationofRHS*MOV4A(B)
Verifies~7450gpmonDrywellSprayHeaderflow VerifiesopenSWP*MOV90A(B)
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page25of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions ThrottleopenSWP*MOV33A(B)toestablish~
7400gpm ClosesRHS*MOV8A(B)after10minutetime delay.
BoothOperator:
Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertthefollowing malfunction(thisshouldbedoneafterHPCSisstarted andtheexamteamhasseenenoughoftheotherscripted actions):
TRG6 CS:HP:MT:I,HPCSMotorFailure,Final=
short Crew
- Recognize/reporttripofHPCS
- Recognize/reportloweringReactorwaterlevel
- AcknowledgestripofHPCSandloweringReactor waterlevel
- DirectsReactorwaterlevelmaintainedabove14 usingCRDandSLS
- DirectsinhibitingADS
- DeterminesReactorwaterlevelcannotberestored andmaintainedabove14
- EntersN2EOPC2,RPVBlowdown Determinesthatthereactorwillremain shutdownwithoutboron Determinesdrywellpressure>1.68psig MaydirectLowpressureECCSterminatedand preventedorverifiedterminatedandprevented ifnotperformedearlier Directs7ADSvalvesopened(CT2.0)
- DirectsReactorwaterlevelrestoredandmaintained 160200
ATC/BOP
- MayterminateandpreventLowpressureECCSifnot performedearlier
- InhibitADS
- Opensall7ADSvalvesusingN2EOPHCattachment 8:
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page26of26
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions DeterminesthatnoSRVsarestuckopenandthat anECCSpumpisoperating INITIATEBlowdownusingONEofthemethods below(CT2.0):
- ArmsanddepressesallADSLOGICpushbuttons forBOTHdivisions:
o ADSLOGIC"A"manualpushbutton o
ADSLOGIC"E"manualpushbutton o
ADSLOGIC"B"manualpushbutton o
ADSLOGIC"F"manualpushbutton
- TAKEScontrolswitchestoOPENatEITHER 2CEC*PNL628or2CEC*PNL631UNTILatotalof 7SRVsareopen:
o MSS*PSV137 o
MSS*PSV127 o
MSS*PSV126 o
MSS*PSV121 o
MSS*PSV134 o
MSS*PSV130 o
MSS*PSV129
- ReportstotheUSthatall7ADSSRVsareopened basedonsolenoidsbeingenergizedandallADSN2 Tankshavingacceptablepressure
Event Termination Criteria
- RPVhasbeenblowndown.
- Reactorlevelbeingcontrolledinassignedband.
ILTNRC221
Scenario#1TOSheetandNormalEvolution
Simulator Scenario Handout Reference Packet
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario1 Page9of26
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 100%.
WCS pump B is out of service for maintenance PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Swap RDS pumps per N2-OP-30 section F.2.0. The procedure is in progress up to step F.2.3. It is desired for the BOP operator to perform this evolution.
Then, lower Reactor power to 95% per the provided ReMA. N2-OP-101D is in progress up to step F.3.6.b.3. It is desired for the ATC operator to perform this evolution.
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 OPERATING PROCEDURE N2-OP-30 REVISION 02600 CONTROL ROD DRIVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED Approval Authority: Director - Operations
Page 2 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600
SUMMARY
OF ALTERATIONS Revision Change Summary of Revision or Change 026 00 Minor revision to incorporate:
PCR-18-04735 Enhance P&L D.20 and warning statements contain an actionable Step. Enhance bulleted items to ensure correct order is performed.
PCR-18-04735:
x D.20.0, Update P&L wording.
x F.13.2.2, Change bulleted items to numbered items.
x F.14.3, Change bulleted items to numbered items.
x H.10.1, Add AR number to 3rd note.
x H.10.2 Caution, Change Caution to a Warning, and modify wording.
x H.10.2, Added new Step.
x H.11.1 Warning, Delete.
x, Add Warning at top of page and added (See WARNING) in applicable action boxes.
x, Add Warning at top of page and added (See WARNING) in applicable action boxes.
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE Page 3 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS....................................................................................... 5 B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................... 9 C.
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................... 16 D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................................ 16 E.
STARTUP................................................................................................................................ 20 1.0 System Start-Up from an Extended Outage.................................................................. 20 2.0 Precharging HCU/Filling and Venting of Accumulators................................................. 23 3.0 System Start-Up from a Short Outage........................................................................... 25 4.0 Control Rod Drive Venting After Shutdown Maintenance or an Extended Outage......... 28 5.0 Startup of RPV Water Level Instrument Backfill System................................................ 28 F.
NORMAL OPERATIONS.......................................................................................................... 29 1.0 Suction Filter Changeover [SOP].................................................................................. 29 2.0 CRD Pump Changeover............................................................................................... 31 3.0 Pump Discharge Filter Changeover [SOP].................................................................... 32 4.0 Flow Control Valve Changeover.................................................................................... 33 5.0 Stabilizing Valve Changeover....................................................................................... 34 6.0 Stabilizing Flow Adjustment.......................................................................................... 34 7.0 Accumulator Trouble..................................................................................................... 36 8.0 Isolating an HCU........................................................................................................... 38 9.0 Flushing of CRD Mechanisms....................................................................................... 43 10.0 Flushing HCU Charging Water Inlet Check Valves........................................................ 44 11.0 CRD Pump Changeover Due to Discharge Check Valve Leak by or to Prevent Suction Relief Valve Lifting on Pump Shutdown (Start of Standby Pump with Discharge Valve Initially Closed)................................................................................... 45 12.0 Documenting Control Rod Drive Operational Problems [C1] [C7]................................. 47 13.0 Disarming a Control Rod at the HCU............................................................................ 47 14.0 Rearming a Control Rod at the HCU............................................................................. 48 15.0 HCU Cooling Water Check Valve Operability................................................................ 49 16.0 Scram Air Header Supply Filter/PCV Changeover........................................................ 50 17.0 Control Rod Recovery Following On-line HCU Maintenance......................................... 50 18.0 Flow Control Valve Control Air Filter/PCV Changeover................................................. 52 G.
SHUTDOWN............................................................................................................................ 53 1.0 Shutdown to Standby Readiness.................................................................................. 53 2.0 CRD Lay-Up................................................................................................................. 53 H.
OFF NORMAL PROCEDURES................................................................................................ 54
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
SECTION PAGE Page 4 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 1.0 Failure to Insert/Withdraw Control Rod......................................................................... 54 2.0 Uncoupled Control Rod [TS]......................................................................................... 65 3.0 Maximizing CRD Injection [EOP].................................................................................. 66 4.0 Accumulator Piston Seal Leakage................................................................................ 67 5.0 Isolating and Bypassing 2RDS-PV101 CRD Pressure Control Valve............................ 69 6.0 Returning 2RDS-PV101 CRD Pressure Control Valve to Service................................. 70 7.0 Rod Withdraw and Position Indication Bypassing per TS 3.10.6 for Support of Vessel Inspections........................................................................................................ 71 8.0 CRD Flushing Due to Movement Problems................................................................... 73 9.0 Dynamic Venting of the CRD Pump Following Maintenance Requiring System Draining........................................................................................................................ 76 10.0 Installation of 2RDS*V116 Temporary Tool to Stop an Air Leak.................................... 78 11.0 CRD Leakage Flow....................................................................................................... 79 12.0 Manual CRD Flow Control............................................................................................ 80 13.0 Reduction in CRD Flow Control for RPV Level Assist................................................... 80 14.0 Post SCRAM Control Rod Insertion [SOP].................................................................... 82 15.0 Establishing HCU conditions to support Full Scram Activities (Outage)......................... 83 16.0 Raising CRD System Flow while in Mode 1 and 2 [SOP].............................................. 85 17.0 Restoration of Control Rod following Drift from position 00 to 02................................... 86 18.0 Transfer Operation of CRD Flow Control Valve............................................................. 87 19.0 Responding to a Control Rod High Temperature Alarm for a Control Rod At Position 48.................................................................................................................... 87, HCU Valve Lineup......................................................................................................... 90, High Temperature Control Rod Drive Log..................................................................... 93, Accumulator Precharge Nitrogen Pressure Versus Ambient Temperature Figure......... 94, Rod Withdraw and Position Indication Bypassing per TS 3.10.6 to Support Vessel Inspections.............................................................................................................. 95 A, Control Rod Position Indication Bypass/Restoration................................................. 100, Rod Insertion Testing for Potential Fuel Channel Bow [C11]....................................... 103, Isolated Insert Stall Flow Data Sheet........................................................................... 109, Isolated Withdraw Stall Flow Data Sheet..................................................................... 110, Rod Insertion Friction Testing...................................................................................... 111, HCU Locations............................................................................................................ 113 0, Maximizing CRD Injection................................................................... 114
Page 5 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS 1.0 Technical Specifications x
Section 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin (SDM) x Section 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability x
Section 3.1.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulators x
Section 3.1.8, Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves x
Section 3.3.1.2, Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation x
Section 3.9.2, Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock x
Section 3.9.3, Control Rod Position x
Section 3.9.4, Control Rod Position Indication x
Section 3.9.5, Control Rod Operability-Refueling x
Section 3.10.6, Multiple control Rod Withdrawal-Refueling 2.0 Licensee Documentation x
Unit 2 USAR Section 1.2.9.3, Control Rod Drive System x
Unit 2 USAR Section 4.6.1, Control Rod Drive System 3.0 Policies, Programs and Procedures x
OP-CE-109-101, Clearance and Tagging x
N2-ARP-603300, 2CEC*PNL603 Series 300 Alarm Response Procedures x
N2-ARP-603400, 2CEC*PNL603 Series 400 Alarm Response Procedures x
N2-ELU-01, Electric Lineup and Breaker Operations x
N2-OP-30-LINEUPS, Control Rod Drive - Lineups x
N2-OP-13-LINEUPS, Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System - Lineups x
N2-FHP-023, Control Rod Uncoupling, Recoupling, And Venting x
N2-OP-4, Condensate Storage and Transfer x
N2-OP-13, Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System x
N2-OP-29, Reactor Recirculation System x
N2-OP-34, Nuclear Boiler Automatic Depressurization & Safety Relief Valves x
N2-OP-37, Reactor Water Cleanup System x
N2-OP-39, Fuel Handling and Reactor Service Equipment x
N2-OP-96, Reactor Manual Control and Rod Position Indication System x
N2-OSP-RDS-@001, Control Rod Stroke Timing and Coupling Verification
A. REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Continued)
Page 6 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 3.0 (Continued) x N2-OSP-RDS-R004, Scram Accumulator Check Valve Reverse Flow Test x
N2-PM-@031, Control Rod Venting and Stroking x
N2-SOP-08, Unplanned Power Changes x
N2-SOP-30, Control Rod Drive Failures x
N2-SOP-101C, Reactor Scram x
N2-SOP-101D, Rapid Power Reduction x
N2-CSP-2V, Turbine Chemistry Surveillance at Unit 2 4.0 Technical Information 4.1 Drawings x
PID-30A, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System x
PID-30B, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System x
PID-30C, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System x
ESK-5RDS01, Electrical Diagram, CRD FEED PMP 1A x
ESK-5RDS02, Electrical Diagram, CRD FEED PMP 1B x
ESK-6RDS01, Electrical Diagram, CRD HYD SYS MOVs 4.2 Vendor Drawings GE Elementary 807E159TY 4.3 Vendor Manuals x
N20285, GEK-39469E, Vol. 3, Part 3, Hydraulic Control Unit x
N20269, GEK-83310, Control Rod Drive Removal Equipment x
N20269, GEK-83317A, Control Rod Drive System x
N20269, GEK-83318B, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System x
N20248, GEI-92814C Control Rod Drive Mechanism 4.4 General Electric (GE) Service Information Letters (SILs) x GE SIL 139, Control Rod Drive Collet Retainer Tube Cracking x
GE SIL 148, Water Quality for Control Rod Drive System x
GE SIL 173, Control Rod Drive High Operating Temperature x
GE SIL 200, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, Increase CRD System Flow to RPV After Shutdown During Emergency Condition x
GE SIL 292 and Supp. 1, Inadvertent Control Rod Withdraw x
GE SIL 373, SCRAM Valve Opening Air Pressures
A. REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Continued)
Page 7 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 4.4 (Continued) x GE SIL 407, Preventing Unauthorized Control Rod Patterns x
GE SIL 419, CRD Hydraulic Control Unit Isolation Valves x
GE SIL 422, Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valve Stem Connector x
GE SIL 427, CRD Lay Up Procedure for an Extended Outage x
GE SIL 441, Control Rod Drive Scram Anomaly x
GE SIL 471 and Supp. 1, Undetected Single Rod Scram/Prevention of Single Rod Scrams x
GE SIL 536, HCU Liquid Level Switch Malfunction x
GE SIL 538, CRD Cooling Water Orifices [C5]
4.5 INPO Signification Event Reports (SERs) and Signification Event Notifications (SENs) x SER 14-89, Multiple Rod Drifts Due to Low Scram Air Pressure x
SER 93-090, RPV Level Indication x
SEN 264, Unplanned BWR Control Rod Withdrawals While Shutdown 4.6 Others x
NRC Bulletin 93 RPV Level Indication x
NRC Generic Letter 92 RPV Level Indication 5.0 Supplemental References x
Mod PN2Y87MX092, RDS Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valve Limit Switches x
Mod PN2Y91MX008, Expansion of Undervessel Equipment Platform x
Mod PN2Y88MX059, CRD to RWCU Pump Seals Piping Installation x
Mod PN2Y93MX003, Reactor Water Level Indication Enhancement
A. REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Continued)
Page 8 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 6.0 Commitments Sequence Number Commitment Number Description 1
DER 2-92-Q-0050 Control Rod Drive Problems experienced during 12/13/91 and 12/16/91 Reactor startup 2
SOER 84-02 Prompt notification of Nuclear Recommendation 1 Engineering personnel and General Supervisor Operations prior to mispositioned control rod recovery 3
GE SIL 536 HCU Liquid Level Switch Malfunction, rapid nitrogen charge or discharge of HCU 4
DER 2-94-0497 Unsatisfactory Control Rod Drive performance during Reactor Startup 5
DER 2-91-Q-1558 Include GE SIL 538 regarding missing cooling water orifices as a reference, and to raise awareness of Rod Drive performance problems 6
DER 2-95-1478 Blade guide became bound while trying to couple rod 7
DER C-96-0603 Insufficient monitoring of important plant parameters INPO finding OP.2-1 (1996) 8 DER 2-98-2936 Monitor WCS pump seal parameters while swapping RDS pumps 9
DER 2-98-3130 Failure of RDS cooling water to meet FSAR Requirements 10 DER-NM-2004-5483 Slow notch settle time on Control Rod 02-31 (MAD-NMP-KG1-05-002) 11 CR NM-2006-1697 GE Part 21 SC 06-12, Surveillance Program for Channel-Control Blade Interference Monitoring 12 CR 2007-3031 INPO SEN 264, Unplanned BWR Control Rod Withdrawals While Shutdown 13 CR 2007-3226 OE23750 - Increasing Levels of Chlorides In Reactor Water (Grand Gulf)
Page 9 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The Control Rod Drive System (CRD) makes changes in core reactivity by individually positioning neutron absorbing control rods within the core in response to manual control signals (RMC). System proper operation is monitored by the following back up systems; Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) and Rod Block Monitor (RBM).
The CRD System is also designed to insert all control rods (scram) to rapidly shut down the reactor in response to a signal from the Reactor Protective System (RPS), Redundant Reactivity Control System, (RRCS), or manually.
This procedure will cover the Control Rod Drive Hydraulics. For information on Control Rod movement and control, refer to N2-OP-96, Reactor Manual Control and Rod Position Indication.
1.0 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System consists of two 100 percent system capacity pumps, two 100 percent system capacity suction and discharge filters, a hydraulic control unit (HCU) for each of the 185 control rods and the associated valves, instrumentation, and piping required to operate each control rod.
The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Pumps (PlA, PlB) are horizontal, ten stage, centrifugal pumps, and are controlled by their respective control switches located on Control Room panel P603.
Each control switch is provided with START, STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK, and AUTO positions. The CRD pumps are rated at 115 gpm at 3,235 ft. TDH. Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water provides cooling for the bearings and seal cooler.
The pump motors are three phase, 4,160-V AC motors. The motors are rated at 300 horsepower and are powered from 2NNS-SWG014 (P1A) and 2NNS-SWG015 (P1B). Each motor has an electrical heater (0.8 kw) that is energized when the motor is off. Both heaters are powered from 2SCA-PNL201.
One pump is normally in operation with the other in a standby status.
When the plant is operating, condensate demineralizers supply condensate to the suction header via a self-contained pressure reducing valve (PCV140). Pressure control valve PCV140 is manually throttled to maintain the required suction head to the CRD pumps. The condensate storage tanks supply the CRD pumps when the condensate pumps are off during shutdown.
The suction header for the CRD pumps has two 100 percent capacity suction filters and provide filtration of any particles greater than 25 microns.
Differential pressure across the suction filters is sensed by a differential pressure indicating switch (PDIS104) which is located on local panel 2CES-RAK103, and provides an annunciator for high differential pressure on P603. The normal operating maximum pressure drop across a clean filter is 2 psid at 100 gpm and the maximum pressure drop across a dirty filter is 18 psid at 100 gpm.
Suction pressure of each pump is monitored by 2RDS-PS2A(B). Low suction pressure of 25" Hg absolute will initiate a low suction pressure alarm, and trip the running pump on a sustained low suction pressure after a 3.5 second time delay. This time delay is provided to prevent spurious pump trips from transient pressure waves, such as those experienced following a reactor scram.
From the suction filters, the CRD pumps are supplied through their respective suction and discharge isolation valves.
B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Page 10 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 1.0 (Continued)
Each pump discharge header contains a supply line that provides up to 16 gpm to RWCU pump (2WCS-P1A, P1B) seals for seal life extension. A pump recirculation line is attached to each discharge header and recirculates approximately 20 gpm during normal operations back to the condensate storage tank via a common return line for pump minimum flow protection.
The CRD Hydraulic system provides water at CRD pump discharge pressure to the reactor vessel level instrumentation backfill system via a connection at 2RDS-V20. This backfill system is designed to prevent the buildup of non-condensable gases in the RPV water level reference legs.
A constant flow of 0.475 gallons per hour at rated conditions to each of 4 reference legs is controlled at instrument racks 2ISC*RAK001A,B,C,D. All startup, shutdown and adjustments of the Backfill system are contained in N2-OP-34. Precautions for and reference to the Backfill system are contained in this procedure as required.
The CRD pump discharge header branches into two lines, each of which contains a drive water filter, which are 100 percent system capacity filters and will remove any particles larger than 50 microns.
The differential pressure across the drive water filters is sensed by a differential pressure indicating switch (PDIS106), and annunciated on P603. The normal operating maximum pressure drop across a clean filter is 14 psid at 73 gpm and the maximum pressure drop across a dirty filter is 125 psid.
The outlet of the drive water filters supplies approximately 3 to 5 gpm each (normal) to the number one seal cavity of the Reactor Recirculation System Pumps (2RCS-P1A, P1B).
The drive water filters outlet header contains a flow element (FE107). Flow transmitter FT107 is located on local panel 2CES-RAK102 and supplies the following:
x Analog computer point for system flow.
x Flow indicator located on P603.
x Flow indicator located locally on 2CES-RAK102.
x Flow controller located on Control Room panel P603, supplies a modulation control signal to flow control valves FV6A & FV6B.
The drive water filters combined outlet header also supplies a reactor plant sample connection and the charging water header. The charging water header supplies each scram accumulator (185), and has local pressure indication, Control Room indication, Control Room annunciator for low header pressure, and a computer point. The drive header supplies two flow control valves (FV6A, 6B).
Normally one flow control valve is operating and the other is isolated. Flow control valves FV6A, 6B maintain Rod Drive System flow constant at about 63 gpm during normal operation.
B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Page 11 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 1.0 (Continued)
The drive water header supplies the stabilizing valve units and is equipped with a motor-operated pressure control valve (PV101), operated by a switch located on Control Room panel P603 with OPEN, NORM, CLOSE positions. Pressure control valve PV101 maintains the upstream drive water pressure at 260 psig above reactor pressure by throttling the flow.
Differential pressure is sensed by a pressure differential transmitter PDT114. Pressure differential transmitter PDTY114 supplies signals to a differential pressure indicator located locally on 2CES-RAK103 and P603.
The outlet header of pressure control valve PV101 is the cooling water header and is maintained at approximately 7 psig above reactor pressure. Pressure differential transmitter PDT117 is located on 2CEC-RAK103 and provides the operator with indication of differential pressure between the reactor and the cooling water header both locally (2CES-RAK103) and on 2CEC*PNL603. There is also flow indication on 2CEC*PNL603 via FI115.
Differential pressure indicator PDI114 allows the operator to monitor pressure and manually position pressure control valve PV101 to maintain drive water pressure 260 psig above reactor pressure. There is also local and Control Room indication of drive water flow on P603 via FIX112 and FIY112 respectively.
2.0 Stabilizing Valve Units Two sets of stabilizing valve units are provided to maintain constant flow conditions in the system. One stabilizing valve unit is in operation while the other has its inlet and outlet isolation valves closed. Needle valves are provided on the outlet of each solenoid valve and regulate drive water flow as follows:
x Drive insert solenoid (SOVX7A/B) - 4 gpm x
Drive withdraw solenoid (SOVY7A/B) - 2 gpm With no rod movement, approximately six gpm flows through the in-service stabilizing unit, four gpm through SOVX7A or 7B, and two gpm through SOVY7A or 7B.
Control rod insertion requires four gpm to maintain the required differential pressure (260 psig) for rod insertion. Solenoid valve SOVX7A or 7B closes, allowing only two gpm to pass through the stabilizing unit to the cooling water header, thus providing four gpm additional flow to the drive water header. This maintains a constant drive water header pressure at 260 psig above reactor pressure during rod insertion. When the drive insert signal is removed, solenoid valve SOVX7A or 7B opens and the system is returned to a normal condition as stated above.
The control rod withdrawal operation is similar to insertion, except that two gpm is required for operation and SOVY7A or 7B closes, thus providing the two gpm for control rod withdrawal.
Fourteen exhaust water branch lines receive exhaust water from the 185 HCUs and combine into the exhaust water header. The exhaust water header is equipped with a local pressure indicator (PI120).
The two main exhaust water headers are each equipped with a pressure equalizing valve (RV15A, 15B). The pressure equalizing valves operate at 80 psid to repressurize the exhaust header from the cooling water header following a scram. Each pressure equalization valve is equipped with locked open inlet and outlet globe valves.
B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Page 12 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 3.0 Instrument Air Supply Instrument Air is supplied to the Control Rod Drive System for the operation of:
x Flow control valve FV6A, 6B (30 psig).
x Scram discharge volume drain and vent valves *AOV123, 124, 130 and 132 (70 to 75 psig).
x 185 scram supply and exhaust valves (AOV126) and (AOV127) via the Scram Pilot Solenoid valves (SOV139) (70 to 75 psig).
There are two CRD Instrument Air headers. The first header supplies two pressure control valves (PCV18A, 18B). Normally, one valve is in service maintaining outlet pressure at 20.5 psig while the other valve is isolated with its inlet and outlet block valves closed. The outlet lines of pressure control valve PCV18A, 18B, combine and supply the following with 20.5 psig instrument air:
x Pressure indicator PI134 located locally on 2CES-RAK102.
x Control air to flow control valves 6A, 6B electro-pneumatic positioners via current to pressure converter I/P107 on 2CES-RAK102.
x Auto/manual stations 6A, 6B located locally on 2CES-RAK102.
The second header supplies two pressure control valves PCV19A, 19B. Normally, one valve is in service maintaining outlet pressure at 70 to 75 psig while the other valve is isolated with its inlet and outlet blocking valves closed. The outlet of PCV19A, 19B supplies operating air to valves FV6A, 6B and to the scram air header. The scram air header feeds the following air supply lines:
x Operating air supply to scram inlet and outlet valves via dual-solenoid operated 3-way scram pilot valves (SOV139) for each of 185 control rods.
x Operating air supply to scram discharge volume vent and drain valves via 3-way solenoid operated valves SOV154 for AOV124 (vent) and AOV123 (drain) and SOV155 for AOV132 (vent) and AOV130 (drain).
The scram air header is normally maintained pressurized. When a scram signal is generated by both channels of the Reactor Protection System, SOV138 and SOV137 (3-way solenoid operated backup scram pilot valves) energize blocking supply air to the scram air header while simultaneously venting it. At the same time, the dual-solenoid 3-way scram pilot valves for each set of scram inlet and outlet valves de-energize blocking operating air to the scram inlet and outlet valves while simultaneously venting the valve actuator, allowing the scram inlet and outlet valves to open by spring pressure.
SOV154 and SOV155 also de-energize blocking and venting operating air to the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves AOV124, 132 and AOV123, 130, allowing these air-operated valves to close.
B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Page 13 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 3.0 (Continued)
Two additional 3-way solenoid operated valves SOV162, 163 are in the scram air header in series with SOV137 and 138. These valves are associated with the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) function of the Redundant Reactivity Control System and perform the same function as the back-up scram valves SOV137 and 138 energizing to function in response to an ARI signal to prevent an anticipated transient without Scram (ATWS).
The Control Rod Drive scram pilot valve air header is equipped with a pressure indicator and pressure transmitter located locally on 2CES-RAK 102. The pressure transmitter PT139 supplies input to process computer and to Control Room annunciator for actuation on high or low pressure condition.
4.0 Hydraulic Control Units There are 185 hydraulic control units (HCUs), one for each control rod. One will be explained and the remaining units are identical. Each hydraulic control unit consists of the following:
x Directional control valves:
- Withdrawal supply SOV122
- Insert supply SOV123
- Insert exhaust SOV121
- Withdrawal exhaust and settle SOV120 x
Scram pilot valves SOV139 x
Scram inlet valve AOV126 x
Scram outlet valve AOV127 x
Scram accumulator with:
- Local nitrogen pressure indicator PI205
- Pressure switch (PS206) which actuates on low pressure to energize a Control Room annunciator and a Control Room digital computer point.
- Level switch (LDS129) which actuates to provide a Control Room annunciator and a digital computer point in the event of water leakage into the scram accumulator nitrogen cylinder.
x Charging water header x
Drive water header x
Cooling water header x
Exhaust water header x
Insert riser x
Withdraw riser x
B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Page 14 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 4.0 (Continued)
The drive water header is equipped with a manual valve and a check valve. The drive water header connects to each HCU between the insert and withdraw supply valves. Control rod insertion is accomplished as follows:
x Insert supply valve SOV123 opens and drive water is directed to the control rod via the insert riser at a nominal rate of four gpm.
x Insert exhaust valve SOV121 opens and provides a flow path for exhaust water from the withdraw riser to be discharged to the exhaust header.
x The exhaust header routes water returning from the drive in motion to the underside of the SOV 121 on the other 184 non-moving CRD HCUs.
x Each SOV 121 is designed to relieve and equalize the pressure on the exhaust header to the reactor vessel.
x Following de-energization of valves SOV121 and SOV123, SOV120 opens in the settle mode to exhaust the under piston area of the CRD to allow the CRD index tube to "settle" downward to the next latch position.
Control rod withdraw is accomplished as follows:
x SOV121 and SOV123 are energized for about 0.5 second to provide an insert signal to remove the weight of the control rod from the CRD collet fingers.
x Withdraw supply valve SOV122 then opens and drive water is directed to the control rod via the withdraw riser at a nominal rate of two gpm.
x Simultaneously withdraw exhaust valve SOV120 opens and provides a flow path for exhaust water from the insert riser to be discharged to the exhaust header. Exhaust water is directed to the reactor vessel as previously described.
x SOV122 deenergizes and closes, while SOV120 stays open for approximately 6 seconds in the settle mode.
Insertion speed control (4 gpm) is accomplished by the manual adjustment of a needle valve located on the inlet side of insert supply valve SOV123. Withdraw speed control (2 gpm) is accomplished by the manual adjustment of a needle valve located on the outlet side of withdraw exhaust valve SOV120. The speed control needle valves compensate flow to the Control Rod Drive mechanisms to overcome seal leakage to achieve proper rod speed.
The charging water header is equipped with a manual valve, a check valve and a drain connection. The charging water header branches and connects the water side of the scram accumulator to the insert riser. The charging water header maintains the accumulator pressure approximately equal to pump discharge pressure. The scram accumulator consists of a water side and a nitrogen side separated by a piston and seals. Nitrogen is charged into a dry accumulator by a portable charging unit. The purpose of the scram accumulator is to provide a stored energy source for rapid insertion of the control rod on a reactor scram signal. A ball check valve located in each control rod drive housing allows reactor pressure to scram the control rod when accumulator pressure equals reactor pressure.
B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Page 15 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 4.0 (Continued)
The charging water header to the insert riser is equipped with an air-operated scram inlet valve (AOV126). Scram inlet valve AOV126, when open, allows the scram accumulator to discharge into the insert riser causing the control rod to scram. Displaced water in the withdraw riser during a control rod scram is exhausted via the scram discharge header which is equipped with a scram outlet valve (AOV127), a check valve, and a manual gate valve. The scram discharge header branches from the withdraw riser and directs scram exhaust water to the scram discharge volume.
The cooling water header is equipped with a manual gate valve and a check valve. The cooling water header connects to the insert riser and supplies water to the control rod drive for cooling.
The cooling water in the insert riser flows past the drive piston and up into the control rod at a rate of approximately 63 gpm (total for all 185 CRDs) during normal non-rod movement conditions. CRD Cooling Water flow may be reduced to as low as 20 gpm, when the reactor is shut down to aid in reactor pressure vessel level control provided flow is restored to greater than or equal to 37 gpm within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The cooling water header also connects to the exhaust water header through the pressure equalizing valves.
The scram pilot valve air header provides the operating medium for the scram inlet (AOV126) and scram outlet (AOV127) valves through a self-contained dual solenoid pilot valve (SOV139).
The dual solenoids de-energize on a scram signal and cause the air to be vented from AOV126 and AOV127, resulting in the control rod scram insertion.
5.0 Scram Discharge Volume The Scram Discharge Volume consists of two separate, but connected, pipe headers that connects to each (185) HCU scram discharge header. The volume is adequately sized to contain the water volume displaced from all control rods scrammed from the fully withdrawn position. During a scram after all rods are fully inserted, leakage past the CRD seals continues to flow into the volume until it equalizes with reactor pressure.
Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves AOV123, AOV124, AOV130 and AOV132 are normally open and can be opened after a reactor scram to drain the scram discharge volume.
They close to isolate the primary system upon reactor scram.
The two instrument volumes of 50 gallons minimum provides scram discharge volume water level measurement. The instrument volumes are monitored by 12 level switches set at the following three progressive levels:
x Level switches (LS126 and LS129) which provide an annunciator 603130, SDV LEVEL HIGH on 2CEC*PNL603, indicating that the instrument volume is not empty.
x Level switches (LS125 and LS127) which provide a rod block signal at intermediate instrument volume levels.
x Level switch transmitters LSX11A, LSY11A, LSX11B, LSY11B, LTX12A, LTY12A, LTX12B and LTY12B which all provide inputs to the Reactor Protection System for reactor scram signals in the event of high level in the scram discharge volume.
Page 16 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 C.
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS 1.0 Systems x
N2-OP-3, Condensate and Feedwater System x
N2-OP-4, Condensate Storage and Transfer x
N2-OP-13, Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling x
N2-OP-19, Instrument and Service Air System x
N2-OP-71B, 4.16KV A.C. Power Distribution x
N2-OP-71C, 600V A.C. Power Distribution x
N2-OP-71D, Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) x N2-OP-72, Standby and Emergency A.C. Distribution System x
N2-OP-73A, Normal D.C. Distribution x
N2-OP-73B, 24/48 Volt D.C. Distribution x
N2-OP-96, Reactor Manual Control and Rod Position Indication System x
N2-OP-97, Reactor Protection System D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 1.0 Maintain charging water pressure below 1600 psig. Excessive charging water pressure may cause drive mechanism damage during a scram.
2.0 When valving an HCU into or out of service, the order of valve operation must follow the sequence specified. Failure to follow the proper valve sequence is a personnel safety hazard and may cause drive mechanism damage due to excessive internal differential pressure in the drive.
3.0 When a drive mechanism is initially installed and coupled, do not insert the drive beyond position 06 until the drive has been properly vented.
4.0 Do not attempt to cool an overheating rod drive mechanism by giving it repeated drive signals.
After checking for possible outlet scram valve leakage (AOV127), a CRD with a high temperature alarm should be left "HOT". Write an IR for maintenance on the affected drive.
5.0 Observe all precautions to limit radiation exposure and the spread of contamination. Water from leakage or drain/vent operations should be treated as contaminated. Make provisions to contain the source of the water and notify Radiation Protection.
6.0 Possible IGSCC corrosion may be indicated by higher than normal torque required to open the V101, V102 and V112 valves on HCUs. If abnormal torque is experienced, notify the System Engineer. See GE SIL 419.
7.0 Isolating Control Rod Drive System Suction from Condensate will affect Hotwell Level. See N2-OP-4 Precautions.
8.0 When a Control Rod is withdrawn to Full Out position, a Control Rod coupling check shall be performed per Technical Specification SR 3.1.3.5.
D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Continued)
Page 17 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 9.0 If the CRD system is to be shutdown, then the RDS RPV Water Level Instrument Backfill System must also be shutdown per N2-OP-34. The Backfill system should be isolated at 2RDS-V2058, RDS COMMON HDR ISOL, or 2RDS-V20, PI105/RDS BACKFILL ISOL. Isolating the system at these valves will minimize the possibility of air getting into the backfill lines when restarting a CRD pump.
10.0 If a CRD pump trips due to low suction pressure and the standby pump does not start or subsequently trips, then the backfill injection system should be isolated at 2RDS-V2058 RDS COMMON HDR ISOL, or 2RDS-V20, PI105/RDS BACKFILL ISOL. Isolating the system at these valves will minimize the possibility of air getting into the backfill lines when the CRD pump is restarted.
11.0 2RDS*V111, Nitrogen Cartridge Valve shall not be throttled when charging or discharging an HCU to prevent damaging the Liquid Level Indicating Switch internal spring. Throttling nitrogen when charging or discharging an HCU shall be accomplished by using the valve on the charging rig. [C3]
12.0 If abnormalities occur during CRD insertion with only a blade guide installed in a cell (i.e. CRD stops, or inserts slowly, or the blade guide is observed to lift), both blade guide positioning and fuel support casting orientation must be inspected. After control rod insertion, reverify proper orientation of the fuel support casting. [C6]
13.0 Performance of Subsections/Steps in this procedure may be required by the EOPs or SAPs.
Changes to these Subsections/Steps (including renumbering) are required to be reviewed by the EOP Coordinator.
14.0 During Plant operation, adjustment of 2RDS*V559B (SDV Vent/Drain 2RDS*SOV155 needle valve) should not be performed since SDV vent/drain valve closure times may be affected. Per Technical Specifications if 2RDS*V559B is adjusted, an actual or simulated scram signal may be required to verify compliance with SR 3.1.8.3.a.
15.0 If in Mode 5, the Mode switch must be locked in REFUEL prior to withdrawing a control rod (T/S 3.9.2).
16.0 If in Mode 5, whenever a control rod is withdrawn from position 00, the FULL IN light not lit must be verified with a valid position observed on the four rod display (T/S 3.9.4).
17.0 If increasing Drive Water DP to facilitate rod movement, do not exceed the maximum allowable Drive Water pressure of 1510 psig.
18.0 When operating the RDS Flow Controller (2RDS-FC107) in manual at P601, care should be taken when using the fast detent mode such that controller demand does not exceed valve motion (i.e. - demand signal is great enough that valve motion continues after controls are released).
19.0 Drive water differential pressure (DP) shall not exceed 430 PSID for control rods having a fuel cell with a bowed channel fuel bundle. The drive water header pressure differential (DP) limitation will limit the momentary hydraulic lifting force.
20.0 Personnel injury may occur due to potential for 2RDS*V116 (xx-yy) valve plug to eject from the valve body if restraining washer fails. Use caution while installing the 2RDS*V116 temporary tool (See DER 2005-1565/AR02019373).
21.0 Failure to restrain the 2RDS*V116(XX-YY) valve body while tightening the 2RDS*V116 valve tool may break the copper air tubing, which could lead to a reactor scram.
D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Continued)
Page 18 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 22.0 Control Rod Drive Flange Leakage Guidelines:
The fact that a CRD flange to vessel flange joint leakage exists on a newly installed CRD does not mean that an adequate flange joint seal has not been achieved. The following guidelines are recommended for assessing CRD flange leakages:
x All drip-type leaks which show a decreasing leak rate over an 8-hour period at reactor pressures greater than or equal to 1000 psig do not require any corrective maintenance action. For additional assurance, they should, however, be observed at later periods whenever the opportunity exists.
x Drip-type leaks of 30 drops per minute or less which show a constant or decreasing leak rate over an 8-hour period at reactor pressures greater than or equal to 1000 psig do not require any corrective maintenance action.
x Maintenance should be considered if a drip-type leak shows an increasing rate over an 8-hour period at reactor pressures greater than or equal to 1000 psig.
x Maintenance should be considered if a drip-type leak greater than 30 drops per minute shows a constant rate over an 8-hour period at reactor pressures greater than or equal to 1000 psig.
x Maintenance should be considered for any stream-type or spray-type leak.
The maintenance suggestions for reducing the leakage rate are (a) performing an insert stall flow test, (b) performing a withdraw stall flow test, (c) scramming, and (d) replacing the three metal o-rings. Performing a insert stall flow test and scramming [suggestions (a) and (c)] assist the sealing of the self-energizing o-ring at the insert port by increasing the internal pressure of the o-ring. Similarly, performing a withdraw stall flow test [suggestion (b)] assists the sealing of the o-ring at the withdraw port.
When performing the stall flow tests, a higher-than-normal drive water pressure together with normal reactor pressures will increase the probability of reducing the CRD flange leakage rate.
Before scramming the CRD, the CRD system should have been vented to minimize the quantity of air in the lines. Scramming a CRD with excessive air in the lines could result in CRD seal damage. When scramming the CRD, the HCU charging water isolation valve (valve No. 113) should be closed. A total of 6 full stroke scrams may be performed.
23.0 Drive water differential pressure should be between 250 and 260 psid during the insert stall flow data collection. Exceeding 260 psid may result in test inaccuracies.
24.0 Isolating HCUs with 2RDS*V101(XX-YY) or 2RDS-V104(XX-YY) closed raises the Cooling Water Differential Pressure. A Cooling Water Differential Pressure of 35 psid is sufficient to operate the Collet Piston and unlatch Control Rods which could result in unplanned Control Rod withdrawals. With a normal RDS System lineup isolating more than 80 HCUs with an RDS Pump in service could raise Cooling Water Differential Pressure to greater than or equal to 35 psid. To prevent unplanned Control Rod withdrawals while the Plant is shut down, the RDS Pumps shall be secured prior to isolating more than 80 HCUs. Refer to INPO SEN 264. [C12]
25.0 Whenever 2RDS-V103 is manipulated, it should be slowly throttled open to minimize the pressure increase rate. This will prevent water hammer pressure transients which could cause "O" ring deformation and leakage on the Directional Control Valves (DCVs). This is of special concern if maintenance has been performed on the DCV's as the piping between 2RDS-V103 and 2RDS*SOV122/123 is expected to contain air at atmospheric pressure.
D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Continued)
Page 19 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 26.0 When depressurizing the SCRAM air header for maintenance, the preferred method is to rapidly depressurize it by inserting a manual SCRAM signal to fully actuate the scram solenoid pilot valves (SSPV) and then close the manual isolation valves. This ensures that a reset is completed successfully and the SSPV will seat fully (Reference CR-2010-003442).
27.0 The control rod drive hydraulic control unit directional control valve block at the HCU are stamped with the words OUT next to the 121 and 123 valves (the insert valves) and IN next to the 120 and 122 valves (the withdraw valves). These stamped words are reversed and are not to be used for valve manipulations.
28.0 Failure to return drive water pressure to normal after unsticking a stuck control rod may result in excessive control rod speed and/or double notching. To alleviate repetitive drive pressure adjustments and associated operational challenges, elevated drive pressure for control rod withdrawal is authorized up to and including control rod position 12.
29.0 When the CRD FCV is in Local Manual control, an Operator shall be kept in continual attendance at the Local Control Station during any reactor power or pressure changes to make adjustments as necessary. In addition, the Operator shall be briefed to be able to respond in the event of a scram to close the CRD FCV. When shutdown with the Reactor depressurized, this requirement can be relaxed
F.
NORMAL OPERATIONS (Continued)
Initials Page 31 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 2.0 CRD Pump Changeover 2.1 Verify the following valve positions for pump to be started: [SOP]
2.1.1 2CCP-V162 (163), 2RDS-P1A (B) Coolers Inlet Isol Vlv -
Open 2.1.2 2CCP-V164 (165), 2RDS-P1A (B) Coolers Outlet Isol Vlv - Open 3 Notches (4 Notches).
2.1.3 2RDS-V7A (7B), RDS Pump 1A (1B) Suction Isol. - Open 2.1.4 2RDS-V18A (18B), RDS Pump 1A (1B) Disch. Isol. - Open 2.2 IF RDS is supplying WCS pump seal cooling, THEN station personnel at the following locations to simultaneously monitor WCS pump seal parameters during RDS pump changeover.
[C8]
x 2CES*RAK002, RB EL 289 behind 2NJS-US2.
x RB EL 215 at WCS pump seal flow indicators 2WCS-FI77A (77B), 2WCS-FI78A(78B).
2.3 Start standby CRD pump 2RDS-P1A (P1B), CRD PUMP 1A (1B) by placing its control switch to START, THEN release to Normal-After-START.
2.4 Stop CRD pump to be shutdown 2RDS-P1B (P1A), CRD PUMP 1B (1A) by taking its control switch to STOP AND releasing to Normal-After-STOP.
2.5 Monitor operating WCS pump(s) seal cavity temperatures as indicated by 2WCS-TIS36A(B) AND 2WCS-TIS36C(D), (located on 2CES*RAK002, RB EL. 289 AZ 332, behind 2NJS-US2).
CAUTION The total demand for RDS seal water injection flow to the WCS pumps shall not exceed 16 gpm.
2.6 IF WCS pump seal cooling is being supplied from RDS, THEN verify seal cooling flow is between 1 to 4 gpm as indicated on 2WCS-FI77A(77B) AND 2WCS-FI78A(78B) for running WCS pump(s).
2.7 IF WCS pump seal cooling adjustment required, THEN adjust 2WCS-FV58A(B) AND/OR 2WCS-FV59A(B) as follows:
CAUTION Adjust stem by hand only, use of mechanical means on stem could cause stem damage.
2.7.1 Loosen top locknut only.
2.7.2 Rotate stem clockwise to lower flow OR counter-clockwise to raise flow UNTIL flow is between 1 to 4 gpm.
2.7.3 Hold stem steady AND re-tighten locknut.
OPE OPE OPE OPE OPE OPE
F. NORMAL OPERATIONS (Continued)
Initials Page 32 of 114 N2-OP-30 Rev 02600 2.8 Verify NO excessive leakage (less than 100 dpm per seal) from WCS pump seals.
2.9 Verify RCS seal purge flow is between 3 to 5 gpm as indicated on RCS-FI3A(B).
2.10 IF RCS seal purge flow adjustment required, THEN adjust 2RCS-FCV2A(B) as follows:
2.10.1 Loosen locknut for needle valve on top of 2RCS-FCV2A(B).
2.10.2 For 2RCS-FCV2A(B), turn needle valve counter-clockwise to raise flow OR clockwise to lower flow.
2.10.3 AFTER adjustment is made tighten locknut.
2.10.4 Log adjustment in Control Room Log.
2.11 As required, adjust RPV Level Instrumentation Backfill flowrate per N2-OP-34, Subsection F.4.0.
3.0 Pump Discharge Filter Changeover [SOP]
NOTE The in-service discharge filter shall be isolated, removed, and replaced with a clean filter whenever the differential pressure is greater than 20 psid as read at the local gauge 2RDS-PDIS106, RDS FILTER D/P, on 2CES-RAK101 (RB 261').
3.1 Open 2RDS-V23B (A), Disch. Flt. 2B (2A) Inlet Isol.
3.2 Open 2RDS-V2074B (A), Disch. Flt. 2B (2A) Vent AND vent standby discharge filter.
3.3 WHEN a solid stream of water, free of air bubbles is coming from 2RDS-V2074B (A),
THEN close 2RDS-V2074B (A).
3.4 Slowly open 2RDS-V26B (A), Disch. Flt. 2B (2A) Outlet Isol.
3.5 Slowly close 2RDS-V26A (B), Disch. Flt. 2A (2B) Outlet Isol. to remove filter from service.
3.6 Close 2RDS-V23A (B), Disch. Flt. 2A (2B) Inlet Isol.
NOTE The filter which was in-service is now in standby.
3.7 IF filter does NOT require replacement with a clean filter, THEN stop here.
ILTNRC221
Scenario#1ReMAPacket
Simulator Scenario Handout Reference Packet
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline
Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario #:
NRC-2 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #:
2023-1 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
The plant is operating at approximately 85% power. WCS pump B is out of service for maintenance.
Turnover:
Transfer feed for 2NJS-US5 from Alternate to Normal per N2-OP-71C section H.2.0. Then, perform a control rod pattern adjustment per the provided ReMA and N2-OP-96.
Critical Tasks:
CT-1: Given a failure to scram with Reactor power above 4%,
the crew will lower Reactor power by one or more of the following methods, in accordance with N2-EOP-C5:
Rapidly lowering RPV water level Tripping RCS pump B Injecting boron The Reactor power reduction must be initiated within ten minutes of the start of the failure to scram.
CT-2: Given a failure to scram, the crew will initiate control rod insertion, in accordance with N2-EOP-C5. This may be accomplished by manual insertion with RMCS or by repeated manual scrams. Control rod insertion must be commenced within one hour of the start of the failure to scram.
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N - BOP, SRO Transfer Feed for 2NJS-US5 From Alternate to Normal N2-OP-71C 2
N/A R - ATC, SRO Control Rod Pattern Adjustment N2-OP-96 3
Override DG05A DG06A C - BOP, SRO TS - SRO MC - BOP Spurious Start of Div 1 EDG, EDG Overspeeds, Overspeed Trip Fails ARP, N2-OP-100A, Technical Specifications 4
IA02A IA01 IA04A IA04B C - BOP, SRO MC - BOP IAC Trips, Standby IAC Fails to Automatically Start N2-SOP-19 5
RR:PA:
MT:I C - ATC, SRO TS - SRO RCS Pump A Trip N2-SOP-29, Technical Specifications 6
IA01 C - All Instrument Air Leak N2-SOP-19, N2-SOP-101C, N2-EOP-RPV 7
RD17Z M - All MC - All Failure to Scram N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-C5 8
RP12A RP12B C - ATC, SRO MC - ATC RRCS Fails To Automatically Initiate N2-EOP-C5 9
TU07 TC:PA(
B):MT:I C - BOP, SRO MC - BOP Spurious Main Turbine Trip, EHC Pumps Trip N2-EOP-C5
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Op-Test No.: 2023-1
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Events 8 & 9 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4)
Events 3, 4, 5, 6 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2)
Event 7 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
N2-EOP-RPV 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (1 per scenario set)
N2-EOP-C5 1
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2
Copy of
TrainingId: April2023NRCScenario2 Revision:
0.0 Title
April2023NRCScenario2
Signature/PrintedName Date DevelopedBy SignatureonFile/MikeAlexander 4/4/23 ValidatedBy N/A/BenBrenon 1/5/23 N/A/JimLai 1/5/23 N/A/JeremyTitus 1/5/23 FacilityReviewer SignatureonFile/JohnToothaker 4/4/23
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page2of42
References
- 1.
N2OP71C,600VACPowerDistribution
- 2.
N2OP96,ReactorManualControlandRodPositionIndicationSystem
- 3.
ARP852117,EDG1RUNNING
- 4.
ARP852125,EDG1OVERSPEEDTRIP
- 5.
N2OP100A,StandbyDieselGenerators
- 6.
N2SOP19,LossofInstrumentAir
- 7.
N2SOP29,SuddenReductioninCoreFlow
- 8.
N2SOP101C,ReactorScram
- 9.
N2EOPRPV,RPVControl
- 10. N2EOPC5,RPVControlATWS
- 11. N2EOPHC,NMP2EOPHardCardsProcedure
- 12. NMPUnit2EALWallboardEPAA1013Addendum4Appendix1
- 13. N2TSPEC,NMPNSUnit2ImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(Volume1,2,3)
- 14. OPAA112101,ShiftTurnoverandRelief
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page3of42
InstructorInformation A. ScenarioDescription
- 1.
SequenceofEvents/ExpectedCrewResponse
- a.
Thescenariobeginsatapproximately85%reactorpower withWCSpumpBoutofservice.
Event1isthenormalevolutionperformedbytheBOP operatortotransferthefeedforelectricalbus2NJSUS5 fromAlternatetoNormalperN2OP71C.
- b.
Event2isareactivityevolution.TheATCoperatorwill performacontrolrodpatternadjustmentperthe providedReMAandN2OP96.
- c.
Event3occurswhentheDivision1EDGspuriouslystarts.
TheEDGwilloverspeed,buttheoverspeedtripwithfailto occur.ThecrewwillrespondpertheassociatedARPsand shutdowntheEDGperN2OP100A.TheSROwillevaluate TechnicalSpecifications.
- d.
Event4occurswhenInstrumentAirCompressor2IASC3A tripsandInstrumentAirCompressor2IASC3Cfailsto automaticallystart.ThecrewwillrespondperN2SOP19 andstarttheInstrumentAirCompressor2IASC3Cto maintainInstrumentAirpressure.
- e.
Event5beginswhenReactorRecirculationpumpAtrips.
ThecrewwillrespondperN2SOP29andtakeactions includinginsertingatleast4CRAMrods.TheSROwill evaluateTechnicalSpecification3.4.1forsingleloop operation.
- f.
Event6beginswhenanInstrumentAirleakoccurs.The leakexceedsthecapacityoftheavailableInstrumentAir CompressorandInstrumentAirpressurelowers.Thecrew willexecuteN2SOP19.LoweringInstrumentAirpressure willnecessitateaReactorscram.
- g.
Events79beginimmediatelyfollowingthescramattempt whencontrolrodsfailtoinsert.ThecrewwillenterN2 EOPRPVandtransitiontoN2EOPC5.Thecrewwilltake actionstolowerReactorpower(criticaltask)andinsert
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page4of42
controlrods(criticaltask).RRCSfailstoautomatically initiate.Thiswillrequirethecrewtotakemanualactions tocontrolRecirculationpumpBandStandbyLiquid Control.TheMainTurbinewillspuriouslytripandEHC pumpswilltrip,causingthelossofTurbineBypassValves, causingadditionalSRVactuationandnecessitating additionalactionsforReactorpressurecontrol.
- 2.
TerminationCriteria
- a.
ReactorpowerdownscaleonAPRMs.
- b.
Controlrodsinsertioninprogressorcompleted.
- c.
Reactorlevelbeingcontrolledinassignedband.
- 3.
CriticalTasks CT1.0Justification:
SafetySignificance:
CriticalTask1.0isidentifiedascriticalbecause,withoutoperatoractiontolowerReactorpower,theriskof damagetofissionproductbarriersissignificantlyelevated.
InitiatingCue:
MultipleannunciatorsandindicationswillprovideevidencethattheReactorhasfailedtoscramandthat Reactorpowerremainsabove4%.N2EOPRPVandN2EOPC5providedirectiontolowerReactorpower.
SuccessPath:
ThecrewwillmanipulateinjectionsourcestolowerReactorwaterlevel,RCSpumpAcontrolswitch,and/or SLScontrols.
PerformanceFeedback:
Reactorwaterlevelandinjectionsourceflowrateswillprovideperformancefeedbackregardingthe successofrapidlyloweringRPVwaterlevel.RCSpumpandSLSpumpindicationsandflowrateswill provideperformancefeedbackregardingthesuccessofoperatingthosesystems.Overall,multiple indicationswillprovideperformancefeedbackontheeffectoftheseactionsonReactorpower.
MeasurablePerformance Standard:
Manipulatinginjectionsources,RCSpumpAcontrolswitch,and/orSLScontrolswillprovidetheevaluation teamwithobservableactions.
BoundingConditions:
TimelimitbasedonOperationsrepresentativerecommendation.
- a.
CT1.0,GivenafailuretoscramwithReactorpowerabove 4%,thecrewwilllowerReactorpowerbyoneormoreof thefollowingmethods,inaccordancewithN2EOPC5:
RapidlyloweringRPVwaterlevel TrippingRCSpumpB Injectingboron TheReactorpowerreductionmustbeinitiatedwithinten minutesofthestartofthefailuretoscram.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page5of42
CT2.0Justification:
SafetySignificance:
CriticalTask2.0isidentifiedascriticalbecause,withoutoperatoractiontoinsertcontrolrods,theReactor willnotachieveastable,longtermshutdowncondition.
InitiatingCue:
Multipleannunciatorsandindicationswillprovideevidenceofthefailureofcontrolrodstoinsertonthe scram.
SuccessPath:
ThecrewwillutilizeoneormoremethodsinN2EOP6.14toinsertcontrolrods,suchasrepeatedmanual scramattemptsormanualinsertionusingRMCS.
PerformanceFeedback:
ControlrodpositionindicationandReactorpowerindicationwillprovideperformancefeedbackregarding thesuccessofcontrolrodinsertion.
MeasurablePerformance Standard:
ManipulationofCRD/RMCScomponentswillprovideobservableactionsfortheevaluationteam.
BoundingConditions:
TimelimitbasedonOperationsrepresentativerecommendation.
- b.
CT2.0,Givenafailuretoscram,thecrewwillinitiate controlrodinsertion,inaccordancewithN2EOPC5.This maybeaccomplishedbymanualinsertionwithRMCSor byrepeatedmanualscrams.Controlrodinsertionmust becommencedwithinonehourofthestartofthefailure toscram.
- 4.
Length
- a.
60minutes
- 5.
MitigationStrategyCode
- a.
DMSAT01,highpowerATWS(greaterthanAPRM downscale);heatadditiontosuppressionpoolortorus requiresentryintolevelpowercontrol;RPVlevel controlledbelowfeedwaterspargers;RPVblowdownnot required
- 6.
TechnicalSpecifications(Applicableactionsforinitialconditions only)
- a.
None
- 7.
EALClassification
- a.
Alert,EALMA3:
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page6of42
- 1)
B.
InitialConditions
- 1.
ICNumber
- a.
IC021orequivalent(IC222forILT221)
- 2.
Presets/WithTriggers
- a.
Malfunctions
- 1)
CU:PB:BK:I,RWCUPumpBBreakerFailure,Final=
trip Inserted
- 2)
DG05A,EDG#1(DIV1)Overspeed,Final=True,Delay
=30seconds TRG1
- 3)
DG06A,EDG#1(DIV1)OverspeedTripFailure,Final=
True TRG1
- 4)
IA02A,2IASC3AThermalOverloadTrip,Final=True TRG2
- 5)
IA01,LossofInstrumentAir,Final=5 TRG2
- 6)
IA04A,IASCompressorLagAutostartFailure,Final=
True Inserted
- 7)
IA04B,IASCompressorBackupAutostartFailure, Final=True Inserted
- 8)
RR:PA:MT:I,RRP1AMotorFailure,Final=short TRG3
- 9)
RD17Z,RD17forAllRods,Final=14 Inserted
- 10) RP12A,RRCSDivisionFailure(DivI),Final=True Inserted
- 11) RP12B,RRCSDivisionFailure(DivII),Final=True Inserted
- 12) TC:PA:MT:I,TurbineEHCPumpAMotorFailure, Final=short,Delay=5minutes TRG5
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page7of42
- 13) TC:PB:MT:I,TurbineEHCPumpBMotorFailure,Final
=short,Delay=5minutes TRG5
- 14) TU07,SpuriousMainTurbineTrip,Final=True,Delay
=3minutes TRG5
- b.
Remotes
- 1)
MS06A,DEFEATLEVELONEISOLATIONOFMSIVS (JUMPERK148A),Final=Defeated TRG20
- 2)
MS06B,DEFEATLEVELONEISOLATIONOFMSIVS (JUMPERK148B),Final=Defeated TRG20
- 3)
MS06C,DEFEATLEVELONEISOLATIONOFMSIVS (JUMPERK148C),Final=Defeated TRG20
- 4)
MS06D,DEFEATLEVELONEISOLATIONOFMSIVS (JUMPERK148D),Final=Defeated TRG20
- 5)
ED68A,CKTBKR600B53BJUMPEREB10andEB 11,Final=jumpered Inserted
- c.
Overrides
- 1)
DI7748,STREMERDIESELGENERATOR1START, Final=on TRG1
- 2)
DI7744,PTLEMERDIESELGENERATOR1START, Final=off TRG1
- 3)
DI7745,STPEMERDIESELGENERATOR1START, Final=off TRG1
- d.
- 1)
None
- e.
EventTriggers Event#
EventAction Command 4
LeftBlank Imfia018010:00 5
rp_d535==1&rp_d536==1(Reactorscram)
LeftBlank 15 rp_d535==1&rp_d536==1(Reactorscram) dmfia01 25 zdia1asc01(2)==1(IACCcontrolsswitchtostart) dmfia01
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page8of42
Event#
EventAction Command 28 zddg43lbensx04==1 (Div1LOCAbypassswitchto BYPASS) dordi7744 29 zddg43lbensx04==1 (Div1LOCAbypassswitchto BYPASS) dordi7745 30 zddg43lbensx04==1 (Div1LOCAbypassswitchto BYPASS) dordi7748
- f.
EquipmentOutofService
- 1)
WCSpumpB
- g.
SupportDocumentation
- 1)
ProvideN2OP71CsectionH.2.0.Placekeepthrough stepH.2.6.NextsteptoperformisstepH.2.7.
- 2)
ProvideReMAforcontrolrodpatternadjustment.
- h.
Miscellaneous
- 1)
Transferfeedfor2NJSUS5fromnormaltoalternate.
- 2)
PlaceclearancereferencetagontheWCSpumpB controlswitchinPTL.
- 3)
PlaceProtectedpathwaysignsontheWCSpumpA controlswitch C.
ShiftTurnoverInformation
- 1.
ReactorPower:85%
- 2.
Rodline:Below100%
- 3.
TechnicalSpecificationLCOsineffect:
- a.
None
- 4.
SignificantProblems/Abnormalities/EquipmentOutof Service:
- a.
WCSpumpBoutofserviceformaintenance
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page9of42
- 5.
Evolutions/MaintenanceScheduledforthisShift:
- a.
Transferfeedfor2NJSUS5fromAlternatetoNormalper N2OP71CsectionH.2.0.Theprocedureisinprogress andthenextsteptobeperformedisH.2.7.
- b.
Then,performacontrolrodpatternadjustmentperthe providedReMAandN2OP96.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page10of31
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 85%.
WCS pump B is out of service for maintenance PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Transfer feed for 2NJS-US5 from Alternate to Normal per N2-OP-71C section H.2.0. The procedure is in progress and the next step to be performed is H.2.7.
Then, perform a control rod pattern adjustment per the provided ReMA and N2-OP-96.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page11of31
Event#1-TransferFeedfor2NJSUS5FromAlternatetoNormal Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions Reactoratpower 2NJSUS5suppliedfromAlternate
- VerifiableActions Transferfeedfor2NJSUS5FromAlternatetoNormal
- Final(expected)operatingresult 2NJSUS5suppliedbynormalsource
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions SRO
- DirectsBOPtotransferfeedfor2NJSUS5From AlternatetoNormalperN2OP71CsectionH.2.0.
RolePlay:
IfcontactedasanEOtoensureproperbreakeroperation inthefield,waittwominutesandinformthemthat properbreakeroperationwasobserved.
RolePlay:
Ifcontactedtoremovejumperinrearof2NJSUS5,wait twominutes,reinsertremoteED68AinNORMAL,and thenreporttaskcompletion.
- Acknowledgesdirectiontotransferfeedfor2NJS US5FromAlternatetoNormalperN2OP71C sectionH.2.0.
- At2CEC*PNL852,PERFORMthefollowing:
CLOSEBREAKER53B,Normalsupplytobus OPENBREAKER58B,AlternateSupplyto2NJS US5
- DispatchoperatortoREMOVEjumperbetween terminalsEB10ANDEB11,intherearof2NJSUS5, SECTION3,onterminalstripEB.
- NOTIFYcrewofthefollowing:
2NJSUS5isonnormalsupply Jumperisremovedfrom52bcontactsof2NJS US58B
Event Termination Criteria
- Transferof2NJSUS5FromAlternatetoNormalhasbeencompleted
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page12of31
Event#2-ControlRodPatternAdjustment Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions Reactorat~85%power
- VerifiableActions MovecontrolrodsperprovidedReMA
- Final(expected)operatingresult Reactorpowerat~90%withnewcontrolrodpatternestablished
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- DirectsATCtoperformacontrolrodpattern adjustmentpertheprovidedReMAandN2OP96.
Note:
TheReMAdirectswithdrawingcontrolrods1843,4243, 4219,and1819fromposition06toposition10using notchwithdrawal.
- Acknowledgesdirectiontoperformacontrolrod patternadjustmentpertheprovidedReMAandN2 OP96.
- ReviewsN2OP96actionsforfirsttimerodselection andwithdrawalactions:
SELECTStherodtobemovedbymomentarily depressingthepushbuttonforthatrodonthe RodSelectModuleat2CEC*PNL603Monitors RPV,CRDandNuclearInstruments OBSERVESthefollowing:
- Thepushbuttonforselectedrodislit
- Thewhiteselectlightonfullcoredisplayislit forcontrolrod
- Therod'spositionisindicatedANDincorrect locationon4RodDisplay
- IFavailable,THENRodWorthMinimizer indicatescorrectrodANDrodposition OTHERWISEMARKthisstepN/A NotchWithdrawalisperformedasfollows:
- VERIFIESReactormodeswitchisnotin SHUTDOWNANDtherearenorod withdrawalblocks.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page13of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- VERIFIEScorrectrodhasbeenselectedper sequencebeingused
- WITHDRAWSselectedcontrolrodasfollows:
o DEPRESSESWITHDRAWpushbutton.
o CONFIRMSRodmotionasindicated by:
Rodpositionindicationon4 RodDisplay Withdrawlightisilluminated o
RELEASESWITHDRAWpushbutton o
OBSERVESSETTLElightilluminated
- Continuescontrolrodwithdrawalpertheprovided ReMA
- MonitorsNIindications,reactorlevelandreactor pressure.
- Monitorsplantparameterstoverifyproper operations.
- Providespeerchecksasneeded.
Event Termination Criteria
- ControlrodmovementscompletedsufficientlyasdeterminedbytheLeadEvaluator
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page14of31
Event#3-SpuriousStartofDiv1EDG,EDGOverspeeds,OverspeedTripFails Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions PlantoperatingatpowerwithallEDGsinthestandbylineup
- VerifiableActions SecureDiv1EDG
- Final(expected)operatingresult PlantoperatingatpowerwithDiv1EDGsecured
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insert thefollowing overridesandmalfunctions:
TRG1 DI7748,STREMERDIESELGENERATOR1 START,Final=on
DI7744,PTLEMERDIESELGENERATOR1
START,Final=off
DI7745,STPEMERDIESELGENERATOR1
START,Final=off
DG05A,EDG#1(DIV1)Overspeed,Final=
True,Delay=30seconds
DG06A,EDG#1(DIV1)OverspeedTrip Failure,Final=True
Div1EDGstartsandrunsunloaded Div1EDGoverspeeds,butdoesnotautomaticallytrip Thefollowingannunciatoralarms:
852117,EDG1RUNNING 852125,EDG1OVERSPEEDTRIP
- Silences,acknowledgesandreportsannunciators
- Recognizes/reportsDiv1EDGhasspuriously started
- Recognizes/reportsDiv1EDGisoverspeedingbut hasnottripped.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page15of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Spec Condition ApplicableActions 3.8.1 B
B.1&B.3.1orB.3.2&B.4 Action Description B.1 PerformSR3.8.1.1forOPERABLErequired offsitecircuit(s).(1hour)
B.3.1 or B.3.2 DetermineOPERABLEDG(s)arenot inoperableduetocommoncausefailure.
or
PerformSR3.8.1.2forOPERABLEDG(s).
(24hours)
B.4 RestorerequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatus.
(14days)
- AcknowledgesspuriousstartofDiv1EDG
- DirectsshutdownofDiv1EDGperARPsand/orN2 OP100A
- EvaluatesplantconditionsagainstTechSpecsand determinesthefollowingapply:
ITS3.8.1ConditionB,ActionsB.1,B.3.1orB.3.2, andB.4 RolePlay:
Ifdispatchedtoinvestigate EGS*EG1,wait2minutes, thenreportcurrentstatusofEGS*EG1(runningor secured),andthatnothingelselooksobviouslyabnormal.
BoothOperator:
WhentheLOCABypassswitchistakentoBYPASS,TRG30 willautomaticallydeleteoverridesdi7748,di7744,and di7445.ThisremovestheoverridesontheDiv1EDG controlswitchthatcausedthespuriousstartandallows forstoppingtheEDGfromtheControlRoom.
IfrequestedtolocallytriptheEDG,wait1minute,then deletemalfunctionDG06A(OverspeedTripFailure)to causetheEDGtotrip.
- ExecutesARP852117:
VERIFYEGS*EG1shouldberunningAND OPERATEPERN2OP100A,StandbyDiesel Generators VERIFYalarmclearsWHENdieselgeneratoris shutdown
- ExecutesARP852125:
VERIFYautomaticresponsehasoccurred(takes Div1EDGcontrolswitchtoSTOPorPTL)
NOTIFYMMDtoINVESTIGATEANDCORRECT causeofoverspeed RESEToverspeedgovernorPERN2OP100A, SubsectionH.11.0,2EGS*EG1(EG3)Overspeed TripReset(iftimepermits)
- MayexecuteN2OP100AsectionH.1.2:
PLACEEMERGENCYDSLGEN1LOCASIGNAL BYPASSswitchtoON PLACEtheDivision12EGS*EG1StartSwitchto PULLTOLOCK
- MayexecuteN2OP100AsectionH.1.3:
DispatchEOtodepressEMERGENCYSTOPSTOP (red)pushbutton
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page16of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Event Termination Criteria
- Div1EDGhasbeensecured
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page17of31
Event#4-IACTrips,StandbyIACFailstoAutomaticallyStart Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions PlantoperatingatpowerwithInstrumentAirCompressor2IASC3Arunning, InstrumentAirCompressor2IASC3Bisrunning,andInstrumentAirCompressor2IAS C3Cisinstandby
- VerifiableActions StartInstrumentAirCompressor2IASC3C
- Final(expected)operatingresult PlantoperatingatpowerwithInstrumentAirCompressors2IASC3Band2IASC3C runningandnormalInstrumentAirpressure
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertthefollowing malfunctions:
TRG2 IA02A,2IASC3AThermalOverloadTrip, Final=True
IA01,LossofInstrumentAir,Final=5
Thefollowingmalfunctionsarepreset:
IA04A,IASCompressorLagAutostart Failure,Final=True
IA04B,IASCompressorBackup
AutostartFailure,Final=True Theplantrespondsasfollows:
IASC3A,therunninginstrumentaircompressortrips onmotorelectricalfault InstrumentAirHeaderPressurestartstolower
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page18of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions Thefollowingannunciatorsalarm:
851228,InstrAirCpsr3A/3B/3CAutoTripFailTo Start 851259,InstrAirCompressorClgWtrFlowLow 851260,InstrAirCompressorCoolingSysTrouble
Thefollowingcomputerpointsaregenerated:
CCPBC09,RBCLCWP2A/BAutoStart(Start)
IASUC04,IASCPRSRC3A/B/CAT/FTS(Tripped)
Approximately1minuteaftereventinitiation(basedon thetimelinessofcrewactions)thefollowingannunciator alarms:
851229,InstrAirSystemTrouble Thefollowingcomputerpointisgenerated:
IASPC02,InstrAirHdrPress(Low)
- Silences,acknowledgesandreportsannunciator 851228andreportsthatherunningIAScompressor hastripped
- Providescrewupdateforthetripof2IASC3A
- AcknowledgesROreportof2IASC3Atrip
- ProvidescrewupdatefortheentryintoN2SOP19
- DirectsROtoenterN2SOP19
- Overseescrewactions
- Providescrewtransientbrief/reversebrief
- DirectsROnottoisolatebreathingair
- Maydirect2IASC3B/Cprotected RolePlay:
AsEquipmentOperatorifdispatchedlocallytoevaluate localairpressureindicators,wait2minutesandthen reportairpressuresbasedonsimulatordisplayIA01.
RolePlay:
AsEquipmentOperatordispatchedlocallyto2IASC3A, wait2minutesandthenreportthat2IASC3Atripon thermaloverload,butfurtherinvestigationisneededto verifythat.
Ifdispatchedtopowersupply,wait2minutesandreport thatnothingapparentisvisible.
- ExecutesN2SOP19:
- Determinesthatanaircompressortriphasoccurred
- Determinesthatcompressorcoolingisavailable
- Determinesthatheaderpressureislowering
- Performs"Compressor"legactionsofN2SOP19:
- Determinesthatanaircompressorhastripped and/orisdegraded
- Determinesthattherehasnotbeenalossofallair compressorsduetoslowtransferorlossofcontrol power
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page19of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Ifaskedaboutanyreverseairflowthrough2IASC3A, reportthatthereisnoreverseairflowthrough2IASC3A.
BoothOperator:
When2IASC3Ccontrolswitchistakentonormalafter start,TRG25willautomaticallyinsertanddelete malfunctionIA01.
When2IASC3AisplacedinPTLthefollowing annunciatorclears:
851228,InstrAirCpsr3A/3B/3CAutoTripFailToStart
WhenIASheaderpressurerisesto~100psig,thefollowing annunciatorclears:
851229,InstrAirSystemTrouble
- Determinesthatthelagcompressorfailedtoauto start
- Providescrewupdateofthefailureofthelag compressortoautostart
- ManuallystartsthelagcompressorperN2SOP19:
- Selects2IASC3CasLEADontheinstrument aircompressorselectorswitch
- Places2IASC3Ccontrolswitchtonormal afterstart
- Monitorsairheaderpressuretodetermineif pressureisrestoring
- Determinesinstrumentairheaderpressureis restoring
- Performs"HeaderPressure"legactionsofN2SOP 19:
- Determinesthecauseofloweringairpressuretobe lossofIAScompressors
- Determinesthatthelossofairisnotduetoaline break
- Determinesthatthecauseoftheloweringair pressurehasbeencorrected
- Performsattachment1ofN2SOP19
- DeterminesfromSROthatbreathingairwillnotbe shutdown
- Determinesthatlossofairisnotduetoimproper valvelineup
- DeterminesthatIASSOV171serviceairisolation valvedidnotclose
- PerformsARP851228,851259&851260 DispatchesEquipmentOperatortoinvestigate 2IASC3Alocallytodeterminetripcause DispatchesEquipmentOperatortoinspectpower supplyindications
- ContinueswithARPactions:
Places2IASC3AinPTL Verifies2IASC3AisselectedasthebackupIAS compressor
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page20of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- MaydirectEquipmentOperatortoprotect2IAS C3B/C
Event Termination Criteria
- InstrumentAirCompressors2IASC3Band2IASC3Crunning
- InstrumentAirpressurehasreturnedtonormal
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page21of31
Event#5-RCSPumpATrip Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions PlantoperatingatpowerwithbothReactorRecircpumpsoperatinginfastspeed
- VerifiableActions Insert4CRAMrods
- Final(expected)operatingresult Plantoperatingatpowerinsingleloopoperation
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertthefollowing malfunctions:
TRG3 RR:PA:MT:I,RRP1AMotorFailure,Final=
short Theplantrespondsasfollows:
RecircpumpAtrips.
Flowandpowerlower.
Thefollowingannunciatorsalarm:
602107,RECIRCPUMP1A/1BMOTORELECFAULT 602119,RECIRCPUMP1A/1BMOTORAUTOTRIP Reactorpowerwillbe~60%
Coreflowwillbe~48mlbm/hr ATC
- Recognizes/reportstripofRCSP1A
Note:
N2RESP07maybereferencedforTechSpecs.
RolePlay:
AsREcontacted,acknowledgedirectionandinformthe controlroomyouwillstartworkingonit.
- AcknowledgesreportoftripofRecircpumpA
- DirectsATCtoenterN2SOP29
- ReferstoTS3.4.1anddeterminestheLCOisnotmet duetoRPSflowinstrumentationisnotresetfor singleloopoperation.EntersafourhourLCO, ConditionC.
- NotifiesREtocheckthermallimitsandtomake adjustmentstotherodpatternbasedonoperation intheHeightenedAwarenessRegion
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page22of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions Note:
Basedontheinitialpowerlevelandhowthecrewplots thepowertoflow,theplantmayormaynotbeoperating intheExitregion.IfitisoperatingintheExitregion,then expectthecrewtoeitherraisecorefloworinsert additionalcramrodstoexittheExitregion.Eitheraction isacceptable.
Thefirst4CRAMrodsare3039,3023,2231,and3831.
Afterinsertingtheserods,Reactorpowerwillbe approximately53%andfurtherrodinsertionwilllikelybe needed.Thenext4CRAMrodsare1439,4623,1423, and4639.
RolePlay:
AsI&CacknowledgethedirectiontoadjustAPRMs,Rod Blocks,andRodBlockMonitorsetpoints.
- AcknowledgesdirectiontoenterN2SOP29
- DeterminesaRecircpumpisinservice
- Determinescoreflowandpowerarenotwithinthe ScramRegion
- DeterminesCoreflowANDpowerareNOTwithin theOPRMDependentStabilityRegion
- Insertsthefirstfourcramrods
- PerformsN2SOP29,Attachment1:
- IfplantisoperatingintheEXITregion:
ShiftsAPRMrecorderstofastspeedandmonitors forcoreoscillations EitherinsertsmoreCRAMrodsorraisescoreflow
- DeterminescauseofreducedcoreflowisNOTFCV runback
- VerifiesclosedflowcontrolvalveforRCSloopA
- VerifiesRCSloopBisoperating<41,800gpm
- ContactsI&CforadjustmenttoAPRMs,RodBlocks, andRodBlockMonitor
- ReferstoN2OP29,SectionH.6.0forsingleloop operations.
Event Termination Criteria
- 4CRAMrodsinserted
- TechnicalSpecificationshavebeenaddressed
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page23of31
Event#6,7,8,and9-InstrumentAirLeak;FailuretoScram;RRCSFailsToAutomatically Initiate;SpuriousMainTurbineTrip,EHCPumpsTrip Event Information
- Presumedorrequiredinitialplantoperatingconditions Plantoperatingatpower
- VerifiableActions Reactorscramattempted Reactorpowerlowered Controlrodsinserted
- Final(expected)operatingresult Reactorpower<4%
Controlrodinsertioninprogressorcompleted
- MitigationStrategycode(ifapplicable)
DMSAT01,highpowerATWS(greaterthanAPRMdownscale);heatadditionto suppressionpoolortorusrequiresentryintolevelpowercontrol;RPVlevelcontrolled belowfeedwaterspargers;RPVblowdownnotrequired
CriticalTasks (Ensurethetaskactionis boldedanditalicizedinthe "OperatorActions"column wherethecriticaltaskis performed)
- 1. GivenafailuretoscramwithReactorpowerabove4%,thecrewwilllowerReactor powerbyoneormoreofthefollowingmethods,inaccordancewithN2EOPC5:
- RapidlyloweringRPVwaterlevel
- TrippingRCSpumpB
- Injectingboron TheReactorpowerreductionmustbeinitiatedwithinfiveminutesofthestartofthe failuretoscram.
- 2. Givenafailuretoscram,thecrewwillinitiatecontrolrodinsertion,inaccordancewith N2EOPC5.ThismaybeaccomplishedbymanualinsertionwithRMCSorbyrepeated manualscrams.Controlrodinsertionmustbecommencedwithinonehourofthestart ofthefailuretoscram.
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions BoothOperator:
Whendirectedbytheleadevaluator,insertTRG4,which willinsertthefollowingmalfunction(fromtheTRG4 Eventcommandline):
IA01,LossofInstrumentAir,Final=80,Ramp=10:00
InstrumentAirheaderpressurelowers ExpectedAssociatedAnnunciators:
Crew
- Silences,acknowledges,andreportsannunciators
- Recognizes/reportsloweringInstrumentAirheader pressure
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page24of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions 851229,INSTRAIRSYSTEMTROUBLE SRO Acknowledgesreportofloweringinstrumentair headerpressure DirectsBOPtoenterN2SOP19 Acknowledgesreportthatinstrumentairpressureis loweringandcannotberestored DirectsATCtoscramtheReactorperN2SOP101C RolePlay:
AsEOsdirectedtomonitorlocalpressuregages, acknowledgethedirection.Provideupdatesasrequested usingSimulatorDisplayIA01,InstrumentAir
RolePlay:
AsEOdirectedtoinvestigateforleaks,acknowledgethe direction.
RolePlay:
AsEOdirectedtolineuptemporaryaircompressor, acknowledgethedirection.
BOP AcknowledgesdirectiontoenterN2SOP19 ContactsEOsanddirectsthemtomonitorthe followinglocalpressuregages:
o 2IASPI194,(RB261) o 2RDSPI133,(RB261)
ContactsEOanddirectsthemtoinvestigateforair leaks MaydispatchEOtolineuptemporaryaircompressor Attemptstodeterminethecauseoftheloweringair headerpressure.
InformstheSROthatairheaderpressureislowering andcannotberestored
- AcknowledgesSROdirectiontoscramthereactor
- ArmsANDdepressesBOTHManualScram pushbuttonsoneithersideof2CEC*PNL603.
- PlacestheReactorModeSwitchintheSHUTDOWN position
- Providesscramreport,byreporting:
Reactormodeswitchinshutdown APRMsNOTdownscale Reactorpressureandtrend Reactorlevelandtrend MSIVsopen Feedwaterpumpsarerunning AllcontrolrodsNOTfullyinserted
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page25of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Thefollowingmalfunctionsarepresettocausethefailure toscramandfailureofRRCS:
RD17Z,RD17forAllRods,Final=14 RP12A,RRCSDivisionFailure(DivI),Final=True RP12B,RRCSDivisionFailure(DivII),Final=True
Thefollowingmalfunctionswillautomaticallyinserton TRG5whenRPSscramstocausethespuriousMain TurbinetripandlossofEHCpumps:
TU07,SpuriousMainTurbineTrip,Final=True,Delay=3 minutes TC:PA:MT:I,TurbineEHCPumpAMotorFailure,Final=
short,Delay=5minutes TC:PB:MT:I,TurbineEHCPumpBMotorFailure,Final=
short,Delay=5minutes
Note:
TheRRCSfailuremaynotberevealedtothecrewbefore injectingSLS.Itwillberevealedwhenthecrewnotices RRPBdidnotautomaticallytrip.
- Enters&executesN2EOPRPV InformscrewofN2EOPRPVentry Determinesthefollowing:
- Scramwasinitiated
- Failuretoscramhasoccurred
- ExitsN2EOPRPVandenters&executesN2EOPC5
- Informscrewthatreactorhasfailedtoscram,exiting N2EOPRPV,andenteringN2EOPC5
- DeterminesReactorpoweris>4%
- DirectsrapidlyloweringRPVwaterlevel(DetailJ):
DirectsinhibitingADS Directsterminatingandpreventingall injectionintotheRPVexceptboron, CRD,andRCIC(CT1.0)
DirectsmaintainingRPVwaterlevel between39and100using Condensate/Feedwater,HPCS,RCIC, SLS,and/orCRD DirectsboroninjectionusingSLS(CT 1.0)
MaydirectpreventingMainTurbinetrip fromRCIC(N2EOP6.2)
Maydirectbypassingthefollowing isolationsperN2EOP6.10 MSIVlowwaterlevel Offgashighradiation
- PowerLeg VerifiesModeSwitchinSHUTDOWN DirectsinitiatingRRCS(N2EOP6.13) o AcknowledgesRRCSfailures (automaticandpushbutton)
DirectsreducingRecircflowtominimum DirectstrippingRecircpumpB(CT1.0)
DirectsinsertingcontrolrodsperN2EOP6.14 (CT2.0)
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page26of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- LevelLeg:
DirectsverificationofautoactionsperN2EOP 6.1forisolations,ECCS,andDGs DeterminestheMainCondenserisavailable Maydirectbypassingthefollowingisolationsper N2EOP6.10 o
MSIVlowwaterlevel o
Offgashighradiation DirectsmaintainingRPVwaterlevelbetween 39and100usingCondensate/Feedwater, HPCS,RCIC,SLS,and/orCRD
- PressureLeg:
DeterminesnoSRVsarecycling DirectsRPVpressurebandof8001000psig usingEHC
- Directsrestoringpneumaticstothedrywell Assignscriticalparameterformonitoring/
reportingthefollowing:
Suppressionpooltemperature(110°Fisakey valueforBIIT)
- AcknowledgesdirectiontoinitiateRRCSperN2EOP 6,Attachment13
- AttemptstomanuallyinitiateRRCSasfollows:
AtPNL603,armsanddepressestheDivisionIand IIAandBRRCSMANUALINITAITIONSWITCHES DeterminestheDivisionIandIIARIinitiation lightsarenotlit DeterminesSLCdidnotinitiateafter98seconds andWCSdidnotisolateasexpected InformsSROthatRRCSfailedtoinitiatemanually andthatheistakingmanualactions ManuallyplacesthekeylockswitchesforSLS P1AandP1Binstart(CT1.0)
VerifiesSLSP1AandP1BstartsandWCSisolates
- InformstheSROthatbothSLCpumpsarerunning andWCSisisolated.
- Terminatesandpreventspanel603(CT1.0):
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page27of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
RolePlay AsPOdirectedtodefeattheARIandRPSinterlocks,wait 2minutesandtheninsertthefollowingmalfunctions:
RP14A,DIVISIONIARIDEFEATED,FV=TRUE RP14B,DIVISIONIIARIDEFEATED,FV=TRUE RP02,RPSFAILURETOSCRAM,FV=TRUE Whenthemalfunctionsarefullyinserted,reporttothe controlroomthatARIandRPSinterlockshavebeen defeated
BoothOperator IfthecrewhasNOTYETdrivensomerodswithRMCS, oncethe8RPSwhitelightsarerelit,modifymalfunction RD17_Ztoallowcontrolrodstoinsertjustonemore notchatatimewithanothermanualscram.
IfthecrewhasdrivensomerodswithRMCS,oncethe8 RPSwhitelightsarerelit,deletemalfunctionRD17_Zto allowcontrolrodstofullyinsertwithanothermanual scram.
VERIFIEScontroller2FWSHIC1600isinmanual with0%output VERIFIESthefollowingcontrollersareinmanual with0%output:
o 2FWSHIC1010A o
2FWSHIC1010B o
2FWSHIC1010C o
2FWSLIC1055A o
2FWSLIC1055B o
2CNMLIK1137
- InformstheSROthatPNL603isterminatedand prevented.
- AllowsRPVleveltolowerto<100inchesandthen reestablishesfeedflowandanRPVlevelbandas directed(CT1.0)
- TripsRecircpumpB(CT1.0)
- Astimepermits,verifiesautoactionsoccurredas expected
- InsertscontrolrodsperN2EOP6.14(CT2.0):
ManualScrams
- Determinesthescramsolenoidpowerlightsareoff andthescramvalvesareopen
- ResetsARIanddefeatstheRPSinterlocksasfollows:
ContactsaPOanddirectsthemto defeattheARIandRPSinterlocksper N2EOP6.14
- ResetsRPSAandBbyplacingtheresetswitcheson PNL603inRESET
- EnsuresalleightwhiteRPSsolenoidlightsarelit
- EnsuresAN603306,CRDSCRAMVALVEPILOTAIR HDRPRESSHIGH/LOWisclear
- EnsuresSDVventanddrainvalvesareopen
- Waitsforthescramdumpvolumetodrain.
- InitiatesamanualscramwhentheSDVindicates sufficientlydrained.
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page28of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
ManualInsertionofRods
- Verifies2RDSP1AandP1Barerunning
- Placescontroller2RDSFC107,CRDFLOWCONTROL, inMANUALat(2CEC*PNL603)
- DepresstheOPENpushbuttonon2RDSFC107UNTIL thecontrolleroutputmetershows100%ORRDS pumpmotorcurrentapproaches40amps
- CheckthatRDSSystemflowrisesonC12R606,CRD SYSTEMFLOW
- Close2RDSPV101,DRIVEWTRPRESSCONTROL MOV,tomaximizeDriveWaterP
- EnsureRDSDriveWaterPrisesonC12R602,DRIVE WTRDIFFPRESSURE
- UsinganSHH5366key,bypasstheRWMbytaking theRWMOperatorConsoleBYPASS/OPERATE/TEST switchtotheBYPASSposition
- Insertscontrolrodsinaspiralpattern
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page29of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
Note IftheLOCABypassswitchistakentoBYPASSintheearlier EDGevent,thenthefollowingwillbeobservedduringthis event:
RHS*P1AwillnotautomaticallystartwhentheLPCI A/LPCSMANUALINITIATIONpushbuttonisarmed anddepressed;thecrewwilllikelymanuallystartit RHS*MOV24AandCSL*MOV104cantbemanually overridden;thecrewwilllikelyplaceRHS*P1AinPTL topreventinjectionfromthissystem
RolePlay:
IfdirectedtodefeattheRCIClevel8logic,wait1minute thenmanuallyinsertthefollowingremote:
RC02A,RCICLevel8TripDefeat:WithdrawTripUnits N693A,E,Final=Defeated
RolePlay IfcontactedtodefeatMSIVlowwaterlevelisolationper N2EOP6.10,insertthefollowingremotes:
TRG20 MS06A,DefeatLevelOneIsolationofMSIVs (JumperK148A),Final=Defeated
MS06B,DefeatLevelOneIsolationofMSIVs (JumperK148B),Final=Defeated
MS06C,DefeatLevelOneIsolationofMSIVs (JumperK148C),Final=Defeated
MS06D,DefeatLevelOneIsolationofMSIVs (JumperK148D),Final=Defeated
Wait1minuteandreportthattheMSIVlowwaterlevel jumpershavebeeninstalled.
- InhibitsADS:
PlacesDIVIADSAUTOMATICINITIATION DISABLEswitchtoONandverifiestheassociated whitelightislit PlacesDIVIIADSAUTOMATICINITIATION DISABLEswitchtoONandverifiestheassociated whitelightislit Verifies601521DIVISIONIADSAUTOMATIC INITIATIONDISABLEDislit Verifies601522DIVISIONIIADSAUTOMATIC INITIATIONDISABLEDislit
- InformsSROthatADSisinhibited
- Terminatesandpreventspanel601(CT1.0):
PlacesCSL*P1,PMP1,controlswitchinPULLTO LOCK ArmsanddepressesLPCIA/LPCSMANUAL INITIATIONpushbutton ClosesandoverridesRHS*MOV24A,LPCIA INJECTIONVLVandCSL*MOV104,PMP1 INJECTIONVLV PlacesRHS*P1C,PMP1C,controlswitchinPULL TOLOCK ArmsanddepressesLPCIB&CMANUAL INITIATIONpushbutton ClosesandoverridesRHS*MOV24B,LPCIB INJECTIONVLVandRHS*MOV24C,LPCIC INJECTIONVLV
- InformstheSROthatPNL601isterminatedand prevented.
- Ifdirected,dispatchesEOtopreventMainTurbine tripfromRCIC
- InformsSROthatMainTurbinetripfromRCICis defeated
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page30of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
RolePlay IfcontactedasfieldoperatortodefeattheOffgashigh radiationisolationperN2OP42Attachment6,wait1 minuteandinsertthefollowingremote:
TRG8 OG03,OffGasHighRadiationIsolation Defeated,Final=Defeated
ThenreportthattheOffgashighradiationisolationhas beendefeated.
RolePlay IfdispatchedtopreventMainTurbinetripfromRCIC, acknowledgedirection.
- Ifdirected,defeatsMSIVlowwaterlevelisolationsat 2CEC*PNL609(611)
InstallsthefollowingEOPJumpers:
- #20fromrelayB22HK148Atojumperblock (P609)
- #18fromrelayB22HK148Ctojumperblock (P609)
- #13fromrelayB22HK148Btojumperblock (P611)
- #12fromrelayB22HK148Dtojumperblock (P611)
Verifies2IAS*SOV166,LOCAOVERRIDEVLV switchinOVERRIDE(P851)
Verifies2IAS*SOV184,LOCAOVERRIDEVLV switchinOVERRIDE(P851)
Verifiesthefollowingvalvesareopen:
- 2IAS*SOV166(P851)
- 2IAS*SOV184(P851)
IFrequired,defeatsOFGsystemhighradiation isolationANDrestoresOFGsystemperN2OP 42,Attachment6
- Dispatchesfieldoperatortoliftleadat2OFG IPNL122
- InformsSROthatMSIVlowwaterlevelisolationis defeated
- Ifdefeated,informsSROthatOFGhighradiation isolationisdefeated
- MaintainsRPVpressure8001000psigusingEHCor appropriatepressurebandusingSRV'siftheMSIVs closeorafterEHCpumpstrip
- RestorespneumaticstothedrywellusingN2EOPHC attachment7panel601:
At2CEC*PNL851:
- PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV166to OVERRIDE
- OPENSIAS*SOV166
- PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV184to OVERRIDE
- OPENSIAS*SOV184 At2CEC*PNL601
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page31of31
InstructorActions/PlantResponse OperatorActions
- PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV164to OVRD
- OPENSIAS*SOV164
- PLACESLOCAOVERRIDEVLVIAS*SOV165to OVRD
- OPENSIAS*SOV165
- PeriodicallyupdatesSROonsuppressionpool temperatureandtrend
Event Termination Criteria
- ReactorpowerdownscaleonAPRMs.
- Controlrodsinsertioninprogressorcompleted.
- Reactorlevelbeingcontrolledinassignedband.
ILTNRC221
Scenario#2TOSheetandNormalEvolution
Simulator Scenario Handout Reference Packet
NOTES
April2023NRCScenario2 Page9of29
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 85%.
WCS pump B is out of service for maintenance PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Transfer feed for 2NJS-US5 from Alternate to Normal per N2-OP-71C section H.2.0. The procedure is in progress and the next step to be performed is H.2.7.
Then, perform a control rod pattern adjustment per the provided ReMA and N2-OP-96.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station UNIT 2 OPERATING PROCEDURE N2-OP-71C 600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION Revision 00400 Safety Related CONTINUOUS USE 10 CFR 50.59 Review Required Approval Authority: Director - Operations
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 2 of 68
SUMMARY
OF ALTERATIONS PCR-21-03582:
x
==
Description:==
Add note to section H.6.4 to verify bus configuration before cross-tying bus 2NJS-US2 and set load limitation on bus tie breaker.
x Reason: IR 04457850, Gap identified while examining 2NJS-US2-3B Feeder Breaker trip.
x H.6.4.a preceding note added 3rd bullet, and added preceding 1800 amps caution.
Procedure Writer Editorial Changes:
x Applied Exelon Operating Procedure Template, updated Section and Step numbering, moved procedure information from page footer to header, no revision bars used.
x Formatted multiple steps to "At location X, ACTION VERB component Y in position Z",
no revision bars used.
x Updated N/A statements to comply with AD-NM-101-1005 5.4.C.13 and in preparation for the transition to Exelon Smart Procedures, by removing N/A check-boxes, made into IF/THEN statements and "OTHERWISE MARK this step (or these steps) N/A", no revision bars used.
x Restructured multiple procedure steps to ACTION VERB first, no revision bars used.
x Updated fonts for ACTION VERBS and LOGIC WORDS, bold and lowercase underline for not, cannot, and no per AD-NM-101-1005 and AD-AA-101-1002, no revision bars used.
x Deleted the following previous revision outdated legacy precautions per IR 04172818, PIIM 2018-0380 Operations Procedure Excellence:
x All applicable evolutions described in this procedure shall be monitored and controlled in accordance with Radiation Protection procedures.
x E.12, Placing the Normal, Welding and Lighting 600V Dist Panels In Service, restructured into individual panel steps and substeps to meet format and content structure requirements of AD-NM-101-1005, Control of Technical Procedure Format and Content, and for the upcoming transition to Exelon Smart Procedures (ESP), to minimize HU Error Trap of excessive and unnecessary branching, and reduce use of unnecessary tables in the procedure body.
x H.1.7, H.2.7, H.3.7, and H.4.7 preceding Note revised from as quickly as possible to as efficiently as possible to prevent encouraging Operators from working too fast.
x H.1.4, H.2.4, H.3.4, and H.4.4 revised from IV to CV, for Jumper installation per HU-AA-101, Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices, Revision 11, section 4.3.4.1, and Attachment 2, Verification Practices Selection Guide.
x H.6, Placing an NJS Load Center on its Normally Open Crosstie, revised all substeps that previously required At approximately 600 volts, verify voltage on bus A, B, AND C to VERIFY voltage approximately 600 volts on bus A, B, AND C, as it is not humanly possible to verify voltage on all 3 phases at the exact instant that voltage reached approximately 600V. No revision bars used.
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 3 of 68 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS....................................................................................... 4 B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................... 9 C.
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................. 9 D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................................ 10 E.
STARTUP................................................................................................................................ 11 E.1.
Placing 2NJS-US5 In Service From 2NJS-X1E (2NJS-X1F) Transformer..................... 11 E.2.
Placing 2NJS-US6 In Service From 2NJS-X3E (2NJS-X3F) Transformer..................... 12 E.3.
Placing 2NJS-US3, US4 and US7 In Service................................................................ 13 E.4.
Placing 2NJS-US1 and US2 In Service......................................................................... 15 E.5.
Placing 2NJS-US8, US9 and US10 In Service.............................................................. 17 E.6.
Placing 2NHS-MCC001, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 13 through 18 In Service......................... 19 E.7.
Placing 2NHS-MCC004 In Service................................................................................ 26 E.8.
Placing 2NHS-MCC008 In Service................................................................................ 27 E.9.
Placing 2NHS-MCC009 In Service................................................................................ 28 E.10. Placing 2NHS-MCC011 In Service................................................................................ 29 E.11. Placing 2NHS-MCC012 In Service................................................................................ 30 E.12. Placing the Normal, Welding and Lighting 600V Dist Panels In Service........................ 31 E.13. Placing Plant Cranes and Hoists in Service.................................................................. 38 F.
NORMAL OPERATIONS.......................................................................................................... 39 G.
SHUTDOWN............................................................................................................................ 39 H.
OFF NORMAL PROCEDURES................................................................................................ 40 H.1.
Transfer Feed for 2NJS-US5 From Normal to Alternate................................................ 40 H.2.
Transfer Feed for 2NJS-US5 From Alternate to Normal................................................ 42 H.3.
Transfer Feed for 2NJS-US6 From Normal to Alternate................................................ 44 H.4.
Transfer Feed for 2NJS-US6 From Alternate to Normal................................................ 46 H.5.
Removing Plant Cranes and Hoists from Service.......................................................... 48 H.6.
Placing an NJS Load Center on its Normally Open Crosstie......................................... 49 H.7.
Returning an NJS Load Center to a Normal Lineup After Being Placed on its Normally Open Crosstie............................................................................................................... 57 H.8.
Momentary Paralleling of a Motor Control Center Using Kirk Key................................. 65 H.9.
Returning a 2NHS-MCC Back to Normal After Performing Subsection H.8................... 67
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 4 of 68 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS A.1.
Technical Specifications x
TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating x
TS 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown A.2.
Licensee Documentation x
USAR Section 8, Electric Power A.3.
Standards, Regulations, and Codes x
Reg Guide 1.32, Criteria for Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants x
Reg Guide 1.6, Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems (Safety Guide 6) x Reg Guide 1.68, Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants x
Reg Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems x
Reg Guide 1.93, Availability of Electric Power Sources A.4.
Technical Information A.4.1.
Electrical Diagrams x
ESK5NJS01, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1C&X1D ACB 1-5 x
ESK5NJS02, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1A, X1B & X1G ACB 1-14 x
ESK5NJS03, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3C & X3D ACB 3-3 x
ESK5NJS04, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3A, X3B & X3G ACB 3-13 x
ESK5NJS05, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1F ACB 14-4 x
ESK5NJS06, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1E ACB 14-8 x
ESK5NJS07, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3F ACB 15-1 x
ESK5NJS08, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3E ACB 15-7 x
ESK5NJS09, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1H, X1J & X1K ACB1-1A x
ESK5NJS10, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3H, J, K ACB 3-1A x
ESK5NNS01, Feeder to Aux XFMR 2ATX-XS1 ACB 1-4 x
ESK5NNS02, Feeder to Aux XFMR 2ATX-XS3 ACB 3-6 x
ESK6NJS07, Unit Sub 2NJS-US5 Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS08, Unit Sub 2NJS-US5 Supply Breaker
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 5 of 68 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Cont)
A.4.1 (Continued) x ESK6NJS09, Unit Sub 2NJS-US6 Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS10, Unit Sub 2NJS-US6 Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS11, Bus 2NJS-US1 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS12, Bus 2NJS-US2 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS13, Bus 2NJS-US3 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS14, Bus 2NJS-US4 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS15, Bus 2NJS-US5, US6 & US7 UV Prot x
ESK6NJS16, Breaker Control Interlocks x
ESK6NJS17, Unit Sub 2NJS-US1A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS18, Unit Sub 2NJS-US1B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS19, Unit Sub 2NJS-US3A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS20, Unit Sub 2NJS-US3B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS21, Unit Sub 2NJS-US7A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS22, Unit Sub 2NJS-US7B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS23, Unit Sub 2NJS-US1A & US1C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS24, Unit Sub 2NJS-US3A & US3C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS25, Unit Sub 2NJS-US1B & US1C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS26, Unit Sub 2NJS-US3B & US3C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS27, Unit Sub 2NJS-US7A & US7B Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS28, Breaker Control Interlocks x
ESK6NJS29, Unit Sub 2NJS-US2A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS30, Unit Sub 2NJS-US2B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS31, Unit Sub 2NJS-US4A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS32, Unit Sub 2NJS-US4B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS33, Unit Sub 2NJS-US2A & US2C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS34, Unit Sub 2NJS-US4A & US4C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS35, Unit Sub 2NJS-US2B & US2C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS36, Unit Sub 2NJS-US4B & US4C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS37, Bus 2NJS-US8 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS38, Bus 2NJS-US9 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS39, Bus 2NJS-US10 Undervoltage Protection x
ESK6NJS40, Breaker Control Interlocks
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 6 of 68 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Cont)
A.4.1 (Continued) x ESK6NJS41, Breaker Control Interlocks x
ESK6NJS42, Unit Sub 2NJS-US8A & US8C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS43, Unit Sub 2NJS-US8A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS44, Unit Sub 2NJS-US8B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS45, Unit Sub 2NJS-US8B & US8C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS46, Unit Sub 2NJS-US9A & US9C Tie Bkr x
ESK6NJS47, Unit Sub 2NJS-US9A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS48, Unit Sub 2NJS-US9B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS49, Unit Sub 2NJS-US9B & US9C Tie Brkr x
ESK6NJS50, Unit Sub 2NJS-US10A & US10C Tie Bkr x
ESK6NJS51, Unit Sub 2NJS-US10A Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS52, Unit Sub 2NJS-US10B Supply Breaker x
ESK6NJS53, Unit Sub 2NJS-US10B & 10C Tie Brkr x
ESK8NJS01, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1A,B,C,&D Rly & Mtr x
ESK8NJS02, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3A,B,C,&D Rly & Mtr x
ESK8NJS03, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1E &F RLY & Mtr x
ESK8NJS04, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X3E &F RLY & Mtr x
ESK8NJS05, FDR to XFMR 2NJS-X1&3H, J, K Relay & Mtr x
EE001S, Normal Bus 2NJS-US7 x
EE001T, Normal Bus 2NJS-US1 x
EE001U, Normal Bus 2NJS-US2 x
EE001V, Normal Bus 2NJS-US3 x
EE001W, Normal Bus 2NJS-US4 x
EE001X, Normal Bus 2NJS-US5 x
EE001Y, Normal Bus 2NJS-US6 x
EE001Z, Emer. Bus 2EJS*US1 & US3 x
EE001AA, 2NHS-MCC001 x
EE001AB, 2NHS-MCC002 x
EE001AD, 2NHS-MCC003 x
EE001AE, 2NHS-MCC004 & MCC015 x
EE001AF, 2NHS-MCC0013 x
EE-001AG, 2NHS-MCC005
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 7 of 68 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Cont)
A.4.1 (Continued) x EE001AH, 2NHS-MCC006 x
EE001AK, 2NHS-MCC007 x
EE001AL, 2NHS-MCC008, 2NHS-MCC009 x
EE001AM, 2NHS-MCC010 x
EE001AN, 2NHS-MCC010 x
EE001AP, 2NHS-MCC011 & 2NHS-MCC012 x
EE001AZ, 2NHS-MCC014 x
EE001BB, 2LAT-PNL100 & 2LAT-PNL300 x
EE001BG, 2NJS-PNL500 & 2NJS-PNL600 x
EE001CC, 2EJS*PNL100A(-G) & 2EJS*PNL300B(-Y) x EE001CX, Normal Bus 2NJS-US8 x
EE001CY, Normal Bus 2NJS-US9 x
EE001CZ, Normal Bus 2NJS-US10 x
EE001FB, 2NHS-MCC017 x
EE-001FC, 2NHS-MCC016 x
EE001FE, 2NHS-MCC018 x
EE9W, 600V Load Center 2NJS-US5 x
EE9X, 600V Load Center 2NJS-US5 x
EE9Y, 600V Load Center 2NJS-US5 x
EE9Z, 600V Load Center 2NJS-US6 x
EE9AA, 600V Load Center 2NJS-US6 x
EE9AB, 600V Load Center 2NJS-US6 x
EEMO01A, Normal Power Distribution x
EEMO01B, Emergency Power Distribution x
EEMO01C and M001D, Normal 600V & 120VAC x
EEMO01E, Emergency 600V & 120VAC x
EEMO01F, Emer & Norm 125V & 24/48 VDC x
EEMO01G, Normal 125 VDC A.4.2.
Vendor Manuals x
Transfer Switch (ASCO) Automatic Transfer Switch Manual ID4800-R2 x
Siemens Model 90 Motor Control Center Manual (N2A18000CKTBRK001)
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 8 of 68 A.
REFERENCES AND COMMITMENTS (Cont)
A.5.
Supplemental References x
E015N, 600V Load Centers x
E015Q, 600V Motor Control Centers x
E0902, Transfer Switch 2VBB-TRS1 x
E014T, 600V Distribution Panels x
MPL-C72, Electrical Protection Assembly (GE Spec) x PN2Y91MX005, Modification CWS Chemical Injection and Analysis Facility x
ESB2-E95-1184, Internal Correspondence T. Aiken to R. Crandall dated 12/26/95 on N2-OP-71 Precautions A.6.
Commitments x
[C1], 00379300, NMP 64418, SER 2589 Evaluation, Notify Electrical Maintenance to locate electrical fault, and coordinate with Meter & Test. Correct any problems before returning system to normal.
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 9 of 68 B.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION There are two 600V load centers supplied by the 4.16KV buses 2NNS-SWG014 and 2NNS-SWG015. The two 600V load centers, 2NJS-US5 and 2NJS-US6, are fed from two supply breakers, one normally closed and one normally open.
There are eight 600V load centers supplied by the 13.8KV buses 2NPS-SWG001 and 2NPS-SWG003. One 600V load center, 2NJS-US7, is divided into A and B sections. The A section is supplied from 13.8KV bus 2NPS-SWG001; and the B section is supplied from 13.8KV bus 2NPS-SWG003. The remaining Seven 600V load centers, 2NJS-US1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10 are divided into A, B, and C sections. The A section is fed from 13.8KV bus 2NPS-SWG001 and a tie breaker supplies the C sections. The B sections are fed from 13.8KV bus 2NPS-SWG003 and a tie breaker can supply the C sections. There is a normally open tie breaker between the two sections.
C.
OPERATING REQUIREMENTS The following systems must be in operation per their respective Operating Procedures to support the 600V A.C. Power Distribution System:
x N2-OP-54A, Normal Switchgear Building Ventilation x
N2-OP-70, Station Electrical Feed and 115KV Switchyard x
N2-OP-71A, 13.8KV AC Power Distribution x
N2-OP-71B, 4.16KV AC Power Distribution x
N2-OP-73A, Normal DC Distribution x
N2-OP-74A, Emergency DC Distribution
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 10 of 68 D.
PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS D.1.
Breaker racking operations shall be performed per N2-OP-71C-LINEUPS, Attachment 2, N2-OP-71C Walkdown Electric Lineup.
D.2.
Before closing a breaker on a motor control center, the control switch for the component associated with that breaker must be in the PULL-TO-LOCK position where applicable.
D.3.
To meet seismic qualification requirements, ensure all 4160V switchgear cubicle doors are fully dogged down and all 600V switchgear/load center cubicle doors have thumb screws fully engaged.
D.4.
When only one Auxiliary Transformer is supplying Load Centers 2NJS-US3, 2NJS-US7, or 2NJS-US9, ensure that Load Center amperage does not exceed 1940 Amps, as read on the Load Center Local Ammeter, to avoid possible damage to Aux Transformer.
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 42 of 68 Initials H.2.
Transfer Feed for 2NJS-US5 From Alternate to Normal H.2.1.
OBTAIN SM permission to jumper the 52b contacts of 2NJS-US5-8B, ALTERNATE SUPPLY TO BUS.
SM H.2.2.
NOTIFY CRO that the 52b contacts of 2NJS-US5-8B will be jumpered.
CRO H.2.3.
VERIFY the following are not on Maintenance Supply:
x 2VBB-UPS1A........................................................................................
x 2VBB-UPS1C.......................................................................................
x 2VBB-UPS3A........................................................................................
H.2.4.
In the rear of 2NJS-US5, SECTION 3, on terminal strip EB, INSTALL jumper between terminal EB-10 (2NJSX13C01)
AND EB-11 (2NJSX13C02).
CV H.2.5.
VERIFY the following:
x No other maintenance is being performed at 2NJS-US5.......................
x All personnel are clear of 2NJS-US5.....................................................
x All cubicles are closed...........................................................................
H.2.6.
At 2NNS-SWG014, CHECK closed the following breakers:
x 2NNS-SWG014-4, TO UNIT SUBSTATION 2NJS-US5 VIA 2NJS-X1F x
2NNS-SWG014-8, TO UNIT SUBSTATION 2NJS-US5 VIA 2NJS-X1E NOTE The transfer of power supplies should be performed as efficiently as possible to minimize the possibility of a fault occurring while both supply breakers are closed.
H.2.7.
At 2CEC*PNL852, PERFORM the following:
a.
CLOSE BREAKER 5-3B, Normal supply to bus.................................
b.
OPEN BREAKER 5-8B, Alternate Supply to 2NJS-US5.....................
600V AC POWER DISTRIBUTION N2-OP-71C Revision 00400 Page 43 of 68 H.
OFF-NORMAL PROCEDURES (Continued)
Initials NOTE The next step is performed.
H.2.8.
In the rear of 2NJS-US5, SECTION 3, on terminal strip EB, REMOVE jumper between terminals EB-10 AND EB-11.
IV H.2.9.
NOTIFY SM and CRO of the following:
x 2NJS-US5 is on normal supply.............................................................
x Jumper is removed from 52b contacts of 2NJS-US5-8B.......................
ILTNRC221
Scenario#2ReMAPacket
Simulator Scenario Handout Reference Packet
Unit 2
19 Special Sequence ID:
Date Date Date Date Date Date RWM Keyword (if applicable)
Control Rod Sequence Review and Approval Sheet NF-AB-720-F-1 Unit Supervisor Reviewed by:
Qualified Nuclear Engineer Approved by:
Prepared by:
Reactor Engineering Manager Authorized For Use:
NM2C19-1 Rev. 0 RWM Keyword or N/A Reactor Engineer or N/A Unit Supervisor Authorized Justification for on-the-spot Change Rod Status Verified and Page Check Complete:
Cycle RWM Loaded and Verified:
N/A \\ N/A Sequence Type:
QRE/QNE/Licensed Operator Purpose/Supporting Design Documents:
April 2021 Sequence Exchange (Raise Load Line),
ReMA NMC18-1, Cycle Management Report Reactor Engineer N/A if Change No Longer Applies QNE Review (RWM Loaded, if applicable; Rod Status Verified; Page Check Complete)
Steps Modified John Engineer Today Joseph Reviewer Today Reactor Manager Today Pete Senior Today Joseph Reviewer Today
NF-AB-720-F-6 Revision 1 Prepared by:
Reactor Engineer Date Reviewed by:
Qualified Nuclear Engineer Date
- Perform sequence exchange.
- Raise power to rated IAW REMA NM2C19-1.
Control Rod Sequence General Instructions Sequence ID: NM2C19-1 Rev. 0 John Engineer Today Joseph Reviewer Today
Sequence ID:
Page:
ACD DJK ACD DJK 1
06 10 N/A N/A 06 N/A N/A 10 ACD DJK 2
06 10 N/A N/A 06 N/A N/A 10 ACD DJK 3
06 10 N/A N/A 06 N/A N/A 10 ACD DJK 4
06 10 N/A N/A 06 N/A N/A 10 02 06 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 59 59 55 55 Prepared by:
51 51 47 47 Date:
43 1
3 43 39 39 35 35 31 31 Verified by:
27 27 23 23 19 4
2 19 Date:
15 15 11 11 07 07 03 03 02 06 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 Today NOTES Paul Blejwas Today Kahn, Gerald J 18-19 N/A N/A Single Notch 42-43 N/A N/A Single Notch 42-19 N/A N/A Single Notch 18-43 N/A N/A Single Notch Comments QNE INIT SRO INIT RO PEER RO PEER RO Coupling Check INIT Full Out Light
()
To Move Complete INIT To Move Complete INIT PEER Concurrence to Proceed WITHDRAW INSERT RECOVERY ALL Step Control Rod From To Move Complete INIT Coupling Check INIT Full Out Light
()
UNIT 2 SPECIAL MANEUVER ROD MOVEMENT SHEET FROM: 06 TO: 10 NM2C19-1 Rev. 0 1
Form 4.1-BWR Boiling-Water Reactor Examination Outline Facility:
Nine Mile Point 2 K/A Catalog Rev. 3 Rev.
1 Date of Exam:
04/17/2023 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
4 4
3 3
3 3
20 4
3 7
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 6
1 2
3 Tier Totals 5
5 4
4 4
4 26 5
5 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
4 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
3 2
3 26 3
2 5
2 0
1 1
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
11 0
2 1
3 Tier Totals 4
3 3
4 3
3 3
3 4
3 4
37 5
3 8
- 3.
Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6
CO EC RC EM 7
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 2
- 4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6
3 3
Notes: CO =
EM =
Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Nine Mile Point 2)
Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
Item E/APE # / Name /
Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
1 (295001) (APE 1)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION X
(295001AK1.03) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Thermal limits 4.1 1
2 (295003) (APE 3)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER X
(295003AK2.01) Knowledge of the relationship between the PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) Station batteries 4
2 3
(295004) (APE 4)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF DC POWER X
(G2.2.44) Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions (CFR: 41.5 /
43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 3
4 (295005) (APE 5) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP X
(295005AA2.08) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /
45.13) Electrical distribution status 3.9 4
5 (295006) (APE 6)
SCRAM X
(295006AK1.02) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the SCRAM: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Shutdown margin 3.6 5
6 (295016) (APE 16)
CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT X
(295016AA1.17) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 /
45.5 to 45.8) Main turbine and auxiliaries 2.6 6
7 (295018) (APE 18)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
X (295018AK2.03) Knowledge of the relationship between the PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)
Reactor water cleanup system 3.5 7
8 (295019) (APE 19)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR X
(295019AA2.01) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR:
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Instrument air pressure 4.1 8
9 (295021) (APE 21)
LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING X
(295021AA1.07) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) Fuel pool cooling and cleanup 3.4 9
10 (295023) (APE 23)
REFUELING ACCIDENTS X
(295023AK2.04) Knowledge of the relationship between the REFUELING ACCIDENTS and the following systems or components:
(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) RMCS/RCIS 3.2 10 11 (295024) (EPE 1) HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE X
(295024EA1.13) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) Suppression pool cooling 3.8 11
12 (295025) (EPE 2) HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE X
(G2.2.39) Knowledge of less than or equal to 1-hour technical specification action statements (This K/A does not include action statements of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or less that follow the expiration of a completion time for a technical specification condition for which an action statement has already been entered.) (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 /
45.13) 3.9 12 13 (295026) (EPE 3)
SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE X
(295026EK3.04) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) SLCS injection 3.6 13 14 (295028) (EPE 5) HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE (MARK I AND MARK II ONLY)
X (295028EK1.02) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE (MARK I AND MARK II ONLY): (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Equipment environmental qualification 3.1 14 15 (295030) (EPE 7) LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL X
(295030EK2.10) Knowledge of the relationship between the LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) Systems required to shut down the reactor 3.4 15 16 (295031) (EPE 8)
REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL X
(295031EK1.01) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 /
45.8) Adequate core cooling 4.7 16 17 (295037) (EPE 14)
SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN X
(G2.4.6) Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures major action categories 3.7 17 18 (295038) (EPE 15)
HIGH OFFSITE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RATE X
(295038EK3.03) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to HIGH OFFSITE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RATE: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)
Control room ventilation system isolation 3.8 18 19 (600000) (APE 24)
PLANT FIRE ON SITE X
(600000AK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: (CFR:
41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) Steps called out in the site fire protection plant, fire protection system manual, and fire zone manual 3.3 19 20 (700000) (APE 25)
GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES X
(700000AA2.05) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Operational status of offsite circuit 3.3 20 21 (295001) (APE 1)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION X
(295001AA2.03) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Core flow 4.0 76 22 (295005) (APE 5) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP X
(G2.4.41) Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11).
4.6 77
23 (295018) (APE 18)
PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
X (295018AA2.03) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW): (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Partial or complete loss 3.5 78 24 (295024) (EPE 1) HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE X
(295024EA2.11) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /
45.13) Drywell integrity 4.4 79 25 (295030) (EPE 7) LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL X
(G2.4.21) Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of emergency operating procedures critical safety functions or shutdown critical safety functions (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 /
45.12) 4.6 80 26 (295037) (EPE 14)
SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN X
(G2.4.44) Knowledge of emergency plan implementing procedures protective action recommendations (SRO Only)
(CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.4 81 27 (600000) (APE 24)
PLANT FIRE ON SITE X
(600000AA2.04) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)
The fires extent of potential operational damage to plant equipment 3.6 82 K/A Category Totals:
4 4
3 3
7 6
Group Point Total:
27 ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Nine Mile Point 2)
Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
Item E/APE # / Name /
Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
28 (295008) (APE 8) HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL X
(G2.1.32) Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 3.8 21 29 (295010) (APE 10)
HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE X
(295010AA2.06) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)
Drywell temperature 3.8 22 30 (295014) (APE 14)
INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION X
(295014AK3.01) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) Reactor SCRAM 4.3 23 31 (295029) (EPE 6) HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL X
(295029EA1.04) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.5 /
41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) RCIC 3.5 24 32 (295035) (EPE 12)
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE X
(295035EK1.01) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Secondary containment integrity 3.9 25
33 (295036) (EPE 13)
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL X
(295036EK2.03) Knowledge of the relationship between the SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)
Radwaste system 2.9 26 34 (295012) (APE 12)
HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE X
(295012AA2.01) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5
/ 45.13) Drywell temperature 4.2 83 35 (295022) (APE 22)
LOSS OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMPS X
(G2.4.2) Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedure entry conditions (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) 4.6 84 36 (295033) (EPE 10)
HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVELS X
(G2.4.40) Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.11) 4.5 85 (295002) (APE 2) LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM / 3 (295007) (APE 7) HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE
/ 3 (295009) (APE 9) LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL / 2 (295013) (APE 13)
HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE. / 5 (295017) (APE 17)
ABNORMAL OFFSITE RELEASE RATE / 9 (295020) (APE 20)
INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION / 5 & 7 (295032) (EPE 9) HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE / 5 (295034) (EPE 11)
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION / 9
(500000) (EPE 16)
HIGH CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION / 5 K/A Category Totals:
1 1
1 1
2 3
Group Point Total:
9 ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Nine Mile Point 2)
Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
Item System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
37 (203000) (SF2, SF4 RHR/LPCI) RHR/LPCI:
INJECTION MODE X
(203000A1.01) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) Reactor water level 4.4 27 38 (209001) (SF2, SF4 LPCS) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X
(209001K4.06) Knowledge of LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)
Adequate pump net positive suction head 3.4 28 39 (209001) (SF2, SF4 LPCS) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X
(209001K6.13) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.7 /
45.7) High drywell pressure 4.3 29 40 (209002) (SF2, SF4 HPCS) HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X
(209002A2.05) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the HIGH-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 /
45.6) Loss of DC electrical distribution 4
30 41 (209002) (SF2, SF4 HPCS) HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X
(209002K2.02) HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Valves 3.9 31
42 (211000) (SF1 SLCS)
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM X
(211000A2.06) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR:
41.5 / 45.6) Abnormal valve position 3.7 32 43 (211000) (SF1 SLCS)
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM X
(211000A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)
SLCS control switch 4.1 33 44 (212000) (SF7 RPS)
(212000K6.08) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.7 /
45.7) Main turbine generator and auxiliaries systems 3.3 34 45 (215003) (SF7 IRM)
INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM X
(215003A3.01) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
Meters and recorders 3.6 35 46 (215004) (SF7 SRMS)
SOURCE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM X
(215004K4.03) Knowledge of SOURCE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Gamma compensation 2.7 36 47 (215005) (SF7 PRMS)
AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR X
(215005K5.01) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3) LPRM detector operation 3.5 37 48 (217000) (SF2, SF4 RCIC) REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM X
(217000K1.10) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) Main steam system 3.6 38
49 (217000) (SF2, SF4 RCIC) REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM X
(217000K3.06) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4)
Condensate storage tank level 3.2 39 50 (218000) (SF3 ADS)
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM X
(218000A4.04) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM in the control room: (CFR:
41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) ADS inhibit 4.4 40 51 (223002) (SF5 PCIS)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM /
NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF X
(223002K1.24) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM / NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /
45.7 to 45.8) Leak detection system 3.1 41 52 (239002) (SF3 SRV)
(239002) SAFETY RELIEF VALVES (291003K1.10) CONTROLLERS AND POSITIONERS (CFR: 41.7) Function and characteristics of air-operated valves, including failure modes 2.8 42 53 (259002) (SF2 RWLCS)
REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM X
(259002K1.01) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM and the following systems:
(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) RPS 3.9 43 54 (261000) (SF9 SGTS)
STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM X
(261000K3.06) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: (CFR:
41.7 / 45.4) Primary containment oxygen content (Mark I and II) 3 44 55 (262001) (SF6 AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X
(262001K2.02) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR:
41.7) AC breaker control power 3.7 45 56 (262002) (SF6 UPS)
UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC)
X (262002A1.01) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC) including: (CFR:
41.5 / 45.5) Inverter outputs 3.1 46
57 (263000) (SF6 DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X
(263000A3.02) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Breaker trips 3.5 47 58 (264000) (SF6 EGE)
EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET)
X (264000K1.01) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) AC electrical distribution 4.5 48 59 (300000) (SF8 IA)
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X
(G2.1.19) Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 3.9 49 60 (205000) (SF4 SCS)
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE)
X (G2.1.7) Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation (CFR: 41.5 /
43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 4.4 50 61 (400000) (SF8 CCS)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X
(400000K5.02) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3) Determine source(s) of RCS leakage into CCW 3.1 51 62 (510000) (SF4 SWS*)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM X
(510000A3.03) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SERVICE WATER SYSTEM including: (CFR:
41.7 / 45.7) Traveling screen operation 2.8 52 63 (203000) (SF2, SF4 RHR/LPCI) RHR/LPCI:
INJECTION MODE X
(G2.4.45) Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm (CFR: 41.10 /
43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 4.3 86
64 (262001) (SF6 AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X
(262001A2.11) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 /
45.6) Degraded bus voltages 3.9 87 65 (263000) (SF6 DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X
(G2.4.20) Knowledge of the operational implications of emergency and abnormal operating procedures warnings, cautions, and notes.
4.3 88 66 (264000) (SF6 EGE)
EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET)
X (264000A2.12) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Loss of DC electrical distribution 4
89 67 (400000) (SF8 CCS)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X
(400000A2.03) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)
High/low CCW temperature 3.5 90 K/A Category Totals:
4 2
2 2
2 2
2 5
3 2
5 Group Point Total:
31 ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Nine Mile Point 2)
Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
Item System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Q#
68 (201006) (SF7 RWMS)
ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM X
(201006K4.09) Knowledge of ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) System initialization 2.8 53 69 (226001) (SF5 RHR CSS) RHR/LPCI:
CONTAINMENT SPRAY MODE SYSTEM MODE X
(226001K5.06) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the RHR/LPCI: Containment Spray System Mode: Vacuum breaker operation 3.6 54 70 (202001) (SF1, SF4 RS) RECIRCULATION SYSTEM X
(202001A1.03) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the RECIRCULATION SYSTEM including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) Core flow 4.1 55 71 (214000) (SF7 RPIS)
ROD POSITION INFORMATION SYSTEM X
(214000K2.01) ROD POSITION INFORMATION SYSTEM Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: RPIS 3.0 56 72 (215002) (SF7 RBMS)
ROD BLOCK MONITOR SYSTEM X
(215002) ROD BLOCK MONITOR SYSTEM (291002K1.22) Nuclear Instrumentation: Failure modes of fission chambers, ion chambers, and proportional counters 3.1 57 73 (239001) (SF3, SF4 MRSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM X
(239001K3.03) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4)
Feedwater system 3.5 58 74 (245000) (SF4 MTGEN)
MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS X
(245000K4.06) Knowledge of MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Generator protection 3.5 59
75 (259001) (SF2 FWS)
FEEDWATER SYSTEM X
(259001A2.05) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the FEEDWATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Loss of Instrument air system 3.6 60 76 (268000) (SF9 RW)
RADWASTE SYSTEM X
(268000A4.01) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the RADWASTE SYSTEM in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) Sump integrators 3.2 61 77 (286000) (SF8 FPS)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM X
(286000K6.07) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.7 /
45.7) Diesel-driven fire pump 3.4 62 78 (510001) (SF8 CWS*)
(510001A3.02) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Valve alignment 2.9 63 79 (201003) (SF1 CRDM)
CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM X
(201003A2.04) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Single control rod SCRAM 3.8 91 80 (271000) (SF9 OG)
OFFGAS SYSTEM X
(271000A2.04) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the OFFGAS SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Offgas system high radiation 3.4 92 81 (288000) (SF9 PVS)
PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS X
(G2.1.40) Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements (CFR:
41.10 / 43.5 / 43.6 / 45.13) 3.9 93
(201001) (SF1 CRDH)
CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM (201002) (SF1 RMCS)
REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM (201004) (SF7 RSCS)
ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (201005) (SF1, SF7 RCIS) ROD CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (202002) (SF1 RSCTL)
RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM (204000) (SF2 RWCU)
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM (214000) (SF7 RPIS)
ROD POSITION INFORMATION SYSTEM (216000) (SF7 NBI)
NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION (219000) (SF5 RHR SPC) RHR/LPCI:
TORUS/SUPPRESSIO N POOL COOLING MODE (223001) (SF5 PCS)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXILIARIES (230000) (SF5 RHR SPS) RHR/LPCI:
TORUS/SUPPRESSIO N POOL SPRAY MODE (233000) (SF9 FPCCU)
FUEL POOL COOLING/CLEANUP
(234000) (SF8 FH)
FUEL HANDLING (239003) (SF9 MSVLCS) MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM (241000) (SF3 RTPRS)
REACTOR/TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM (256000) (SF2 CDS)
CONDENSATE SYSTEM (272000) (SF7, SF9 RMS) RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (290001) (SF5 SC)
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (290002) (SF4 RVI)
REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS (290003) (SF9 CRV)
CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION K/A Category Totals:
0 1
1 2
1 1
1 3
1 1
2 Group Point Total:
14 Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Nine Mile Point 2)
Facility:
Nine Mile Point 2 Date of Exam:
04/17/2023 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (RO/SRO)
Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-Only Item #
IR Q#
IR Q#
- 1.
Conduct of Operations G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 82 4.6 64 G2.1.8 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room 83 3.4 65 G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables (reference potential) (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 84 4.2 94 G2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations (reference potential) 85 3.9 95 Subtotal N/A 2
N/A 2
- 2.
Equipment Control G2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 86 3.7 66 G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operation and safety limits 87 4.0 67
G2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments and work prioritization (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 88 3.9 96 G2.2.37 Ability to determine operability or availability of safety-related equipment (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.12) 89 4.6 97 Subtotal N/A 2
N/A 2
- 3.
Radiation Control G2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10) 90 3.8 68 G2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment (CFR: 41.11 /
41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 91 2.9 98 Subtotal N/A 1
N/A 1
- 4.
Emergency Procedures / Plan G2.4.39 Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures (CFR: 41.10 / 45.11) 92 3.9 69 G2.4.43 Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 93 3.8 99 G2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 94 4.2 100 Subtotal N/A 1
N/A 2
Tier 3 Point Total N/A 6
N/A 7
Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Nine Mile Point 2)
Facility:
Nine Mile Point 2 Date of Exam:
04/17/2023 Theory (Tier 4) (RO)
Category K/A #
Topic RO Item #
IR Q#
Reactor Theory 292003 (292003 K1.05) REACTOR KINETICS AND NEUTRON SOURCES (CFR:
41.1) Define reactor period 95 3.7 70 292007 (292007 K1.01) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS (CFR: 41.1)
Define burnable poison and state its use in the reactor 96 3.1 71 292008 (292008 K1.24) REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS (CFR: 41.1) (POWER OPERATION) Describe the parameters to be monitored and controlled during rod pattern exchanges 97 3.2 72 Subtotal 3
Thermodynamics 293005 (293005 K1.05) THERMODYNAMIC CYCLES (CFR: 41.14) State the advantages of moisture separators/reheaters and feedwater heaters for a typical steam cycle 98 2.8 73 293006 (293006 K1.05) FLUID STATICS AND DYNAMICS (CFR: 41.14) Explain operational implications of fluid/water hammer 99 3.3 74 293007 (293007 K1.02) HEAT TRANSFER (CFR: 41.14) (HEAT TRANSFER)
Describe thermal conductivity 100 2.6 75 Subtotal 3
Tier 4 Point Total N/A 6
Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.
Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 1 Question 17 295037 SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN 2.4.30 - Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the RO license level.
Additionally, emergency notification techniques are already also tested in Question 99.
Randomly reselected K/A 295037 SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN 2.4.6 - Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures major action categories.
2 / 1 Question 28 209001 LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM K4.02 - Knowledge of LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:
Prevents water hammer An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A without too many repeat questions from the last 2 NRC exams.
Randomly reselected K/A 209001 LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM K4.06 - Knowledge of LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Adequate pump net positive suction head.
2 / 1 Question 38 217000 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM K1.03 - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM and the following systems: Suppression pool An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A without overlapping Questions 15 and 24.
Randomly reselected K/A 217000 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM K1.10 - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM and the following systems: Main steam system.
2 / 1 Question 46 262002 UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC)
A1.02 - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC) including: Motor generator outputs An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A because NMP2 does not have motor generators associated with the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC) system.
Randomly reselected K/A 262002 UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC) A1.01 - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC) including: Inverter outputs.
2 / 1 Question 50 300000 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM 2.1.7 - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A without over-testing Instrument Air topics. Additionally, system 205000 was mistakenly skipped during the random sampling process and system 300000 was one of the double-sampled systems.
Reselected K/A 205000 Shutdown Cooling System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode) 2.1.7 - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
2 / 2 Question 54 201006 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM K5.09 - Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM:
Select error System 201006 was mistakenly double-sampled during the random sampling process.
Randomly reselected K/A 226001 RHR/LPCI:
Containment Spray System Mode K5.06 - Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the RHR/LPCI: Containment Spray System Mode:
Vacuum breaker operation.
2 / 2 Question 56 215001 TRAVERSING IN CORE PROBE K2.01 - Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Shear valves An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A without testing minutia.
Randomly reselected K/A 214000 Rod Position Information System K2.01 - Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: RPIS.
2 / 2 Question 57 215002 ROD BLOCK MONITOR SYSTEM 291002 Sensors and Detectors K1.04 - Flow: Modes of failure An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A due to lack of relevant flow detectors related to system 215002.
Randomly reselected K/A 215002 ROD BLOCK MONITOR SYSTEM 291002 Sensors and Detectors K1.22 - Nuclear Instrumentation: Failure modes of fission chambers, ion chambers, and proportional counters.
2 / 2 Question 58 239001 MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM K3.14 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: Residual heat removal system An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A due to lack of relationship between Main and Reheat Steam and RHR.
Randomly reselected K/A 239001 MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM K3.03 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters: Feedwater system.
3 Question 65 2.1.27 - Knowledge of system purpose and/or function An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A without being overly simplistic or making the question an extension of Tier 2.
Randomly reselected K/A 2.1.8 - Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room.
3 Question 67 2.2.23 - Ability to track technical specification limiting conditions for operation An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the RO license level.
Randomly reselected K/A 2.2.22 - Knowledge of limiting conditions for operation and safety limits.
1 / 1 Question 76 295001 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION AA2.02 - Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION:
Neutron monitoring An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the SRO level due to related procedure actions being Immediate Actions.
Randomly reselected K/A 295001 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION AA2.03 - Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: Core flow.
1 / 1 Question 78 295018 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
AA2.06 - Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW):
Surge tank level An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the SRO level due to lack of related procedure actions.
Randomly reselected K/A 295018 PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) AA2.03 - Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW):
Partial or complete loss.
2 / 1 Question 88 263000 DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 2.4.49 - Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the SRO level (testing immediate actions).
Randomly reselected K/A 263000 DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 2.4.20 - Knowledge of the operational implications of emergency and abnormal operating procedures warnings, cautions, and notes.
2 / 1 Question 90 400000 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM A2.02 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:
High/low surge tank level An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the SRO level due to lack of related procedure actions.
Randomly reselected K/A 400000 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM A2.08 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:
Residual heat removal system heat exchanger tube leak.
2 / 2 Question 92 271000 OFFGAS SYSTEM A2.15 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the OFFGAS SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Air intrusion An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A at the SRO level without being overly simplistic.
Randomly reselected K/A 271000 OFFGAS SYSTEM A2.04 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the OFFGAS SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Offgas system high radiation.
3 Question 95 2.1.46 - Ability to use integrated control systems to operate plant systems or components An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A due to lack of an integrated control system at NMP2.
Randomly reselected K/A 2.1.5 - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations (reference potential).
2/1 Question 90 400000 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM A2.08 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:
Residual heat removal system heat exchanger tube leak An acceptable question could not be developed for the randomly sampled K/A due to RHR heat exchangers being supplied by Service Water (510000), not Component Cooling Water (400000).
Randomly reselected K/A 400000 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM A2.03 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: High/low CCW temperature.