Letter Sequence Supplement |
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TAC:MF0404, Control Room Habitability (Approved, Closed) |
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MONTHYEAR2CAN121202, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA-805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 Edition)2012-12-17017 December 2012 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA-805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Project stage: Request ML13043A1342013-02-15015 February 2013 Acceptance Review, Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protections for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Project stage: Acceptance Review ML13235A0052013-09-11011 September 2013 Request for Additional Information, Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protections for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Project stage: RAI 2CAN111301, Response to Request for Additional Information, Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052013-11-0707 November 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information, Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Response to RAI 2CAN121302, Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052013-12-0404 December 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Response to RAI 2CAN011401, Response to Request for Additional Information, Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052014-01-0606 January 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information, Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Response to RAI ML14085A2252014-03-28028 March 2014 Request for Additional Information, Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protections for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Project stage: RAI 2CAN051404, Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052014-05-22022 May 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Response to RAI ML14155A1332014-06-0909 June 2014 Request for Additional Information, Nrr/Dra/Apla Request to Adopt NFPA-805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protections for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: RAI 2CAN061406, Arkansas, Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052014-06-30030 June 2014 Arkansas, Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Response to RAI 2CAN081401, Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052014-08-0707 August 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Response to RAI ML14329A4112014-08-15015 August 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Record of Review, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2), LAR Attachment V- Table V-1 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) Project stage: Other 2CAN091402, License Amendment Request Supplemental Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-8052014-09-24024 September 2014 License Amendment Request Supplemental Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Supplement ML14329A4262014-10-22022 October 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Record of Review, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2), LAR Attachment V-Table V-1 Fire PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os). Project stage: Other ML14343A6022014-12-0505 December 2014 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 NFPA-805 LAR Revised License Condition Necessitates Updated Enclosures 2 and 3 to Original LAR Project stage: Other 2CAN121404, Arkansas, Unit 2 - Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805, License Amendment Request Supplemental2014-12-0909 December 2014 Arkansas, Unit 2 - Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805, License Amendment Request Supplemental Project stage: Supplement ML14356A1722014-12-22022 December 2014 Summary of Site Audit to Support the Review of a License Amendment Request for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 to Transition to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Fire Protection Licensing Basis Project stage: Approval ML14356A1852014-12-22022 December 2014 ANO2 Exit Project stage: Request ML15007A4782015-01-15015 January 2015 Summary of July 15-18, 2013, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Audit Associated with License Amendment Request to Transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Project stage: Other ML15050A1932015-01-22022 January 2015 NRR E-mail Capture - Action: Request for NFPA 805 License Amendment Sunsi/Factual Accuracy Review Project stage: Request ML14356A2272015-02-18018 February 2015 Issuance of Amendment No. 300, Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants Project stage: Approval 1CAN031602, Response to PRA RAI 03, Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 8052016-03-25025 March 2016 Response to PRA RAI 03, Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 Project stage: Other 2CAN121602, Supplemental Information to License Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications2016-12-0202 December 2016 Supplemental Information to License Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications Project stage: Supplement 2014-03-28
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML23326A0392024-01-24024 January 2024 Issuance of Amendment No. 281 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML24017A1582024-01-17017 January 2024 Submittal of Emergency Plan Revision 50 IR 05000313/20234202024-01-10010 January 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000313/2023420 and 05000368/2023420 IR 05000313/20234022024-01-0202 January 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000313/2023402 and 05000368/2023402 ML23354A0022023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML23349A1672023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML23348A3572023-12-14014 December 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Use Online Monitoring Methodology Slides and Affidavit for Pre-Submittal Meeting ML23352A0292023-12-13013 December 2023 Entergy - 2024 Nuclear Energy Liability Evidence of Financial Protection ML23340A1592023-12-13013 December 2023 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Entergy Fleet Project Manager Assignment IR 05000313/20234052023-12-12012 December 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000313/2023405 and 05000368/2023405 ML23341A0832023-12-11011 December 2023 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000313/368/2023404- Cover Letter ML23305A0922023-12-0707 December 2023 Summary of Regulatory Audit Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times RITSTF Initiative 4b ML23333A1362023-11-29029 November 2023 Supplement to Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23275A2072023-11-28028 November 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 280 Removal of Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation ML23325A1412023-11-21021 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000313/20230032023-11-21021 November 2023 Revised - ANO Revised Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2023003 and 05000368/2023003 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200013/ 2023001 ML23243B0452023-11-13013 November 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML23313A0962023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2023003 and 05000368/2023003 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200013/2023001 ML23311A2082023-11-0909 November 2023 Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch IV IR 05000313/20230112023-10-10010 October 2023 Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Report 05000313/2023011 and 05000368/2023011 IR 05000313/20230052023-08-21021 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000313/2023005 and 05000368/2023005) - Mid Cycle IR 05000313/20243012023-08-14014 August 2023 Notification of NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination 05000313/2024301 IR 05000313/20230022023-08-11011 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2023002 and 05000368/2023002 and Notice of Violation ML23209A6022023-08-0909 August 2023 Regulatory Audit Plan in Support of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk- Informed Completion Times IR 05000416/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000416/2023002 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200050/2023001 ML23208A2132023-08-0303 August 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Concerning Review of License Amendment Request to Remove Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation ML23208A2112023-07-27027 July 2023 Entergy Operations Inc., Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-205, Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, and Related Definitions ML23188A1732023-07-12012 July 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML23142A2022023-06-29029 June 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 279 and 332 Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements IR 05000313/20234032023-06-28028 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000313/2023403 and 05000368/2023403 ML23178A0892023-06-26026 June 2023 August 2023 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection-Request for Information ML23166B0902023-06-21021 June 2023 Request for Relief ANO1 ISI 036 Regarding Volumetric Examination Requirements ML23180A1082023-06-20020 June 2023 ANO Unit 1 SAR Amendment 31, TRM, TS Bases, 10 CFR 50.59 Report, and Commitment Change Summary Report IR 05000313/20234012023-06-13013 June 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000313/2023401 and 05000368/2023401 ML23130A2972023-05-17017 May 2023 Notification of Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000313/2023003) and Request for Information ML23121A3012023-05-10010 May 2023 Regulatory Audit Plan in Support of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk - Informed Completion Times ML23114A3572023-05-10010 May 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Concerning Review of Request for Alternative ANO-CISI-002 Regarding Containment Inservice Inspection Frequency ML23130A2732023-05-10010 May 2023 and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station - Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations IR 05000313/20230012023-05-0909 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2023001 and 05000368/2023001 ML23118A3202023-05-0808 May 2023 Notification of Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection and Request for Information (05000313;05000368/2023010) IR 05000368/20233012023-05-0101 May 2023 NRC Examination Report 05000368/2023301 ML23117A2172023-05-0101 May 2023 Safety Evaluation for Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment ML23108A1362023-04-24024 April 2023 Approval of Request for Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration No. 46 ML23110A1122023-04-20020 April 2023 Annual Report for Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual Changes Under 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3), 10 CFR 71.106, and 10 CFR 72.140(d). Notification of Application of Approved Appendix B to 10 CFR 72 Subpart G 2024-01-24
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEAR2CAN012403, Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 42024-01-11011 January 2024 Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 1CAN122301, Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval (ANO1-ISl-037)2023-12-14014 December 2023 Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval (ANO1-ISl-037) 1CAN092301, Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 42023-09-21021 September 2023 Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 2CAN032303, Responses to Request for Additional Information Concerning the Request for Alternative Regarding the Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 462023-03-29029 March 2023 Responses to Request for Additional Information Concerning the Request for Alternative Regarding the Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 46 1CAN012301, Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Relief ANO1-ISI-0352023-01-30030 January 2023 Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Relief ANO1-ISI-035 2CAN072201, Response to Request for Additional Information Requests for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second and Third Periods2022-07-20020 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Requests for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second and Third Periods 1CAN062201, Response to the Request for Additional Information Proposed Technical Specifications 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 Revised Dose Calculations2022-06-0202 June 2022 Response to the Request for Additional Information Proposed Technical Specifications 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 Revised Dose Calculations 0CAN052203, Response to the Second Round of Request for Additional Information Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2022-05-18018 May 2022 Response to the Second Round of Request for Additional Information Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors 0CAN032201, Response to the Request for Additional Information Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2022-03-0909 March 2022 Response to the Request for Additional Information Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors 0CAN022201, Response to the Second Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Support Proactive Upgrade of the Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping2022-02-17017 February 2022 Response to the Second Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Support Proactive Upgrade of the Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping 2CAN112104, Response to Request for Additional Information 2 Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt a Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)2021-11-12012 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information 2 Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt a Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) 2CAN112105, Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Request ANO2-RR-21-002 Support the Repair of the Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 462021-11-0707 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Request ANO2-RR-21-002 Support the Repair of the Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 46 2CAN102103, Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Request ANO2-R&R-012 Support the Repair of the Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 462021-10-12012 October 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Request ANO2-R&R-012 Support the Repair of the Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 46 0CAN102101, Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Generic Letter 2004-022021-10-0404 October 2021 Final Request for Additional Information Concerning Generic Letter 2004-02 0CAN092102, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Support Proactive Upgrade of the Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping2021-09-23023 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Support Proactive Upgrade of the Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping 0CAN092101, Unit 2 - Revised Proprietary Demarcation in Response to Request for Additional Information (Follow-up) - Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping2021-09-14014 September 2021 Unit 2 - Revised Proprietary Demarcation in Response to Request for Additional Information (Follow-up) - Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping 0CAN072102, Response to Request for Additional Information (Follow-up) - Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping2021-07-22022 July 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information (Follow-up) - Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping 2CAN052103, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt a Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)2021-05-24024 May 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt a Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) 0CAN042101, Response to Request for Additional Information Reduction of Commitment to the Entergy Operation'S Quality Assurance Program Manual Description2021-04-0505 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Reduction of Commitment to the Entergy Operation'S Quality Assurance Program Manual Description 0CAN022101, Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping2021-02-22022 February 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of Emergency Cooling Pond Supply Piping ML21063A2442021-02-22022 February 2021 Enclosure 4 - Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of ECP Supply Piping in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) (Non-Proprietary) CNRO-2021-00002, Entergy Operations, Inc. - Basis for Concluding the Terms of Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153 Are Complete, Element L2021-01-28028 January 2021 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Basis for Concluding the Terms of Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153 Are Complete, Element L 1CAN122001, Responses to Request for Additional Information for the Request for Relief Related to American Society of Mechanical Engineers(Asme) Code Case N-770-5 Supplemental Examination Requirements - ANO1-ISI-0342020-12-10010 December 2020 Responses to Request for Additional Information for the Request for Relief Related to American Society of Mechanical Engineers(Asme) Code Case N-770-5 Supplemental Examination Requirements - ANO1-ISI-034 0CAN112001, Relief Request No. EN-20-RR-001, Revision 1 - Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/ Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 Systems, Section XI, Div 12020-11-17017 November 2020 Relief Request No. EN-20-RR-001, Revision 1 - Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/ Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 Systems, Section XI, Div 1 1CAN102002, Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Loss of Voltage Relay Allowable Values2020-10-0505 October 2020 Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise Loss of Voltage Relay Allowable Values 2CAN092002, Response to Second Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request Associated with Technical Specification Deletions, Additions, and Relocations2020-09-22022 September 2020 Response to Second Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request Associated with Technical Specification Deletions, Additions, and Relocations ML20255A1182020-09-0101 September 2020 Enclosuresponse to Request for Additional Information Related to Exemption Request from Certain EP Requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E ML20076C4152020-03-11011 March 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Revise the Control Element Assembly Drop Times 0CAN022001, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Into the Licensing Basis2020-02-19019 February 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Into the Licensing Basis 2CAN022001, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Alternative VRR-ANO2-2019-12020-02-11011 February 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Alternative VRR-ANO2-2019-1 CNRO-2019-00030, Response to Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153, Element K 2019 Summary2019-12-30030 December 2019 Response to Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153, Element K 2019 Summary ML19322A7672019-11-14014 November 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Into the Licensing Basis 1CAN111901, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-729-4 Supplemental Examination Requirements ANO1-ISI-0332019-11-0707 November 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-729-4 Supplemental Examination Requirements ANO1-ISI-033 2CAN041904, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Application to Technical Specification Actions to Address Inoperability of the Containment Building Sump2019-04-30030 April 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Application to Technical Specification Actions to Address Inoperability of the Containment Building Sump 1CAN021903, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Relief Request ANO1-ISI-0322019-02-28028 February 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Relief Request ANO1-ISI-032 1CAN101801, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to ...2018-10-17017 October 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to ... 2CAN101801, Responses to the Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Update the Reactor Coolant System Pressure-Temperature Limits2018-10-10010 October 2018 Responses to the Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Update the Reactor Coolant System Pressure-Temperature Limits 0CAN091801, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Application for Adoption of Emergency Action Level Schemes Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 62018-09-17017 September 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to the Application for Adoption of Emergency Action Level Schemes Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 1CAN081806, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Relief Request ANO1-ISI-0312018-08-22022 August 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Relief Request ANO1-ISI-031 1CAN081801, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request - Revision to Technical Specification Bases Related to Emergency Feedwater Turbine-Driven Pump Steam Supply Valves2018-08-10010 August 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request - Revision to Technical Specification Bases Related to Emergency Feedwater Turbine-Driven Pump Steam Supply Valves 2CAN081802, Responses to the Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Update the Reactor Coolant System Pressure-Temperature Limits2018-08-0101 August 2018 Responses to the Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Update the Reactor Coolant System Pressure-Temperature Limits ML18163A4182018-07-11011 July 2018 Documentation of the Completion of Required Actions Taken in Response to the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident ML18215A1782018-06-30030 June 2018 WCAP-18169-NP, Rev 1, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation. 1CAN041803, License Amendment Request: Revision to Technical Specification Bases Related to Emergency Feedwater Turbine-Driven Pump Steam Supply Valves2018-04-26026 April 2018 License Amendment Request: Revision to Technical Specification Bases Related to Emergency Feedwater Turbine-Driven Pump Steam Supply Valves 1CAN041805, Supplemental Information Supporting the Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee ...2018-04-26026 April 2018 Supplemental Information Supporting the Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee ... 2CAN031803, Supplemental Information Supporting the Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled ...2018-03-26026 March 2018 Supplemental Information Supporting the Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled ... 2CAN031802, Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Revision to Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule2018-03-13013 March 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Revision to Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule 2CAN091701, Response to Request for Additional Information Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program Plan2017-09-0606 September 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Reactor Vessel Internals Aging Management Program Plan 0CAN121601, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima...2016-12-20020 December 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima... 2CAN121601, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-545, TS Inservice Testing Program & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5.2016-12-0707 December 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-545, TS Inservice Testing Program & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5. 2024-01-11
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2CAN121602
December 2, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SUBJECT: Supplemental Information License Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-368 License No. NPF-6 REFERENCES: 1. Entergy letter dated October 27, 2016, License Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (2CAN101601) (ML16302A227) 2. NRC letter dated November 29, 2016, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested License Action RE: Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications (CAC MF8691) (2CNA111602) (ML16333A307) 3. NRC letter dated February 18, 2015, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program In Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c), (TAC No. MF0404) (2CNA021502) (ML14356A227)
Dear Sir or Madam:
By letter dated October 27, 2016 (Reference 1), and pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) submitted a request (Reference 1) to amend the Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2). The proposed change, in part, would revise the NFPA-805 modifications as previously approved by NRC in letter dated February 18, 2015 (Reference 3).
During the course of review, the NRC determined that supplemental information is required to support continued review of the Reference 1 request. The request was communicated to Entergy via Reference 2. The attachment to this letter contains the requested supplemental information. Entergy Operations, Inc. 1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Tel 479-858-3110 Richard L. Anderson ANO Site Vice President 2CAN121602 Page 2 of 2 Entergy has determined that the attached supplemental information does not affect or invalidate the No Significant Hazards Determination present in the Reference 1 original request.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated Arkansas state official. No new commitments have been identified in this letter.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 2, 2016. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Stephenie Pyle at 479-858-4704.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY RICHARD L. ANDERSON RLA/dbb
Attachment:
Supplemental Information - ANO-2 NFPA-805 Revisions
cc: Mr. Kriss M. Kennedy Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RGN-IV 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P. O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Thomas Wengert MS O-08B1 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Bernard R. Bevill Arkansas Department of Health Radiation Control Section 4815 West Markham Street Slot #30 Little Rock, AR 72205 Attachment to 2CAN121602 Supplemental Information - ANO-2 NFPA-805 Revisions
Attachment
to 2CAN121602 Page 1 of 7 Supplemental Information - ANO-2 NFPA-805 Revisions By letter dated October 27, 2016 (Reference 1), and pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) submitted a request (Reference 1) to amend the Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2). The proposed change, in part, would revise the NFPA-805 modifications as previously approved by NRC in letter dated February 18, 2015 (Reference 3).
During the course of review, the NRC determined that supplemental information is required to support continued review of the Reference 1 request. The request was communicated to Entergy via Reference 2. The attachment to this letter contains the requested supplemental information.
The following includes the information request presented in the NRC's letter (Reference 2) followed by Entergy's response. Following the response, a summary listing of all subject matter included in Entergy's Reference 1 letter is provided, along with an explanation of why Entergy believes NRC review of the subject matter is required.
Request Most of the proposed modifications in Section 2.0 of the LAR replace cable rerouting with alternative electronic modification. Cable rerouting would eliminate the possibility for fire-induced failure while alternative electronic modifications will only reduce the possibility of fire induced failures. Contrary to this observation, Tables 1 and 2 on Page 25 of 30 of Attachment 1 of the LAR indicate that several alternative electronic modifications result in lower plant risk compared to the cable rerouting option. Provide supplemental information explaining why the risk decreases in some of the modifications summarized in Table 2 and increases for other modifications.
RESPONSE The following information describes the plant modifications, assumptions, inputs, and risk impact for each of the modifications listed in Attachment 1, Table 2, of the subject Reference 1 license amendment request (LAR). Modification S1-1 (2CV-1026-2 and 2CV-1076-2) - No inhibit switch credited in this modification, cable routing change only. As described in the detailed description of Section 2.0 of the Reference 1 LAR, Entergy plans to relocate the relays associated with Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor operated valves (MOVs) 2CV-1026-2 and 2CV-1076-2 from Fire Area HH, Fire Zone 2096-M, to Fire Area B-3, Fire Zone 2091-BB, where the motor control centers (MCCs) for the affected valves are located.
The original modification described in Attachment S of Entergy letter dated August 7, 2014 (Reference 4), relocated the relays from Fire Zone 2096-M to the adjacent Fire Zone 2098-C. The original design concept removed the fire induced impact for those circuits in Fire Zone 2096-M only by moving the relays to an adjacent zone. The proposed design revision
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to 2CAN121602 Page 2 of 7 described in the Reference 1 letter relocates the relays to Fire Zone 2091-BB, which contains the MCCs for the affected valves. Since the MCC is located within Fire Zone 2091-BB, the fire induced impacts of this specific conductor are completely contained within the same fire zone and, therefore, removed the fire induced impact between Fire Zones 2096-M and 2091-BB. As a result, a reduction in risk has been calculated from that determined for the original modification design that was approved in Attachment W risk results for ANO-2 (Reference 4).
Additionally, the relocation of the relays for 2CV-1026-2 and 2CV-1076-2 had risk reduction benefits beyond the original scope of the modification described in Attachment S, Table S-1, Modification S1-1 of Reference 4, due to sharing of an EFW auxiliary relay with the circuits for EFW valves 2CV-0340-2, 2CV-0205-2, and 2CV-0795-2. The MCC associated with these MOVs is also located in Fire Zone 2091-BB and a contribution to risk reduction was achieved for the same reason described above for 2CV-1026-2 and 2CV-1076-2.
Modification S1-2 and S1-4 (2CV-4816 and 2CV-4817) - No inhibit switch credited in this modification, although circuit modification has been employed. As described in Attachment S, Table S-1, for Modifications S1-2 and S1-4 (Reference 4), the original modification for Letdown valves 2CV-4816 and 2CV- 4817 rerouted cable 2I016N by using embedded conduit C4080, which is located between Fire Area G (cable spreading room) and Fire Area EE-L. Cable 2I016N was also planned to be separately fused in Main Control Room (MCR) panel 2C-09 to prevent failure due to a loss of cable 2I016P. This modification would eliminate circuit impacts in Fire Areas TT, JJ, and EE-U.
The proposed change in this modification was described in the Reference 1 letter as a replacement of handswitch 2HS-4817 with a new four-position switch in the existing location in panel 2C-09. The new switch configuration allows the operator to place the switch in the CLOSE position to isolate the transducer and its field cable from the controller, and bond the positive and negative conductors of the current loop to each other. This arrangement eliminates intracable faults as a potential failure, prevents spurious operation of the controller from opening the valve, and provides protection from postulated intercable faults. A detailed discussion of this circuit and its failure modes is provided in the Reference 1 request.
As a result of this revised modification, the spurious failures of 2CV-4816 and 2CV-4817 were removed from the scenarios which were previously assumed to fail. The removal of the spurious failures in these fire zones resulted in a lower calculated plant risk than that determined for the original modification design that was approved in Attachment W risk results for ANO-2 (Reference 4).
Modification S1-7 (2CV-1036-2 and 2CV-1075-1) - No inhibit switch credited in this modification; circuit modification is employed in lieu of separation/protection.
The original design described in Attachment S, Table S-1, for Modification S1-7 (Reference 4), would change the control circuits for the subject EFW valves by separating the cable conductors, inclusive of internal panel wiring, that can cause spurious valve operation, and protecting the conductors with suitable barriers to prevent inadvertent energizing of target conductors in the MCR.
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to 2CAN121602 Page 3 of 7 The revised modification uses interposing relays to ensure hot shorts will not bypass the valve torque switches. Therefore, the cables to and from the MCR (where the interposing relays are located) no longer maintain a fire induced adverse impact. This information was incorporated into the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (FPRA) model and provided in the update to Attachment W (Reference 1) to assess the impact of the changes. The result of the change was a decrease in calculated plant risk.
Modification S1-8 (2CV-4698-1) - Inhibit switch credited in this modification.
The original modification design described in Attachment S, Table S-1, for Modification S1-8 (Reference 4) proposed to separate the cable conductors and protect the cables with suitable barriers to prevent inadvertent energizing of the conductors. The proposed revision to the design modifies the control circuit of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) vent valve 2CV-4698-1 by installing an inhibit circuit to prevent spurious operation in the event of a fire-induced short circuit. The inhibit circuit utilizes an existing spare closed contact in the CLOSE-OPEN control switch to effectively ground the valve opening circuit except when the control switch is moved to the OPEN position. A fire-induced circuit failure will result in a short to ground through the closed contact. This will prevent a cable failure from causing spurious operation of the valve.
The risk value associated with the new modification design was calculated using the same methodology as that used in the ANO, Unit 1 (ANO-1) request for additional information (RAI)response for inhibit circuits and approved in the associated NRC Safety Evaluation for ANO-1 (Reference 5). Consistent with the ANO-1 analysis, fires outside the cabinet that impact cabling associated with the inhibit circuits assumed a hot short failure probability of 1E-03 in the event DC power cables (fused greater than 10 amps) are routed in the same cable trays. Fires inside the cabinet were assumed to cause spurious operation using the NUREG-7150 hot short probability.
The revision to the design associated with 2CV-4698-1 increased the calculated plant risk due to the probability of failure associated with the inhibit switch. Since the original design assumed no spurious operation where the conductors were separated and protected with metallic shielding, this change in the modification has increased the risk as depicted in Table 2 of the
Reference
1 letter.
Modification S1-9 (2SV-4670-2 and 2SV-4669-1) - Inhibit switch credited in this modification; however, the change in risk due to this modification change is listed in Table 2 as "no more than minimal" because the change results in an insignificant change in risk. The original modification design described in Attachment S, Table S-1, for Modification S1-9 (Reference 4), was intended to eliminate adverse impacts on the subject Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent solenoid valves for a fire in Fire Area G by installing a grounded metallic sleeve and/or barriers up to the load side of the valve's handswitch. The revision to the design, described in the Reference 1 letter, modifies the control circuits of 2SV-4670-2 and 2SV-4669-1 by installing an inhibit circuit for each switch to prevent spurious operation in the event of a fire-induced short circuit. The inhibit circuit will utilize an existing spare closed contact in the CLOSE-OPEN control switch to effectively ground the valve opening circuit except when the control switch is moved to the OPEN position. A fire-induced circuit failure will result in a short
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to 2CAN121602 Page 4 of 7 to ground through the closed contact. This will prevent a cable failure from causing spurious operation of the valve. The functional and performance characteristics of the two valves are not changed. The method of operating the valves will remain the same.
The original risk analysis considered the probability of a spurious operation to be zero. Implementation of this design change and the zero spurious operation probability assumed were determined to be unfeasible. Ultimately, the design change to include the use of the inhibit switch resulted in a non-zero spurious operation probability. The risk of the new modification was calculated using the same methodology as that used in the ANO-1 RAI response for inhibit circuits and approved in the associated Safety Evaluation (Reference 5). Consistent with the ANO-1 FPRA analysis, fires outside the cabinet that impact cabling associated with the inhibit circuits assumed a hot short failure probability of 1E-03 in the event DC power cables (fused greater than 10 amps) are routed in the same cable trays. Fires inside the cabinet were assumed to cause a spurious operation based upon the hot short probability from NUREG-7150.
To address the potential failure of the inhibit circuit for this modification, it should be noted that multiple valves are required to fail in order to meet the criteria for a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA). The hot short probability used also considers the hot short duration terms provided in NUREG-7150. The following combinations of spurious operations are required for each flow path:
- 1. Through flow orifice 2FO-4675 spurious operation of either RCS vent valve 2SV-4636-1 or 2SV-4636-2, AND 2. Through flow orifice 2FO-4668 spurious operation of either RCS vent valve 2SV-4668-1 or 2SV-4668-2, AND 3. Through one of the RCS vent valves 2SV-4669-1 or 2SV-4670-2.
The simplified diagram below depicts the flow paths described above:
2FO 46682SV-4669-12R-12T-42PRESSSURIZER 2FO 4675 2T-1 S S 2SV-4636-1 2SV-4636-2 SS2SV-4668-12SV-4668-2S2SV-4670-2CONT ATMOSSQUENCH TANKREACTOR VESSEL
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to 2CAN121602 Page 5 of 7 From NUREG-7150, the hot short probability is 1.763E-01 and the hot short probability for scenarios lasting greater than 7 minutes is 2.20E-03.
For the configuration above, the probability of an RCS leak as defined in the multi-spurious operation (MSO) report is ([2 X (1.763E-01 X 2.20E-02)]^2) X [2 X 1.763E-01 X 2.20E-02)] = 4.67E-07. When this probability is combined with the frequency of a fire inside the cabinets in the MCR (4.28E-05/yr), the impact on the core damage frequency (CDF) is considered negligible in relation to the overall CDF as depicted in Table 2 of the Reference 1 letter.
For scenarios outside the cabinets, a hot short probability of 1E-03 is applied to credit the inhibit circuit in addition to the duration term from NUREG-7150. Therefore, a fire affecting the cabling outside the MCR is essentially the same order of magnitude as that for a fire inside the MCR and is considered negligible in relation to the overall CDF. Given the multiple paths required, the frequency of creating a SBLOCA is considered insignificant in relation to its risk impact on CDF and the large early release frequency (LERF). The following three items are not modifications, but were included in the updated Attachment W results provided in the Reference 1 request. These items were specifically identified to provide full explanation for the additional changes incorporated into the analysis that were included in the revised Attachment W. Bin 9 Update For Bin 9 (IA compressors), the Bayesian update of the data was removed and the value changed to reflect the generic frequency from Supplement 1 of NUREG/CR-6850 of 4.65E-03. This corrected frequency is a factor of 10 higher than that used in the original ANO-2 LAR analysis. The results for incorporating the revised frequency for instrument air compressors increases the CDF as depicted in Table 2 of the Reference 1 letter.
Availability of instrumentation for Fire Are JJ The ANO-2 FPRA model originally assumed instrumentation was available for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) corridor in Fire Area JJ. However, the only power supply to the instrument bus is fed from the green train battery bank. As a result, absent an operator action to transfer the power supply to a red train source, the instrument bus would de-energize upon battery depletion. The current analysis now accounts for operator action to transfer the power supply to the alternate red train source. The incorporation of this operator action to maintain power to the instrument bus increases the risk and adds a recovery action to mitigate this failure.
Dual Unit MCR Abandonment - This item was not depicted in Table 2; however, the impact on risk has been included in the Attachment W update included in the Reference 1 letter. A dual unit MCR abandonment scenario has been added to the overall ANO-2 fire risk results to ensure that the ANO-1 and ANO-2 NFPA-805 LAR submittals are consistent in assumptions relating to MCR abandonment scenarios. The dual unit MCR abandonment scenario is a low probability, high consequence scenario that results in damage to the ANO-2 sensitive
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to 2CAN121602 Page 6 of 7 electronics located within the MCR, caused by a hot gas layer forming from a fire in the ANO-1 MCR. This scenario would require a challenging dual unit shutdown and was conservatively assigned a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of 1.0. The CDF associated with this scenario is 2.34E-06/rx-yr. The ANO-2 MCR is contained in Fire Area G and this new scenario contributes only a small percentage of the overall risk for Fire Area G (4.07E-05/rx-yr). This change in risk is included in the overall risk results provided in the updated Attachment W included in the Reference 1 request.
The ANO-2 evaluation depicted in the Reference 1 letter is consistent with the evaluation performed for the ANO-1 transition to NFPA-805 documented in Entergy letter dated March 25, 2016 (Reference 6).
Summary The above information provides the basis for both reductions and increases in fire-related risk associated with the ANO-2 transition to NFPA 805. Below is a summary list of changes depicted in the Reference 1 letter and the basis for Entergy's request for NRC review and approval of each.
Modification Changes Because the method of each modification is specifically referenced in the ANO-2 Operating License (tied to the Reference 4 letter), the OL must be updated to reference the letter containing the revised modification descriptions (Reference 1). Therefore, NRC review and approval is required for the modification changes. Bin 9 Update The application of the correct ignition frequency for air compressors resulted in an increase in overall risk; therefore, NRC review and approval is requested. Availability of instrumentation for Fire Are JJ A new operator action has been identified resulting in an increase in overall risk; therefore, NRC review and approval is requested. Dual Unit MCR Abandonment Revising the MCR abandonment scenario to be consistent with that previously approved in the ANO-1 transition to NFPA 805 (Reference 5) resulted in an increase in overall risk; therefore, NRC review and approval is requested. Fire Dynamics Simulator A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics model (Fire Dynamics Simulator, Version 6.2) was used to analyze the thermal response of an electrical cable associated with the Safety Parameter Display System which was not previously reviewed and approved by the NRC for ANO-2; therefore, NRC review and approval is requested.
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to 2CAN121602 Page 7 of 7 EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 Entergy also requested confirmation of the acceptability to utilize performance-based methods to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA-805 as established by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide, Final Report," July 2003. This request was originally stated in Entergy letter dated November 7, 2013 (Reference 7), but was not discussed in the NRC's approval of the ANO-2 transition to NFPA-805 (Reference 3). The NRC approved use of the EPRI report for ANO-1 in the Reference 5 Safety Evaluation.
References 1. Entergy letter dated October 27, 2016, License Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (2CAN101601) (ML16302A227)2. NRC letter dated November 29, 2016, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested License Action RE: Amendment Request to Revise the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Modifications (CAC MF8691) (2CNA111602) (ML16333A307)3. NRC letter dated February 18, 2015, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program In Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c), (TAC No. MF0404) (2CNA021502) (ML14356A227)4. NRC letter dated August 7, 2014, Response to Request for Additional Information - Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, (2CAN081401) (ML14219A635)5. NRC letter dated October 7, 2016, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (CAC No. MF3419) (1CAN101601) (ML16223A481)6. Entergy letter dated March 25, 2016, Response to PRA RAI 03 - Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805, (1CAN031602) (ML16088A299)7. Entergy letter dated November 7, 2013, Response to Request for Additional Information - Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805, (2CAN111301) (ML13312A877)