ML19322A767

Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Into the Licensing Basis

ML19322A767
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	11/14/2019
From:	Gaston R Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OCAN111901
Download: ML19322A767 (136)

Text

Entergy Operations, Inc.

1340 Echelon Parkway Jackson, MS 39213 Tel 601-368-6138 Ron Gaston D1f:lc:tor, Nuclear l.Jcensmg 10 CFR 50.90

• OCAN111901 Novemb~r 14, 2019 ATTN: .Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional lnform~tion Related to License Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator into the Licensing Basis Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368

~enewed Facility Operating-License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 By letter dated April 29, 2019 (Reference 1), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), requested NRC approval of a proposed change to the license basis documents for Arkansas Nuclear One, Uriit 1 (AN0-1) and Unit 2 (AN0-2) to use the Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE) methodology as the licensing basis to qualify several components that have been identified as

- - - - - - - ~ . not conforming .to .the .unit.specific current licensing basis. During the course of review, *the NRC det~rmined additional information was required to comple.te the review pro'cess. .

The NRC initially notified Entergy of the request fo.r additional information (RAI) on September 20, 2019. The RAI was formalized in an email dated October 7, 2019 (Reference 2),

with a 90-day response period beginning September 20, 2019 (i.e., response due December 19, 2019). /

Entergy's RAI response is included in the attached enclosure.* The responses do not impact the no significant hazards consideration provided in the original amendment request (Reference 1).

No new regulatory commitments are included in this* submittal.

hi! accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, Entergy is notifying the State of Arkansas of Entergy's TMRE application RAI response by transmitting a copy*of this letter and enclosure to the designated State Official.

OCAN111901 Page '2 of 2 If there are ~my questions or if additional information i~ needed, pleas~ contact Tim Arnold at 4 79-858-7826.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on* November 14, 2019. .*

Respectfully, .

k] .~

Ron Gaston RWG/dbb

Enclosure:

Response to Request for Additional lnformationHe lated to Proposed Adoption of a Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Attachments to

Enclosure:

1. List of SSCs'Assumed to b_e* Affected by Toma.do-Generated Missfle.s in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

2. Supporting Figures

References:

1.

• Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG), Ucense Amendment Request to Incorporate Tomado Missile R{sk Evaluator into the Ucensing Basis, Art<ansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 (OCAN041904) (ML19119A090), dated April 29, 2019. . . . .

2. NRC email to Entergy, Final RAl*#1 RE: Ucense Amend.ment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE). info Licensing Basis (EPJD L-2019-LLA-0093), (OCNA101901) (ML19280A040), dated October 7, 2019.

• 1 cc: NRC Region IV Regional Administrator NRC Senior ~esident Inspector - Arkansas Nuclear One .

NRC Project Manager - Arkansas Nuclear One Designated Arkansas State Official

/

Enclosure to OC_AN11t90~

' ' f I ' ,-

Response to Request for Addltlonal lnfonnation Related to Proposed Adoption of a Tornado Mlsslle Risk'Evaluator

Enclosure to OCAN111901

, Page 1 of 24 RESPON SE TO REQUES T FOR ADDITIO NAL INFORMA TION RELATED TO PROPOS ED ADOPTIO N OF A TORNAD O MISSILE RISK EVALUA TOR By letter dated April 29, 2019 (Reference 1), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), requested NRC approval of a proposed change to the license basis documen ts for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (AN0-1) and Unit 2 (AN0-2) to use the Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE) '

methodology as the licensing basis to qualify several components that have been identified as not conforming to the unit specific current licensing basis. During the course of review, the NRC determined additional information was required to complete the review process.

The NRC initially notified Entergy. of the request for additional information (RAI) on September 20, 2019. The RAI was formalized in email dated October 7, 2019 (Reference 2),

with a 90-day response period beginning Septembe r 20, 2019 (i.e., response due December 19, 2019).

Each question associated with the subject RAI is repeated below followed immediately by Entergy's response to the specific question.

PRA RAI 01 - AN0-1 Internal Events PRA Model Full-Scop e Peer Review Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic'Risk,Assessment [PRA] Results.for Risk Informed Activities,"-Revision 2, March 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML0904-10014) endorses American Society for Mechanic al Engineers/American Nuclear Society (ASMEiANS) RA-Sa-20 09, "Addenda to ASME/ANS

• RAS- 2008, Standard for Level 1 / Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications," (the PRA Standard). According to the regulatory position in Section C.2 of RG 1.200, when the staffs regulatory positions contained in Appendices A through* D are taken into account, use of a peer review can be used to demonstrate that the PRA [with regard to an at-power Level 1/LERF PRA for internal events (I Es) (excluding exte1:1a1 hazards)] is adequate to support a ris_k-informed a*pplication.

Section 4.1 of Attachment 1 of the 'licensee amendme nt request states that a peer review of the AN0-1 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model was performed in August 2009. However, Section 4.2 of Attachment 1 of the LAR states that the latest full-scope peer review for AN0-1 was conducted in July 2Q09 using RG 1.200, Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001).

Based on the information provided in the LAR, the NRG staff could not determine which revision of RG 1.200 the licensee used to perform the peer review of the AN0-1 IE probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model.

• Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee:

a. Clarify which revision of RG 1.200 was used to perform the peer review of the AN0-1 IEPRA model that formed the basis for the AN0-1 TMRE PRA model.

b. If the peer review was conducted against Revision 1 of RG 1.200, provide justification, such as a gap assessment, that the differences between the currently and formerly endorsed PRA standards do not impact the technical acceptability of the AN0-1 TMRE PRA.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 2 of 24 Entergy Response

a. The AN0-1 IE at-power PRA model used for the TMRE application was reviewed to meet the requirements of RG 1.200, Revision 2. A peer review was performed in August 2009 against th~ AN0-1 model using Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 05-04, "Process for Performing lntema~ Events PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME/ANS PRA Standard," the AS ME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 .PRA Standard, and RG 1.200, Revision 2. This AN0-1 PRA*model was used to support other risk informed license amendment request (LAR) submittals such as "fechnical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-425 (Reference 3) and National FJre Protection Association (NFPA)-805 (Reference 4).

b. The AN0-1 IE at-power 2009 peer review was conducted using RG 1.200, Revision 2.

PRA RAI 02 - AN0-1 Nonconformln*g SSCs Not Included in the TMRE Analysis Section 2.3 of the enclosure to the LAR,. identifies two nonconfom,ing, safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for AN0-1 that were not incorporated, into the TMRE' PRA models. These SSCs are: (1) conduit EC1493, which includes the reactor head vent solenoid valve, and (2) small bore service water piping (HCD-65-2" and HeD-65-2") to VCH-4A and 48 pumps. The justification provided by the licensee for their exclusion was that they were evaluated as having a negligible impact on risk in the IE PRA and therefore not included in the TMRE PRA.

Part 2 of the 2009 ASME/ANS PRA Standard contains several supporting requirements (SRs) th~t allow screening of SSCs from the IEPRA. However, the self-assessment of SR SY-A15 for application to the TMRE PRA in Appendix D of NEI 17-:02, Revision 18, "Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Industry Guidance Document" (ADAMS Accession No. ML18262A328), specifically states that the" ... failure of SSCs due to tornado missiles shall not use the exclusions of

,SY-A15." The NRC staffs comments on the self-assessment for SY-A15 provides additional_

clarification on not using screening for the TMRE PRA. The licensee's comment for AN0-1 for SY-A15 in Table 9 in Enclosure Attachment 1 to the LAR states, 1'The TMRE process was

• followed as described," which appears to the NRC staff to be inconsistent with the screening of the two nonconforming SSCs identified above.

Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee describe how the exclusion of the two nonconformances identified above is consistent with the guidance in NEI 17-02, Revision 18. In particular, address the statement in the self-assessment for SRs for development of the TMRE PRA that states that the failure of SSCs due to tornado missiles shall not us~the exclusions of SR SY-A 15. Alternately, the NRC staff requests that the licensee demonstrate that the exclusion of the two nonconformances identified above does not impact this LAR.

Entergy Response Conduit EC1493 contains cables associated with the red-train Reactor Coolant Syste~ (RCS) high point vent valves. All of these valves are normally closed. Failure of the cables in the conduit would prevent opening valves to vent the RCS. Venting of the RCS, however, is not included in the IE PRA model. Therefore, failure of the cables in EC1493 would have no impact

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 3 of 24 on the IE model. The red-train RCS vents were not screened from the IE PRA model using any of the criteria in SR SY-A 15. Because the high point vents are not considered in the IE PRA model, failure would not affect risk determined for the TMRE analysis.

The two small-bore Service Water pipes (HCD-65-2" and HCD-66-2") provide cooling water flow to the VCH-4A and 48 Emergency Switchgear Room Chiller units, which provide room cooling for the electrical switchgear rooms. Analyses performed for the IE PRA model determined that the room cooling provided by VCH-4A and VCH-48 was not required for PRA components to function. Therefore, failures of VCH-4A or VCH-48 were not included in the IE PRA model.

VCH-4A and VCH-48 were not screened from the IE PRA model using any of the criteria in SR SY-A 15 and were not included in the TRME analysis because the chiller units are not needed to fulfill any PRA-related function.

A secondary effect from failure of HCD-65-2" and HCD-66-2"* could be flooding. The pipes are located in the Turbine Building. No equipment in the Turbine Building that is credited in the IE PRA model would be available after a tornado-induced loss of offsite power (LOOP) event.

Additionally, the Turbine Building is designed to be sealed from the Auxiliary Building to minimize the potential for flooding to propagate from the Turbine Building to PRA-related equipment located in the Auxiliary Building Therefore, any secondary effects caused by flooding would not impact the TMRE analysis.

• PRA RAI 03 - ANO Tornado Missile Walkdown Area RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," Revision 3, (ADAMS Accession No. ML17317A256), Staff Regulatory Guidance Section C.2, states that the engineering analyses conducted to justify any PfOposed licensing basis change should be appropriate for the nature and scope of the proposed change.

• Section 3.4.2 of NEI 17-02, Revision 18, states that in the case of targets greater than 1500 feet

'from the plant reference point, a qualitative evaluation of the missile inventory within 2500 feet

• from the outlying target(s) should be done. The intent of this evaluation is to determine whether the missile inventory used for the TMRE is applicable to all the targets.

Section 3.3.3 of the enclosure to the LAR states the missile walkdown was performed in accordance with Section 3.4 of NEI 17-02,and the walkdown area was defined by a 2500 feet radius from the center point between the two reactor buildings, but does not state if all targets satisfied the criteria of NEI 17-02, Revision 1B. Based* on the information provided in the LAR, it is unclear to the NRC staff if the qualitative evaluation identified in NEI 17-02 was* performed and whether such an evaluation resulted in changes to the missile inventory. Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee:* *

a. Confirm that the ANO TMRE methodology includes a qualitative evaluation of the missile inventory within 2500 feet of targets that are further than 1500 feet from the plant reference point and changes the missile inventory, if necessary.

I

b. If such qualitative evaluation is not included in the ANO TMRE methodology, justify that exclusion for*current and future applications of the ANO TMRE.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 4 of 24 Entergy Response

a. NEI 17-02, Revision 1B, requires a qualitative evaluation of missi/e inventory within 2500 feet of any target located more than 1500 feet from the plant*area reference point.

The SSC:;s that are included in the TMRE evaluations are located within the power block area and within 1500 feet of the reference point. These structures include the Turbine Buildings, Auxiliary Buildings, Intake Structures, tank areas, and the Alternate AC Diesel Generator. Figure 1 of Attachment 2 of this enclosure shows the 1500-foot radius from the plant reference point and the aforementioned structures are less than 1500 feet from the reference point. Therefore, an assessment of targets greater than 1500 feet from the plant reference point is not necessary. *

b. Because the targets included in the TMRE evaluations are less than 1500 feet from the reference point, no further evaluation is included in the current TMRE analysis. The area outside the 1500-foot radius includes wooded areas and several buildings, but no SSCs that are considered in the PRA models. Should a new SSC be added outside the 1500-foot radius in the future, that SSC would be required to meet current requirements, i.e., the use of TMRE would not be allowed.

PRA RAI 04 - ANO Multiunit LOOP Section C.6.3 of RG 1.17~, Revision 3, states t~at the licensee's submittal should discuss measures used to ensure the ,PRA is acceptable for the application PRA, such as a report of a peer review augmented by a discussion of the appropriateness of the PRA model for supporting a risk assessment of the licensing basis change being considered.

Section 6 of NEI 17-02, Revision* 1B, describes the TMRE PRA model to be used in the analyses. The appropriate event and fault trees, at a minimum, cause a reactor trip and loss of offsite power (LOOP). Section 6.2 of NEI 17.:-02, Revision 1B, states that for multi-unit sites, the tornado event should be assumed to result in a multi-unit LOOP event. Further, a generic list of TM RE-relevant SRs is provided in NEI 17-02,. Revision 1B, Appendix D.

In Enclosure Attachments 1 and 2 of the LAR, the licensee discusses PRA technical adequacy for ANO Units 1 and 2, respectively. Se.ction 4.2 in each.attachment states that a systematic review of the SRs relative to the AN0-1 and AN0-2 TMRE model development was performed and documented in the "Additional AN0-1/AN0-2 TMRE Comments" column of Table 9.

However, the NRC staff noted that two SRs related to multi-unit LOOP events (IE-A10 and IEB5) have no entries in either table and therefore, it is not clear to the NRC staff whether the ANO TMRE methodology is consistent with the guidance in NEI 17-02.

The NRC staff requests that the licensee confirm that the ANO TMRE methodology followed the guidance in Section 6.? of NEI 17-02, Revision 1B, by assuming that the tornado event results in a multi-unit LOOP event. If the guidance is not followed, describe the ANO methodology with detailed justification or provide an updated T,MRE analysis that incorporates multi-unit LOOP initiators.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 5 of 24 Entergy Response The ANO TMRE analysis followed the guidance in Section 6.2 of NEI 17-02, Revision 18, by assuming that the tornado event results in a multi-unit LOOP event. The two entries for additional comments in the referenced Table 9 for each attachment are blank because there are no additional TMRE specific ~nsiderations or comments related to these items.

PRA RAI 05-ANO TMRE Compliant-Case Conservatisms Se!1sitivlty Section C.2.5.1.2 of RG 1.174, R'evision 3, states that in interpreting the results of a PRA, it is important to understand the impact of a specific assumption or choice of model on the predictions of the PRA.

Section 7.2.2 of NEI 17-02, Revision 18, states that the licensee should-review cut sets in the top 90 percent of the TMRE compliant case to identify conservatisms related to equipment failures only that could impact results and perform sensitivity studies to address SRs AS-A 10, LE-C3 and SY-87 in Ap.pendix D.

Section 3.3.9 of the enclosure to the LAR states for the compliant-case sensitivity that compliant TMRE basic events were removed from both the compliant and degraded cases. This appears to the NRC staff to remove valid failures of exposed SSCs from both cases, whereas the intent of the sensitivity is to address conservatisms related to failure probabilities only in the compliant case. Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee:

a. Provide justification that the approach for performing the compliant-case conservatism sensitivity study is appropriate to eval!,.late the compliant-case conservatisms consistent with the guidance in NEI 17-,02, Revision 18.

b. Alternatively, provide an updated sensitivity study that only impacts an identified conseryatism in the compliant-case results.

• Entergy Response This response provides justification (a) that the approach used in the quantification is appropriate for evaluating the impact of the compliant-case conservatisms. The NEI 17-02, Revision 18, 'guidance provides three examples of methodologies that can be used to evaluate the impact of the conservatism in compliant case failures. It is noted in the guidance that these are only provided as possible examples t~at are not intended to specify required methods.

The first two methods proposed in the NEI 17-02, Revision 18, guidance involve altering the Exposed Equipment Failure Probability (EEFP) in the compliant case only. This is accomplished by either setting the EEFPs to false or estimating a more realistic value. As noted in the guidance, both of these methods are very conservative. Because the degraded case is unchanged, any decrease in risk from changing the compliant case will ultimately add to the change in core damage frequency (b.CDF) and change in large early release frequency (b.LERF) directly. Because the intent of the b.CDF and b.LERF calculations is to evaluate the risk impact of the non-conforming SSCs, the changes in these values in only the compliant case scenarios does not make a valid comparison to the base case, i.e., degraded case. The first two examples of evaluating the compliant case conservatism are meant to be an easy, bounding approach when the modeled conservatisms do not have a significant risk impact.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 6 of 24 These methods are not pursued for the ANO TMRE due to the simplistic modeling of the compliant case scenarios. Many of the compliant qase scenarios involve SSCs that are in compliance with the licensing-basis requirements, but are classified as vulnerable due to not meeting the NEI 17-02 tom.ado missile protection criteria. These scenarios are, in many cases,

• modeled conservatively as failing all Sscs* in the affected area and without credit for intervening barriers, e.g., multiple block walls, that are not addressed specifically by NEI 17-02. Because scenarios involving barriers that are in compliance with licensing basis requirements are not the subject of this application and.do not contribute to .llCDF and .lll.ERF, simplistic and conservative modeling is determined.io b~ appropriate.

Because the first two methods are overly conservative and not applicable to the analysis, a third method is used. The third method of evaluating the compliant case conservatisms in the

• NEI 17-02 guidance evaluates the impact of changing the conservatisms in both the ~mpliant and degraded cases. This is the method.that was utilized in the sensitivity perfonned for the

~NO TMRE quantification.

There are two ways the compliant case s*cenarios can .affect the b.CDF and b.LERF calculation for the non-confonning SSCs. The compliant cas.e scenario can be in a cutset with th~ basic event modeling a non-conformance, which results in the conservatism increasing the total risk from the non-confonnance. The degraded case cutsets for each unit are reviewed to determine if any compliant case scenarios contribute significantly Jo. the risk from the non-conformances.

A summary of the conclusions from this review are presented below for each unit.

\ .

AN0-1 Review Results CA-1 Fire Damper(386_-foot elevation Room 128)

I The fire darnper non-confonnance is modeled as two sets of EEFP values for Room 128.

Orie set of EEFP values was* calculated for the degraded case considering the total target ar~a for all vulnerabilities and a second set of EEFP values was calculated for the compliant case by removing.the targefarea associated with the three fire dampers. The top cutsets involving tornado missile impact to the AN0-1 controlled access (CA-1) area fire damper include failures of the #1 diesel generator (DG1 ): fail to start on demand, fail to load and run during first hour of operation, fail to run aJter first hour of operation, and test and maintenance. The first cutset including a compliant case scenario is cutset 36, which includes basic events F5-128-A'and FS-76-A. The frequency of this scenario is 3.34E-08, which is only about 2% of the total CDF from the 128-A cutsets preceding it. Therefore, the compliant scenarios have a very minor impact on tt,is non-conformance. '

Demineralizer Area Conduits (354-foot elevation Room 73)

The conduits in the demineralizer area are modeled as divided into four correlatidn groups:

73-A, 73-8, 73-C, and 73-D.

• The top cutsets involving tornado missile irnpact to the demineralizer area conduits ir:iclude 'battery 006 discharge at five hours (without AC charging). The first cutset including a compliant case scenario is cutset 57, which includes basic events FS-128-A and F5-73-A. The frequency of this scenario is 1.90E-08, which is only about 2% of the total CDF from the 73-A, 73-8, 73-C, and 73-D cutsets preceding it.

Therefore, the compliant case scenarios have a very minor impact on this non-conformance.

I

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 7 24of Block-out FB-103-4 (368-foot elevation Room 104)

Penetrations in wall FB-103-4 include the block-out and several small penetrations at different elevations which are vulnerable from the south. The top cutset involving a tornado 1

missile strike to the FB-103-4 is number 53, which includes TMRE basic events 'F5-104-EL and FS-128-A. Although this cutset includes a compliant case scenario, the total frequency of this event is 2.1 OE-08 Because the frequency is two orders of magnitude below the RG 1.174 acceptance criteria similar to the CA-1 fire damper and demineralizer area conduits non-conformances, it is concluded that a missile strike through the block-out FB-103-4 contributes a negligible amount of risk. Therefore, the compliant case scenario that affects the block-out FB-103-4 does not impact the overall results.

EFW Piping (404-foot elevation Room 170)

The top cutset involving a tornado missile strike to the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) steam piping in the penthouse area is number 487, which i.ncludes basic events F5-170-EFW and F5-76-A. Although this cutset includes a compliant case scenario, the total frequency of this event is 1.28E-09. -Because the frequency is three orders of magnitadeiJelow the RG 1.174 acceptance criteria and an order of magnitude less than the CA-1 fire damper, demineralizer area conduits, and block-out FB-103-4 non-conformances, it is concluded that a missile strike to the EFW steam piping contributes a negligible 'amount of risk. Therefore, the compliant case scenario that affects the EFW piping does not impact the overall results.

AN0-2 Review Results Emergency Diesel Exhaust stacks (Above 386-foot elevation Outside Auxiliary Building West Wall)

The non-conforming Emergency Diesel <;,enerator (EOG) exhaust)s modeled as a failure of the affected EOG. The top cutsets involving tornado missile if!lpact to the diesel exhaµst include- failures'" cif the 'opposing EOG train:* *-fail to run, test and maintenance, fail to run after first hour, and 4 kV breaker fail to trip. The first cutset including a complian.t case scenario is cutset 23Q, which includes basic events FS-2076-A and F5-YARD-2K-4B-EXHAUST. The frequency of this scenario is 2.73E-09, which is only about 6% of the total CDF from the "B" EOG exhaust cutsets pr~ceding it. Therefore, the compliant case scenarios have a very minor impact on this non-conformance. **

EFW Piping (404-foot elevation Room 2155)

The top cutset involving a tornado missile strike to the EFW steam piping is number 966, which includes basic events FS-2101-A and FS-2155-EFW-3. Although this cutset includes a compliant case scenario, the totarfrequency of this event is 2.13E-10. Because the frequency is four orders of magnitude below the RG 1.174 acceptance criteria and two orders of magnitude less than the diesel exhaust non-conformance, it'is concluded that a missile strike to the EFW steam piping contributes a negligible amount of risk. Therefore, the compliant case scenario that affects the EFW piping does not _impact the overall results.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 8 of 24 Conduit EC1373 (386-foot elevation Rao~ 2136)

A tornado missile strike to non-conforming condurt EC1373 results in failure of the red-train EOG start air system due to loss of solenoid valve 2SV-2810-1. Therefore, the top cutsets involving this event include failure of the green-train EOG, which leads to a station blackout.

The top cutsets are similar to the diesel exhaust stacks in that they are comprised of IE failures of the green-train EOG (fail to run, test and maintenance, fail to start, and 4 kV breaker fail to trip). The first cutset containing a compliant case scenario is cutset 910, having a probability of 2.44E-10, which is only about 4% of the preceding cutsets involving, internal events. Therefore, the compliant case scenarios have a very minor impact on this non-conformance.

The other way the compliant case scenarios can impact the b.COF and b.LERF calculation is by masking the importance of the non-confonning basic events. This is the scenario where the conservatism needs to be evaluated, since the compliant case scenarios do not significantly affect the total, risk from non-conforming SSCs. This is accomplished by setting all compliant case tornado events to false. Because the compliant case scenarios do not significantly contribute to the total risk of the non-conformances, this is an easy way to evaluate if the conservatism in the compliant cases is masking risk from the non-conformances. As shown in the results of the sensitivity, the b.COF and b.LERF do increase as a result of removing the compliant case scenarios. However, the b.CDF and llLERF still meet the acceptance criteria of RG 1.174. .

In summary, the compliant cases do not significantly impact the risk from the non-conforming SSCs because the top cutsets are comprised of IE failures and are not comprised of other tornado missile scenarios. This sensitivity is primarily evaluating whether the conservative compliant scenario modeling potentially masks the risk from the non-confonnances. Therefore, the methods used in this sensitivity analysis are appropriate and provide a sufficient basis that compliant case assumptions do not have an impact on the cumulative risk for non-conforming SSCs.

PRA 'RAI 06 - Table Corrections In the enclosure to the LAR on, page 34 of 37, the AN0-1 TMRE Missile Distribution Sensitivity Results table provides the core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) for the degraded and compliant plants, and the difference (delta) between the two for the missile distribution sensitivity study.

In the enclosure to the LAR on page 36 of 37, the AN0-1 Single Event Cutset Sensitivity Results table provides the COF and LERF for the degraded and compliant plants, and the delta between the two for the single event cutset sensitivity study.

The NRC staff noted that both tables indicat9i that the compliant plant COF and LERF are greater than degraded plant CDF and LERF, but no explanation is provided in the LAR. Based on the NEI 17-02 guidance for modeling non-conforming SSCs in the compliant case and the basis for the risk assessment in the TMRE methodology, it is unclear to the NRC staff how the compliant case values are higher than the degraded case. Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee explain the above-cited results and/or provide corrections to the tables as applicable.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 9 of 24 Entergy Response The values shown in the tables have been transposed between the compliant and degraded cases for each of the two tables identified. The corrected table corresponding to the table contained on Page 34 of 47 of the Reference 1 LAR is as follows:

AN0-1 TMRE Missile Distribution Sensitivity Results CDF (/yr) LERF (/yr)

Degraded 1.69E-05 4.79E-06 Compliant 1.56E-05 4.52E-06 Delta 1.30E-06 2.70E-07 The corrected table corresponding to the table contained on Page 36 of 4 7 of the Reference 1 LAR is as follows:

AN0-1 Single Event Cutset Sensitivity Results CDF (/yr) LERF (/yr)

Degraded 6.03E-06 7.74E-07 Compliant 5.43E-06 7.33E-07 Delta 6E-07 4.1E-08 Entergy requests that the NRG refer to the above tables in lieu of the corresponding tables contained on Pages 34 of 47 and 36 of 47 of the original Reference 1 LAR in completing its regulatory review.

PRA RAI 07 - AN0-1 Defense-In-Depth Considerations One of the five key principles of risk-informed decision making addresses defense-in-depth (DID) considerations. Section C.2.1.1.3, "Evaluating the Impact of the Proposed Licensing Basis Change on Defense in Depth," at RG 1.174, Revision 3, provides guidance on the consideration of DID as part of risk-informed decisionmaking for licensing basis changes.

Section 3.2 of the enclosure to the LAR states that non-conforming conduits in the AN0-1 demineralizer area if impacted by a tornado-generated missile could affect both trains of service water (SW). Thl3 same section also states that both trains of emergency feedwater (EFW) may also be impacted by a tornado-generated missile in the AN0-1 demineralizer area. The LAR further indicates that the TMRE PRA analysis demonstrates that the SW and EFW systems will remain "functional." Based on the information provided in the LAR, it appears to the NRG staff that SSC functionality from a PRA viewpoint is being used to support a DID conclusion. Further,

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 10 of 24

\

the NRC staff notes that due to the potential for non-confirming conduits to affect both trains of SW or EFW and th~*lack of detailed cable tracing, a tornado-generated missile hit oh the conduits would be modeled as a common-cause failure (CCF) of both trains of SW or EFW.

Therefore, it is unclear-to the NRC staff how PRA functionality" is being claimed by the licensee .. The guidan~ in Section C.2.1.1.3 *of RG 1.174, Revision 3, does not support the _use of PRA."functionality." The NRC staff requests that the licensee'.. '

a. Clarify the statement that the TMRE PRA analysis demonstrates that the SW and EFW systems will ~emain "functional" following impact from a tornado-generated missile.

b. .Justify how the use of fu~ctionality" i[:1 a PRA model is consistent y.rith. the guidance on the DfD considerations described in Section C.2.1.1.3 of RG 1.174, Revision 3, to meet the second key principle of risk-informed regulation. Alternately, provide a basis that does not rely on PRA functionality" for why DID continues to be maintained despite the apparent CCFs of the SW and EFW systems.

• Section 3.3.9 of the enclosure to the LAR discusses several sensitivity studies induding the

'!AN0-1 Single Event Cutset Sensitivity." T.he LAR states that the base CDF cutset results contain . several single-order c:;utsets (i.e., initiating.event and one basic event) and identifies the most important of such basic events as tornado failures for Room 129 (Control Room), Room 98 (Corridor) and Room 97 (Cable Spreading Room) . .The guidance for Item 5, "Maintain multiple fission prod4~t barriers," i11 Section C.2.1.1.3 of-RG 1.174, Revision 3, states that the evaluation of the proposed licens111g basis change should demonstrate that th~ change does not (1) create a significant increase in the likelihood or consequence of an event that simultaneously a

challenges multiple barriers or (2) introduce new event that would simultaneously impact multiple barriers. !t qppears to tlie NRC staff, that the single order cutsets in the base TMRE PRA model challenge DID by simultaneously impacting and failing.. multiple barriers. Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the liCE!nsee:

c. Describe the SSCs that are considered as being impacted by tornado-generated missiles in Room 129 (Control Room), Room 98 (Corridor) and Room 97 (Cable Spreading Room) and their modeling in the TMRE PRA (i.e., what S~Cs the single basic event fo_r the rooms represents). *

d. Justify how simultaneous challenges to multiple barriers is avoided and consequently, DID is maintained given the insights from the AN0-1 TMRE PRA model base results as well as the "AN0-1 Single Event Cutset Sensitivity." The justification should include ,

details about any conservatisms in modeling the impact of tornado-generated missiles as well as resulting failures *of relevant SSCs in Room 129 (Control' Room), Room 98 (Corridor) and Room 97 (Cable Spreading Room). , -

The AN0-1 TMRE "Missile Distribution Sensitivity discussed in Section 3.3.9 of the enclo*sure to the LAR demonstrates a substantial increase in LERF. Section 3.3.9 of the enclosure to the LAR ahd the discu'ssion for "Item 20" in E'nclosure Attach.ment 3 of the LAR provides justification for why this result is conservative. Howe'{er, the conservatisms discussed seem generally applicable to the entire TMRE model (i.e., to the total CDF and LERF), and therefore would apply to both the compliant and degraded cases. It is unclear to the NRC staff how they relate specifically to the nJOdeling of the nonconformances that results in the calculated delta risk. For example, it is stated that a detailed evaluation of cable routing would allow fewer correlated

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 11 of 24 failures and thus result in a lower risk, but these cables appear not to be related to any of the nonconfonnances listed in Table 1 of the LAR. As another example, the LAR states that much of the risk increase is caused by the multiplier applied to targets in the "bowling alley," but it is later explained in Item 20.c of Attachment 3 of the enclosure that none of the "highly exposed" SSCs are considered nonconfonnances. It appears to the NRC staff that there is al) additional failure mode introduced that impacts LERF mdre adversely .than CDF. Ther~fore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee:

e. Jljstify how a reasonable balance between accident mitigation and prevention* .is maintained as part of DID given the substantial increase in LERF for the AN0-1 TMRE "Missile* Distribution Sensitivity" discussed in Section 3.3.9 of the LAR. The justification should include discussion of insights from the cited sensitivity study as,well* as. any conservatisms in th~ determLnation of the change in risk (e.g., related to modeling the impact of tornado-generated" missiles as well as resultin~ failures .of relevant ~SCs).

Entergy Response

a. The first clarification to be made is that a sing.le missile *cannot impact the non-conforming SSCs affecting both the SW and EFW systems. The-conduits and cables affecting the SW system components* are located on the 354-foot elevation near Column Lihe 5.9 between Lines C and E in the.demineralizer-area: The SSCs that 'could affect the EFW system are not located in the demineralizer area. The cond~its and cables affecting the EFW system components are located on the 368-foot elevation inside Room 104. *  :

The SSCs,in the demineralizer area affect the following components for the SW system:

• P-4C

• CV-2806 (~oop 2 SW, to EFW P-7 A Suction)

• CV-3851 (Loop 2 SW to EFW P-7A Suction)

• CV-3644 (P-4A to P-4B SW Crosstie)

• CV-3642 (P-4C to P-4B SW Crosstie)

• CV-3640 (P-4C to P-4B SW Crosstie)

• CV-3646 (P-4A to P-4B SW Crosstie)

• CV-3820 (Loop I Supply to ICW Coolers)

• CV-3643 (ACW Isolation Valve) _

• SG-3 C'A" I "B" SW Bay Cross-Connect)

• SG-4 (B" / "C" SW Bay Cross-Connect) .

Should P-4C be failed, -the opposite train pump, nominally P-4A, would remain available.

The swing SW pump, P-4B, would also remain available. Availability of P-4B is subject to the initial alignment. It may be running initially in which case* no impact to SW system operation would occur. Alternatively, P-4B could be aligned in standby to either train. If aligned in standby to P-4A, then realignment to P-4C would be required with operation subject to the impacts discussed below for sluice gate alignment. If aligned in standby to P-4C, then operation could occur almost immediately:*

• Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 12 of 24 LOOP1 1111 SERVICE WATER SG-1 LOOP2 1111 SERVICE WATER Failure of valves CV-2806 and CV-3851 would prevent alignment of Loop 2 SW to EFW pump P-7A from the main Control Room. However, local operation of these valves would be possible. Although Loop 2 SW to EFW pump P-7A would not be available, this function would not be needed for several hours after the initial reactor trip. Additionally, Loop 1 SW to EFW pump P-7B would remain available.

Valves CV-3644, CV-3642, CV-3640, and CV-3646 are the SW loop cross-tie valves and are used to separate the Loop 1 and Loop 2 SW headers. These valves receive a signal to close on an Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuation. ES actuation is associated with RCS and/or Reactor Building pressure parameters. Following a tornado with coincident LOOP, an ES actuation is not assumed. Therefore, closure of these valves would not be demanded.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 13 of 24 As with the loop cross-tie valves discussed above, the Loop 1 SW supply to the Intermediate Cooling Water (ICW) heat exchangers, CV-3820, receives a close signal on

,ES actuation. Because no ES signal would be generated following a tornado-induced

• event, this valve repositioning would not be demanded The same is true for the Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW) isolation valve, CV-3643.

The SW bay cross-connect sluice gates, SG-3 and SG-4, fail as-is. During nonnal SW system operation, the SW bays are aligned to receivE:1 water from the Lake Dardane lle through SG-1 and SG-2. SG-1 located in the "A" SW bay provides flow to the "A" SW bay while SG-2 located in the "C" Circulating Water (CW) bay provides flow to the "C" SW bay. Lake water to the "8" or swing SW bay can be provided from either the "A" or "C" SW bay through SW bay cross-connect sluice gates, SG-3 and SG-4.

SG-3 separates the "A" and "B" SW bays while SG-4 separates the "B" and "C" SW bays.

SW bay cross-connect sluice gates are aligned based on SW pump configuration, SW pump P-48 preferred power supply, or as detennined by Operations. Therefore, at least one of the cross-conn!3ct sluice gates is expected to be open. As a result, the swing SW

• pump P-48 could be available. If aligned to SW Loop 2, *then P-48 could be started as directed by procedures. If aligned to SW Loop 1, then P-48 could be re-aligned to Loop 2 and started.

• The physical layout of the conduits affecting these components is such that four scenarios are evaluated for missile strikes because a single missile strike would not be expected to impact all conduits at the same time. The first scenario considers a missile strike that could impact the following conduits that are considered non-conforming:

' 1 EC1281 EC2341 Failure of EC1281 would fail only SG-3 while failure of EC2341 would fail only SG-4.

Therefore, for that scenario, all SW pumps along with cross-tie and isolation valves would remain available.

• The second scenario considers a missile strike that could impact the following conduits that are considered non-confonning:

EC1593 EC1256 EC1255- EC2014 EC1254 EB2096 EA2013 Failure of conduits 'EC1593, EC1254, EC1256, does not affect any SW system components. Failure of EC1255 could affect the Loop 2 SW to ICW valve CV-3820

, and SW pump cross~tie valves CV-3640 and'CV-3646. Failure of either conduit EC2014 or EB2096 could affect the Loop 2 SW to EFW pump suction valves CV-2806 and CV-3851, SW pump cross-tie valves CV-3642 and CV-3644, and the SW to ACW valve CV-3643. As stated previously, there is no demand for the SW to ICW/AC W or SW cross-tie valves to reposition during a tornado-induced event. Also as stated previous ly, the SW to EFW pump suction function would not be needed for several hours after the initial reactor trip. Additionally, Loop 1 SW to EFW pump P-78 .would rem.ain available

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 14 of 24 Failure of conduit EA-2013 could affect P-4C. Availability of the sluice gates and P-4B would allow alignment to compensate for failed SW pump P-4C.

The third scenario considers a missile strike that could impact the following conduits that are considered .non-conforming:

EC1593 EC1254 EC1256 EC1255 SW system components that could be affected by a missile strike on these conduits are detailed above. For this scenario, loop isolation using SW pump cross-tie/ ACW supply valves CV-3642, CV-3643, and CV-3644 could occur, flow from P-4C would remain ,

available, and Loop 2 SW to EFW pump P-7 A would remain avail,able. Additionally, availability of the sluice gates and P-4B would allow alignment to compensate for any random failures of the other two SW pumps.

The fourth scenario considers a missile strike that could impact the following conduits that are considered non-confom,ing:

EB2300 EC2508 EC2014 EB2096 EA2013 Failure of conduits EB2300 and EC2508 does not affect any SW system components.

SW system components that could be affected by a missile strike on the remaining conduits are detailed above. For this scenario, the two SW loops could be separated by closing valves CV-3640 and CV-3646. Also, availability of the sluice gates and P-4B would allow alignment to compensate for failed SW pump P-4C.

Based on the evaluations presented above, there is no one scenario that would cause failure of all components needed to render both SW loops unavailable.

The SSCs in Room 104 affect the following components for the EFW system (a simplified drawing of the EFW system is provided below):

CV-2627 CV-2667 CV-2663 CV-2869 P-7B Auto-start signal from EFIC Channel A AC power to D-03A Battery Charger EFW Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel B provides a redundant start signal to EFW pump P-7B given failure of the signal from EFIC Channel A. A tornado missile could fail the control power to CV-2627. The function of providing flow control from EFW pump P-7A to Steam Generator (SG) A is provided by upstream valve CV-2645.

A tornado missile could fail the power to CV-2667. This would prevent closing the valve which is nom,ally open to allow steam flow to EFW pump P-7 A from SG A. Closing this valve would only be required in the event of a steam line break, which is not assumed to occur during a tornado-induced LOOP event.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 16 of 24

b. Although both trains of the SW system or the EFW system could be affected by a .

tornado missile, the discussions above in response to Part 7.a of this RAI show that any single tornado missile would not prevent either the SW or EFW system from fulfilling the required system function. Therefore, at least one layer of DID is provided for e 9 ch system consistent with RG 1.174, Section C.2.1.1.3.

c. The SSCs that are impacted for the tornado-generated missile events in Room 129, Roem 98, and Room 97 are presented in Table 1 of Attachment 1 to this enclosure along with PRA equipment affected by the impacted SSC.

A missile entering one of these rooms was assumed to impact and cause simultaneous failure of all SSCs located in the room. The SSCs failed in each room include components from the High Winds Equipment List (HWEL) as well as electrical raceways and conduits containing cables that support components from the HWEL. Due to the large number of SSCs (particularly cables), this results in impacts to a large number of plant components in each room.

, d. In response to Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2015-06, '"Tornado Missile Protection,"

Entergy performed walk downs at ANO to identify potential discrepancies with the ANO current license basis related to tornado-generated missile protection. As part of the walk downs, SSCs were identified as being non-conforming. The non-conforming SSCs were entered in the corrective action program. The conditions that satisfied reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 were reported to the NRC as outlined in Entergy's request to extend enforcement discretion as related to EGM 15-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado Missile Protection Noncompliance," for ANO, which was subsequently approved by the NRC. Several non-conformances have been resolved by plant modifications at significant cost. Although the SSCs in Room 129, Room 98, and Room 97 are modeled as vulnerabilities in the TMRE PRA model, SSCs in these rooms were determined to have adequate protection to meet the requirements for licensing basis tornado missile protection. Therefore, there is no licensing basis change being requested for the SSCs in these rooms. The TMRE PRA models tornado-induced failure of components in thes*e rooms due to the lack of missile protection meeting the NEI 17-02 criteria.

The modeling treatment of tornado-generated missile events in these rooms does not represent of a lack of DID .. Rather, t.he results shown in the TMRE are a reflection of the conservatism used to simplify the TMRE analysis for these vulnerabilities that meet licensing basis missile protection requirements. The most significant conservatism is the correlation and assumed failure of all SSCs in each of room as a result of a single tornado missile entering the room. Because of the large area containing the SSCs in each of the rooms, it is considered physically impossible for a single tornado missile to enter one of the rooms through penetrations in the wall and then strike all of the SSCs in 1

the room.

Additionally, the TMRE analysis assumes that any component struck by a tornado missile is failed, which is consistent with the NEI 17-02 guidance for missile fragility.

This treatment is especially conservative for these rooms, which mostly contain electrical raceways. A missile strike to a cable tray or conduit is unlikely to result in failure of all cables contained within. Cables are flexible and robust components.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 17 of 24 A tornado-generated m11ssile impacting a cable, particularly one located in a cable tray, would be expected to push the cable away from the path of the missile. Failure of a cable requires severing the modelled conductor or disconnecting the cable from the endpoint to result in failure It is also conservative to assume that control cable damage is sufficient to fail the associated SSC, since operators may be able to manually operate equipment inside of the Category I boundary after the tornado. However, no credit was taken in the TMRE analysis for manual operation of any such failed components.

The DID for each room is demonstrated below:

Room 129 (Control Room)

As shown in Attachment 2, Figure 2, of this enclosure, the modeled vulnerabilities in the Control Room include several penetrations in the southern exterior wall (FB-129-6),

which include Door 65. The intervening structures outside of this wall include several grouted block walls to the south and east. A tornado missile protection modification has been installed that reinforces the grouted block walls and adds a 5/16D steel plate to the exterior of the controlled access area. Because this modification does not meet the NEI 17-02 criteria of 1" of steel plating and it is not clear from the NEI 17-02 guidance whether a combination of 5/16" steel plate and a reinforced block wall is sufficient to prevent missile penetration, the modification was not credited in the TMRE analysis.

The tornado resistance of the plated, reinforced, grouted block walls was determined to be adequate per the licensing basis. A separate part of the modification installed a 1" steel plating around Stairwell No. 3 that can be credited as part of the TMRE analysis.

Additionally, the moisture separator reheaters (MSRs) are large robust components that may be credited for the TMRE analysis.

Because this vulnerability is adequately protected to comply with the licensing basis for tornado-generated missiles, a simplifying assumption was made that all SSCs in the Control Room are failed simultaneously by any missil~ enterin~ the room. The physical layout of the Control Room makes this assumption overly conservative, since only certain combinations of panels can be vulnerable from a single missile trajectory.

The largest penetration considered for the Control Room is Door 65. The line of sight to the door is protected from the southeast by the stairwell missile shield and the MSR.

Supporting figures are provided in Attachment 2 of this enclosure. The line of sight to the C_ontrol Room from the door is shown in Figure 3. Alf *other penetrations are small diameter core bores that are only vulnerable to directly perpendicular, horizontal missiles. The penetrations in the south wall of the Control Room are shown in Figure 2.

The potential missile trajectories into the Control Room are shown in Figures 3 and 4.

The trajectory through Door 65 can impact Control Room panels C-09, C-19, and C-100.

All electrical raceways are located below the panels or below the door, so the raceways are not vulnerable. Loss of these panels results in failure of primary-to-secondary cooling due to loss of all EFW pumps.' However, once-through cooling remains available, since SW, High Pressure Injection (HPI), and the electromatic relief valve

• (ERV) remain functional. Therefore, this* missile trajectory does not result in core_

damage and DID is maintained.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 18 of 24 The trajectory from Penetration 729 does not impact any main Control Room panels; therefore, there is no effect on risk. /

The trajectory from Penetrations 722 and 723 can impact panels C86, C486-3, C19, C04, C03, CO2, C01, and C100. For a missile that impacts these panels, both primary-to-secondary cooling and once-through cooling remain available. Therefore, there are multiple layers of DID to prevent core damage.

The trajectory from the remaining penetrations can impact panels C90, C91, C37-3, C37-4, C-16, C-14, C-13, C-12, C-11, and C-10. For a missile.that impacts these panels, both primary-to-secondary cooling and once-through cooling remain available.

Therefore, there are multiple layers of DID to prevent core damage.

Room 98 (Conidor)

The modeled TMRE vulnerability in Room 98 includes openings in the eastern exterior wall FB-98-3, which includes Door 56. No credit is taken for reducing the number of missiles for intervening barriers, and all SSCs are considered correlated for modeling simplicity.

This vulnerability is adequately protected against licensing basis tornado-generated missiles by the intervening structures in the turbine building. The credited intervening structures include steel building beams, steel building columns, switchgear units, and the AN0-1 turbine pedestal.

Although the conservative TMRE modeling treatment indicates a lack of DID, there are several layers of defense that prevent a singleitornado-generated missile event in this room from 'challenging multiple fission product barriers. The most significant conservatism is the simplification that all SSCs located in Room 98 are correlated, which results in the simultaneous failure of all SSCs in the room from a single basic event.

Room 98 is a long corridor that is approximately 10'-0" wide and 50'-0" long. It is not physically possible for a single tornado missile to strike all of the SSCs located in the corridor.

The majority of SSCs located in this room are electrical raceways that are routed along the ceiling of the corridor. These SSCs are protected by a W36x260 structural steel beam located outside of the room. Because the web of the beam is only 0.84" thick, it does not satisfy the NEI 17-02 criteria of 1" steel plate. However, the criteria would be satisfied by the beam in combination with other steel components such as steel conduit or cable tray structures. Because the vulnerability for Room 98 is not a non-conformance, no evaluation of these structures was performed. A more detailed TMRE model could consider the penetrations in the line of sight of the beam protected, since there are a significant number of steel conduits routed above the door in the Turbine Building that also provide protection.

The other penetrations below the level of the beam are protected by the non-safety switchgear. The switchgear is comprised of at least 0.27" of steel based on the primary and secondary enclosures. Because the line of sight to Room 98 is protected by two sets of switchgear, the total thickness is approximately 0.5" of steel. However, this does

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 19 of 24 not satisfy the NEI 17-02 criteria of 1" steel plate. In addition to the switchgear, there are a significant number of electrical raceways routed through this area that could be considered and satisfy the criteria for 1" of equivalent steel shielding. A more detailed TMRE model could consider only the conduit in the first few feet inside Room 98 as vulnerable from these penetrations, since the electrical raceways in the room provide additional missile protectionr The other penetration to Room 98 is Door 56, which is also protected by the non-safety related switchgear. As discussed previously, the majority of SSCs in this room are located above the level of the door. The only SSCs on the HWEL that are not electrical raceways located above the door m this room are the battery chargers D-04A and D-04B. Although the battery chargers are modeled as vulnerable from this opening, they are actually located in an alcove outside of the battery room, which is protected by an 18" thick reinforced concrete wall. Therefore, more detailed TMRE modeling would only consider vertically routed conduits and cable trays as vulnerable from the doorway.

As discussed above, a tornado-generated missile entering Room 98 would not be expected to cause failure of multiple SSCs used to prevent core damage. A plant-spectfic evaluation of tornado-genernted missile protection of this room concludes that all SSCs located in this room are adequately protected in accordance with the licensing basis. Because this TMRE vulnerability is not a non-conformance, the impact to the plant is modeled very simply and conservatively. As discussed above, a more detailed TMRE model would result in fewer vulnerable SSCs as well as a smaller EEFP due to crediting several of the intervening structures outside of the room.

Room 97 (Cable Spreading and Relay Rooms)

The modeled vulnerability in Rooms 97 include penetrations in the eastern walls FB-97-5 and FB-96-3. The Relay Room 96 is included as part of Room 97, since the two areas are only separated by a block fire wall that is not adequate for missile protection per the requirements of NEI 17-02. The penetrations in these walls include several core bores, blackouts, Door 45, and Door 44. There are tornado missile protection modifications installed that protect both doors as well as large heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) penetrations in the Relay Room. Although Door 44 is protected from the east by the steel plate installed in the sample room, there is a line of sight that is only protected by switchgear. Although that protection is considered adequate for licensing-basis missiles, the switchgear: does not provide 1" of steel and, therefore, 1the TMRE analysis does not consider this door protected per NEI 17-02.

This vulnerability is adequately protected against all licensing basis tornado-generated missiles by the intervening structures in the turbine building. The credited intervening structures include steel building columns, switchgear units, and installed tornado missile protection modifications.

The TMRE analysis models all SSCs located in Rooms 96 and 97 as correlated, so any single tornado missile entering the room is assumed to simultaneously fail all SSCs.

This treatment is very conservative and results in the tornado-generated missile event in these rooms leading to core damage. However, there are several layers of defense that prevent a tornado missile event in this room from failing multiple fission product barriers.

,I

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 20 of 24 Wrth the exception of Door 44, all penetrations leading into this room are very small with the largest being a 36" x 12" grouted blackout (EEFP). Door 44 is only vulnerable from a very small line-of-sight that is protected by the non-safety related switchgear. Therefore, only very narrow missile trajectories are physically possible to enter the room. The cable spreading room and relay room combined are approximately 50'-0" by 30'-0"; therefore, only a small fraction of the SSCs in the rooms are actually vulnerable to impact from a single missile entering through a single penetration.

Additionally, 1t is unlikely that a tornado-generated missile would have sufficient energy to damage a significant number of cables in its line of sight. These rooms primarily contain conduits and cable trays. There is no guidance for how many cables a single tornado missile is capable of failing, so it is assumed that all of the cables fail. However, cables are robust components that can ea,sily flex without failure when struck by a missile. The steel structural components that house the cables also provide some form of missile protection. Therefore, it is conservative to assume that all cables in a missile

/

trajectory fail simultaneously.

Because the vulnerabilities for Room 97 are not non-conformances and because of the complexity of the required analysis to consider the hundreds of cables in these *rooms, a more detailed TMRE analysis was not performed. The SSCs in these rooms are adequately protected per the licensing basis. Because this TMRE vulnerability is not non-conforming, the impact to the plant is modeled very conservatively and simply. As discussed above, a single tornado missile is only capable of damaging a small percentage of the total SSCs in the room. Th~refore, adequate DID exists.

e. For the missile distribution sensitivity, the EEFPs for all SSCs with a risk achievement worth (RAW) greater than 2 are increased by a factor of 2.75. In total, 39 EEFPs had a RAW greater than 2 and subsequently the values for these EJ=FPs were increased.

In addition, any highly-exposed target is evaluated to determine if more than 1100 potential missiles are located within 100 feet of the target. If so, the EEFP for that target may be Increased by a factor greater than 2. 75. Six of the 39 SSCs above met the criteria in NEI 17-02, Revision 18, as being'highly exposed. One of these six, the fuel oil storage tank vents, was determined to have more than 1100 potential missiles within 100 feet. As a result, the EEFP for the fuel oil storage tank vents was increased by a factor of 3.85. None of the highly-exposed SSCs were considered a non-conformance.

The substantial increase in LERF for the sensitivity study is due to conservatisms in modelling of the SSCs in Rooms 98, 97, and 129 with the largest effect being that of Room 98. A missile impact to SSCs in one of these rooms is modelled as leading directly to core damage. When the accident sequence modelling is extended to LERF, the scenario is treated as a complete loss of secondary cooling which results in a dry SG at core melt. The combination of a dry SG and core melt results in an induced SG tube rupture, which is assumed to lead directly to LERF. Because of the high probability of an induced tube rupture occurring given a dry SG, scenarios involving Rooms 98, 97, and 129 result in the largest change in LERF. These rooms contribute about twice as much to overall LERF as to overall CDF for the base case. This explains why the model

'Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 21 of 24 results in a larger increase in LERF than in CDF. Because the barriers for Rooms 98, 97, and 129 are considered vulnerabilities but not non-conformances, the increase in LERF from these rooms does not contribute to the increase in b.LERF.

Another cause for the substantial increase in LERF with respect to the sensitivity is the i.ncrease in the EEFP representin-g failure of the SG safety relief valves (SRVs). These valves are considered as correlated failures such that a strike on one valve fails all SRVs. Also, failure of the SRV is modelled as causing the valve to stick open and depressurize the SG. Correlating the SRV failures in the model represents depressurization of both SGs. A depressurized SG results in a higher likelihood of an induced SG tube rupture. Given the rugged nature of the SRVs, there would be some chance that an impacted valve would not stick open. If the missile impact precludes opening a SRV, then the affected SG would not depressurize and no increase in LERF would be expected. Also, tr.eating all*SRVs on both SGs as a single, correlated failure adds another level of conservatism. Any reduction in the EEFP for SRVs or removal of the correlation between the valves would reduce the risk increase seen.

A similar situation exists for failure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). That is, an impact to the MSIVs is modelled as preventing closure of the valves followed by subsequen f depressurization of both SGs.

Failure of the SRVs or MS IVs alone does not result in core damage. Additional failures of other SSCs must occur. Some of these additional failures involve the four non-conformances identified in Table 1 of the original LAR enclosure. These additional failures, along with the high probability of an induced SG tube rupture given a depressurized SG, result in a larger relative increase in LERF than in CDF. These additional failures also contribute to the increase in the b.LERF. However, a less conservative treatment of failures of the SRVs or MSIVs would result in a smaller change in LERF and b.LERF.

Given the numerous conservatisms in modelling discussed above, it is concluded that a reasonable balance of DID is maintained with respect to accident prevention and mitigation.

PRA RAI 08 - Key Assumptions and Uncertainties that Could Affect the Application Regulatory Position C. 3.3.2, "Assessme nt of Assumptions and Approximations," of RG 1.200, Revision 2, states in part:

For each application that calls upon this regulatory guide, the applicant identifies the key assumptions and approximations relevant to that application. This will be used to identify sensitivity studies as input to the decision-making associated with the application.

I Key assumptions and sources of uncertainty as well as their disposition in the_ context of this application are important elements of the NRC stafrs review of and conclusion for this application. The licensee's response to Item 22 in Enclosure Attachment 3 to the LAR states, "Action to identify the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty, along with any potential impact on the TMRE application in the PRA model of record, is being tracked via a Condition Report." As a result, it appears to the NRC staff that key assumptions and sources of uncertainty for this application have neither been identified nor dispositioned.

Enclosure to /

OCAN111901 Page 22 of 24 Regulatory Position C.4.2, "Licensee Submittal Documentation," of RG 1.200, Revision 2, states in part:

These assessments provide information to the NRC staff in their determination of whether the use of these assumptions and approximations is appropriate for the application, *or wheJher sensitivity studies performed to support the decision are appropriate.

Regulatory Position, C.4.2, "Licensee Submittal Documentation," of RG 1.200, Revision 2, identifies key assumptions in the PRA that impact the application as information that the

' licensee should submit to support the NRC staffs conclusion that the proposed licensing basis change is consistent with the key principles of risk-informed regulation and NRC staff expectations. *

• Based on established guidance and precedent for decisionmaking and submittal documentation for risk-informed licensing actions, key assumptions and sources of uncertainty as well as their disposition in the context of this application need to be provided as part of the application. NRC staff cannot support its review of and conclusion for this application based on yet-to-be-determined information. Therefore, the NRC staff requests that the licensee:

a. Describe the approach used to identify and characterize the key assumptions and key sources of uncertainty that impact this application. The description should include discussion of how the licensee's approach is consistent with that in NUREG-1855, "Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making," Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17062A466), or RG 1.200, Revision 2.

b. Describe how each identified key assumption and key source of uncertainty was dispositioned for this application.

Entergy Response *

a. For each unit, key assumptions and sources of uncertainty included in the PRA models are identified using the methodology described in NUREG-1855, Revision 1, "Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decisionmaking." A PRA notebook is used to document these assumptions and sources of uncertainty with a separate notebook developed for each unit.

b. For each unit, all sources of uncertainty identified in the associated Sources of Uncertainty notebook were reviewed to determine the potential for each source of uncertainty to impact the conclusions reached in the TMRE evaluations.

The sources of uncertainty for AN0-1 along with the associated evaluation and disposition are listed in Table 2. For AN0-2, the information is* presented in Table 3.

These tables are included in Attachment 1 of this enclosure.

Based on the evaluations documented in Tables 2 and 3, it is concluded that the sources of uncertainty identified would not impact the conclusions reached in the TMRE evaluations for ANO.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page 23 of 24 PRA RAI 09 - AN0-1 and AN0-2 Aggregate Results Section C.2.4, "Acceptance Guidelines," of RG 1.174, Revision 3, provides acceptance guidelines for risk-informed decisionmaking.

The following PRA RAls may result in changes to the ANO TMRE PRA models:

o PRA RAI 03 - ANO Tornado Missile Walkdown Area

• PRA RAI 04 - ANO Multi unit LOOP I

o PRA RAI 07 -AN0-1 Defense-in-Depth Considerations The following PRA RAls address sensitivity studies and exceed anee of RG 1.174 *criteria.

• PRA RAI 05:.... ANO TMRE Comphan~-Case Conservatisms Sensitivity

• PRA RAI 08 - Key Assumptions and Uncertainties That Could Affect the Application For any*changes introduced as a result of these RAls, the NRC staff requests that the licensee:

I I *

a. Provide updated ANO TMRE results and associated sensitivities that incorporate changes from the resolutions of these RAls.

b. If the guidelines from RG 1.174 applicable to TMRE PRA as discussed in Ntl 17-02 are exceeded, provide justification using one of the three methods described in Section 7.3 ofNEI 17-02.

Entergy Response

a. As discussed in the responses to the previous RAI questions, no new analyse.s were performed.--Ttierefore, there are no updated results or sensitivities to provide.

b. The only instance where the guidelines from RG 1.174 applicable to the TMRE PRA are exceeded is the AN0-1 TMRE Missile Distribution Sensitivity. The justification for acceptability of this result is detailed in the response to RAI Item 7.e.

Enclosure to OCAN111901 Page

.{;,.

24 of 24

~*-~

REFERENCES

1. Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

(NRC), Ucense Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator into the Ucensing Basis, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 (OCAN041904)

• (ML19119A090), dated April 29, 2019.

2. NRC email to Entergy, Final RAJ #1 RE: Ucense Amendment Request to Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE) into Ucensing Basis (EPID L-2019-LU\-0093),

(OCNA101901) (ML19280A040), dated October 7, 2019.

3. Entergy letter to NRC, Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific SuNeillance Frequency Requirements to a Lice.nsee Controlled Program (TSTF-425), Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (1CAN031801) (ML18071A319), dated March 12, 2018.

4. Entergy letter to NRC, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based standard for Fire Protection for Ught Water Re'actor Generating Plants (2001 Edition), Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 (1CAN011401) (ML14029A438), dated January 29, 2014.

A1TACHMENTS

1. List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

2. Supporting Figures

\..

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Gen erated Missiles in Rooms.97, 98, and 129

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 1 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 C04 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 129 C04- CV-1000 ERV ISOLATION 129 C04 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 C04 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 C04 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 /

129 C04 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 129 C04 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 C04 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 C04 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 C04 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 C04 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 C09 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 C09 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 C09 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 129 C09 I CV-3851 EFW SERV wrR LOOP II ISOLATION 129 C09 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 129 C09 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 129 cog CV-2615 BYPASS 129 C09 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN)'

129 C09 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 cog CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 C09 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 129 C09 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 129 C09 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 129 cog CV-2803 EFW P-7B SUCTION FROM SW 129 C09' CV-3850 EFW SERV WTR LOOP I ISOLATION 129 C09 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 129 C09 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 2 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 C09 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CV-2665 BYPASS 129 C09 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 C09 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 C09 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 129 C09 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 129 C09 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL*CV-2692 CLOSURE 129 C10 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 129 C10 8-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-6 129 C10 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 129 C10 8-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 129 C10 K-48 #2EDG 129 C10 A-3 4160 VOLT sus*A-3 129 C10 K-4A #1 EOG 129 C14 CV-1404 P-34-NB SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 129 C15 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 C16 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 129 C16 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 129 C16 CV-3642 P-48 TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 129 C16 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 129 C16 P-348 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP I

129 C16 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 129 C16 CV-3643 ACW,LOOP ISOL 12~ C16 CV-1227 HPI TO P-328 DISCHARGE I

, 129 C16 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 129 C16 CV-1400 LP I/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 129 C16 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 129 C16 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 129 C16 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 129 C16 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-358 INLET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 3 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumep to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 r1"*[~~*=- ,. mp;!

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~,__,,._4:~J ~*) .; ~-,,:: :;~~i&*J 129 C16 CV-1284 'C' HPI BLOCK VALVE 129 C16 CV-1285 HPI TO P-32D DISCH 129 C16 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 129 C16 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 129 C16 CV-1277 'B' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 129 C16 CV-1435 DECAY HEAT P-34B SUCTION FROM RCS 129 .C16 , CV-1437 DECAY HEAT P-34B SUCTION FROM BWST 129 C16 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 129 C16 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOLCV-2691 CLOSURE 129 C16 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 C16 C91 .ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 C16 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 C18 PSV-;100,0 PZR ERV 129 C18 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 129 C18 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 129 C18 CV-3640 'B'* DISCH TO LOOP II SW 129 C18 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 129 C18 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 129 C18 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 129 C18 P-7B EMERGENCYF.W PUMP 129 C18 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTLET 129 C18 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK .,,

129 C18 , CV-1219 HPI TO P-32C DISCHARGE 129 C18 CV-1220 HPI TO P-32D DISCHARGE j29 C18 . CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTLET 129 C18 CV-3820 . LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 129 C18 CV-3822 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35A INLET 129 C18 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 129 'C18 CV-1278 , HPI TO P-32A DISCH

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 4 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 C18 CV-1279 HPI TO P-32B DISCH

. 129 C18 CV-5612 FIREWATER TO RB INSIDE ISOL 129 C18 SG-3 SLUICE GATE I 129 C18 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 129 C18 CV-3643 Acw LOOP ISO(,.

129 C18 CV-1276 'A' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36A SUCTION 129 c1*a CV-1434 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM RCS 129 C18 CV-1436 DE'cAY HEAT p:.:34A SUCTION FROM BWST 129 C18 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 129 C18 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 129 C18 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 129 C18 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 129 C18 C539B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 129 C18 LT-1001 PZR LVL 129 C18 NE-0501 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 129 C18 PT-1042 B'* LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 129 C18 C86 SAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 C18 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 C19 VEF-24C #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 129 C19 VEF-24D #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 129 C19 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 129 C19 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT'REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 129 C19 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS

, 129 C19 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 129 C19 CV-2615 BYPASS 129 C19 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 129 C19 VEF-24B #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 129 C19 VUC-1A AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL LJNIT COOLER 129 C19 VUC-1B AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 5 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 C19 CV-3806 SERV .WTR TO DG1 CLRS 129 C19 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 129 C19 CV-2665 BYPASS 129 C20 K-4B #2EDG 129 C20 K-4A #1 EOG 129 C26 SG-6 SLUICE GATE 129 C26 SG-7 SLUICE GATE 129 C26 SG-2 SLUICE GATE 129 C26 SG-4 SLUICE GATE 129 C26 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 129 C26 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 129 C26 SG-1 SLUICE GATE 129 C27 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 C27 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 C30 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE I 129 C30 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 C30 PSV-1000 PZR ERV -

129 C30 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 129 C37-1 C37-1 ' EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 C37-2 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 C37-3 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 C37-4 C374 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 C41 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 C41 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 C41 PT-1021 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 129 C42 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 C42 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 C4233 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 C43 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 6 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 C43 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 129 C43 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43 129 C44 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 C44

• TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 C4420 PSV-1000 PZRERV*

129 C4422 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 C4423 CV-2676 , ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 C4423 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 C4436 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 C4438 PSV-1000 PZRERV 129 C4439 CV-2~76 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 C4439 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 C486-1 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 C486-2 C4B6-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN)

)

129 C486-3 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUI_PMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 129 C486-4 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 129 C498 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 129 C86 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 C87 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 C88 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 C89 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 C90 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 C91 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 C92 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 C9752 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 C9753 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 CVC055 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 129 DC133 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 DC134 PSV-1000 PZR ERV

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 7 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• Roorrr 129 DC135 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 DC135 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 DC135 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 DC136 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 DC136 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 DC136 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 DC140 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 DC141 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 129 DJ078 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ078 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ079 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ079 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ080 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ080 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ081 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ081 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ082 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 DJ082 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 EC1098 K-4A #1 EOG 129 EC1098 P-78 EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 129 EC1098 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 EC1098 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 12!;1 EC1098 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1098 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 129 EC1152 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 EC1152 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 E(:;1157 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 EC1159 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 EC1160 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 8 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 129 EC1160 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 EC1161 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 I

129 EC1161, C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 EC1161 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 EC1221  ; K-4A #1 EDG 129 EC1221 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 EC1221 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1221 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1222 K-4A #1 EDG 129 EC1224 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 EC1226 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 EC1226 CV-2646* P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1226 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1227 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 129 EC1268 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 129 EC1283 . SG-3 SLUICE GATE 129 EC1286 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 129 EC1311 CV-5612 FIREWATER TO RB INSIDE !SOL 129 EC1311 SG-1 SLUICE GATE 129 EC1311 CV-1050 DH SUCTION !SOL 129 EC1360 CV-1050 DH SUCTION !SOL 129 EC1361 CV-1050 DH SUCTION !SOL 129 EC1362 CV-1050 DH SUCTION !SOL 129 EC1393 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 EC1393 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 EC1457 P-78 EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 129 EC1459 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 129 EC1460 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1460 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 9 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 129 EC1483 SG-1 SLUICE GATE 129 EC1486 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 129 EC1486 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 129 EC1490 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 129 EC1508 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 EC1508 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 129 EC1508 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 129 EC1522 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 EC1522 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1522 CV-2648, P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 EC1522 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 129 EC1526 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 EC1527 C37-1 . EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED)

~

129 EC1537 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 EC1555 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 129 EC1555 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 129 EC1555 C539B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 129 EC1555 LT-1001 PZR LVL 129 EC1555 NE-0501 . SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 129 EC1555 PT-1042 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 129 EC1598 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 EC2092 K-4B #2 EOG 129 EC2092 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 EC2092 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 129 EC2092 C486-2 *AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EC2092 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EC2092 CV-2647 P-?A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 EC2092 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 EC2092 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUUON PNL RS2

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 10 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 It *

. *Ro*<;>m1*,.;

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129 f EC2169 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 EC2176 K-4B #2 EOG 129 EC2176 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 EC2176 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 129 EC2176 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EC2176 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EC2176 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 EC2176 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 EC2176 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 129 EC2182 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 EC2182 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 EC2183 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 129 EC2183 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 EC2183 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 EC2183 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 EC2266 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 EC2266 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 129 EC2267 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 129 EC22~8 K-4B #2 EOG 129 EC2268 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 EC2269 K-4B #2.EDG 129 EC2271 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 EC2306 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 ,

129 EC2330 C486~2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EC2330 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EC2330 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 129 EC2330 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 EC2342 SG-4 SLUICE GATE 129 EC2343 SG-4 SLUICE GATE

\

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 11 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 -, EC2455 -

CV-1410 DH SUCTION !SOL 129 EC2700 C4'86-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EC2700 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EC2700 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 EC2745_ SG-2 SLUICE GATE 129 EC2757 .,. CV-26.13 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 129 EC2757 CV-2615 BYPASS 129 EC2757 C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPM.ENT TIE CHAN B 129 EC2760 . C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN B 129 EC2760 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EC2769 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREENJ 129 EC2769 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EC2769 ' CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 129 EC2769 - CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE'K-3 STEAM ADMISSION 'i.JLV 129 EC2771

• C37-2 EFIG CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EC2775 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 I EC2780 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EC2780 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 129 EC2794 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 129 EC2803 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EC2805 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EC2805 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EC2805 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EC2805 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL <

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 12 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In I

Rooms 97,'98, and 129

'.:._H.:.* -~ .. ::.. ~'{:j.-ffli.*ri,t:':£,; 1;-,....,;'11. . ~--~.::. \..' ;-_,_,l"'.'_,:.:.,.;'** ,;-;:.-\..,VY ~- (Yi"::l1".:i71J7 ,1tr.--i, ..,.,,q : ",'°""*-*>*~ ~ ""~"t~~*j~"'~,,,.."..,-~.;v;~.. *r,+? ..~t-f-r a'b6rh;;

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129 EC2810 C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE .CHAN B 129 EC2811 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEArv1 ADMISSION VLV 129 '-EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE EC2811 CV-2615 BYPASS 129 EC2811 C512 TRIP INTERFACE _E;QUIPMENT TIE CHAN B I

129 ,EC2827 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 EC2832 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADM_ISSION VLV 129 EFW PUMP TURBlt,JE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE EC2832 CV-2615 BYPASS 129 EC3002 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 129 EC3002 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 129 EC3008 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 129 EC3009 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3. .,

129 EC3011 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 129 EC3011 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 129 EC3019 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 EC3020 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 129 EC3021 TE-1040 B LOOP TH T!=MP TO RPS 129 EC3023 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 129 EC3027 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 129 EC3030 C486-3 AUXILlf.R.Y EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 129 EC.3031 C486-3,, AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL: (YELLOW) 129 EC3035 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 EC3036 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 EC3038 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YEL,LOW) 129 EC3043 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 EC4013 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 129 EC4013 RS-4 120 vAc DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 129 EC4019 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 129 EC4022 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE)

)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 13 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

. ~ ,, .

Roofn . * :1mP.~J~d .'*6qulpm~~ti(mk.t~; i**. *-' .*: :~ *:>-: *6~-~itia~ irA~~ci~~;-s*$.~ . . ,): ...:.*: .

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129 EC4022 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 129 EC4027 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 EC4028 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 129 EC4029 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 EC4034 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 129 EC4036 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 EC4037 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 EJ1001 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 EJ1001 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EJ1001 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 EJ1006 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC)

' (EFIC) 129 EJ1006 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL 129 EJ1006 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ1006 LT-2667 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ1006 LT-2669 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ1006 PT-2667A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ1006 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 EJ1010 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 EJ1010 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EJ1010 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 EJ1024 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 EJ1024 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 EJ1024 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 EJ2002 LT-2622 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ2002 LT-2624 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ2002 PT-2618B PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ2002 LT-2671 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL 129 EJ2002 LT-2673 STM GEN E248 UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ2002 PT-26678 PT-E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 14 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 129 EJ2002 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EJ2002 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 EJ2003 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EJ2008 LT-2622 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ2008 LT-2624 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ2008 PT-2618B PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ2008 LT-2671' STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL 129 EJ2008 LT-2673 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ2008 PT-2667B PT-E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ2013 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EJ2013 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EJ2013 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 EJ2024 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EJ2024 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 129 EJ2025 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EJ2025 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EJ2025 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 129 EJ2027 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 EJ2027 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 EJ2027 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 EJ2035 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 EJ3006 LT-2668 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ3006 LT-2670 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ3006 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ3006 LT-2617 STM GEN E248 LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ3006 LT-2619 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ3006 PT-2617A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 EJ4003 LT-2672 SG A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 15 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missi.les in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

1-¥ -~~----p~,..; <-; * ~_,.,,..~-- ~-:,,~1 *,.1 JJ-,~, ,..-,"!.-J. /"/~.----.:..r----;;1~,._-*----:.-,,,*.*,., .. ,.t't....,.l'\'(Y;*-,l' i *

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129 EJ4003 LT-2674 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ4003 PT-2668B \ PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI -

129 EJ4003 LT-2621 SG E-24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ4003 LT-2623 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 EJ4003 PT-2617B E24B MAIN STM _PRESS-MSLI 129 ER1007 , C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 ER1007 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 ER1007 PT-10,21 'A' LOOP RCS. PRESS (RPS) 129 ER1008 C37~1 EF.IC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 ER1008 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 ER1008 PT-1021 'A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 129 ER1023 C37-1 EF.IC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 ER1024 C37-1 . EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 ER1025 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 ,

I 129 ER1025 PT-1021 'A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 129 ER2010 *

• C37-2 EFIC CABINET, CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 ER2010 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 ER2012 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN)

I 129 ER2012 ', TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 ER2020 , C91 ESAS CABINET .QIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 ER2020 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 ER2022 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 ER2025 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN}

129 ER2026 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 ER3004 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 ER3004 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 129 ER3004 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43 129 ER3006 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 ER3006 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 16 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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4 129 ER3006 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43 129 ER3007 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 ER3007 PT-1040 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #3) 129 ER3007 PT-2407 RB PRESS (ESAS #3) '.

129 ER3010

• 637-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 ER3010 PT-1038 B LOOP RC'S PRESS C RPS C43 129 ER3011 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP-TO RPS '

129 ER4004 PT-26688 PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-_MSLI 129 ER4004 PT~26178 E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 ER4004 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 ER4004 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 ER4017 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNE~ D (BLUE) 129 ER4017 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 ER4018 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 ER4020 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 ER406 LT-2672 SG A LOW RANGE LEVEL (~FIC) 129 ER406 LT-2674 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 ER406 PT-26688 PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 ER406 LT-2623 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 ER406 PT-26178 E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 ER406 C37-4 EFIC Cf\BINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 ER406 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP.

129 FC022 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHAN":JEL B (~REEN) 129 FC022 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 FJ022 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS FJ022 C498 (DROPS) CAB . .'

129 FJ022 .C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE)  :

129 J4088 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 17 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 D .,- * :*. lril~c!C\ed, -~'. - ~~U[Prft~ni Aff~ed' ; 'c **:- D t" n' *_f_A_ff_ :t,...-1*.cs,;-* .* ' . .

_P-9,°~' , -- *S.S.d- _;')~lln'lps@ed:9SQ .* . _'_{' -~cr~_1_9\;.o _~ ~c*"""'*:"-*':*)-_ '*'_

C498 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 129 J4088 I (DROPS) CAB ' \

129 J4088 - CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 129 J4187 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4187 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4193 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 129 J4200 CV-2619 . ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4200 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4201 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4201 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4258 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4258 CV-2676 ATMOSJ)UMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 129 J4740 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 129 J4740 C498 (DROPS) CAB 129 J4740 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE)

• 129 J4779 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 129 J4779 C498 (DROPS) CAB 129 J4781 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 129 J4781 C498 (DROPS) CAB 129 JB317 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 JB317 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 129 JB317 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 129 JB318 TE-1040 8 LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 129 JB318 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PAN_EL (YELLOW)

I 129 J8318 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 129 JB319 K-48 #2 EDG 129 JB319 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 JB320 K-4A #1 EOG

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 18 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlsslles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• Im ,-act~ci**:

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129 JB320 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 JB320 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 JB320 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 JB320 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 JB320 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 JB320 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 129 JB386 K-4A #1 EOG 129 JB386 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 129 JB386 C88 . ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 JB386 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 JB386 CV-2648 ' P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 JB386 - RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 129 JB387 K-4B #2EDG 129 J8387 C89 E,SAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 JB387 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 129 JB387 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 JB387 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 JB387 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 JB387 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR

~

129 JB387 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 129 JB389 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 129 JB389 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 JB390 K-4B #2 EOG 129 JB390 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 JB390 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 JB390 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 129 JB390 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 JB390 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 JB390 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 19 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• lm{ii:ict?c!; . Eq~ipfne~t 6\ffected:

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129 JB390 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 JB390 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 129 JB391 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 JB391 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 129 JB391 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43 129 JB392 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 JB392 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 129 JB393 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 JB393 TE-1012 'A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 129 JB393 PT-1021 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 129 JB510 SG-4 SLUICE GATE 129 JB511 SG-3 SLUICE GATE \

129 JB536 SG-6 SLUICE GATE 129 JB536 SG-7 SLUICE GATE 129 JB536 SG-2 SLUICE GATE 129 JB536 SG-4 SLUICE GATE

\

129 JB537 CV-5612 FIREWATER TO RB INSIDE ISOL 129 JB537 SG-1 SLUICE GATE 129 JB537 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 129 JB716 LT-2622 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC}

129 JB716 LT-2624 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129

-JB716 PT-2618B PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 JB716 LT-2671 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL 129 JB716 LT-2673 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC}

129 JB716 PT-2667B PT-E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 JB716 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 129 JB716 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 JB716 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 JB716 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 20 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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129 JB734 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 129 JB734 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CV-2615 BYPASS 129 JB734 C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN B 129 JB734 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 JB886 P-7B EMERGENCY F W PUMP 129 JB886 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 129 JB886 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 129 JB886 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CV-2665 BYPASS 129 JB886 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 129 JB886 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 JB886 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL (EFIC)

I 129 JB886 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 JB886 LT-2667 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 JB886 LT-2669 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 129 JB886 PT-2667A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 129 JB886 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 129 JB886 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 JB886 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 JB886 C37-1

- EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 129 RS-1 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 129 RS-2 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 129 RS-3 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 129 RS-4 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 129 Tl-1432 Tl-1432 DH CLR E35B LP INJ TO REACT 129 Tl-1433 Tl-1433 DH CLR E35A LP INJ TO REACT 129 VC041 PSV-1000 PZRERV 129 VC051 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 VC051 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 21 of 103 Table 1 '

List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlsslles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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f,-;:S-,_;,;: .--.itY_-U 1;t; ~ t'\ ~~1;):.~~:}~;:;;-t-.f.bi:* 1r~~-i:-.,<:~ "_.;?~*;~1**~ s~;.'!-_ ..~. ,.* . .-;_~J:t ~

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129 VC051 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 129 VC051 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 129 VC052 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 129 VC052 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 129 VC052 CV-2803

• EFW P-7B SUCTION FROM SW 129 VC052 CV-38~0 EFW SERV WTR LOOP I ISOLATION 129 VC052 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 129 VC05~. : C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 VC053 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 VC053 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 129 VC114 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 129 VC117 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 129 VC122 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 129 VC129 CV-3822 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35A INLET 129 VC129 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 129 vc1*29 C539B, EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 129 VC129 LT-1001 PZR LVL 129 VC129 NE-0501 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 129 VC129 PT-1042 'B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 129 VC130 CV-1278 HPI TO P-32A DISCH 129 VC130 CV-1279 HPI TO P-32B DISCH 129 VC182 C37-2 -EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 VC182 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 129 VC194 CBS ESAS ANALOG $UBSYSTEM NO 1 129 VC194 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 129 VC196 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 129 VC196 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 129 VC196 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 VC198 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3

\

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 22 of 103 Tabl'e 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Gen erated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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-.: t...., ., ,t*>,' i j, 129 VC199 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 VC199 *C91 E~AS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 129 .VC205 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 129 VJ015 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 129 VJ015 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL .

129 VJ015 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 129 VJ015 SV-0611 MAIN STM. ISOL -. CV-2691 CLOSURE .

129 VJ015 SV-0721 MAIN . STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE .

129 VJ048 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE).

129 VJ048 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 129 VJ062 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 129 VJ065 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 F2-98-A EC1175 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 F2-98-A EC1179 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 98 EC1180 A-3 **

4160 VOLT BUS A-3 98 EC1182 A-3  : 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 98 JB343 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 98 JB345 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 98 JB346 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 98 EC2006 , A:4 '4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2022 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2025 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2128 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2211

• A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2216 A-4 4160 \(OLT BUS A-4 98 EC2229 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC225 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC229 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2319 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 23 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

.' .- Q~c~pti~n of'Affeet~ci*ssi ...

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98 EC235 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 JB347 A-4 ,4150 VOLT BUS A-4 98 JB348 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 98 EC2020 B-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-5 98 EC2020 1B-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC1175 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC1179 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC1193 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC1259 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2017 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2020 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2022 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2128 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2211 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2216 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2227 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2229 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC225 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC229 - B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC2319 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 EC235 8-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 JB343 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 JB345 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 JB346 B,f3 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 JB347 B-6 , , 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 98 JB348 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6

98. EB203 8-65 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EB204 8-65 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EB2274 , B-65 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 24 of 103 Table 1 I

List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 98 EB2275 B-65 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC206 C1.87 EFIC Tie caJ:iinet 98 EC207 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC208 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC209 C187 EFIC Tie ca.binet 98 EC2131 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC2216 ' ' C187 ., EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC2218 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC2227 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC2228 C187 -EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC2229 C187 EF.IC Tie cabinet 98 EC224 C187 EFIC Ti~ ~binet 98 EC225 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet_

98 EC229 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EC235 C187 EFIC Tie ~abinet 98 EC2759 CJ87 EFIC Tie cabjnet 98 EC2788 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet

' 98 JB347 C187 E.FIC Tie cabinet 98 JB348 C187 EFIC Tie cabinet 98 EJ1002 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 98 EJ1004

• C37-1 EFIC CABIN,ET CHANNEL A (RED) 98 JB711 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 98 ER2005 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 98 ER201 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 98 ER202 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 98 DJ001 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 98 J4064 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 98 DJ001 C48 NNI AUX CONTRQL SYS (Y-PWR) 98 J4064 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-P\(VR)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 25 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

. *- .,_ -- * *

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98 EJ1002 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 98 EJ1004 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 98 JB711 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 98 EJ2012 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 98 ER202 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 C4093 C498 (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 DC018 C498 (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 DC019 C498 (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98

• DJ001 C498 (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 DJ048 C498 (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 DJ049 C498 (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 J4064 C498 J (DROPS) CAB DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 J4801 C498 (DROPS) CAB

\

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 98 J9053 C498 (DROPS) CAB 98 EC1498 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 98 EC1504 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 98 JB711 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A

. 98 '

EC209 C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN B 98 EC2757 C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN B 98 EC2770 C512 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN B 98 DJ001 C539A

• EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 J4064 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 DJ048 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 26 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

'. *. ~~fa'rh'J., * '°**Ss<1:

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98 DJ049 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONl?ITIONING CABINET 98 EC206 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC207 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONblTIONING CABINET 98 EC208 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC209 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC210 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC234 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC2806 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 ER202 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 J4064 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 J4801 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 J9053 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC206 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC207 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC208 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC209 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC210 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC234 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 EC2806 C540B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 98 ER2005 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 98 ER201 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 98 ER202 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 98 C4108 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 98 EC207 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 98 EC208 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 98 EC209 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 98 EC2025 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 98 EC2027 CV-1227 HPI TO P-328 DISCHARGE 98 -

EC207 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 27 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In I Roqms 97, 98, and 129

..  : - - -

• r - . :" *;;, *or.~ I

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RQC5ru 1mpacj~cf Equ,~m~~~l Air~dt~: Des-~ript1orf of f1,ff~cte{$S,G, ... . ,:  : '

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98 EC208 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 98 EC209 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 98 EC210 . CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 98 EC2025 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 98 EC2027 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 98 EC207 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 98 EC208 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 98 EC209 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 98 EC210 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE {

98 EC2020 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 98 EC2020 CV-1277 'B' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 98 EC2025 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 EC207 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 EC208 CV-1400 LP I/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 EC209 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 EC210 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 EC1498 CV-1401 LP I/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 EC1504 CV-1'401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 JB711 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 98 C4092 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 C4170 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 DC018 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EB203 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EB204 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EB205 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EC224 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EC225 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EC230 CV-14_04 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98' EC231 CV-1404 P-34A/8 SUCT SUPP FROM RCS

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 28 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Gen erated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 F

.:,)*: ',.'

98 EC232 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EC233 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT ~UPP FR9M RCS 98 EC234 'CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS

\

98 EC241 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 98 EC2025 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC2028 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC207 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC208 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC209 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC210 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC2520 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 98 EC2025 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 98 EC207 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 98 EC208 CV-1408 BWST T-3_0UTLET 98 EC209 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 98 EC210 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 98 EC2027 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 98 EC207 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 98 EC208 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 98 EC209 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 98 EC210 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 98 EC2018 CV-1435 DECAY HEAT P-34B SUCTION FROM RCS 98 EC2018 CV-1437 DECAY HEAT P-34B SUCTION FROM BWST 98 EC207 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 0

98 EC208 CV-2613 EFW PP TURB INE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 98 EC209 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINFK-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 98 EC2174 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 98 EC2757 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 98 EC2759 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 29 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

Rqon:l"-. >

,**' iQ1pgqt~.Q/' ,E~~'Rr:11~~~-Aff~e~

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98 EC2851 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSIONVLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC207 CV-2615 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC208 CV~2615 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC209 CV-2615 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC2174 CV-2615 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC2757 CV-2615 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC2759 CV-2615 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC2851 CV-2615 BYPASS 98 EC207 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-8 98 EC208 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 98 EC209 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 98 EC210 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 98 EC2174 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 98 ~ C4096 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 98 C9688 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 98 DJ004 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 98 EC207 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 98 EC208 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 98 EC209 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 98 EC210 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 98 EC208 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 EC209 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 EC210 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 . EC2131 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 EC2216 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 30 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

.* -~ .- -. *-*.imp~tte-a:. *._ Ed~ir,ffle;:i_t..Att~d~<:i" .-,-, *: *;>. *~- **. * ~. * ~, .. -~~ffi-_."iu. s-~-:e*, -. *'.* ~ .**.; .,_

'*'.\ oo~: ,.;::*~ S;S'{i':*: . ~;:t,~i lJ"Kp&ttfa :$,Sit.'.::._*,.*-.~.*. *<'*. D_ -'* .n~t_!~n o'.'.: .' ~~- '*. :_~*- ...:*i. \:* >..*,;_;'

98 EC229 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 EC235 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 EC2795

• CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 EJ2012 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 ER202 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 TB670 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 98 . EJ1002 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 98 EJ1004 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 98 JB711 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 98 TB669 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 98 EC208 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC209 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC210 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC2131 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC2216 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC229 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC235 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EC2795 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EJ2012 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 ER202 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 TB670 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 98 EJ1002 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 98 EJ1004 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 98 JB711 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 98 TB669 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 98 EC1504 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC1530 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 JB711 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC1504 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CV-2665 BYPASS -

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 31 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated.Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

~ ... .. ~- .. - . - , ,

l,rrfpact~*a' E;q~*it5me~t Aff$ctetl : '

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EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 EC1530 CV-2665 BYPASS EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 98 JB711 CV-2665 BYPASS 98 EC1498 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 98 EC1504 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 98 JB711 *cv-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 98 DC018 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 98 DC019 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 98 DC262 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A,.' BLOCK VALVE 98 DJ004 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 98 EC1530 CV-2803 EFW P-?B SUCTION FROM SW 98 EB20~ CV-2806 EFW P-?A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EB204 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EB205 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW '-

98 EC2006 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC207 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC208 CV-2806 EFW P-?A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC209 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC210 CV-2806 EFW P-?A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC2173 CV-2806 EFW P-?A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC241 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC24B6 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EC2488 CV-2806 EFW P-?A SUCTION FROM SW 98 EB203 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB204 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB205 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB206 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB207 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2021 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 32 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 t :.>R60'~:; .. ,. .l~~~ftit.. '. :l;QJl,ietD~~/ itt~~~F:: '. :/:.;, ;*.*. **~' ': ,: *o~er;~tJ' t/~;'of1iff~c1~-d~ife*' \/, ';*: ,\ *

':' - ':, '. _* :~~Q~\:':/ QJ!l.m!?:a?t~.pq~ - 'f. ',; *:.' .. *.~ ~. :**,. ' ' *;,;~ -.:-:* **.* .:r:* . *-~~" ,

98 EC2026 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC206 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2172 CV-3642 P-4B JO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2226 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC224 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC225 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC230 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC231 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER*

98 EC232' CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC233 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC234 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC1153 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 98 EC1258 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 98 EC2018 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 98 JB343 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 98 EB203 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB204 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB205 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB206 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB207 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2021 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2026 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC206 *cv-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2172 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC2226 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC224 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC225 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC230 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC231 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 33 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlsslles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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98 EC232 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC233 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EC234 C'{-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 98 EB1029 CV-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS 98

• EC1182 CV-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS 98 EC1203 CV-3606 SERV WfR TO DG1 CLRS 1

98 EC1260 CV-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS 98 JB346 CV-3806 SERV WfR TO DG1 CLRS 98 TB561 CV-3806 SER,V WTR TO DG1 CLRS 98 EC207 CY-3807 SERVWTR TO DG2,CLRS 98 EC208 CV-3807 SERV Wffi. TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC209 CV-3_807 SERV WfR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC210 CV-3807 SERV WfR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC2175 'CV-3807 SERV WfR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC2208 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC2313 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC2314 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC235 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 98 EC2025 CV-3811 _ LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 98 EC2028 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TQ ICW COOLERS 98 EC207 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLy TO ICW COOLERS 98 EC208 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS '

98 EC209 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 98

• EC210 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS

.98 EC2028 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 98 EC207 . CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET, 98 EC208 CV-3821 C DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 98 EC209 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT*CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 98 EC210 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET I

Enclosure Attachment 1 to \

OCAN1 t1901 Page 34 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 .

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98 EC230 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET I

98 EC231* CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR !=-35B INLET 98 EC232

• CV-3821 DECAY HEAT C_LR SERVICE WfR E-35B INLET

• 98 EC2325 CV-3821 ' DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WfR E-35B INLET 98 EC233 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 98 EC1530 CV-3850 EFW SERV WfR LOOP I ISOLATION I

98 EB203 .. CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION

'. CV-3851 *'.

98 EB204 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 98 EB205 CV-3851; EFW SERV WTR LOOP-lrlSOCATION ___ --- -

98 EC2006 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION

~

98 EC207 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 98 EC208. CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 98 EC209 cv~3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION  ;

98 EC210 CV-3851 EFW SERVWTR LOOP II ISOLATION_

98 EC2173 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 98 EC241 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 98 EC2486 CV-3851 EFW SERV WrR LOOI;' II ISOL...f\.TION

)

98 EC2488 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 98 EC206 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 98 EC2172 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 98 EC2324 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIQE ISOL 98 JB250 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 98 EC2126 D-02 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC229 D-02 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 D-04A D-04A 04A BATIERY CHARGER FOR D06

• 98 EB205 D-04A 04A BATIERY CHARGER F0R D06 98 EB2306 D:-04-A 04A BATIERY CHARGER FOR D06 I 98 EC2545 D-04A* D04A BATIERY CHARGER FOR D06 98 D-04B D-04B D04B BATIERY CHARGER FOR D06

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 35 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• ~oqm*, . lr:np.a0~9 ",: l;quipr:nent Aff~c_t.ed; ', *'

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• ~~-c ,, PY l~pa:cted_:$$y.  ! ... - -*. - ./ . '. ' - -

98 EB204 D-04B D04B BATIERY CHARGER FORP06 98 EB205 D-04B D04B BATTERY CHARGER FOR D06 98 EB2275 D-04B D04B BATTERY CHARGER FOR D06 98 EB2306 D-04B D04B BATTERY CHARGER FOR D06

• 98 EC2546 D-04B D04B BATTERY CHARGER FOR D06 I

98 EC2124 D-06 125V DC STATION BATTERY BANK TO BUS D02 98 EC2822 D-06 125V DC STATION BATIERY, BANK TO BUS D02 98 EC2210 D-11 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 1 D11 98 EC2215 D-11 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 1 D11 98 EC229 D-11 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 1 D11 .

98 EC235 D-11 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 1 D11 98 EC1183 D-21 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 2 D21 98 EC2127 D-21 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 2 D21 98 EC229 D-21 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL NO 2 D21 98 EC208 D-25 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC209 D-25 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC221Q D-25 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC229 D-25 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 98 EC1175 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1179 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1180 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1182 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1193 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1203 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1204 K-4A #1 EOG 98 EC1258 K-4A #1 EOG 98 JB343 K-4A #1 EOG 98 JB345 K-4A #1 EOG 98 JB346 K-4A #1 EOG

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 36 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Room~ 97, 98, and 129 _

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98 EC2022 K-48 #2 EOG /

98 EC208 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC209 K-48 #2EOG 98 EC210 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC2128 K-48 #2 EOG 98 E02208 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC2211 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC22'16 K-48 #2EOG 98 EC2217 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC2227 K-48 #2EOG 98 EC2228 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC225 K-48 #2EOG 98 EC229 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC2313 K-48 #2EOG 98 EC2315 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC2319 K-48 #2EOG 98 EC235 K-48 #2EOG 98 JB347 K-48 #2EOG 98 JB348 K-48 #2 EOG 98 EC206 LT-1002 PZR LVL 98 EC207 LT-1002 PZR LVL 98 EC208 LT-1002 PZR LVL 9,8 EC209 LT-1002 PZR LVL 98 EC210 LT-1002 PZR LVL 98 EC234 LT-1002 PZR LVL 98 EC2806 LT-1002 PZR LVL 98 ER202 LT-1002 , PZR LVL 98 EJ3002 LT-2617 STM GEN E248 LOW RAN.GE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3004 LT-2617 STM GEN E248 LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 37 of 103 Table 1

.J List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlsslles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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98 JB713 LT-2617 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1003 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1004 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 JB711 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3002 LT-2619 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3004 LT-2619 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 98 JB713 LT-2619 ~TM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1003 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL (EFIC)

I 98 EJ1004 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL (EFIC) 98 JB711 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL (EFIC) 98 ER201 LT-2622 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 ER202 LT-2622 SG E-24~ LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 ER201 LT-2624 STM 'GEN E.24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 ER202 LT-2624 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1003 LT-2667 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1004 LT-2667 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 JB711 LT-2667 .STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3002, LT-2668 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3004 LT-2668 SG E-24A.!-OW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) r' 98 JB713 LT-2668 SG E-24A LOW RANGE .LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1003 LT-2669 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ1004 LT-2669 STM Gl;:N E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 JB711 LT-2669 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3002 LT-2670 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EJ3004 LT-2670 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 JB713 LT-2670 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 98 E~01 LT-2671 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL 98 ER202 LT-2671 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL 98 ER201 LT-2673 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 38 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

-~ t ,. ~-~*~*t' 1:f*~-~~:~~ ':*:~ f;:i,ilJP~... ,.~-,-; ~4'ii:,?~Xtf~1Wt ,.-i"""' ".l' ~-.l -~ .. -"' ~.,; .. ~ "C--:' *..,

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98 ER202 LT-2673 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 98 EC206 NE-0502- SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEM.BLY 98 EC20? NE-0502 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 EC208 NE-0502 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 EC209 NE-0502 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 EC210 NE-0502 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 EC234 NE-0502 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 EC2806 NE-0502

• SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 ER202 NE-0502 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 98 *EC2017 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 98 EC2026 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH.REMOVAL PUMP I

• 98 EC206 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 98 EC2227 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 98 EC224 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 98 EC225 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 98 EC1153 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 98 EC1258 P-36A P_RIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 98 JB343 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 98 ' EC2019 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 98 EC1153 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC1258 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 JB343 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC2017 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC2021 F?-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC206 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC2172 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC2226 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC224 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 98 EC225 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 39 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 98 EC1498 P-7B EMERGENCY F W. PUMP 98 EC1504 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 98 JB711 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 98 C0302 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 98 C4099 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 98 ER2005 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 98 ER201 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 98 ER202 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 98 EC206' PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 EC207 PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 EC208 PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 EC209 PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 EC210 PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 EC234 PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 EC2806 PT-1041 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 ER202 PT-1041 Bt LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 98 ER2005 PT-2406 RB PRESS (ESAS #2) 98 ER201 P:f-2406 RB PRESS (ESAS #2)

• 98 ER202 PT-2406 RB PRESS (ESAS #2) 98 EJ3002 PT-2617A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ3004 PT-2617A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 JB713 - PT-2617A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ1002 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ1004 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 JB711 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ2012 PT-2618B PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 ER201 .PT-2618B PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 ER202 PT-2618B PT-E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ1002 PT-2667A E2413 MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 40 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlsslles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

'.

Roott1~\  ; "*!?rt~-~~~d: ' : ~qi:i'ighiai'if:~ffecte{i; ~-,. . ., ,

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98 EJ1004 PT-2667A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 JB711 PT-2667A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ2012 PT-2667B PT-E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 ER201 PT-2667B PT-E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 ER202 PT-2667B PT-E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ3002 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EJ30Q4 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 JB713 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 98 EC2130 RA-2 ',125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL RA2 98 EC229 RA-2 125 voe DISTRIBUTION PNL RA2 98 EC1154 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 98 EC1182 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1

\

98 EC1193 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 98 JB345 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 98 JB346 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 -

98 EC2184 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2 98 EC3007 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 98 EC4021 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 -

98 EC2019 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE; 98 EC206 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC207 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC208 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC209 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2131 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2216 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL ~V-2692 CL,OSURE 98 EC2218 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2227 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE.

98 EC2228 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2229 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 41 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mi~siles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• .- *- .. ' - ' ~ - . - . - ,. --** - -

\.-. - " . ~- ......

, *Jmpcfcta.d .. l;.qu11;1m~~n't AffeQteq :; . ;_,: ' ,' .:.: D~criptio~:of:f\ffe:c;tecC$~(r' - i,

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98 EC224 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC225

• SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC229 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC235 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2759 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2788 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 J8347 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 JB348 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 98 EC2019 SV-0711 .MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC206 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 . EC207 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC208 SV-0711 . MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE*

98 EC209

• SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2131 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL*CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2216 SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2218 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2227 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE ,

98 EC2228 SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2229 SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC224 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC225 SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC229 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC235 SV-071_1 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2759 SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 EC2788 SV--0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 J8347 SV-0711 Mf\lN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 J8348 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 98 ER2005 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 98 ER201 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 42 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-~en erated Missil~s in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 r 'F.foonf  : . lrt;JpaGte,d, "i *Equipin~~i Aff~J~.:: ~_;.: ::,: ...,::

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• ;.'. -~ ~ ~, ;_ *~~ -*- *_:.: ,- *~ **::.' t ,*1..., .,~1 ", ~-,

98 - ER202 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 98 EC1154 VEF-24A #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC1181 VEF-24A #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC1193 VEF-24A #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 JB345 VEF-24A #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 JB346 VEF-24A #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC1154 VEF-248 ' #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC1181 VEF-248 #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC1193 VEF-248 #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 JB345 VEF-248 #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 JB346 VEF-248 #1 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC207 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC208 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC209 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC210 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2175 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan \ I 98 EC2205 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2208 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2216 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC229 VEF-:24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC235 VEF-24C #2 EOG e,xhaust fan 98 EC207' VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC208 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC209 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC210 VEF-240 #2 EOG ex,t,aust fan 98 EC2175 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2205 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2208 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2216 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 43 of 1 03 Table 1 List <:>f SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

' ," ~::*... /. *~. :-_;/: - ,* -~ {i;.* .... -.. ~::*~~ . . , :; :- ,~' ~ -,: ~**--:.::-. J ' . !--~:. .

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98 EC229 VEF-24D #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC235 VEF-24D #2 EOG exhaust fan 98 EC2021 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC207 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC208 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC209 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC210 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER

~8 EC2175 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC207 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC208 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC209 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC210 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC2175 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC2205 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC2216 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC229 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 EC235 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 98 E~2211 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER I 98 EC2212 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 E°C2213 Y-22 Y221NVERTER 98 EC2215 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 EC2229 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 EC229 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 EC235 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 JB347 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 JB348 Y-22 Y22 INVERTER 98 EC2211 Y-24 Y24 INVERTEf3 98 EC2212 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER 98 EC2214 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 44 of 103 I Table 1 '

List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Gen erated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

-*" .'* ~**.

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98 EC2215 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER 98 EC2229 Y-24 Y241NVERTER 98 EC229 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER 98 EC235 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER 98 JB347 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER 98 JB348 Y-24 Y24 INVERTER 98 EC2229 Y-25 Y25SWINGINV ERTER 98 EC229 Y-25 Y25SWINGINV ERTER 98 EC234 Y-25 Y25SWINGINV ERTER 98 EC235 Y-25 Y25 SWING INVERTER 98 EC2549 Y-25 Y25 SWING INVERTER 98 EC2550 Y-25 Y25SWINGINV ERTER 98 EC2806 Y-25 Y25SWINGINV ERTER 98 JB348 Y-25 Y25SWINGINV ERTER 97 C4090 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 C4092 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 97 C4093 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 C4096 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 C4099 PSV-1000 PZR ERV .

97 C4108 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 97 C4233 PSV-1000 PZRERV 97 C4293 CV-1207 SEALINJCON TROLVALVE 97 C4420 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 C4422 PSV-1000 PZRERV 97 C4423 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 C4423 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 C543 LT-141:t BWST LVL XMTR 97 C544 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 97 CVC055 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 45 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• • 'frd:orp.

• SS.t *.. . by 1mp'a'.qe.d s:sc.-

• ,:l.mpaQt~~:. :,Equ\~~r,-;*e~!v\ff~~t~d, ~'.... * : :, * * .' , , .: ~~GH(ifio'n*.'ofJ~:ffe,ct.~d-?S,8 {:*~

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97 DC017 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 DC030 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC030 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC030 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC032 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC032 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC033 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC033 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC034 ., CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC034 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC035 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC035 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC036 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC036 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC037 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC037 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC038 CV-1207 *SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 , DC038 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC039 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC039 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC040 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC040 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC058 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC058 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC058 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC060 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC061 PSV-1000 PZR ERV '

97 DC068 - CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC068 CV-1000 ERV Isolation

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN11190 1 Page 46 of 103

, Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In

- Rooms 97, 98, arid 129

~ .Ego~e~t'Affect:~'d ~

1

d{o~rt,\ *,

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-- -- .. - - t ' - - _.. - ..... ~~ ";~ - - '- "'I_- * ' -~ '* J ,, '

97 DC069 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC070 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC070 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 97 DC070 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC071 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC071 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 97 I DC071 PSV-1000 PZR ERV e

97 DC072 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC074 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC077 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 97 DC077 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC077 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC078 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC079 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC085 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 97 DC086 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS*

97 DC087 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 97 DCOBB CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 97 DC098 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC098 CV-1404 P-34A/B SUCT SUPP FROM RCS 97 DC098 DNERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DC099 CV-2676 ATry'IOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC099 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC099 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DC101 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 DC102 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 1

97 DC103 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 DC103 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 47 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In

• Rooms 97, 98, and 129

. 97 DC104 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC104 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 DC104 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC104 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC105 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC106 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DC106 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC157 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC163 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE I

97 DC163 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC227 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DC239 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 97 DC239 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC240 CV-1000 ERV Isolation 97 DC240 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DC241 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DC241 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DC242 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE ~REVENTION SYS 97 DC242 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DC243 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ022 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ022 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ023 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) '

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ023 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ023 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 DJ023 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 48 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by To,rnado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 DJ024 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ024 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ024 C37-1

• EFIC CAB I.NET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 DJ024 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 97 DJ024 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CtfANNEL 8 (GREEN) 97 DJ024 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 97 DJd24 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 DJ024 CBS ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ024 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ025 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ025 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ025 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ026' CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ026 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ026 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ027

• CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ027 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ027 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3

• 97 DJ028 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ028 C90 E$AS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ02,9 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ030 CV-1.207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ031 . CV-1207 SEALINJCO NTROLVAL VE 97 DJ032 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ033 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 *DJ034 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ035 C47 N~I AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ035 DIVERSE RX OVERPRES SURE PREVENTIO N SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB

/

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 49 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, an~ 129

- ~ ., . - ' -- - - . : - *_ ........ - *: - .. '*, --- - .- - . - -* ',,

• .{fhpaqe~ - Eq ~ipmEfril Afu¥:.t~, . :. . ~riptih11 df !,\Jf'.eJc_t~d~S$C

.* R.ooti'L *' ssc* *

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• * ,,. _-:i:~ ~

-:,'- r;....,'":,, . *J1y-lr(lJ5aRted S9,(\:* '*,  : ~- _,. * ~- :... *. ". * * :,4,-:'. ,"' I, .-,_:* \ * : " , . ~ :.:. ' -~*-,_ ::.;~;: ,~:1 97 DJ035 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ036 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DNERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ036 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ036 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ036 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ037 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ037 C47 I NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DNERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ037 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ037 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ038 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ038 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ038 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ038 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ038 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ039 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ039 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ039 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ040 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ040 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ040 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ041 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ041 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ043 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ044 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 DJ045 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 50 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

. ,. *_* 1mP.acct~d--':E~CJii?rtr~nt~l\tt~ciEja~,---_:_:~ . ... ,:-~- -,... ~,* ,

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97 DJ046 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP '8' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ046 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 DJ097 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 DJ097 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ097 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ097 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ098 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 DJ098 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ098 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ098 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ098 C88 ESAS P,,.NALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ099 CV-1207 SEAL lt;JJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ109 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTROL VALVE 97 DJ110 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 DJ110 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB

'>-----+------+--------+--------------------1 97 DJ110 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ110 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 DJ110 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 DJ110 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 DJ111 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ111 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ111 C48

• NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 DJ111 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 DJ115 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) 97 DJ115 DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ116 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR) ,

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page51 of103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ117 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ118 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ118 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 DJ119 C47 NNI AUX *coNTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 DJ119 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 EC1015 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 97 EC1015 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1018 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 97 EC1018 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 97 EC1018 CV-1050 DH Suction lsol 97 EC1018 CV-1434 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM RCS 97 EC1018 CV-1436 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM BWST 97 EC1018 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 EC1018 C539B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 EC1018 LT-1001 PZR LVL 97 EC1018 NE-0501 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 97 EC1018 PT-1042 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 97 EC1019 VEF-24A #1 EOG exhaust fan 97 EC1019 VEF-24B #1 EOG exhaust fan 97 EC1019 VUC-1A AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC1019 VUC-18 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC1019 CV-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS 97 EC1020 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTLET 97 EC1020 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1020 CV-1407 BWSTT-3 OUTLET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 52 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 EC1020 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 EC1020 CV-3822 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35A INLET 97 EC1020 CV-1276 'A' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36A SUCTION 97 EC1021 CV-1219 HPI TO P-32C DISCHARGE 97 EC1021 CV-1220 HPI TO P-320 DISCHARGE 97 EC1021 CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 EC1022 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 EC1022 B-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-5 97 EC1022 K-4A #1 EOG -

97 EC1023 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1023 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC1023 VUC-1A AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC1023 VUC-1B AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC1024 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 _EC1024 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC1024 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC1024 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 EC1024 CV-3646 - P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC1025 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP -

97 EC1025 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC1025 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC1026 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 EC1026 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC1026 . P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP I

97 EC1026 CV-1220 HPI TO P-32D DISCHARGE 97 EC1027 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 EC1056 B-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-5 97 EC1098 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1098 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 53 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assum,ed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated IV!lssiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 EC1098 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC1098 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1098 CV-264.8 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EC10Q8 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 97 EC1140 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1140 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 EC1140 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC1140 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP

, P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP '

97 EC1140 97 EC1140 VEF-24A #1 EOG 8<HAUST FAN 97 EC1140 VEF-24B #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1140 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC1140 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 EC1140. C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 EC1141 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3

/

97 EC1141 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP I

97 EC1141 CV-3643 AGW LOOP ISOL I 97 EC1142 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1142 CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 EC1142 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 EC1143 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 -EC1143 VEF-24B #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1143 VUC-1A AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER ,

97 EC1143 VUC-18 .AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 ' EC1143 CV-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS 97 EC1144 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1144 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1144 VEF-24B #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1144 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 54 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129 l~t"\ ,.- *~~ ,*r,,m.a 1~* BfeedV* 1.r*~ '~*':'~~';l'.-,:;. kr/~z . . p, *'"'?~**,""'J.r;,*:'t:itil......rf; .-v_' ~-;:::_r,;~*"f, ;,,f'/*. Jr ... ,:'.,.

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97 EC1144 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 EC1144 (

C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 2 97 EC1145 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 EC1145 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-5 97 - EC1145 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1146 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 EC1146 B-5 480\/ LOAD CENTER BUS B-5 97 EC1146 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1147 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1147 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1147 VEF-248 #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1147 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 *EC1147 CV-2646 P-78 TO SG-A CONIBOL VALVE 97 EC1147 CV-2648 P-78 TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1151 8~5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 EC1153 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 0

97 EC1153 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC1153 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 EC1154 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1154 VEF-248 #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC1154 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 97 EC1159 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 - EC1160 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 EC1160 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 EC1161 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC1161 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 EC1"161 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 EC1212 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1213 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTLET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 55 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 EC1213 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 EC1213 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 EC1213 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC1214 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC1214. P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC1214 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC1221 K-4A #1 EOG 97 EC1221 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC1221 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1221 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-8 CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1254 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1255 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTI.ET 97 EC1255 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 EC1255 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 EC1255 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC1256 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 EC1256 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 EC1269 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 EC1269 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC1269 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC1269 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 EC1269 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 EC1376 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 EC1376 CV-1434 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM RCS 97 EC1376 CV-1436 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM BWST 97 EC1387 LT-1421 ' BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC1391 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC1456 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 EC1458 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP

1 Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 56 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 EC1485 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 97 EC1485 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 97 EC1495 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 EC1495 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1495 C511 RIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 97 EC1498 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W PUMP 97 EC1498 CV-1401 LPt/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1498 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 97 EC1498 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 97 EC1505 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 97 I EC1507 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 97 EC1509 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 EC1509 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC1514 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 EC1514 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 EC1514 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 EC1522 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 EC1522 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1522 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1522 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 97 EC1537 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 EC1542 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 EC1542 C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 97 EC1542 CV-2646 P-7B TO $G-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1542 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EC1554 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC1558 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDfTIONING CABINET 97 EC1558 C539B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 57 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in t Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 EC1558 LT-1001 PZR LVL 97 EC1558 NE--0501 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 97 EC1558 PT-1042 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 97 EC1564 CV-2663 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 97 EC1564 CV-2665 BYPASS 97 EC1593 CV-1278 HPI TO P-32A DISCH 97 EC1593 CV-1279 HPI TO P-32B DISCH 97 EC2013 K-4B #2EDG 97 EC2022 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 ' EC2022 K-4B #2 EOG 97 EC2022 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 97 EC2025 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 EC2025 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 97 EC2025 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 97 EC2025- CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC2025 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 EC202!? CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 97 EC2025 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 EC2028 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 97 EC2028 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 EC2028 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 97 EC2092 K-4B #2 EDG 97 EC2092 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 EC2092 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 EC2092 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 97 EC2092 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTRQL 97 EC2092 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 EC2092 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC2092 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2

Enclosure Attachment 1 to pCAN111901 Page 58 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Gen erated Missiles in Rooms_97, 98, and 129

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97 EC2146 VEF-24C #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC2146 VEF-24D' #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC2146 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2146 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2146 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 97 EC2147 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 EC2147 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2147 CV-3643 ACW LOOP !SOL 97 EC2147 CV-1435 DECAY HEAT P-348 SUCTION FROM RCS 97 EC2147 CV-1437 DECAY HEAT P-348 SUCTION FROM BWST 97 EC2148 P-348 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC2148 P-36C . PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC2149 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2149 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2149 CV-3642 P-48 TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2149 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 EC2149 SV-0711 MAIN STM !SOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 EC2150 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 EC2150 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 EC2150 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 97 EC2150 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 EC2150 CV-2647 P-iA TO SG-8 CONTROL 97 EC2151 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 EC2151 8-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-6 97 EC2151 ' K-48 #2EDG 97 EC2152 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 EC2152 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 EC2152 8-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 97 EC2152 8-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-6

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 59 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In

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• Eqt1ipme*rjt'Attettect Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 ' EC2152 CV-1277 'B' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 97 EC2153 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC2153 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2154 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 EC2154 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC2154 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2155 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 EC2155 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 CV-~821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET

- EC2155 97 EC2155 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2155 K-4B #2 EOG 97 EC2156 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 97 EC2156 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 97 EC2.156 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC2156 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 EC2157 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC2157 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 97 EC2157 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC2157 C91 E$AS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2158 * * * 'CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2158 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2158 P-4C 'C' SER\/_ICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2158 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 97 EC2158 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 97 EC2158 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICWCOOLERS 97 EC2158 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 97 EC2159 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC2159 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 97 EC2160 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 60 of 103 I

Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

. ' . . :I . ' .'

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97 EC2160 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC2160 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET "

97 EC2160 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2161 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 \

97 EC2161 . B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-6 97 EC2161 K-48 #2EDG 97 EC2164 P-348 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC2172 CV-3642 P-48 TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2172 CV-3644 . P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2172 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2172 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 97 EC2173 CV-2806

• EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 97 EC2173 - CV-3851 EFW SERV WfR LOOP II !SOLATION 97 EC2174 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-8 97 EC2174 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 97 EC2174 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION.VALVE CV-2615 BYPASS 97 .EC2175 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 97 EC2175.  : VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 97 EC2175 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2175 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2175 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 97 'EC2179 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 EC2182 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC2182 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2183 .. CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUJ"LET '

97 EC2183 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 EC2183 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2183 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2184 RS-2 120VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS2

r Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 61 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 EC2205 VEF-24C #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC2205 VEF-24D #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC2205 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2239 K-4B #2 EOG

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97 EC2239 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2239 CV-3~ P-;4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2239 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2239 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH RE:MOVAL PUMP 97 EC2239 VEF~24C #2 EOG EXHAUST FAf\l.

97 EC2239 VEF-24D #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 EC2239 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2240 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 EC2240 B-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 EC2240 B-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 97 EC2240 B-6 480VLOAD CENTER BUS B-6 97 EC2242 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 EC2242 B-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-5 97 EC2242 B-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 97 EC2242 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 97 EC2308 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 97 EC2308 VEF-24D #2 EOG exhaust fan 97 EC2308 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2308 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 EC2308 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 97 EC2309 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 EC2309 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE -

97 EC2309 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 97 EC2309 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 EC2309 CV-1408* BWST T-3 OUTLET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN11190 1 Page 62 of 1 03 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 EC2309 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET .

97 EC2309 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2322 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2322 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2322 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2322 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC2322 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 EC2323 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 EC2323 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 EC2323 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 97 EC2323 CV-12(7 'B' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 97 EC2329 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2329 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 EC2329 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 EC2329 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC2455 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 EC2496 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC2498 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 EC2498 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 EC2700 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 97 EC2700 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 EC2700 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 EC2758 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 97 EC2758 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II ISOLATION 97 EC2758 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 97 EC2758 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 97 EC2758 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CV-2615 BYPASS 97 EC2758 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 EC2758 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 63 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

- k' ** ' -.,

97 EC2769 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 EC2769 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 EC2769 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 EC2769 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 97 EC2803 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 EC2804 SV-06~1 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 EC2804 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 EC2825 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC2826 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 EC2837 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-B 97 EC2837 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 97 EC2837 CV-2615 BYPASS 97 EC2958 CV-1284 'C' HPI BLOCK VALVE 97 EC2958 CV-1285 HPI TO P-32D DISCH 97 EC3002 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQ!-)IF:,"MENT PANEL (YELLOW) 97 EC3002 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 97 EC3007 RS-3 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS3 97 EC3019 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 EC3031 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 97 EC4013 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 97 EC4013 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 97 EC4021 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 97 EC4034 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 97 EC4038 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 97 EJ1001 , C486-1 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (RED) 97 EJ1001 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ1001 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ1002 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 EJ1002 PT-2667A E248 MAIN STM PRESS-MSU~

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 64 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 EJ1002 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ1002 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 EJ1003 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ1003 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL (EFIC) 97 EJ1003 LT-2667 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ1003 LT-2669 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ1006 LT-2618 STM GEN E24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ1006 LT-2620 STM GEN E24A UPPER RNG LEVL (EFIC) 97 EJ1006 1 PT-2618A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 EJ1006 LT-2667 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ1006 LT-2669 STM GEN E24B UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ1006 PT-2667A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 EJ1006 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 EJ1010 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 EJ1010 CV72646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ1010 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ1022 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ1022 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 EJ2013 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 EJ2013 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 EJ2013 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 EJ2024 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 EJ2024 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 'EJ3002 I LT-2668 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ3002 LT-2670 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ3002 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 EJ3002 LT-2617 STM GEN E24B LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 65 of 103 Table 1 I

List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

• * .. - * ., ~ * * * - ...... - - \.-, * * - - - ' - - ,... ... .. ,,. - - , ... ",r -~ *- -

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97 EJ3002 LT-2619 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC)'

97 EJ3002 PT-2617A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 EJ3006 LT~2668 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ3006 LT-2670 STM GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ3006 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 EJ3006 LT-2617 STM GEN E24B* LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ3006 LT-2619 STM GEN E24B UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 97 EJ3006 PT-2617A E24B MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 ER1001 C37-1 E~IC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 ER1001 TE-1012 A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 97 ER1001 PT-1021 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 97 ER1001 CBS ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM . r NO 1 97 ER1001 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 ER1001 PT-1020 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 ER1001 PT-2405 RB PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 ER1004 CBS ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 ER1004 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 ER1004 PT-1020 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 ER1004 PT-2405 RB PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 ER1007 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 ER1007 TE-1012 A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 97 ER1007 PT-1021 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 97 ER1014 CB6 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 ER1017 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 ER1017 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 ER1019 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 ER1019 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 ER1019 PT-1020 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 ER1019 PT-2405 RB PRESS (ESAS #1)

Enclosure Attachme nt 1 to OCAN111901 Page 66 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs As~umed to be Affected by Tornado-Genera~ed Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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97 ER1020 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 ER1020 TE-1012 A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 97 ER1020 PT-1021 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 97 ER2005 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 ER2005 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 97 ER2005 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYST EM NO. 2 97 ER2005 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 ER2005 PT-2406 )~B PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 ER2009 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 ER2009 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 97 ER2010 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 ER2010 TE-1013 _'A' LOOP TH TEMP 97 ER.2018 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYST EM 2 97 ER2018., C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYST EM 2 97 ER2020 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYST EM 2 97 ER2020 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYST EM 2 97 ER2022 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYST EM 2 97 ER2023 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYST EM NO. 2 97 ER2023 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 ER2023 PT-2406 RB PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 ER3001 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 97 ER3001 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 97 ER3001 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43 97 ER3002 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYST EM NO 3 .

97 ER3002 PT-1040 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #3) 97 ER3002 PT-2407 RB PRESS (ESAS #3) 97 ER3004 C37-3 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 97 ER3004 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 97 ER3004 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 67 of 103 -

Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 ER3007 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 ER3007 PT-1040 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #3) 97 ER3007 PT-2407 RB PRESS (ESAS #3) 97 ER4017 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 97 ER4017 TE-1041 'B' LOOP TH TEMP 97 J4064 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 J4064 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 J4064 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 J4064 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 J4064 C540A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 J4087 CV-1207 SEAL INJ CONTRO.L VALVE 97 J4087 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 J4089 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 J4169 CV-2619 ATMOS D,UMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 J4169 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 J4170 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 J4170 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 J4807 C47 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (X-PWR)

DIVERSE RX OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYS 97 J4807 C498 (DROPS) CAB 97 J4807 C48 NNI AUX CONTROL SYS (Y-PWR) 97 JB03 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 JB03 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 JB03 B-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS B-6 97 JB03 CV-3642 P-48 TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB03 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB03 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 JB03 P-348 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 JB03 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP

Enclosure Attachme nt 1 to OCAN111901 Page 68 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado- Generate d Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 JB03 ' 8-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 97 JB03 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 JB03 VEF-24C #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB03 VEF-24D #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB03 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 J803 VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 JB03 CV-1227 HPI TO P-328 DISCHARGE 97 JB03 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 97 JB03 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 JB03 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET )

97 JB03 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 97 JB03 CV-2806 EFW P-7A SUCTION FROM SW 97 JB03 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS

, 97 JB03 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-358 INLET 97 JB03 CV-3851 EFW SERV WTR LOOP II !SOLATION 97 JB03 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 97 JB03 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-8 97 J803 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL 97 JB03 CV-1410 DH SUCTION ISOL -

97 JB03 CV-12TT '8' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 97 JB03 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV I

97 JB03 EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE CV-2615 BYPASS 97 JB03 K-48 #2EDG 97 JB03 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB03 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB04 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 JB04 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 JB04 K-48 #2EDG

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 69 of 103 Table 1

,r List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by.Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 JB04 8-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-6 97 JB04 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 JB04 CV-3642 P-48 TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB04 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB04 P-348 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 JB04 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 JB04 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 JB04 B-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 97 JB04 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 JB04 VEF-24C #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB04 VEF-24D #2 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB04 VUC-1C AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 JB04 . VUC-1D AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 JB04 CV-3807 SERV WTR TO DG2 CLRS 97 JB04 CV-2617 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-8 97 JB04 CV-1277 'B' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 97 JB04 - CV-1435 DECAY HEAT P-348 SUCTION FROM RCS 97 JB04 CV-1437 DECAY HEAT P-348 SUCTION FROM BWST 97 _JB04 CV-261'3 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV EFW PUMP TURBINE K3 STEAM ADMISSION VALVE 97 JB04 CV-2615 BYPASS 97 JB04 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 JB04 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 JB04 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB04 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB06 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 JB06 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 97 JB06 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 JB06 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 JB06 PT-2406 RB PRESS (ESAS #2)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 70 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Misslles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129 r.,/ \~/

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97 JB193 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 97 JB194 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 JB303 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 JB303 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 JB303 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB303 P-34A 1 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 JB303 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 JB303 P-7B EMERGENCY F W. PUMP 97 JB303 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTLET 97 JB303 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 JB303 CV-1220 HPI TO P-32D DISCHARGE 97 JB303 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 JB303 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 JB303 SV-0721 MAIN. STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 JB304 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB304 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOl 97 JB304 PT-1020 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 JB304 PT-2405 RB PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 JB304 C86 ESAS CABINET.DIGITAL SUBSYS,TEM 1 97 JB304 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 JB305 K-4A #1 EOG 97 JB305 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB305 VEF-24B #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB305 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB305 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 JB305 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 JB305 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 JB305 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 JB306 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 71 of 103 r

Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affect~d by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

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• -

• by. lmpa_cted s:s~C~.

• 97 JB306 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS 1#2) 97 Ji3306 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (GREEN) 97 JB306 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A_CONTROL 97 JB306 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-8 CONTROL 97 JB306 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB306 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB307 C486-3 AU~ILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW) 97 JB307 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 JB308 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 JB308 TE-1012 A LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 1

97 I JB308 PT-1021 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 97 JB308 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 J!3308 CV-1050 DH SUCTION ISOL 97 . -- JB308 PT-1020 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #1) 97 JB308 PT-2405 RB PRESS (ESAS #1)

• 97 JB309 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 JB309 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 JB309 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 97 JB309 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 97 J8309 CV-1050 DH suc:noN ISOL 97 JB309 CV-1434 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM RCS 97 JB309 CV-1436 DECAY HEAT P-34A SUCTION FROM BWST 97 JB309 K-4A #1 I EOG 97 JB309 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 JB309 C5398 EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 JB309 LT-.1001 PZR LVL 97 JB309 NE-0501 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 97 J8309 PT-1042 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 97 JB310 C486-3 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (YELLOW)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 72 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tomado~G enerated Missiles In

• Rooms 97, 98, and 129 97 JB311 C486-4 AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT PANEL (BLUE) 97 JB311 RS-4 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS4 97 JB312 C37-1 EFIC 'CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 JB312 TE-1012 A' LOOP TH TEMP DUAL ELEMENT INCL TE-1014 97 ,JB312 PT-10~1 A' LOOP RCS PRESS (RPS) 97 JB313 C37-3  : *EFIC CABINET CHANNEL C (YELLOW) 97 JB313 TE-1040 B LOOP TH TEMP TO RPS 97, JB313 PT-1038 B LOOP RCS PRESS C RPS C43

~ 97 JB314 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 JB314 TE-1013 'A' LOOP TH TEMP 97 JB315 K-4B #2EDG 97 JB315 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVE R 97 JB315 CV-3644 P-4A TO .P-4B DISCH CROSSOVE R 97 JB315 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 JB315 P-348 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP '

97 JB315 VEF-24C #2 EOG exhaust fan 97 JB315 VEF-240 #2 EOG exhaust fan 97 JB315 VUC-10 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOyAL UNIT COOLER 97 JB315 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 ,,

97 JB315 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 JB315 C486-2 AUXILIARY EQ~IPMENT PANEL,(GR EEN) 97 JB315 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 JB315 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 JB315 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 JB315 RS-2 120 VAC DISTRIBWTION PNL RS2 97 JB316 K-4A #1 EOG 97 JB316 P-7B EMERGENC Y F.W. PUMP 97 JB316 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 73 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlsslles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

- . - ~ - -- 1 - - r* . , -- -, - - -.. ---- - ~ - ~ - --

.(mg~.G.t~.,-, .Ecj Li ipm~_nt;e,ffect~ **

- Roortr i:. ;_ _ _ * :,. _o~npti\:m .r;:,t ~fjeGtea_ Ss~e.:.\ '.; .. *, .  ?

,* =-~-- * .- :t5j .lmpa~e.c:J. SS_C, t*..*{,_,,_: ' . ~,,,_,:~.-~: .... ,,. ..._. . . _::..,,.- ,,,~:'...*~"l-~,:,*_:*

.. ~SSIZ*'-- 1

-. ~---7' .;,' 1'." "

'-£

.*. ** ....___.. * .... ,

• I 97 JB316 VEF-24B #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB316 _ C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB316 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 JB316 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 JB316 RS-1 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION PNL RS1 I

97 JB321 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB321 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB322 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 JB322 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 JB323 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB323 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB325 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 JB325 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB325 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 JB325 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 JB325 P-34B 'B' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 JB325 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 JB325 CV-1227 HPI TO P-32B DISCHARGE 97 JB325 CV-1228 HPI TO P-32A DISCHARGE 97 JB325 CV-1400 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 JB325 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 JB325 CV-1406 RB SUMP LINE B OUTLET 97 JB325 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 JB325 CV-3821 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35B INLET 97 JB325 K-4B #2 EOG 97 JB325 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 JB325 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB325 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 JB325 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 74 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generat ed Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 1291

~-~q~ 1pn;i_~ift:1:\ft~ct1?.d !.: .-1., . ~:s:.:.-.~:- ~: ~:.*,: . *._.*..._.. ~/.~'"~.:*. . *~. -.

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\

97 J8325 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 J8326 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 J8326 K-4A #1 EOG 97 J8326 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 J8326 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 J8326 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 J8326 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 J8326 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 JB326 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 J8326 CV-1401 LP I/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 J8326 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 JB326 VEF-248 #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 J8326 CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTI..ET 97 J8326 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 J8326 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 J8326 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 J8326 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 JB326 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 J8326 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 J8327 P-78 EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 J8327 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTLET 97 J8327 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 J8327 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 J8327 VEF-248 #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 J8327 VUC-1A AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 J8327 VUC-18 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 J8327 CV-1219 HPI TO P-32C DISCHARGE 97 J8327 CV-1220 HPI TO P-32D DISCHARGE 97 J8327 CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTLET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 75 of 103

.Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles In Rooms 97, 98, and 129

.- ~7 .. *l,:.,. d; ' '\"_..-,,rl +) ,-  :-1 '~,--;;:-!-, *'*I

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97 J8327 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 J8327 CV~3822 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE wrR E-35A INLET 97 J8327 *cv-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS -

97 J8327 CV-1276 'A' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36A SUCTION 97 J8328 K-4A #1 EOG 97 J8328 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 JB328 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 JB328 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW '

97 J8328 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-48 DISCH CROSSOVER 97 J8328 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 J8328 P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP -

9[ J8328 P-78 EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 J8328 VEF-24A #1 EOG EXHAUST FAN 97 J8328 VEF-248 #1*EDG EXHAUST PAN 97 J8328 VUC-1A AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 JB328 VUC-18 AUX BLDG DECAY HT REMOVAL UNIT COOLER 97 JB328 CV-3806 SERV WTR TO DG1 CLRS 97 J8328 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 J8328 SV-061 ~ MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 J8328 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 J8328 CBB ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 JB328 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 J8328 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 J8329 C37-4 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL D (BLUE) 97 J8329 TE-1041 '8' LOOP TH TEMP 97 J8333 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 J8333 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-5 97 JB333 8-56 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 97 JB333 8-6 480V LOAD CENTER BUS 8-6

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 76 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

>:1t~ -.,:,, ,-.*;' '(r)P.8G '/, i,y~t '14i*,:i:fci'£{?~ri~tt&'2f'c,{

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-I'" I y, 97 J8375 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 J8375 PT-1040 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #3) 97 JB375 PT-2407 RB PRESS (ESAS #3) 97 J8710 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 J8712 LT-2668 SG E-24A LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 JB712 LT-2670 STh1 GEN E24A UPPER RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 J8712 PT-2668A E24A MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 J[;!712 LT-2617 STM GEN E248 LOW RANGE LEVEL (EFIC) 97 J8712 LT-2619 STM GEN E248 UPPER RNG LEVEL (EFIC) 97 JB712 PT-2617A E248 MAIN STM PRESS-MSLI 97 J8722 P-78 EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 J8722 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 J8722 C511 TRIP INTERFACE EQUIPMENT TIE CHAN A 97 TB1551 8-5 480V LOAD CENTER BUS ~-5 97 TB419 LT-1421 BWST LVL XMTR 97 VC041 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 VC044 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 VC045 CV-1275 MAKEUP TANK OUTLET 97 VC045 CV-1000 ERV ISOLATION 97 VCP48 CV-2676 ATMOS DUMP 'A' BLOCK VALVE 97 VC048 CV-2619 ATMOS DUMP 'B' BLOCK VALVE 97 VC051 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 VC051 C37-1 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL A (RED) 97 VC051 CV-2646 P-7B TO SG-A CONTROL VALVE 97 VC051 CV-2648 P-7B TO SG-B CONTROL VALVE 97 VC052 CV-2613 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM ADMISSION VLV 97 VC052 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP

{

97 VC052

• CV-2803 EFW P-7B SUCTION FROM SW 97 . VC052 CV-3850 EFW SERV WTR LOOP I ISOLATION

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 77 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Mlssiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

'r"-\;:~;~ . . . . :,,:;*~~1/1; ;,,-.; * ;"i-;~;;-:"',,,\-,:;~. . ~! .:!~t... ~:;-.-:_:,;;.~1!~> . -//,;J

-.~f.i~; :fc.,. JfrtJf* iila .,'.

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.!\

~:\ .\;;.:*\,s :~:~,,..,..,; -'~~mg~~c:ffSSQ.':J

\ -~v:...,,. *...._**oJ-**'.. "~f!.t; ... ,\---l...,_ .. _ **-.&.*~; it?':.,~,,.). "l's-Y-H--.-'r., C'... (~,,.._ J~~-~* *~,::,, :1.-..... ,~, ~£ 97 VC052 CV-2667 EFW PP TURBINE K-3 STEAM FROM SG-A 97 VC053 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 VC053 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL I 97 VC053 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B*CONTROL 97 VC109 CV-1404 P-34NB SUCT SUPP FROM RCS  !

97 VC114 CV-1410 DH SL!ct,on lsol 97 VC117 LT-1411 BWST LVL XMTR 97 VC118 CV-1284 'C' HPI BLOCK VALVE 97 VC118 CV-1285 HPI TO P-32D DISCH 97 VC119. CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL 97 VC119 CV-5611 FIREWATER TO RB OUTSIDE ISOL.

. 97 VC119 .. CV-1277 'B' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36C SUCTION 97 VC122 A-4 4160 VOLT BUS A-4 97 VC124 SV-0621 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 VC124 SV-0711 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 VC125 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 VC129 CV-3822 DECAY HEAT CLR SERVICE WTR E-35A INLET 9T VC129 C539A EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET -

97 VC129 C539B EFIC SIGNAL CONDITIONING CABINET 97 VC129 LT-1001 PZR LVL 97 VC129 \ NE-0501 SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR ASSEMBLY 97 VC129 PT.-1042 B' LOOP RCS PRESS (WR) 97 VC130 CV-1278 HPI TO P-32A DISCH 97 VC130 CV-1279 HPI TO P-32B DISCH J 97 VC131 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 VC132 PSV-1000 PZR ERV 97 VC133 P-7B EMERGENCY F.W. PUMP 97 VC133 CV-1405 RB SUMP LINE A OUTLET 97 VC133 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 78 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

,..,_;.,,7.1,1'3, *

,; :,..Re:~..: ))f :,;:,::ftitit4-_a~i~: ,,';J; ,;:::* :-.;,.-; .;"* *_., o;:'.',,(::;:f-1t:;.t"l;,:t/,::!:**1J:;; ;!. ;.,. ,:,f'r<..."!;'.Z/'. :-~1, *.

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97 VC133 CV-1219 HPI TO P-32C DISCHARGE 97 VC133 CV-1220 HPI TO P-32D DISCHARGE 97 VC133 CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 VC133 CV-1276 'A' DH LOOP DISCH TO MU PUMP P-36A SUCTION 97 VC134 A-3 4160 VOLT BUS A-3 97 )

VC134 P-4A *'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 VC134 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 VC134 . P-36A *PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 VC134 'CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 VC134 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 VC135 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 VC135 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 VC135 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 VC135 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 VC136 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 VC136 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER ,

-r 97 VC136 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 VC136 P-7B EMERGENCY F W. PUMP 97 VC136 CV-3643 ACW LOOP ISOL .

97 VC136 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 VC136 SV-0721 MAIN S)'M ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 VC190 CV-3640 'B' DISCH TO LOOP II SW 97 VC190 CV-3646 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 VC190 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 VC190 CV-3820 LOOP 1 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 VC190 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 VC191 P-4A 'A' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 VC191 *P-36A PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 VC191 CV-1407 BWST T-3 OUTLET

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 79 of 103 Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129

.. -f "-~  : . - ~ , - -: - =*1.r- ~

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97 VC191 K-4A #1 EOG 97 VC191 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 VC191 C89 ESAS ANALOG I SUBSYSTEM NO 2 97 VC191 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 VC192 P-34A 'A' LOOP DH REMOVAL PUMP 97 VC192 CV-1401 LPI/DECAY HEAT BLOCK 97 VC192 CV-f407 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 VC192 C87 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 VC194 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 VC194 C86 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 1 97 VC196 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 VC196 PT-1022 A LOOP RCS PRESS (ESAS #2) 97 VC196 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 VC198 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 VC199 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 VC199 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 VC200 CV-3642 P-4B TO P-4C DISCH CROSSOVER 97 VC200 CV-3644 P-4A TO P-4B DISCH CROSSOVER 97 VC200 P-4C 'C' SERVICE WATER PUMP 97 VC200 CV-1408 BWST T-3 OUTLET 97 VC200 CV-3811 LOOP 2 SUPPLY TO ICW COOLERS 97 VC200 K-4B #2 EOG 97 VC200 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 VC200 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2 97 VC200 C89 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 97 VC200 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 VC201 P-36C PRIMARY MAKEUP PUMP 97 VC201 C88 ' ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 VC201 C91 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 80 of 103

\

Table 1 List of SSCs Assumed to be Affected by Tornado-Generated Missiles in Rooms 97, 98, and 129 VC201 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 VC205 C90 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 3 97 VJ015 CV-2645 P-7A TO SG-A CONTROL 97 VJ015 CV-2647 P-7A TO SG-B CONTROL 97 VJ015 C37-2 EFIC CABINET CHANNEL B (GREEN) 97 VJ015 SV-0611 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2691 CLOSURE 97 VJ015 SV-0721 MAIN STM ISOL CV-2692 CLOSURE 97 VJ033 SG-5 SLUICE GATE 97 VJ033 SG-3 SLUICE GATE 97 VJ062 C88 ESAS ANALOG SUBSYSTEM NO 1 97 VJ065 C92 ESAS CABINET DIGITAL SUBSYSTEM 2

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 81 of 103 TABLE 2 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-1 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE lmpact*Assessment -

Uncertainty Impact?

ANO Specific Sources of Uncertainty -

Support system initiating event The quantification results show The TMRE methodology assumes that a Pump that support system initiating fault tree 1s affected by this LOOP_ occurs as a result of the tornado. -

Alignment for source of uncertainty. The events result in different Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to No Initiating Event nominal pump* configuration is, frequencies based on pump support system initiating event frequencies Fault Trees used in the t;>aseline alignments. does not affect the TMRE results.

qu~ntification .

. The screening critena used in development of

' the AN0-1 P~ model follows the guidelines

• Th.e system failure probacilities m the PRA ASME standard. These guidelines The system models exclude would be slightly higher if ensure that screened components and failure some compon~nts and failure . including all potential Screening of modes h.ave,a rieglig1ble impact on PRA modes based on low.frequency** component failures and failure Components results. Additionally, the TMRE evaluations of occurrence. The components modes. However, when No and/or Failure located all*piping and cables that could be and/or failure_!Tlodes are simply following the screening cntena, Modes impacted by tornado missiles and the

• assumed to have negligible the impact of the *screening potential failures were explicitly evaluated.

probability. process has a negligible impact Therefore, there would be no impact on*the on the results.

TMRE evalua~ions from excluding low-

' probability failure from the base PRA model.

The system failure probabilities The non-conforming conditions for AN0-1 do The system models exclude may be slightly higher some not include flow diversion pathways.

Flow Diversion some flow diversion p*athways flow diversion paths not Therefore, the use of an arbitrary Ima size to No based on an arbitrary line size considered* actually would screen flow diversion would contribute to both cause system failure. the compliant and degraded cases.

The recovery actions for the DC breaker for the 4160 bus was The TMRE evaluations take no credit for 4kV Breaker Assuming that operator actions applied according to procedure recovering.AC power if the EDGs fail.

Recovery may re*cover hardware failures No OP-1107.001. This recovery Therefore, this source of uncertainty does not Actions may not be practical rule is only applied in cutsets for affect the results of the TMRE analysis.

sequences TBX, RBX, and SX.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 82 of 103 J

TABLE .2 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-1 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model . TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Generic Sources of Uncertainty The generic industry frequencies for the four LOOP '-

The LOOP frequency 1s a function of several factors event categories developed in including switchyard design, the NUREG/CR-6890 are number and independence of applicable to the ANO site. The generic industry frequencies are offsite power feeds, the- local power produc~on and appropriate to *use~as priors to The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP consumption environment and develop a pl~nt-specific LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado, and that Grid Stability the degree of plant control of the frequency. The plant-specrfic OSP cannot be recovered. Therefore, the No local grid and grid.maintenance data is sufficient for the initiating event frequency and recovery values Three different aspects relate to Bayesian updat~. Tne four do not impact the TMRE analysis. -

this issue: LOOP event categories are merged into. a single LOOP 1a. LOOP initiating event frequency event Merging the frequency values and LOOP events into a single recovery probabilities. category may affect recovery '.

. *r probability . *,

The genenc industry data for consequential LOOP developed The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP Conditional The possibility* that offsite power in NUREG/CR-6890 is occurs as a result of the tornado, ~md that LOOP is lost as a result of the reactor/ applicable to the ANO srte. The OSP cannot be recovered. Therefore, the No Probab1lrty turbine trip is modeled. frequency for consequential conditional LOOP probability does not impact -

LOOP is calculated for an ECCS

• the TMRE analysis '

signal and general plant tnps *-

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 83 of 103 TABLE 2 SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-1 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model . TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

All PWRs are improving ECCS Plugging of the containment -

sump *management practices sump was modeled using the

• including installation of new The TMRE analysis does not assume that a Containment guidance provided in

• sump strainers at most plants. coincident LOCA occurs during the tornado Sump/Strainer WCAP-16882-NP. The straine*r No The PRA models the potential event.

• Therefore, thfs source of uncertainty Performance failure probabilities are affected .

for containment sump blockage does not impact the TMRE analysis by. the method used to ..

depending on the size of the determine strainer performance. ,

LOCA..

_. Detailed analyse~ are only

.. performed for t~e risk Operator actions are evaluated explicitly as significant, post-initiator HFEs.

There is not a consistent meth*oo part of the TMRE process to ensure that they No significant assumptions for the treatment of pre-inrt1ator are unaffected by the tornado. All other HFEs HRA employs industry-accepted*

and post-initiator human .errors. are evaluated as part of the quantrf1catior:1 to Basis for HEPs methodologies. Standard

• No However, human failures events ensure that their uncertainty does not impact sensitMty case for HFEs are are* typically s1gnrf1cant the PRA results. Therefore, this source of performecl as [1art of the confributors*to CDF anp LERF .. uncertainty does not impact the TMRE

\

.. quantification in order-to determine the impact of applicat10,n.

.. \

assumptions.

The potential for plant and operator response NRC analytical models and. '

.. to impact TI-SGTR and affect LERF was research findings continue to The results of the generic event evaluated in ,the internal events PRA. The show that a thermally-induced tree quantification reported in change in LERF due to TI-SGTR would Thermally- steam generator tube rupture WCAP-16341 are applicable to impact both the compliant case and the Induced Failure (TI-SGTR) is more probable AN0-1. Plant specific degraded case for TMRE. As a result, there No of Hot Leg/SG than predicted by the industry. parameters is used throughout would be some negating of the effects for the Tubes- PWRs There is a need to come to the model. TI-SGTR can have change in risk. However, the overall

- .. agreement with NRC on the a large impact on LERF due to conclusions of the TMRE would not change.

thermal hydraulics modeling of

• immediate containment bypass.

.. Therefore, this source of uncertainty does not Tl SGTR.

- affect the results of the TMRE analysis.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 84 of 103

• TABLE 2-SOURCES OFUNCE~TAINTY FOR AN0-1 TMRE Source of ..

Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment TMRE Uncertainty Impact?

[SLOCA is often a significant contributor to LERF. One key mput to the ISLOCA analysis are the assumptions related to common cause failure of J Industry-accepted approach isolation valves between the utilized to address common The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP_

ISLOCA RCS/RPVand low-pressure cause failures No significant initiating event occurs. There is no potential Initiating Event piping. There is no consensus assumptions made. Failure of for a tornado missile to cause an ISLOCA. No Frequency approach to the data or , *the low-pressure p'1pe upon Therefore, this rtem does not impact the treatment of this issue. exposure to RCS pressure is TMRE results.

Additionally, given an assumed to be 1.0.

overpressure condition in low pressure.piping, there is uncertainty surrounding the

• ra1lu~ mode of the piping. , ':.

Common cause failures have been shown to be important contributors m PRAs. As limited Standard sensitivity case for plant-specific data is available, 'The TMRE application considers that all Intra-System CCFs are performed as part of Com*mon , generic common cause factors condrt1ons are nominal. The application does the quantification in order to No are commonly used. not involve consideration of specific common Cause Events determine the impact of Sometimes, plant-specific cause failures.

• assumptions.

evidence can indicate that the generic values are inappropriate ..

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 85 of 103

(

TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment 'Impact?

Uncertainty ANO Specific Sources of Uncertainty The TMRE methodology assumes that a Actual plant configuration Loss of either bud 2001 or - LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

Loss ofOC requires that additional failures No 20002 is assumed to result in*a Therefore, ariy uncertainty wrth regards to Initiating Event occur before a reactor trip reactor trip. support system initiating event frequencies would be expected does not affect the TMRE results.

Support system initiating event The quantification results show The TMRE methodology assumes that a Pump fault tree is affected by this that support system initiating , LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

Alignment for source of uncertainty The No events result in different Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to Initiating Event nominal pump configuration is frequencies based on pump support system initiating event frequencies Fault Trees used in the baseline alignment. does not affect the TMRE results.  ;

quantification.

The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP Several assumptions relate,to occurs as a result of the tornado, and that The combined impact of these Offsite Power calculating the probability of OSP cannot be recovered Therefore, the No

• *events is to affect the probability Recovery recovering offsite power LOOP recovery probability does not impact of recovering LOOP.

following a LOOP the TMRE analysis

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 86 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

The generic industry frequencies for the four LOOP event categories developed in NUREG/CR-6890 are applicable to the ANO site. The generic industry frequencies are "

There are several as-sumpt10-ns appropriate to use as priors to . The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP with respect to the effect of Gnd Stability develop a plant-specific LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado, and that severe weather and other and Affecting . frequency. The plant-spedfic OSP cannot be recovered. 1herefore,. the No factors on LOOP frequency is Factors data is sufficient for the initiating event frequency and recovery valu9?

not considered in the base PRA Bayesian update._ The four do not impact the TMRE analysis.

model LOOP event categories are merged into a single LOOP frequency event. Merging the LOOP events into a single category may affect recovery probability.

The genenc industry data for consequential LOOP developed The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP Conditional in NUREG/CR-6890 is The possibility that offsite power occurs- as a result of the tornado, and that applicable to the ANO site The LOOP is lost as a result of the reactor/ ,asp cannot be recovered: Therefore, the No Probability frequency for consequential -

turbine trip is modeled. conditional Loop* probability does not impact LOOP 1s calculated for an the TMRE analysis ECCS signal and general plant trips '

/

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 87 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

There are several instances where it is mentioned that multiple R9P seal LOCAs (regardless of count) are Because a TMRE will cause a loss-of offsite This assumption is considered assumed to be a SBLOGA. In pow~r and the RCPs will stop, the random to be reasonable for the base addition, although RCP seal failure probability of an RCP seal failure is model. However, for some RCP Seal failures divert some of the HPSI small and would be an insignificant applications; a *higher flow rate No LOCA Flow inJect1on flow from reaching-the contributor to overall risk. Furthermore, the or consideration that flow from a core, these failures are assumed success criteria for a medium LOCA is similar seal leak on multiple seals to be small enough to allow to a small LOCA so no significant change in could affect the success cnteria.

sufficient flow to the core to risk is expected.

satisfy core cooling

~quirements using SBLOCA success criteria.

This is a reasonable assumption for sequences Containment Temperature and The TMRE model shows similar plant where no core damage occurs.

Pressure Control, is assumed to*. response to the base LOOP model There Containment Should core damage occur, be maintained via the Long are no unique core damage sequences m the No Performance then the results of specific Term RCS Inventory Control TMRE model that would be affected by this accident sequences could be and Heat Removal function. assumption affected. As a result, this is a potential source of uncertainty.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 88 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF. UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Neglecting this potential failure mode may affect the results of sequences where over cooling Pressurized thermal shock could occur, e.g , large steam (PTS) is assumed not to be a The TMRE methodology assumes that a PTS significant contributor to core line breaks. For small steam line break, the potential for LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado. -

damage and, thus, was not Therefore, any uncertainty wit~ regards to No overcooling is minimal or non-mcxfeled as a consequential steam line breaks does not affect the TMRE existant Therefore, this is event in the PRA., - results.

considered a source of uncertainty for accident scenarios that involve overcooling potential.

This assumption is reasonable All LOCAs are conservatively The TMRE methodology assumes that a assumed to happen on 'the cold and consistent with standard LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

LOCA' Location PRA practice. However, this leg, and Medium and Large Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to No assumption couTd affect specific LOCAs also require hot leg LOCA location does not affect the TMRE applications involving injection recirculation. results ,.

pathways.

It is assumed that a LOCA This assumption,is considered a The TMRE methodology assumes that a followed by failure of the reactor source of uncertainty since LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

Failure to Trip after a LOCA a

trip system is low risk there are no evaluations Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to No contributor and was not showing success criteria for LOCA initiating events does not affect the considered further failure to scram after a LOCA. TMRE results .

./

\. '

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 89 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty -Impact?

For accident sequences .

assessed in the PRA, certain equipment may be credited for

) operation in conditions that are beyond their design basis pressures, temperatu*res and /or radiation. This n,ay present a challenge to the ability of the

- equipment to complete its This assumption should be The TMRE model shows similar plant mission assumed in the PRA reviewed for equipment cre,dited

• Post-Accident - This equipment may include ,response to the base LOOP model. There Equipment instrumentation for operator in sequences where environmental conditions are no unique core damage sequences in the No Operation actions assumed in the PRA. TMRE model that would be affected by this exceed design values. This is a The operability of equipment in assumption potential source of uncertainty.

beyond design basis conditions should. be limited to* equipment inside the containment or, for high energy line breaks outside containmei:it and, interfacing system LOCAs, equipment -

located in the auxiliary or turbine buildings in the proxi_mity of the line break.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 90 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

In some instances, the PRA model assumes that raw water systems can be used as a back -

up to a primary system that normally uses high quality water.

In this case, there is the -

potential for equipment failures in portions of the primary system This assumption 1s re13sonable The TMRE application assumes that LOOP that are still in use due to effects for the base model and a occurs as result of a tornado. These Use of Raw

• of the poor water quality of the consistent plant design For conditions are considered in the design basis Water Systems raw water source. For example, specific applications, however, which credits service water for use as an No the service water (SW) system, a high-debris condrtion could EFW supply source There are no unique which typically uses river, lake change risk results. effects expected after a tornado.

or ocean water, sometimes serves, and 1s modeled in the*

PRA, as a backup to the I

emergency feedwater (EFW) system in providing a heat sink for po~t-accident decay heat removal.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 91 of 103 TA,BLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Impact?

Uncertainty The PRA model typically does not consider that des1g!'lerrors and/or maintenance errors could result in conditions wherein air or steam binding could ~ccur in I pumps assumed to operate in -

the PRA model. The design of plant systems should assure that the suction lines for pumps are full under all possible conditions under which they are The accident sequences considered in the

- Steam and Air assumed to be operable. Conservative assumptions can TMRE evaluations do not create any unique - No Binding WCAP-16779-P recommends result in uncertainties characteristics that would affeGt the potential that no failures of systems due for steam or air binding to air and steam binding need to be modeled in the PRA for the base model. However, air

- binding should be identified as

. an uncertainty m the PRA models. However, based on the  ;

low frequency of occurrence of these events, no sensitivity analysis is needed to quantify the impact of the uncertainty.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 92 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE '

Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty _Impact?

I The model. assumes that pump mini-flow recirc is not needed for LPSI success. Smee the Large LOCA will cause RCS depressunzation to the LPSI -

shutoff head or below (PSA-AN02-01-IE, Table 2), only the smallest Large LOCA, which cau,sed depressurization just to the LPSI shutoff head, would give an RCS pressure high enough* to cause pump Operation of the LPSI pumps deadheading without mini-flow following automatic actuation for recirc; but in this case, the HPSI events other than Large LOCAs The TMRE methodology assumes that a flow would be more than may require mini-flow LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

Recirculation adequate, as shown by medium, recirculation. Omission of this Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to No Flow LOCA analysis, for _which the failure mode could provide effects unique to LOCA inrtiating events does RCS depressurizes to drfferent results. Therefore, this not affect the TMRE results.

approximately the LPSI shutoff 1s considered a potential source head within the first hour. A of uncertainty.

LOCA size any larger than this limiting case would result in a lower RCS pressure than the LPSI shutoff head and consequently a much larger LPSI flow, much greater than the required flow for LPSI operation without mm1-flow recirc - which can be taken to be

< 100 gpm, the mini-flow rec1rc flow. (Section 5.18)

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page'93 *of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TI!1RE Discussion of lssu~ Impact on Model , TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Associated wrth the 2-out-of-4 logic for each RPS signal is a logic matnx This matrix is This assumption is rnasonable .

made up of re,lays that * 'for the base model 'and The TMRE application assumes that LOOP de-energize for signal ~ctuation. consistent plant' design. For RPS Success occurs as.a result of a tornado As-c! result, Failure of 4 or*more of these specific applications involving No Modelling the rod control system will de-energize relays is required for signal RPS components this .

causing a scram regardless of ROPS logic failure. Therefore, the assumption could change risk probability of failure is r:iegligible, results.

and these relays have been ,,

excluded from the model. .

After a reactor trip it is assumed that the MFW and Feedwater Control System (FWCS) " ... will automatically control the Steam '

J Generator water level between O*and 100% power ... ". After a This .assumption IS considered reactor trip, Steam Generator The TMRE methodology assumes that a to be reasonabl'3 for the base Post-Trip MFW (SG) level will be maintained via LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado No model. _However, for some Operation a MFW pump feeding the Therefore, MFW is lost.

appliCc!:fions, the assumption .

Feedwater Bypass Regulating

- may be invalid. /

valves It is assumed that MFW will continue to operate for at -

least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during a SBLOCA or Event Q failure that may cause driving steam pressure to decrease below normal levels.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 94 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

All cases assume a total loss of This assumption 1s considered feedwater at the SBLOCA to be reasonable for the base The TMRE methodology assumes that a SLOCA accident initiation The time . model. However, for some LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

Success between core uncovery and core applications, an explicit Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to No Criteria damage for a Small LOCA case evaluation of timing and effects unique to LOCA initiating events does 1s assumed to be at least condition could result in not affect the TMRE results.

20 minutes. _different results.

This assumption is considered a ~

Room cooling is assumed not source of uncertainty because Recent evaluations performed for the PRA -

Room Cooling there is no explicit consideration update confirmed the areas for which room No required for most rooms.

.. of system and component - cooling is or 1s not needed.

failure modes This assumption is reasonable ~

There are several assumptions for the base model but could be The TMRE application considers that all

-common regarding the groupir,g of overly conservative for conditions are nominal. The application does Cause Failures components for consideration of aRphcations involving not involve consideration of specific common No common cause failures consideration of specific a cause failures.

". common cause failures.

The system failure probab1lrti_es The non-conforming conditions for AN0-2 do The system models exclude may be slightly higher some not.include flow diversion pathways.

Flow Diversion som~ flow diversion pathways flow diversi6n"paths not Therefore, the use of an arbitrary line size to No based on an arbrtrary line size. cons1dered*actually would screen flow diversion would *contribute to both

'-- cause system failure. the-compliant and degraded cases.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 95 of 103 .

TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE lmpact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Following a 2A3 or 2A4 undervoltage event, if more than two maier loads are not shed or are concurrently resequenced to 2A3 or 2A4, the DG is assumed to fail due to overloading. Major loads were assumed to include 2P4A,2P35A,2P60A:2P89A, Jhis assumption could affect and 2P7B on *2A3; and 2P4C, The TMRE application considers that all events with off-normal No Load Shedding 2P35B, 2P60B, and 2P89B on conditions are nominal Off-normal alignments and some 2A4. Only SW pumps 2P60A alignments are not applicable.

applications.

and B are assumed to contribute to load shed failures, since these pumps are assumed to be the * -

only normally-operating large loads on 2A3 and 2A4. Any combination of three maJor loads

• is assumed tc:i contribute to load sequencing failures.

This assumption is a source of Prior and mission failures of a The TMRE methodology assumes that a uncertainty because DC power DC Support station battery were eliminated LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

is-needed to energize the trip No Requirements as contributors to the failure to Therefore, transfer to offslte p9wer is not coil and open the breaker using *applicable transfer to off-slte power.

the charging springs.

Failure of Feed Water isolation -

dunng Feed Water Line or Mam The TMRE methodology assumes that a This ~ssumption is reasonable Modelling of Steam Line breaks inside LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

for the base model but could be No Feedwater containment (containment Therefore, any uncertainty wrth regards to significant for some Isolation over-pressurization scenario) is HELB events does not affect the TMRE applications.

beyond current AN0-2 PRA results. -

scope.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 96 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Dlscussiqn of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

The probability of the relief - There is no basis for this valves failing to reclose when assumption and it could be Instrument Air assumed that system failure The TMRE methodology assumes that a combined with the failure of the LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado As a No Modelling caused by a relief valve relief valves transferring open- 1s result, instrument air is lost.

negligible. (Section 10.2.2) transferring open cannot be

~ *' recovered, No credible failures exist in the control to flow control valve 2CV-5091 during the LPSI '

injection that will cause a failure of the LPSI system. This is due The TMRE methodology assumes that a to the fact that administrative Omission of transfer failure LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

LPSI Modelling controls require 2SV-5091 to be

• modes could underestimate Therefore, any uncertainty with regards to No locked open (vent to risk. LOCA initiating events does not affect the atmosphere) when the LPSI TMRE results.

system is required to be*

operational. Also, 2SV-5091 ,

. fails open on loss of power that causes 2CV~5091 to open.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 97 of 103 TABLE_3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Shutdown heat exchanger room cooler failure modes include only fan failures and cooling (service) water valve failures Heat exchanger plugging, tube rupture, and cooling capability failures are not considered.

Tube rupture events are not expected to diminish the cooling Omission of these failure modes The overall failure model for room coolers SOC Room function and are therefore not a is not consistent with failure uses generic data. Therefore, this Cooler failure mode. The plugging data available and may affect No.

assumption 1s not applicable to the TMRE Modelling failure mode is effectively overall results for some analysis.

contained m the heat exchanger applications.

cooling capability failure mode. -

The contribution of the cooling I

capability failure mode to the overall heat exchanger failure probability is considered negligible. Therefore, the cooling i;apability failure mode 1s not considered.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 98 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty I Impact?

MSS2XHE-FO-MSSVG -

"Condttlonal Probabilrty of MSSV(s) -

challenge given a SGTR" phenomena event quantification uses following assumption. It IS assumed that MSSVs are not going to be challenged during inrbal Main Steam System overpressure transient neither due to Turbine Stop Valves closure nor due to SGTR (leak size based on definition of SGTR Initiating event) The basic event MSS2XHEFO-MSSVG represents following complex of phenomenological and personnel failure events that lead to MSSV challenge: a) Operator falls to The TMRE methodology assumes that a follow procedure (EOPs on SGTR This assumption may not SGTR System LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

guide an operator to inrbate adequately consider al~failure Response Therefore, any uncertainty wrth regards to No cooldown to 535 °F, to depressurize modes and their effects on the Models unit bellow SIG safety valves LOCA location does not affect the TMRE plant and response to events.

opening setpoint include control of results.

HPSI and isolate MSIV of the ruptured SG) this 1mpl1es that procedure is written in a way to avoid SIG safety valve challenge.

b) After MSIV 1s Isolated, pressure m the pnmary clrcun: may be increased due to erther temporary -

misbalance 1n Core Decay Heat and heat removal into secondary arcuit or due to HPSI - 1f operator fails to mitigate this transient and keep parameters bellow SIG set points c) Event may additionally account for non-procedurallzed action

("failure to gag the MSSV").

Currently it does not

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 99 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Impact?

Uncertainty This assumption is reasonable The baseline PSA assumes that for the base model and The TMRE application considers that all there is a normal amount of consistent plant design. For conditions are nominal._ Off-normal condrtions No SW Modelling -specific applications, however, debris in the SW bays rather are not applicable.

than a high amount of debris. ' a h1gh-debns condition could change nsk results.

There are several assumptions - Assuming that an operator The actions are associated wrth recovering regarding n:,odelling operator - action can recover hardware breakers associates with recovery of offsite No HRA actions to recover failed failures can be considered a power. The TMRE application does not credit equipment. repair and may not be practical. recovery of offsite power The recovery actions for the DC breakerfor the 4160 bus was The TMRE evaluations take no credit for 4kV Breaker Assuming that operator actions recovering AC power if the EDGs fail.

applied according to procedure No Recovery may recover hardware failures Therefore, this source of uncertainty does not OP-1107.001. This recovery may not be practical Actions affect the results of the TMRE analysis.

rule is only applied in cutsets for sequences TBX, RBX, and SX. *'

Enclosure Attach'ment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 100 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE*

Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Gen~rlc Sources of Uncertainty The AN0-2 PRA models include consideration of inrtiating events that result from multiple failures if the equipment failures result from a common cause or from

' system alignments resulting from preventive and correctJve The TMRE methodology assumes that a maintenance. However, loss of Support system inrt1ating event LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado.

Common multiple non-safeguards buses frequency and effects could Therefore, any uncertainty wrth regards to No Cause Failures is not modeled however, based change. support system initiating event frequencies on expected*low frequency and does not affect the TMRE results.

low CCDP, as described in Table 3 of Ref. xErrorl Reference soutce not found. , -

This screening of potential IEs due to bus CCF is a potential -

source of uncertainty.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 101 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessme_nt Uncertainty lmpa~t?

For accident sequences assessed m the PRA, certain equipment may be credited for operation in conditions that are beyond their design basis pressures, temperatures and /or radiation. This may present a challenge to the ability of the equipment to complete its This assumption should be mission assumed in the PRA. The TMRE model shows similar plant reviewed for equipment credited Post-Accident This equipment may include response to the base LOOP model. There in sequences where are no unique core damage sequences in the No Equipment instrumentation for operator environmental conditions Operation actions assumed in the PRA. TMRE model that would be affected,by this exceed design values. This is a The operability of equipment in assumption potential source of uncertainty.

beyond design basis conditions should be limited to equipment inside the containment or, for high energy line breaks. outside containment and interfacing system LOCAs, equipment located in the auxiliary or turbine buildings in the proximity of the line break

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 102 of 103 TABLE 3 SOURCES OF tJNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

Operating at full capacity, the station batteries will provide DC power for five hours. These estimates are conservative since all loads on the batteries are assumed to be operating at full The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP No credit for equipment Battery Life capacity with no credit for load occurs as a result of the tornado, and that operation after battery depletion Calculations shedding. The assumption is may represent a slight OSP cannot be recovered. Therefore, battery No made that power cannot be chargers are needed for success and battery conservative treatment.

recovered after batteries are life is not a factor.

depleted. No credit for -

equipment operation,after battery depletion may represent a slight conservative treatment.

All PWRs are improving ECCS ,

Plugging of the containment sump management practices

~

sump was modeled using the including installation of new The TMRE analysis does not assume that a Containment guidance provided in WCAP-sump strainers at most plants. coincident LOCA occurs during the tornado Sump/Strainer 16882-NP. The strainer failure No The PRA models the potential event. Therefore, this source of uncertainty Perfonnance probabilities are affected by the for containment sump blockage does not impact the TMRE analysis.

method used to detennine depending on the size of the strainer perfonnance.

LOCA.

Enclosure Attachment 1 to OCAN111901 Page 103 of 103 TABLE 3 - SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY FOR AN0-2 TMRE Source of TMRE Discussion of Issue Impact on Model TMRE Impact Assessment Uncertainty Impact?

The generic industry The LOOP frequency is a frequencies for the four LOOP function of several factors event categories developed in including switchyard design, the NUREG/CR-6890 are number and independence of applicable to the ANO site. The offsite power feeds, the local generic industry frequencies are appropriate to use as priors to The TMRE analysis assumes that a LOOP power production and develop a plant-specific LOOP occurs as a result of the tornado, and that consumption environment and Grid Stability frequency. The plant-specific OSP cannot be recovered. Therefore, the No the degree of plant control of the data is sufficient for the initiating event frequency and recovery values local grid and grid maintenance.

Bayesian update. The four do not impact the TMRE analysis Three different aspects relate to this issue: LOOP event categories are merged into a single LOOP 1a. LOOP lnrt1ating event frequency event. Merging the frequency values and LOOP events into a single recovery probabilities. category may affect recovery -

probability The NUREG/CR-6595 sed for AN0-2 LERF methodology does not explicitly use source terms LERF calculated for the TMRE models 1s very Fission Product or decontamination factors as is This could result in conservative No small so any reduction would not be Scrubbing done in a full scope Level 2 estimates of LERF.

significant.

analysis. However, phenomena give conservative results of large, early release.

Enclosure Attachment 2 to OCAN111901 Supporting Figures

Enclosure Attachment 2 to OCAN111901 Page 1 of 4 FIGURE 1 - TMRE MISSILE WALKDOWN AREA Legend 1.- _

Approximate Centerpoint 1 1500-11 Radius

--=::::11-= :a____ Feet 0 400 800 1,600 r--1 I. __ 1 2500-ft Radius c:J Missile Zone Note: Numbers (1 through 36) identify the missile zones.

Enclosure Attachment 2 to OCAN111901 Page 2 of 4 FIGURE 2 PENETRATIONS RESULTING IN VULNERABLE SSCs IN ROOM 129 (Control Room - Looking South)

EL. 403'

• 0,.

{\J LL 0

t~

1-

r.:

Cf) z Q

28 ' 3"

Enclosure Attachment 2 to OCAN111901 Page 3 of 4 FIGURE 3 LIN E-OF-SIGHT FROM DOOR 65 TO CONTROL ROOM 11 D

( Oll#II ~-

CJ

Enclosure Attachment 2 to OCAN111901 Page 4 of 4 FIGURE 4 POTENTIAL MISSILE TRAJECTORIES IN CONTROL ROOM 1!'.LCCTRICAL AUX.ILIARY S't'STEM'S FEEi>~

__ <§;, _ _ _

A.NE> (ONOENSt.\TE 4'* 0" 4'J't' 2.7 '- 0 ""