:on 970404,RHR Not Aligned IAW TS Requirements. Caused by non-conservative Decision Making & Not Recognizing When TS Were Not Controlling Plant Operations.Pbnp Mgt Philosophy Re TS Interpretations Changed to Minimize Use| ML20147J395 |
| Person / Time |
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| Site: |
Point Beach  |
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| Issue date: |
05/02/1997 |
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| From: |
Weaver D WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML20147J393 |
List: |
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| References |
|---|
| LER-97-019, LER-97-19, NUDOCS 9705070094 |
| Download: ML20147J395 (4) |
|
text
i l
NRC FORC 360 U.S. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY Ob8 NO. 31504104
{
(4-95)
EXPIRES 04/30/98 l
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUR lEN ESTIMATE (See reverse for required number of TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT digits / characters for each block)
BRANCH (T 6 F33).
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
]
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 2055,-0001, AND TO THE PAPFRWORK RFOUCTION PROJEN FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
$ Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 1 OF 4 TITLE 14)
Residual Heat Removal Not Aligned In Accordance With Technical S_pecificitions Requirements EVENT DATE 15)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED 18)
SEQUEN TIA L REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBEF.
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR Unit 2 05000301 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 04 97 97 019 --
00 05 02 97 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or moral (11)
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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Codel David Weaver (414) 221-3418 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE gg{
CAUSE
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPJRT EXPECTED 1141 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION Uf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEl.
X NO D ATE (15)
ABSTRACT ILet to 1400 spaces to., approximately 15 single-spaced typewntten lines) (16)
On April 4, 1997, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 was in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was shut down during its annual refueling outage.
During a review of NRC Inspection Report IR 96018, it was determined that PBNP had been operated during past refueling shutdown conditions with j
neither RHR normal decay heat removal loops in an operable status.
Normal l
RHR decay heat removal takes suction from the "A" RCS loop hot leg and returns to the "B" RCS loop cold leg.
However, during several occurrences, the RHR return was aligned to core deluge, potentially bypassing the reactor core.
In the future, this method of utilizing the ccre deluge RHR line-up will be used only during conditions in which RHR is not required to be operable, or a Technical Specifications Change Request (TSCR) will be submitted to allow this line-up when RHR is requir ed to be operable.
A four-hour report was provided to the NRC in l accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (i).
The NRC resident inspectors were also notified of this event.
9705070094 970502 PDR ADOCK 05000266 S
pop
.__ ~ _
I NRC FOQM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULOTOQY COMMIS$10N I4 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION F ACILITY N AME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL HEVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 4 l
97 019 00 TEXT fit more space os required use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) l17)
Event Description
On April 4, 1997, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 was in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was shut down during its annual refueling outage.
During a review of NRC Inspection Report IR 96018, it was deterr.ined that PBNP had been operated during past refueling shutdown conditions. with both RHR normal decay heat removal loops inoperable.
Normal RHR decay heat removal takes suction from the "A" RCS loop hot leg and returns to the "B"
RCS loop cold leg.
However, during past evolutions such as Technical Specifications Test TS-30, "High and Low Head SI Check Valve Leakage Test, Unit 1," and TS-31, "High and Low Head SI Check Valve Leakage Test, Unit i
2," the RHR return was aligned to core deluge through valves SI-852A&B, potentially bypassing the reactor core.
A Technical Specifications Interpretation DCS 3.1.22, "Use of Core Deluce as a Modified Residual Heat Removal (MRHR) Loop," provided guidance to allow this line-up.
Safety I
Evaluation Report (SER)01-118 and 91-118-01 incorrectly concluded that the modified RHR line-up utilizing the. core deluge injection path did not involve a change to the plant Technical Specifications.
Technical Specification 15.1.C states, in part, that a system, subsystem, train or component shall be operable "...when it is capable of performing its function (s) as analyzed in the safety analysis report."
This modified lineup is not described in the PBNP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
Therefore, the definition of operability was not met, rendering both trains of RHR inoperable during the time this line-up was utilized.
Having both trains of RHR inoperable without immediate corrective action to restore a train to service is contrary to Technical Specification 15.3.1.A.3.
In the future, this method of utilizing the core deluge RHR line-up will be used only during conditions in which RHR is not required to be operable, or a Technical Specifications Change Request (TSCR) will be submitted to allow this line-up when RHR is required to be operable.
A four-hour report was provided to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR l
50.72 (b) (2) (i).
The NRC resident inspectors were also notified of this event.
Cause
The root cause of this event was non-conservative decision making and not recognizing when the Technical Specifications (TS) were not controlling plant operations.
The use of administrative controls (DCS 3.1.22) to administer the intent of the TS led to a failure to submit a Technical Specifications Change Request for prior NRC review and approval.
Corrective Actions
- 1. DCS 3.1. 2 2, "Use of Core Deluge as a Modified Residual Heat Removal (MRHR) Loop," has been canceled.
- 2. The PBNP management philosophy regarding TS interpretations has changed to minimize the use of TS interpretations.
BIRC FORM 366A (4 95)
l NRC FOLM 766A U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION 14-9 5)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
)
TEXT CONTINUATION i
F ACILITY N AME (1)
DOCKET NUM8ER (2)
LER NUMBER I6I PAGE (3)
YEAR SE QUENTIAL REVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NUMBER NUMBER 3OF4 I9/
019 00
}
TEKT tot more space os required. use additional capnes of NRC Form 366A) l17)
- 3. This method of utilizing the core deluge RHR line-up will be used only 1
during conditions in which RHR is not required to be operable, or a
]
j Technical Specifications Change Request (TSCR) will be submitted to 4
allow this line-up when RHR is required to be operable.
Associated t
j procedures implementing this line-up vill be revised accordingly.
j
Reportability
This Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (1) (B), "Any operation or c.andition i
prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."
A four-hour report
]
was provided to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (i).
The NRC l
j resident inspectors were also notified of this event.
4
Safety Assessment
When using the core deluge lines for residual heat removal (RHR), there is i
no pumped flow through the reactor core.
Cooling water enters the upper j
plenum and exits via the hot leg.
Reactor coolant pumps are not required to be running.
The heat removal method is natural circulation, similar to j
the heat removal means in the spent fuel pool.
j 1
i Although the modifiel RHR line-up discussed above was not described in the PBNP FSAR and had not been previously reviewed by the NRC, the i
configuration has been thoroughly evaluated by Licensee personnel.
One result of forced circulation is the prevention of boron stratification by l
allowing mixing during boron concentration changes.
SERs91-118 and 91-1 118-01 included provisions for preventing inadvertent dilution by securing j
all sources of dilute water to the reactor coolant system when the core deluge line-up is used.
Nuclear Power Department Calculation N-91-112 1
also evaluated the decay heat removal capability of the RHR system using the core deluge line-up.
The calculation included data obtained from testing and concluded that the core deluge lines can be used to remove 1
decay heat.
Therefore, the plant remained in a safe condition and this event created no additional risk to plant personnel and the general public.
Similar occurrences:
i The following LERs describe events involving inadequately implemented i
Technical Specifications requirements:
1 LEE Title i
266/97-016-00 Steam Generator Level Logic Not Tested In Accordance With j
Technical Specifications 266/97-012-00 Diesel-Driven Fire Pump Day Tank Not Sampled In Accordance With Technical Specifications NRC FORM 360A (4-SM y
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l I
NRC FOJ.M d66 i U.S. NUCLEAR RERULATORY COMMIS110N i
14-9 5)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION i
FACILITY NAME 11)
DOCKET NUM8ER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000266 NUMBER NUMBER 4 OF 4 019 00 97 T-,,,-............~.,-...,-,--,,,,,
1 266/97-011-00 Containment Fan Cooler Accident Fans Not Tested In I
Accordance With Technical Specifications i
l 266/97-005-00 1SI-852A Not Tested In Accordance With Technical l
Specifications j
266/97-003-00 Spare Containment Fenetrations Not Leak Tested In l
l Accordance With Technical Specificatiens 1
t 266/96-014-00 Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Not Performed In j
Accordance With Technical Specifications i
l 266/96-012-00 EDG Fuel Oil System Tests Not Performed In Accordance j
With Technical Specifications 1
266/96-008-00 Missed Full Pressure Test of Containment Airlock e
i 2
1 I
e t
~
l 1
a 1
f i
NHt'?ORM 366A 14-95)
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000266/LER-1997-001, :on 970108,safety Injection Delay Times Exceeded Design Basis Values.Caused by Degraded Voltage Conditions.Licensee Engineers Will Prepare FSAR Change Requests to Reflect LBLOCA Evaluation |
- on 970108,safety Injection Delay Times Exceeded Design Basis Values.Caused by Degraded Voltage Conditions.Licensee Engineers Will Prepare FSAR Change Requests to Reflect LBLOCA Evaluation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000301/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00,re Containment Structure Where Internal Containment Structural Members Could Have Damaged Containment Liner During Safe Shutdown Earthquake | Forwards LER 97-001-00,re Containment Structure Where Internal Containment Structural Members Could Have Damaged Containment Liner During Safe Shutdown Earthquake | | | 05000301/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970107,containment Liner Clearance Was Not IAW Plant Design Basis.Caused by Void Between Containment Liner & Concrete Containment Structure.Inspected Containment |
- on 970107,containment Liner Clearance Was Not IAW Plant Design Basis.Caused by Void Between Containment Liner & Concrete Containment Structure.Inspected Containment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000266/LER-1997-002, :on 970109,potential to Overpressurize Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Occurred.Caused by Original Design Not Providing Overpressure Protection for Piping.Review Completed |
- on 970109,potential to Overpressurize Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Occurred.Caused by Original Design Not Providing Overpressure Protection for Piping.Review Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000301/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970415,potential Reactor Coolant Sys Branch Connection Stresses Beyond Design Basis,Indicated.Caused by Mod Initiated to Remove RTD Bypass Line Isolation Valves. Stress Analysis Conducted on RTD Bypass Piping |
- on 970415,potential Reactor Coolant Sys Branch Connection Stresses Beyond Design Basis,Indicated.Caused by Mod Initiated to Remove RTD Bypass Line Isolation Valves. Stress Analysis Conducted on RTD Bypass Piping
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-003, :on 970109,did Not Perform Leak Test on Spare Containment Penetrations Per Ts.Caused by Lack of Routine Testing.Tested Penetrations W/Satisfactory Results |
- on 970109,did Not Perform Leak Test on Spare Containment Penetrations Per Ts.Caused by Lack of Routine Testing.Tested Penetrations W/Satisfactory Results
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000301/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970729,declared RHR Loop Inoperable Due to CCW Leak.Caused by Failure of RHR Heat Exchanger CCW Piping. Repaired Piping & Declared RHR Loop Operable |
- on 970729,declared RHR Loop Inoperable Due to CCW Leak.Caused by Failure of RHR Heat Exchanger CCW Piping. Repaired Piping & Declared RHR Loop Operable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-004, :on 970113,potential for Particular Common Mode Failure That Could Affect Opposite Trains of Unit 2 Safeguards Equipment Was Noted.Caused by Lack of Physical Separation.Replaced Subject Circuit Breakers |
- on 970113,potential for Particular Common Mode Failure That Could Affect Opposite Trains of Unit 2 Safeguards Equipment Was Noted.Caused by Lack of Physical Separation.Replaced Subject Circuit Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000301/LER-1997-005-01, :on 970806,RHR Pump Was Declared Inoperable Due to Abnormal Seal Leakage from Loop a RHR 2P-10A.Repaired RHR Pump |
- on 970806,RHR Pump Was Declared Inoperable Due to Abnormal Seal Leakage from Loop a RHR 2P-10A.Repaired RHR Pump
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-005, :on 970116,1SI-852A Was Not Tested IAW Inservice Test Program Required by Tss.Caused Because Condition Revealed That Valve 1SI-852A Had Not Been Completely Tested.Tests Will Be Reviewed |
- on 970116,1SI-852A Was Not Tested IAW Inservice Test Program Required by Tss.Caused Because Condition Revealed That Valve 1SI-852A Had Not Been Completely Tested.Tests Will Be Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1997-006, :on 970120,refueling Cavity Drain Failed During Loca.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Original Design.Design of Refueling Cavity Drains Was Revised with Respect Capability to Withstand an Earthquake |
- on 970120,refueling Cavity Drain Failed During Loca.Caused by Inadequate Evaluation of Original Design.Design of Refueling Cavity Drains Was Revised with Respect Capability to Withstand an Earthquake
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-007, :on 970124,determined That Potential Existed for EDG Overload Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize This Condition When Plants Initially Licensed W/Two Edgs. Implemented Procedure Changes |
- on 970124,determined That Potential Existed for EDG Overload Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize This Condition When Plants Initially Licensed W/Two Edgs. Implemented Procedure Changes
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-008, :on 970131,non-seismic Ductwork Located Above safety-related Equipment in Containment Occurred.Caused by Incomplete Seismic Evaluation.Mods Will Be Completed During Current Unit 2 Refueling Outage |
- on 970131,non-seismic Ductwork Located Above safety-related Equipment in Containment Occurred.Caused by Incomplete Seismic Evaluation.Mods Will Be Completed During Current Unit 2 Refueling Outage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-009, :on 970214,potential for Safety Injection Failure During Filling of Safety Injection Accumulator Discovered.Caused by Situation Not Adequately Covered by Procedures.Procedure OI-100 Revised |
- on 970214,potential for Safety Injection Failure During Filling of Safety Injection Accumulator Discovered.Caused by Situation Not Adequately Covered by Procedures.Procedure OI-100 Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-1997-010, :on 970219,svc Water & Component Cooling Water TS Action Requirements Were Not Met.Caused Because Licensee Did Not Comply W/Cold Shutdown Requirements of TS 15.3.3.C.2 & 15.3.3.D.2.Evaluations Were Performed |
- on 970219,svc Water & Component Cooling Water TS Action Requirements Were Not Met.Caused Because Licensee Did Not Comply W/Cold Shutdown Requirements of TS 15.3.3.C.2 & 15.3.3.D.2.Evaluations Were Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-011, :on 970305,containment Fan Cooler Accident Fans Were Not Tested in Accordance with Tss.Caused by non-conservative Interpretation of Literal Requirements of Tss.Unit 1 & 2 Accident Fans Were Tested |
- on 970305,containment Fan Cooler Accident Fans Were Not Tested in Accordance with Tss.Caused by non-conservative Interpretation of Literal Requirements of Tss.Unit 1 & 2 Accident Fans Were Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1997-012, :on 970304,diesel-drive Fire Pump Day Tank Not Sampled IAW TSs.Non-conservative Interpretation of TS Led to Failure.Day Tank T-30 Sample Was Drawn & Analyzed W/Satisfactory Results |
- on 970304,diesel-drive Fire Pump Day Tank Not Sampled IAW TSs.Non-conservative Interpretation of TS Led to Failure.Day Tank T-30 Sample Was Drawn & Analyzed W/Satisfactory Results
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1997-013, :on 970304,CCWS Found Not in Accordance W/ Plant Design Basis.Caused by Inoperable Valve Due to Overtorquing in Closed position.Cross-tie Will Be Resolved |
- on 970304,CCWS Found Not in Accordance W/ Plant Design Basis.Caused by Inoperable Valve Due to Overtorquing in Closed position.Cross-tie Will Be Resolved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-013-01, Forwards Suppl LER 97-013-01,re Component Cooling Water Sys Not IAW Plant Design Basis.Rept Replaces LER 97-013-00 in Its Entirety & Includes Addl Similar Occurrence Not Previously Reported to NRC | Forwards Suppl LER 97-013-01,re Component Cooling Water Sys Not IAW Plant Design Basis.Rept Replaces LER 97-013-00 in Its Entirety & Includes Addl Similar Occurrence Not Previously Reported to NRC | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-014, :on 970321,auxiliary Feedwater Sys Inoperability Due to Loss of Instrument Air.Design Mods Initiated,Providing Pneumatic Supply to Control Valves |
- on 970321,auxiliary Feedwater Sys Inoperability Due to Loss of Instrument Air.Design Mods Initiated,Providing Pneumatic Supply to Control Valves
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000266/LER-1997-015, :on 970324,control Room Ventilation Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Failures of Backdraft Damper & Vent Duct Access Door.Backdraft Damper,Replaced |
- on 970324,control Room Ventilation Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Failures of Backdraft Damper & Vent Duct Access Door.Backdraft Damper,Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-1997-016, :on 970325,SG Level Logic Was Not Tested IAW Ts.Caused by Nonconservative Interpretation of Tss.Ts Amends Proposed to Provide Consistency Between Test Requirements & LCO Associated W/Sg Tests |
- on 970325,SG Level Logic Was Not Tested IAW Ts.Caused by Nonconservative Interpretation of Tss.Ts Amends Proposed to Provide Consistency Between Test Requirements & LCO Associated W/Sg Tests
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-017, :on 920508,containment Third Door Was Blocked Open During Refueling Operations.Caused by Interpretation That Movement of Core Components Per TS Definitions Rather than Literal Wording.Routine Maintenance Procedure Revised |
- on 920508,containment Third Door Was Blocked Open During Refueling Operations.Caused by Interpretation That Movement of Core Components Per TS Definitions Rather than Literal Wording.Routine Maintenance Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-018, :on 970403,potential for RHR Overpressure During Accidents Was Discovered.Original Design Did Not Provide Overpressure Protection for Isolated Piping Section. Evaluation Was Performed to Determine Stress on Piping |
- on 970403,potential for RHR Overpressure During Accidents Was Discovered.Original Design Did Not Provide Overpressure Protection for Isolated Piping Section. Evaluation Was Performed to Determine Stress on Piping
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-1997-019, :on 970404,RHR Not Aligned IAW TS Requirements. Caused by non-conservative Decision Making & Not Recognizing When TS Were Not Controlling Plant Operations.Pbnp Mgt Philosophy Re TS Interpretations Changed to Minimize Use |
- on 970404,RHR Not Aligned IAW TS Requirements. Caused by non-conservative Decision Making & Not Recognizing When TS Were Not Controlling Plant Operations.Pbnp Mgt Philosophy Re TS Interpretations Changed to Minimize Use
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1997-020-01, Forwards LER 97-020-01,describing Plant Conditions in Which Ability to Achieve & Maintain Safe Shutdown in Event of Postulated Fire May Have Been Adversely Affected | Forwards LER 97-020-01,describing Plant Conditions in Which Ability to Achieve & Maintain Safe Shutdown in Event of Postulated Fire May Have Been Adversely Affected | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000266/LER-1997-021, :on 970430,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Sys Was Not in Accordance W/Plant Design Basis.Cause Indeterminate.Closed & re-tagged Valves SF-27 & SF-28 & Investigated Basis for Fsar,App a |
- on 970430,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Sys Was Not in Accordance W/Plant Design Basis.Cause Indeterminate.Closed & re-tagged Valves SF-27 & SF-28 & Investigated Basis for Fsar,App a
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-022, :on 970507,discovered That Postulated Control Room Fire May Cause Electrical Hot Short That Disables Limit or Torque Switches for Certain Movs.Mods Initiated to Remedy Condition |
- on 970507,discovered That Postulated Control Room Fire May Cause Electrical Hot Short That Disables Limit or Torque Switches for Certain Movs.Mods Initiated to Remedy Condition
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000266/LER-1997-023, :on 970508,discovered Noncompliant Emergency Lighting for Postulated App R Fires.Caused by Alternative Provisions Made in Original Safe Shutdown Analysis.Emergency Lights Will Be Installed |
- on 970508,discovered Noncompliant Emergency Lighting for Postulated App R Fires.Caused by Alternative Provisions Made in Original Safe Shutdown Analysis.Emergency Lights Will Be Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-024, :on 970501,determined Post Accident Sampling Sys Degradation.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Will Upgrade Containment Atmosphere Sample Sys & Will Perform Mod to Reduce Dose within GDC 19 Dose Limits |
- on 970501,determined Post Accident Sampling Sys Degradation.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Will Upgrade Containment Atmosphere Sample Sys & Will Perform Mod to Reduce Dose within GDC 19 Dose Limits
| | | 05000266/LER-1997-025, :on 970520,pressurizer Level Was Controlled Higher than Assumed in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inappropriately Changing Procedures W/O Adequate Consideration.Listed Affected Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 970520,pressurizer Level Was Controlled Higher than Assumed in Accident Analysis.Caused by Inappropriately Changing Procedures W/O Adequate Consideration.Listed Affected Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-026, :on 970521,discovered TS Violation of Operability Requirement of MSL Isolation.Caused by Inadequate Consideration for Operability of All Required Functions.Verified Low RCS Sys Average Temp |
- on 970521,discovered TS Violation of Operability Requirement of MSL Isolation.Caused by Inadequate Consideration for Operability of All Required Functions.Verified Low RCS Sys Average Temp
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-027, :on 970521,non-environmentally Qualified Matl Existed in Containment Hatch Applications.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Mods Will Be Performed to Remove Existing Teflon Material |
- on 970521,non-environmentally Qualified Matl Existed in Containment Hatch Applications.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Mods Will Be Performed to Remove Existing Teflon Material
| | | 05000266/LER-1997-031, :on 970619,discovered That Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints May Not Ensure Adequate Suction Pressure Protection for AFW Pumps Following Tornado Event.Caused by Inadequate Design |
- on 970619,discovered That Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints May Not Ensure Adequate Suction Pressure Protection for AFW Pumps Following Tornado Event.Caused by Inadequate Design
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-1997-032, :on 970630,discovered Inadequately Rated Electrical Buses Could Disable Switchgear & Cause Secondary Fires.Caused by Characteristic of Original Design. Established twice-per-shift Fire Watches |
- on 970630,discovered Inadequately Rated Electrical Buses Could Disable Switchgear & Cause Secondary Fires.Caused by Characteristic of Original Design. Established twice-per-shift Fire Watches
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-1997-034, :on 970707,discovered Unplanned Loss of Voltage on Train B Safeguards Buses.Caused by Inadequate Design & Design Review for Installation of New Train B Edgs.Incorrect Wiring Reworked |
- on 970707,discovered Unplanned Loss of Voltage on Train B Safeguards Buses.Caused by Inadequate Design & Design Review for Installation of New Train B Edgs.Incorrect Wiring Reworked
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000266/LER-1997-035, :on 970516,discovered Inadequate Seismic Support for Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Stand.Caused by Rotor Stand Being Stored Since Initial Plant Construction.Moved Rotor Stand & Verified as Seismically Adequate |
- on 970516,discovered Inadequate Seismic Support for Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Stand.Caused by Rotor Stand Being Stored Since Initial Plant Construction.Moved Rotor Stand & Verified as Seismically Adequate
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000266/LER-1997-036, :on 970826,potential Common Mode Failure in DC Power Supply Which Could Disable AFW Sys Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design & Design Review.Plant Mods Were Performed to Eliminate Potential Common Mode Failure |
- on 970826,potential Common Mode Failure in DC Power Supply Which Could Disable AFW Sys Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design & Design Review.Plant Mods Were Performed to Eliminate Potential Common Mode Failure
| | | 05000266/LER-1997-037, :on 970903,potential Failure of EDG Load Sequence Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Design of EDG Load Sequencing Logic.Mod Restored Operability of EDG During Load Sequencing |
- on 970903,potential Failure of EDG Load Sequence Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Design of EDG Load Sequencing Logic.Mod Restored Operability of EDG During Load Sequencing
| | | 05000266/LER-1997-038, :on 970926,determined That Inoperability of Standby Emergency Power Placed Unit 2 in 7-day Lco.Caused by Failure That Occurred When EDG G-03 Was Shutdown.Repaired Governor & Returned EDG G-03 to Service |
- on 970926,determined That Inoperability of Standby Emergency Power Placed Unit 2 in 7-day Lco.Caused by Failure That Occurred When EDG G-03 Was Shutdown.Repaired Governor & Returned EDG G-03 to Service
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-039-01, :on 970615,RHR Loop Inoperable.Caused by Removal of CCW Pump from Svc.Ccw Pump Restored |
- on 970615,RHR Loop Inoperable.Caused by Removal of CCW Pump from Svc.Ccw Pump Restored
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-039, Forwards LER 97-039-00 Re RHR Loop Inoperable,Due to Inoperable CCW Pump.New Commitments within Rept Indicated in Italics | Forwards LER 97-039-00 Re RHR Loop Inoperable,Due to Inoperable CCW Pump.New Commitments within Rept Indicated in Italics | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-1997-040-01, Forwards LER 97-040-01 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 97-040-01 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000266/LER-1997-041, :on 971023,potential Common Mode Failure in Afws Control Circuits Was Noted.Caused by AFW Control Circuits Installed by Plant Mods.Temporary Mods Will Restore Physical Separation for Cables |
- on 971023,potential Common Mode Failure in Afws Control Circuits Was Noted.Caused by AFW Control Circuits Installed by Plant Mods.Temporary Mods Will Restore Physical Separation for Cables
| | | 05000266/LER-1997-042, :on 971030,discovered That Upper Containment Personnel Air Interlock Had Been Inoperable.Caused by Removal of Remote Operating Gear.Reinstalled Remote Operating Connector Gear |
- on 971030,discovered That Upper Containment Personnel Air Interlock Had Been Inoperable.Caused by Removal of Remote Operating Gear.Reinstalled Remote Operating Connector Gear
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000266/LER-1997-043-01, Forwards LER 97-043-01,re Discovery That TS Surveillance of Reactor Trip Sys Interlocks Were Not Adequate. Supplemental Info Is Provided at End of Rept.Previous Commitments Made within Rept Also Encl | Forwards LER 97-043-01,re Discovery That TS Surveillance of Reactor Trip Sys Interlocks Were Not Adequate. Supplemental Info Is Provided at End of Rept.Previous Commitments Made within Rept Also Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000266/LER-1997-044, :on 971216,use of Dedicated Operators During IST of Containment Spray Sys Constituted Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Improper Consideration for Use of Dedicated Operators.Revised Procedures |
- on 971216,use of Dedicated Operators During IST of Containment Spray Sys Constituted Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Improper Consideration for Use of Dedicated Operators.Revised Procedures
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