ML20106E922
Text
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Appendix 8A. Tables Appendix 8A. Tables
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-1. Class 1E Loads Safety Loads Function Power Component Cooling Pumps Equipment Cooling 4160VAC Containment Spray Pumps Containment Cooling 4160VAC Residual Heat Removal Pumps Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Safety Injection Pumps Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Centrifugal Charging Pumps Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Steam Generator Makeup for 4160VAC Emergency Core Cooling Nuclear Service Water Pumps Environmental Control and Equipment 4160VAC Cooling Fuel Pool Cooling pumps Fuel Pool Cooling 4160VAC HVAC Compressors Environmental Control 4160VAC Essential Motor Control Centers1 Supply Emergency Power 600VAC Vital Battery Chargers Supply Vital DC Power and Maintain 600VAC Vital Battery Charge Diesel Battery Chargers Supply DC Power for Diesel Control 600VAC and Maintain Charge on Diesel Battery Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Booster Diesel Generator Operation 125VDC Pumps Vital I&C DC Distribution Centers Supply Vital DC Power 125VDC Auxiliary Relay Racks (Process Process Control 120VAC Instrumentation and Control System)
Note:
- 1. See Table 8-6 for a listing of Essential Motor Control Center Loads.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-2 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-2. Transmission Structures Design Specifications A. General Loading: 0.5" radial ice, 0°F, 4 pounds wind Overload factors: vertical 1.50 transverse wind 2.50 wire tension, suspension 1.10 wire tension, strain 1.25 Application: one or both circuits intact B. Extreme wind loading: no ice, 60°F, 9 pounds wind Overload factors: Same as A, above Application: Same as A, above C. Heavy ice loading: 1.25" radial ice, 0°F, no wind Overload factors: 1.0 on all loads Application: Same as A, above D. Construction loading:
Lattice Towers:
a) Suspension structures: Same as A (above) with any one wire broken.
b) Strain structures: Same as A (above) with any three wires broken on one side.
Steel Poles:
a) Suspension structures: Same as A (above) with any one wire broken.
b) Strain structures: Same as A (above) with any one wire broken.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-3 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-3. Description of Transmission Lines Transmission Line Line First Major Distance to Figure Identification Voltage Substation Substation Conductor Type Reference Comments Newport 230kV Newport Tie 5.2 miles (Bundled) 2-1272 KCM Figure 8-5 Shares common R/W with Station 54/19 ACSR Allison Creek Line; has one crossover point Allison Creek 230kV Newport Tie 5.2 miles (Single) 1-1272 KCM 54/19 Figure 8-6 Shares common R/W with Station ACSR Newport Line; has one crossover point Roddey 230kV Pacolet Tie 41.4 miles (Bundled) 1-954 KCM 54/19 Figure 8-7 Shares common R/W with Station ACSR Clay Hill Line; has one crossover point Clay Hill 230kV Ripp Sub- 24.5 miles (Single) 1-1272 KCM 54/19 Figure 8-8 Shares common R/W with station ACSR Roddey Line; has one crossover point Moser 230kV Allen Steam 10.9 miles (Bundled) 2-1272 KCM Figure 8-9 Shares common R/W with a Station 54/19 ACSR 525kV Line; has no Switchyard crossovers Peacock 230kV Peacock Tie 14.8 miles (Bundled) 2-1272 KCM Figure 8-28 Shares common R/W with Station 54/19 ACSR Roddey and Clay Hill Lines; has 1 crossover point Notes:
- 1. R/W is an abbreviation for Right of Way.
- 2. Crossover point refers to a 500 kV line crossing above a 230 kV line.
- 3. Conductor area units "KCM" are equivalent to conductor area units "MCM", reference National Electrical Safety Code - 1996, section 110-6.
(24 APR 2006)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-4 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-4. Grid Frequency Decay Analysis Case Assumptions Results Case Duke generation was reduced by more than 2100 MW by the loss of all Marshall generation and Insignificant Decay - The A associated transmission. In addition to this loss of generation and transmission, two additional interconnected network supports interconnections were assumed to be out of service -- the 500 kV line between Jackson Ferry of frequency.
Appalachain Power Company and Duke's Antioch Station and the 230 kV douible circuit line between Roxboro Steam Plant of Carolina Power and Light Company and Eno Tie Station. The remaining interconnections mitigated substantially the disturbance to the Duke system.
Case Duke generation was reduced by more than 2200 MW by the loss of all Belews Creek generation Insignificant Decay - The B and associated transmission. In addition the 230 kV Roxboro to Eno interconnection was interconnected network supports assumed to be out of service. The remaining interconnections mitigated substantially the frequency.
disturbance to the Duke system.
Case Duke generation was reduced by more than 2700 MW by the loss of all Oconee generation and Insignificant Decay - The C associated transmission. This loss of transmission eliminated the 500 kV line between Oconee interconnected network supports and Norcross of the Georgia Power Company system. In addition, the 500 kV interconnection frequency.
between Jackson Ferry of Appalachian Power Company and Duke's Antioch station was assumed out of service. The remaining interconnections mitigated substantially the disturbance to the Duke system.
Since the above three disturbances did not cause undue strain on the Duke system, another highly improbable disturbance was investigated. For the remaining cases (D, E, & F), it was assumed that all interconnections from surrounding power systems into the Duke system were removed from service, leaving the Duke system isolated.
Case Duke generation was reduced by more than 2200MW by the loss of Belews Creek generation and Maximum frequency decay rate D associated transmission. of approximately 0.38 hertz per second.
Case Duke generation was reduced by more than 3000MW by the loss of Belews Creek generation and E associated transmission and Oconee 2 generation.
Case Duke generation was reduced by more than 3500MW by the loss of Belews Creek generation and Maximum frequency decay rate F associated transmission, Oconee 2 generation and McGuire 1 generation. of approximately 1.06 hertz per second, still well below the max 4 Hz/sec.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-5 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-5. Transmission System Availability HISTORICAL INFORMATION NOT REQUIRED TO BE REVISED 500 kV Facilities 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Line Miles 549 549 549 549 558 Line Tripouts 8 16 41 12 8 Tripouts per 100 Miles 1.46 2.91 7.47 2.19 1.43 Line Lockouts 1 0 1 1 0 Lockouts per 100 Miles 0.18 0 0.18 0.18 0 Total Outage Time (hours) 0.02 12 13 3 1 Availability Factor 0.99999 0.9951 0.9947 0.9989 0.9999 (per 100 Miles)
Average Availability Factor for 5-Year Period: 0.9977 (per 100 Miles) 230 kV Facilities 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Line Miles 2483 2483 2526 2526 2579 Line Tripouts 69 116 133 89 70 Tripouts per 100 Miles 2.78 4.67 5.27 3.52 2.71 Line Lockouts 3 0 3 1 3 Lockouts per 100 Miles 0.12 0 0.12 0.04 0.12 Total Outage Time (hours) 23 2 32 14 20 Availability Factor 0.9976 0.9998 0.9971 0.9979 0.9986 (per 100 Miles)
Average Availability Factor for 5-Year Period: 0.9982 (per 100 Miles)
Notes:
- 1. Line tripouts refers to the total number of times a relay operation tripped a line, regardless of the cause.
- 2. Line lockouts refers to the number of tripouts in which reclosing was unsuccessful.
- 3. Total outage time includes outages from all causes.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 1 of 14)
Table 8-6. Catawba Nuclear Station: Sequenced Loads To Be Supplied From One Of The Redundant Engineered Safety Power Distribution Systems Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks No. 1(2) Motor Operated 575 50 HP Yes Yes Valves and Dampers (11 Boric Acid Transfer AB NV 575 15.5 KW Yes Yes 1-15.5KW/diesel Seconds) Pump Motor After Motor Driven Aux. AB WL 575 7.5 HP Yes Yes 1-7.5HP/diesel Diesel FDW. Pump Sump Starts)
Pump Motor Steam Turbine AB WL 575 7.5 HP Yes Yes 1-7.5HP/diesel Driven Aux. FDW.
Pump Sump Pump Motor Aux. Building AB WZ 575 60 HP Yes Yes 3-20HP/unit Train A Ground Water 1EMXG Drainage Sump Pump Motor 125VDC Vital Inst. AB EPL 600 103 KVA Yes Yes 2-51.3KVA/diesel
& Cntrl. Btry Chrgr ECA,C(ECB,D)
Liquid Radwaste ND AB WL 575 10 HP Yes Yes 1-10HP/diesel
& NS Sump Pump Motor Annulus Ventilation AB VE 575 40 HP Yes -- 1-40HP/diesel Fan Mtr.
(17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 2 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Annulus Ventilation AB VE 600 45 KW Yes -- 1-45KW/diesel Moisture Elimination Heater Pump Room Heater- AB VA 600 80 KW Yes Yes 2-40KW/unit Train Demister Section A 1EMXG Aux. Bldg. Filtered AB VA 575 200 HP Yes Yes 2-100HP/unit Train Exhaust Fan Motor A 1EMXG Switchgear Room Air AB VC 575 30 HP Yes Yes 2-15HP/diesel Handling Unit Fan Motor Fuel Handling Area AB VF 600 160 KW --(5) Yes 2-80KW/diesel Filter Train Moisture Separator Heater Unit Essential AB EPY 600 30 KVA Yes Yes 2-15KVA/diesel Panelboard Transformers Fuel Handling Area AB VF 575 100 HP --(5) Yes 2-50HP/diesel Exhaust Fan Motor Aux. Shutdown Panel AB VA 575 4 HP Yes Yes 1-4HP/diesel Area Air Conditioning Units Nuclear Service PH RN 575 .75 HP Yes Yes 1-.75HP/diesel Water Strainer Backwash Drive Motor (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 3 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Nuclear Service PH VZ 575 7.5 HP Yes Yes 1-7.5HP/diesel Water Pump Structure Vent Fan Motor Deleted Per 2007 Update.
Diesel Starting Air DB VG 575 20 HP Yes Yes 2-10HP/diesel Compressor Motor (5) (6)
AC Emergency AB ELA 600 30 KVA , Yes 1-30KVA/diesel Lighting Pnlbd.
Diesel 600/120V DB EPY 600 5 KVA Yes Yes 1-5KVA/diesel Panelboard Deleted Per 2007 Update.
(5)
Diesel Generator DB LD 575 3 HP Yes 1-3HP/diesel Engine Lube Oil Transfer Pump Motor Deleted Per 2007 Update.
Diesel Battery DB EPQ 600 20 KVA Yes Yes 1-20KVA/diesel Charger Diesel Generator DB WN 575 10 HP Yes Yes 2-5HP/diesel Room Sump Pump Motor Diesel Bldg. DB VD 575 60 HP Yes Yes 2-30HP/diesel Generator Vent Fan Motor (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 4 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Control Room Air AB VC 575 50 HP Yes Yes 1-50HP/unit Train A Handling Unit Fan 1EMXG Motor Containment Air CV VX 575 .38 HP Yes -- 1-.38HP/diesel Return Isolation Damper Control Room Area AB VC 575 25 HP Yes Yes 1-25HP/unit Train A Filter Train Pressure 1EMXG Fan Motor Yes Control Room Area AB VC 600 25 KW Yes 1-25KW/unit Train PFT-1 Moisture A 1EMXG Separator Heater (10) (10)
Power Operated CV NC 575 4 HP 1-2HP/diesel Train Pressurizer Relief A 2-2HP/diesel Isolation Valves Train B (5) (6)
Hydrogen Igniter AB EHM 600 25 KVA , -- 1-25 KVA/diesel Panelboard Transformer No. 2 Centrifugal Charging AB NV 4000 600 HP Yes Yes 1-600HP/diesel 4 Pump Motor KV 1E Load (12 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
(17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 5 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks No. 3 Safety Injection AB NI 4000 400 HP Yes -- 1-400HP/diesel Pump Motor 4KV 1E Load (15 Seconds After Diesel Starts)3 CRDM Ventilation CV VV 575 200 HP -- Yes 2-100HP/diesel Fan Motor Lower Containment CV VV 575 178 HP -- Yes 2-89HP/diesel Vent Unit Fan Motor Upper Containment CV VV 575 15 HP -- Yes 2-7.5HP/diesel Vent Unit Fan Motor Upper Containment CV VV 575 15 HP -- Yes 2-7.5HP/diesel Return Air Fan Motor Containment Pipe CV VV 575 10 HP -- Yes 1-10HP/diesel Tunnel Booster Fan Motor Containment AB IAE 575 3 KVA -- Yes 1-3KVA/diesel Personnel Air Lock Incore Instrument CV VV 575 5 HP -- Yes 1-5HP/diesel Room Vent Unit Fan Motor Site AB ECE 600 120 KVA -- Yes 4-30KVA/Station Assembly/Evacuation Train B 1MXP, Alarm Transformers 2MXP (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 6 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Penetration Room AB EXS 600 43.3 KVA -- Yes 1-43.3 KVA/diesel Condensing Unit Transformer Bank Penetration Room Air AB VA 575 10 HP -- Yes 1-10 HP/diesel Handling Unit Control Room Air AB EMF 600 0.75 KVA -- Yes 2-0.75 KVA/Station Intake Radiation Unit 1 Train A Monitor Sample Pump Skid Unit 2 Train B Containment AB EMF 600 1.50 KVA -- Yes 1-1.50 KVA/Unit Radiation Monitors Train A Sample Pump Skid No. 4 Residual Heat AB ND 4000 400 HP Yes -- 1-400HP/diesel Removal Pump 4KV 1E Load (20 Motor Seconds After Diesel Starts)
No. 5 Deleted Per 2012 Updated (25 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
(17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 7 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks No. 6 Component Cooling AB KC 4000 500 HP Yes Yes 2-250HP/diesel Water Pump Motor 4KV 1E Load (30 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
No. 7 Nuclear Service PH RN 4000 1000 HP Yes Yes 1-1000HP/diesel Water Pump Motor 4KV 1E Load (35 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
No. 8 Aux. Feedwater AB CA 4000 600 HP Yes Yes 1-600HP/diesel Pump Motor 4KV 1E Load (40 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
No. 9 Main Fire Protection INT RY 4000 300 HP -- Yes 2-300HP/station Pump Non 1E 4KV Load (50 IFTB, 2FTA Seconds After Diesel Starts)
No. 10 (3) Reactor Make-Up AB NB 575 25 HP -- Yes 1-25HP/diesel Water Pump Motor (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 8 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks (60 Feedwater Pump AB IWE 575 1.5 HP -- Yes 1-1.5HP/diesel Seconds Turbine Turning Gear After Motor Diesel Starts)
Main Turbine TB LT 575 50 HP -- Yes 1-50HP/Unit Train Turning Gear Oil B Pump Motor Main Turbine TB ITE 575 60 HP -- Yes 1-60HP/Unit Train Turning Gear Motor A Diesel Building CO2 TB RF 575 3 HP -- Yes 1-3HP/Unit Train B Storage Tank Refrigeration Unit Main Turbine Lube TB LT 575 40 HP -- Yes 8-5HP/Unit Train B Oil Lift Pump Motor Generator Main Seal TB LG 575 25 HP -- Yes 1-25HP/Unit Train Oil Pump Motor A Generator TB LG 575 10 HP -- Yes 1-10HP/Unit Train Recirculating Seal B Oil Pump Motor Generator Seal Oil TB LG 575 2 HP -- Yes 1-2HP/Unit Train B Vacuum Pump Motor Fire Protection SB RF 575 5 HP -- Yes 1-5HP/Unit Train A Jockey Pump Motor Fire Protection SB RF 575 25 HP -- Yes 1-25HP/Station Unit Jockey Pump Motor 1 Train B (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 9 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Boric Acid Tank AB VA 600 10 KW -- Yes 6-5KW/Station Room Unit Heaters 1MXW, 1MXX, 2MXW Boric Acid Filter AB VA 600 5 KW -- Yes 2-5KW/Station Room Unit Heaters Train A 1MXW, 2MXW Boric Acid Transfer AB VA 600 5 KW -- Yes 2-5KW/Station Room Unit Heaters Train B 1MXX, 2MXX Tech. Support Center SB VH 600 4.00 KW -- Yes 1-4.00KW/Station Filter Unit Preheater Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center SB VH 575 7.5 HP -- Yes 1-7.5HP/Station Filter Unit Fan Motor Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center SB VH 600 30.75 KW -- Yes 1-30.75KW/Station Condensing Unit Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center SB ELN 600 45.0 KVA -- Yes 1-45.0KVA/Station Lighting Transformer Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center SB VH 600 15 KW -- Yes 3-5.0KW/Station Duct Heaters Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center SB VH 575 7.5 HP -- Yes 1-7.5HP/Station Air Handling Unit Train A SMXE Unit Vent Radiation AB EMF 600 1.50 KVA -- Yes 1-1.50 KVA/Unit Monitors Sample Train B Pump Skid (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 10 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Fuel Bldg Ventilation AB EMF 600 0.75 KVA -- Yes 1-0.75 KVA/Unit Radiation Monitor Train B Sample Pump Skid Condensate Steam TB EMF 600 0.75 KVA -- Yes 1-0.75 KVA/Unit Air Ejector Exhaust Train A Radiation Monitor Sample Pump Skid Auxiliary Bldg AB EMF 575 0.75 HP -- Yes 1-0.75 HP/Station Ventilation Radiation Unit 2 Train A Monitor Sample Pump Transformer KTSA AB N/A 600 30 KVA -- Yes Unit 1 Train A Unit 2 Train B No. 11 (2) Electric Hydrogen CV VX 600 75 KVA Yes -- 1-75KVA/Diesel Recombiner Power (10 Supply Panel Minutes After Diesel Starts)
Control Room Area AB VC 575 150 HP Yes Yes 1-150HP/unit Train Air Handling Unit A 1EMXG Fan Motor Containment Air CV VX 575 60 HP Yes -- 1-60HP/Diesel Return Fan Motor Hydrogen Skimmer CV VX 575 75 HP Yes -- 1-75HP/Diesel Fan Motor (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 11 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Control Room Area AB YC 575 50 HP Yes Yes 1-50HP/unit Train A Chilled Water Pump 1EMXG Motor Control Room Chiller AB YC 575 1.5 HP Yes Yes 1-1.5HP/unit Train Compressor Oil A 1EMXG Pump Motor and Chiller Controls No. 12 Control Room Area AB YC 4000 479 KW Yes Yes 1-479KW/diesel Chiller Compressor 4KV 1E Load (11 Minutes After Diesel Starts)
No. 13 Instrument Air SB VI 575 350 HP -- -- 2-350HP/station Compressor Non 1E L.C. Load (12 1LXI,2LXH minutes after diesel starts)
Fuel Pool Cooling AB KF 4000 300 HP -- -- 4KV 1E Load 1-Pump Motor 300HP/diesel Reactor Coolant AB ETC 600 346 KW -- (9) 1-416KW/diesel Pressurizer Heater Non 1E L.C. Load Power Panel Auxiliary Building AB VA 575 40 HP -- (9) 1-40HP/diesel Unfiltered Exhaust Fan Motor (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 12 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Auxiliary Building AB VA 575 100 HP -- (9) 1-100HP/diesel Supply Unit Fan Motor 125VDC Aux. AB EPK 600 150 KVA -- -- 1-150KVA/diesel Control Battery Non 1E L.C. Load Charger 1CCA(1CCB) 250VDC Power SB EPJ 600 100 KVA -- -- 1-100KVA/unit Non Battery Charger 1E L.C. Load Train 1DPC (2DPC) B Auxiliary Building AB VA 575 3 HP -- -- 1-3HP/Unit Train B Filter Room Exhaust Fan Motor No. 13 Unit Blackout AB ETE 600 30 KVA -- Yes 1-30 KVA/diesel Panelboard Non 1E L.C. Load Transformer (17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 13 of 14)
Sequence Auto Auto.
No. and Auto. Connected Connected Initiation Connected for for Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Per Diesel LOCA Blackout Remarks Notes:
- 1. AB - Auxiliary Building PH - Pump House (Nuclear Service Water Intake Structure)
DB - Diesel Building CV - Reactor Building (inside containment)
TB - Turbine Building SB - Service Building INT - LPSW Intake
- 2. Class 1E 600 volt MCC Loads
- 4. Disconnected on LOCA Signal
- 5. Given a permissive manual connection after all LOCA loads are sequenced on.
- 6. Disconnected on LOCA Signal and Blackout Signal
- 7. The load sequence interval tolerance for each load group is as follows:
(17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 14 of 14)
LOAD GROUP SEQUENCE TIME NUMBER (Seconds)
Initiate Timer (T0) 9.7 +/- 0.3 1 (T1) T0 + 0.9 +/- 0.1 2 (T2) T0 + 1.9 +/- 0.1 3 (T3) T0 + 4.7 +/- 0.3 4 (T4) T0 + 9.4 +/- 0.6 5 (T5) T0 + 14.1 +/- 0.9 6 (T6) T0 + 18.8 +/- 1.1 7 (T7) T0 + 23.5 +/- 1.4 8 (T8) T0 + 28.2 +/- 1.8 9 (T9) T0 + 37.6 +/- 2.4 10 (T10) T0 + 47.0 +/- 3.0 11 (T11) T0 + 555.0 +/- 35.0 12 (T12) T11 + 56.4 +/- 3.6 13 (T13) T11 + 112.8 +/- 7.2
- 8. This table gives HP/KW/KVA ratings of the different loads and information about the number of such loads per diesel or per unit for general reference only. For the actual load ratings and summation of total loading, refer to calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0147.
- 9. Load is credited in licensing basis and must be manually restarted following Load Group 13 actuation.
- 10. Power is available to these valves, but they must be operated via a pushbutton in the Control Room.
(17 APR 2012)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-7 (Page 1 of 2)
Table 8-7. Catawba Nuclear Station - Switchgear Control Power Sources. Unit 11 Bus Control Power Source 13.8 KV Switchgear 1HTA 1CDA 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1TA3 1CDA 3
1TB 1CDB 1TC3 1CDA 1TD3 1CDB RCP1A 1CDA RCP1B 1CDB RCP1C 1CDA RCP1D 1CDB 4.16 KV Switchgear 1ETA2 1EDE2 1ETB2 1EDF2 1GTA 1CDA 1GTB 1CDB 1FTA 1CDA 1FTB 1CDB 600 V Load Centers 1ELXA2 1EDE2 1ELXB2 1EDF2 1ELXC2 1EDE2 1ELXD2 1EDF2 1LXA 1CDA 1LXB 1CDA 1LXC 1CDB 1LXD 1CDB 1LXE 1CDA 1LXF 1CDA 1LXG 1CDA 1LXN 1CDA (22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-7 (Page 2 of 2)
Bus Control Power Source 1SLXA 1CDB 1SLXB 1CDB 1SLXC 1CDB 1SLXD 1CDB 1SLXG SDSP1 1LXH 1CDB 1LXI 1CDA Notes:
- 1. Unit 2 is similar
- 2. Safety Related
- 3. The feeder breaker which feeds the reactor coolant pump motor switchgear receives control power from the distribution center associated with the opposite battery.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 1 of 5)
Table 8-8. Single Failure Analysis of the Onsite Power Systems Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. Auxiliary Transformer Fault on one auxiliary No Safety significance:
(including associated non- transformer Protective relaying trips the associated switchyard and segregated bus to 6900 volt generator circuit breakers and the appropriate 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear) normal auxiliary switchgear incoming circuit breakers to isolate the faulted transformer.
The 6900 volt switchgear incoming breakers normally connected to the faulted transformer zone are tripped and the switchgear tie breakers are closed with a maximum dead - bus time of 93 milliseconds with arcing, thus all unit auxiliaries continue to receive power.
The unit generator automatically runs back to approximately 56% of rated output.
(09 OCT 2016)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 2 of 5)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 2. 6900 Volt Normal Auxiliary Breaker fault or failure to No safety significance:
Switchgear Source Breaker open during a fault The associated generator circuit breaker trips to isolate the unit generator from the fault, and the two applicable switchyard PCBs trip to isolate the system from the fault. The unit generator runs back to approximately 56% of rated output.
The 6900 volt switchgear tie breaker of the affected switchgear is locked open.
The other 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear that are supplied from the affected transformer zone are connected by a rapid transfer to their alternate supplies. A rapid transfer closes the switchgear tie breaker with a maximum dead-bus time of 93 milliseconds with arcing.
If the faulty breaker is the normal source for a reactor coolant pump motor and the unit generator is operating above P-8 (reference UFSAR Tables 7-1 and 7-2), both the unit generator and the reactor are tripped. This results in the tripping of the remaining generator circuit breaker to maintain power to the unit auxiliaries from the remaining train of preferred power.
If one of the 4160 volt essential auxiliary switchgear is connected to the affected 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear, one train of essential power is lost. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries continues to operate unaffected on power from the redundant train to essential power. The diesel generator of the affected train of essential power is automatically started, and its blackout loads are sequenced on.
(09 OCT 2016)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 3 of 5)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 3. 6900 Volt Normal Auxiliary Bus faulted No safety significance:
Switchgear bus The 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear source breaker is tripped and the switchgear tie breaker is locked open.
If the fault is on a section of switchgear that supplies one of the reactor coolant pump motors and the unit generator is operating above P-8 (reference UFSAR Tables 7-1 and 7-2),
both the unit generator and the reactor are tripped. This results in the tripping of both generator circuit breakers to maintain power to the unit auxiliaries through the two immediate access offsite power sources. However, if the unit generator is operating below P-8, the reactor and generator are not tripped.
If one of the 4160 volt essential auxiliary switchgear is connected to the affected 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear, one train of essential power is lost. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries continues to operate unaffected.
The diesel generator of the affected train of essential power is automatically started, and its blackout loads are sequenced on.
- 4. 6900 Volt Normal Auxiliary Breaker fault or failure to No safety significance:
Switchgear Feeder Breaker open during a fault.
Same as 3 above.
- 5. Feeder Cable to the Cable fault No safety significance:
4160VAC Essential Auxiliary The associated 6900 volt and 4160 volt switchbreakers are Power System Switchgear tripped and one train of essential power is lost. However, the redundant train of essential auxiliaries continue to operate unaffected. The diesel generator of the affected train of essential power is automatically started, and its blackout loads are sequenced on.
- 6. 6900/4160 Volt Auxiliary Transformer fault No safety significance:
Transformer Same as 5 above.
(09 OCT 2016)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 4 of 5)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 7. 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Breaker fault or failure to No safety significance:
Power System Switchgear open during a fault The affected 4160 volt essential switchgear is de-energized.
Source Breaker The feeder breaker in the 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear is tripped, and the diesel generator breaker is locked out. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries remains operable from the redundant train of essential power.
7a. 4160 VAC Essential Auxiliary Breaker fails to open due The affected 4160 VAC essential switchgear is de-energized Power System Switchgear to load sequencer and the diesel generator breaker remains open due to the load Source Breaker malfunction during sequencer load shed interlock. The redundant train of coincident LOCA and loss essential auxiliaries remains operable from the redundant train of off-site power of auxiliary power.
- 8. 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Bus fault No safety significance:
Power System Switchgear The affected 4160 volt essential switchgear is de-energized.
Bus The 4160 volt essential switchgear source breaker and the diesel generator breaker are locked out. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries remains operable from the redundant train of essential power.
- 9. 4160 Volt Essential Breaker fault No safety significance:
Switchgear Feeder Breaker Same as 8 above.
- 10. 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Fault on one cable No safety significance:
Power System Switchgear The associated load feeder breaker trips to isolate the Feeder Cables to Loads switchgear from the fault. The load supplied by the affected cable is lost but the redundant load of the other train remains available.
- 11. 4160/600 Volt Essential Load Fault on one transformer No safety significance:
Center Transformer Same as 10 above. A spare standby transformer is readily available to replace the affected transformer.
(09 OCT 2016)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 5 of 5)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 12. 600 Volt Essential Load Fault on one breaker No safety significance:
Center Source Breaker Same as 10 above.
- 13. 600 Volt Essential Load Bus fault No safety significance:
Center Bus The 600 volt essential load center source breaker trips. The loads supplied by the affected load center are lost, but the redundant loads of the other train remain available.
- 14. 600 Volt Essential Load Breaker fault No safety significance:
Center Feeder Breaker Same as 13 above.
- 15. 600 Volt Essential Load Cable fault No safety significance:
Center Feeder Cable The 600 volt essential load center feeder breaker trips. The loads supplied by the affected motor control center are lost, but the redundant loads of the other train remain available.
- 16. 600 Volt Essential Motor Bus fault No safety significance:
Control Center Bus Same as 15 above.
- 17. 600 Volt Essential Motor Cable fault No safety significance:
Control Center Feeder Cable Interlocked armor cable faults are unlikely; however, some faults beyond the motor control center feeder breaker may trip the motor control center incoming breaker also for some MCCs.
The main incoming breakers of essential MCCs 2EMXA, 2EMXB, 2EMXC, 2EMXD, 2EMXI, 2EMXJ, 2EMXK and 2EMXL have been removed in order to enhance the coordination. The feeder breakers of these MCCs coordinate with the upstream breaker in the load center which feeds the MCC. The loads supplied by the affected motor control center are lost, but the redundant loads of the other train remain available.
(09 OCT 2016)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-9 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-9. Deleted Per 1991 Update (22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-10 (Page 1 of 2)
Table 8-10. Single Failure Analysis of the 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. Battery Charger Loss of 600 volt ac power supply No safety significance - Associated 125 volt battery is available to to one battery charger supply power to the 125 volt dc distribution center without interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction.
Loss of charger output No safety significance - Associated 125 volt battery is available to supply power to the 125 volt dc distribution center without interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Additionally, a spare battery charger is readily available to replace the non-functional charger.
Internal battery charger fault No safety significance - If the battery charger output breaker does not clear the fault the battery breaker may trip also. Power is lost to the instrumentation and control channel served by the faulted charger; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Additionally, a spare battery charger is readily available to replace the faulted charger.
- 2. 125 volt Battery Battery fault No safety significance - Power is lost to the instrumentation and control channel served by the faulted battery; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. The faulted battery is isolated from its dc distribution center by the distribution center circuit breaker. Power is restored to the affected distribution center by manually connecting it to its train associated distribution center.
- 3. Load Group DC Distribution Fault between positive and No safety significance - Power is lost to the instrumentation and Center negative buses in one dc control channel served by the faulted distribution center; however, distribution center the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Power is restored to the affected loads after the fault is cleared.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-10 (Page 2 of 2)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments Gradual decay of the voltage on No safety significance - The voltage of each 125 volt dc bus is one dc distribution center monitored and will initiate a low voltage alarm at a voltage level above that required for safe shutdown of the unit. In the event of a low voltage condition, power may be restored by correcting the cause of the low voltage or by connecting the bus to its alternate source.
- 4. Auctioneered Distribution Fault between positive and No safety significance - Power is lost to the train of dc loads served Center negative buses in one by the faulted distribution center; however, the redundant train auctioneered distribution center continues to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Power is restored to the affected loads after the fault is cleared.
- 5. Load Group or Auctioneered Ground on one bus No safety significance - The 125 volt dc system is an ungrounded DC Distribution Center system. A single ground will not prevent the operation of the required safety loads. Ground detection equipment monitors the 125 volt dc system and initiates an alarm in the control room to alert the operator in the event of a ground.
- 6. Distribution Center Feeder Cable fault No safety significance - All dc distribution center feeder cables are Cable provided with isolating circuit breakers that would isolate a shorted cable on a sustained fault condition. Power to the load(s) supplied by the faulted cable is lost until the fault is cleared; however, the redundant load(s) continues to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction.
- 7. 125 Volt DC Power Panelboard Fault between positive and No safety significance - The dc distribution center breaker isolates negative buses in one 125 volt dc the faulted panelboard as described above for a faulted feeder cable.
power panelboard Power is lost to the loads served by the affected panelboard; however, the redundant loads of the remaining load groups continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction.
- 8. Auctioneering Diode Assembly Loss of power from one No safety significance - Power to the associated distribution center is auctioneering diode assembly supplied without interruption from the alternate auctioneering diode assembly.
(22 OCT 2001)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-11 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-11. Single Failure Analysis of the 120VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. 125VDC-120VAC Static Loss of 125VDC supply to one No safety significance - Power is lost to the associated channel of Inverter static inverter or failure of one 120VAC instrumentation; however, the redundant channels continue inverter to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Each unit has two swing inverters available (one per train) to allow an inoperable inverter to be removed from service but allow the AC panelboard to remain on Class 1E power.
- 2. Static Inverter Feeder Cable Failure of feeder cable No safety significance - Same as 1 above.
- 3. 120VAC Power Panelboard Failure of one 120VAC No safety significance - Power is lost to the associated channel of panelboard 120VAC instrumentation; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.
(24 OCT 2004)
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-12 (Page 1 of 1)
Table 8-12. Single Failure Analysis of the 125VDC Diesel Essential Auxiliary Power System Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. Battery Charger Loss of 600VAC supply to one No safety significance - The 125VDC battery is available to supply battery charger the affected loads without interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.
Loss of 125VDC output from No safety significance - Same as above for loss of 600VAC supply.
one battery charger Internal fault in one battery No safety significance - Same as above for loss of 600VAC supply.
charger The battery chargers are designed to prevent the battery from discharging into an internal charger fault.
- 2. Battery Fault on one battery No safety significance - Power is lost to the loads of the affected train, however, an independent train of 125VDC is provided for the redundant diesel generator. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.
(22 OCT 2001)