ML20106E925

1 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 9, Appendix 9A, Tables

ML20106E925
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/02/2020
From:	Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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References
RA-19-0423
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Text

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Appendix 9A. Tables Appendix 9A. Tables

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-1 (Page 1 of 3)

Table 9-1. Spent Fuel Cooling System Component Design Parameters SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING & MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP Number per unit 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 175 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow rate, gpm 2840 Design head, ft 275

@ design flow Material of construction SS FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Number per unit 2 Type U-Tube Heat transfer per HX at design conditions (btu/hr) 15,000,000 Flow, tube side, gpm 2310 Flow, shell side, gpm 3000 Tube side inlet temperature, F 125 Tube side outlet temperature, F 112 Shell side inlet temperature, F 100 Shell side outlet temperature, F 110 Design pressure, shell/tube, psig 150/175 Design temperature, shell/tube, F 225/225 Material of Construction, shell/tube CS/SS FUEL TRANSFER CANAL AIR DRIVEN UNWATERING PUMP Number per unit 1 Type Portable submersible air driven pump Design pressure, psig 40 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow rate, gpm 225 Design head, ft 50 (21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-1 (Page 2 of 3)

Material of Construction SS SPENT FUEL POOL PURIFICATION EQUIPMENT FUEL POOL COOLING PRE-FILTER Number per unit 2 Type Disposable cartridge Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 265 Retention @ 6 micron and 98%

larger particle size Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL COOLING DEMINERALIZER Number per unit 1 Type Flushable Resin type Bead Mixed Bed Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 530 Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL COOLING DEMIN RESIN STRAINER - (Unit 1 Only)

Number per unit 1 Type Cone Design Pressure, psig 200 Design Temp, °F 200 Design Flow, gpm 530 Retention mesh .092 Materials of Const. SS FUEL POOL COOLING POST-FILTER Number per unit 2 Type Disposable cartridge Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow rate, gpm 265 (21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-1 (Page 3 of 3)

Retention @ 3 micron 98%

and larger particle size Material of Construction SS SPENT FUEL POOL SKIMMER EQUIPMENT FUEL POOL SKIMMER STRAINER Number per unit 1 Type Basket Design pressure, psig 20 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 100 Perforation, dia, in 7/64 Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL SKIMMER PUMP Number per unit 1 Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 45 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 100 Design head, ft 55 Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL SKIMMER FILTER Number per unit 1 Type Disposable cartridge Design pressure, psig 75 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 100 Retention @ 3 micron and 98%

larger particle size Material of Construction SS (21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-2 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-2. Nuclear Service Water System Component Design Parameters NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUMPS Number per unit 2 Type Vertical, wet pit, mixed flow with above floor discharge Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 105 Design Flow, gpm 20,900 Design Head, ft. 174 Shutoff Head, ft. 260 Min. Flow Rate, gpm 8600 (continuous), 4000 (Intermittent, up to 2 hr per 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />)

Material of Construction Carbon Steel Motor horsepower, name plate 1000 Type Vertical, totally enclosed, water cooled Motor Cooler Design Flow, gpm 40 Deleted Per 2006 Update Motor Upper Bearing OilCooler Flow, gpm 4 (nominal), 1 (minimum)

Submergency Req. at Max Flow, ft. 5 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER STRAINERS Number per unit 2 Type Horizontal, continuous automatic backflush Design Pressure, psig 100 Design Temperature, F 100 Design Flow, gpm 20,900 Strainer element type slotted tubular stainless steel Strainer element size openings, in. 1/32 Maximum pressure drop, psi 4 Material of construction Carbon Steel Deleted Per 2006 Update NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM UNWATERING PUMP Number per station 1 Type Portable submersible pump Design Flow, gpm 800 (17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-2 (Page 2 of 2) minimum 400 maximum 1200 Design Head, ft. at Design Flow 65 ft. at Shutoff 78 Design Pressure, psig 50 Design Temperature, F 108 Driver Type Submersible electric motor Casing Material Carbon Steel Impeller Material Stainless Steel Deleted Per 2006 Update (17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-3 (Page 1 of 3)

Table 9-3. Nuclear Service Water System Flow Rates Outside the Nuclear Service Water Pumphouse Mode E Mode F Mode B Engineered Engineered Nominal Normal Safeguards Safeguards Individual Mode A (Power) Mode C Mode D (Safety (Sump Component Startup Operation Shutdown Refueling Injection) Recirculation)

Modulated Flow Rates No. in No. in No. in No. in No. in No. in Component Header Flow (GPM) Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation GROUP I --

COMPONENTS ON EACH UNIT WHICH RECEIVE RN FLOW WITH OR WITHOUT OFFSITE POWER

1. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers E No 2800 0 0 0 0 0 2

2. Deleted Per 2007 Update

3. Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Area Assured Source to Air Conditioning Units E Yes 10 0 0 0 0 0 0

4. Component Cooling Heating Exchangers E Yes 5200 2 1 2 2 2 2 Delete Per 2010 Update

5. Assured Spent Fuel Pool Makeup E No 140 0 0 0 0 0 0

6. Assured Source of Auxiliary Feedwater E No 900 0 0 0 0 2 0 (21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-3 (Page 2 of 3)

Mode E Mode F Mode B Engineered Engineered Nominal Normal Safeguards Safeguards Individual Mode A (Power) Mode C Mode D (Safety (Sump Component Startup Operation Shutdown Refueling Injection) Recirculation)

Modulated Flow Rates No. in No. in No. in No. in No. in No. in Component Header Flow (GPM) Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation

7. Assured Component Cooling Makeup E No 340 0 0 0 0 0 0 Deleted Per 2006 Updated

8. Assured E No 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 Containment Valve Injection Makeup (Note 1: Long term CA makeup flow rate is 599 gpm.)

GROUP I FLOW TOTALS (PER UNIT-

-GPM) 10,400 5200 10,400 10,400 12220 17820 GROUP II --

SHARED COMPONENTS (UNIT 1 ONLY)

WHICH RECEIVE FLOW WITH OR WITHOUT OFFSITE POWER

1. Control Room Chiller Condenser E Yes 1300 1 1 1 1 1 1 Delete Per 2010 Update (21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-3 (Page 3 of 3)

GROUP II FLOW TOTALS (GPM) 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 GROUP III --

COMPONENTS ON EACH UNIT WHICH RECEIVE FLOW UPON LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

1. Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Cooler E No 900 2 2 2 2 2 2

2. Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Coolers N No 150 4 4 4 4 4 0

3. Lower Containment Vent Units N Yes 8002 4 4 4 4 4 0

4. Upper Containment Vent Units N Yes 18 3 3 3 4 4 0

5. Incore Instrumentation Room Vent Units N Yes 10 2 2 2 2 2 0

6. Auxiliary Building Supply Vent Unit N Yes 2 2 2 2 0 0 GROUP III FLOW TOTALS (PER UNIT-

-GPM) 5874 5874 5874 5892 5692 1800 Deleted per 2006 Update (21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 1 of 9)

Table 9-4. Nuclear Service Water System Failure Analysis Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

1. Lake Wylie Loss of Dam RN Pumphouse pit emergency low level in either train automatically aligns RN supply and return lines to the SNSWP, isolates the RN non-essential headers, and starts all of the RN pumps. The RN Pumphouse pit level interlocks are designed to operate during all modes of operation, including ESF modes.

2. Diesel Generator 1A, Any failure causing diesel to a. During normal station operation: If blackout occurs during normal 1B, 2A, or 2B not start or fail after starting operation, the RN pumps are such aligned that each one starts upon its respective diesel startup. Crossovers remain open so either pump can supply demands. Normal valve alignment prevents RN Pump runout.

b. If diesel fails during regularly scheduled test, the shared EMO valves (RN Pumphouse Pit supply and all main return valves so noted on flow diagram) should be aligned to Unit 2 diesel of corresponding channel using switchover provided. Either unit ESF signal actuates all shared valves.

c. Failure of diesel simultaneous with blackout and subsequent Loss of Lake and/or LOCA prevents the associated diesel supply and return valves (i.e., valves 1RN232A, 1RN846A and 1RN847A for Diesel Generator 1A) from supplying cooling water and realigning discharge from Lake Wylie to SNSWP. Lake discharge valves are interlocked with SNSWP discharge valves such that the Lake return and the SNSWP return valves can not be closed at the same time.

This ensures a discharge flow path for RN through the KD heat exchangers. Operator action is required to position valves that fail to reposition automatically during a swap to the SNSWP.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 2 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

d. If a single diesel fails simultaneous with blackout and subsequent Loss of Lake and LOCA, no more than one channel of RN will be lost. The remaining channel in each unit is sufficient to shut down both units safely even with one pit (hence a Unit 1 and Unit 2 channel) out of operation. Separation of channels and isolation of non-safety class piping prevent seismic induced flooding and RN Pump runout should all control valves fail open on loss of air due to station blackout.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7) one RN supply header is isolated. The RN crossover valves in the RN pumphouse, Auxiliary Building, and Diesel Generator Rooms remain open, so RN cooling water flow is available to all four RN Essential Headers and Diesel Generators. In this alignment, if a single diesel fails simultaneous with loss-of-offsite-power, and subsequent Loss of Lake and LOCA, RN channel separation is not desired. This alignment does not result in a loss of a RN channel.

3. Lake supply to pit valve Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of any one valve or either complete 1A, 2B, 5A or 6B or all channel will not prevent isolation of Lake Wylie. In conjunction with valves of like channel switchover to SNSWP, this means that SNSWP can never be lost to a "dry" Lake Wylie.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 3 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

4. SNSWP supply to pit Failure to open on Loss of Lake a. Each valve serves one pit of the RN Pumphouse, so failure of one valve 3A or 4B SNSWP supply valve to open when Lake supply valves close results in failure of only that pit. Only one channel of RN is lost. The remaining channel in each unit is sufficient to shut down both units safely. The redundant channels automatically separate upon emergency low pit level concurrent with a safety injection signal on one of the units. Otherwise, the operator will need to manually isolate train.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), one RN supply header is isolated. The RN crossover valves in the RN pumphouse, and the RN supply header crossover isolation valves in the Auxiliary, 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented for auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level, since channel separation is not desired in this alignment. Similarly, the RN return header crossover header isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54A are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers, even with the failure of one RN pit to transfer suction to the SNSWP. This alignment does not result in loss of a RN channel.

b. If a diesel generator is known to be out of service, these valves are aligned to the other unit's operable diesel generator on the corresponding channel. However, failure of one SNSWP supply valve to open when the Lake supply valves close will result in failure of that pit. One channel of RN is lost. If the diesel generator out of service is on the RN channel unaffected by the SNSWP supply valve failure, only one RN pump will be operable. One pump is sufficient to provide for safe shutdown of the operating unit and maintaining the other unit in cold shutdown.

If a diesel generator or RN pump is known to be out of service, the RN system can not be aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 4 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

5. Main Lake return valves Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent 1RN57A or 1RN843B isolation of Lake discharge. In conjunction with switchover to SNSWP, this means that SNSWP can never be lost to a "dry" Lake Wylie.

6. Main SNSWP return Failure to open on Loss of Lake Each valve serves one shared train of RN System return to SNSWP, so failure valves 1RN63A of one valve to open when Lake return valves close results in failure of only 1RN58B one channel in both units. The remaining channel in each unit is sufficient to shut down both units safely.

If the valve failure occurs while the RN system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), channel separation does not occur and the RN return header crossover isolation valves, 1RN53B and 1RN54A, are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that a NSW cooling water flow path is available to all four essential headers, even with the failure of one SNSWP return valve to reposition, and does not result in a loss of a RN channel.

If a Unit 1 diesel is known to be out of service, these valves are aligned to the Unit 2 diesel of corresponding channel.

If a diesel generator or RN pump is known to be out of service, alignment of the RN system in Single Supply Header Operation is prohibited.

7. Crossover valves Failure to close on ESF Signal, Alignment of these non-nuclear safety valves is not required for any design 1RN36A or 1RN37B as applicable basis event.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 5 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences a) Crossover valves Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent 1RN47A or 1RN48B or ESF Signal, as applicable channel separation when required.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented from auto-closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal, or an emergency low pumphouse pit level.

Similarly, the RN return header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54B are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates either or both of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.

8. Non-essential header Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent isolation valves 1RN49A isolation of non-safety class piping when required.

or 1RN50B 1RN51A or 1RN52B

9. Any or all Channel A Failure to assume proper Channel B functions in its entirety and is sufficient to shut down the unit valves actuated by Loss position upon signal safely. Sufficient manual realignment via crossovers is provided for of Lake or ESF Signal maintenance or a second failure in long term after LOCA.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented from auto-closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal, or an emergency low pumphouse pit level.

Similarly, the RN return header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54B are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates either or both of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 6 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

10. Any or all Channel B Failure to assume proper Channel A functions in its entirety and is sufficient to shut down the unit valves actuated by Loss position upon signal safely. Sufficient manual realignment via crossovers is provided for of Lake or ESF Signal maintenance or a second failure in the long term after LOCA.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented from auto-closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal, or an emergency low pumphouse pit level.

Similarly, the RN return header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54B are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates either or both of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.

11. Diesel Generator Engine Failure to close on Loss of Lake a. Most likely cause is diesel failure, which means supply valve Jacket Water Cooler 1RN232A, 1RN292B, 2RN232A, or 2RN292B will not open either.

discharge to Lake In this case, see item 2 above.

1RN847A, 1RN849B,

b. Lake discharge valves are interlocked with SNSWP discharge valves 2RN847A, or 2RN849B 1RN846A, 1RN848B, 2RN846A, and 2RN848B such that the Lake return and the SNSWP return valves can not be closed at the same time. This ensures a discharge flowpath for RN through the KD heat exchangers. Operator action is required to position valves that fail to reposition automatically during a swap to the SNSWP.

12. Either RN Pump 1A or Any failure causing RN Pump RN Pumps 1B and 2B provide 100% redundancy. Before crossover isolation, 2A to not start or fail after starting they can be used to supply all loads previously aligned to train A pumps.

After crossover isolation, train B essential heat exchangers in both units allow safe shutdown.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 7 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

13. Any Channel A safety Tube rupture or plug or shell Channel B heat exchangers and RN Pump provide 100% redundancy. Before related heat exchanger or rupture crossover isolation, any RN Pump in operation can supply any channel heat equipment exchanger, or a mixture of A and B channel heat exchangers. After channel separation, the B RN Pumps supply only Channel B essential heat exchangers, which are sufficient for safe shutdown of both units.

When the RN system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN channels remain cross-connected. The crossover valves are prevented from closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal or an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers and Diesel Generators if there is an event that generates either, or both, of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation, even with the failure of one Channel A safety-related heat exchanger. Isolation valves can be repositioned to isolate the affected component.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 8 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

14. RN Pump 1A and 2A Rupture or plug Use Channel B intake line from Lake or SNSWP, Pumphouse Pit B, RN discharge piping to heat Pumps 1B and 2B, and all Channel B heat exchangers until repairs can be exchangers made.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), one buried RN supply header is isolated, so redundant RN supply header is not immediately available to provide flow to essential components.

Pipe rupture is an initiating event and concurrent design-basis events are not required to be considered, unless they result from rupture. Postulated leakage rates for a pipe rupture of the in-service supply header piping can be tolerated, and still provide adequate RN flow to essential components on a long term bais to enable safe shut down of both units.

Plugging, blockage or collapse of the buried RN supply header is not considered credible since there are no internal components and the piping internal pressure exceeds soil pressure.

In the event of a catastrophic failure of the in-service supply header while in Single Supply Header Operation, plant procedures exist to allow safe shut down of both units.

15. RN Pumphouse Intake Collapse or plug Use Channel B intake line from SNSWP, Pumphouse Pit B, and all Channel line A from SNSWP B heat exchangers unit repairs can be made.

When the RN system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN channels remain cross-connected. The crossover valves are prevented from closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal or an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers and Diesel Generators if there is an event that generates either, or both, of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation, even with the failure of one intake line form the SNSWP. This alignment does not result in a loss of a RN channel.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 9 of 9)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

16. RN Pumphouse Shared Collapse or plug RN Pumphouse Pit emergency low level will automatically realign to Intake line from Lake SNSWP and start all RN Pumps for temporary operation until line is repaired, or for shutdown.

17. Either RN Strainer 1A or Rupture or plug Isolate affected RN Strainer and RN Pump. Use another pump to satisfy 2A cooling water requirements through normally open crossovers.

18. Any non-safety related Any failure which would Isolate component and perform required maintenance.

component prevent normal operation of the component.

19. Shared discharge line to Rupture or plug Manually align all RN Pumphouse Intake line valves and all return line Lake Wylie isolation valves to SNSWP for temporary operation until line is repaired or for shutdown.

20. Channel A shared return Rupture or plug Isolate affected return line A and utilize backup train return line B until train line to SNSWP A is repaired.

Deleted Per 2006 Update

21. Crossover valves Failure to close on Loss of A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent 1RN53B or 1RN54A Lake. channel separation when required.

When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54A are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.

(21 OCT 2010)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-5 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-5. Nominal Nuclear Service Water System Flow Rates in the Nuclear Service Water Pumphouse Individual Component Flow Component Rate (GPM)

GROUP I -- RECEIVE FLOW ONLY WHEN ITS RESPECTIVE RN PUMP IS IN OPERATION

1. RN Pump Motor Coolers (2 Flow Paths per Cooler) 40

2. RN Pump Motor Upper Bearing Oil Coolers 4 (nominal), 1 (minimum)

GROUP I TOTAL FLOW (Per Pump) 44 GPM GROUP II -- STRAINER BACKFLUSH FLOW

1. RN Strainers (1 Per Pump) 1000 (Periodic)

GROUP II Totals (for the entire pumphouse)

a. Periodic Up to 4000 GPM No of Pumps in No of Pumps x Group I Group II Periodic Flow Total Flow Required Operation Total Flow Total By RN Pumphouse 1 44 GPM Up to 4000 GPM Up to 4044 GPM 2 88 4000 4088 3 132 4000 4132 4 176 4000 4176 (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 1 of 16)

Table 9-6. Component Cooling System Heat Load and Flow Requirements Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Unit Startup Residual Heat Removal HXs 1 1 37.4 5000 1 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1 2 .443 50 2 Component Cooling Pumps 4 4 .216 120 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 2 .136 60 3 Containment Spray Pumps 0 - - 60 3 Safety Injection Pumps 0 2 - 80 4 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 0 2 - 140 4 Letdown HX 1 1 16.0 1000 Sealwater HX 1 1 1.98 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1 2 .620 80 3 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 1 1 18.5 3000 5 Recycle Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 6 Waste Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 6 Waste Gas Compressor Package 1 2 .134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 1 2 .07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0 1 - 225 Excess Letdown HX 1 1 5.18 250 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 7 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 2 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Reactor Coolant Pumps 4 4 4.80 824 8 Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 9 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 ASPSUs 2 2 .06 20 10 TOTALS 103.908 12915 Notes:

1. Discontinued after Reactor Coolant Pumps are started.

2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

5. Only one Fuel Pool Cooling HX is assumed to be in service. However, the Component Cooling System has sufficient capacity to place both KF HXs in service if necessary.

6. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.

7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

8. The Thermal Barrier, Upper and Lower Bearing Oil Coolers of each Reactor Coolant Pump receive cooling flow.

9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

(15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 3 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Normal Unit Operation Residual Heat Removal HXs 0 0 - -

Residual Heat Removal Pumps 0 2 - 50 1 Component Cooling Pumps 2 4 .108 120 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 0 2 - 60 2 Containment Spray Pumps 0 2 - 60 2 Safety Injection Pumps 0 2 - 80 3 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 0 2 - 140 3 Letdown HX 1 1 10.42 1000 4 Sealwater HX 1 1 1.98 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 10 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1 2 .620 80 2 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 1 1 18.5 3000 Recycle Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 5 Waste Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 5 Waste Gas Compressor Package 1 2 .134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 1 2 .07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1 1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 6 Reactor Coolant Pumps 4 4 4.80 824 7 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 4 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Post Accident Liquid Sampler Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 8 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 ASPSUs 2 2 .06 20 9 TOTALS 57.291 7665 Notes:

1. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

2. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers and oil coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.

5. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.

6. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

7. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.

8. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

9. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

10. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

Normal Unit Shutdown (Two trains of ND)

Residual Heat Removal HXs 2 2 234.36 10000 1 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2 2 .886 50 2 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 5 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Component Cooling Pumps 4 4 .216 120 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 2 .136 60 3 Containment Spray Pumps 0 2 - 60 3 Safety Injection Pumps 0 2 - 80 4 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 1 2 .577 140 4 Letdown HX 1 1 10.42 1000 5 Sealwater HX 1 1 1.604 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0 2 - 80 3 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0 0 - -

Recycle Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 6 Waste Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 6 Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1 2 .134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 1 2 .07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1 1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 7 Reactor Coolant Pumps 1 4 2.508 824 8 Post Accident Liquid Sampler Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 9 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 ASPSUs 2 2 .06 20 10 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 6 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes TOTALS 271. 570 14665 Notes:

1. Heat load determined as follows:

Core decay heat load at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 120.21 x 106 Btu/hr Reactor Coolant System sensible 100.50 x 106Btu/hr heat load (2.01 x 106 Btu/°F at 50°F/hr cooldown rate)

One Reactor Coolant Pump heat input 13.65 x 10 6 Btu/hr 234.36 x 10 6 Btu/hr

2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

5. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally, the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.

6. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.

7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

8. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.

9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

(15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 7 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

Normal Unit Shutdown at 20 Hours Residual Heat Removal HXs 2 2 74.75 10000 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2 2 .886 50 1 Component Cooling Pumps 4 4 .216 120 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 2 .136 60 2 Containment Spray Pumps 0 2 - 60 2 Safety Injection Pumps 0 2 - 80 3 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 1 2 .577 140 3 Letdown HX 1 1 10.42 1000 4 Sealwater HX 1 1 1.604 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 10 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0 2 - 80 2 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0 0 - -

Recycle Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 5 Waste Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 5 Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1 2 .134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 1 2 .07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1 1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 6 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 8 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Reactor Coolant Pumps 0 4 - 824 7 Post Accident Liquid Sampler Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 8 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 ASPSUs 2 2 0.06 20 9 TOTALS 109.452 14665 Notes:

1. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

2. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.

5. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.

6. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

7. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.

8. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

9. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

10. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

Unit Shutdown at 4 Hours (LOCA on Other Unit)

Residual Heat Removal HXs 1 1 133.86 5000 1 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 9 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1 2 .443 50 2 Component Cooling Pumps 2 4 .108 120 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1 2 .068 60 3 Containment Spray Pumps 0 2 - 60 3 Safety Injection Pumps 0 2 - 80 4 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 1 2 .577 140 4 Letdown HX 1 1 10.42 1000 5 Sealwater HX 1 1 1.604 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0 2 - 80 3 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0 0 - -

Recycle Evaporator Package 0 1 - 810 6 Waste Evaporator Package 0 1 - 810 6 Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1 2 .134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 1 2 .07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1 1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 7 Reactor Coolant Pumps 1 4 2.508 824 8 Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 9 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 10 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes ASPSUs 2 2 .06 20 10 TOTALS 152.413 9665 Notes:

1. Heat load determined as follows:

Core decay heat load at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 120.21 x 106 Btu/hr One Reactor Coolant Pump heat input 13.65 x 10 6 Btu/hr The cooldown will proceed slowly as the decay heat load 133.86 x 106 Btu/hr decreases.

2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

5. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally, the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.

6. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.

7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

8. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.

9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

(15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 11 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Refueling Residual Heat Removal HXs 2 2 42.97 10000 1 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2 2 .886 50 2 Component Cooling Pumps 4 4 .216 120 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 0 2 - 60 3 Containment Spray Pumps 0 2 - 60 3 Safety Injection Pumps 0 2 - 80 4 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 0 2 - 140 4 Letdown HX 0 1 - 1000 5 Sealwater HX 0 1 - 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 12 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1 2 .620 80 3 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 1 1 18.5 3000 6 Recycle Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 7 Waste Evaporator Package 1 1 9.019 810 7 Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1 2 .134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 1 2 .07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0 1 - 225 Excess Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 8 Reactor Coolant Pumps 0 4 - 824 9 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 12 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 10 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 ASPSUs 2 2 0.06 20 11 TOTALS 81.825 17665 Notes:

1. Heat load is core decay heat at 4 days after zero power, at which time transfer of fuel assemblies is expected to begin.

2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

5. 1000 GPM cooling flow would be expected if the control valve failed open. Normally, with no heat load the flow would tend towards zero.

6. One Fuel Pool Cooling HX is assumed for normal refueling. Flow should be blocked to nonessential equipment with no heat load if both Fuel Pool Cooling HXs are necessary.

7. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.

8. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

9. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.

10. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

11. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

12. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

(15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 13 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Engineered Safeguards (Safety Injection)

Residual Heat Removal HXs 0 2 - 10000 1 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2 2 .886 50 2 Component Cooling Pumps 4 4 .216 120 3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 2 .136 60 3 Containment Spray Pumps 2 2 .772 60 3 Safety Injection Pumps 2 2 1.132 80 4 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2 2 1.154 140 4 Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Sealwater HX 0 0 - -

Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0 0 - -

Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0 0 -

Recycle Evaporator Package 0 0 -

Waste Evaporator Package 0 0 -

Waste Gas Compressor Packages 0 0 -

Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 0 0 -

Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0 1 - 250 5 Excess Letdown HX 0 1 - 225 6 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 - 7 Reactor Coolant Pumps 0 4 - 824 8 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 14 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 9 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 ASPSUs 2 2 0.06 20 10 TOTALS 4.687 11845 Notes:

1. Cooling flow is supplied although there is no heat load on the Residual Heat Removal HXs during the safety injection mode of operation.

2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

5. The Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when cooling flow is automatically secured.

6. If the Excess Letdown HX is receiving cooling flow when the safety injection signal is received, it will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured.

7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

8. The Reactor Coolant Pumps receive cooling flow until the containment high-high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

Engineered Safeguard (Recirculation)

Residual Heat Removal HXs 2 2 95.03 10000 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 15 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2 2 .886 50 1 Component Cooling Pumps 4 4 .216 120 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 2 .136 60 2 Containment Spray Pumps 2 2 .772 60 2 Safety Injection Pumps 2 2 1.132 80 3 Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2 2 1.154 140 3 Letdown HX 0 0 - -

Sealwater HX 0 0 - -

Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0 0 - - 10 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0 0 - -

Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0 0 - -

Recycle Evaporator Package 0 0 - -

Waste Evaporator Package 0 0 - -

Waste Gas Compressor Packages 0 0 - -

Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack. 0 0 - -

Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0 0 - 0 4 Excess Letdown HX 0 0 - 0 5 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0 0 - 6 Reactor Coolant Pumps 0 0 - 0 7 Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1 1 0.331 10 8 Radiation Monitors 0 2 - 6 (15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 16 of 16)

Number Number Total Heat With Heat Receiving Load Total Flow Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Load Flow (Btu/Hr 106) (GPM) Notes ASPSUs 2 2 0.06 20 9 TOTALS 99.717 10546 Notes:

1. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.

2. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

3. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.

4. The Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when cooling flow is automatically secured.

5. If the Excess Letdown HX is receiving cooling flow when the safety injection signal is received, it will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured.

6. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).

7. The Reactor Coolant Pumps receive cooling flow until the containment high-high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.

8. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.

9. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.

10. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

(15 NOV 2007)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-7 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-7. Component Cooling System Valve Alignment for Various Modes of Operation Mode of Operation Valve Number 1 2 3-1 3-2 3-3 4 5-1 5-2 Figure Loc.

KC1A 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 C-6 KC3A 0 0 0 0 0 (2) (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 C-6 KC50A 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 K-7 KC230A 0 0 0 0 0 (2) (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 K-7 KC56A (4) X 0 0 (4) 0 (5,9) (5,9) CN-1573-2.0 KC18B 0 0 0 0 0 (2) (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 C-9 KC2B 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 C-9 KC53B 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 K-8 KC228B 0 0 0 0 0 (2) (1,3) (1,3) 9-35 K-8 KC81B (4) X 0 0 (4) 0 (5,9) (5,9) CN-1573.2.1 KC148 (4,6) (4) X X X (4,6) 9-37 G-11 KC155 (4,6) (4) X X X (4,6) 9-37 G-13 KC2251 0 0 0 0 0 0 9-41 G-8 KC2521 0 0 0 0 0 0 9-41 G-7 KC4631 0 0 0 0 0 0 9-41 B-2 1

KC477 0 0 0 0 0 0 9-41 F-4 KC320A 0 0 0 0 0 0 (7) (7) 9-38 B-10 KC332B 0 0 0 0 0 0 (7) (7) 9-38 E-2 KC333A 0 0 0 0 0 0 (7) (7) 9-38 G-2 KC305B 0 X X X X X (8) (8) 9-38 D-13 KC315B 0 X X X X X (8) (8) 9-38 L-13 KC338B 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) (3) 9-38 D-12 KC424B 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) (3) 9-38 L-5 KC425A 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) (3) 9-38 L-7 Note:

1. On Unit 1 only.

Nonmenclature: 0 - open X - closed

- - downstream of a closed valve (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-7 (Page 2 of 2)

Mode of Operation Valve Number 1 2 3-1 3-2 3-3 4 5-1 5-2 Figure Loc.

Valves listed in this table are isolation valves which are regularly manipulated align the system for its various modes of operation. All other isolation valves should remain in the position indicated on the flow diagrams except for changes required for maintenance, or emergency situations.

1. Closes on low-low FWST level following a S-signal (Safety Injection Signal).

2. Normally open, but closed when both fuel pool cooling HXs are used in refueling.

3. Closes on P-signal (High-High Containment Pressure Signal).

4. Valve may be open or closed, depending on which train (or heat exchanger) is in operation and which is serving as backup.

5. Opens on low-low FWST level following a S-signal (Safety Injection Signal).

6. Both fuel pool cooling HXs may be in operation. See Note 2.

7. Normally open, closes on T-signal (High Containment Pressure Signal).

8. Normally closed, closes on T-signal (High Containment Pressure Signal) if open.

9. Opens on P-Signal (High High Containment Pressure Signal).

This table contains nominal valve alignments based on projected component operation and selected worst case assumptions (such as maximum lake temperature). Actual valve alignments may differ based on actual plant conditions.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-8 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-8. Component Cooling System Component Design Data COMPONENT COOLING PUMPS Number per unit 4 Type Centrifugal Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 200 Design Flow, gpm 3760 Design Head, ft. 200 OEM Max. Tested Flow Rate, gpm 5700 Deleted Per 2006 Update Minimum Flow Rate (continuous), gpm 1100 NPSH Required At Design Flow, Ft. 13.7 Material of Construction Carbon Steel COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS Number per Unit 2 Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 200 Estimated UA, BTU/HR F (inhibited Admiralty) 6.82 x 106 Estimated UA, BTU/HR F (316SS) 6.38 x 106 Design Flow (Shell Side), LB/HR 3.242 x 106 Design Flow (Tube Side), LB/HR 5.000 x 106 Shell Side Inlet Temp., F 172 Shell Side Outlet Temp., F 110 Tube Side Inlet Temp., F 90 Tube Side Outlet Temp., F 130.4 Max. Pressure Loss, psi 15 Shell Side Fouling Factor .0005 Tube Side Fouling Factor .002 Shell Side Material Carbon Steel Tube Side Material (HXs 1B, 2A) Inhibited Admiralty Tube Side Material (HXs 1A, 2B) 316SS COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK Number per Unit 2 (24 APR 2006)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-8 (Page 2 of 2)

Total Volume per tank, gal 3925 Normal Water Volume per tank, gal 2500 Normal Pressure, psig 0 Design Pressure, psig 15 Design Temperature, F 200 Material of Construction 304 Stainless Steel COMPONENT COOLING DRAIN SUMP Number per Unit 1 Total Volume per sump, gal. 500 Design Temperature, F 200 Height of curbing, inches 6 COMPONENT COOLING DRAIN SUMP PUMPS Number per Unit 2 Type Vertical wet pit centrifugal Design Flow, gpm 50 Design Head, ft 115 Shutoff, ft 138 (24 APR 2006)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-9 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-9. Component Cooling System. Failure Analysis (Assuming Receipt of Safety Injection Signal)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

1. Component cooling water pump Rupture of pump casing By definition, the backup train of pumps start on signal. They provide 100% redundancy and are able to supply minimum engineered safety requirements.

2. Component cooling water pump Pump fails to start Same as #1.

3. Component cooling water pump Manual valve on a pump This is prevented by prestartup and operational suction line closed checks. Further, during normal operation each pump is checked on a periodic basis which should show that a valve was closed.

4. Component cooling water pump Stop valve on discharge line Stop valves are locked open and check valves are closed or check valve sticks checked open by prestartup and operational checks.

closed

5. Component cooling water pump Loss of normal electric power Normal power sources automatically switch to emergency diesel power. There are two emergency diesel- generators per unit, either of which are capable of supplying power for the operation of the necessary safeguard features & protection systems.

6. Component cooling heat exchanger Tube or shell rupture Backup train of pumps/heat exchanger function as required. Each heat exchanger is capable of supplying minimum engineered safety features heat transfer requirements. A tube rupture will cause a release of chromated water to the environment well within allowable limits.

A shell rupture will cause the spillage of one train of the system. Pressure, flow, and surge tank level alarms would indicate this failure.

7. Component cooling heat exchanger vent or drain Left Open This is prevented by prestartup and operational valve checks.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-9 (Page 2 of 2)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

8. Valves and piping Through-wall crack Isolate equipment supplied and start redundant equipment or isolate entire header and start equipment on redundant header. Any pipe crack will cause spillage of pot entially radioactive water within Auxiliary Building.

9. Component Cooling Surge Tank Through-wall crack Backup train of component cooling system functions as required. Surge tank failure would drain down only the channel affected, and even then, pump operation is assured with surge tank empty.

However, this channel is disabled as far as outleakage is concerned. Level alarm indicates such a failure.

10. Isolation Valve Train A Fails to Actuate on Safety Train B gives 100% redundancy.

Signal

11. Isolation Valve Train B Fails to Actuate on Safety Train A gives 100% redundancy.

Signal (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-10 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-10. Makeup Demineralized Water System Component Design Parameters MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER SUPPLY PUMPS Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Quantity 2 per Station Type Vertical In-Line Model 4 x 3 x 8 VOC Number of Stages One Design Flow 475 GPM Design TDH 215 FT Speed 3600 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 40 HP Minimum Continuous Flow 100 GPM Deleted per 2015 update MAKEUP DEMINERALIZERS Manufacturer IWT Quantity 2 per Station Type Mixed Bed Model NA Design Flow 475 GPM each Design Pressure 100 PSIG Design Temperature 150°F Pressure Drop @ Design Flow 21 PSI Anion Resin Volume 339 CU. FT.

Cation Resin Volume 154 CU. FT.

Deleted per 2015 update DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK Manufacturer FESCO Quantity 1 per Station Design Capacity 9,970 GAL.

Design Temperature 110°F Design Internal Pressure 60 PSIG Design External Pressure 0 PSIG Deleted per 2015 update (05 APR 2015)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-10 (Page 2 of 2)

DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK SUPPLY PUMPS Manufacturer Ingersoll - Rand Quantity 2 per Station Type Vertical In - Line Model 2 x 1 1/2 x 8 VOC Number of Stages One Design Flow 100 GPM Design TDH 130 FT Speed 3550 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 7.8 HP Minimum Continuous Flow 25 GPM Deleted per 2015 update MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER AIR COMPRESSOR Manufacturer Nash Quantity One per Station Type Liquid Ring Model CL - 701 Number of Stages One Design Capacity 620 SCFM Design Discharge Pressure 15 PSIG Motor Horsepower 50 HP Deleted per 2015 update (05 APR 2015)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-11 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-11. Filtered Water System and Drinking Water System Component Design Parameters Deleted per 2015 update FILTERED WATER BOOSTER PUMP Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Quantity Two per Station Type Centrifugal Model 3 x 2 x 8 VOC Number of Stages One Design Flow 210 GPM Design TDH 120 FT Speed 3550 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 15 HP Deleted per 2015 update (05 APR 2015)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-12 and 9-13 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-12. Deleted Per 1994 Update Table 9-13. Deleted Per 1994 Update (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-14 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-14. Condensate Storage System Design Parameters UPPER SURGE TANK DOME Quantity 1 per Unit Design Capacity 7570 Gal.

Design Temperature 212°F Design External Pressure 15 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 0 PSIG UPPER SURGE TANK Quantity 2 per Unit Design Capacity 42,500 Gal.

Design Temperature 212°F Design External Pressure 15 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 0 PSIG CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Quantity 1 per Unit Design Capacity 30,000 Gal.

Design Temperature 212°F Design External Pressure 4 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 4 PSIG AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS Quantity 1 per Unit Design Capacity 42,500 Gal.

Design Temperature 135°F Design External Pressure 0 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 0 PSIG CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK PUMPS Manufacturer Ingersoll - Rand Quantity 2 per Unit Type Vertical In-Line Model 3x7W Number of Stages One Design Flow 300 GPM Design Head 125 FT (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-14 (Page 2 of 2)

Speed 3500 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 14.8 HP (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-15 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-15. Refueling Water System Component Design Data Refueling Water Storage Tank Number per unit 1 Internal Volume, gallons 395,000 Technical Specification minimum contained Volume, gallons 377,537 Design pressure, internal ATM Normal Operating pressure, internal ATM Design pressure, external, psig 0.20 Vent size(s) in (1)-6 (1)-12 Design temperature, F 120 Operating temperature F (Water-min) 70 Type Vertical, field constructed Material of construction Stainless steel Outside diameter, ft-in 40'-0 7/16" Straight side height, ft-in 42' - 6 1/4" Number of heaters 4 Capacity of each heater, Kw 10-20-30 (staged)

Insulation sides only Boron concentration ppm B 2000 to 4000 Refueling Water Pumps Number per unit 1 Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 205 Design Temperature, F 140 Material of construction Stainless Steel Design flow, gpm Condition 1: 310 Condition 2: 200 Design head, ft Condition 1: 220 Condition 2: 305 Refueling Water Pump Strainer Number per unit 1 Type Basket (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-15 (Page 2 of 2)

Design pressure, psig 70 Design temperature, F 140 Design flow, gpm 310 Pressure loss at design flow Negligible Strainer openings, inches 1/4 Refueling Water Recirculation Pumps Number per unit 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 75 Design temperature, F 120 Material of construction Stainless Steel Design flow, gpm 50 Design head, ft 35 (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-16 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-16. Conventional Low Pressure Service Water System Component Design Parameters CONVENTIONAL LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER PUMPS Manufacturer Johnston Quantity 3 Type Vertical Model 48 CMC Number of Stages 1 Design Flow 38,000 GPM Design Head 160 Ft. (min.)

Speed 710 RPM Design Brake 1,900 HP Horsepower Minimum 19,000 GPM Continuous Flow CONVENTIONAL LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER STRAINERS Manufacturer R. P. Adams Quantity 2 per station Type Self-cleaning Simplex Model 42" VDWS-146 Design Flow 33,000 GPM Design Pressure 125 PSIG Design Temperature 88°F Strainer Medium 1/8" mesh Maximum Pressure 1.8 PSI Drop (24 APR 2006)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 1 of 4)

Table 9-17. Compressed Air Systems Component Design Parameters INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS (INCLUDES AFTERCOOLERS)

Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Quantity 3 per station Type Centrifugal Model 1ACII15M2 Number of Stages 2 Design Capacity 1455 ICFM Design Discharge Pressure 105 psig Design Brake Horsepower 350 HP INSTRUMENT AIR DESICCANT DRYER Manufacturer Pneumatic Products Corp. (PPC)

Quantity 2 per Station Type Heatless, desiccant, air-purge Model 2500 CHA Design Capacity 2000 ICFM Design Dew Point -40°F @ Design Conditions Design Pressure 150 PSIG Design Inlet Temperature 110°F Design Ambient Temperature 110°F INSTRUMENT AIR RECEIVERS Manufacturers IPC Quantity 3 per Station Volume 60 " x 16 '

Design Pressure 15 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F MAINSTREAM ISOLATION VALVE AIR TANKS Manufacturer RECO Quantity 4 per Unit Volume 8 ft. 3 Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 200°F INSTRUMENT AIR PREFILTERS AND AFTER-FILTERS (17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 2 of 4)

Manufacturer Pneumatic Products Corp. (PPC)

Quantity 5 per Station Type Particulate Filter Model PCC124004G65 (2 Prefilters, 2 Afterfilters)

PCS124004G65 (1 Prefilter)

Design Flow 2400 SCFM Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F Filter Medium 1 Micron Pressure Drop @ Design Flow 2 PSI Clean PORTABLE DIESEL COMPRESSOR DRYER Manfacturer Pure-Aire Quantity 1 per Station Type Regenerative Model PAR 1200 Design Capacity 1200 CFM Design Dewpoint -40°F Design Pressure 100 PSIG Design Ambient Temperature 100°F PORTABLE DIESEL COMPRESSOR AFTERFILTER Manufacturer Pure-Aire Quantity 1 per Station Type Coalescing Model PF-510 Design Flow 1600 CFM Design Pressure 100 PSIG Design Temperature 250°F Filter Medium 0.3 micron STATION AIR COMPRESSORS Manufacturer Sullair Quantity 2 per Station Type Screw Model 20-150L (17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 3 of 4)

Number of Stages One Design Capacity 750 CFM Design Discharge Pressure 100 PSIG Design Brake Horsepower 150 HP STATION AIR COMPRESSOR AFTERCOOLERS AND MOISTURE SEPARATORS Manufacturer R. P. Adams Quantity 2 per Station Type Shell and Tube Model SAF-SL-53 & 6" CYC Design Capacity 750 CFM Design Shell Side Pressuree 115 PSIG Design Shell Side Pressure 125 PSIG Design Temperature 240°F STATION TO INSTRUMENT AIR OIL FILTERS Manufacturer Zurn Quantity 2 per Station Type Coalescing Oil Filter Model 77107 Design Flow 750 CFM Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F Filter Medium 0.3 Micron Pressure Drop @ Design Flow 2 PSI Clean STATION AIR RECEIVERS Manufacturer IPC Quantity 2 per Station Volume 60" x 16' Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F BREATHING AIR COMPRESSORS Manufacturer Sullair Quantity 2 per Station Type Rotary Screw (17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 4 of 4)

Model RAS-75 Number of Stages One Design Capacity 330 CFM Design Discharge Pressure 115 PSIG Design Brake Horsepower 75 HP BREATHING AIR RECEIVERS Manufacturer NASH Quantity 2 per Station Volume 49.5 ft3 Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 120°F AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL VALVES AIR TANKS Manufacturer Tioga (Unit 1) Ward (Unit 2)

Quantity 8 per Unit Volume 15 ft.3 Design Pressure 115 psig Design Temperature 110°F (17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-18 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-18. Nuclear Sampling System Sample Locations and Data Design Pressure, Sampled System Sample Location PSIA Design Temperature°F Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Liquid 2500 680 Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Steam 2500 680 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Coolant Hotleg Loop A 2500 650 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Coolant Hotleg Loop C 2500 650 Residual Heat Removal RHR Pump A Discharge 615 400 System Residual Heat Removal RHR Pump B Discharge 615 400 System Chemical Volume Control Volume Control Tank Gas Space 90 200 System Safety Injection System Accumulator A 715 300 Safety Injection System Accumulator B 715 300 Safety Injection System Accumulator C 715 300 Safety Injection System Accumulator D 715 300 Chemical Volume Control Letdown Hx. Outlet 315 175 System Chemical Volume Control Mixed Bed Demin. Outlet 315 175 System Chemical Volume Contol Cation Bed Demin. Outlet 315 175 System Chemical Volume Control Volume Control Tank Outlet 90 175 System Chemical Volume Control Boric Acid Blender Outlet 165 250 System Boron Thermal Boron Thermal Reg. Demin. 315 175 Regeneration System Outlet Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Demin. A 165 200 Outlet Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Demin. B 165 200 Outlet Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Pump Outlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Cond. Demin. 165 200 Outlet Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Demin. Inlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System Reactor Makeup Water Storage 50 120 (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-18 (Page 2 of 2)

Design Pressure, Sampled System Sample Location PSIA Design Temperature°F Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Evap. Feed Tank Pump 165 200 Outlet Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Drain Tank Pump Outlet 165 200 1

Liquid Radwaste System Waste Evap. Dist. Cooler Outlet 165 200 Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Monitor Tank Pump Outlet 165 200 Spent Fuel Cooling System Spent Fuel Pool 165 200 Spent Fuel Cooling Fuel Pool Cooling Post Filter 215 200 Refueling Water System Refueling Water Storage Tank 65 114 Recirculation Solid Radwaste System1 Spent Resin Sluice Filter 165 200 Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator Blowdown A 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator Blowdown B 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator Blowdown C 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator Blowdown D 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator A Upper Shell 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator BUpper Shell 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator C Upper Shell 1200 600 System Steam Generator Blowdown Steam Generator D Upper Shell 2300 600 System Note:

1. Shared system, receives from both units (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-19 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-19. Temperature and Pressure Reduction for Samples in the Conventional Systems Sample Panel Sample Rough Cooling Pressure Regulated Final Cooling S. G. A Blowdown Sample X X S. G. B Blowdown Sample X X S. G. C Blowdown Sample X X S. G. D Blowdown Sample X X Final Feedwater Sample X X X Hotwell Pump Discharge X X Polish Demineralizer Main X X Effluent Sample Heater Drain C1 H. P. Sample X X X Heater Drain C2 H. P. Sample X X X Upper Surge Tank Sample X Main Steam Sample A X X X Main Steam Sample B X X X Main Steam Sample C X X X Main Steam Sample D X X X Moisture Separator Reheater Drain X X X Tank (A, B, C, & D)

First Stage Reheater Drain (A, B, X X X C, & D)

Second Stage Reheater Drain (A, X X X B, C, & D)

Low Pressure Reheater Drain X X X (A/B, C/D)

Steam Generator Blowdown X X X Demineralizer Influent Steam Generator Blowdown X X X Demineralizer Effluent (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-20 (Page 1 of 3)

Table 9-20. Types of Analyses Provided in the Conventional Sampling Lab Grab Specific Cation Sulfate, Amine, Samples Sample Conductivity Conductivity Sodium PH Chloride Oxygen Hydrazine Patch Panel S.G. A Blowdown X X X X X X Sample S.G. B Blowdown X X X X X X Sample S.G. C Blowdown X X X X X X Sample S.G. D Blowdown X X X X X X Sample Final Feedwater X X X X X X X X X Sample Hotwell Pump X X X X X X Discharge Sample Polish Demineralizer X X X Main Influent Sample Polish Demineralizer X X X X Main Effluent Sample Heater Drain C1 H. X X P. Sample Heater Drain C2 H. X X P. Sample Upper Surge Tank X Sample Main Steam Sample X X X X A

Main Steam Sample X X X X (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-20 (Page 2 of 3)

Grab Specific Cation Sulfate, Amine, Samples Sample Conductivity Conductivity Sodium PH Chloride Oxygen Hydrazine Patch Panel B

Main Steam Sample X X X X C

Main Steam Sample X X X X D

Moisture Separator X X Reheater Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)

First Stage Reheater X X Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)

Second Stage X X Reheater Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)

Low Pressure X X Turbine Crossover (A/B, C/D)

Steam Generator X X X X X X Blowdown Demineralizer Effluent Steam Generator X X X X X Blowdown Demineralizer Influent Polish Demineralizer X X Vessel (A, B, C, D, E) Effluent Sample (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-20 (Page 3 of 3)

Grab Specific Cation Sulfate, Amine, Samples Sample Conductivity Conductivity Sodium PH Chloride Oxygen Hydrazine Patch Panel (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-21 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-21. Chemical and Volume Control System Design Parameters General Seal water supply flow rate, for four reactor coolant pumps, 32 nominal, gpm Seal water return flow rate, for four reactor coolant pumps, 12 nominal, gpm Letdown flow:

Normal, gpm 75 Maximum, gpm1 120 Charging flow (excludes seal water):

Normal, gpm 55 Maximum, gpm2 100 Temperature of letdown reactor coolant entering system, °F 557 Temperature of charging flow directed to Reactor Coolant 516 System, °F Temperature of effluent directed to Boron Recycle System, °F 115 Centrifugal charging pump bypass flow (each), gpm 60 Amount of 4% boric acid solution required to meet cold Controlled by COLR shutdown requirements shortly after full power operation Unuseable volume at bottom of Boric Acid Tank (21" above 10,846 bottom of tank), gallons Maximum pressurization required for hydrostatic testing of 3,107 Reactor Coolant System, psig Notes:

1. 185 gpm is the maximum allowable flow when RHR letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.

2. 180 gpm is the maximum allowable flow when RHR letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 1 of 8)

Table 9-22. CVCS Principal Component Data Summary Centrifugal Charging Pumps Number 2 Design pressure, psig 2800 Design temperature, °F 300 Design flow, gpm 150 Design head, ft 5800 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel 180-gpm reactor coolant charging flow is permissible from the centrifugal charging pumps when residual heat removal system letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is

<200°F.

Boric Acid Transfer Pump Number 2 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 75 Design head, ft 235 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Boric Acid Batching Tank Pump Number 1 Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature °F 200 Design flow, gpm 75 Design head, ft 12 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Boric Acid Recirculation Pump Number 1 Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, °F 200 Design Flow, gpm 120 Design Head, ft 198 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 2 of 8)

Regenerative Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design 11.0 x 106 conditions, BTU/hr Shell Side Design Pressure, psig 2485 Design temperature, °F 650 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Tube Side Design pressure, psig 2735 Design temperature, °F 650 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Shell Side (Letdown)

Flow, lb/hr 37,200 Inlet temperature, °F 560 Outlet temperature, °F 290 Tube Side (Charging)

Flow, lb/hr 27,300 Inlet temperature, °F 130 Outlet temperature, °F 516 180-gpm reactor coolant charging flow is permissible through the regenerative heat exchanger (tube side) when residual heat removal system letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.

Letdown Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at 16.0 X 106 design conditions, BTU/hr Shell Side Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 250 Fluid Component Cooling Water (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 3 of 8)

Material Carbon Steel Tube Side Design pressure, psig 600 Design temperature, °F 400 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Shell Side Design Normal Flow, lb/hr 498,000 200,000 Inlet temperature, °F 105 105 Outlet temperature, °F 137 149 Tube Side (Letdown)

Flow, lb/hr 59,500 37,200 Inlet temperature, °F 380 290 Outlet temperature, °F 115 115 185-gpm reactor coolant letdown flow from the residual heat removal system is permissible through the letdown heat exchanger when the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.

Seal Water Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design 1.98 X 106 (Alt.1)1 1.604 X106 conditions, BTU/hr Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure, psig 150 150 Design temperature, °F 250 250 Design flow, lb/hr 125,000 48,400 66,0001 Inlet temperature, °F 105 155.9 1391 Outlet temperature, °F 121 115 Fluid Component Cooling Water Borated Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat Transfer rate at design 5.18 x 106 conditions, BTU/hr Shell Side Tube Side Design Pressure, psig 150 2485 (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 4 of 8)

Design Temperature, °F 250 650 Design Flow, lb/hr 125,000 12,500 Inlet temperature, °F 105 560 Outlet temperature, °F 147 165 Fluid Component Cooling Water Borated Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel Volume Control Tank Number 1 Volume, ft3 400 Design pressure, psig 75 Design temperature, °F 250 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Boric Acid Tanks Number 1 Volume, gal. 46,000 Design Pressure, psig Atmospheric Design Temperature 200° Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Batching Tank Number 1 Capacity, gal. 800 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, °F 300 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Chemical Mixing Tank Number 1 Capacity, gal. 5 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 200 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 5 of 8)

Mixed Bed Demineralizers Number 2 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 120 Resin volume, each, ft3 30 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel 150-gpm reactor coolant letdown flow from the residual heat removal system is permissible through the mixed bed demineralizer when the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.

Cation Bed Demineralizers Number 1 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 75 Resin volume, ft3 20 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Resin Fill Tank Number 1 3

Volume, ft 8 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, °F 200 Normal operating temperature Ambient Material of construction Austenitic SS Chemical Mixing Tank Orifice Number 1 Design temperature, °F 200 Design pressure, psig 150 Operating temperature, °F Ambient Design flow, gpm 2 Design differential pressure, psi 50 Material of Construction Austenitic SS Boric Acid Pump Orifice (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 6 of 8)

Number 1 Design temperature, °F 200 Design pressure, psig 150 Operating temperature, °F 75 Design flow, gpm 10 Reactor Coolant Filters Number 2 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel 185 gpm reactor coolant letdown flow from the residual heat removal system is permissible through the Reactor Coolant Filters when the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.

Reciprocating Charging Pump Accumulators Note: Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 was abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00 Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 was abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00 Suction Discharge Number 1 1 Design temperature, °F 175 250 Normal operating 115 115 temperature Design pressure, psig 220 2735 Capacity, gallons 1.0 2.0 Boric Acid Blender Number 1 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 200 Material of Construction Austenitic SS Deleted row(s) Per 2003 Update Cation Bed Demineralizer Resin Strainer (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 7 of 8)

Number 1 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 175 Design flow rate, gpm 75 Pressure drop at design flow, psig 1 Retention screen size, inches 0.012 Material of Construction SS Seal Water Injection Filters Number 2 Design pressure, psig 2735 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 80 Particle retention 98% of 5 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel Seal Water Return Filter Number 1 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel Batching Tank Agitator Number 1 Service Continuous Agitator mounting Enter at angle (8° - 10°)

through top head of tank Material of construction Austenitic SS Fluid data (Design Basis) 12 wt. percent boric Fluid handled acid in water (Normal: 4 wt. percent)

Specific gravity (165°F) 1.025 (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 8 of 8)

Viscosity (165°F), cp 1.0 Temperature, °F 90-165 Boric Acid Filter Number 1 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel Letdown Orifice 45 gpm 75 gpm Number 1 1 Design flow, lb/hr 22,230 37,050 Differential pressure at 1700 1700 design flow, psid Design pressure, psig 2,485 2,485 Design temperature, °F 650 650 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel No. 1 Seal Bypass Orifices Number 1/Loop (Total 4)

Design flow, gpm 1 Differential pressure at 300 design flow, psig Design pressure, psig 2485 Design temperature, °F 250 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Note:

1. Includes max. NC Pump #1 seal leakage of 48 gpm.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 1 of 32)

Table 9-23. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Chemical and Volume Control System. Active Components - Normal Plant Operation and Load Follow Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

1. Air a. Fails a. Charging and Volume a. Failure reduces redundancy a. Valve position a. Valve is designed to fail operate open. Control - letdown of providing letdown flow indication (open to closed and wired so that d gate flow. isolation to protect PZR closed position electrical solenoid of the valve heaters from uncovering at change) at CB. operator is energized to NV2A low water level in PZR. No open the valve. Solenoid (NV1A effect on system operation. is de-energized to close analogo Alternate isolation valve the valve upon the us) (NV-1A) provides backup generation of a low level letdown flow isolation. PZR control signal. The Heaters automatically valve is electrically deenergize on low level. interlocked with the level letdown orifice isolation valves and may not be opened manually from the CB if any of these valves are at an open position.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure blocks normal b. Valve position closed Volume Control - letdown flow to VCT. indication (closed letdown flow. Minimum letdown flow to open position requirements for borations change) at CB; of RCS to hot standby letdown flow concentration level may be temperature met by establishing letdown indications flow through alternate (NVP5110 and excess letdown flow path. NVP5590) at CB; letdown flow-pressure indication (NVP5570) at CB; letdown flow indication (NVP5530) at CB; and VCT level indication (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 2 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks If the alternate excess letdown flow path to VCT is not available due to common mode failure (loss of instrument air supply) affecting the opening operation of isolation valves in each flow path, the plant operator can borate the RCS to a hot standby concentration level without letdown flow by taking advantage of the steam space available in the PZR.

2. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure prevents a. Valve position a. Valve is of the similar diaphra open Volume Control - isolation of normal indication (open to design as that stated for gm letdown flow. letdown flow through closed position item #1. Solenoid is de-operate regenerative heat change) at CB. energized to close the d gate exchanger when valve upon the generation valve bringing the reactor to of an ESF T signal, the NV10A a cold shutdown generation of letdown (NV13 condition after the isolation valves (NV2A A and RHRS is placed into and NV1A) upstream of NV11A operation. No effect the regenerative heat analogo on hot standby exchanger.

us) operation.

Containment isolation valve (NV15B) may be remotely closed from the CB to isolate letdown flow through the heat exchanger.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 3 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure blocks normal b. Same methods of closed. Volume Control - letdown flow to VCT. detection as those letdown flow. Normal letdown flow stated for item #1, to VCT may be failure mode Fails maintained by opening closed.

alternate letdown orifice isolation valve NV11A. Minimum letdown flow requirements for boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level may be met by opening letdown orifice isolation valves NV13A or NV11A. If common mode failure (loss of instrument air) prevents opening of these valves and also prevents establishing alternate flow through excess letdown flow path, plant operator can borate the RCS to a hot standby concentration level without letdown flow by taking advantage of steam space available in PZR.

3. Motor a. Fails a. Charging and a. Same effect on system a. Same methods of a. Motor operator is operate closed. Volume Control operation as that stated detection as those energized to close the d globe letdown flow. for item #1, failure stated for item #1, valve upon the generation valve mode Fails closed. failure mode Fails of an ESF "T" signal.

NV15B closed. In addition, close position group monitoring light at CB.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 4 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure has no effect b. Valve position open. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (open to letdown flow. during normal plant closed position operation and load change) at CB.

follow. However, under accidents conditions requiring containment isolation, failure reduces the redundancy of providing isolation of normal letdown line.

4. Deleted per 1994 update.

5. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure prevents a. Letdown heat 1. Valve is designed fail "open" diaphra open Volume Control - control of pressure to exchanger tube and is electrically wired so the gm letdown flow. prevent flashing of discharge flow electrical solenoid of the air operate letdown flow in indication diaphragm operator is d globe letdown heat (NVP5530) and energized to close valve.

valve exchanger and also high flow alarm at NV148 allows high pressure CB; temperature fluid to mixed bed indication demineralizers. Relief (NVP5590) and valve (NV151) opens high temperature in demineralizer line alarm at CB; and to release pressure to pressure indication VCT and valve (NVP5570) at CB.

(NV153A) changes position to divert flow to VCT. Boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level is possible with valve failing open.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 5 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Same effect on system b. Letdown heat 2. As a design transient the closed Volume Control - operation as that for exchanger letdown heat exchanger is letdown flow. item #1, failure mode discharge flow designed for complete loss of Fail closed. indication letdown flow.

(NVP5530), and pressure indication (NVP5570) and high pressure alarm at CB.

6. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Letdown flow a. Valve position 1. Electrical solenoid of air diaphra open for Volume Control - bypassed from flowing indication (VC diaphragm operatore is gm flow letdown flow. to mixed bed Tank) at CB and electrically wired so that operate only to demineralizers. RCS activity level solenoid is energized to open d VCT. Boration of RCS to hot when sampling valve flow to the mixed bed threewa standby concentration letdown flow. demineralizers. Valve opens y valve level is possible with for flow to VCT on High NV153 valve failing open for Letdown Temp.

A. flow only to VCT.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Continuous letdown to b. Valve position 2. Technical specifications open for Volume Control - mixed bed indication provide a limit on RCS activity.

flow letdown flow. demineralizers. Failure (Demin.) at CB.

only to prevents automatic mixed isolation of mixed bed bed demineralizers under deminera fault condition of high lizer. letdown flow temperatures. These systems may be manually isolated using local valves (NV353 and NV368) at mixed bed demineralizers.

Boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level is possible with valve failing open for flow only to demineralizer.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 6 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

7. Deleted per 1997 update.

8. Deleted per 2000 update.

9. Deleted per 2000 update.

10. Relief a. Fails a. Charging and a. Letdown flow is a. High temperature 1. Radioactive fluid contained.

valve open. Volume Control - relieved to pressurizer relief line NV14 letdown flow. relief tank. Failure indication and inhibits use of alarm at CB and demineralizers for VCT level reactor coolant indication purification. Normal (NVP5761) and letdown line can be low level alarm at isolated and minimum CB.

letdown flow requirements for hot standby may be met by establishing letdown flow through alternate excess letdown flow path.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 7 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

11. Relief a. Fails a. Charging and a. Letdown flow is a. RCS activity level 1. Radioactive fluid contained.

valve open. Volume Control - relieved to VCT. when sampling NV151 letdown flow. Failure inhibits use of letdown flow.

demineralizers for reactor coolant purification. Normal letdown line can be isolated and minimum letdown flow requirement for hot standby may be met by establishing flow through alternate excess letdown flow path.

12. Deleted per 1997 update.

13. Deleted per 2000 update.

14. Deleted per 2000 update.

15. Deleted per 2000 update.

16. Deleted per 2000 update.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 8 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

17. Deleted per 2000 update.

18. Deleted per 2000 update.

19. Deleted per 2000 update.

20. Deleted per 2000 update.

21. Deleted per 2000 update.

22. Deleted per 2000 update.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 9 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

23. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure inhibits use of a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail "closed" diaphra closed. Volume Control - the excess letdown indication (closed and is electrically wired so that gm letdown flow. fluid system of the to open position the electrical solenoid of the air operate CVCS as an alternate change) at CB and diaphragm operator is d globe system that may be excess letdown energized to open valve.

valve used for letdown flow heat exchanger NV123 control during normal outlet pressure B plant operation and indication (NV122 inhibits use of the (NVP5280) and B excess letdown system temperature analogo to control water level indication us) in the pressurizer of (NVP5090) at CB.

the RCS during final stage of plant startup due to flow blockage.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure reduces b. Valve position 2. If normal letdown and excess open. Volume Control - redundancy of indication (open to letdown flow is not available letdown flow. providing excess closed position for hot standby operations, letdown flow isolation change) at CB. plant operator can borate RCS during normal plant to hot standby concentration operation and for plant using steam space available in startup. No effect on PZR.

system operation.

Alternate isolation valve (NV122B) closes to provide backup flow isolation of excess letdown line.

24. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Same effect on system a. Same methods of 1. Same remarks as those stated diaphra closed. Volume Control - operation as stated for detection as those above for item #23.

gm letdown flow. item #23, failure mode stated for item #23, operate Fails closed. failure mode Fails d globe closed except for valve valve position NV124 indication at CB.

B (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 10 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure prevents b. Excess letdown open. Volume Control - manual adjustment at heat exchanger letdown flow. CB of RCS system outlet pressure pressure downstream indication of excess letdown heat (NVP5280) at CB, exchanger to a low and seal water pressure consistent return flow with No. 1 seal leakoff recordings backpressure (NVCR5140) and requirements. When low flow alarm at using excess letdown CB.

system failure leads to a decrease in seal water pump shaft flow for cooling pump bearings.

25. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. No automatic makeup a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail diaphra closed. Volume Control - of seal water to seal indication (closed "closed" and is electrically gm seal water flow. standpipe that services to open position wired so that the electrical operate No. 3 seal of RC pump change) and low solenoid of the air d plug 1A. No effect on standpipe level diaphragm operator is valve operation to bring the alarm at CB. energized to open valve.

NV102 plant to hot standby A condition.

(NV107 B,

NV112 A, and NV117 B

analogo us)

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 11 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Overfill of seal water b. Valve position 2. Low level standpipe alarm open. Volume Control - standpipe and indication (open to conservatively set to allow RC seal water flow. dumping of reactor closed position pump operation without a makeup water to change) and high complete loss of seal water containment sump standpipe level from being injected to No. 3 during automatic alarm at CB. seal after sounding of alarm.

makeup of water for No. 3 seal of RC pump 1A. No effect on operations to bring reactor hot standby condition.

26. Relief e. Fails a. Charging and a. RC pump seal water a. Decrease in VCT 1. The capacity of the relief valve valve open. Volume Control - return flow and excess level causing equals maximum flow from NV87 seal water flow. letdown flow bypassed RMCS of CVCS to four RC pump seals flow.

to PZR relief tank of operate.

RCS. Failure inhibits use of the excess letdown fluid system of the CVCS as an alternate system that may be used for letdown flow control during normal plant operation and inhibits use of excess letdown system to control water level in the PZR of the RCS during final stage of a plant startup.

1. Radioactive fluid contained.

2. Same as remark #2 noted for item #23.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 12 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

27. Motor a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect a. Valve position 1. Valve in normally at a full operate open. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (open to open position and motor d gate seal water flow and during normal plant closed position operator is energized to valve excess letdown operation and load change) at CB. close the valve upon the NV89A flow. follow. However, generation of an ESF T (NV91 under accident signal.

B conditions requiring analogo containment isolation us) failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of seal water flow and excess letdown flow.

b. Fails b. Charging and a. RC pump seal water b. Valve position 2. If normal letdown and closed. Volume Control - return flow and excess indication (closed excess letdown flow is not seal water flow and letdown flow blocked. to open position available for hot standby excess letdown Failure inhibits use of change) at CB; operation, plant operator flow. the excess letdown group monitoring can borate RCS to hot fluid system of the light and alarm at standby concentration CVCS as an alternate CB; and seal water using steam space system that may be return flow available in PZR.

used for letdown flow recordings control during normal (NVCR5140) and plant operation and low seal water degrades cooling return flow alarm capability of seal at CB.

water in cooling RC pump bearings.

28. Motor a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect a. Valve position 1. Valve is normally at a full open operate open. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (open to position and motor operator is d gate charging flow. during normal plant closed position energized to close the valve valve operation and load change) at CB. upon the generation of a Safety NV314 follow. However, Injection S signal.

B under accident (NV312 condition requiring A isolation of charging analogo line, failure reduces us) redundancy of providing isolation of normal charging flow.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 13 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure inhibits use of b. Valve position closed. Volume Control M normal charging line indication (closed charging flow. to RCS for boration, to open position dilution, and coolant change) and group makeup operations. monitoring light Seal water injection (valve closed) at path remains available CB; letdown for boration of RCS to temperature a hot standby indication concentration level (NVP5110) and and makeup of coolant high temperature during operations to alarm at CB; bring the reactor to hot charging flow standby condition. temperature indication (NVP5100) at CB; seal water flow pressure indication (NVP5620) at CB; VCT level indication (NVP5761) and high level alarm at CB.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 14 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

29. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure prevents a. Seal water flow 1. Valve is designed fail "open" diaphra open. Volume Control - manual adjustment at pressure indication and is electrically wired so the gm charging flow and CB of seal water flow (NVP5620) at CB; electrical solenoid of the air operate seal water flow. through the control of seal water return diaphragm operator is d globe back pressure in recordings energized to close valve.

valve charging header (NVCR5140); and NV309 resulting in a reduction low seal water of flow to RC pump return flow alarm seals leading to a at CB.

reduction in flow to RCS via labyrinth seals and pump shaft flow for cooling pump bearings. Boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and makeup of coolant during operations to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible through normal charging flow path.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Same effect on system b. Same method of closed. Volume Control - operation as that stated detection as those charging flow. for item #28, failure stated above for mode "Fails closed". item #28, failure mode "Fails closed".

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 15 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

30. Motor a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect a. Valve position operate open. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (open to d globe charging flow and during normal plant closed position valve seal water flow. operation and load change) at CB.

NV203 follow. However, A under accident (NV202 condition requiring B isolation of centrifugal analogo charging pump us) miniflow line, failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of miniflow to suction of pumps via seal water heat exchanger.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure blocks b. Valve position closed. Volume Control - miniflow to VCT via indication (closed charging flow and seal water heat to open position seal water flow. exchanger. Normal change) at CB; charging flow and seal group monitoring water flow prevents light (valve closed) deadheading of pumps and alarm at CB; when used. Boration and charging and of RCS to a hot seal water flow standby concentration indication level and makeup of (NVP5630) and coolant during high flow alarm at operations to bring CB.

reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 16 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

31. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail "open" diaphra open. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (open to and is electrically wired so the gm charging flow during normal plant closed position electrical solenoid of the air operate operation, load follow change) at CB. diaphragm operator is d gate and hot standby energized to close valve.

valve operation. Valve is NV32B used during cold shutdown operation to isolate normal charging line when using the auxiliary spray during the cooldown of the pressurizer. Cold shutdown of reactor is still possible, however, time for cooling down PZR will be extended.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure blocks normal b. Valve position closed. Volume Control - charging flow to the indication (closed charging flow. RCS. No effect on to open position CVCS operations change) at CB; during normal plant charging flow operation, load follow indication or hot standby (NVP5100) at CB; operation. Plant regenerative heat operator can maintain exchanger shell charging flow by side exit establishing flow temperature through alternate indication charging path by (NVP5110) and opening of isolation high temperature valve (NV39A). alarm at CB; and charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and low flow alarm at CB.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 17 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

32. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure reduces a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail "open" diaphra closed. Volume Control - redundancy of indication (closed and is electrically wired so the gm charging flow. charging flow paths to to open position electrical solenoid of the air operate RCS. No effect on change) at CB. diaphragm operator is d gate CVCS operations energized to close valve.

valve during normal plant NV39A operation, load follow, or hot standby operation. Normal charging flow path remains available for charging flow.

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Same effect on system b. Valve position open. Volume Control - operation and indication (open to charging flow. shutdown as that closed position stated above for item change) at CB.

1. 31, failure mode "Fails open" if alternate charging line is in use.

33. Motor a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure results in a. Valve position operate open. Volume Control - inadvertent operation indication (open to d globe charging flow. of auxiliary spray that closed position valve results in a reduction change) at CB and NV37A of PZR pressure PZR pressure during normal plant recording operation and load (NCCR5160) and follow. PZR heaters low pressure alarm operate to maintain at CB.

required PZR pressure.

Boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and makeup of coolant during operation to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 18 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure has no effect b. Valve position closed. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (closed charging flow. during normal plant to open position operation, load follow change) at CB.

and hot standby operation. Valve may be used during cold shutdown operation to activate auxiliary spray for cooling down the pressurizer after operation of RHRS.

34. Relief a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure results in a a. Local pressure 1. Radioactive fluid contained.

Valve open. Volume Control - portion of seal water indication NV205 charging flow. return flow and (NVPG5550 and centrifugal charging NVPG5560) in pump miniflow being discharge line of bypassed to VCT. centrifugal Boration of RCS to a charging pumps.

hot standby concentration level and maekup of coolant during operations to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.

35. Relief a. Fails a. Charging and a. No effect on normal a. Local pressure Valve open. Volume Control - plant operation, load indication NV305 charging flow and follow or bringing (NVPG5540) in seal water flow. reactor to hot standby discharge line of condition. constant displacement pump.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 19 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

2. Radioactive fluid contained.

3. Valve 1NV305 has been gagged closed and 1NVPG5540 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Valve 2NV305 has been gagged closed and 2NVPG5540 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

36. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure reduces a. Charging and seal 1. Valve is designed fail "open" diaphra open. Volume Control - redundancy of water flow and is electrically wired so the gm charging flow and providing charging indication electrical solenoid of the air operate seal water flow. and seal water flow to (NVP5630) and diaphragm operator is d globe RCS. No effect on high flow alarm at energized to close valve.

valve normal plant CB, and PZR level NV294 operation, load follow, recording or bringing reactor to (NCCR5161) and hot standby condition. high level alarm at CB.

2. Methods of detection apply when a centrifugal charging pump is in operation.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 20 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Charging and b. Failure reduces b. Charging and seal closed. Volume Control - redundancy of water flow charging flow and providing charging indication seal water flow. and seal water flow to (NVP5630) and RCS. No effect on low flow alarm at system operation CB, and PZR level during normal plant recording operation, load follow, (NCCR5161) and or bringing reactor to low level alarm at hot standby condition. CB.

Valve failing closed under an accident condition requiring flow delivery by centrifugal charging inhibits flow from the pumps.

37. Check a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure reduces a. Charging and seal valve open. Volume Control - redundancy of water flow NV306 charging flow and providing charging indication seal water flow. and seal water to RCS. (NVP5630) and No effect on normal low flow alarm at plant operation, load CB, and PZR level follow, or bringing recording reactor to hot standby (NCCR5161) and condition. low level alarm at CB.

2. Methods of detection apply when centrifugal charging pump 1A is in operation.

3. Positive displacement pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.

Positive displacement pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 21 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

38. Check a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure reduces a. Same methods for 1. Centrifugal charging pump 1A valve open. Volume Control - redundancy of detection as those may be isolated by the closing NV270 charging flow and providing charging stated above for of manual valves in pump's (NV290 seal water flow. and seal water flow to item #37. suction and discharge lines.

analogo RCS. Discharge of us) centrifugal charging pump 1A is open to "backflow" when centrifugal charging pump 1B is placed into operation after failure of centrifugal charging pump 1A to deliver charging and seal water flow. No effect on normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.

39. Deleted per 2000 update.

40. Centrif a. Fails to a. Charging and a. Failure reduces a. Same methods of 1. Flow rate for a centrifugal ugal deliver Volume Control - redundancy of detection as those stated charging pump is controlled by chargin working charging flow and providing charging above for item #39 a modulating valve (NV294) in g pump fluid. seal water flow. and seal water flow to when centrifugal discharge header for the 1A RCS. Alternate charging pump 1A is in centrifugal charging pumps.

APCH delivery of charging operation. In addition, (Pump and seal water flow by monitor light and alarm 1B a centrifugal charging for group monitoring of analogo pump not available. components at CB.

us) No effect on normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 22 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

41. Air a. Fails a. Chemical Control, a. Failure blocks a. VCT pressure 1. Plant's technical specification diaphra closed. Purification and hydrogen flow to VCT indication sets limits on RCS activity gm Makeup - oxygen and loads to loss of (NVP5500) and level.

operate control. venting of VCT (vent low pressure alarm d globe valve 1WG3 closes on at CB. Periodic valve low VCT pressure) sampling of gas NV224 resulting in loss of gas mixture in VCT.

stripping of fission products from RCS coolant. No effect on operation to bring the reactor to hot standby condition.

42. Relief a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure allows VCT a. Decrease in VCT 1. Radioactive fluid contained.

valve open. Volume Control - liquid to be relieved to level causing NV223 charging flow and BRS recycle holdup RMCS to operate; seal water flow. tank resulting in a loss VCT level of VCT liquid and indications makeup coolant (NVP5761) and available for charging low level alarm at and seal water flow CB; and BRS during normal plant recycle holdup operation, load follow, tank level increase.

and bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.

VCT isolation valves (NV188A and NV189B) close on low water level tank level signal causing the suction of charging pumps to be transferred to the RWST for an alternate supply of borated (Controlled by COLR) coolant.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 23 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

43. Motor a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect a. Valve position 1. During normal plant operation operate open. Volume Control - on CVCS operation indication (open to and load follow valve is at a d gate charging flow and during normal plant closed position full open position and the valve seal water flow. operation, load follow, change) at CB. motor operator is energized to NV188 and bringing reactor to close the valve upon the A a hot standby generation of a VCT low water (NV189 condition. However, level signal or upon the B) under accident generation of a Safety Injection analogo conditions requiring "S" signal.

us isolation of VCT, failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation for discharge line of VCT.

a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure blocks fluid a. Valve position closed. Volume Control - flow from VCT during indication (closed charging flow and normal plant to open position seal water flow. operation, load follow change) at CB; and when bringing the group monitoring reactor to a hot light and alarm standby condition. (valve closed) at Alternate supply of CB; charging and borated (Controlled by seal water flow COLR) coolant from indication the RWST to suction (NVP5630) and of charging pumps can low flow alarm at be established from CB; and PZR level the CB by the operator recording through the opening of (NCCR5161) and RWST isolation valves low level alarm at (NV252A and CB.

NV253B).

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 24 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

44. Air a. Fails a. Chemical Control, a. Failure reduces the a. VCT pressure 1. Valve is designed fail "closed" diaphra closed. Purification and redundancy of flow indication and is electrically wired so that gm Makeup - oxygen paths provided for the (NVP5500) and the electrical solenoid of the air operate control. venting of VCT gas high pressure diaphragm operator is d globe mixture to gas waste alarm at CB. energized to open valve.

valve processing system for Periodic sampling NV467 stripping of fission of gas mixture in 2. Same remark as that stated for products from RCS VCT. item #41 in regards to RCS coolant during normal activity.

plant operation and 3. Methods of detection apply load follow. No effect when alternate flow path is on operations to bring being used for venting.

the reactor to standby condition.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 25 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

45. Air a. Fails a. Boron a. Failure blocks fluid a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail "closed" diaphra closed Concentration flow from reactor indication (closed and is electrically wired so that gm Control - reactor makeup control system to open position the electrical solenoid of the air operate makeup control - for automatic boric change) at CB; diaphragm operator is d globe boration, auto acid addition and total makeup flow energized to open valve.

valve makeup, and reactor water makeup deviation alarm at NV186 alternate dilution. during normal plant CB; and VCT level A operation and load indication follow. Failure also (NVP5761) and reduces redundancy of low level alarm at fluid flow paths for CB.

dilution of RC coolant by reactor makeup water and blocks fluid flow for boration of the RC coolant when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition. Boration (at BA tank boron concentration level) of RCS coolant to bring the reactor to hot standby condition is possible by opening of alternate BA tank isolation valve (NV236B) at CB.

b. Fails b. Boron b. Failure allows for b. Valve position open. Concentration alternate dilute mode indication (open to Control - reactor type operation for closed change) at makeup control - system operation of CB.

boration, auto normal dilution of makeup, and RCS coolant. No alternate dilution. effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow, and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 26 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

46. Air a. Fails a. Boron a. Failure blocks fluid a. Same methods for 1. Valve is designed fail "closed" diaphra closed. Concentration flow from RMCS for detection as those and is electrically wired so that gm Control - reactor dilution of RCS stated above for the electrical solenoid of the air operate makeup control - coolant during normal item #45, failure diaphragm operator is d globe dilution and plant operation and mode Fails energized to open valve.

valve alternate dilution. load follow. No effect closed.

NV181 on CVCS operation.

A Operator can dilute RCS coolant by establishing alternate dilute mode of system operation.

Dilution of RCS coolant not required when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.

b. Fails b. Boron b. Failure allows for b. Valve position open. Concentration alternate dilute mode indication (open to Control - reactor type operation for closed position makeup control - system operation of change) at CB.

dilution and boration and auto alternate dilution. makeup of RCS coolant. No effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby operation.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 27 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

47. Relief a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure allows for a b. Decrease in VCT 2. Radioactive fluid contained.

Valve open. Volume Control - portion of flow to level causing NV273 charging and seal suction header of RMCS to operate; water flow. charging pumps to be VCT level relieved to BRS indications recycle holdup tank. (NVP5761) and Boration of RCS low water level coolant to bring alarm at CB; and reactor to hot standby BRS recycle condition is still holdup tank level possible. increase.

48. Air a. Fails a. Boron a. Failure prevents the a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail "open" diaphra open. Concentration addition of a pre- indication (open to and is electrically wired so the gm Control - reactor selected quantity of closed position electrical solenoid of the air operate makeup control - concentrated boric change) at CB; and diaphragm operator is d globe boration and auto acid solution at a pre- boric acid flow energized to close valve.

valve makeup. selected flow rate to recording NV238 the RCS coolant (NVCR5450) and A during normal plant flow deviation operation, load follow alarm at CB.

and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.

Boration to bring the reactor to a hot standby condition is possible, however, flow rate of solution from BA tanks cannot be automatically controlled.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 28 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Boron b. Failure blocks fluid b. Valve position closed. Concentration flow of boric acid indication (closed Control - reactor solution from BA to open position makeup control - tanks during normal change) at CB; and boration, and auto plant operation, load boric acid flow makeup. follow, and when recording bringing the reactor to (NVCR5450) and a hot standby flow deviation condition. Boration alarm at CB.

(at BA tank boron concentration level) of RCS coolant to bring the reactor to hot standby condition is possible by opening of alternate BA tank isolation valve (NV236B) at CB.

49. Air a. Fails a. Boron a. Failure blocks fluid a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed fail "closed" diaphra closed. Concentration flow of water from indication (closed and is electrically wired so that gm Control - reactor reactor makeup control to open position the electrical solenoid of the air operate makeup control - system during normal change) at CB; diaphragm operator is d globe dilute, alternate plant operation and VCT level energized to open valve.

valve dilute and auto load follow. No effect indications NV242 makeup. on system operation (NVP5761) and A when bringing the low level alarm at reactor to a hot CB; and makeup standby condition. water flow recording (NVCR5450) and flow deviation alarm at CB.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 29 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Boron b. Failure prevents the b. Valve position open. Concentration addition of a indication (open to Control - reactor preselected quantity of closed position makeup control - water makeup at a pre- change) at CB and dilute, alternate selected flow rate to makeup water flow dilute and auto the RCS coolant recording makeup. during normal plant (NVCR5450) and operation and load flow deviation follow. No effect on alarm at CB.

system operation when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.

50. Motor a. Fails a. Boron a. Failure reduces a. Valve position 1. Valve is at a closed position operate closed. Concentration redundancy of flow indication (closed during normal RMCS d globe Control - reactor paths for supplying to open position operation.

valve makeup control - boric acid solution change) at CB and NV236 boration and auto from BA tanks to RCS flow indication 2. If both flow paths from BA B makeup. via charging pumps. (NVP5440) at CB. tanks are blocked due to failure No effect on CVCS of isolation valves (NV238A operation during and NV236B), borated water normal plant (Controlled by COLR) from operation, load follow, RWST is available by opening or hot standby isolation valve NV252A or operation. Normal NV253B.

flow path via RMCS remains available for boration of RCS coolant.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 30 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

b. Fails b. Boron b. Failure prevents the b. Valve position open. Concentration addition of a pre- indication (open to Control - reactor selected quantity of closed position makeup control - concentrated boric change) at CB and boration and auto acid solution at a pre- flow indication makeup. selected flow rate to (NVP5440) at CB.

the RCS coolant during normal plant operation, load follow and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.

Boration to bring the reactor to a hot standby condition is possible, however, flow rate of solution from BA tanks can not be automatically controlled.

51. Boric a. Fails to a. Boron a. No effect on CVCS a. Pump motor start 1. Both BA transfer pumps acid deliver Concentration system operation relay position operate simultaneously for transfer working Control - reactor during normal plant indication (open) RMCS boration operation.

pump fluid. makeup control - operation, load follow at CB and local 1A boration and auto or bringing reactor to pump discharge 2. Redundant BA transfer pumps APBA makeup. hot standby condition. pressure indication provided for each unit.

(BA Redundant BA transfer (NVP5700).

transfer pump 1B provides pump necessary delivery of 1B working fluid for analoge CVCS system ous) operation.

(27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 31 of 32)

Effect on System Operation Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks

52. Air a. Fails a. Charging and a. Failure bypasses a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed to fail open diaphra open for Volume Control - normal letdown flow indication (Holdup for flow to VCT and is gm flow letdown flow. to BRS recylce holdup Tank) at CB; VCT electrically wired so that operate only to tank resulting in water level electrical control solenoids for d three BRS excessive use of indication valve are energized for flow to way recycle RMCS. No effect on (NVP5761) and BRS recycle holdup Tank.

valve holdup operation to bring low level alarm at Valve opens to flow to BRS NV172 tank. reactor to hot standby CB; and increase recycle holdup tank on high A condition. water level in BRS VCT water level signal.

recycle holdup tank.

Notes:

1. See list at end of table for definition of acronyms and abbreviations used.

2. As part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance inspection and instrument calibrations are made to monitor equipment and performance. Failures may be detected during such monitoring of equipment in addition to detection methods noted.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations BA - Boric Acid BRS - Boron Recycle System BTR - Boron Thermal Regeneration BTRS - Boron Thermal Regeneration System CB - Control Board CVCS - Chemical and Valume Control System Demin. - Demineralizer HX - Heat Exchange PZR - Pressurizer RC - Reactor Coolant RCS - Reactor Coolant System RHRS - Residual Heat Removal System RWST - Refueling Water Storage Tank RMCSn. - Reactor Makeup Control System (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 32 of 32)

VCT - Volume Control Tank (27 MAR 2003)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 1 of 4)

Table 9-24. Boron Recycle System Component Data Summary Recycle Evaporator Feed Pumps Number 2 Design pressure, psig 150 0

Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 30 Design head, ft 302 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Holdup Tanks Number 2 Capacity, gal 112,000 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, 0F 200 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Reagent Tank Number 1 Capacity, gal 5 Design pressure 150 Design temperature, 0F 200 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizers Number 2 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 120 Resin volume, ft3 30 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Condensate Demineralizer Number 1 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 75 Resin volume, ft3 20 (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 2 of 4)

Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Feed Filters Number 2 Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 5 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Condensate Filter (as originally supplied)

Number 1 Design pressure, psig 200 0

Design temperature, F 250 Design flow, gpm 35 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Number 1 Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 35 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel) Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Package Number 1 Design flow, gpm 15 Concentration of Concentrate (boric acid), 4 wt percent Concentration of Condensate 10 ppm boron as H3BO3 Material Stainless steel Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Eductor Number 1 Design pressure, psig 5 Design temperature, 0F 200 (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 3 of 4)

Typical flow, SCFM 1.4 Material Stainless steel Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks Number for Both Units 2 (1 per unit)

Usable Volume, Gallons 112,000 Total Volume, Gallons 125,000 Tank Design Pressure1 Atmospheric Tank Design Temperature, 0F 200 Tank Operating Temperature, 0F 115 Material of Construction Austenitic SS lined Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Number for Both Units 4 (2 per unit)

Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, 0F 200 Design flow, GPM 150 Design Head, ft 250 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Condensate Return Unit Number for Both Units 1 Receiver Volume, Gallons 100 Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, 0F 350 Number of Pumps 2 Design Flow, GPM 25 Design Head, ft. 65 Reactor Makeup Water Filter Number 1 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 120 Design flow, gpm 300 Particle retention 99.98% of 0.1 micron size (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 4 of 4)

Material, (vessel) Stainless steel Note:

1. Not including hydrostatic head.

(24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-25 (Page 1 of 3)

Table 9-25. Boron Thermal Regeneration System Component Data HISTORICAL INFORMATION NOT REQUIRED TO BE REVISED Chiller Pumps Number 3 (one per unit plus one shared)

Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 200 Design flow, gpm 400 Design head, feet 150 Material Carbon Steel Moderating Heat Exchanger Number 1 (per unit)

Design heat transfer, BTU/hr 2.53 X 106 Shell Tube Design pressure, psig 300 300 Design temperature, °F 200 200 Design flow, lb/hr 59,600 59,600 Design inlet temperature (boron 50 115 storage mode), °F Design outlet temperature (boron 92.4 72.6 storage mode), °F Inlet temperature (boron release 140 115 mode), °F Outlet temperature (boron release 123.7 131.3 mode), °F Fluid circulated Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Material Stainless Steel Stainless Steel Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Number 1 (per unit)

Design heat transfer, BTU/hr 1.65 X 106 Shell Tube Design pressure, psig 150 300 Design temperature, °F 200 200 Design flow, lb/hr 175,000 59,640 (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-25 (Page 2 of 3)

Design inlet temperature (boron 39 72.6 storage mode), °F Design outlet temperature (boron 48.4 45 storage mode), °F Inlet temperature (boron 90 123.7 release mode), °F Outlet temperature (boron 99.4 96.1 release mode ), °F Fluid circulated Chromated Water Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Stainless Steel Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger Number 1 (per unit)

Design heat transfer, BTU/hr 1.49 X 106 Shell Tube Design pressure, psig 300 600 Design temperature, °F 200 400 Design flow, lb/hr 59,640 44,730 Inlet temperature, °F 115 280 Outlet temperature, °F 140 246.7 Fluid circulated Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Material Stainless Steel Stainless Steel Chiller Surge Tank Number 1 (per unit)

Volume, gal 500 Design pressure, psig Atmospheric Design temperature, °F 200 Material Carbon Steel Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers Number 5 (per unit)

Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 120 3

Resin volume, ft 74.3 Material of construction Stainless Steel (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-25 (Page 3 of 3)

Chillers Number 3 (one per unit plus one shared)

Capacity, BTU/hr 1.66 X 106 Design flow, gpm 352 Inlet temperature, °F 48.4 Outlet temperature, °F 39 (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-26 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-26. Control Room Area Ventilation System Failure Analysis Component Failure Comments and Consequences Control Room, Control Room Fail Redundant Fan Available Area, or Switchgear Room Vent Fan Control Room, Control Room Fail Redundant Unit Available Area, or Switchgear Room Heating and Cooling Coil Units Pressurizing Fan Fail Redundant Fan Available Pressurizing Filter Train Fail Redundant Unit Available Chilled Water System Fail Redundant System Available Component Damper (Control or Isolation) Fail Redundant Damper System Available Outside air intake isolation valve Fail Redundant Valve Available (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-27 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-27. Fuel Handling Area Exhaust System Failure Analysis Component Failure Comments and Consequences Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan Fail Redundant Exhaust System Available Fuel Handling Area Filter Train Fail Redundant Exhaust System Available Damper (Control or Isolation) Closes and fails to reopen Redundant Exhaust System Available Damper (Bypass) Opens and fails to close Failure is indicated. Redundant Exhaust System Available.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-28 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-28. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Failure Analysis Components Failure Comments and Consequences Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Fan Fail Redundant fan available during accident condition operating mode.

Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Fail Redundant filter train available during Filter Train accident condition operating mode.

Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Fail Redundant Preheater/Demister Section Preheater/Demister Section available during accident condition operating mode.

Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Room Air Fail Redundant Shutdown Panel with air Conditioning Unit conditioning unit available.

Damper (Bypass or Isolation) Fails to close Redundant damper and duct path available during accident condition operating mode.

Inlet Vane Damper Fails to reduce Redundant damper and filter system Filtered Exhaust available during accident condition System flow operating mode.

rate (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-29 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-29. Purge System Isolation Valve Design and Test Criteria Design: Pressure 15 psig Differential Pressure 15 psi Temperature 2500F Radiation 2x108 rads Closure Time1 5 seconds Tests: Hydrotest to 150% of design pressure Leak-test across valve for zero leakage Valve minimum wall measurement Note:

1. Testing of the Containment Purge (VP) System closure times is not performed because the isolation valves are sealed or locked closed during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-30 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-30. Annulus Ventilation System. Malfunction Analysis Components Failure Comments and Consequences

1. Annulus ventilation fan Fan fails to start or Two 100 percent capacity fans are stops running and provided.

cannot be restarted.

2. Annulus ventilation filter train Filter failure Two 100 percent capacity trains are provided.

3. Annulus ventilation moisture Eliminator failure Two 100 percent capacity eliminator eliminators are provided.

4. Cross-connect Valve Fails to close Valves provide two 100 percent flow paths in the suction header.

5. Discharge Isolation Valve Fails to open Each fan train, including discharge isolation valve, is a redundant flow path.

6. Control Damper Fails to modulate Two 100 percent capacity subsystems are provided.

7. Carbon Filter Carbon ignition due Dispersion of the radioiodine to excessive localized throughout the filter influent and radioiodine uniform filter flow distribution deposition. assures uniform filter loading therein precluding carbon ignition. Even though carbon ignition is not considered a probability, each filter train carbon section is provided with a fire detection and protection system in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. (See Section 12.3.3).

8. Annulus ventilation fan LOCA coincident Power is supplied to redundant with loss of offsite annulus ventilation subsystems from power and with a the emergency diesel generators.

single active failure (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-31 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-31. Deleted Per 2018 Update (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-32 (Page 1 of 3)

Table 9-32. Communications Available for Transient and Accident Conditions Electro-Sound-Expected PABX Powered Electro-Sound-Noise Telephon Telephone- Powered PA via Fiber Optic Utilizing A e Emergency Maintenance PA PABX Dispatch Weighting (95dBA)1, Circuit Circuit System Telephone Phone Location db Levels3 2 (110dBA)1 (110dBA)1 (95dBA)1 (95dBA)1, 2 (76dBA)1 Auxiliary feedwater 95db X X X X pump turbine Auxiliary shutdown 70db X X X X panel rooms Control room 62db X X X X X X Technical Support 62db X X X X Center Diesel generator 105db X X X X rooms Fuel pool area 76db X X X X HVAC equipment 70db X X X room control panels Instrument air 90db X X X compressors Switchgear and 70db X X X X motor control center rooms Valves 1ND26, 95db X X X 1ND27, 1ND60, &

1ND61 in the Residual Heat Removal System Valves 1KC56A 96db X X X (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-32 (Page 2 of 3)

Electro-Sound-Expected PABX Powered Electro-Sound-Noise Telephon Telephone- Powered PA via Fiber Optic Utilizing A e Emergency Maintenance PA PABX Dispatch Weighting (95dBA)1, Circuit Circuit System Telephone Phone Location db Levels3 2 (110dBA)1 (110dBA)1 (95dBA)1 (95dBA)1, 2 (76dBA)1 and 1KC81B in Component Cooling Water System Valves 1VQ15B, 94db X X X 1VQ16A, & 1VQ13 in the Containment Air Release and Addition System Reactor Coolant 100db X X System Pressure Gage Primary Sample 75db X X X Sink Electrical 75db X X X Penetration Room Control Room 62db X X X Annex 6.9 KV Switchgear 75db X X X Room RC Temperature 70db X X H&C Connection Box Residual Heat 90db X X Removal heat exchanger outlet (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-32 (Page 3 of 3)

Electro-Sound-Expected PABX Powered Electro-Sound-Noise Telephon Telephone- Powered PA via Fiber Optic Utilizing A e Emergency Maintenance PA PABX Dispatch Weighting (95dBA)1, Circuit Circuit System Telephone Phone Location db Levels3 2 (110dBA)1 (110dBA)1 (95dBA)1 (95dBA)1, 2 (76dBA)1 temperature Notes:

Maximum noise level capabilities of equipment.

1. Telephone equipped with transistor amplifier and noise cancelling transmitter.

2. Noise levels result of measurements taken at comparable plants.

3. After a unit is operational, plant noise levels will be measured during normal and shutdown conditions. Sound isolation booths or noise cancelling devices will then be added as necessary.

4. Hand Held Radios are available to plant personnel.

(14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-33 (Page 1 of 3)

Table 9-33. Communications and Lighting Available for Safe Shutdown of Plant Electro-Sound- Electro- Emer-Powered Sound- Fiber gency 8- Emer- Emer-Telephone- Powered PA via Optic Hour gency 208 gency PABX Emergency Maintenance PA PABX Dispatch Battery Y/120VAC 250VDC Location Telephone Circuit Circuit System Telephone Phone Lighting Lighting Lighting Auxiliary X X X X X X X feedwater pump turbine panel Auxiliary X X X X X X X shutdown panel rooms Control room X X X X X X X X X Diesel X X X X X X X generator rooms Fuel pool area X X X X X X X HVAC X X X X X X equipment room control panels Instrument air X X X X X compressors Switchgear and X X X X X X motor control center rooms Valves 1 and 2 X X X X X X ND26,ND27,N D60, & ND61 in the Residual Heat Removal System (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-33 (Page 2 of 3)

Electro-Sound- Electro- Emer-Powered Sound- Fiber gency 8- Emer- Emer-Telephone- Powered PA via Optic Hour gency 208 gency PABX Emergency Maintenance PA PABX Dispatch Battery Y/120VAC 250VDC Location Telephone Circuit Circuit System Telephone Phone Lighting Lighting Lighting Valves 1 and 2 X X X X X X KC56A and KC81B in the Component Cooling Water System Valves 1 and 2 X X X X X X VQ15B, VQ16A, &

VQ13 in the Containment Air Release and Addition System Reactor X X X X X Coolant System Pressure Gage RC Temp, H&C X X X X X Connection Box Residual Heat X X X X X Removal heat exchanger outlet termperature Technical X X X X X Support Center (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-33 (Page 3 of 3)

Electro-Sound- Electro- Emer-Powered Sound- Fiber gency 8- Emer- Emer-Telephone- Powered PA via Optic Hour gency 208 gency PABX Emergency Maintenance PA PABX Dispatch Battery Y/120VAC 250VDC Location Telephone Circuit Circuit System Telephone Phone Lighting Lighting Lighting Note:

1. The Emergency 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery lights list given in this table is not intended to be a list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting. See Table 9-36 for a complete list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lights.

(14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-34 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-34. Single Failure Analysis of the Emergency Lighting Systems. (Assume Emergency Lighting Systems are Energized)

Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences

1. Emerg. AC Incandescent lamp or No Consequences, only failed lamp will be out of Lighting Fixture service, all other lamps will continue to operate and Fixture Failure - due to provide adequate illuminations. Emergency 250VDC Damage or Other Lighting System will also illuminate the area along Incident with appropriate Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting for access and egress and vital locations.

2. Emerg. AC Failure - due Lighting circuit affected will be out of service with Lighting to Damage protection by the panelboard circuit breaker. Will lose Cable, (AC) illumination in a localized area. Emergency Panelboard 250VDC Lighting System will adequately illuminate to Fixture affected area. Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will illuminate area for access and egress and vital locations.

3. Emerg. AC Failure or Lighting circuits affected will be out of service. Will Lighting Loss of Voltage lose (AC) illumination in localized areas. Emerg.

Panelboard 250VDC Lighting System will adequately illuminate affected areas. Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will provide lighting for access and egress and vital locations.

4. Emerg. AC Failure or Loss of Same Comment as 3.

Lighting 600 VAC Power Transformer Supply

5. Emerg. DC Incandescent Lamp No consequences, only failed lamp will be out of Lighting or service. All other lamps will continue to operate and Fixture Fixture Failure - due provide adequate illumination. Emergency AC to Damage or Other Lighting System will also illuminate the area along Incident with appropriate Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting.

6. Emerg. DC Failure - due to Lighting circuit affected will be out of service with Lighting Damage protection by relay protective fuse. Will lose (DC)

Cable, illumination in localized area. Emerg. AC Lighting Panelboard System will adequately illuminate affected area.

to Fixture Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will also illuminate area for access and egress and vital locations.

7. Emerg. DC Failure or Lighting circuits affected will be out of service. Will Lighting Loss of Voltage lose (DC) illumination in localized areas. Emerg. AC Panelboard Lighting Systems will adequately illuminate affected areas. Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will also illuminate area for access and egress and vital locations.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 1 of 11)

Table 9-35. Lighting Systems Available to Illuminate Safety Related Equipment1,2,5 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC CA MOTOR DRIVEN AUX. X X FEEDWATER PUMPS 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B STEAM TURB. DRIVEN AUX. X X X X FEEDWATER PUMP AUX. FEEDWATER CONTROL X X X X X X PANELS ASP1A, ASP1B EIA AUX. RELAY RACKS 1ARR1, X X X X X 1ARR2 PROTECTION SET I, II, III, IV X X X X X Cabinets 1, 2, 3, 4 EME RCP VOLTAGE AND FREQ SYS. X X PANEL 1RCPM EOA MAIN CONTROL BOARDS X X X X X X 1MC1-1MC13, 2MC1-2MC13, MC14 CONTROL BOARD INPUT X X X X CABINETS 1IC1-1IC18, 1IC20, 2IC1-2IC18, 2IC20 CONTROL BOARD INPUT X X CABINETS 1IC21, 1IC22, 1IC26-1IC33, 2IC21, 2IC22, 2IC26-2IC33 EPB PTS FEEDING RCP POWER X X MONITOR (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 2 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC EPC 4160 SWITCHGEAR GROUP 1ETA, X X X X X X 1ETB 4160 SWITCHGEAR GROUP 2ETA, X X X X X X 2ETB EPE 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXA, X X X X X X 2ELXA 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXB, X X X X X X 2ELXB 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXC, X X X X X X 2ELXC 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXD, X X X X X X 2ELXD 600V MCC 1EMXA, 2EMXA X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXB, 2EMXB X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXC, 2EMXC X X X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXD, 2EMXD X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXE, 2EMXE X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXF, 2EMXF X X X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXG X X X X X 600V MCC 2EMXH 600V MCC 1EMXI, 2EMXI X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXJ, 2EMXJ X X X X (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 3 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC 600V MCC 1EMXK, 2EMXK X X X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXL, 2EMXL X X X X 600V MCC 1EMXO X X 600V MCC 2EMXP X 600V MCC 1EMXQ, 2EMXQ X X 600V MCC 1EMXR, 2EMXR X X EPG STATIC INVERTER 1EIA, 2EIA X X X X STATIC INVERTER 1EIB, 2EIB X X STATIC INVERTER 1EIC, 2EIC X X X X STATIC INVERTER 1EID, 2EID X X X X STATIC INVERTER 1EIE, 2EIE X X X X STATIC INVERTER 1EIF, 2EIF X X X X POWER PANEL 1ERPA, 2ERPA X X X X POWER PANEL 1ERPB, 2ERPB X X POWER PANEL 1ERPC, 2ERPC X X POWER PANEL 1ERPD, 2ERPD X X X X EPL BATTERY CHARGER 1ECA, 2ECA X X X X BATTERY CHARGER 1ECB, 2ECB X X BATTERY CHARGER 1ECC, 2ECC X X BATTERY CHARGER 1ECD, 2ECD X X (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 4 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC BATTERY 1EBA, 2EBA X X BATTERY 1EBB, 2EBB X X BATTERY 1EBC, 2EBC X X BATTERY 1EBD, 2EBD X X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDA, 2EDA X X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDB, 2EDB X X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDC, 2EDC X X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDD, 2EDD X X DC PANELS 1EPA-1EPD X X DC PANELS 2EPA-2EPD X X DC SPARE CHGR. DISTR. CTR X X 1EDS, 2EDS SPARE CHGR. 600V AC POWER X X PNL 1EMS, 2EMS AUCTIONEERING D10DES X X X X X X 1EADA, 2EADA AUCTIONEERING D10DES X X X X X X 1EADB, 2EADB DC DISTR. CENTER 1EDE, 2EDE X X X X X X DC DISTR. CENTER 1EDF, 2EDF X X X X X X (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 5 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC EPQ DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES X X X X X X 1DGBA&B, 2DGBA&B BATTERY CHARGER X X X X X X 1DGCA&B, 2DGCA&B AUCT.DIODES 1VADA, 2VADA X X X X X X AUCT.DIODES 1VADB, 2VADB X X X X X X DISTR. CTR. 1DGA&B, 2DGA&B X X X X X X EPY TRANSFORMER 1EKTG X X X X X TRANSFORMER 2EKTH X X X X X TRANSFORMER 1EKTB, X X X X 1EKTI, 2EKTB, 2EKTI X X X X EQA EMERG.DIESEL GENERATOR X X X X X X EQC DIESEL GEN.CONTROL PANELS X X X X X X 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B (INCLUDES EXCITATION VOLTAGE REG.)

DIESEL ENGINE CONTROL X X X X X X PANELS 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B Deleted Per 2012 Update.

ERN DIESEL GEN. GROUND X X X X X X TRANSFORMERS DIESEL GEN. RESISTOR BOXES X X X X X X DIESEL GEN. SURGE PACKS X X X X X X (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 6 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC DIESEL GEN. GROUND CTS X X X X X X DIESEL GEN. RELAY X X X X X X CABINETS 1EATC14, 15, 2EATC14, 15 EWA CABLE ROOM CABLE SUPPORT X X SYS EWB BATTERY ROOM CABLE X X SUPPORT SYS EZA ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS X X N/A AREA TERMINAL CABINETS X X X 1EATC1-1EATC19 2EATC1-2EATC19 X X X AREA TERMINAL BOXES 1T BOX X X 1-27 FD DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL X X X X X X DAY TANKS DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL X X X X X X BOOSTER PUMPS DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL X X X X X X RELIEF VALVES IPE REACTOR PROT. SYS. SOLID X X X X STATE PROT SYS RACKS AUX. SAFEGUARD CABINET X X X X X X AUX. SHUTDOWN PANELS 1A, 1B (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 7 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC ISE ESF TEST CABINET X X X ITE TURBINE TERMINAL BOX A, B, D, X EESF TEST CABINET KC COMPONENT COOLING WTR. X X X X PUMPS COMPONENTS COOLING HEAT X X X X EXCH.

COMPONENT COOLING SURGE X X TK.

KD DIESEL GEN. COOLING WTR. X X X HEAT EXCH.

DIESEL GEN JACKET WTR. X X X PUMPS DIESEL GEN JACKET WTR. X X X STANDPIPE KF SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMPS X X SPENT FUEL COOLING HEAT X X EXCH SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP X X SUCTION STRAINERS LD DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL X X X X FILTERS DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL X X X X COOLERS (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 8 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL X X X X RELIEF VLVs DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL X X X X HEAT EXCH DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL X X X X SUMP TK NB BORON RECYCLE EVAP FEED X X PUMPS BORON RECYCLE HOLDUP TANK X X BORON RECYCLE EVAP FEED X X FILTERS BORON RECYCLE STRIPPING X X COLUMN ND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOV. PUMPS X X X X RESIDUAL HEAT REMOV. HEAT X X X X EXCH NI SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS X X X X SAFETY INJ ACCUMULATORS X X NM NUCLEAR SAMPLING DELAY X COIL 6 NUCLEAR SAMPLING VLV. OPER. X PNL NS CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS X X (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 9 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT X X EXCH NV CHEMICAL AND VOLUME X X CONTROL CHARGING PUMPS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME X X X X CONTROL LETDOWN HEAT EXCH CHEMICAL AND VOLUME TANK X X CHEMICAL AND VOLUME X X CONTROL BORIC ACID TANK RF FIRE PROT DIESEL ROOM X X X X CONTROL PANEL SM MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VLVS. X X SV MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VLVS. X X RELIEF VLVS.

VA AUX. BLDG. VENT SYS. FITERS. X X VC CONTROL BLDG. VENT SYS FAN X X CONTROL BLDG. VENT SYS X X FILTERS CONTROL BLDG. VENT SYS AIR X X HANDLING UNITS (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 10 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC CONTROL BLDG VENT SYS HVAC X X AUX RELAY CAB. A&B VD DIESEL BLDG. VENT FANS X X X DIESEL BLDG. VENT FILTERS X X X DIESEL BLDG. VENT DAMPERS X X X VP CONTAINMENT PURGE VENT X X SYS ISOLATION VALVES WG WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR PKG. X X WASTE GAS TANKS X X

` WASTE GAS HYDROGEN X X RECOMBINERS WL LIQUID WASTE SYS. DRAIN TK. X X X RHR & CS ROOM SUMP WN DIESEL GEN ROOM SUMPS X X X DIESEL GEN ROOM SUMPS X X X PUMP PANELS WS SPENT RESIN STORAGE TK YC CONTROL AREA X X X CHILLER COMPRESSOR CRA-C-1, 2 PANELS (17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 11 of 11)

EMERG. LIGHTING FOR 3

EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR EMERG. EMERG. 8-HR EMERG EMERG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT BATTERY AC DC BATTERY . AC . DC Notes:

1. Equipment listing taken from Nuclear Safety Related Structures, Systems, and Components.

2. Listing does not contain equipment located in reactor bldgs.

3. Listed lighting is located in close proximity to equipment listed.

4. Listed lighting is located in corridors/areas outside rooms, alcoves, etc. that equipment is located in.

5. The emergency 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery lights list given in this table isn ot intended to be a list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting. See Table 9-36 for a complete list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lights.

6. The delay coil has been abandoned in place per EC 112660 (U-1) and EC 112663 (U-2) based on ALARA dose considerations.

(17 APR 2012)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 1 of 6)

Table 9-36. Lighting for Post-Fire Alternate Shutdown Utilizing the Standby Shutdown System Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 543 AA/51-52 210 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 AA/62-63 253 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 AA/62-63 254 Aisle AB 543 AA-BB/51 7 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 AA-BB/63 61 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 BB/51 192 Aisle AB 543 BB/52 48 Aisle/RC Temp Control Box AB 543 BB/62 100 Feedwater Pump Panels AB 543 BB/65 63 Area AB 543 BB-CC/49-50 284 1CA36/1CA64/Area AB 543 BB-CC/61-62 101 Aisle AB 543 CC/52-53 191 Aisle AB 543 CC/61-62 165 Aux. FW Pump Turb PNL AB 543 CC/62 252 Aisle AB 543 CC/63 287 2CA64/2CA36 AB 543 CC-DD/52 47 Stairs AB 543 CC-DD/61-62 102 Stairs AB 543 DD/52-53 208 Aisle/1CA52 AB 543 DD-EE/53-54 209 Aisle/1CA48 AB 543 DD-EE/60-61 251 Aisle/2CA48 AB 543 EE/52-53 207 Aisle AB 543 EE/61-62 247 Aisle/2CA52 AB 543 FF/52-53 206 Aisle AB 543 FF/61-62 246 Aisle AB 543 FF-GG/59-60 250 Stairs AB 543 FF-GG/61 248 Aisle AB 543 GG/52-53 205 Aisle AB 543 GG/56 218 Aisle AB 543 GG/59-60 249 Aisle AB 543 GG/61-62 244 Aisle (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 2 of 6)

Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 543 GG/61-62 245 Aisle AB 543 HH/52 204 Aisle AB 543 HH/62 97 2VQ13/2VQ15B AB 543 HH/62 242 Aisle AB 543 HH/62 243 Aisle AB 543 JJ/51 203 Aisle AB 543 JJ/63 241 Aisle AB 543 JJ-KK/50-51 224 Aisle AB 543 JJ-KK/63-64 240 Aisle AB 543 KK/50 202 Aisle AB 543 KK-LL/50-51 68 Aisle AB 543 KK-LL/63-64 238 Aisle AB 543 KK-LL/63-64 239 Aisle AB 543 MM-NN/50-51 201 Aisle AB 543 MM-NN/63-64 237 Aisle AB 543 PP/50-51 200 Stairs AB 543 PP/63-64 236 Stairs AB 554 BB/54 234 Aisle AB 554 BB/60 278 Aisle AB 554 CC/61 277 Aisle AB 560 AA/49-50 16 1ETB AB 560 AA/64 260 2ETB11/2ETB12 AB 560 AA/65 110 2ETB/2ELXB AB 560 AA-BB/61-62 263 Aisle AB 560 BB/46 15 Aisle/1EMXL F09A AB 560 BB/46 230 Aisle AB 560 BB/49 229 Aisle AB 560 BB/51 14 Aisle/1ETB12/1ETB13 AB 560 BB/51 228 Aisle AB 560 BB/52-53 226 Aisle AB 560 BB/63 111 Aisle/2ETB AB 560 BB/63 261 Aisle (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 3 of 6)

Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 560 BB/65 259 Aisle AB 560 BB/68 258 Aisle AB 560 BB/69 109 Aisle AB 560 CC-DD/52 17 Stairs AB 560 CC-DD/52-53 227 Stairs AB 560 CC-DD/61-62 112 Stairs AB 560 CC-DD/61-62 262 Aisle AB 560 FF-GG/59 257 Stairs AB 560 GG/55 164 1EMXJ/1EMXB AB 560 GG/59 160 2EMXJ/2EMXB AB 560 GG/59 161 Area/Door AB 560 HH/55 85 Comp. Cooling PMP Area AB 560 HH/57 163 KC Pump 1B1/Door AB 560 HH/58 162 Area AB 560 PP/50-51 199 Stairs AB 560 PP/63-64 256 Stairs AB 568 FF-GG/59 159 Stairs AB 574 BB/61 279 Aisle AB 574 BB-CC/54 180 Aisle AB 574 CC/61 181 Aisle AB 577 AA/49 22 1EMXS/1ETA AB 577 AA/50 194 Aisle/1ETA AB 577 AA/61-62 189 Aisle AB 577 AA/64 267 2ETA12/2ETA13 AB 577 AA/65 119 Aisle/2EMXS AB 577 AA/67 266 Aisle AB 577 AA-BB/45 193 Aisle AB 577 AA-BB/52 185 Aisle AB 577 AA-BB/62 118 Aisle/2ETA AB 577 AA-BB/69 265 Aisle/SSS Disconnect Cubicle AB 577 BB/46 21 Aisle/1EMXK F09A AB 577 BB/46 184 Aisle (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 4 of 6)

Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 577 BB/51 20 Aisle AB 577 BB/51 183 Aisle AB 577 BB/63 187 Aisle AB 577 BB/65 268 Aisle AB 577 BB/68 188 Aisle AB 577 BB/68-69 120 2ELXC/2ETXE AB 577 CC-DD/52 23 Stairs AB 577 CC-DD/52-53 182 Aisle AB 577 CC-DD/61-62 117 Stairs AB 577 DD/62 186 Aisle AB 577 FF/58 155 Component Cooling Pump 2A1/2A2 AB 577 FF-GG/59-60 153 Stairs AB 577 GG/57 156 Area AB 577 GG/60 154 Door/Area AB 577 PP/50-51 198 Stairs AB 577 PP/63-64 264 Stairs AB 594 AA-BB/57 35 Aisle/Control Boards AB 594 BB/49 27 Area AB 594 BB/51 28 Aisle AB 594 BB/51 29 Aisle AB 594 BB/55 168 Aisle AB 594 BB/59 171 Area AB 594 BB/63 148 Aisle/AX656B Switchgear AB 594 BB/63 149 Aisle/AX656B Switchgear AB 594 CC/51 231 Aisle/Reactor Trip AB 594 CC/56 167 Aisle AB 594 CC/58 170 Aisle AB 594 CC/62 147 Stairs AB 594 CC/63 275 Aisle/Reactor Trip AB 594 CC/63 276 Aisle/Reactor Trip AB 594 CC-DD/52 31 Stairs AB 594 CC-DD/54 169 1PCC7/1PCC8 (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 5 of 6)

Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 594 CC-DD/60 172 2PCC7/2PCC8 AB 594 DD/51-52 190 Aisle AB 594 DD/53-54 143 Aisle AB 594 DD/60-61 146 Aisle AB 594 DD/62 283 Ladder/2CA54B AB 594 DD-EE/52 225 Aisle/1CA54B AB 594 DD-EE/55 144 Aisle AB 594 DD-EE/58 145 Aisle AB 594 EE/62 280 Area AB 594 FF/53-54 211 Aisle AB 594 FF-GG/60-61 150 Aisle AB 594 GG/54 212 Aisle AB 594 GG/61-62 273 Aisle AB 594 GG-HH/60 151 Aisle AB 594 HH/53 213 Aisle AB 594 JJ/61 272 Aisle AB 594 JJ-KK/53 214 Aisle AB 594 KK-LL/62 271 Aisle AB 594 MM/51 216 Aisle AB 594 MM/52 215 Aisle AB 594 MM/61 270 Aisle AB 594 NN/63 269 Aisle DH 594 EE/43 80 Area DH 594 EE/43 82 Area DH 594 EE/43 285 1CA38A/1CA66B DH 594 EE/43-45 286 Area DH 594 EE/71 139 Area DH 594 EE/71 140 Area DH 594 EE-70 288 2CA66B/2CA38A DH 594 EE-70 289 Stairs/Aisle DH 618 EE/52-53 232 Aisle/Ladder/1SA4 DH 618 EE/52-53 233 Aisle/Ladder/1SA4 (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 6 of 6)

Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage DH 618 EE/61-62 281 Aisle/Ladder/2SA4 DH 618 EE/61-62 282 Aisle/Ladder/2SA4 SRV 574 V/37 178 Area SRV 584 V/36 175 Stair SRV 594 U/34-35 174 Aisle SSF 601 A/2-4 SSF5 Aisle SSF 601 A-B/4 SSF6 Aisle/Diesel Generator SSF 601 B/6 SSF7 Aisle SSF 601 B-C/2 SSF4 Aisle SSF 601 B-C/4 SSF3 Aisle SSF 601 B-C/8 SSF1 Aisle/SSS Control Console SSF 601 C/6 SSF2 Aisle/SSS Control Console TB 594 1C/17 56 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.

TB 594 1D/17 57 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.

TB 594 1L/17 54 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.

TB 594 1M/17 55 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.

TB 594 2C/17 124 SWITCHGEAR TB 594 2D/17 123 SWITCHGEAR TB 594 2L/17 126 SWITCHGEAR TB 594 2M/17 125 SWITCHGEAR Notes:

1. AB Auxiliary Building

2. DH Doghouse

3. SRV Service Building

4. SSF Standby Shutdown Facility

5. TB Turbine Building (14 APR 2018)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-37 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-37. Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System Single Failure Analysis FAILURE MODE/ DETECTION COMPONENT CAUSE EFFECTS METHOD REMARKS Fuel Oil Transfer Valve Fails open/material failure No adverse effect on High level alarm in day Level rises in day tank or solenoid failure system performance tank until it enters the day tank vent pipe and eventually reaches an equilibrium level well below the top of the vent.

Fails closed/material or Low level in day tank Low level alarm in day Transfer valve can be solenoid failure tank manually bypassed. One hour of fuel is available in day tank. Redundant diesel remains operable.

Fuel Oil Transfer Piping Line break or tank rupture/ Loss of fuel or limited fuel Low level alarm in day Redundant diesel remains and Day Tank corrosion or mechanical tank operable.

damage Day Tank Level Control Fails to function/material, Low level in day tank Low level alarm in day Transfer valve can be mechanical or electrical tank manually bypassed. One failure hour of fuel is available in day tank. Redundant diesel remains operable.

Fuel Oil Booster Pump Clogged/Accumulation of Low fuel oil supply High differential pressure Strainer is duplex type and Strainer dirt and debris pressure alarm flow can be manually diverted from the clogged strainer to the clean strainer.

Fuel Oil Booster Pump Fails to start/mechanical No fuel to engine, engine Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains or electrical failure or fails to start operable.

damage Fuel Oil Filter Clogged/Accumulation of Low fuel oil supply High differential pressure Redundant diesel remains dirt and debris pressure alarm operable.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-37 (Page 2 of 2)

FAILURE MODE/ DETECTION COMPONENT CAUSE EFFECTS METHOD REMARKS Vents to Atmosphere Failed due to tornado Eventual loss of fuel oil Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains missiles flow to engine operable.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-38 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-38. Deleted Per 2004 Update (24 OCT 2004)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-39 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-39. Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Single Failure Analysis FAILURE MODE/ DETECTION COMPONENT CAUSE EFFECTS METHOD REMARKS Engine-Driven Jacket Water Fails to Loss of cooling water flow Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains Circulation Pump function/mechnanical to engine leading to eventual operable.

failure or damage shutdown Temperature Control Valve Fails open/mechanical Continuous flow through Low temperature alarm Diesel continues to run but failure jacket water cooler - low with less efficiency.

system temperature Fails closed/mechanical All flow through by - pass, High temperature alarm Redundant diesel remains failure no flow to cooler - operable.

temperature rise leading to eventual shutdown Jacket Water Standpipe Leaks/Mechanical failure Low water level in standpipe Low level alarm Manual makeup from due to corrosion demineralized water system.

Jacket Water Cooler Leaks/Mechanical failure Low level in standpipe, loss Low level alarm Redundant diesel remains due to corrosion or of NPSH to circulation standpipe operable.

ruptures pump, loss of flow to engine leading to eventual shutdown Jacket Water Piping Leaks or ruptures in piping Low level in standpipe, loss Low level alarm Redundant diesel remains including tube-sides of of flow to engine, standpipe operable.

tube oil cooler, governor temperature rise in Cooliing oil cooler, engine water, lube oil, and intercooler combustion air leading to eventual shutdown Jacket Water Heater or Inoperable/mechanical or Drop in cooling water Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel Keep Warm Pump electrical failure temperature below optimum maintains readiness at starting temperature (140°F) proper temperature.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-40 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-40. Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Alarm and Shutdown Setpoints PARAMETER ALARM SETPOINT SHUTDOWN SETPOINT Pressure:

Low Jacket Water Inlet Pressure 10 PSIG Temperature:

High Temp Aftercooler Inlet 165°F Low Temp H2O Engine Inlet 140°F High Temp H2O Engine Inlet 175°F Low Temp H2O Engine Outlet 140°F High Temp H2O Engine Outlet 190°F 200°F Level:

Low Level Jacket Water Standpipe 176 Inches Above Tank Bottom (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-41 (Page 1 of 2)

Table 9-41. Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System Single Failure Analysis DETECTION COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/ CAUSE EFFECTS METHOD REMARKS Starting Air Compressor Fails to function/mechanical or Low air pressure Low pressure Redundant compressor on the electrical failure or damage in system alarm same diesel remains operable.

Redundant diesel remains operable.

Starting air Aftercooler Leaks/mechanical failure due to Low air pressure Low pressure Redundant aftercooler on the corrosion or ruptures in system alarm same diesel remains operable.

Redundant diesel remains operable.

Starting Air Dryer Leaks due to corrosion or control Low air pressure Low pressure Redundant air dryer on the system failure in system alarm same diesel remains operable.

Redundant diesel remains operable.

Starting Air Tanks Leaks/mechanical failure due to Low air pressure Low pressure Redundant air tank on the same corrosion in system alarm diesel remains in service.

Redundant diesel remains operable.

Starting Air Solenoid Valves Fails open/material or electrical Starting air tank Low pressure Redundant air tank on the same failure bleeds down alarm diesel remains in service.

through open Redundant diesel remains valve operable.

Fails closed/material or electrical Loss of associated None Redundant starting air train on failure starting air train same diesel remains in service.

Redundant diesel remains operable.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-41 (Page 2 of 2)

DETECTION COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/ CAUSE EFFECTS METHOD REMARKS Starting Air Piping Line break upstream of check Loss of associated Low pressure Redundant starting air train on valves 1VG29, 1VG30, 1VG31, starting air train alarm same diesel remains in service.

and 1VG32 (Figure 9-183) and Redundant diesel remains check valves 1VG73, 1VG74, operable.

1VG75, and 1VG76 (Figure 9-184)/ Mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Line break down stream of Starting air tanks Low pressure Redundant diesel remains check valves 1VG29, 1VG30, bleed down alarm operable.

1VG31, and 1VG32 ( Figure 9-183) and check valves 1VG73, 1VG74, 1VG75, and 1VG76 (Figure 9-184) Mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Starting Air Governor Oil Fails to function/mechanical or Time required to None Diesel remains operable.

Pressure Boost Cylinder pneumatic failure start diesel will Redundant diesel remains increase operable.

Starting Air Distributors One air distributor fails to None None Redundant air distributor on the function/mechanical failure same diesel remains operable.

Redundant diesel remains operable.

Both air distributors fail to Engine start None Redundant diesel remains function/mechanical failure capability is lost operable.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-42 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-42. Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System Single Failure Analysis FAILURE MODE/ DETECTION COMPONENT CAUSE EFFECTS METHOD REMARKS Engine-Driven Lube Fails to function/ mechanical No oil flow to engine leading Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains Oil Pump failure or damage to high bearing temperatures operable.

and eventual shutdown Lube Oil Cooler Leaks/Mechanical failure Reduction in oil flow to Low pressure alarm or Redundant diesel remains due to corrosion or ruptures engine, increase in bearing high bearing temperature operable.

temperature alarm Lube Oil Filter Clogged/Accumulation of Reduction in oil flow to High differential pressure Filter is duplex type and (Duplex) dirt and debris engine alarm flow can be manually diverted from the clogged filter to the clean filter.

Cannot be bypassed.

Lube Oil Strainer Clogged/Accumulation of Reduction in oil flow to High differential pressure Strainer is duplex type and dirt and debris engine alarm flow can be manually diverted from the clogged strainer to the clean strainer.

Lube Oil Heaters Electrical failure Low oil temperature; diesel Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains may not start within readiness at proper acceptable time frame temperature.

Prelube Oil Pump Fails to function/mechanical Low oil temperature; diesel Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains or electrical failure or may not start within readiness at proper damage acceptable time frame temperature.

Prelube Oil Filter or Clogged/Accumulation of Reduction in standby oil flow Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains Strainer dirt and debris through engine; diesel may readiness at proper not start within acceptable temperature.

time frame Lube Oil Piping Line break/corrosion or Loss of oil flow to engine Low pressure or low Redundant diesel remains damage temperature alarm operable.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-43 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-43. Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System Alarm and Shutdown Setpoints Parameter Alarm Setpoint Shutdown Setpoint Pressure:

Full Flow Lube Oil Duplex Strainer 20 PSID High Differential Pressure Full Flow Lube Oil Duplex Filter 20 PSID High Differential Pressure Low Engine Lube Oil Pressure 40 PSIG 30 PSIG1 Low Turbocharger (RH) Lube Oil Pressure 20 PSIG 15 PSIG Low Turbocharger (LH) Lube Oil Pressure 20 PSIG 15 PSIG High Crankcase Pressure 5 in - H2O Temperature:

Low Temperature Lube Oil Engine Inlet 140°F High Temperature Lube Oil Engine Inlet 175°F Low Temperature Lube Oil Engine Outlet 140°F High Temperature Lube Oil Engine Outlet 190°F 200°F High Temperature Engine Main Bearings 228°F Note:

1. Low-low lube oil pressure trip will automatically shutdown diesel regardless of operating mode.

(22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-44 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-44. Diesel Generator Engine Intake and Exhaust System Single Failure Analysis Component Failure Mode/ Cause Effects Detection Method Remarks Intake Filter Blockage/Accumulation of Reduction in air flow to High exhaust gas Redundant diesel remains dirt and debris engine temperature operable.

Silencer Blockage/Accumulation of Reduction in air flow to High exhaust gas Redundant diesel remains dirt and debris engine temperature operable.

Ruptured/Mechanical Excessive noise, loss of Excessive noise in diesel Engine remains operable.

Failure due to cracks or outdoor intake air building corrosion Intake Air Pipes And Blockage/Accumulation of Reduction in air flow to High exhaust gas Redundant diesel remains Flexible Hose dirt and debris engine temperature operable.

Ruptured/Mechanical Excessive noise, loss of Excessive noise in diesel Engine remains operable.

Failure due to cracks or outdoor intake air building corrosion Turbocharger Loss of air supplied Reduced or no air flow High exhaust gas Redundant diesel remains mechanical failure of temperature or stopping of operable.

compressor or turbine engine Aftercooler Leaks/Mechanical failure Loss of adequately cooled Loss of engine power Redundant diesel remains due to cracks or corrosion air output operable.

Exhaust Gas Pipe And Blockage/Accumulation of Engine slows or stops Stopping of engine Redundant diesel remains Flexible Coupling dirt and debris operable.

Ruptured/Mechanical Excessive noise, exhaust Excessive noise in diesel Engine remains operable.

failure due to cracks or gas inside diesel building building corrosion Exhaust Silencer Blockage Engine slows or stops Stopping of engine Redundant diesel remains operable.

Ruptured Excessive noise, exhaust Excessive noise inside Engine remains operable.

gas inside diesel building building (22 OCT 2001)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-45 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-45. Comparison of VQ System to BTP CSB 6-4 BTP Disposition 1a. Actuators will close the containment isolation valves assuming full containment pressure differential and resultant flow.

b. The system as shown in Figure 9-194 contains only one supply and one return line.

c. The lines are nominal 4" pipe.

d. The design of the containment penetrations is listed in Table 6-74 and Table 6-77.

e. The containment isolation valves close on receipt of a "T" signal (phase A isolation). One of the parameters that can initiate a "T" signal is high containment airborne activity (see Figure 7-2, page 10).

f. The containment isolation valves close within 5 seconds.

g. The pipes which connect the containment isolation valves with the containment is Duke Class F (i.e., ANSI B31.1 pipe, seismically qualified). The pipes are open to upper containment atmosphere which will afford virtually complete isolation from high energy pipe break generated debris. In addition, the opening of the pipes are covered by a 40 mesh screen that is held in place between a pair of flanges.

2. This system is designed only to control containment pressure during normal operation.

3. This system is not designed or used to purge the containment to reduce airborne activity.

4. Provisions for testing of containment isolation valves during reactor operations exist.

5a. See response to position 1.e. for valve closure signals. The amount of radiation that can realistically be expected to be released through this flow path is insignificant.

b. The VQ system utilizes schedule 40 pipe which precludes rupture due to application of containment design pressure (15 psig). The only safety related equipment in the system are the containment isolation valves.

c. If the system is in operation at the start of an accident the amount of air lost while the valves are closing is insignificant.

d. An allowable leak rate for these valves will be developed in the type "C" test program.

(17 OCT 2013)

Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-46 (Page 1 of 1)

Table 9-46. Groundwater Drainage System Component Design Parameters AUXILIARY BUILDING GROUNDWATER DRAINAGE SUMP PUMPS Number both units 6 Type Vertical Design Capacity, GPM 300 Head at Design Flow, FT 90 Minimum Available NPSH, FT 30 Normal Operating Pressure, PSIG 40 Temperature of Pumped Fluid, °F Ambient TURBINE BUILDING GROUNDWATER DRAINAGE SUMP PUMPS Number both units 4 Type Vertical Design Capacity, GPM 300 Head at Design Flow, FT 65 Minimum Available NPSH, FT 30 Normal Operating Pressure, PSIG 25 Temperature of Pumped Fluid, °F Ambient (22 OCT 2001)