ML20106E925
Text
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Appendix 9A. Tables Appendix 9A. Tables
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-1 (Page 1 of 3)
(21 OCT 2010)
Table 9-1. Spent Fuel Cooling System Component Design Parameters SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING & MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP Number per unit 2
Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 175 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow rate, gpm 2840 Design head, ft 275
@ design flow Material of construction SS FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Number per unit 2
Type U-Tube Heat transfer per HX at design conditions (btu/hr) 15,000,000 Flow, tube side, gpm 2310 Flow, shell side, gpm 3000 Tube side inlet temperature, F 125 Tube side outlet temperature, F 112 Shell side inlet temperature, F 100 Shell side outlet temperature, F 110 Design pressure, shell/tube, psig 150/175 Design temperature, shell/tube, F 225/225 Material of Construction, shell/tube CS/SS FUEL TRANSFER CANAL AIR DRIVEN UNWATERING PUMP Number per unit 1
Type Portable submersible air driven pump Design pressure, psig 40 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow rate, gpm 225 Design head, ft 50
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-1 (Page 2 of 3)
(21 OCT 2010)
Material of Construction SS SPENT FUEL POOL PURIFICATION EQUIPMENT FUEL POOL COOLING PRE-FILTER Number per unit 2
Type Disposable cartridge Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 265 Retention @ 6 micron and larger particle size 98%
Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL COOLING DEMINERALIZER Number per unit 1
Type Flushable Resin type Bead Mixed Bed Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 530 Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL COOLING DEMIN RESIN STRAINER - (Unit 1 Only)
Number per unit 1
Type Cone Design Pressure, psig 200 Design Temp, °F 200 Design Flow, gpm 530 Retention mesh
.092 Materials of Const.
SS FUEL POOL COOLING POST-FILTER Number per unit 2
Type Disposable cartridge Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow rate, gpm 265
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-1 (Page 3 of 3)
(21 OCT 2010)
Retention @ 3 micron and larger particle size 98%
Material of Construction SS SPENT FUEL POOL SKIMMER EQUIPMENT FUEL POOL SKIMMER STRAINER Number per unit 1
Type Basket Design pressure, psig 20 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 100 Perforation, dia, in 7/64 Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL SKIMMER PUMP Number per unit 1
Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 45 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 100 Design head, ft 55 Material of Construction SS FUEL POOL SKIMMER FILTER Number per unit 1
Type Disposable cartridge Design pressure, psig 75 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 100 Retention @ 3 micron and larger particle size 98%
Material of Construction SS
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-2 (Page 1 of 2)
(17 OCT 2013)
Table 9-2. Nuclear Service Water System Component Design Parameters NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUMPS Number per unit 2
Type Vertical, wet pit, mixed flow with above floor discharge Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 105 Design Flow, gpm 20,900 Design Head, ft.
174 Shutoff Head, ft.
260 Min. Flow Rate, gpm 8600 (continuous), 4000 (Intermittent, up to 2 hr per 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />)
Material of Construction Carbon Steel Motor horsepower, name plate 1000 Type Vertical, totally enclosed, water cooled Motor Cooler Design Flow, gpm 40 Deleted Per 2006 Update Motor Upper Bearing OilCooler Flow, gpm 4 (nominal), 1 (minimum)
Submergency Req. at Max Flow, ft.
5 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER STRAINERS Number per unit 2
Type Horizontal, continuous automatic backflush Design Pressure, psig 100 Design Temperature, F 100 Design Flow, gpm 20,900 Strainer element type slotted tubular stainless steel Strainer element size openings, in.
1/32 Maximum pressure drop, psi 4
Material of construction Carbon Steel Deleted Per 2006 Update NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM UNWATERING PUMP Number per station 1
Type Portable submersible pump Design Flow, gpm 800
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-2 (Page 2 of 2)
(17 OCT 2013) minimum 400 maximum 1200 Design Head, ft. at Design Flow 65 ft. at Shutoff 78 Design Pressure, psig 50 Design Temperature, F 108 Driver Type Submersible electric motor Casing Material Carbon Steel Impeller Material Stainless Steel Deleted Per 2006 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-3 (Page 1 of 3)
(21 OCT 2010)
Table 9-3. Nuclear Service Water System Flow Rates Outside the Nuclear Service Water Pumphouse Component Header Modulated Flow Nominal Individual Component Flow Rates (GPM)
Mode A Startup No. in Operation Mode B Normal (Power)
Operation No. in Operation Mode C Shutdown No. in Operation Mode D Refueling No. in Operation Mode E Engineered Safeguards (Safety Injection)
No. in Operation Mode F Engineered Safeguards (Sump Recirculation)
No. in Operation GROUP I --
COMPONENTS ON EACH UNIT WHICH RECEIVE RN FLOW WITH OR WITHOUT OFFSITE POWER
- 1. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers E
No 2800 0
0 0
0 0
2
- 2. Deleted Per 2007 Update
- 3. Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Area Assured Source to Air Conditioning Units E
Yes 10 0
0 0
0 0
0
- 4. Component Cooling Heating Exchangers E
Yes 5200 2
1 2
2 2
2 Delete Per 2010 Update
- 5. Assured Spent Fuel Pool Makeup E
No 140 0
0 0
0 0
0
- 6. Assured Source of Auxiliary Feedwater E
No 900 0
0 0
0 2
0
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-3 (Page 2 of 3)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Header Modulated Flow Nominal Individual Component Flow Rates (GPM)
Mode A Startup No. in Operation Mode B Normal (Power)
Operation No. in Operation Mode C Shutdown No. in Operation Mode D Refueling No. in Operation Mode E Engineered Safeguards (Safety Injection)
No. in Operation Mode F Engineered Safeguards (Sump Recirculation)
No. in Operation
- 7. Assured Component Cooling Makeup E
No 340 0
0 0
0 0
0 Deleted Per 2006 Updated
- 8. Assured Containment Valve Injection Makeup (Note 1: Long term CA makeup flow rate is 599 gpm.)
E No 5
0 0
0 0
0 0
GROUP I FLOW TOTALS (PER UNIT-
-GPM) 10,400 5200 10,400 10,400 12220 17820 GROUP II --
SHARED COMPONENTS (UNIT 1 ONLY)
WHICH RECEIVE FLOW WITH OR WITHOUT OFFSITE POWER
- 1. Control Room Chiller Condenser E
Yes 1300 1
1 1
1 1
1 Delete Per 2010 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-3 (Page 3 of 3)
(21 OCT 2010)
GROUP II FLOW TOTALS (GPM) 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 GROUP III --
COMPONENTS ON EACH UNIT WHICH RECEIVE FLOW UPON LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
- 1. Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Cooler E
No 900 2
2 2
2 2
2
- 2. Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Coolers N
No 150 4
4 4
4 4
0
- 3. Lower Containment Vent Units N
Yes 8002 4
4 4
4 4
0
- 4. Upper Containment Vent Units N
Yes 18 3
3 3
4 4
0
- 5. Incore Instrumentation Room Vent Units N
Yes 10 2
2 2
2 2
0
- 6. Auxiliary Building Supply Vent Unit N
Yes 2
2 2
2 0
0 GROUP III FLOW TOTALS (PER UNIT-
-GPM) 5874 5874 5874 5892 5692 1800 Deleted per 2006 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 1 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Table 9-4. Nuclear Service Water System Failure Analysis Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 1. Lake Wylie Loss of Dam RN Pumphouse pit emergency low level in either train automatically aligns RN supply and return lines to the SNSWP, isolates the RN non-essential headers, and starts all of the RN pumps. The RN Pumphouse pit level interlocks are designed to operate during all modes of operation, including ESF modes.
- 2. Diesel Generator 1A, 1B, 2A, or 2B Any failure causing diesel to not start or fail after starting
- a. During normal station operation: If blackout occurs during normal operation, the RN pumps are such aligned that each one starts upon its respective diesel startup. Crossovers remain open so either pump can supply demands. Normal valve alignment prevents RN Pump runout.
- b. If diesel fails during regularly scheduled test, the shared EMO valves (RN Pumphouse Pit supply and all main return valves so noted on flow diagram) should be aligned to Unit 2 diesel of corresponding channel using switchover provided. Either unit ESF signal actuates all shared valves.
- c. Failure of diesel simultaneous with blackout and subsequent Loss of Lake and/or LOCA prevents the associated diesel supply and return valves (i.e., valves 1RN232A, 1RN846A and 1RN847A for Diesel Generator 1A) from supplying cooling water and realigning discharge from Lake Wylie to SNSWP. Lake discharge valves are interlocked with SNSWP discharge valves such that the Lake return and the SNSWP return valves can not be closed at the same time.
This ensures a discharge flow path for RN through the KD heat exchangers. Operator action is required to position valves that fail to reposition automatically during a swap to the SNSWP.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 2 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- d. If a single diesel fails simultaneous with blackout and subsequent Loss of Lake and LOCA, no more than one channel of RN will be lost. The remaining channel in each unit is sufficient to shut down both units safely even with one pit (hence a Unit 1 and Unit 2 channel) out of operation. Separation of channels and isolation of non-safety class piping prevent seismic induced flooding and RN Pump runout should all control valves fail open on loss of air due to station blackout.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7) one RN supply header is isolated. The RN crossover valves in the RN pumphouse, Auxiliary Building, and Diesel Generator Rooms remain open, so RN cooling water flow is available to all four RN Essential Headers and Diesel Generators. In this alignment, if a single diesel fails simultaneous with loss-of-offsite-power, and subsequent Loss of Lake and LOCA, RN channel separation is not desired. This alignment does not result in a loss of a RN channel.
- 3. Lake supply to pit valve 1A, 2B, 5A or 6B or all valves of like channel Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of any one valve or either complete channel will not prevent isolation of Lake Wylie. In conjunction with switchover to SNSWP, this means that SNSWP can never be lost to a "dry" Lake Wylie.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 3 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 4. SNSWP supply to pit valve 3A or 4B Failure to open on Loss of Lake
- a. Each valve serves one pit of the RN Pumphouse, so failure of one SNSWP supply valve to open when Lake supply valves close results in failure of only that pit. Only one channel of RN is lost. The remaining channel in each unit is sufficient to shut down both units safely. The redundant channels automatically separate upon emergency low pit level concurrent with a safety injection signal on one of the units. Otherwise, the operator will need to manually isolate train.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), one RN supply header is isolated. The RN crossover valves in the RN pumphouse, and the RN supply header crossover isolation valves in the Auxiliary, 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented for auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level, since channel separation is not desired in this alignment. Similarly, the RN return header crossover header isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54A are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers, even with the failure of one RN pit to transfer suction to the SNSWP. This alignment does not result in loss of a RN channel.
- b. If a diesel generator is known to be out of service, these valves are aligned to the other unit's operable diesel generator on the corresponding channel. However, failure of one SNSWP supply valve to open when the Lake supply valves close will result in failure of that pit. One channel of RN is lost. If the diesel generator out of service is on the RN channel unaffected by the SNSWP supply valve failure, only one RN pump will be operable. One pump is sufficient to provide for safe shutdown of the operating unit and maintaining the other unit in cold shutdown.
If a diesel generator or RN pump is known to be out of service, the RN system can not be aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 4 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 5. Main Lake return valves 1RN57A or 1RN843B Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent isolation of Lake discharge. In conjunction with switchover to SNSWP, this means that SNSWP can never be lost to a "dry" Lake Wylie.
- 6. Main SNSWP return valves 1RN63A 1RN58B Failure to open on Loss of Lake Each valve serves one shared train of RN System return to SNSWP, so failure of one valve to open when Lake return valves close results in failure of only one channel in both units. The remaining channel in each unit is sufficient to shut down both units safely.
If the valve failure occurs while the RN system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), channel separation does not occur and the RN return header crossover isolation valves, 1RN53B and 1RN54A, are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that a NSW cooling water flow path is available to all four essential headers, even with the failure of one SNSWP return valve to reposition, and does not result in a loss of a RN channel.
If a Unit 1 diesel is known to be out of service, these valves are aligned to the Unit 2 diesel of corresponding channel.
If a diesel generator or RN pump is known to be out of service, alignment of the RN system in Single Supply Header Operation is prohibited.
- 7. Crossover valves 1RN36A or 1RN37B Failure to close on ESF Signal, as applicable Alignment of these non-nuclear safety valves is not required for any design basis event.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 5 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences a) Crossover valves 1RN47A or 1RN48B Failure to close on Loss of Lake or ESF Signal, as applicable A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent channel separation when required.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented from auto-closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal, or an emergency low pumphouse pit level.
Similarly, the RN return header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54B are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates either or both of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.
- 8. Non-essential header isolation valves 1RN49A or 1RN50B 1RN51A or 1RN52B Failure to close on Loss of Lake A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent isolation of non-safety class piping when required.
- 9. Any or all Channel A valves actuated by Loss of Lake or ESF Signal Failure to assume proper position upon signal Channel B functions in its entirety and is sufficient to shut down the unit safely. Sufficient manual realignment via crossovers is provided for maintenance or a second failure in long term after LOCA.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented from auto-closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal, or an emergency low pumphouse pit level.
Similarly, the RN return header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54B are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates either or both of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 6 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 10. Any or all Channel B valves actuated by Loss of Lake or ESF Signal Failure to assume proper position upon signal Channel A functions in its entirety and is sufficient to shut down the unit safely. Sufficient manual realignment via crossovers is provided for maintenance or a second failure in the long term after LOCA.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN47A, 1RN48B, 2RN47A, and 2RN48B are prevented from auto-closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal, or an emergency low pumphouse pit level.
Similarly, the RN return header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54B are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates either or both of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.
- 11. Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Cooler discharge to Lake 1RN847A, 1RN849B, 2RN847A, or 2RN849B Failure to close on Loss of Lake
- a. Most likely cause is diesel failure, which means supply valve 1RN232A, 1RN292B, 2RN232A, or 2RN292B will not open either.
In this case, see item 2 above.
- b. Lake discharge valves are interlocked with SNSWP discharge valves 1RN846A, 1RN848B, 2RN846A, and 2RN848B such that the Lake return and the SNSWP return valves can not be closed at the same time. This ensures a discharge flowpath for RN through the KD heat exchangers. Operator action is required to position valves that fail to reposition automatically during a swap to the SNSWP.
- 12. Either RN Pump 1A or 2A Any failure causing RN Pump to not start or fail after starting RN Pumps 1B and 2B provide 100% redundancy. Before crossover isolation, they can be used to supply all loads previously aligned to train A pumps.
After crossover isolation, train B essential heat exchangers in both units allow safe shutdown.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 7 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 13. Any Channel A safety related heat exchanger or equipment Tube rupture or plug or shell rupture Channel B heat exchangers and RN Pump provide 100% redundancy. Before crossover isolation, any RN Pump in operation can supply any channel heat exchanger, or a mixture of A and B channel heat exchangers. After channel separation, the B RN Pumps supply only Channel B essential heat exchangers, which are sufficient for safe shutdown of both units.
When the RN system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN channels remain cross-connected. The crossover valves are prevented from closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal or an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers and Diesel Generators if there is an event that generates either, or both, of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation, even with the failure of one Channel A safety-related heat exchanger. Isolation valves can be repositioned to isolate the affected component.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 8 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 14. RN Pump 1A and 2A discharge piping to heat exchangers Rupture or plug Use Channel B intake line from Lake or SNSWP, Pumphouse Pit B, RN Pumps 1B and 2B, and all Channel B heat exchangers until repairs can be made.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), one buried RN supply header is isolated, so redundant RN supply header is not immediately available to provide flow to essential components.
Pipe rupture is an initiating event and concurrent design-basis events are not required to be considered, unless they result from rupture. Postulated leakage rates for a pipe rupture of the in-service supply header piping can be tolerated, and still provide adequate RN flow to essential components on a long term bais to enable safe shut down of both units.
Plugging, blockage or collapse of the buried RN supply header is not considered credible since there are no internal components and the piping internal pressure exceeds soil pressure.
In the event of a catastrophic failure of the in-service supply header while in Single Supply Header Operation, plant procedures exist to allow safe shut down of both units.
- 15. RN Pumphouse Intake line A from SNSWP Collapse or plug Use Channel B intake line from SNSWP, Pumphouse Pit B, and all Channel B heat exchangers unit repairs can be made.
When the RN system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN channels remain cross-connected. The crossover valves are prevented from closing on a Phase B containment isolation signal or an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers and Diesel Generators if there is an event that generates either, or both, of these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation, even with the failure of one intake line form the SNSWP. This alignment does not result in a loss of a RN channel.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-4 (Page 9 of 9)
(21 OCT 2010)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 16. RN Pumphouse Shared Intake line from Lake Collapse or plug RN Pumphouse Pit emergency low level will automatically realign to SNSWP and start all RN Pumps for temporary operation until line is repaired, or for shutdown.
- 17. Either RN Strainer 1A or 2A Rupture or plug Isolate affected RN Strainer and RN Pump. Use another pump to satisfy cooling water requirements through normally open crossovers.
- 18. Any non-safety related component Any failure which would prevent normal operation of the component.
Isolate component and perform required maintenance.
- 19. Shared discharge line to Lake Wylie Rupture or plug Manually align all RN Pumphouse Intake line valves and all return line isolation valves to SNSWP for temporary operation until line is repaired or for shutdown.
- 20. Channel A shared return line to SNSWP Rupture or plug Isolate affected return line A and utilize backup train return line B until train A is repaired.
Deleted Per 2006 Update
- 21. Crossover valves 1RN53B or 1RN54A Failure to close on Loss of Lake.
A and B valves are in series, so failure of either valve will not prevent channel separation when required.
When the NSW is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation (refer to Section 9.2.1.7), the RN supply header crossover isolation valves 1RN53B and 1RN54A are prevented from auto-closing on an emergency low pumphouse pit level. This ensures that NSW cooling water flow is available to all four essential headers if there is an event that generates these signals while the NSW system is aligned in Single Supply Header Operation.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-5 (Page 1 of 1)
(27 MAR 2003)
Table 9-5. Nominal Nuclear Service Water System Flow Rates in the Nuclear Service Water Pumphouse Component Individual Component Flow Rate (GPM)
GROUP I -- RECEIVE FLOW ONLY WHEN ITS RESPECTIVE RN PUMP IS IN OPERATION
- 1. RN Pump Motor Coolers (2 Flow Paths per Cooler)
- 2. RN Pump Motor Upper Bearing Oil Coolers 40 4 (nominal), 1 (minimum)
GROUP I TOTAL FLOW (Per Pump) 44 GPM GROUP II -- STRAINER BACKFLUSH FLOW
- 1. RN Strainers (1 Per Pump) 1000 (Periodic)
GROUP II Totals (for the entire pumphouse)
- a. Periodic Up to 4000 GPM No of Pumps in Operation No of Pumps x Group I Total Flow Group II Periodic Flow Total Total Flow Required By RN Pumphouse 1
44 GPM Up to 4000 GPM Up to 4044 GPM 2
88 4000 4088 3
132 4000 4132 4
176 4000 4176
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 1 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Table 9-6. Component Cooling System Heat Load and Flow Requirements Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Unit Startup Residual Heat Removal HXs 1
1 37.4 5000 1
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1
2
.443 50 2
Component Cooling Pumps 4
4
.216 120 3
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2
2
.136 60 3
Containment Spray Pumps 0
60 3
Safety Injection Pumps 0
2 80 4
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 0
2 140 4
Letdown HX 1
1 16.0 1000 Sealwater HX 1
1 1.98 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1
2
.620 80 3
Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 1
1 18.5 3000 5
Recycle Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 6
Waste Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 6
Waste Gas Compressor Package 1
2
.134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
1 2
.07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0
1 225 Excess Letdown HX 1
1 5.18 250 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 7
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 2 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Reactor Coolant Pumps 4
4 4.80 824 8
Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 9
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
ASPSUs 2
2
.06 20 10 TOTALS 103.908 12915 Notes:
- 1. Discontinued after Reactor Coolant Pumps are started.
- 2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 5. Only one Fuel Pool Cooling HX is assumed to be in service. However, the Component Cooling System has sufficient capacity to place both KF HXs in service if necessary.
- 6. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.
- 7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 8. The Thermal Barrier, Upper and Lower Bearing Oil Coolers of each Reactor Coolant Pump receive cooling flow.
- 9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 3 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Normal Unit Operation Residual Heat Removal HXs 0
0 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 0
2 50 1
Component Cooling Pumps 2
4
.108 120 2
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 0
2 60 2
Containment Spray Pumps 0
2 60 2
Safety Injection Pumps 0
2 80 3
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 0
2 140 3
Letdown HX 1
1 10.42 1000 4
Sealwater HX 1
1 1.98 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 10 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1
2
.620 80 2
Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 1
1 18.5 3000 Recycle Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 5
Waste Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 5
Waste Gas Compressor Package 1
2
.134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
1 2
.07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1
1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0
0 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 6
Reactor Coolant Pumps 4
4 4.80 824 7
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 4 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Post Accident Liquid Sampler Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 8
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
ASPSUs 2
2
.06 20 9
TOTALS 57.291 7665 Notes:
- 1. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 2. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers and oil coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.
- 5. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.
- 6. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 7. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.
- 8. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 9. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 10. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Normal Unit Shutdown (Two trains of ND)
2 234.36 10000 1
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2
2
.886 50 2
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 5 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Component Cooling Pumps 4
4
.216 120 3
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2
2
.136 60 3
Containment Spray Pumps 0
2 60 3
Safety Injection Pumps 0
2 80 4
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 1
2
.577 140 4
Letdown HX 1
1 10.42 1000 5
Sealwater HX 1
1 1.604 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0
2 80 3
Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0
0 Recycle Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 6
Waste Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 6
Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1
2
.134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
1 2
.07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1
1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0
0 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 7
Reactor Coolant Pumps 1
4 2.508 824 8
Post Accident Liquid Sampler Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 9
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
ASPSUs 2
2
.06 20 10
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 6 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes TOTALS 271. 570 14665 Notes:
- 1. Heat load determined as follows:
Core decay heat load at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Reactor Coolant System sensible heat load (2.01 x 106 Btu/°F at 50°F/hr cooldown rate)
One Reactor Coolant Pump heat input 120.21 x 106 Btu/hr 100.50 x 106Btu/hr Btu/hr 10 x
234.36 Btu/hr 10 x
13.65 6
6
- 2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 5. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally, the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.
- 6. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.
- 7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 8. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.
- 9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 7 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Normal Unit Shutdown at 20 Hours Residual Heat Removal HXs 2
2 74.75 10000 Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2
2
.886 50 1
Component Cooling Pumps 4
4
.216 120 2
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2
2
.136 60 2
Containment Spray Pumps 0
2 60 2
Safety Injection Pumps 0
2 80 3
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 1
2
.577 140 3
Letdown HX 1
1 10.42 1000 4
Sealwater HX 1
1 1.604 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 10 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0
2 80 2
Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0
0 Recycle Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 5
Waste Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 5
Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1
2
.134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
1 2
.07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1
1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0
0 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 6
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 8 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Reactor Coolant Pumps 0
4 824 7
Post Accident Liquid Sampler Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 8
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
ASPSUs 2
2 0.06 20 9
TOTALS 109.452 14665 Notes:
- 1. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 2. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.
- 5. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.
- 6. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 7. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.
- 8. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 9. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 10. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Unit Shutdown at 4 Hours (LOCA on Other Unit)
1 133.86 5000 1
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 9 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1
2
.443 50 2
Component Cooling Pumps 2
4
.108 120 3
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1
2
.068 60 3
Containment Spray Pumps 0
2 60 3
Safety Injection Pumps 0
2 80 4
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 1
2
.577 140 4
Letdown HX 1
1 10.42 1000 5
Sealwater HX 1
1 1.604 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0
2 80 3
Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0
0 Recycle Evaporator Package 0
1 810 6
Waste Evaporator Package 0
1 810 6
Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1
2
.134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
1 2
.07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 1
1 2.23 225 Excess Letdown HX 0
0 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 7
Reactor Coolant Pumps 1
4 2.508 824 8
Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 9
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 10 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes ASPSUs 2
2
.06 20 10 TOTALS 152.413 9665 Notes:
- 1. Heat load determined as follows:
Core decay heat load at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> One Reactor Coolant Pump heat input The cooldown will proceed slowly as the decay heat load decreases.
120.21 x 106 Btu/hr Btu/hr 10 x
133.86 Btu/hr 10 x
65 13 6
6
- 2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 5. Heat load on the Letdown HX may vary from 6.52 x 106 Btu/hr to 10.42 x 106 Btu/hr. Normally, the cooling flow is throttled to between 250 and 660 GPM. 1000 GPM would be expected if the control valve failed open.
- 6. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.
- 7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 8. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.
- 9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 11 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Refueling Residual Heat Removal HXs 2
2 42.97 10000 1
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2
2
.886 50 2
Component Cooling Pumps 4
4
.216 120 3
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 0
2 60 3
Containment Spray Pumps 0
2 60 3
Safety Injection Pumps 0
2 80 4
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 0
2 140 4
Letdown HX 0
1 1000 5
Sealwater HX 0
1 250 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 12 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1
2
.620 80 3
Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 1
1 18.5 3000 6
Recycle Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 7
Waste Evaporator Package 1
1 9.019 810 7
Waste Gas Compressor Packages 1
2
.134 100 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
1 2
.07 20 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0
1 225 Excess Letdown HX 0
0 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 8
Reactor Coolant Pumps 0
4 824 9
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 12 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 10 Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
ASPSUs 2
2 0.06 20 11 TOTALS 81.825 17665 Notes:
- 1. Heat load is core decay heat at 4 days after zero power, at which time transfer of fuel assemblies is expected to begin.
- 2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 5. 1000 GPM cooling flow would be expected if the control valve failed open. Normally, with no heat load the flow would tend towards zero.
- 6. One Fuel Pool Cooling HX is assumed for normal refueling. Flow should be blocked to nonessential equipment with no heat load if both Fuel Pool Cooling HXs are necessary.
- 7. Each evaporator package consists of an evaporator condenser, vent condenser, distillate cooler, concentrate heat exchanger, concentrate sample cooler, and the concentrate pumps bearing coolers. Only one of the two concentrate pumps bearing coolers is assumed to be in service.
- 8. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 9. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each reactor coolant pump receive cooling flow.
- 10. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 11. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 12. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 13 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Engineered Safeguards (Safety Injection)
2 10000 1
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2
2
.886 50 2
Component Cooling Pumps 4
4
.216 120 3
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2
2
.136 60 3
Containment Spray Pumps 2
2
.772 60 3
Safety Injection Pumps 2
2 1.132 80 4
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2
2 1.154 140 4
Letdown HX 0
0 Sealwater HX 0
0 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0
0 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0
0 Recycle Evaporator Package 0
0 Waste Evaporator Package 0
0 Waste Gas Compressor Packages 0
0 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
0 0
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0
1 250 5
Excess Letdown HX 0
1 225 6
Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 7
Reactor Coolant Pumps 0
4 824 8
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 14 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 9
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
ASPSUs 2
2 0.06 20 10 TOTALS 4.687 11845 Notes:
- 1. Cooling flow is supplied although there is no heat load on the Residual Heat Removal HXs during the safety injection mode of operation.
- 2. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 5. The Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when cooling flow is automatically secured.
- 6. If the Excess Letdown HX is receiving cooling flow when the safety injection signal is received, it will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured.
- 7. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 8. The Reactor Coolant Pumps receive cooling flow until the containment high-high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 9. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 10. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 11. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Engineered Safeguard (Recirculation)
2 95.03 10000
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 15 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2
2
.886 50 1
Component Cooling Pumps 4
4
.216 120 2
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2
2
.136 60 2
Containment Spray Pumps 2
2
.772 60 2
Safety Injection Pumps 2
2 1.132 80 3
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2
2 1.154 140 3
Letdown HX 0
0 Sealwater HX 0
0 Reciprocating Charging Pump Brg. Oil Cooler 0
0 10 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 0
0 Fuel Pool Cooling HXs 0
0 Recycle Evaporator Package 0
0 Waste Evaporator Package 0
0 Waste Gas Compressor Packages 0
0 Waste Gas Hyd. Recombiner Pack.
0 0
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX 0
0 0
4 Excess Letdown HX 0
0 0
5 Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 0
0 6
Reactor Coolant Pumps 0
0 0
7 Post Accident Liquid Sample Cooler 1
1 0.331 10 8
Radiation Monitors 0
2 6
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-6 (Page 16 of 16)
(15 NOV 2007)
Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System Number With Heat Load Number Receiving Flow Total Heat Load (Btu/Hr 106)
Total Flow (GPM)
Notes ASPSUs 2
2 0.06 20 9
TOTALS 99.717 10546 Notes:
- 1. The pump motor coolers and mechanical seal heat exchanger of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 2. The pump motor coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 3. The pump motor coolers and oil cooler(s) of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 4. The Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when cooling flow is automatically secured.
- 5. If the Excess Letdown HX is receiving cooling flow when the safety injection signal is received, it will continue to receive cooling flow until the containment high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured.
- 6. The Reactor Vessel Support Coolers have been abandoned in place per CD100872 (Unit 1) and CD200950 (Unit 2).
- 7. The Reactor Coolant Pumps receive cooling flow until the containment high-high pressure signal is received, when flow is automatically secured. The thermal barrier, upper and lower bearing oil coolers of each pump receive cooling flow.
- 8. The PALS Panel is normally in operation only during Engineered Safeguards; however, the panel may be tested at any time. Following train separation, the PALS panel receives cooling flow from one (but not both) KC Essential Headers.
- 9. ASPSU cooling water supplied by RN on ASP event.
- 10. Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-7 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-7. Component Cooling System Valve Alignment for Various Modes of Operation Mode of Operation Valve Number 1
2 3-1 3-2 3-3 4
5-1 5-2 Figure Loc.
KC1A 0
0 0
0 0
0 (1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 C-6 KC3A 0
0 0
0 0
(2)
(1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 C-6 KC50A 0
0 0
0 0
0 (1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 K-7 KC230A 0
0 0
0 0
(2)
(1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 K-7 KC56A (4)
X 0
0 (4) 0 (5,9)
(5,9)
CN-1573-2.0 KC18B 0
0 0
0 0
(2)
(1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 C-9 KC2B 0
0 0
0 0
0 (1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 C-9 KC53B 0
0 0
0 0
0 (1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 K-8 KC228B 0
0 0
0 0
(2)
(1,3)
(1,3) 9-35 K-8 KC81B (4)
X 0
0 (4) 0 (5,9)
(5,9)
CN-1573.2.1 KC148 (4,6)
(4)
X X
X (4,6) 9-37 G-11 KC155 (4,6)
(4)
X X
X (4,6) 9-37 G-13 KC2251 0
0 0
0 0
0 9-41 G-8 KC2521 0
0 0
0 0
0 9-41 G-7 KC4631 0
0 0
0 0
0 9-41 B-2 KC4771 0
0 0
0 0
0 9-41 F-4 KC320A 0
0 0
0 0
0 (7)
(7) 9-38 B-10 KC332B 0
0 0
0 0
0 (7)
(7) 9-38 E-2 KC333A 0
0 0
0 0
0 (7)
(7) 9-38 G-2 KC305B 0
X X
X X
X (8)
(8) 9-38 D-13 KC315B 0
X X
X X
X (8)
(8) 9-38 L-13 KC338B 0
0 0
0 0
0 (3)
(3) 9-38 D-12 KC424B 0
0 0
0 0
0 (3)
(3) 9-38 L-5 KC425A 0
0 0
0 0
0 (3)
(3) 9-38 L-7 Note:
- 1. On Unit 1 only.
Nonmenclature:
0 - open X - closed
- - downstream of a closed valve
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-7 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Mode of Operation Valve Number 1
2 3-1 3-2 3-3 4
5-1 5-2 Figure Loc.
Valves listed in this table are isolation valves which are regularly manipulated align the system for its various modes of operation. All other isolation valves should remain in the position indicated on the flow diagrams except for changes required for maintenance, or emergency situations.
- 1. Closes on low-low FWST level following a S-signal (Safety Injection Signal).
- 2. Normally open, but closed when both fuel pool cooling HXs are used in refueling.
- 3. Closes on P-signal (High-High Containment Pressure Signal).
- 4. Valve may be open or closed, depending on which train (or heat exchanger) is in operation and which is serving as backup.
- 5. Opens on low-low FWST level following a S-signal (Safety Injection Signal).
- 6. Both fuel pool cooling HXs may be in operation. See Note 2.
- 7. Normally open, closes on T-signal (High Containment Pressure Signal).
- 8. Normally closed, closes on T-signal (High Containment Pressure Signal) if open.
- 9. Opens on P-Signal (High High Containment Pressure Signal).
This table contains nominal valve alignments based on projected component operation and selected worst case assumptions (such as maximum lake temperature). Actual valve alignments may differ based on actual plant conditions.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-8 (Page 1 of 2)
(24 APR 2006)
Table 9-8. Component Cooling System Component Design Data COMPONENT COOLING PUMPS Number per unit 4
Type Centrifugal Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 200 Design Flow, gpm 3760 Design Head, ft.
200 OEM Max. Tested Flow Rate, gpm 5700 Deleted Per 2006 Update Minimum Flow Rate (continuous), gpm 1100 NPSH Required At Design Flow, Ft.
13.7 Material of Construction Carbon Steel COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS Number per Unit 2
Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 200 Estimated UA, BTU/HR F (inhibited Admiralty) 6.82 x 106 Estimated UA, BTU/HR F (316SS) 6.38 x 106 Design Flow (Shell Side), LB/HR 3.242 x 106 Design Flow (Tube Side), LB/HR 5.000 x 106 Shell Side Inlet Temp., F 172 Shell Side Outlet Temp., F 110 Tube Side Inlet Temp., F 90 Tube Side Outlet Temp., F 130.4 Max. Pressure Loss, psi 15 Shell Side Fouling Factor
.0005 Tube Side Fouling Factor
.002 Shell Side Material Carbon Steel Tube Side Material (HXs 1B, 2A)
Inhibited Admiralty Tube Side Material (HXs 1A, 2B) 316SS COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK Number per Unit 2
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-8 (Page 2 of 2)
(24 APR 2006)
Total Volume per tank, gal 3925 Normal Water Volume per tank, gal 2500 Normal Pressure, psig 0
Design Pressure, psig 15 Design Temperature, F 200 Material of Construction 304 Stainless Steel COMPONENT COOLING DRAIN SUMP Number per Unit 1
Total Volume per sump, gal.
500 Design Temperature, F 200 Height of curbing, inches 6
COMPONENT COOLING DRAIN SUMP PUMPS Number per Unit 2
Type Vertical wet pit centrifugal Design Flow, gpm 50 Design Head, ft 115 Shutoff, ft 138
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-9 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-9. Component Cooling System. Failure Analysis (Assuming Receipt of Safety Injection Signal)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 1. Component cooling water pump Rupture of pump casing By definition, the backup train of pumps start on signal. They provide 100% redundancy and are able to supply minimum engineered safety requirements.
- 2. Component cooling water pump Pump fails to start Same as #1.
- 3. Component cooling water pump Manual valve on a pump suction line closed This is prevented by prestartup and operational checks. Further, during normal operation each pump is checked on a periodic basis which should show that a valve was closed.
- 4. Component cooling water pump Stop valve on discharge line closed or check valve sticks closed Stop valves are locked open and check valves are checked open by prestartup and operational checks.
- 5. Component cooling water pump Loss of normal electric power Normal power sources automatically switch to emergency diesel power. There are two emergency diesel-generators per unit, either of which are capable of supplying power for the operation of the necessary safeguard features & protection systems.
- 6. Component cooling heat exchanger Tube or shell rupture Backup train of pumps/heat exchanger function as required. Each heat exchanger is capable of supplying minimum engineered safety features heat transfer requirements. A tube rupture will cause a release of chromated water to the environment well within allowable limits.
A shell rupture will cause the spillage of one train of the system. Pressure, flow, and surge tank level alarms would indicate this failure.
- 7. Component cooling heat exchanger vent or drain valve Left Open This is prevented by prestartup and operational checks.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-9 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 8. Valves and piping Through-wall crack Isolate equipment supplied and start redundant equipment or isolate entire header and start equipment on redundant header. Any pipe crack will cause spillage of pot entially radioactive water within Auxiliary Building.
- 9. Component Cooling Surge Tank Through-wall crack Backup train of component cooling system functions as required. Surge tank failure would drain down only the channel affected, and even then, pump operation is assured with surge tank empty.
However, this channel is disabled as far as outleakage is concerned. Level alarm indicates such a failure.
- 10. Isolation Valve Train A Fails to Actuate on Safety Signal Train B gives 100% redundancy.
- 11. Isolation Valve Train B Fails to Actuate on Safety Signal Train A gives 100% redundancy.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-10 (Page 1 of 2)
(05 APR 2015)
Table 9-10. Makeup Demineralized Water System Component Design Parameters MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER SUPPLY PUMPS Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Quantity 2 per Station Type Vertical In-Line Model 4 x 3 x 8 VOC Number of Stages One Design Flow 475 GPM Design TDH 215 FT Speed 3600 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 40 HP Minimum Continuous Flow 100 GPM Deleted per 2015 update MAKEUP DEMINERALIZERS Manufacturer IWT Quantity 2 per Station Type Mixed Bed Model NA Design Flow 475 GPM each Design Pressure 100 PSIG Design Temperature 150°F Pressure Drop @ Design Flow 21 PSI Anion Resin Volume 339 CU. FT.
Cation Resin Volume 154 CU. FT.
Deleted per 2015 update DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK Manufacturer FESCO Quantity 1 per Station Design Capacity 9,970 GAL.
Design Temperature 110°F Design Internal Pressure 60 PSIG Design External Pressure 0 PSIG Deleted per 2015 update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-10 (Page 2 of 2)
(05 APR 2015)
DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK SUPPLY PUMPS Manufacturer Ingersoll - Rand Quantity 2 per Station Type Vertical In - Line Model 2 x 1 1/2 x 8 VOC Number of Stages One Design Flow 100 GPM Design TDH 130 FT Speed 3550 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 7.8 HP Minimum Continuous Flow 25 GPM Deleted per 2015 update MAKEUP DEMINERALIZER AIR COMPRESSOR Manufacturer Nash Quantity One per Station Type Liquid Ring Model CL - 701 Number of Stages One Design Capacity 620 SCFM Design Discharge Pressure 15 PSIG Motor Horsepower 50 HP Deleted per 2015 update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-11 (Page 1 of 1)
(05 APR 2015)
Table 9-11. Filtered Water System and Drinking Water System Component Design Parameters Deleted per 2015 update FILTERED WATER BOOSTER PUMP Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Quantity Two per Station Type Centrifugal Model 3 x 2 x 8 VOC Number of Stages One Design Flow 210 GPM Design TDH 120 FT Speed 3550 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 15 HP Deleted per 2015 update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-12 and 9-13 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-12. Deleted Per 1994 Update Table 9-13. Deleted Per 1994 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-14 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-14. Condensate Storage System Design Parameters UPPER SURGE TANK DOME Quantity 1 per Unit Design Capacity 7570 Gal.
Design Temperature 212°F Design External Pressure 15 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 0 PSIG UPPER SURGE TANK Quantity 2 per Unit Design Capacity 42,500 Gal.
Design Temperature 212°F Design External Pressure 15 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 0 PSIG CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Quantity 1 per Unit Design Capacity 30,000 Gal.
Design Temperature 212°F Design External Pressure 4 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 4 PSIG AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS Quantity 1 per Unit Design Capacity 42,500 Gal.
Design Temperature 135°F Design External Pressure 0 PSIG Design Internal Pressure 0 PSIG CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK PUMPS Manufacturer Ingersoll - Rand Quantity 2 per Unit Type Vertical In-Line Model 3 x 7 W Number of Stages One Design Flow 300 GPM Design Head 125 FT
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-14 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Speed 3500 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 14.8 HP
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-15 (Page 1 of 2)
(14 APR 2018)
Table 9-15. Refueling Water System Component Design Data Refueling Water Storage Tank Number per unit 1
Internal Volume, gallons 395,000 Technical Specification minimum contained Volume, gallons 377,537 Design pressure, internal ATM Normal Operating pressure, internal ATM Design pressure, external, psig 0.20 Vent size(s) in (1)-6 (1)-12 Design temperature, F 120 Operating temperature F (Water-min) 70 Type Vertical, field constructed Material of construction Stainless steel Outside diameter, ft-in 40'-0 7/16" Straight side height, ft-in 42' - 6 1/4" Number of heaters 4
Capacity of each heater, Kw 10-20-30 (staged)
Insulation sides only Boron concentration ppm B 2000 to 4000 Refueling Water Pumps Number per unit 1
Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 205 Design Temperature, F 140 Material of construction Stainless Steel Design flow, gpm Condition 1: 310 Condition 2: 200 Design head, ft Condition 1: 220 Condition 2: 305 Refueling Water Pump Strainer Number per unit 1
Type Basket
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-15 (Page 2 of 2)
(14 APR 2018)
Design pressure, psig 70 Design temperature, F 140 Design flow, gpm 310 Pressure loss at design flow Negligible Strainer openings, inches 1/4 Refueling Water Recirculation Pumps Number per unit 2
Type Centrifugal Design pressure, psig 75 Design temperature, F 120 Material of construction Stainless Steel Design flow, gpm 50 Design head, ft 35
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-16 (Page 1 of 1)
(24 APR 2006)
Table 9-16. Conventional Low Pressure Service Water System Component Design Parameters CONVENTIONAL LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER PUMPS Manufacturer Johnston Quantity 3
Type Vertical Model 48 CMC Number of Stages 1
Design Flow 38,000 GPM Design Head 160 Ft. (min.)
Speed 710 RPM Design Brake Horsepower 1,900 HP Minimum Continuous Flow 19,000 GPM CONVENTIONAL LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER STRAINERS Manufacturer R. P. Adams Quantity 2 per station Type Self-cleaning Simplex Model 42" VDWS-146 Design Flow 33,000 GPM Design Pressure 125 PSIG Design Temperature 88°F Strainer Medium 1/8" mesh Maximum Pressure Drop 1.8 PSI
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 1 of 4)
(17 OCT 2013)
Table 9-17. Compressed Air Systems Component Design Parameters INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS (INCLUDES AFTERCOOLERS)
Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Quantity 3 per station Type Centrifugal Model 1ACII15M2 Number of Stages 2
Design Capacity 1455 ICFM Design Discharge Pressure 105 psig Design Brake Horsepower 350 HP INSTRUMENT AIR DESICCANT DRYER Manufacturer Pneumatic Products Corp. (PPC)
Quantity 2 per Station Type Heatless, desiccant, air-purge Model 2500 CHA Design Capacity 2000 ICFM Design Dew Point
-40°F @ Design Conditions Design Pressure 150 PSIG Design Inlet Temperature 110°F Design Ambient Temperature 110°F INSTRUMENT AIR RECEIVERS Manufacturers IPC Quantity 3 per Station Volume 60 " x 16 '
Design Pressure 15 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F MAINSTREAM ISOLATION VALVE AIR TANKS Manufacturer RECO Quantity 4 per Unit Volume 8 ft. 3 Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 200°F INSTRUMENT AIR PREFILTERS AND AFTER-FILTERS
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 2 of 4)
(17 OCT 2013)
Manufacturer Pneumatic Products Corp. (PPC)
Quantity 5 per Station Type Particulate Filter Model PCC124004G65 (2 Prefilters, 2 Afterfilters)
PCS124004G65 (1 Prefilter)
Design Flow 2400 SCFM Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F Filter Medium 1 Micron Pressure Drop @ Design Flow 2 PSI Clean PORTABLE DIESEL COMPRESSOR DRYER Manfacturer Pure-Aire Quantity 1 per Station Type Regenerative Model PAR 1200 Design Capacity 1200 CFM Design Dewpoint
-40°F Design Pressure 100 PSIG Design Ambient Temperature 100°F PORTABLE DIESEL COMPRESSOR AFTERFILTER Manufacturer Pure-Aire Quantity 1 per Station Type Coalescing Model PF-510 Design Flow 1600 CFM Design Pressure 100 PSIG Design Temperature 250°F Filter Medium 0.3 micron STATION AIR COMPRESSORS Manufacturer Sullair Quantity 2 per Station Type Screw Model 20-150L
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 3 of 4)
(17 OCT 2013)
Number of Stages One Design Capacity 750 CFM Design Discharge Pressure 100 PSIG Design Brake Horsepower 150 HP STATION AIR COMPRESSOR AFTERCOOLERS AND MOISTURE SEPARATORS Manufacturer R. P. Adams Quantity 2 per Station Type Shell and Tube Model SAF-SL-53 & 6" CYC Design Capacity 750 CFM Design Shell Side Pressuree 115 PSIG Design Shell Side Pressure 125 PSIG Design Temperature 240°F STATION TO INSTRUMENT AIR OIL FILTERS Manufacturer Zurn Quantity 2 per Station Type Coalescing Oil Filter Model 77107 Design Flow 750 CFM Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F Filter Medium 0.3 Micron Pressure Drop @ Design Flow 2 PSI Clean STATION AIR RECEIVERS Manufacturer IPC Quantity 2 per Station Volume 60" x 16' Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 110°F BREATHING AIR COMPRESSORS Manufacturer Sullair Quantity 2 per Station Type Rotary Screw
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-17 (Page 4 of 4)
(17 OCT 2013)
Model RAS-75 Number of Stages One Design Capacity 330 CFM Design Discharge Pressure 115 PSIG Design Brake Horsepower 75 HP BREATHING AIR RECEIVERS Manufacturer NASH Quantity 2 per Station Volume 49.5 ft3 Design Pressure 115 PSIG Design Temperature 120°F AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL VALVES AIR TANKS Manufacturer Tioga (Unit 1) Ward (Unit 2)
Quantity 8 per Unit Volume 15 ft.3 Design Pressure 115 psig Design Temperature 110°F
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-18 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-18. Nuclear Sampling System Sample Locations and Data Sampled System Sample Location Design Pressure, PSIA Design Temperature°F Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Liquid 2500 680 Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Steam 2500 680 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Coolant Hotleg Loop A 2500 650 Reactor Coolant System Reactor Coolant Hotleg Loop C 2500 650 Residual Heat Removal System RHR Pump A Discharge 615 400 Residual Heat Removal System RHR Pump B Discharge 615 400 Chemical Volume Control System Volume Control Tank Gas Space 90 200 Safety Injection System Accumulator A 715 300 Safety Injection System Accumulator B 715 300 Safety Injection System Accumulator C 715 300 Safety Injection System Accumulator D 715 300 Chemical Volume Control System Letdown Hx. Outlet 315 175 Chemical Volume Control System Mixed Bed Demin. Outlet 315 175 Chemical Volume Contol System Cation Bed Demin. Outlet 315 175 Chemical Volume Control System Volume Control Tank Outlet 90 175 Chemical Volume Control System Boric Acid Blender Outlet 165 250 Boron Thermal Regeneration System Boron Thermal Reg.
Demin.
Outlet 315 175 Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Demin. A Outlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Demin. B Outlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Pump Outlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap.
Cond.
Demin.
Outlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System1 Recycle Evap. Feed Demin. Inlet 165 200 Boron Recycle System Reactor Makeup Water Storage 50 120
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-18 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Sampled System Sample Location Design Pressure, PSIA Design Temperature°F Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Evap. Feed Tank Pump Outlet 165 200 Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Drain Tank Pump Outlet 165 200 Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Evap. Dist. Cooler Outlet 165 200 Liquid Radwaste System1 Waste Monitor Tank Pump Outlet 165 200 Spent Fuel Cooling System Spent Fuel Pool 165 200 Spent Fuel Cooling Fuel Pool Cooling Post Filter 215 200 Refueling Water System Refueling Water Storage Tank Recirculation 65 114 Solid Radwaste System1 Spent Resin Sluice Filter 165 200 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator Blowdown A 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator Blowdown B 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator Blowdown C 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator Blowdown D 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator A Upper Shell 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator BUpper Shell 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator C Upper Shell 1200 600 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator D Upper Shell 2300 600 Note:
- 1.
Shared system, receives from both units
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-19 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-19. Temperature and Pressure Reduction for Samples in the Conventional Systems Sample Panel Sample Rough Cooling Pressure Regulated Final Cooling S. G. A Blowdown Sample X
X S. G. B Blowdown Sample X
X S. G. C Blowdown Sample X
X S. G. D Blowdown Sample X
X Final Feedwater Sample X
X X
Hotwell Pump Discharge X
X Polish Demineralizer Main Effluent Sample X
X Heater Drain C1 H. P. Sample X
X X
Heater Drain C2 H. P. Sample X
X X
Upper Surge Tank Sample X
Main Steam Sample A X
X X
Main Steam Sample B X
X X
Main Steam Sample C X
X X
Main Steam Sample D X
X X
Moisture Separator Reheater Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)
X X
X First Stage Reheater Drain (A, B, C, & D)
X X
X Second Stage Reheater Drain (A, B, C, & D)
X X
X Low Pressure Reheater Drain (A/B, C/D)
X X
X Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer Influent X
X X
Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer Effluent X
X X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-20 (Page 1 of 3)
(24 OCT 2004)
Table 9-20. Types of Analyses Provided in the Conventional Sampling Lab Samples Grab Sample Specific Conductivity Cation Conductivity Sodium PH Sulfate, Amine, Chloride Oxygen Hydrazine Patch Panel S.G. A Blowdown Sample X
X X
X X
X S.G. B Blowdown Sample X
X X
X X
X S.G. C Blowdown Sample X
X X
X X
X S.G. D Blowdown Sample X
X X
X X
X Final Feedwater Sample X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Hotwell Pump Discharge Sample X
X X
X X
X Polish Demineralizer Main Influent Sample X
X X
Polish Demineralizer Main Effluent Sample X
X X
X Heater Drain C1 H.
P. Sample X
X Heater Drain C2 H.
P. Sample X
X Upper Surge Tank Sample X
Main Steam Sample A
X X
X X
Main Steam Sample X X
X X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-20 (Page 2 of 3)
(24 OCT 2004)
Samples Grab Sample Specific Conductivity Cation Conductivity Sodium PH Sulfate, Amine, Chloride Oxygen Hydrazine Patch Panel B
Main Steam Sample C
X X
X X
Main Steam Sample D
X X
X X
Moisture Separator Reheater Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)
X X
First Stage Reheater Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)
X X
Second Stage Reheater Drain Tank (A, B, C, & D)
X X
Low Pressure Turbine Crossover (A/B, C/D)
X X
Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer Effluent X
X X
X X
X Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer Influent X
X X
X X
Polish Demineralizer Vessel (A, B, C, D, E) Effluent Sample X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-20 (Page 3 of 3)
(24 OCT 2004)
Samples Grab Sample Specific Conductivity Cation Conductivity Sodium PH Sulfate, Amine, Chloride Oxygen Hydrazine Patch Panel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-21 (Page 1 of 1)
(27 MAR 2003)
Table 9-21. Chemical and Volume Control System Design Parameters General Seal water supply flow rate, for four reactor coolant pumps, nominal, gpm 32 Seal water return flow rate, for four reactor coolant pumps, nominal, gpm 12 Letdown flow:
75 Normal, gpm Maximum, gpm1 120 Charging flow (excludes seal water):
Normal, gpm 55 Maximum, gpm2 100 Temperature of letdown reactor coolant entering system, °F 557 Temperature of charging flow directed to Reactor Coolant System, °F 516 Temperature of effluent directed to Boron Recycle System, °F 115 Centrifugal charging pump bypass flow (each), gpm 60 Amount of 4% boric acid solution required to meet cold shutdown requirements shortly after full power operation Controlled by COLR Unuseable volume at bottom of Boric Acid Tank (21" above bottom of tank), gallons 10,846 Maximum pressurization required for hydrostatic testing of Reactor Coolant System, psig 3,107 Notes:
- 1. 185 gpm is the maximum allowable flow when RHR letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.
- 2. 180 gpm is the maximum allowable flow when RHR letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 1 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Table 9-22. CVCS Principal Component Data Summary Centrifugal Charging Pumps Number 2
Design pressure, psig 2800 Design temperature, °F 300 Design flow, gpm 150 Design head, ft 5800 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel 180-gpm reactor coolant charging flow is permissible from the centrifugal charging pumps when residual heat removal system letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is
<200°F.
Boric Acid Transfer Pump Number 2
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 75 Design head, ft 235 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Boric Acid Batching Tank Pump Number 1
Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature °F 200 Design flow, gpm 75 Design head, ft 12 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Boric Acid Recirculation Pump Number 1
Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, °F 200 Design Flow, gpm 120 Design Head, ft 198 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 2 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Regenerative Heat Exchanger Number 1
Heat transfer rate at design conditions, BTU/hr 11.0 x 106 Shell Side Design Pressure, psig 2485 Design temperature, °F 650 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Tube Side Design pressure, psig 2735 Design temperature, °F 650 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Shell Side (Letdown)
Flow, lb/hr 37,200 Inlet temperature, °F 560 Outlet temperature, °F 290 Tube Side (Charging)
Flow, lb/hr 27,300 Inlet temperature, °F 130 Outlet temperature, °F 516 180-gpm reactor coolant charging flow is permissible through the regenerative heat exchanger (tube side) when residual heat removal system letdown is in service and the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.
Letdown Heat Exchanger Number 1
Heat transfer rate at design conditions, BTU/hr 16.0 X 106 Shell Side Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 250 Fluid Component Cooling Water
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 3 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Material Carbon Steel Tube Side Design pressure, psig 600 Design temperature, °F 400 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Shell Side Design Normal Flow, lb/hr 498,000 200,000 Inlet temperature, °F 105 105 Outlet temperature, °F 137 149 Tube Side (Letdown)
Flow, lb/hr 59,500 37,200 Inlet temperature, °F 380 290 Outlet temperature, °F 115 115 185-gpm reactor coolant letdown flow from the residual heat removal system is permissible through the letdown heat exchanger when the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.
Seal Water Heat Exchanger Number 1
Heat transfer rate at design conditions, BTU/hr 1.98 X 106 (Alt.1)1 1.604 X106 Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure, psig 150 150 Design temperature, °F 250 250 Design flow, lb/hr 125,000 48,400 66,0001 Inlet temperature, °F 105 155.9 1391 Outlet temperature, °F 121 115 Fluid Component Cooling Water Borated Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Number 1
Heat Transfer rate at design conditions, BTU/hr 5.18 x 106 Shell Side Tube Side Design Pressure, psig 150 2485
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 4 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Design Temperature, °F 250 650 Design Flow, lb/hr 125,000 12,500 Inlet temperature, °F 105 560 Outlet temperature, °F 147 165 Fluid Component Cooling Water Borated Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel Volume Control Tank Number 1
Volume, ft3 400 Design pressure, psig 75 Design temperature, °F 250 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Boric Acid Tanks Number 1
Volume, gal.
46,000 Design Pressure, psig Atmospheric Design Temperature 200° Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Batching Tank Number 1
Capacity, gal.
800 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, °F 300 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Chemical Mixing Tank Number 1
Capacity, gal.
5 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 200 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 5 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Mixed Bed Demineralizers Number 2
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 120 Resin volume, each, ft3 30 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel 150-gpm reactor coolant letdown flow from the residual heat removal system is permissible through the mixed bed demineralizer when the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.
Cation Bed Demineralizers Number 1
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 75 Resin volume, ft3 20 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Resin Fill Tank Number 1
Volume, ft3 8
Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, °F 200 Normal operating temperature Ambient Material of construction Austenitic SS Chemical Mixing Tank Orifice Number 1
Design temperature, °F 200 Design pressure, psig 150 Operating temperature, °F Ambient Design flow, gpm 2
Design differential pressure, psi 50 Material of Construction Austenitic SS Boric Acid Pump Orifice
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 6 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Number 1
Design temperature, °F 200 Design pressure, psig 150 Operating temperature, °F 75 Design flow, gpm 10 Reactor Coolant Filters Number 2
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic Stainless Steel 185 gpm reactor coolant letdown flow from the residual heat removal system is permissible through the Reactor Coolant Filters when the reactor coolant system temperature is <200°F.
Reciprocating Charging Pump Accumulators Note: Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 1 was abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00 Reciprocating Charging Pump No. 2 was abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00 Suction Discharge Number 1
1 Design temperature, °F 175 250 Normal operating temperature 115 115 Design pressure, psig 220 2735 Capacity, gallons 1.0 2.0 Boric Acid Blender Number 1
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 200 Material of Construction Austenitic SS Deleted row(s) Per 2003 Update Cation Bed Demineralizer Resin Strainer
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 7 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Number 1
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 175 Design flow rate, gpm 75 Pressure drop at design flow, psig 1
Retention screen size, inches 0.012 Material of Construction SS Seal Water Injection Filters Number 2
Design pressure, psig 2735 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 80 Particle retention 98% of 5 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic Stainless Steel Seal Water Return Filter Number 1
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic Stainless Steel Batching Tank Agitator Number 1
Service Continuous Agitator mounting Enter at angle (8° - 10°)
through top head of tank Material of construction Austenitic SS Fluid data (Design Basis)
Fluid handled 12 wt. percent boric acid in water (Normal: 4 wt. percent)
Specific gravity (165°F) 1.025
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-22 (Page 8 of 8)
(27 MAR 2003)
Viscosity (165°F), cp 1.0 Temperature, °F 90-165 Boric Acid Filter Number 1
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic Stainless Steel Letdown Orifice 45 gpm 75 gpm Number 1
1 Design flow, lb/hr 22,230 37,050 Differential pressure at design flow, psid 1700 1700 Design pressure, psig 2,485 2,485 Design temperature, °F 650 650 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel No. 1 Seal Bypass Orifices Number 1/Loop (Total 4)
Design flow, gpm 1
Differential pressure at design flow, psig 300 Design pressure, psig 2485 Design temperature, °F 250 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Note:
- 1. Includes max. NC Pump #1 seal leakage of 48 gpm.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 1 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Table 9-23. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Chemical and Volume Control System. Active Components - Normal Plant Operation and Load Follow Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 1.
Air operate d gate valve NV2A (NV1A analogo us)
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control - letdown flow.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing letdown flow isolation to protect PZR heaters from uncovering at low water level in PZR. No effect on system operation.
Alternate isolation valve (NV-1A) provides backup letdown flow isolation.
Heaters automatically deenergize on low level.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- a.
Valve is designed to fail closed and wired so that electrical solenoid of the operator is energized to open the valve. Solenoid is de-energized to close the valve upon the generation of a low level PZR control signal. The valve is electrically interlocked with the level letdown orifice isolation valves and may not be opened manually from the CB if any of these valves are at an open position.
- b.
Fails closed
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Failure blocks normal letdown flow to VCT.
Minimum letdown flow requirements for borations of RCS to hot standby concentration level may be met by establishing letdown flow through alternate excess letdown flow path.
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; letdown flow temperature indications (NVP5110 and NVP5590) at CB; letdown flow-pressure indication (NVP5570) at CB; letdown flow indication (NVP5530) at CB; and VCT level indication (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 2 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks If the alternate excess letdown flow path to VCT is not available due to common mode failure (loss of instrument air supply) affecting the opening operation of isolation valves in each flow path, the plant operator can borate the RCS to a hot standby concentration level without letdown flow by taking advantage of the steam space available in the PZR.
- 2.
Air diaphra gm operate d gate valve NV10A (NV13 A and NV11A analogo us)
- a.
Fails open
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Failure prevents isolation of normal letdown flow through regenerative heat exchanger when bringing the reactor to a cold shutdown condition after the RHRS is placed into operation. No effect on hot standby operation.
Containment isolation valve (NV15B) may be remotely closed from the CB to isolate letdown flow through the heat exchanger.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- a.
Valve is of the similar design as that stated for item #1. Solenoid is de-energized to close the valve upon the generation of an ESF T signal, the generation of letdown isolation valves (NV2A and NV1A) upstream of the regenerative heat exchanger.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 3 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Failure blocks normal letdown flow to VCT.
Normal letdown flow to VCT may be maintained by opening alternate letdown orifice isolation valve NV11A. Minimum letdown flow requirements for boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level may be met by opening letdown orifice isolation valves NV13A or NV11A. If common mode failure (loss of instrument air) prevents opening of these valves and also prevents establishing alternate flow through excess letdown flow path, plant operator can borate the RCS to a hot standby concentration level without letdown flow by taking advantage of steam space available in PZR.
- b.
Same methods of detection as those stated for item #1, failure mode Fails closed.
- 3.
Motor operate d globe valve NV15B
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control letdown flow.
- a.
Same effect on system operation as that stated for item #1, failure mode Fails closed.
- a.
Same methods of detection as those stated for item #1, failure mode Fails closed. In addition, close position group monitoring light at CB.
- a.
Motor operator is energized to close the valve upon the generation of an ESF "T" signal.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 4 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow. However, under accidents conditions requiring containment isolation, failure reduces the redundancy of providing isolation of normal letdown line.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 4.
Deleted per 1994 update.
- 5.
Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV148
- a.
Fails open
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Failure prevents control of pressure to prevent flashing of letdown flow in letdown heat exchanger and also allows high pressure fluid to mixed bed demineralizers. Relief valve (NV151) opens in demineralizer line to release pressure to VCT and valve (NV153A) changes position to divert flow to VCT. Boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level is possible with valve failing open.
- a.
Letdown heat exchanger tube discharge flow indication (NVP5530) and high flow alarm at CB; temperature indication (NVP5590) and high temperature alarm at CB; and pressure indication (NVP5570) at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "open" and is electrically wired so the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to close valve.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 5 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails closed
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Same effect on system operation as that for item #1, failure mode Fail closed.
- b.
Letdown heat exchanger discharge flow indication (NVP5530), and pressure indication (NVP5570) and high pressure alarm at CB.
- 2.
As a design transient the letdown heat exchanger is designed for complete loss of letdown flow.
- 6.
Air diaphra gm operate d
threewa y valve NV153 A.
- a.
Fails open for flow only to VCT.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Letdown flow bypassed from flowing to mixed bed demineralizers.
Boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level is possible with valve failing open for flow only to VCT.
- a.
Valve position indication (VC Tank) at CB and RCS activity level when sampling letdown flow.
- 1.
Electrical solenoid of air diaphragm operatore is electrically wired so that solenoid is energized to open valve flow to the mixed bed demineralizers. Valve opens for flow to VCT on High Letdown Temp.
- b.
Fails open for flow only to mixed bed deminera lizer.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Continuous letdown to mixed bed demineralizers. Failure prevents automatic isolation of mixed bed demineralizers under fault condition of high letdown flow temperatures. These systems may be manually isolated using local valves (NV353 and NV368) at mixed bed demineralizers.
Boration of RCS to hot standby concentration level is possible with valve failing open for flow only to demineralizer.
- b.
Valve position indication (Demin.) at CB.
- 2.
Technical specifications provide a limit on RCS activity.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 6 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 7.
Deleted per 1997 update.
- 8.
Deleted per 2000 update.
- 9.
Deleted per 2000 update.
- 10. Relief valve NV14
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Letdown flow is relieved to pressurizer relief tank. Failure inhibits use of demineralizers for reactor coolant purification. Normal letdown line can be isolated and minimum letdown flow requirements for hot standby may be met by establishing letdown flow through alternate excess letdown flow path.
- a.
High temperature relief line indication and alarm at CB and VCT level indication (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB.
- 1.
Radioactive fluid contained.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 7 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 11. Relief valve NV151
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Letdown flow is relieved to VCT.
Failure inhibits use of demineralizers for reactor coolant purification. Normal letdown line can be isolated and minimum letdown flow requirement for hot standby may be met by establishing flow through alternate excess letdown flow path.
- a.
RCS activity level when sampling letdown flow.
- 1.
Radioactive fluid contained.
- 12. Deleted per 1997 update.
- 13. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 14. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 15. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 16. Deleted per 2000 update.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 8 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 17. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 18. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 19. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 20. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 21. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 22. Deleted per 2000 update.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 9 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 23. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV123 B
(NV122 B
analogo us)
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Failure inhibits use of the excess letdown fluid system of the CVCS as an alternate system that may be used for letdown flow control during normal plant operation and inhibits use of the excess letdown system to control water level in the pressurizer of the RCS during final stage of plant startup due to flow blockage.
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB and excess letdown heat exchanger outlet pressure indication (NVP5280) and temperature indication (NVP5090) at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "closed" and is electrically wired so that the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to open valve.
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing excess letdown flow isolation during normal plant operation and for plant startup. No effect on system operation.
Alternate isolation valve (NV122B) closes to provide backup flow isolation of excess letdown line.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 2.
If normal letdown and excess letdown flow is not available for hot standby operations, plant operator can borate RCS to hot standby concentration using steam space available in PZR.
- 24. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV124 B
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Same effect on system operation as stated for item #23, failure mode Fails closed.
- a.
Same methods of detection as those stated for item #23, failure mode Fails closed except for valve position indication at CB.
- 1.
Same remarks as those stated above for item #23.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 10 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- b.
Failure prevents manual adjustment at CB of RCS system pressure downstream of excess letdown heat exchanger to a low pressure consistent with No. 1 seal leakoff backpressure requirements. When using excess letdown system failure leads to a decrease in seal water pump shaft flow for cooling pump bearings.
- b.
Excess letdown heat exchanger outlet pressure indication (NVP5280) at CB, and seal water return flow recordings (NVCR5140) and low flow alarm at CB.
- 25. Air diaphra gm operate d plug valve NV102 A
(NV107 B,
NV112 A, and NV117 B
analogo us)
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
seal water flow.
- a.
No automatic makeup of seal water to seal standpipe that services No. 3 seal of RC pump 1A. No effect on operation to bring the plant to hot standby condition.
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) and low standpipe level alarm at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "closed" and is electrically wired so that the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to open valve.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 11 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
seal water flow.
- b.
Overfill of seal water standpipe and dumping of reactor makeup water to containment sump during automatic makeup of water for No. 3 seal of RC pump 1A. No effect on operations to bring reactor hot standby condition.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) and high standpipe level alarm at CB.
- 2.
Low level standpipe alarm conservatively set to allow RC pump operation without a complete loss of seal water from being injected to No. 3 seal after sounding of alarm.
- 26. Relief valve NV87
- e.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
seal water flow.
- a.
RC pump seal water return flow and excess letdown flow bypassed to PZR relief tank of RCS. Failure inhibits use of the excess letdown fluid system of the CVCS as an alternate system that may be used for letdown flow control during normal plant operation and inhibits use of excess letdown system to control water level in the PZR of the RCS during final stage of a plant startup.
- a.
Decrease in VCT level causing RMCS of CVCS to operate.
- 1.
The capacity of the relief valve equals maximum flow from four RC pump seals flow.
- 1.
Radioactive fluid contained.
- 2.
Same as remark #2 noted for item #23.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 12 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 27. Motor operate d gate valve NV89A (NV91 B
analogo us)
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
seal water flow and excess letdown flow.
- a.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow. However, under accident conditions requiring containment isolation failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of seal water flow and excess letdown flow.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 1.
Valve in normally at a full open position and motor operator is energized to close the valve upon the generation of an ESF T signal.
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
seal water flow and excess letdown flow.
- a.
RC pump seal water return flow and excess letdown flow blocked.
Failure inhibits use of the excess letdown fluid system of the CVCS as an alternate system that may be used for letdown flow control during normal plant operation and degrades cooling capability of seal water in cooling RC pump bearings.
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; group monitoring light and alarm at CB; and seal water return flow recordings (NVCR5140) and low seal water return flow alarm at CB.
- 2.
If normal letdown and excess letdown flow is not available for hot standby operation, plant operator can borate RCS to hot standby concentration using steam space available in PZR.
- 28. Motor operate d gate valve NV314 B
(NV312 A
analogo us)
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- a.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow. However, under accident condition requiring isolation of charging line, failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of normal charging flow.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 1.
Valve is normally at a full open position and motor operator is energized to close the valve upon the generation of a Safety Injection S signal.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 13 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control M charging flow.
- b.
Failure inhibits use of normal charging line to RCS for boration, dilution, and coolant makeup operations.
Seal water injection path remains available for boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and makeup of coolant during operations to bring the reactor to hot standby condition.
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) and group monitoring light (valve closed) at CB; letdown temperature indication (NVP5110) and high temperature alarm at CB; charging flow temperature indication (NVP5100) at CB; seal water flow pressure indication (NVP5620) at CB; VCT level indication (NVP5761) and high level alarm at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 14 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 29. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV309
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure prevents manual adjustment at CB of seal water flow through the control of back pressure in charging header resulting in a reduction of flow to RC pump seals leading to a reduction in flow to RCS via labyrinth seals and pump shaft flow for cooling pump bearings. Boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and makeup of coolant during operations to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible through normal charging flow path.
- a.
Seal water flow pressure indication (NVP5620) at CB; seal water return recordings (NVCR5140); and low seal water return flow alarm at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "open" and is electrically wired so the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to close valve.
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- b.
Same effect on system operation as that stated for item #28, failure mode "Fails closed".
- b.
Same method of detection as those stated above for item #28, failure mode "Fails closed".
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 15 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 30. Motor operate d globe valve NV203 A
(NV202 B
analogo us)
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow. However, under accident condition requiring isolation of centrifugal charging pump miniflow line, failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of miniflow to suction of pumps via seal water heat exchanger.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- b.
Failure blocks miniflow to VCT via seal water heat exchanger. Normal charging flow and seal water flow prevents deadheading of pumps when used. Boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and makeup of coolant during operations to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; group monitoring light (valve closed) and alarm at CB; and charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and high flow alarm at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 16 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 31. Air diaphra gm operate d gate valve NV32B
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow
- a.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation, load follow and hot standby operation. Valve is used during cold shutdown operation to isolate normal charging line when using the auxiliary spray during the cooldown of the pressurizer. Cold shutdown of reactor is still possible, however, time for cooling down PZR will be extended.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "open" and is electrically wired so the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to close valve.
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- b.
Failure blocks normal charging flow to the RCS. No effect on CVCS operations during normal plant operation, load follow or hot standby operation. Plant operator can maintain charging flow by establishing flow through alternate charging path by opening of isolation valve (NV39A).
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; charging flow indication (NVP5100) at CB; regenerative heat exchanger shell side exit temperature indication (NVP5110) and high temperature alarm at CB; and charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and low flow alarm at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 17 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 32. Air diaphra gm operate d gate valve NV39A
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of charging flow paths to RCS. No effect on CVCS operations during normal plant operation, load follow, or hot standby operation. Normal charging flow path remains available for charging flow.
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "open" and is electrically wired so the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to close valve.
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- b.
Same effect on system operation and shutdown as that stated above for item
- 31, failure mode "Fails open" if alternate charging line is in use.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 33. Motor operate d globe valve NV37A
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- a.
Failure results in inadvertent operation of auxiliary spray that results in a reduction of PZR pressure during normal plant operation and load follow. PZR heaters operate to maintain required PZR pressure.
Boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and makeup of coolant during operation to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB and PZR pressure recording (NCCR5160) and low pressure alarm at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 18 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- b.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation, load follow and hot standby operation. Valve may be used during cold shutdown operation to activate auxiliary spray for cooling down the pressurizer after operation of RHRS.
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB.
- 34. Relief Valve NV205
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow.
- a.
Failure results in a portion of seal water return flow and centrifugal charging pump miniflow being bypassed to VCT.
Boration of RCS to a hot standby concentration level and maekup of coolant during operations to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.
- a.
Local pressure indication (NVPG5550 and NVPG5560) in discharge line of centrifugal charging pumps.
- 1.
Radioactive fluid contained.
- 35. Relief Valve NV305
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
No effect on normal plant operation, load follow or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
Local pressure indication (NVPG5540) in discharge line of constant displacement pump.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 19 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 2.
Radioactive fluid contained.
- 3.
Valve 1NV305 has been gagged closed and 1NVPG5540 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Valve 2NV305 has been gagged closed and 2NVPG5540 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
- 36. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV294
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing charging and seal water flow to RCS. No effect on normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
Charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and high flow alarm at CB, and PZR level recording (NCCR5161) and high level alarm at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "open" and is electrically wired so the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to close valve.
- 2.
Methods of detection apply when a centrifugal charging pump is in operation.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 20 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- b.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing charging and seal water flow to RCS. No effect on system operation during normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
Valve failing closed under an accident condition requiring flow delivery by centrifugal charging inhibits flow from the pumps.
- b.
Charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and low flow alarm at CB, and PZR level recording (NCCR5161) and low level alarm at CB.
- 37. Check valve NV306
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing charging and seal water to RCS.
No effect on normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
Charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and low flow alarm at CB, and PZR level recording (NCCR5161) and low level alarm at CB.
- 2.
Methods of detection apply when centrifugal charging pump 1A is in operation.
- 3.
Positive displacement pump No. 1 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-11392/00.
Positive displacement pump No. 2 has been abandoned in place per NSM CN-21392/00.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 21 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 38. Check valve NV270 (NV290 analogo us)
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing charging and seal water flow to RCS. Discharge of centrifugal charging pump 1A is open to "backflow" when centrifugal charging pump 1B is placed into operation after failure of centrifugal charging pump 1A to deliver charging and seal water flow. No effect on normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
Same methods for detection as those stated above for item #37.
- 1.
Centrifugal charging pump 1A may be isolated by the closing of manual valves in pump's suction and discharge lines.
- 39. Deleted per 2000 update.
- 40. Centrif ugal chargin g pump 1A APCH (Pump 1B analogo us)
- a.
Fails to deliver working fluid.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of providing charging and seal water flow to RCS. Alternate delivery of charging and seal water flow by a centrifugal charging pump not available.
No effect on normal plant operation, load follow, or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
Same methods of detection as those stated above for item #39 when centrifugal charging pump 1A is in operation. In addition, monitor light and alarm for group monitoring of components at CB.
- 1.
Flow rate for a centrifugal charging pump is controlled by a modulating valve (NV294) in discharge header for the centrifugal charging pumps.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 22 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 41. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV224
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Chemical Control, Purification and Makeup - oxygen control.
- a.
Failure blocks hydrogen flow to VCT and loads to loss of venting of VCT (vent valve 1WG3 closes on low VCT pressure) resulting in loss of gas stripping of fission products from RCS coolant. No effect on operation to bring the reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
VCT pressure indication (NVP5500) and low pressure alarm at CB. Periodic sampling of gas mixture in VCT.
- 1.
Plant's technical specification sets limits on RCS activity level.
- 42. Relief valve NV223
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure allows VCT liquid to be relieved to BRS recycle holdup tank resulting in a loss of VCT liquid and makeup coolant available for charging and seal water flow during normal plant operation, load follow, and bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
VCT isolation valves (NV188A and NV189B) close on low water level tank level signal causing the suction of charging pumps to be transferred to the RWST for an alternate supply of borated (Controlled by COLR) coolant.
- a.
Decrease in VCT level causing RMCS to operate; VCT level indications (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB; and BRS recycle holdup tank level increase.
- 1.
Radioactive fluid contained.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 23 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 43. Motor operate d gate valve NV188 A
(NV189 B) analogo us
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure has no effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation, load follow, and bringing reactor to a hot standby condition. However, under accident conditions requiring isolation of VCT, failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation for discharge line of VCT.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
- 1.
During normal plant operation and load follow valve is at a full open position and the motor operator is energized to close the valve upon the generation of a VCT low water level signal or upon the generation of a Safety Injection "S" signal.
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging flow and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure blocks fluid flow from VCT during normal plant operation, load follow and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
Alternate supply of borated (Controlled by COLR) coolant from the RWST to suction of charging pumps can be established from the CB by the operator through the opening of RWST isolation valves (NV252A and NV253B).
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; group monitoring light and alarm (valve closed) at CB; charging and seal water flow indication (NVP5630) and low flow alarm at CB; and PZR level recording (NCCR5161) and low level alarm at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 24 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 44. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV467
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Chemical Control, Purification and Makeup - oxygen control.
- a.
Failure reduces the redundancy of flow paths provided for the venting of VCT gas mixture to gas waste processing system for stripping of fission products from RCS coolant during normal plant operation and load follow. No effect on operations to bring the reactor to standby condition.
- a.
VCT pressure indication (NVP5500) and high pressure alarm at CB.
Periodic sampling of gas mixture in VCT.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "closed" and is electrically wired so that the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to open valve.
- 2.
Same remark as that stated for item #41 in regards to RCS activity.
- 3.
Methods of detection apply when alternate flow path is being used for venting.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 25 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 45. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV186 A
- a.
Fails closed
- a.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration, auto makeup, and alternate dilution.
- a.
Failure blocks fluid flow from reactor makeup control system for automatic boric acid addition and reactor water makeup during normal plant operation and load follow. Failure also reduces redundancy of fluid flow paths for dilution of RC coolant by reactor makeup water and blocks fluid flow for boration of the RC coolant when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition. Boration (at BA tank boron concentration level) of RCS coolant to bring the reactor to hot standby condition is possible by opening of alternate BA tank isolation valve (NV236B) at CB.
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; total makeup flow deviation alarm at CB; and VCT level indication (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "closed" and is electrically wired so that the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to open valve.
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration, auto makeup, and alternate dilution.
- b.
Failure allows for alternate dilute mode type operation for system operation of normal dilution of RCS coolant. No effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow, and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed change) at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 26 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 46. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV181 A
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
dilution and alternate dilution.
- a.
Failure blocks fluid flow from RMCS for dilution of RCS coolant during normal plant operation and load follow. No effect on CVCS operation.
Operator can dilute RCS coolant by establishing alternate dilute mode of system operation.
Dilution of RCS coolant not required when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
- a.
Same methods for detection as those stated above for item #45, failure mode Fails closed.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "closed" and is electrically wired so that the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to open valve.
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
dilution and alternate dilution.
- b.
Failure allows for alternate dilute mode type operation for system operation of boration and auto makeup of RCS coolant. No effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation and load follow and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby operation.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 27 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 47. Relief Valve NV273
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
charging and seal water flow.
- a.
Failure allows for a portion of flow to suction header of charging pumps to be relieved to BRS recycle holdup tank.
Boration of RCS coolant to bring reactor to hot standby condition is still possible.
- b.
Decrease in VCT level causing RMCS to operate; VCT level indications (NVP5761) and low water level alarm at CB; and BRS recycle holdup tank level increase.
- 2.
Radioactive fluid contained.
- 48. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV238 A
- a.
Fails open.
- a.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration and auto makeup.
- a.
Failure prevents the addition of a pre-selected quantity of concentrated boric acid solution at a pre-selected flow rate to the RCS coolant during normal plant operation, load follow and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
Boration to bring the reactor to a hot standby condition is possible, however, flow rate of solution from BA tanks cannot be automatically controlled.
- a.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB; and boric acid flow recording (NVCR5450) and flow deviation alarm at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "open" and is electrically wired so the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to close valve.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 28 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails closed.
- b.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration, and auto makeup.
- b.
Failure blocks fluid flow of boric acid solution from BA tanks during normal plant operation, load follow, and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition. Boration (at BA tank boron concentration level) of RCS coolant to bring the reactor to hot standby condition is possible by opening of alternate BA tank isolation valve (NV236B) at CB.
- b.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; and boric acid flow recording (NVCR5450) and flow deviation alarm at CB.
- 49. Air diaphra gm operate d globe valve NV242 A
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
dilute, alternate dilute and auto makeup.
- a.
Failure blocks fluid flow of water from reactor makeup control system during normal plant operation and load follow. No effect on system operation when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB; VCT level indications (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB; and makeup water flow recording (NVCR5450) and flow deviation alarm at CB.
- 1.
Valve is designed fail "closed" and is electrically wired so that the electrical solenoid of the air diaphragm operator is energized to open valve.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 29 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
dilute, alternate dilute and auto makeup.
- b.
Failure prevents the addition of a preselected quantity of water makeup at a pre-selected flow rate to the RCS coolant during normal plant operation and load follow. No effect on system operation when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB and makeup water flow recording (NVCR5450) and flow deviation alarm at CB.
- 50. Motor operate d globe valve NV236 B
- a.
Fails closed.
- a.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration and auto makeup.
- a.
Failure reduces redundancy of flow paths for supplying boric acid solution from BA tanks to RCS via charging pumps.
No effect on CVCS operation during normal plant operation, load follow, or hot standby operation. Normal flow path via RMCS remains available for boration of RCS coolant.
- a.
Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB and flow indication (NVP5440) at CB.
- 1.
Valve is at a closed position during normal RMCS operation.
- 2.
If both flow paths from BA tanks are blocked due to failure of isolation valves (NV238A and NV236B), borated water (Controlled by COLR) from RWST is available by opening isolation valve NV252A or NV253B.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 30 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- b.
Fails open.
- b.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration and auto makeup.
- b.
Failure prevents the addition of a pre-selected quantity of concentrated boric acid solution at a pre-selected flow rate to the RCS coolant during normal plant operation, load follow and when bringing the reactor to a hot standby condition.
Boration to bring the reactor to a hot standby condition is possible, however, flow rate of solution from BA tanks can not be automatically controlled.
- b.
Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB and flow indication (NVP5440) at CB.
- 51. Boric acid transfer pump 1A APBA (BA transfer pump 1B analoge ous)
- a.
Fails to deliver working fluid.
- a.
Boron Concentration Control - reactor makeup control -
boration and auto makeup.
- a.
No effect on CVCS system operation during normal plant operation, load follow or bringing reactor to hot standby condition.
Redundant BA transfer pump 1B provides necessary delivery of working fluid for CVCS system operation.
- a.
Pump motor start relay position indication (open) at CB and local pump discharge pressure indication (NVP5700).
- 1.
Both BA transfer pumps operate simultaneously for RMCS boration operation.
- 2.
Redundant BA transfer pumps provided for each unit.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 31 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
Component Failure Mode CVCS Operation Function Effect on System Operation and Shutdown1 Failure Detection Method2 Remarks
- 52. Air diaphra gm operate d three way valve NV172 A
- a.
Fails open for flow only to BRS recycle holdup tank.
- a.
Charging and Volume Control -
letdown flow.
- a.
Failure bypasses normal letdown flow to BRS recylce holdup tank resulting in excessive use of RMCS. No effect on operation to bring reactor to hot standby condition.
- a.
Valve position indication (Holdup Tank) at CB; VCT water level indication (NVP5761) and low level alarm at CB; and increase water level in BRS recycle holdup tank.
- 1.
Valve is designed to fail open for flow to VCT and is electrically wired so that electrical control solenoids for valve are energized for flow to BRS recycle holdup Tank.
Valve opens to flow to BRS recycle holdup tank on high VCT water level signal.
Notes:
- 1.
See list at end of table for definition of acronyms and abbreviations used.
- 2.
As part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance inspection and instrument calibrations are made to monitor equipment and performance. Failures may be detected during such monitoring of equipment in addition to detection methods noted.
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations BA
- Boric Acid BRS
- Boron Recycle System BTR
- Boron Thermal Regeneration BTRS
- Boron Thermal Regeneration System CB
- Control Board CVCS
- Chemical and Valume Control System Demin.
- Demineralizer HX
- Heat Exchange PZR
- Pressurizer RC
- Reactor Coolant System RHRS
- Residual Heat Removal System RWST
- Refueling Water Storage Tank RMCSn.
- Reactor Makeup Control System
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-23 (Page 32 of 32)
(27 MAR 2003)
- Volume Control Tank
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 1 of 4)
(24 OCT 2004)
Table 9-24. Boron Recycle System Component Data Summary Recycle Evaporator Feed Pumps Number 2
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, 0F 200 Design flow, gpm 30 Design head, ft 302 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Holdup Tanks Number 2
Capacity, gal 112,000 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, 0F 200 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Reagent Tank Number 1
Capacity, gal 5
Design pressure 150 Design temperature, 0F 200 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizers Number 2
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 120 Resin volume, ft3 30 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Condensate Demineralizer Number 1
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 75 Resin volume, ft3 20
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 2 of 4)
(24 OCT 2004)
Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Feed Filters Number 2
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 150 Particle retention 98% of 5 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Condensate Filter (as originally supplied)
Number 1
Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 35 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Number 1
Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, 0F 250 Design flow, gpm 35 Particle retention 98% of 25 micron size Material, (vessel)
Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Package Number 1
Design flow, gpm 15 Concentration of Concentrate (boric acid),
wt percent 4
Concentration of Condensate 10 ppm boron as H3BO3 Material Stainless steel Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Eductor Number 1
Design pressure, psig 5
Design temperature, 0F 200
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 3 of 4)
(24 OCT 2004)
Typical flow, SCFM 1.4 Material Stainless steel Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks Number for Both Units 2 (1 per unit)
Usable Volume, Gallons 112,000 Total Volume, Gallons 125,000 Tank Design Pressure1 Atmospheric Tank Design Temperature, 0F 200 Tank Operating Temperature, 0F 115 Material of Construction Austenitic SS lined Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Number for Both Units 4 (2 per unit)
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, 0F 200 Design flow, GPM 150 Design Head, ft 250 Material Austenitic SS Recycle Evaporator Condensate Return Unit Number for Both Units 1
Receiver Volume, Gallons 100 Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, 0F 350 Number of Pumps 2
Design Flow, GPM 25 Design Head, ft.
65 Reactor Makeup Water Filter Number 1
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 120 Design flow, gpm 300 Particle retention 99.98% of 0.1 micron size
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-24 (Page 4 of 4)
(24 OCT 2004)
Material, (vessel)
Stainless steel Note:
- 1. Not including hydrostatic head.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-25 (Page 1 of 3)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-25. Boron Thermal Regeneration System Component Data HISTORICAL INFORMATION NOT REQUIRED TO BE REVISED Chiller Pumps Number 3 (one per unit plus one shared)
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, °F 200 Design flow, gpm 400 Design head, feet 150 Material Carbon Steel Moderating Heat Exchanger Number 1 (per unit)
Design heat transfer, BTU/hr 2.53 X 106 Shell Tube Design pressure, psig 300 300 Design temperature, °F 200 200 Design flow, lb/hr 59,600 59,600 Design inlet temperature (boron storage mode), °F 50 115 Design outlet temperature (boron storage mode), °F 92.4 72.6 Inlet temperature (boron release mode), °F 140 115 Outlet temperature (boron release mode), °F 123.7 131.3 Fluid circulated Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Material Stainless Steel Stainless Steel Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Number 1 (per unit)
Design heat transfer, BTU/hr 1.65 X 106 Shell Tube Design pressure, psig 150 300 Design temperature, °F 200 200 Design flow, lb/hr 175,000 59,640
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-25 (Page 2 of 3)
(22 OCT 2001)
Design inlet temperature (boron storage mode), °F 39 72.6 Design outlet temperature (boron storage mode), °F 48.4 45 Inlet temperature (boron release mode), °F 90 123.7 Outlet temperature (boron release mode ), °F 99.4 96.1 Fluid circulated Chromated Water Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Stainless Steel Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger Number 1 (per unit)
Design heat transfer, BTU/hr 1.49 X 106 Shell Tube Design pressure, psig 300 600 Design temperature, °F 200 400 Design flow, lb/hr 59,640 44,730 Inlet temperature, °F 115 280 Outlet temperature, °F 140 246.7 Fluid circulated Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Material Stainless Steel Stainless Steel Chiller Surge Tank Number 1 (per unit)
Volume, gal 500 Design pressure, psig Atmospheric Design temperature, °F 200 Material Carbon Steel Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers Number 5 (per unit)
Design pressure, psig 300 Design temperature, °F 250 Design flow, gpm 120 Resin volume, ft3 74.3 Material of construction Stainless Steel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-25 (Page 3 of 3)
(22 OCT 2001)
Chillers Number 3 (one per unit plus one shared)
Capacity, BTU/hr 1.66 X 106 Design flow, gpm 352 Inlet temperature, °F 48.4 Outlet temperature, °F 39
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-26 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-26. Control Room Area Ventilation System Failure Analysis Component Failure Comments and Consequences Control Room, Control Room Area, or Switchgear Room Vent Fan Fail Redundant Fan Available Control Room, Control Room Area, or Switchgear Room Heating and Cooling Coil Units Fail Redundant Unit Available Pressurizing Fan Fail Redundant Fan Available Pressurizing Filter Train Fail Redundant Unit Available Chilled Water System Component Fail Redundant System Available Damper (Control or Isolation)
Fail Redundant Damper System Available Outside air intake isolation valve Fail Redundant Valve Available
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-27 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-27. Fuel Handling Area Exhaust System Failure Analysis Component Failure Comments and Consequences Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan Fail Redundant Exhaust System Available Fuel Handling Area Filter Train Fail Redundant Exhaust System Available Damper (Control or Isolation)
Closes and fails to reopen Redundant Exhaust System Available Damper (Bypass)
Opens and fails to close Failure is indicated. Redundant Exhaust System Available.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-28 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-28. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Failure Analysis Components Failure Comments and Consequences Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Fan Fail Redundant fan available during accident condition operating mode.
Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Fail Redundant filter train available during accident condition operating mode.
Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Preheater/Demister Section Fail Redundant Preheater/Demister Section available during accident condition operating mode.
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Room Air Conditioning Unit Fail Redundant Shutdown Panel with air conditioning unit available.
Damper (Bypass or Isolation)
Fails to close Redundant damper and duct path available during accident condition operating mode.
Inlet Vane Damper Fails to reduce Filtered Exhaust System flow rate Redundant damper and filter system available during accident condition operating mode.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-29 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-29. Purge System Isolation Valve Design and Test Criteria Design:
Pressure 15 psig Differential Pressure 15 psi Temperature 2500F Radiation 2x108 rads Closure Time1 5 seconds Tests:
Hydrotest to 150% of design pressure Leak-test across valve for zero leakage Valve minimum wall measurement Note:
- 1. Testing of the Containment Purge (VP) System closure times is not performed because the isolation valves are sealed or locked closed during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-30 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-30. Annulus Ventilation System. Malfunction Analysis Components Failure Comments and Consequences
- 1.
Annulus ventilation fan Fan fails to start or stops running and cannot be restarted.
Two 100 percent capacity fans are provided.
- 2.
Annulus ventilation filter train Filter failure Two 100 percent capacity trains are provided.
- 3.
Annulus ventilation moisture eliminator Eliminator failure Two 100 percent capacity eliminators are provided.
- 4.
Cross-connect Valve Fails to close Valves provide two 100 percent flow paths in the suction header.
- 5.
Discharge Isolation Valve Fails to open Each fan train, including discharge isolation valve, is a redundant flow path.
- 6.
Control Damper Fails to modulate Two 100 percent capacity subsystems are provided.
- 7.
Carbon Filter Carbon ignition due to excessive localized radioiodine deposition.
Dispersion of the radioiodine throughout the filter influent and uniform filter flow distribution assures uniform filter loading therein precluding carbon ignition. Even though carbon ignition is not considered a probability, each filter train carbon section is provided with a fire detection and protection system in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. (See Section 12.3.3).
- 8.
Annulus ventilation fan LOCA coincident with loss of offsite power and with a single active failure Power is supplied to redundant annulus ventilation subsystems from the emergency diesel generators.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-31 (Page 1 of 1)
(14 APR 2018)
Table 9-31. Deleted Per 2018 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-32 (Page 1 of 3)
(14 APR 2018)
Table 9-32. Communications Available for Transient and Accident Conditions Location Expected Noise Utilizing A Weighting db Levels3 PABX Telephon e
(95dBA)1, 2
Electro-Sound-Powered Telephone-Emergency Circuit (110dBA)1 Electro-Sound-Powered Maintenance Circuit (110dBA)1 PA System (95dBA)1 PA via PABX Telephone (95dBA)1, 2 Fiber Optic Dispatch Phone (76dBA)1 Auxiliary feedwater pump turbine 95db X
X X
X Auxiliary shutdown panel rooms 70db X
X X
X Control room 62db X
X X
X X
X Technical Support Center 62db X
X X
X Diesel generator rooms 105db X
X X
X Fuel pool area 76db X
X X
X HVAC equipment room control panels 70db X
X X
Instrument air compressors 90db X
X X
Switchgear and motor control center rooms 70db X
X X
X Valves 1ND26, 1ND27, 1ND60, &
1ND61 in the Residual Heat Removal System 95db X
X X
Valves 1KC56A 96db X
X X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-32 (Page 2 of 3)
(14 APR 2018)
Location Expected Noise Utilizing A Weighting db Levels3 PABX Telephon e
(95dBA)1, 2
Electro-Sound-Powered Telephone-Emergency Circuit (110dBA)1 Electro-Sound-Powered Maintenance Circuit (110dBA)1 PA System (95dBA)1 PA via PABX Telephone (95dBA)1, 2 Fiber Optic Dispatch Phone (76dBA)1 and 1KC81B in Component Cooling Water System Valves 1VQ15B, 1VQ16A, & 1VQ13 in the Containment Air Release and Addition System 94db X
X X
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Gage 100db X
X Primary Sample Sink 75db X
X X
Electrical Penetration Room 75db X
X X
Control Room Annex 62db X
X X
6.9 KV Switchgear Room 75db X
X X
RC Temperature H&C Connection Box 70db X
X Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger outlet 90db X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-32 (Page 3 of 3)
(14 APR 2018)
Location Expected Noise Utilizing A Weighting db Levels3 PABX Telephon e
(95dBA)1, 2
Electro-Sound-Powered Telephone-Emergency Circuit (110dBA)1 Electro-Sound-Powered Maintenance Circuit (110dBA)1 PA System (95dBA)1 PA via PABX Telephone (95dBA)1, 2 Fiber Optic Dispatch Phone (76dBA)1 temperature Notes:
Maximum noise level capabilities of equipment.
- 1.
Telephone equipped with transistor amplifier and noise cancelling transmitter.
- 2.
Noise levels result of measurements taken at comparable plants.
- 3.
After a unit is operational, plant noise levels will be measured during normal and shutdown conditions. Sound isolation booths or noise cancelling devices will then be added as necessary.
- 4.
Hand Held Radios are available to plant personnel.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-33 (Page 1 of 3)
(14 APR 2018)
Table 9-33. Communications and Lighting Available for Safe Shutdown of Plant Location PABX Telephone Electro-Sound-Powered Telephone-Emergency Circuit Electro-Sound-Powered Maintenance Circuit PA System PA via PABX Telephone Fiber Optic Dispatch Phone Emer-gency 8-Hour Battery Lighting Emer-gency 208 Y/120VAC Lighting Emer-gency 250VDC Lighting Auxiliary feedwater pump turbine panel X
X X
X X
X X
Auxiliary shutdown panel rooms X
X X
X X
X X
Control room X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Diesel generator rooms X
X X
X X
X X
Fuel pool area X
X X
X X
X X
HVAC equipment room control panels X
X X
X X
X Instrument air compressors X
X X
X X
Switchgear and motor control center rooms X
X X
X X
X Valves 1 and 2 ND26,ND27,N D60, & ND61 in the Residual Heat Removal System X
X X
X X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-33 (Page 2 of 3)
(14 APR 2018)
Location PABX Telephone Electro-Sound-Powered Telephone-Emergency Circuit Electro-Sound-Powered Maintenance Circuit PA System PA via PABX Telephone Fiber Optic Dispatch Phone Emer-gency 8-Hour Battery Lighting Emer-gency 208 Y/120VAC Lighting Emer-gency 250VDC Lighting Valves 1 and 2 KC56A and KC81B in the Component Cooling Water System X
X X
X X
X Valves 1 and 2
- VQ15B, VQ16A, &
VQ13 in the Containment Air Release and Addition System X
X X
X X
X Reactor Coolant System Pressure Gage X
X X
X X
RC Temp, H&C Connection Box X
X X
X X
Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger outlet termperature X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-33 (Page 3 of 3)
(14 APR 2018)
Location PABX Telephone Electro-Sound-Powered Telephone-Emergency Circuit Electro-Sound-Powered Maintenance Circuit PA System PA via PABX Telephone Fiber Optic Dispatch Phone Emer-gency 8-Hour Battery Lighting Emer-gency 208 Y/120VAC Lighting Emer-gency 250VDC Lighting Note:
- 1. The Emergency 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery lights list given in this table is not intended to be a list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting. See Table 9-36 for a complete list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lights.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-34 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-34. Single Failure Analysis of the Emergency Lighting Systems. (Assume Emergency Lighting Systems are Energized)
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 1.
Emerg. AC Lighting Fixture Incandescent lamp or Fixture Failure - due to Damage or Other Incident No Consequences, only failed lamp will be out of service, all other lamps will continue to operate and provide adequate illuminations. Emergency 250VDC Lighting System will also illuminate the area along with appropriate Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting for access and egress and vital locations.
- 2.
Emerg. AC Lighting
- Cable, Panelboard to Fixture Failure - due to Damage Lighting circuit affected will be out of service with protection by the panelboard circuit breaker. Will lose (AC) illumination in a localized area. Emergency 250VDC Lighting System will adequately illuminate affected area. Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will illuminate area for access and egress and vital locations.
- 3.
Emerg. AC Lighting Panelboard Failure or Loss of Voltage Lighting circuits affected will be out of service. Will lose (AC) illumination in localized areas. Emerg.
250VDC Lighting System will adequately illuminate affected areas. Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will provide lighting for access and egress and vital locations.
- 4.
Emerg. AC Lighting Transformer Failure or Loss of 600 VAC Power Supply Same Comment as 3.
- 5.
Emerg. DC Lighting Fixture Incandescent Lamp or Fixture Failure - due to Damage or Other Incident No consequences, only failed lamp will be out of service. All other lamps will continue to operate and provide adequate illumination. Emergency AC Lighting System will also illuminate the area along with appropriate Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting.
- 6.
Emerg. DC Lighting
- Cable, Panelboard to Fixture Failure - due to Damage Lighting circuit affected will be out of service with protection by relay protective fuse. Will lose (DC) illumination in localized area. Emerg. AC Lighting System will adequately illuminate affected area.
Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will also illuminate area for access and egress and vital locations.
- 7.
Emerg. DC Lighting Panelboard Failure or Loss of Voltage Lighting circuits affected will be out of service. Will lose (DC) illumination in localized areas. Emerg. AC Lighting Systems will adequately illuminate affected areas. Emergency 8 Hour Battery Lighting will also illuminate area for access and egress and vital locations.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 1 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
Table 9-35. Lighting Systems Available to Illuminate Safety Related Equipment1,2,5 SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC CA MOTOR DRIVEN AUX.
FEEDWATER PUMPS 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B X
X STEAM TURB. DRIVEN AUX.
FEEDWATER PUMP X
X X
X AUX. FEEDWATER CONTROL PANELS ASP1A, ASP1B X
X X
X X
X EIA AUX. RELAY RACKS 1ARR1, 1ARR2 X
X X
X X
PROTECTION SET I, II, III, IV Cabinets 1, 2, 3, 4 X
X X
X X
EME RCP VOLTAGE AND FREQ SYS.
PANEL 1RCPM X
X EOA MAIN CONTROL BOARDS 1MC1-1MC13, 2MC1-2MC13, MC14 X
X X
X X
X CONTROL BOARD INPUT CABINETS 1IC1-1IC18, 1IC20, 2IC1-2IC18, 2IC20 X
X X
X CONTROL BOARD INPUT CABINETS 1IC21, 1IC22, 1IC26-1IC33, 2IC21, 2IC22, 2IC26-2IC33 X
X EPB PTS FEEDING RCP POWER MONITOR X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 2 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC EPC 4160 SWITCHGEAR GROUP 1ETA, 1ETB X
X X
X X
X 4160 SWITCHGEAR GROUP 2ETA, 2ETB X
X X
X X
X EPE 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXA, 2ELXA X
X X
X X
X 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXB, 2ELXB X
X X
X X
X 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXC, 2ELXC X
X X
X X
X 600V LOAD CENTER 1ELXD, 2ELXD X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
600V MCC 2EMXH 600V MCC 1EMXI, 2EMXI X
X X
X X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 3 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
X X
X X
X X
X EPG STATIC INVERTER 1EIA, 2EIA X
X X
X STATIC INVERTER 1EIB, 2EIB X
X STATIC INVERTER 1EIC, 2EIC X
X X
X STATIC INVERTER 1EID, 2EID X
X X
X STATIC INVERTER 1EIE, 2EIE X
X X
X STATIC INVERTER 1EIF, 2EIF X
X X
X POWER PANEL 1ERPA, 2ERPA X
X X
X POWER PANEL 1ERPB, 2ERPB X
X POWER PANEL 1ERPC, 2ERPC X
X POWER PANEL 1ERPD, 2ERPD X
X X
X EPL BATTERY CHARGER 1ECA, 2ECA X
X X
X BATTERY CHARGER 1ECB, 2ECB X
X BATTERY CHARGER 1ECC, 2ECC X
X BATTERY CHARGER 1ECD, 2ECD X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 4 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC BATTERY 1EBA, 2EBA X
X BATTERY 1EBB, 2EBB X
X BATTERY 1EBC, 2EBC X
X BATTERY 1EBD, 2EBD X
X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDA, 2EDA X
X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDB, 2EDB X
X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDC, 2EDC X
X DC DISTR.CENTER 1EDD, 2EDD X
X DC SPARE CHGR. DISTR. CTR 1EDS, 2EDS X
X SPARE CHGR. 600V AC POWER PNL 1EMS, 2EMS X
X AUCTIONEERING D10DES 1EADA, 2EADA X
X X
X X
X AUCTIONEERING D10DES 1EADB, 2EADB X
X X
X X
X DC DISTR. CENTER 1EDE, 2EDE X
X X
X X
X DC DISTR. CENTER 1EDF, 2EDF X
X X
X X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 5 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC EPQ DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES 1DGBA&B, 2DGBA&B X
X X
X X
X BATTERY CHARGER 1DGCA&B, 2DGCA&B X
X X
X X
X AUCT.DIODES 1VADA, 2VADA X
X X
X X
X AUCT.DIODES 1VADB, 2VADB X
X X
X X
X DISTR. CTR. 1DGA&B, 2DGA&B X
X X
X X
X EPY TRANSFORMER 1EKTG X
X X
X X
TRANSFORMER 2EKTH X
X X
X X
TRANSFORMER 1EKTB, X
X X
X 1EKTI, 2EKTB, 2EKTI X
X X
X EQA EMERG.DIESEL GENERATOR X
X X
X X
X EQC DIESEL GEN.CONTROL PANELS 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B (INCLUDES EXCITATION VOLTAGE REG.)
X X
X X
X X
DIESEL ENGINE CONTROL PANELS 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B X
X X
X X
X Deleted Per 2012 Update.
ERN DIESEL GEN. GROUND TRANSFORMERS X
X X
X X
X DIESEL GEN. RESISTOR BOXES X
X X
X X
X DIESEL GEN. SURGE PACKS X
X X
X X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 6 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
X X
X X
X DIESEL GEN. RELAY CABINETS 1EATC14, 15, 2EATC14, 15 X
X X
X X
X EWA CABLE ROOM CABLE SUPPORT SYS X
X EWB BATTERY ROOM CABLE SUPPORT SYS X
X EZA ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS X
X N/A AREA TERMINAL CABINETS 1EATC1-1EATC19 X
X X
X X
AREA TERMINAL BOXES 1T BOX 1-27 X
X FD DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL DAY TANKS X
X X
X X
X DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL BOOSTER PUMPS X
X X
X X
X DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL RELIEF VALVES X
X X
X X
X IPE REACTOR PROT. SYS. SOLID STATE PROT SYS RACKS X
X X
X AUX. SAFEGUARD CABINET AUX. SHUTDOWN PANELS 1A, 1B X
X X
X X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 7 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
X X
ITE TURBINE TERMINAL BOX A, B, D, EESF TEST CABINET X
KC COMPONENT COOLING WTR.
PUMPS X
X X
X COMPONENTS COOLING HEAT EXCH.
X X
X X
COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TK.
X X
KD DIESEL GEN. COOLING WTR.
HEAT EXCH.
X X
X DIESEL GEN JACKET WTR.
PUMPS X
X X
DIESEL GEN JACKET WTR.
STANDPIPE X
X X
KF SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMPS X
X SPENT FUEL COOLING HEAT EXCH X
X SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP SUCTION STRAINERS X
X LD DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL FILTERS X
X X
X DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL COOLERS X
X X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 8 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL RELIEF VLVs X
X X
X DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL HEAT EXCH X
X X
X DIESEL GENERATOR LUBE OIL SUMP TK X
X X
X NB BORON RECYCLE EVAP FEED PUMPS X
X BORON RECYCLE HOLDUP TANK X
X BORON RECYCLE EVAP FEED FILTERS X
X BORON RECYCLE STRIPPING COLUMN X
X ND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOV. PUMPS X
X X
X RESIDUAL HEAT REMOV. HEAT EXCH X
X X
X NI SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS X
X X
X SAFETY INJ ACCUMULATORS X
X NM NUCLEAR SAMPLING DELAY COIL 6 X
NUCLEAR SAMPLING VLV. OPER.
PNL X
NS CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 9 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT EXCH X
X NV CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL CHARGING PUMPS X
X CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL LETDOWN HEAT EXCH X
X X
X CHEMICAL AND VOLUME TANK X
X CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL BORIC ACID TANK X
X RF FIRE PROT DIESEL ROOM CONTROL PANEL X
X X
X SM MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VLVS.
X X
SV MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VLVS.
RELIEF VLVS.
X X
VA AUX. BLDG. VENT SYS. FITERS.
X X
VC CONTROL BLDG. VENT SYS FAN X
X CONTROL BLDG. VENT SYS FILTERS X
X CONTROL BLDG. VENT SYS AIR HANDLING UNITS X
X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 10 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC CONTROL BLDG VENT SYS HVAC AUX RELAY CAB. A&B X
X VD DIESEL BLDG. VENT FANS X
X X
DIESEL BLDG. VENT FILTERS X
X X
DIESEL BLDG. VENT DAMPERS X
X X
VP CONTAINMENT PURGE VENT SYS ISOLATION VALVES X
X WG WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR PKG.
X X
WASTE GAS TANKS X
X
`
WASTE GAS HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS X
X WL LIQUID WASTE SYS. DRAIN TK.
X X
X RHR & CS ROOM SUMP WN DIESEL GEN ROOM SUMPS X
X X
DIESEL GEN ROOM SUMPS PUMP PANELS X
X X
WS SPENT RESIN STORAGE TK YC CONTROL AREA CHILLER COMPRESSOR CRA-C-1, 2 PANELS X
X X
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-35 (Page 11 of 11)
(17 APR 2012)
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT EMERG. LIGHTING AT EQUIP3 EMERG. LIGHTING FOR ACCESS TO EQUIP4 8-HR BATTERY EMERG.
AC EMERG.
DC 8-HR BATTERY EMERG
. AC EMERG
. DC Notes:
- 1.
Equipment listing taken from Nuclear Safety Related Structures, Systems, and Components.
- 2.
Listing does not contain equipment located in reactor bldgs.
- 3.
Listed lighting is located in close proximity to equipment listed.
- 4.
Listed lighting is located in corridors/areas outside rooms, alcoves, etc. that equipment is located in.
- 5.
The emergency 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery lights list given in this table isn ot intended to be a list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting. See Table 9-36 for a complete list of NRC committed Post Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lights.
- 6.
The delay coil has been abandoned in place per EC 112660 (U-1) and EC 112663 (U-2) based on ALARA dose considerations.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 1 of 6)
(14 APR 2018)
Table 9-36. Lighting for Post-Fire Alternate Shutdown Utilizing the Standby Shutdown System Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 543 AA/51-52 210 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 AA/62-63 253 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 AA/62-63 254 Aisle AB 543 AA-BB/51 7
Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 AA-BB/63 61 Turbine Driven CA Pump AB 543 BB/51 192 Aisle AB 543 BB/52 48 Aisle/RC Temp Control Box AB 543 BB/62 100 Feedwater Pump Panels AB 543 BB/65 63 Area AB 543 BB-CC/49-50 284 1CA36/1CA64/Area AB 543 BB-CC/61-62 101 Aisle AB 543 CC/52-53 191 Aisle AB 543 CC/61-62 165 Aux. FW Pump Turb PNL AB 543 CC/62 252 Aisle AB 543 CC/63 287 2CA64/2CA36 AB 543 CC-DD/52 47 Stairs AB 543 CC-DD/61-62 102 Stairs AB 543 DD/52-53 208 Aisle/1CA52 AB 543 DD-EE/53-54 209 Aisle/1CA48 AB 543 DD-EE/60-61 251 Aisle/2CA48 AB 543 EE/52-53 207 Aisle AB 543 EE/61-62 247 Aisle/2CA52 AB 543 FF/52-53 206 Aisle AB 543 FF/61-62 246 Aisle AB 543 FF-GG/59-60 250 Stairs AB 543 FF-GG/61 248 Aisle AB 543 GG/52-53 205 Aisle AB 543 GG/56 218 Aisle AB 543 GG/59-60 249 Aisle AB 543 GG/61-62 244 Aisle
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 2 of 6)
(14 APR 2018)
Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 543 GG/61-62 245 Aisle AB 543 HH/52 204 Aisle AB 543 HH/62 97 2VQ13/2VQ15B AB 543 HH/62 242 Aisle AB 543 HH/62 243 Aisle AB 543 JJ/51 203 Aisle AB 543 JJ/63 241 Aisle AB 543 JJ-KK/50-51 224 Aisle AB 543 JJ-KK/63-64 240 Aisle AB 543 KK/50 202 Aisle AB 543 KK-LL/50-51 68 Aisle AB 543 KK-LL/63-64 238 Aisle AB 543 KK-LL/63-64 239 Aisle AB 543 MM-NN/50-51 201 Aisle AB 543 MM-NN/63-64 237 Aisle AB 543 PP/50-51 200 Stairs AB 543 PP/63-64 236 Stairs AB 554 BB/54 234 Aisle AB 554 BB/60 278 Aisle AB 554 CC/61 277 Aisle AB 560 AA/49-50 16 1ETB AB 560 AA/64 260 2ETB11/2ETB12 AB 560 AA/65 110 2ETB/2ELXB AB 560 AA-BB/61-62 263 Aisle AB 560 BB/46 15 Aisle/1EMXL F09A AB 560 BB/46 230 Aisle AB 560 BB/49 229 Aisle AB 560 BB/51 14 Aisle/1ETB12/1ETB13 AB 560 BB/51 228 Aisle AB 560 BB/52-53 226 Aisle AB 560 BB/63 111 Aisle/2ETB AB 560 BB/63 261 Aisle
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 3 of 6)
(14 APR 2018)
Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 560 BB/65 259 Aisle AB 560 BB/68 258 Aisle AB 560 BB/69 109 Aisle AB 560 CC-DD/52 17 Stairs AB 560 CC-DD/52-53 227 Stairs AB 560 CC-DD/61-62 112 Stairs AB 560 CC-DD/61-62 262 Aisle AB 560 FF-GG/59 257 Stairs AB 560 GG/55 164 1EMXJ/1EMXB AB 560 GG/59 160 2EMXJ/2EMXB AB 560 GG/59 161 Area/Door AB 560 HH/55 85 Comp. Cooling PMP Area AB 560 HH/57 163 KC Pump 1B1/Door AB 560 HH/58 162 Area AB 560 PP/50-51 199 Stairs AB 560 PP/63-64 256 Stairs AB 568 FF-GG/59 159 Stairs AB 574 BB/61 279 Aisle AB 574 BB-CC/54 180 Aisle AB 574 CC/61 181 Aisle AB 577 AA/49 22 1EMXS/1ETA AB 577 AA/50 194 Aisle/1ETA AB 577 AA/61-62 189 Aisle AB 577 AA/64 267 2ETA12/2ETA13 AB 577 AA/65 119 Aisle/2EMXS AB 577 AA/67 266 Aisle AB 577 AA-BB/45 193 Aisle AB 577 AA-BB/52 185 Aisle AB 577 AA-BB/62 118 Aisle/2ETA AB 577 AA-BB/69 265 Aisle/SSS Disconnect Cubicle AB 577 BB/46 21 Aisle/1EMXK F09A AB 577 BB/46 184 Aisle
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 4 of 6)
(14 APR 2018)
Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 577 BB/51 20 Aisle AB 577 BB/51 183 Aisle AB 577 BB/63 187 Aisle AB 577 BB/65 268 Aisle AB 577 BB/68 188 Aisle AB 577 BB/68-69 120 2ELXC/2ETXE AB 577 CC-DD/52 23 Stairs AB 577 CC-DD/52-53 182 Aisle AB 577 CC-DD/61-62 117 Stairs AB 577 DD/62 186 Aisle AB 577 FF/58 155 Component Cooling Pump 2A1/2A2 AB 577 FF-GG/59-60 153 Stairs AB 577 GG/57 156 Area AB 577 GG/60 154 Door/Area AB 577 PP/50-51 198 Stairs AB 577 PP/63-64 264 Stairs AB 594 AA-BB/57 35 Aisle/Control Boards AB 594 BB/49 27 Area AB 594 BB/51 28 Aisle AB 594 BB/51 29 Aisle AB 594 BB/55 168 Aisle AB 594 BB/59 171 Area AB 594 BB/63 148 Aisle/AX656B Switchgear AB 594 BB/63 149 Aisle/AX656B Switchgear AB 594 CC/51 231 Aisle/Reactor Trip AB 594 CC/56 167 Aisle AB 594 CC/58 170 Aisle AB 594 CC/62 147 Stairs AB 594 CC/63 275 Aisle/Reactor Trip AB 594 CC/63 276 Aisle/Reactor Trip AB 594 CC-DD/52 31 Stairs AB 594 CC-DD/54 169 1PCC7/1PCC8
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 5 of 6)
(14 APR 2018)
Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage AB 594 CC-DD/60 172 2PCC7/2PCC8 AB 594 DD/51-52 190 Aisle AB 594 DD/53-54 143 Aisle AB 594 DD/60-61 146 Aisle AB 594 DD/62 283 Ladder/2CA54B AB 594 DD-EE/52 225 Aisle/1CA54B AB 594 DD-EE/55 144 Aisle AB 594 DD-EE/58 145 Aisle AB 594 EE/62 280 Area AB 594 FF/53-54 211 Aisle AB 594 FF-GG/60-61 150 Aisle AB 594 GG/54 212 Aisle AB 594 GG/61-62 273 Aisle AB 594 GG-HH/60 151 Aisle AB 594 HH/53 213 Aisle AB 594 JJ/61 272 Aisle AB 594 JJ-KK/53 214 Aisle AB 594 KK-LL/62 271 Aisle AB 594 MM/51 216 Aisle AB 594 MM/52 215 Aisle AB 594 MM/61 270 Aisle AB 594 NN/63 269 Aisle DH 594 EE/43 80 Area DH 594 EE/43 82 Area DH 594 EE/43 285 1CA38A/1CA66B DH 594 EE/43-45 286 Area DH 594 EE/71 139 Area DH 594 EE/71 140 Area DH 594 EE-70 288 2CA66B/2CA38A DH 594 EE-70 289 Stairs/Aisle DH 618 EE/52-53 232 Aisle/Ladder/1SA4 DH 618 EE/52-53 233 Aisle/Ladder/1SA4
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-36 (Page 6 of 6)
(14 APR 2018)
Building Elevation Column Light Unit Coverage DH 618 EE/61-62 281 Aisle/Ladder/2SA4 DH 618 EE/61-62 282 Aisle/Ladder/2SA4 SRV 574 V/37 178 Area SRV 584 V/36 175 Stair SRV 594 U/34-35 174 Aisle SSF 601 A/2-4 SSF5 Aisle SSF 601 A-B/4 SSF6 Aisle/Diesel Generator SSF 601 B/6 SSF7 Aisle SSF 601 B-C/2 SSF4 Aisle SSF 601 B-C/4 SSF3 Aisle SSF 601 B-C/8 SSF1 Aisle/SSS Control Console SSF 601 C/6 SSF2 Aisle/SSS Control Console TB 594 1C/17 56 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.
TB 594 1D/17 57 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.
TB 594 1L/17 54 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.
TB 594 1M/17 55 6.9KV SWGR. RMS.
TB 594 2C/17 124 SWITCHGEAR TB 594 2D/17 123 SWITCHGEAR TB 594 2L/17 126 SWITCHGEAR TB 594 2M/17 125 SWITCHGEAR Notes:
- 1. AB
- 2. DH
- 3. SRV
- 4. SSF
- 5. TB Auxiliary Building Doghouse Service Building Standby Shutdown Facility Turbine Building
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-37 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-37. Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System Single Failure Analysis COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/
CAUSE EFFECTS DETECTION METHOD REMARKS Fuel Oil Transfer Valve Fails open/material failure or solenoid failure No adverse effect on system performance High level alarm in day tank Level rises in day tank until it enters the day tank vent pipe and eventually reaches an equilibrium level well below the top of the vent.
Fails closed/material or solenoid failure Low level in day tank Low level alarm in day tank Transfer valve can be manually bypassed. One hour of fuel is available in day tank. Redundant diesel remains operable.
Fuel Oil Transfer Piping and Day Tank Line break or tank rupture/
corrosion or mechanical damage Loss of fuel or limited fuel Low level alarm in day tank Redundant diesel remains operable.
Day Tank Level Control Fails to function/material, mechanical or electrical failure Low level in day tank Low level alarm in day tank Transfer valve can be manually bypassed. One hour of fuel is available in day tank. Redundant diesel remains operable.
Fuel Oil Booster Pump Strainer Clogged/Accumulation of dirt and debris Low fuel oil supply pressure High differential pressure alarm Strainer is duplex type and flow can be manually diverted from the clogged strainer to the clean strainer.
Fuel Oil Booster Pump Fails to start/mechanical or electrical failure or damage No fuel to engine, engine fails to start Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Fuel Oil Filter Clogged/Accumulation of dirt and debris Low fuel oil supply pressure High differential pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-37 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/
CAUSE EFFECTS DETECTION METHOD REMARKS Vents to Atmosphere Failed due to tornado missiles Eventual loss of fuel oil flow to engine Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-38 (Page 1 of 1)
(24 OCT 2004)
Table 9-38. Deleted Per 2004 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-39 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-39. Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Single Failure Analysis COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/
CAUSE EFFECTS DETECTION METHOD REMARKS Engine-Driven Jacket Water Circulation Pump Fails to function/mechnanical failure or damage Loss of cooling water flow to engine leading to eventual shutdown Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Temperature Control Valve Fails open/mechanical failure Continuous flow through jacket water cooler - low system temperature Low temperature alarm Diesel continues to run but with less efficiency.
Fails closed/mechanical failure All flow through by - pass, no flow to cooler -
temperature rise leading to eventual shutdown High temperature alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Jacket Water Standpipe Leaks/Mechanical failure due to corrosion Low water level in standpipe Low level alarm Manual makeup from demineralized water system.
Jacket Water Cooler Leaks/Mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Low level in standpipe, loss of NPSH to circulation pump, loss of flow to engine leading to eventual shutdown Low level alarm standpipe Redundant diesel remains operable.
Jacket Water Piping Leaks or ruptures in piping including tube-sides of tube oil cooler, governor oil cooler, engine intercooler Low level in standpipe, loss of flow to engine, temperature rise in Cooliing water, lube oil, and combustion air leading to eventual shutdown Low level alarm standpipe Redundant diesel remains operable.
Jacket Water Heater or Keep Warm Pump Inoperable/mechanical or electrical failure Drop in cooling water temperature below optimum starting temperature (140°F)
Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains readiness at proper temperature.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-40 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-40. Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Alarm and Shutdown Setpoints PARAMETER ALARM SETPOINT SHUTDOWN SETPOINT Pressure:
Low Jacket Water Inlet Pressure 10 PSIG Temperature:
High Temp Aftercooler Inlet 165°F Low Temp H2O Engine Inlet 140°F High Temp H2O Engine Inlet 175°F Low Temp H2O Engine Outlet 140°F High Temp H2O Engine Outlet 190°F 200°F Level:
Low Level Jacket Water Standpipe 176 Inches Above Tank Bottom
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-41 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-41. Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System Single Failure Analysis COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/ CAUSE EFFECTS DETECTION METHOD REMARKS Starting Air Compressor Fails to function/mechanical or electrical failure or damage Low air pressure in system Low pressure alarm Redundant compressor on the same diesel remains operable.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Starting air Aftercooler Leaks/mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Low air pressure in system Low pressure alarm Redundant aftercooler on the same diesel remains operable.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Starting Air Dryer Leaks due to corrosion or control system failure Low air pressure in system Low pressure alarm Redundant air dryer on the same diesel remains operable.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Starting Air Tanks Leaks/mechanical failure due to corrosion Low air pressure in system Low pressure alarm Redundant air tank on the same diesel remains in service.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Starting Air Solenoid Valves Fails open/material or electrical failure Starting air tank bleeds down through open valve Low pressure alarm Redundant air tank on the same diesel remains in service.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Fails closed/material or electrical failure Loss of associated starting air train None Redundant starting air train on same diesel remains in service.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-41 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/ CAUSE EFFECTS DETECTION METHOD REMARKS Starting Air Piping Line break upstream of check valves 1VG29, 1VG30, 1VG31, and 1VG32 (Figure 9-183) and check valves 1VG73, 1VG74, 1VG75, and 1VG76 (Figure 9-184)/ Mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Loss of associated starting air train Low pressure alarm Redundant starting air train on same diesel remains in service.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Line break down stream of check valves 1VG29, 1VG30, 1VG31, and 1VG32 ( Figure 9-183) and check valves 1VG73, 1VG74, 1VG75, and 1VG76 (Figure 9-184) Mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Starting air tanks bleed down Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Starting Air Governor Oil Pressure Boost Cylinder Fails to function/mechanical or pneumatic failure Time required to start diesel will increase None Diesel remains operable.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Starting Air Distributors One air distributor fails to function/mechanical failure None None Redundant air distributor on the same diesel remains operable.
Redundant diesel remains operable.
Both air distributors fail to function/mechanical failure Engine start capability is lost None Redundant diesel remains operable.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-42 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-42. Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System Single Failure Analysis COMPONENT FAILURE MODE/
CAUSE EFFECTS DETECTION METHOD REMARKS Engine-Driven Lube Oil Pump Fails to function/ mechanical failure or damage No oil flow to engine leading to high bearing temperatures and eventual shutdown Low pressure alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Lube Oil Cooler Leaks/Mechanical failure due to corrosion or ruptures Reduction in oil flow to engine, increase in bearing temperature Low pressure alarm or high bearing temperature alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Lube Oil Filter (Duplex)
Clogged/Accumulation of dirt and debris Reduction in oil flow to engine High differential pressure alarm Filter is duplex type and flow can be manually diverted from the clogged filter to the clean filter.
Cannot be bypassed.
Lube Oil Strainer Clogged/Accumulation of dirt and debris Reduction in oil flow to engine High differential pressure alarm Strainer is duplex type and flow can be manually diverted from the clogged strainer to the clean strainer.
Lube Oil Heaters Electrical failure Low oil temperature; diesel may not start within acceptable time frame Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains readiness at proper temperature.
Prelube Oil Pump Fails to function/mechanical or electrical failure or damage Low oil temperature; diesel may not start within acceptable time frame Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains readiness at proper temperature.
Prelube Oil Filter or Strainer Clogged/Accumulation of dirt and debris Reduction in standby oil flow through engine; diesel may not start within acceptable time frame Low temperature alarm Redundant diesel maintains readiness at proper temperature.
Lube Oil Piping Line break/corrosion or damage Loss of oil flow to engine Low pressure or low temperature alarm Redundant diesel remains operable.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-43 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-43. Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System Alarm and Shutdown Setpoints Parameter Alarm Setpoint Shutdown Setpoint Pressure:
Full Flow Lube Oil Duplex Strainer High Differential Pressure 20 PSID Full Flow Lube Oil Duplex Filter High Differential Pressure 20 PSID Low Engine Lube Oil Pressure 40 PSIG 30 PSIG1 Low Turbocharger (RH) Lube Oil Pressure 20 PSIG 15 PSIG Low Turbocharger (LH) Lube Oil Pressure 20 PSIG 15 PSIG High Crankcase Pressure 5 in - H2O Temperature:
Low Temperature Lube Oil Engine Inlet 140°F High Temperature Lube Oil Engine Inlet 175°F Low Temperature Lube Oil Engine Outlet 140°F High Temperature Lube Oil Engine Outlet 190°F 200°F High Temperature Engine Main Bearings 228°F Note:
- 1. Low-low lube oil pressure trip will automatically shutdown diesel regardless of operating mode.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-44 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-44. Diesel Generator Engine Intake and Exhaust System Single Failure Analysis Component Failure Mode/ Cause Effects Detection Method Remarks Intake Filter Blockage/Accumulation of dirt and debris Reduction in air flow to engine High exhaust gas temperature Redundant diesel remains operable.
Silencer Blockage/Accumulation of dirt and debris Reduction in air flow to engine High exhaust gas temperature Redundant diesel remains operable.
Ruptured/Mechanical Failure due to cracks or corrosion Excessive noise, loss of outdoor intake air Excessive noise in diesel building Engine remains operable.
Intake Air Pipes And Flexible Hose Blockage/Accumulation of dirt and debris Reduction in air flow to engine High exhaust gas temperature Redundant diesel remains operable.
Ruptured/Mechanical Failure due to cracks or corrosion Excessive noise, loss of outdoor intake air Excessive noise in diesel building Engine remains operable.
Turbocharger Loss of air supplied mechanical failure of compressor or turbine Reduced or no air flow High exhaust gas temperature or stopping of engine Redundant diesel remains operable.
Aftercooler Leaks/Mechanical failure due to cracks or corrosion Loss of adequately cooled air Loss of engine power output Redundant diesel remains operable.
Exhaust Gas Pipe And Flexible Coupling Blockage/Accumulation of dirt and debris Engine slows or stops Stopping of engine Redundant diesel remains operable.
Ruptured/Mechanical failure due to cracks or corrosion Excessive noise, exhaust gas inside diesel building Excessive noise in diesel building Engine remains operable.
Exhaust Silencer Blockage Engine slows or stops Stopping of engine Redundant diesel remains operable.
Ruptured Excessive noise, exhaust gas inside diesel building Excessive noise inside building Engine remains operable.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-45 (Page 1 of 1)
(17 OCT 2013)
Table 9-45. Comparison of VQ System to BTP CSB 6-4 BTP Disposition 1a.
Actuators will close the containment isolation valves assuming full containment pressure differential and resultant flow.
- b.
The system as shown in Figure 9-194 contains only one supply and one return line.
- c.
The lines are nominal 4" pipe.
- d.
The design of the containment penetrations is listed in Table 6-74 and Table 6-77.
- e.
The containment isolation valves close on receipt of a "T" signal (phase A isolation). One of the parameters that can initiate a "T" signal is high containment airborne activity (see Figure 7-2, page 10).
- f.
The containment isolation valves close within 5 seconds.
- g.
The pipes which connect the containment isolation valves with the containment is Duke Class F (i.e., ANSI B31.1 pipe, seismically qualified). The pipes are open to upper containment atmosphere which will afford virtually complete isolation from high energy pipe break generated debris. In addition, the opening of the pipes are covered by a 40 mesh screen that is held in place between a pair of flanges.
- 2.
This system is designed only to control containment pressure during normal operation.
- 3.
This system is not designed or used to purge the containment to reduce airborne activity.
- 4.
Provisions for testing of containment isolation valves during reactor operations exist.
5a.
See response to position 1.e. for valve closure signals. The amount of radiation that can realistically be expected to be released through this flow path is insignificant.
- b.
The VQ system utilizes schedule 40 pipe which precludes rupture due to application of containment design pressure (15 psig). The only safety related equipment in the system are the containment isolation valves.
- c.
If the system is in operation at the start of an accident the amount of air lost while the valves are closing is insignificant.
- d.
An allowable leak rate for these valves will be developed in the type "C" test program.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 9-46 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 9-46. Groundwater Drainage System Component Design Parameters AUXILIARY BUILDING GROUNDWATER DRAINAGE SUMP PUMPS Number both units 6
Type Vertical Design Capacity, GPM 300 Head at Design Flow, FT 90 Minimum Available NPSH, FT 30 Normal Operating Pressure, PSIG 40 Temperature of Pumped Fluid, °F Ambient TURBINE BUILDING GROUNDWATER DRAINAGE SUMP PUMPS Number both units 4
Type Vertical Design Capacity, GPM 300 Head at Design Flow, FT 65 Minimum Available NPSH, FT 30 Normal Operating Pressure, PSIG 25 Temperature of Pumped Fluid, °F Ambient