ML20106E922
Text
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Appendix 8A. Tables Appendix 8A. Tables
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-1 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-1. Class 1E Loads Safety Loads Function Power Component Cooling Pumps Equipment Cooling 4160VAC Containment Spray Pumps Containment Cooling 4160VAC Residual Heat Removal Pumps Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Safety Injection Pumps Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Centrifugal Charging Pumps Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Steam Generator Makeup for Emergency Core Cooling 4160VAC Nuclear Service Water Pumps Environmental Control and Equipment Cooling 4160VAC Fuel Pool Cooling pumps Fuel Pool Cooling 4160VAC HVAC Compressors Environmental Control 4160VAC Essential Motor Control Centers1 Supply Emergency Power 600VAC Vital Battery Chargers Supply Vital DC Power and Maintain Vital Battery Charge 600VAC Diesel Battery Chargers Supply DC Power for Diesel Control and Maintain Charge on Diesel Battery 600VAC Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Booster Pumps Diesel Generator Operation 125VDC Vital I&C DC Distribution Centers Supply Vital DC Power 125VDC Auxiliary Relay Racks (Process Instrumentation and Control System)
Process Control 120VAC Note:
- 1. See Table 8-6 for a listing of Essential Motor Control Center Loads.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-2 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-2. Transmission Structures Design Specifications A.
General Loading: 0.5" radial ice, 0°F, 4 pounds wind Overload factors:
vertical 1.50 transverse wind 2.50 wire tension, suspension 1.10 wire tension, strain 1.25 Application:
one or both circuits intact B. Extreme wind loading: no ice, 60°F, 9 pounds wind Overload factors:
Same as A, above Application:
Same as A, above C. Heavy ice loading: 1.25" radial ice, 0°F, no wind Overload factors:
1.0 on all loads Application:
Same as A, above D. Construction loading:
Lattice Towers:
a) Suspension structures:
Same as A (above) with any one wire broken.
b) Strain structures:
Same as A (above) with any three wires broken on one side.
Steel Poles:
a) Suspension structures:
Same as A (above) with any one wire broken.
b) Strain structures:
Same as A (above) with any one wire broken.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-3 (Page 1 of 1)
(24 APR 2006)
Table 8-3. Description of Transmission Lines Transmission Line Identification Line Voltage First Major Substation Distance to Substation Conductor Type Figure Reference Comments Newport 230kV Newport Tie Station 5.2 miles (Bundled) 2-1272 KCM 54/19 ACSR Figure 8-5 Shares common R/W with Allison Creek Line; has one crossover point Allison Creek 230kV Newport Tie Station 5.2 miles (Single) 1-1272 KCM 54/19 ACSR Figure 8-6 Shares common R/W with Newport Line; has one crossover point Roddey 230kV Pacolet Tie Station 41.4 miles (Bundled) 1-954 KCM 54/19 ACSR Figure 8-7 Shares common R/W with Clay Hill Line; has one crossover point Clay Hill 230kV Ripp Sub-station 24.5 miles (Single) 1-1272 KCM 54/19 ACSR Figure 8-8 Shares common R/W with Roddey Line; has one crossover point Moser 230kV Allen Steam Station Switchyard 10.9 miles (Bundled) 2-1272 KCM 54/19 ACSR Figure 8-9 Shares common R/W with a 525kV Line; has no crossovers Peacock 230kV Peacock Tie Station 14.8 miles (Bundled) 2-1272 KCM 54/19 ACSR Figure 8-28 Shares common R/W with Roddey and Clay Hill Lines; has 1 crossover point Notes:
- 1. R/W is an abbreviation for Right of Way.
- 2. Crossover point refers to a 500 kV line crossing above a 230 kV line.
- 3. Conductor area units "KCM" are equivalent to conductor area units "MCM", reference National Electrical Safety Code - 1996, section 110-
- 6.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-4 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-4. Grid Frequency Decay Analysis Case Assumptions Results Case A
Duke generation was reduced by more than 2100 MW by the loss of all Marshall generation and associated transmission. In addition to this loss of generation and transmission, two additional interconnections were assumed to be out of service -- the 500 kV line between Jackson Ferry of Appalachain Power Company and Duke's Antioch Station and the 230 kV douible circuit line between Roxboro Steam Plant of Carolina Power and Light Company and Eno Tie Station. The remaining interconnections mitigated substantially the disturbance to the Duke system.
Insignificant Decay - The interconnected network supports frequency.
Case B
Duke generation was reduced by more than 2200 MW by the loss of all Belews Creek generation and associated transmission. In addition the 230 kV Roxboro to Eno interconnection was assumed to be out of service. The remaining interconnections mitigated substantially the disturbance to the Duke system.
Insignificant Decay - The interconnected network supports frequency.
Case C
Duke generation was reduced by more than 2700 MW by the loss of all Oconee generation and associated transmission. This loss of transmission eliminated the 500 kV line between Oconee and Norcross of the Georgia Power Company system. In addition, the 500 kV interconnection between Jackson Ferry of Appalachian Power Company and Duke's Antioch station was assumed out of service. The remaining interconnections mitigated substantially the disturbance to the Duke system.
Insignificant Decay - The interconnected network supports frequency.
Since the above three disturbances did not cause undue strain on the Duke system, another highly improbable disturbance was investigated. For the remaining cases (D, E, & F), it was assumed that all interconnections from surrounding power systems into the Duke system were removed from service, leaving the Duke system isolated.
Case D
Duke generation was reduced by more than 2200MW by the loss of Belews Creek generation and associated transmission.
Maximum frequency decay rate of approximately 0.38 hertz per second.
Case E
Duke generation was reduced by more than 3000MW by the loss of Belews Creek generation and associated transmission and Oconee 2 generation.
Case F
Duke generation was reduced by more than 3500MW by the loss of Belews Creek generation and associated transmission, Oconee 2 generation and McGuire 1 generation.
Maximum frequency decay rate of approximately 1.06 hertz per second, still well below the max 4 Hz/sec.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-5 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-5. Transmission System Availability HISTORICAL INFORMATION NOT REQUIRED TO BE REVISED 500 kV Facilities 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Line Miles 549 549 549 549 558 Line Tripouts 8
16 41 12 8
Tripouts per 100 Miles 1.46 2.91 7.47 2.19 1.43 Line Lockouts 1
0 1
1 0
Lockouts per 100 Miles 0.18 0
0.18 0.18 0
Total Outage Time (hours) 0.02 12 13 3
1 Availability Factor (per 100 Miles) 0.99999 0.9951 0.9947 0.9989 0.9999 Average Availability Factor for 5-Year Period: 0.9977 (per 100 Miles) 230 kV Facilities 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Line Miles 2483 2483 2526 2526 2579 Line Tripouts 69 116 133 89 70 Tripouts per 100 Miles 2.78 4.67 5.27 3.52 2.71 Line Lockouts 3
0 3
1 3
Lockouts per 100 Miles 0.12 0
0.12 0.04 0.12 Total Outage Time (hours) 23 2
32 14 20 Availability Factor (per 100 Miles) 0.9976 0.9998 0.9971 0.9979 0.9986 Average Availability Factor for 5-Year Period: 0.9982 (per 100 Miles)
Notes:
- 1. Line tripouts refers to the total number of times a relay operation tripped a line, regardless of the cause.
- 2. Line lockouts refers to the number of tripouts in which reclosing was unsuccessful.
- 3. Total outage time includes outages from all causes.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 1 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Table 8-6. Catawba Nuclear Station: Sequenced Loads To Be Supplied From One Of The Redundant Engineered Safety Power Distribution Systems Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks No. 1(2)
Motor Operated Valves and Dampers 575 50 HP Yes Yes (11 Seconds)
After Diesel Starts)
Boric Acid Transfer Pump Motor AB NV 575 15.5 KW Yes Yes 1-15.5KW/diesel Motor Driven Aux.
FDW. Pump Sump Pump Motor AB WL 575 7.5 HP Yes Yes 1-7.5HP/diesel Steam Turbine Driven Aux. FDW.
Pump Sump Pump Motor AB WL 575 7.5 HP Yes Yes 1-7.5HP/diesel Aux. Building Ground Water Drainage Sump Pump Motor AB WZ 575 60 HP Yes Yes 3-20HP/unit Train A 1EMXG 125VDC Vital Inst.
& Cntrl. Btry Chrgr ECA,C(ECB,D)
AB EPL 600 103 KVA Yes Yes 2-51.3KVA/diesel Liquid Radwaste ND
& NS Sump Pump Motor AB WL 575 10 HP Yes Yes 1-10HP/diesel Annulus Ventilation Fan Mtr.
AB VE 575 40 HP Yes 1-40HP/diesel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 2 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Annulus Ventilation Moisture Elimination Heater AB VE 600 45 KW Yes 1-45KW/diesel Pump Room Heater-Demister Section AB VA 600 80 KW Yes Yes 2-40KW/unit Train A 1EMXG Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust Fan Motor AB VA 575 200 HP Yes Yes 2-100HP/unit Train A 1EMXG Switchgear Room Air Handling Unit Fan Motor AB VC 575 30 HP Yes Yes 2-15HP/diesel Fuel Handling Area Filter Train Moisture Separator Heater AB VF 600 160 KW
--(5)
Yes 2-80KW/diesel Unit Essential Panelboard Transformers AB EPY 600 30 KVA Yes Yes 2-15KVA/diesel Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan Motor AB VF 575 100 HP
--(5)
Yes 2-50HP/diesel Aux. Shutdown Panel Area Air Conditioning Units AB VA 575 4 HP Yes Yes 1-4HP/diesel Nuclear Service Water Strainer Backwash Drive Motor PH RN 575
.75 HP Yes Yes 1-.75HP/diesel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 3 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Nuclear Service Water Pump Structure Vent Fan Motor PH VZ 575 7.5 HP Yes Yes 1-7.5HP/diesel Deleted Per 2007 Update.
Diesel Starting Air Compressor Motor DB VG 575 20 HP Yes Yes 2-10HP/diesel AC Emergency Lighting Pnlbd.
AB ELA 600 30 KVA (5),(6)
Yes 1-30KVA/diesel Diesel 600/120V Panelboard DB EPY 600 5 KVA Yes Yes 1-5KVA/diesel Deleted Per 2007 Update.
Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil Transfer Pump Motor DB LD 575 3 HP (5)
Yes 1-3HP/diesel Deleted Per 2007 Update.
Diesel Battery Charger DB EPQ 600 20 KVA Yes Yes 1-20KVA/diesel Diesel Generator Room Sump Pump Motor DB WN 575 10 HP Yes Yes 2-5HP/diesel Diesel Bldg.
Generator Vent Fan Motor DB VD 575 60 HP Yes Yes 2-30HP/diesel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 4 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Control Room Air Handling Unit Fan Motor AB VC 575 50 HP Yes Yes 1-50HP/unit Train A 1EMXG Containment Air Return Isolation Damper CV VX 575
.38 HP Yes 1-.38HP/diesel Control Room Area Filter Train Pressure Fan Motor AB VC 575 25 HP Yes Yes 1-25HP/unit Train A 1EMXG Control Room Area PFT-1 Moisture Separator Heater AB VC 600 25 KW Yes Yes 1-25KW/unit Train A 1EMXG Power Operated Pressurizer Relief Isolation Valves CV NC 575 4 HP (10)
(10) 1-2HP/diesel Train A 2-2HP/diesel Train B Hydrogen Igniter Panelboard Transformer AB EHM 600 25 KVA (5),(6) 1-25 KVA/diesel No. 2 (12 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor AB NV 4000 600 HP Yes Yes 1-600HP/diesel 4 KV 1E Load
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 5 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks No. 3 (15 Seconds After Diesel Starts)3 Safety Injection Pump Motor AB NI 4000 400 HP Yes 1-400HP/diesel 4KV 1E Load CRDM Ventilation Fan Motor CV VV 575 200 HP Yes 2-100HP/diesel Lower Containment Vent Unit Fan Motor CV VV 575 178 HP Yes 2-89HP/diesel Upper Containment Vent Unit Fan Motor CV VV 575 15 HP Yes 2-7.5HP/diesel Upper Containment Return Air Fan Motor CV VV 575 15 HP Yes 2-7.5HP/diesel Containment Pipe Tunnel Booster Fan Motor CV VV 575 10 HP Yes 1-10HP/diesel Containment Personnel Air Lock AB IAE 575 3 KVA Yes 1-3KVA/diesel Incore Instrument Room Vent Unit Fan Motor CV VV 575 5 HP Yes 1-5HP/diesel Site Assembly/Evacuation Alarm Transformers AB ECE 600 120 KVA Yes 4-30KVA/Station Train B 1MXP, 2MXP
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 6 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Penetration Room Condensing Unit Transformer Bank AB EXS 600 43.3 KVA Yes 1-43.3 KVA/diesel Penetration Room Air Handling Unit AB VA 575 10 HP Yes 1-10 HP/diesel Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitor Sample Pump Skid AB EMF 600 0.75 KVA Yes 2-0.75 KVA/Station Unit 1 Train A Unit 2 Train B Containment Radiation Monitors Sample Pump Skid AB EMF 600 1.50 KVA Yes 1-1.50 KVA/Unit Train A No. 4 (20 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor AB ND 4000 400 HP Yes 1-400HP/diesel 4KV 1E Load No. 5 (25 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Deleted Per 2012 Updated
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 7 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks No. 6 (30 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Component Cooling Water Pump Motor AB KC 4000 500 HP Yes Yes 2-250HP/diesel 4KV 1E Load No. 7 (35 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor PH RN 4000 1000 HP Yes Yes 1-1000HP/diesel 4KV 1E Load No. 8 (40 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Aux. Feedwater Pump Motor AB CA 4000 600 HP Yes Yes 1-600HP/diesel 4KV 1E Load No. 9 (50 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Main Fire Protection Pump INT RY 4000 300 HP Yes 2-300HP/station Non 1E 4KV Load IFTB, 2FTA No. 10 (3)
Reactor Make-Up Water Pump Motor AB NB 575 25 HP Yes 1-25HP/diesel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 8 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks (60 Seconds After Diesel Starts)
Feedwater Pump Turbine Turning Gear Motor AB IWE 575 1.5 HP Yes 1-1.5HP/diesel Main Turbine Turning Gear Oil Pump Motor TB LT 575 50 HP Yes 1-50HP/Unit Train B
Main Turbine Turning Gear Motor TB ITE 575 60 HP Yes 1-60HP/Unit Train A
Diesel Building CO2 Storage Tank Refrigeration Unit TB RF 575 3 HP Yes 1-3HP/Unit Train B Main Turbine Lube Oil Lift Pump Motor TB LT 575 40 HP Yes 8-5HP/Unit Train B Generator Main Seal Oil Pump Motor TB LG 575 25 HP Yes 1-25HP/Unit Train A
Generator Recirculating Seal Oil Pump Motor TB LG 575 10 HP Yes 1-10HP/Unit Train B
Generator Seal Oil Vacuum Pump Motor TB LG 575 2 HP Yes 1-2HP/Unit Train B Fire Protection Jockey Pump Motor SB RF 575 5 HP Yes 1-5HP/Unit Train A Fire Protection Jockey Pump Motor SB RF 575 25 HP Yes 1-25HP/Station Unit 1 Train B
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 9 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Boric Acid Tank Room Unit Heaters AB VA 600 10 KW Yes 6-5KW/Station 1MXW, 1MXX, 2MXW Boric Acid Filter Room Unit Heaters AB VA 600 5 KW Yes 2-5KW/Station Train A 1MXW, 2MXW Boric Acid Transfer Room Unit Heaters AB VA 600 5 KW Yes 2-5KW/Station Train B 1MXX, 2MXX Tech. Support Center Filter Unit Preheater SB VH 600 4.00 KW Yes 1-4.00KW/Station Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center Filter Unit Fan Motor SB VH 575 7.5 HP Yes 1-7.5HP/Station Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center Condensing Unit SB VH 600 30.75 KW Yes 1-30.75KW/Station Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center Lighting Transformer SB ELN 600 45.0 KVA Yes 1-45.0KVA/Station Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center Duct Heaters SB VH 600 15 KW Yes 3-5.0KW/Station Train A SMXE Tech. Support Center Air Handling Unit SB VH 575 7.5 HP Yes 1-7.5HP/Station Train A SMXE Unit Vent Radiation Monitors Sample Pump Skid AB EMF 600 1.50 KVA Yes 1-1.50 KVA/Unit Train B
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 10 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Fuel Bldg Ventilation Radiation Monitor Sample Pump Skid AB EMF 600 0.75 KVA Yes 1-0.75 KVA/Unit Train B Condensate Steam Air Ejector Exhaust Radiation Monitor Sample Pump Skid TB EMF 600 0.75 KVA Yes 1-0.75 KVA/Unit Train A Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Radiation Monitor Sample Pump AB EMF 575 0.75 HP Yes 1-0.75 HP/Station Unit 2 Train A Transformer KTSA AB N/A 600 30 KVA Yes Unit 1 Train A Unit 2 Train B No. 11 (2)
(10 Minutes After Diesel Starts)
Electric Hydrogen Recombiner Power Supply Panel CV VX 600 75 KVA Yes 1-75KVA/Diesel Control Room Area Air Handling Unit Fan Motor AB VC 575 150 HP Yes Yes 1-150HP/unit Train A 1EMXG Containment Air Return Fan Motor CV VX 575 60 HP Yes 1-60HP/Diesel Hydrogen Skimmer Fan Motor CV VX 575 75 HP Yes 1-75HP/Diesel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 11 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Control Room Area Chilled Water Pump Motor AB YC 575 50 HP Yes Yes 1-50HP/unit Train A 1EMXG Control Room Chiller Compressor Oil Pump Motor and Chiller Controls AB YC 575 1.5 HP Yes Yes 1-1.5HP/unit Train A 1EMXG No. 12 (11 Minutes After Diesel Starts)
Control Room Area Chiller Compressor AB YC 4000 479 KW Yes Yes 1-479KW/diesel 4KV 1E Load No. 13 (12 minutes after diesel starts)
Instrument Air Compressor SB VI 575 350 HP 2-350HP/station Non 1E L.C. Load 1LXI,2LXH Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Motor AB KF 4000 300 HP 4KV 1E Load 1-300HP/diesel Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Heater Power Panel AB ETC 600 346 KW (9) 1-416KW/diesel Non 1E L.C. Load Auxiliary Building Unfiltered Exhaust Fan Motor AB VA 575 40 HP (9) 1-40HP/diesel
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 12 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Auxiliary Building Supply Unit Fan Motor AB VA 575 100 HP (9) 1-100HP/diesel 125VDC Aux.
Control Battery Charger 1CCA(1CCB)
AB EPK 600 150 KVA 1-150KVA/diesel Non 1E L.C. Load 250VDC Power Battery Charger 1DPC (2DPC)
SB EPJ 600 100 KVA 1-100KVA/unit Non 1E L.C. Load Train B
Auxiliary Building Filter Room Exhaust Fan Motor AB VA 575 3 HP 1-3HP/Unit Train B No. 13 Unit Blackout Panelboard Transformer AB ETE 600 30 KVA Yes 1-30 KVA/diesel Non 1E L.C. Load
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 13 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
Sequence No. and Initiation Time7 Equipment Name Location1 System Voltage Auto.
Connected Per Diesel Auto Connected for LOCA Auto.
Connected for Blackout Remarks Notes:
- 1. AB - Auxiliary Building PH - Pump House (Nuclear Service Water Intake Structure)
DB - Diesel Building CV - Reactor Building (inside containment)
TB - Turbine Building SB - Service Building INT - LPSW Intake
- 2. Class 1E 600 volt MCC Loads
- 4. Disconnected on LOCA Signal
- 5. Given a permissive manual connection after all LOCA loads are sequenced on.
- 6. Disconnected on LOCA Signal and Blackout Signal
- 7. The load sequence interval tolerance for each load group is as follows:
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-6 (Page 14 of 14)
(17 APR 2012)
LOAD GROUP NUMBER SEQUENCE TIME (Seconds)
Initiate Timer (T0) 1 (T1) 2 (T2) 3 (T3) 4 (T4) 5 (T5) 6 (T6) 7 (T7) 8 (T8) 9 (T9) 10 (T10) 11 (T11) 12 (T12) 13 (T13) 9.7 +/- 0.3 T0 + 0.9 +/- 0.1 T0 + 1.9 +/- 0.1 T0 + 4.7 +/- 0.3 T0 + 9.4 +/- 0.6 T0 + 14.1 +/- 0.9 T0 + 18.8 +/- 1.1 T0 + 23.5 +/- 1.4 T0 + 28.2 +/- 1.8 T0 + 37.6 +/- 2.4 T0 + 47.0 +/- 3.0 T0 + 555.0 +/- 35.0 T11 + 56.4 +/- 3.6 T11 + 112.8 +/- 7.2
- 8. This table gives HP/KW/KVA ratings of the different loads and information about the number of such loads per diesel or per unit for general reference only. For the actual load ratings and summation of total loading, refer to calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0147.
- 9. Load is credited in licensing basis and must be manually restarted following Load Group 13 actuation.
- 10. Power is available to these valves, but they must be operated via a pushbutton in the Control Room.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-7 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-7. Catawba Nuclear Station - Switchgear Control Power Sources. Unit 11 Bus Control Power Source 13.8 KV Switchgear 1HTA 1CDA 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR 1TA3 1CDA 1TB3 1CDB 1TC3 1CDA 1TD3 1CDB RCP1A 1CDA RCP1B 1CDB RCP1C 1CDA RCP1D 1CDB 4.16 KV Switchgear 1ETA2 1EDE2 1ETB2 1EDF2 1GTA 1CDA 1GTB 1CDB 1FTA 1CDA 1FTB 1CDB 600 V Load Centers 1ELXA2 1EDE2 1ELXB2 1EDF2 1ELXC2 1EDE2 1ELXD2 1EDF2 1LXA 1CDA 1LXB 1CDA 1LXC 1CDB 1LXD 1CDB 1LXE 1CDA 1LXF 1CDA 1LXG 1CDA 1LXN 1CDA
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-7 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Bus Control Power Source 1SLXA 1CDB 1SLXB 1CDB 1SLXC 1CDB 1SLXD 1CDB 1SLXG SDSP1 1LXH 1CDB 1LXI 1CDA Notes:
- 1. Unit 2 is similar
- 2. Safety Related
- 3. The feeder breaker which feeds the reactor coolant pump motor switchgear receives control power from the distribution center associated with the opposite battery.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 1 of 5)
(09 OCT 2016)
Table 8-8. Single Failure Analysis of the Onsite Power Systems Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. Auxiliary Transformer (including associated non-segregated bus to 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear)
Fault on one auxiliary transformer No Safety significance:
Protective relaying trips the associated switchyard and generator circuit breakers and the appropriate 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear incoming circuit breakers to isolate the faulted transformer.
The 6900 volt switchgear incoming breakers normally connected to the faulted transformer zone are tripped and the switchgear tie breakers are closed with a maximum dead - bus time of 93 milliseconds with arcing, thus all unit auxiliaries continue to receive power.
The unit generator automatically runs back to approximately 56% of rated output.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 2 of 5)
(09 OCT 2016)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 2. 6900 Volt Normal Auxiliary Switchgear Source Breaker Breaker fault or failure to open during a fault No safety significance:
The associated generator circuit breaker trips to isolate the unit generator from the fault, and the two applicable switchyard PCBs trip to isolate the system from the fault. The unit generator runs back to approximately 56% of rated output.
The 6900 volt switchgear tie breaker of the affected switchgear is locked open.
The other 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear that are supplied from the affected transformer zone are connected by a rapid transfer to their alternate supplies. A rapid transfer closes the switchgear tie breaker with a maximum dead-bus time of 93 milliseconds with arcing.
If the faulty breaker is the normal source for a reactor coolant pump motor and the unit generator is operating above P-8 (reference UFSAR Tables 7-1 and 7-2), both the unit generator and the reactor are tripped. This results in the tripping of the remaining generator circuit breaker to maintain power to the unit auxiliaries from the remaining train of preferred power.
If one of the 4160 volt essential auxiliary switchgear is connected to the affected 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear, one train of essential power is lost. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries continues to operate unaffected on power from the redundant train to essential power. The diesel generator of the affected train of essential power is automatically started, and its blackout loads are sequenced on.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 3 of 5)
(09 OCT 2016)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 3. 6900 Volt Normal Auxiliary Switchgear bus Bus faulted No safety significance:
The 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear source breaker is tripped and the switchgear tie breaker is locked open.
If the fault is on a section of switchgear that supplies one of the reactor coolant pump motors and the unit generator is operating above P-8 (reference UFSAR Tables 7-1 and 7-2),
both the unit generator and the reactor are tripped. This results in the tripping of both generator circuit breakers to maintain power to the unit auxiliaries through the two immediate access offsite power sources. However, if the unit generator is operating below P-8, the reactor and generator are not tripped.
If one of the 4160 volt essential auxiliary switchgear is connected to the affected 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear, one train of essential power is lost. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries continues to operate unaffected.
The diesel generator of the affected train of essential power is automatically started, and its blackout loads are sequenced on.
- 4. 6900 Volt Normal Auxiliary Switchgear Feeder Breaker Breaker fault or failure to open during a fault.
No safety significance:
Same as 3 above.
- 5. Feeder Cable to the 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System Switchgear Cable fault No safety significance:
The associated 6900 volt and 4160 volt switchbreakers are tripped and one train of essential power is lost. However, the redundant train of essential auxiliaries continue to operate unaffected. The diesel generator of the affected train of essential power is automatically started, and its blackout loads are sequenced on.
- 6. 6900/4160 Volt Auxiliary Transformer Transformer fault No safety significance:
Same as 5 above.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 4 of 5)
(09 OCT 2016)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 7. 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System Switchgear Source Breaker Breaker fault or failure to open during a fault No safety significance:
The affected 4160 volt essential switchgear is de-energized.
The feeder breaker in the 6900 volt normal auxiliary switchgear is tripped, and the diesel generator breaker is locked out. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries remains operable from the redundant train of essential power.
7a. 4160 VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System Switchgear Source Breaker Breaker fails to open due to load sequencer malfunction during coincident LOCA and loss of off-site power The affected 4160 VAC essential switchgear is de-energized and the diesel generator breaker remains open due to the load sequencer load shed interlock. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries remains operable from the redundant train of auxiliary power.
- 8. 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System Switchgear Bus Bus fault No safety significance:
The affected 4160 volt essential switchgear is de-energized.
The 4160 volt essential switchgear source breaker and the diesel generator breaker are locked out. The redundant train of essential auxiliaries remains operable from the redundant train of essential power.
- 9. 4160 Volt Essential Switchgear Feeder Breaker Breaker fault No safety significance:
Same as 8 above.
- 10. 4160VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System Switchgear Feeder Cables to Loads Fault on one cable No safety significance:
The associated load feeder breaker trips to isolate the switchgear from the fault. The load supplied by the affected cable is lost but the redundant load of the other train remains available.
- 11. 4160/600 Volt Essential Load Center Transformer Fault on one transformer No safety significance:
Same as 10 above. A spare standby transformer is readily available to replace the affected transformer.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-8 (Page 5 of 5)
(09 OCT 2016)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 12. 600 Volt Essential Load Center Source Breaker Fault on one breaker No safety significance:
Same as 10 above.
- 13. 600 Volt Essential Load Center Bus Bus fault No safety significance:
The 600 volt essential load center source breaker trips. The loads supplied by the affected load center are lost, but the redundant loads of the other train remain available.
- 14. 600 Volt Essential Load Center Feeder Breaker Breaker fault No safety significance:
Same as 13 above.
- 15. 600 Volt Essential Load Center Feeder Cable Cable fault No safety significance:
The 600 volt essential load center feeder breaker trips. The loads supplied by the affected motor control center are lost, but the redundant loads of the other train remain available.
- 16. 600 Volt Essential Motor Control Center Bus Bus fault No safety significance:
Same as 15 above.
- 17. 600 Volt Essential Motor Control Center Feeder Cable Cable fault No safety significance:
Interlocked armor cable faults are unlikely; however, some faults beyond the motor control center feeder breaker may trip the motor control center incoming breaker also for some MCCs.
The main incoming breakers of essential MCCs 2EMXA, 2EMXB, 2EMXC, 2EMXD, 2EMXI, 2EMXJ, 2EMXK and 2EMXL have been removed in order to enhance the coordination. The feeder breakers of these MCCs coordinate with the upstream breaker in the load center which feeds the MCC. The loads supplied by the affected motor control center are lost, but the redundant loads of the other train remain available.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-9 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-9. Deleted Per 1991 Update
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-10 (Page 1 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-10. Single Failure Analysis of the 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. Battery Charger Loss of 600 volt ac power supply to one battery charger No safety significance - Associated 125 volt battery is available to supply power to the 125 volt dc distribution center without interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction.
Loss of charger output No safety significance - Associated 125 volt battery is available to supply power to the 125 volt dc distribution center without interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Additionally, a spare battery charger is readily available to replace the non-functional charger.
Internal battery charger fault No safety significance - If the battery charger output breaker does not clear the fault the battery breaker may trip also. Power is lost to the instrumentation and control channel served by the faulted charger; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Additionally, a spare battery charger is readily available to replace the faulted charger.
- 2. 125 volt Battery Battery fault No safety significance - Power is lost to the instrumentation and control channel served by the faulted battery; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. The faulted battery is isolated from its dc distribution center by the distribution center circuit breaker. Power is restored to the affected distribution center by manually connecting it to its train associated distribution center.
- 3. Load Group DC Distribution Center Fault between positive and negative buses in one dc distribution center No safety significance - Power is lost to the instrumentation and control channel served by the faulted distribution center; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Power is restored to the affected loads after the fault is cleared.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-10 (Page 2 of 2)
(22 OCT 2001)
Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments Gradual decay of the voltage on one dc distribution center No safety significance - The voltage of each 125 volt dc bus is monitored and will initiate a low voltage alarm at a voltage level above that required for safe shutdown of the unit. In the event of a low voltage condition, power may be restored by correcting the cause of the low voltage or by connecting the bus to its alternate source.
- 4. Auctioneered Distribution Center Fault between positive and negative buses in one auctioneered distribution center No safety significance - Power is lost to the train of dc loads served by the faulted distribution center; however, the redundant train continues to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Power is restored to the affected loads after the fault is cleared.
- 5. Load Group or Auctioneered DC Distribution Center Ground on one bus No safety significance - The 125 volt dc system is an ungrounded system. A single ground will not prevent the operation of the required safety loads. Ground detection equipment monitors the 125 volt dc system and initiates an alarm in the control room to alert the operator in the event of a ground.
- 6. Distribution Center Feeder Cable Cable fault No safety significance - All dc distribution center feeder cables are provided with isolating circuit breakers that would isolate a shorted cable on a sustained fault condition. Power to the load(s) supplied by the faulted cable is lost until the fault is cleared; however, the redundant load(s) continues to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction.
- 7. 125 Volt DC Power Panelboard Fault between positive and negative buses in one 125 volt dc power panelboard No safety significance - The dc distribution center breaker isolates the faulted panelboard as described above for a faulted feeder cable.
Power is lost to the loads served by the affected panelboard; however, the redundant loads of the remaining load groups continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction.
- 8. Auctioneering Diode Assembly Loss of power from one auctioneering diode assembly No safety significance - Power to the associated distribution center is supplied without interruption from the alternate auctioneering diode assembly.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-11 (Page 1 of 1)
(24 OCT 2004)
Table 8-11. Single Failure Analysis of the 120VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. 125VDC-120VAC Static Inverter Loss of 125VDC supply to one static inverter or failure of one inverter No safety significance - Power is lost to the associated channel of 120VAC instrumentation; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Each unit has two swing inverters available (one per train) to allow an inoperable inverter to be removed from service but allow the AC panelboard to remain on Class 1E power.
- 2. Static Inverter Feeder Cable Failure of feeder cable No safety significance - Same as 1 above.
- 3. 120VAC Power Panelboard Failure of one 120VAC panelboard No safety significance - Power is lost to the associated channel of 120VAC instrumentation; however, the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.
Catawba Nuclear Station UFSAR Table 8-12 (Page 1 of 1)
(22 OCT 2001)
Table 8-12. Single Failure Analysis of the 125VDC Diesel Essential Auxiliary Power System Component Malfunction Safety Significance/Comments
- 1. Battery Charger Loss of 600VAC supply to one battery charger No safety significance - The 125VDC battery is available to supply the affected loads without interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.
Loss of 125VDC output from one battery charger No safety significance - Same as above for loss of 600VAC supply.
Internal fault in one battery charger No safety significance - Same as above for loss of 600VAC supply.
The battery chargers are designed to prevent the battery from discharging into an internal charger fault.
- 2. Battery Fault on one battery No safety significance - Power is lost to the loads of the affected train, however, an independent train of 125VDC is provided for the redundant diesel generator. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.