ML20195K135

Technical Evaluation Rept of Dcrdr Pacific Gas & Electric Co,Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 & 2

ML20195K135
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	01/27/1988
From:	SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML16341E817	List: ML20195K135
References
CON-NRC-03-82-096, CON-NRC-3-82-96 SAIC-87-3109, TAC-56117, TAC-68040, NUDOCS 8802010146
Download: ML20195K135 (20)

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SAIC-87/3109 l

i TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT 0F THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S l

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DIABI.0 CANYON POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 l

TAC N0s. 56117 and 68040 t

Januar/ 27, 1988 [

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! Prepared for: ,

i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 I i

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l Contract NRC-03 82-096 Task Order No. 19 i i 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section ELg

1.0 INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Establishment of a Qualified Multidisci Review Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . .plinkry ....... 4 2.2 System Function and Task Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3 Comsarison of Display and Control Requirements Witi a Control Room Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4 Control Room survey to Identify Deviations from Accepted Human Factors Principlos . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5 Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancias (HEDs) to Determine Which Are Significant and Should Be Corrected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7  !

2.6 Selection of Design Improvements .......... 8 4

2.7 Verification That Selected Design Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Correctior. .......... 10 2.8 Verification That the Selected Design Improver.erts Will Not Introduce New HEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 i 2.9 Coordination of Control Room Improvements With Ct,anges From Other Improvement Programs Suen as the Safety Parameter Display System, Operator Training, Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures ........... 11  ;

3.0 CONCLUSION

S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 i q REFERENCES .......................... 15 l 3 ATTACHNENT 1 DECISION CRITERIA FOR VERIFYING EQUIPMENT SUITABILITY i

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 4

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted a Detailed Control Room ,

Design Review (DCRDR) Program Plan to the Nuclear Regulatory Camission (NRC) on August 2, 1983(Reference 1)inordertosatisfytheProgramPlan requirements of NUREG 0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 2) for the Diablo Canyon ,

Power Pl ant, Units 1 and 2 (Diablo Canyon Power Plant). The NRC staff reviewed the submittal with reference to the nine DCRDR requirements of NUREG 0737, Supplement 1 and the guidance provided in NUREG-0700 (Reference

, 3)andNUREG0800(Reference 4).

NUREG 0737, Supplement I requires that a Program Plan be submitted

within two months of the start of the DCRDR. Consistent with the requirements of NUREG 0737, Supplement 1, the Program Plan should describe how the following elements of tlie DCRDR will be accomplished.

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l. Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

! 2. Function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks

! and information and control requirements during emergency operations. ,

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3. A comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory.

4. A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human i

factors principles.

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5. Assessmentofhumanengineeringdiscrepancies(HEDs)to determine ,

which HEDs are significant and should be corrected. )

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6. Selection of design improvemnts.

7. Verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction.

8. Verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs.

9. Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), operator 4

training, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded emergency operating procedures.

The staff comments on Pacific Gas and Electric Company's DCRDR Program Plan review were forwarded to Pacific Gas and Electric Company on November 10, 1933 (Reference 5). NUREG 0737, Supplement I requires that a Sumary Report be submitted at the end of the DCRDR. As a minimum, it shall:

1. Outline proposed control room changes.

2. Outline proposed schedules for implementation.

3. Provide sumary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncorrected or partially corrected.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted a Summary Report for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on December 28, 1984 (Reference 6). Based on the Susstary Report review, the

) staff concluded that a preimplementation audit was necessary in order to I address the concerns regarding Pacific Gas and Electric Company's approach i

for satisfying the nine requirements of a DCRDR specified in NUREG 0737, Supplement 1.

Due to the level of completion of the DCRDR, the staff was unable to conduct a preimplementation audit, and between February 11 and 15, 1985 an

in-progress audit was conducted instead. The results of the audit were forwarded to Pacific Gas and Electric Company via a letter dated September I 16, 1985(Reference 7). On November 6, 1985 Pacific Gas and Electric met I

with the NRC staff in Bethesda, Naryland to address the in progress audit

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findings. As a result of this meeting, Pacific Gas and Electric Company agreed to provide a formal response to all nine items in the in progress l audit report and specifically to include the methodology to be used in completing the DCRDR task analyses to the level of information and control characteristics required by NUREG 0737, Supplement 1. In addition, the licensee agreed to submit a Supplemental Sumary Report outlining all proposed control room changes, including proposed schedules for implementation (Reference 8).

. i On January 9, 1986, Pacific Gas and Electric Company again met with NRC 1 staff in Bethesda, Maryland to address the DCRDR requirement to conduct a '

system function and task analysis. Based en review of the licensee's methodology, the NRC staff concluded that Pacific Gas and Electric Company had the necessary plan to conduct the task ana'iysis (Reference 9).

Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted to the NRC the DCRDR Phase

!! Program Plan via a letter dated February 21, 1986 (Reference 10). This submittal provided responsas to each of the nine open issues addressed in the in-progress audit and subsequent meetings. On November 5, 1987. Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted a Supplemental Summary Report for the DCRDR for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (Reference 11). A meeting was held  ;

, between the NRC and licensee on January 13, 1988 via a conference call to  !

discuss concerns raised during the review of the Supplementa, Sumary 1 Report.

2 This Technical Evaluation Report provides the consolidated findings of the review of the Supplemental Summary Report and conference call with

) respect to the nine DCRDR requirements specified in NUREG 0737, Supplement

) 1. I 1 l 2.0 EVALUATION {

The purpose of the evaluation was to detemine whether the nine DCRDR requirements in NUREG 0737, Supplement I had been satisfied. The evaluation l was performed by compr. ring the information provided by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company with the criteria in NUREG-0800, Section 18.1, Revision 0 Appendix A of the Standard Review Plan. The results of the evaluation are I provided below. '

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1 2.1 Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplir.ary Review Team l The DCRDR project team consisted of a project manager, a management team, and a review team. The licensee's DCRDR review team consisted of representatives from nucitar engineering, operations, and training. General Physics Corporation provided haan factors support in conducting the system function and task analysis, while an independent human factors consultant (J.L. Seminara) participated as a core review team member in all elements of the DCRDR. Review of the DCRDR Project Team organization, the qualifica-i, tions of the DCRDR team members, and the DCRDR team responsibilities provided in Figure 2.1, Table 2-1, and Table 2-3, respectively, in the i Supplemental Sunnary Report indicated that sufficient atthority and needed resources were available to the DCRDR team.

During both the Phase I and Phase !! DCRDR program, a training course ,

was provided by the human factors specialist to the DCRDR team members.

• During Phase I, the five day orientation included the history, content, and  ;

methodology of the human factors discipline. The Phase !! training course  ;

placed less emphasis on data-gathering techniques and more emphasis on enhancement methods and options for corrections of generic human factors '

issues.

l It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for the establishment of a  ;

i qualified multidisciplinary review team.  !

i 2.2 System Function and Task Analysis Using the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Repcrt Update, a list was generated to identify plant-specific systems and  ;

functions required during emergency operations. The list was comparable to I j the safety-related systems identified in the emergency operating procedures j

(EOPs) and the remote shutdown procedure. The list of Diablo Canyon Power

) Plant safety related systems was used to develop scenarios for use in the 1

task analysis. The following five scenarios were developed:

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{ o Anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) and loss of reactor

, coolant

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o Large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) I o Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with cooldown using backfill

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o See.ondary break inside containment with loss of spray capability o Loss of secondary heat sink l

. i Operator tasks from the plant specific E0Ps and remote shutdown procedure not covered in the scenarios were analyzed independently for infomation and control requirements.

Task Analysis Worksheets (TAWS) were developed and used to cullect data regarding operator tasks and information and control needs independently of the control room. Candidate HEDs were noted in the 'CONiENTS' column of the TAW, and data for HEDs were entered on an HED form. Finally, all data in

the TAW were entered into a DCRDR datebase and continually updated to reflect any changes.

1 It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for a system function and task analysis.

2.3 Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with a Control Room ,

Inventory

A control room inventory was developed using photographs and layout  !

drawings of the control room. Equipment characteristics were documented on I an ' Equipment Characteristics Forn.' The fom contained specific data I

listed under the following column headings: Instrumentation and Control j

(!&C) Description and Parameter,14C Number, Panel, Instrument Type, Range, '

Units. Divisions and Scale, and Controller Limits. The inventory was used in comparison with the infomation and control requirements identified during the task analysis to verify the availability and suitability of displays and cont *ols.

The avail ty of instruments and controls was confirmed by comparing

, the requirements listed in the ' SYSTEM COMP PARAM' and ' RELEVANT CHARACTER-5

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ISTICS* columns of the task analysis worksheet to the actual control room instruments and controls. The presence or absence of a required instrument or control was recorded as a "YES" or "N0' in the ' AVAIL' column of the task analysis worksheet. The presence or absence of information and control requirements on the Safety Parameter Display System (SPOS), postaccident monitoring panel, and hot shutdown panel was also noted by a 'YES* or 'NO' in the appropriate column. Any required instrument or control found to be unavailable was identified and documented as a HED.  !

The suitability of required instruments and controls was evaluated based on decision criteria identified in Figure 4-2 of the Supplemental Summary Report (Attachment 1). The suitability of an instrument or control was noted es a "YES' or 'N0' in the ' SUIT' column on the task analysis form.

Any instrument or control documented as being unsuitable was further documented as a HED.

Validation of control room functions was performed by conducting both

slow and real time walkthroughs. Following the walkthrough, operators were asked to describe any errors or problems they ene.ounterad and the source of these errors. These errors or problems were documented as HEDs.

l It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for a comparison of display and control requirements with the control room inventory.

2.4 Control Room Survey to Identify Deviations from Accepted Human Factors

Principles An initial husin factors survey of the control room was conducted using

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guidelines from the Nuclear Utility Technical Assistance Cossaittee (NUTAC).

The eh6cklist surveys tiere performed on Unit 1. In order to review Unit 2 l 1 and ensure consistency between Unit I and Unit 2, half-size photos of Unit 1 l

were compared to the equivalent panel sections of Unit 2. Any differences l

l between Unit I and Unit 2 were recorded as HEDs, as well as any problems specific to Unit 2. Lighting and noise curveys were conducted during this l

period; tiowever, they were viewed as incomplete due to the incomplete i construction of the control room. It was recognized that these surveys would have to be reperformed after the plant became operational.

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I In addition to the checklists, the initial human factors survey incorporated 16 operator interviews, operability walkthroughs using the i

interim emergency operating procedures, and a historical experience review, i Additional survey work was conducted based on the guidelines provided in NUREG 0700, Section 6.1. Reviews of itghting, noise, heating, ventila-  !

j tion, air conditioning, furnishings, and anthropometrics for Units 1 and 2 l panel areas and workspaces were conducted. The survey tasks and results are documented in a report which is on file at Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

l Various instrument and contr61, and electrical engineering investigations l were conducted to determine the full extent and actual significance of both  :

i generic and specific HEDs. These investigations were documented and later I

used by the assessment team in their analysis of the subject HEDs.  !

The results of the data collected were analyzed to identify departures from human engineering guidelines. Any HEDs identified were recorded on the Human Engineering Discrepancy form.

It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company i has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for a control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles, i

2.5 Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies (NEDs) to Determine Which t Are Significant and Should Be Corrected 3

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Each HED identified during the DCRDR was a sessed for its safety l significance and error potential. HEDs judgeo t to lead s errors of '

signtficant safety consequences were further reviewed for operability  !

concerns. Following assessment, HEDs wre grouped into one of six l' categories.,

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i HEDs that were judged to have safety significant consequences with high  ;

or low potential for error wre rated as priority I or II, respectively, i Priority !!! or lY was given to HEDs assessed as having little or no safety ,

) significance but with operability concerns and high or low potential for '

error. HEDs with no safety consequence or operability concern were rated l j not applicable (N/A) and were not addressed for correction. Finally, a J

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l Priority C was given to those HEDs already corrected at the time of l assessment.

! The rationale and any reasons for dissent, as well as initial

recommendation plans, were documented on the 'HED Assessment Form.' Also,

concurrence by the maragement team or reason for rejection was documented on I

! the Assessment Form. Initial recommendations by the assessment team were l l further documented on the specific HED forms. l 4

! Following prioritization', similar HEDs were grouped into assestment l

] packages. Completed assessment packages were forwarded to members of the j

DCRDR management team for concurrence. The Itcensee provided a numerical l listing of the hEDs as well as each individual HED identified during the  !

l DCRDR. The numerical listing presented the following information: HED number, category, l

location, NUREG 0700 guideline, HED priority, and a description of the HED. i 1

i Review of the HEDs iredicates that approximately 670 HEDs were s.ssigned j a priority rating as described in the licensee's methodology. However, i il approximately 90 HEDs out of 759 HEDs received no priority rating. [

] Therefore, it is the review team's judgment that the assessment prccess is I i not complete.  !

During the conference call, the licensee stated that an informal review of these HEDs has already been conducted and a large percentage of them are l

priority 3 and 4. A formal review will be conducted beginning January 18,

1988. The essessment process is expected to be completed by the end of the {

j upcoming refueling outage (May 1984). l I .

i It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company I j has not set the IRNtEG 0737, Supplement I requirement for an assessment of

HEDs to determine which are significant and should be corrected because the  !

i assessment process is incomplete. '

1 2.6 Selection of Design Improvements l Initial proposed modifications were developed during the assessment I process. In order to allow analysis of alternative design improvements, I

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! modifications were presented on a mockup using translucent overlays. These ;

changes were reviewed by the core review team and final changes were

] presented to operators and management f#r consents and feedback. pacific

Gas and Electric Company has developed Human Factors Enhancement Guidelines f

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plays, ;.anel labeling, and annunciators. These guidelines are being final-l ited and incorporated into persanent engineering guidelines for future use.

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Justification was documented for any HED no* corrected or for changes j which could not be implemented as per the team reconnendation. In addition i

) to the infnrmation idertified in Section 2.5, the HED form documented i i corrections, including whether or not the correction had been verified and I l valtoated, and the design change package number and date of issue. Further- l 1 more, the priority for implementation and implementation schedule were '

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documen+.ed.  :

I i l Although the review of the HEDs indicated that many resolutions have been implemented, there were more than 100 HEDs for which the corrective l action had not been specified (for example, Category F: HED gl, 327, 336, l and 5228; Category G: HED 00lG, 56, and 57 Category J: HED 87). The !

action that the licensee is committing to in resolving these HEDs is not i i stated. In addition, six of the descriptions of the MEDs and '

I recosmondations were not clear enough to provide conclusions regarding the l j concern or corrective action (83A, g4, 272, 345, 4318, and 697).

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! In regard to 4:heduling, the licensee has indicated that many surface i f panel enhancements and physical modifications have been made to the Unit 2 main control meerds and postaccident monitoring panels during the Unit 2 l l first refusling estage. Labeling and demarcation for Unit I will be '

! completed during the second refueling outage for Unit 1. Also,

! corresponding physical charges are scheduled during the Unit I second j refueling outage.

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During the conference call, the licensee stated that all priority 1 and 2 HEDs have been corrected and implemented on Unit 2. Modifications to Unit I are scheduled to be implemented beginning in Harch, 1988. Lastly, docu-mentation of the assessment category and corrective action is expected to be completed by the end of the upcoming refueling outage (May,1988).  :

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It is the reitew team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has not met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for selection of design improvomonts.

2.7 Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Correction Prior to implementing a change, review is made by the core review team and feedback is solicited from plant operators. When a design change package :annot be implemented exactly as planned, a field change may be issued to resolve the conflict. Members of the DCRDR core review team I

oversaw the implementation of HED related changes and participated in the approval of any field changes. Final changes are inspected by plant quality control and discipline engineers prior to final acceptance. ,

J After a change is implemented, the new plant configuration is reviewed in light of the original HED by the human factors specialist. The licensee I t

indicated that when most of the changes to the simulator are complete, the '

) review team will walk through the E0?s to determine if the original HED was l corrected and no new HEDs were introduced. The procedure for conducting

! these exercises is being fors411 zed.

! I The results of this process, includirg justification for any differ-ences from the original review team recossendations, are recorded on the l

) ' Human Engine *'ing Discrepancy Record Verification and Validation Form.'  !

j Thus far, appuaimately 200 HED assessment packages have been verified for j Unit 2 and approximately 50 have been verified for Unit 1.

It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that l selected improvements will provide the necessary correction for those HEDs l which have been assessed and for which improvements have been selected, i

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2.8 Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will Not Introduce New HEDs

$ As discussed in Section 2.7, the process for verifying that corrections

! will not introduce new HEDs includad evaluation of the change against human l

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factors guidelines, solicitation of operator feedback, walkthroughs of E0Ps, I and review of the design modification with the engineering department, j l

1 i j Itisthereviewteam'sjudgmentthatPacificGasandElectric Company l has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that the i selected improvements do not introduce new HEDs for those cases in which  ;

improvements have been selected.  !

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} 2.g Coordination of Control Room Improvements With Changes From Other i i

Programs, such as the Safety Parameter Olsplay System, Operator {

j Training, Regulatory Guide 1.g7 Instrumentation, and Upgraded Emergency '

Operating Procedures Coordination of the control room improvements with the SP05 has included interviews by DCRDR team members with the users of the SPDS, i

primarily the Shift Technical Advisors (STAS), and surveys conducted by the l l DCRDR team members of the SPOS in the main control room, at the simulator,  !

and at the emergency operating facility, to determine the availability of '

the SPOS displays and the incorporation of human factors guidelines. I

! Finally, the DCRDR team members have developed human factors enhancement guidelines for revision of SPOS displays.

Use of the simulator and feedback from training personnel have aided in coordinating the improvements to the control room with training operators.

) The training organization reviewee all design change packages relating to l

control room enhancement and operators have been trained on thee through use of the simulator and classroom lectures. In addition, each operator and STA will be required to complete and initial a handout that lists all panel

changes on Unit I and 2 in order to indicate his awareness of the changes.

This handout will then become part of the training record, 4

j A review of the Regulatory Guide 1.g7 instrumentation was performed during Phase !! of the DCRDR. The review consisted of operator inte views

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specifically designed for the postaccident monitoring instrumentation, a 4

system function and task analysis conducted by General Physics, and a survey. A human factors review of the instrumentation was conducted as part of the overall DCRDR effort. HEDs generated during the review were included in the DCRDR database and the assessment and correction of these HEDs are being performed as part of the overall DCRDR.

HED resolutions that involved procedure modification were incorporated into the latest version of the E0Ps as part of the normal two year review  :

cycle. A standard abbreviations list developed by the DCRDR team was coordinated with procedure writers to ensure consister.cy. Finally, interviews with a checklist based on NUREG 0899 and NUREG 0700 were (

conducted in order to obtain feedback regarding the content, format, readability, usability, and location of the E0Ps. Potential ir.provements  !

were translated into specific HEDs and further discussed with procedures writers to detensine resolutions. When control room enhancements are completed on the simulator, walkthroughs using the latest version of the E0Ps will be performed to review human factors and adequacy of enhancement measures, i

It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas end Electric Company l has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for coordinatior, of the DCRDR with other Supplement 1 improvement programs such as ths SPOS,  !

operator training, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, at:d upgraded E0Ps.

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3.0 CONCLUSION

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j On December 28 1484, Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted to the

! NRC the DCICR Summary Report fo; Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2. l I Based on the review of the Summary Report, the staff concluded that a pre- l I implementation audit was necessary. Due to the level of completion of the l DCRDR, the staff was unable to conduct a preimp1tmentation audit, and i therefore between February 11 and 15, 1985 an in progress audit was

conducted. During the audit and several meetings that followed, the staff t

concluded that additional documentation was needed in order to satisfy the i nine requirements of NUREG 0737, Supplement 1. On November 5, 1987, Pacific Gas and Electric subaltted a Supplement to the Sumary Report. A conference

call was held between the NRC and licensee on January 13, 1988 to discuss 12 j l

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l concerns raised during the review of the Supplemental Susunary Report. This Technical Evaluation Report provides the consolidated findings of the review of the Supplemental Sumary Report and the conference call. The conclusions are provided below organized by the nine NUREG 0737 Supplement I require-ments.  !

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1. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company i has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for the establishment j of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

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! 2. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric has met l

) the requirement for a system function and task analysis to identify j control room operator tasks and infonnation and control requirements I

during emergency operations. i l*

3. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for a comparison of  :

display and control 1guirements with the control room inventory.  !

4. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company j has met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requireuent for a control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles.

5. It is the review s 'am's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company j

has not met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for an assessment of HEDs to determine which are significant and should be corrected, j Approxir.ately 90 HEDs out of 759 HEDs were not assessed.

6. It is the review team's judrunt that Pacific Gas and Electric Company i has not met the NUREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for selection of design improvements because approximately 100 HEDs had no corrective

) actions or justifications for leaving them uncorrected. In addition.

l six NEDs were not described in enough detail to make an assessment of i the proposed modifications.

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7. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has met the W REG-0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that i selected improvements will provide the necessary correction, except for those HEDs for which requirements 5 and 6 are not complete.

8. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company [

has met the W REG 0737, Supplement I requirement for verification that I the selected improvements do not introduce new HEDs, except for those  !

HEDs for which requiremepts 5 and 6 are not complete.

9. It is the review team's judgment that Pacific Gas and Electric Company  !

has met the WREG 0737, Supplement I requirement for coordination of  !

the DCRDR with other Supplement 1 improvement programs such as the SPOS, operator training, Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded E0Ps.

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It is the review team's judgment that the licensee's Supplemental I Sumary Report is incomplete regarding HED assessment and selection of i design improvements. It is recommended that these issues be explained and resolved through appropriate comunication between the licensee and the NRC. ,

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RJERENCES

1. ' Program Plan for Implementation af Control Room Design Review. Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2," l

. Attachment to letter from J.D. Schuyler (PG&E) to D.G. Eisenhut (NRC), .

August 2, 1983.  !

2. NUAEG,0737 Supplement 1, ' Clarification of TMI Action Plan Require- (

l ments,' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission, December 1982.  :

3. NUREG 070J. "Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews,' U.S. Nuclear L Regulatory Commission. September 1981.

{ 4. NUREG 0800, ' Standard Review Plan,' Section 18.1, ' Control Room,' and i Appendix A, ' Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design i Reviews (DCRDR),"September 1984. l 4

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5 ' Nuclear Regulatory Consission Staff Cossents on the Pactfic Gas and Electric Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan,' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission, November 10,  !

1983. t l

1 6. 'Susuary Report for Unit 1 and 2 Control Rooms,' Pacific Gas and

Electric Company, December 28, 1984.

7. 'In Progress Audit Report of the DCRDR for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2,* Letter from NRC to M4E dated September 16.  ;

) 1985, 1  ;

) 8. 'Noveaker 6, 1945 Meeting Suamary, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 l

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and 2 DCRDR,' Letter from NRC to PG4E datW December 9,1945.

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9. ' January 9,1986 Meeting Susuary, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 DCRDR,' Letter from NRC to PGIE dated January 29, 1986.

i 10. 'Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 DCRDR, Response to NRC Meeting i Susuaries dated December 9, 1985 and January 29, 1986,* Latter from

} PG&E to NRC dated February 21, 1986, 4

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! 11. 'Diablo Canyon Power Plant Detailed Control Room Design Review l Supplemental Summary Report,' Attached to letter from PG&E to NRC dated .

November 5, 1947.  :

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, ATTACHMENT 1 DECISION CRITERIA FOR VERIFYING EQUIPMENT SUITABILITY i

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For everv test is the last 4:alests.

• q.ettfr that the oevtpw at specified l * ,

te swltsbie te meet the demnds of

• emergency teatt;gemites.

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4 Inferwite displayed mf o rwil e/f eed66th for the qr

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• DisD er of e.6mittattee and/

i,< tvelitettee informatten YES tar other east poemt

, appropriate for test evallable tAtth 60 prevides

• Olstrete/teattaveva sentrel tapropetate fv atitas appreertste informatte I e 91 spier of tread informelle feed 6atti l} available when appropriate . ,

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3 controllers dirett vs.tadtrett measureofflowinsystesleoe)

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YES Is ear

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j nyare 4 2 Mcw Chart of Decistori Prcass for Varifying

Egaigrant Suitability  !

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ENCLOSURE 2 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i

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, REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

1. Provide assessments (priority ratings) anri other incomplete infonnation l on the Human Engineering Discrepancy Rccord for the following HEDs:

001N, 009A, 0098, 022, 032A, 032B, 032C, 031E, 032F 033A, 033B, 033C, 033E, 036, 041A, 0428, 0498, 072, 077L, 077M, 077T, 077X, 080, 081F, 81J, 085, 090, 098, 101, 106, 122, 173, 179, 182, 196, 197, 220, 231, 248, 267, 293A, 301, 305A, 308, 313, 321, 325, 326, 329, 330, 331, 333A, 333B, 334, 335 337, 338, 342, 343, 345, 350, 368, 418, 424A, 4248, 424C, 481, 488, 489, 493, 494A, 4948, 495, 603, 620, 621, 622, 624, 637, 638, 641, 664, 700, 701, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 724, 728, 730, and 753.

2. Specify the corrective actions or justifications for leaving the following HEDs uncorrected: Category A (HEDs 018,066,072,and701);

Category B (HEDs 003, 009A 022, 061, and n '; Cagegory C (HEDs 017,077L,077M,077T,077X,333A,337,342,s43,350,481,and494A);

Category D (HEDs 042B, 046, 047, 085, 325, 326, and 4948); Category E (HEDs 032A, 0328, 03?C, 032E, 032F, 033A, 0338, 033C, 033E, 036, 041A, 0498, 080, 081F, 081J, 231, 248, 267, 281, 292, 293A 293B, 330, 331, 3338, 334, 424A, 4248, 4240, 464, 528A, 5288, 664, 700, 708, 710, 711, 712, 728, and 730); Category F (HEDs 095, 301, 305A, 308, 313, 321, 327, 335, 336, 338, 345,Category and 057); 489, 493, 522B,340, H (HEDs 621,620, and641,624);

andCategory)G (HEDs 648 ; Cagegory 001G, J (HEDs 087,001N, 056, l

088, 098, 208, 220, 368, 610, 704, 705, 706, and 707); Category P (HEDs 009B, 090, 101, 532, 533, 534, and 535); and Category S (HEDs 106, 122, 173, 179,182,196.197,and488).

3. For HEDs 83A, 094, 272, 365, 431B and 697, provide the specific information requested below.

HED 83 Clarify the apparent inconsistency between the description of ths discrepancy indicating that ' operators are not clear on the detectability of display failures" and the assessment recommendation stating: "When meters fail hi or lo operators can readily detennine the failure.'

HED 94 The description of the discrepancy is unclear. Clarify the operators original concerns regarding this HED. Specify those HEDs mentioned in the "Connents" section that presumably cover separately the issues of this HED.

2 HED 27_2 The discrepancy concerns neters for power range cabinets that are not labeled.

Provide details on this connent: "Sufficient idtntifying information is available."

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HED 365 The discrepancy concerns the lack of correlation between readout and nameplate for the subcooling margin monitor located at VB2. Provide details to confirm that the readout and nameplate are indeed appropriately correlated.

i HED 4318 The description of the discrepancy is unclear. Clarify the original concern with regard to this HED. Under "Connents" for a related HED 430, it is noted that operators do not use "this equipment" (presumably incore detectors) and therefore, no correction is planned for HED 430 regarding detector readout fuses not being labeled. Specify the user of the subject equipment. Provide rationale for not providing labels, if needed, for the ap, nropriate !!Ser of the equipment. Similarly, for related HED 475, provide rationale for no action-regarding ammeters on the incore detector readout not providing differentiation betw6en scales.

HED 697 The original discrepancy concerns the unavailability of annunciator procedures to aid in identifying multiple causes for annunciator inputs. Assuming annunciator response procedures are available, specify the origin of this HED.

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