ML20246J173

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Insp Rept 70-1151/89-03 on 890417-21.No Violations & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls, Training,Nuclear Criticality Safety,Operations Review,Maint & Previously Identified Items
ML20246J173
Person / Time
Site: Westinghouse
Issue date: 05/05/1989
From: Mcalpine E, Troup G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246J169 List:
References
70-1151-89-03, 70-1151-89-3, NUDOCS 8905170010
Download: ML20246J173 (8)


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A 0foug UNITED STATES

.Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, $ REGION ll

$ ,, j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

  • 't ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 70-1151/89-03 Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division Columbia, SC 29250 Docket No.: 70-1151 License No.: SNM-1107 Facility Name: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Inspection Conducted: April 17-21,1989 Inspector: / ks s 6j G. L. Troup,~ Fuel Fapility Project Inspector Ddte Signed Approved by: )(YW *i[5[89 E. J. McAlpine, Chief \ Date Signed Material Control and Accountability Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved management controls, training, nuclear criticality safety, operations review, maintenance, and previously identified items. I Results: No NRC-identified violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's internal audit program identified an increase in the number of internally identified violations, which resulted in the development and implementation of a corrective action plan. One non-cited violation (NCV) regarding accumulations of pellets greater than the posted si# ety limit was identified and reviewed during this inspection period.

1 8905170010 890505 PDR C ADOCK 07001151 l PDC 1

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
  • J. S. Baker, Senior Regulatory Engineer W. L. Goodwin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs J. W. Heath, Jr., Manager, Regulatory Operations J. B. Hooper, Regulatory Engineer
  • E. E. Keelen, Manager, Manufacturing R. J. McCormac, III, Process Engineer R. D. Montgomery, Regulatory Engineer
  • E. K. Reitler, Jr. , Manager, Regulatory Engineering R. D. Young, Maintenance Supervisor The . inspector also interviewed other engineers, technicians, and security personnel .
  • Attended exit interview
2. Licensee' Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a. (0 pen) Unresolved Item 88-02-01, Engineered Contrcls Program for Nuclear Criticality Safety The licensee's Engineered Criticality Team report identified fourteen projects for the correction or elimination of identified problems.

These projects were reviewed and approved at the ' Regulatory Comp 11ance Committee meeting July 22, 1988. Target implementation dates have been established for each project. The inspector observed l that several of the projects had been completed or were in progress l during the inspection. This item will remain opened pending further review of the major projects.

l b. (Closed) Unresolved Item 88-19-03, Discrepant Posting of Criticality.

Limits l

l This item was identified because postings in AS25 had a limit of 172 l grams U-235, and containers in the area during the inventory had labels affixed stating that the contents were up to 175 grams U-235.

l The licensee's investigation indicated that the signs in question were old versions of the sign based on the original nuclear safety analysis for the area. Apparently a supply of these signs had been kept in an office in the area, and had not been discarded when new  ;

limits were established and new signs posted. As the heavy paper I signs became worn or tattered, they were replaced with the spares

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2 (stating 172 grams limit) rather than copies of the new sign (stating i 175 grams limit).

The inspector reviewed the nuclear safety analysis and the revised calculation which gave the 175 grams U-235 limit. The Chemical Operating Procedure, COP-831012, specified a limit for the containers of 175 grams U-235.

One issue noted by the inspector was that postings do not have a revision number or revision date. Thus, it was difficult to tell the two versions of the sign apart or to determine which one was current.

Licensee representatives acknowledged this comment.

During the inspection, the licensee revised procedure RA-302, Criticality Signs, to include a revision number. Additionally, procedure RA-104, Regulatory Affairs Review Requests, was revised to require the identification of new criticality postings (by revision number) in the " action" section and also in the pre-operational inspection section. The inclusion of revision number on the signs will make it easier to audit the proper signs as well.

The inspector stated that the review had indicated that the material was properly stored, and the revision to the procedures should help to assure that the proper postings are in place.

This item is closed.

3. Management Organization and Controls (88005)
a. Organizational Structure The inspector reviewed the facility organizational structure and compared it with Section 3 of the license application. No changes in the safety management organization have been made.

No violations or deviations were identified,

b. Safety Committees The Regulatory Compliance Committee (RCC) performs the function of the Safety Committee. The RCC was appointed by letter from the Plant Manager, dated July 8, 1987, and the RCC charter was reissued at the same time. The inspector reviewed the minutes of the committee meetings since October 1, 1988, and determined that the meetings were held at (or exceeding) the required frequency with the required membership present. The inspector also determined that the agenda for items reviewed were in accordance with the charter.

The inspector noted that one of the appointed members of the RCC is no longer at the Columbia site. His replacement was previously a member of the committee so the function was represented but not by

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3 the designated individual. Licensee representatives acknowledged that the appointing letter should be revised. In conjunction with this, the RCC charter and standard meeting' agenda will be reviewed, and updated as appropriate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

l 4. Nuclear Criticality Safety (88015)

a. Facility Changes and Modifications The inspector examined one nuclear criticality safety review request and the associated analysis. The inspector verified that approved evaluation methods were used and that the calculations and analyses were independently checked.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Nuclear Safety Analyses The inspector discussed the methods used to perform nuclear safety calculations with cognizant individuals and verified that the methods used were in-accordance with the license requirements. No changes in the calculational methods have been made since the last inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Procedures (88005,88015,88025)
a. The inspector verified that procedural controls were in place establishing the Regulatory Affairs procedure system (RA-001 and RA-110), the training of Regulatory Affairs personnel (RA-105), the performance and review of nuclear criticality safety analyses (RA-300), and control and testing of the nuc' ear criticality alarm system (RA-304). Other procedures existed ie management controls and assignment of responsibilities. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and verified that they were reviewed and approved as required by internal procedures and the license. The inspector also determined that a mechanism for conducting the annual review of RA

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procedures was in place and functioning.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. The inspector reviewed revisions to six' procedures. All of the procedures had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the internal procedures and the license. The scope of changes were consistent with the regulations and the license.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Audits (88005, 88015, 88020)
a. The inspector reviewed the monthly criticality audit reports for the period of January-March 1989, and verified that the audits were conducted at the required frequency sad in accordance with a plan, as required by the license. The reports identified problems to be rectified, the responsible individuals, and an action date.

Correction of identified items and the close-out date were -]

documented. The adequacy of corrective actions was also reviewed and 1 documented in subsequent licensee audits.

b. The licensee's audit findings during this period were in the MAP f area. As a result of multiple findings over the three' months, a program was developed and implemented to provide additional training to the MAP crews, and provide additional management attention to compliance with nuclear criticality safety requirements. Crew training commenced on April 20.
c. One finding in the February audit of particular concern was that six pellet trays were stacked in a pellet cart. Six trays exceeded the posted slab safety limit. One of the corrective actions being pursued under permanent engineering changes [VRI 88-02-01] was the installation of barriers between the tray stacks in the carts, which would have prevented this viciation. This violation was not cited because the criteria in Section V.G of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied. [NCV 89-03-01].
7. Maintenance (88015,88025)
a. Criticality Monitoring System ,

1 The inspector reviewed the criticality monitoring system status and  !

discussed the various alarms and associated action with two security '

guards. All of the detectors were functioning and no malfunction alarms were indicated. The inspector also reviewed the maintenance records and determined that the units had been calibrated within 3 manufacturer's specifications at the required interval in the

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license.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. SNM Containers i

Boron glass Raschig rings are used in certain liquid tanks as a secondary criticality control method. The license requires that the rings and tanks be checked annually for settling, min mum volume and B203 content. The inspector reviewed the ncords for the settling, minimum volume determinations and B203 content made in 1988. All values met or exceeded the license requirements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Training (88010) i The inspector verified that the licensee has established a training policy for the plant organization (procedure CA-006), and procedures for Regulatory Affairs personnel (RA-105). Radiation protection training was specified in RA-214. The inspector also reviewed the training records for selected employees from the senior manager level down to technicians and operators and verified that they had received the required periodic training and had achieved a satisfactory test score at the end of training.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Operations (88020)
a. Fuel Handling and Storage During tours of the production areas, the inspector observed the handling of pellets, fuel rods, and fuel assemblies. All observed activities were in accordance with posted safety limits and storage requirements. Completed assemblies were stored in permanent fixtures. Storage and transport of completed rods were in accordance with the license requirements for slab thickness and unit separations.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Waste Pump Failure On December 7,1988, the licensee notified Region II by the telephone of the failure of pump in the fluoride stripping system, and a minor injury to a worker in the area. This was followed by a written report in accordance with 10 CFR 20.403(b). A subsequent report was submitted on January 6, 1989 in accordance with 10 CFR 20.405(a).

The licensee conducted an investigation of the cause of the failure, including metallurgical and chemical examinations. The evaluation concluded that precipitation of material being processed occurred, plugging an orifice and dead-heading the pump. As the pump continued to run, heat built up until an exothermic reaction occurred, rupturing the pump.

The review group proposed a wiring modification coupled to a temperature sensor to cut off the pump if it dead heads and starts to heat up. The proposal had not yet been reviewed by the Risk Assessment Committee. If approved, the review group had identified other process pumps which should receive the same modification.

Once the modification is approved, the final report on the incident can be completed. The inspector had no further questions at this time.

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10. Review of the Operational Safety Assessment Findings (92701)
a. An Operations Safety Assessment was conducted by the NRC at the licensee's facility in January 1987. Findings of the assessment were reported in Inspection Report 70-1151/87-01. By letter dated May 21, 1987, the licensee responded to the assessment findings and described the corrective actions being taken on the identified weaknesses and the. improvement items.
b. The following IFIs identified in the Operational Safety Assessment were reviewed during the inspection:

(1) (Open) 87-01-18 Inspection and Test Program for the New Central Fire Detection System.

The test procedure for the central fire detection sysicm has not been completed. Projected completion is June 1989. Procedures RA-208, " Controlled Area Hazard Warning System" and SV-706, [

" Fire Alarm System Testing" were presently in effect.

Instructions were provided to security personnel at the central alarm station. The remaining work pertains to the smoke and heat detectors. ,

(2) (Closed) 87-01-23, Color Coding and/or Labeling of Chemical Service Piping.

The cuding and labeling of chemical service piping and process piping in the MAP areas had been completed. Other areas had previously been completed. Conduits were not marked.  !

(3) (Closed) 87-01-35 Accident Evaluation Associated with the UF6 Bay Drainage Trench. The licensee's accident evaluation for the failure of a UF6 cylinder in a vaporizer in conjunction with the activation of the fire sprinkler system would not present a nuclear criticality safety hazard from accumulations in the trench. An independent evaluation performed by the inspector reached the same conclusion. However, a modification to the trench drainage system was being prepared in increase the pumping and filtration capacity which will further reduce the potential.

(4) (0 pen) 88 11-01 Modification / Repair of the UN Discharge Monitors. As part of the plant review by the Risk Assessment Committee, a modification was approved to install uranium and pH monitors in the process lines discharging to the unfavorable I geometry uranyl nitrate tanks. Modification / repairs have been j made to the uranium monitors but the pH monitors were l incomplete. The licensee was continuing to work on resolving the problem.

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(5) (0 pen) 88-11-03. Modifications cf UF6 Heating System. To better regulate the vaporization of UF6, a task force identified several modifications to install . additional instrumentation.

The installation of steam line and vapor line pressure instrumentation had been completed but the UF6 cylinder pressure.

sensors and indicators had not been installed. This' item remains open pending completion of the UF6 instrumentation. '

11. ' Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 26, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector identified one URI and two IFIs which were closed during the inspection:  ;

IFI 87-01-23 Color coding and/or. labeling of chemical service piping.

IFI 87-01-35 Accident evaluation associated with the UF6 Bay drainage trench.

URI 88-19-03 Discrepant postings of criticality limits. .l i

. In addition to the scope and findings of the inspection, the following items were discussed: (1) the Operational Safety Assessment, which will be conducted during the summer in conjunction with- the. licensee renewal, (2)= the Branch Technical Positions, as published in 54 FR' 11590 on March 21,1989, and (3) the upcoming NRC Fuel Cycle Workshop. '

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. Proprietary materials were reviewed during the inspection but no proprietary material )

is discussed in this report. j i

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