ML20247N590

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Safety Evaluation Concluding That Overall State of Onsite & Offsite Emergency Preparedness Provides Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Protective Measures Can & Will Be Taken in Event of Radiological Emergency at Plant
ML20247N590
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20247N580 List:
References
NUDOCS 8908030064
Download: ML20247N590 (11)


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b SAFETY: EVALUATION BY'THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR SEABROOK STATION DOCKET NO. 50-443 13.3. Emergency Planning 13.3.1 Introduction The staff has further reviewed the New Hampshire Yankee Division o'f Public Service Company of.New Hampshire-(NHY) Seabrook' Station Emergency Plan, in accordance with Section 13.3 of the' Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800); the .

' requirements.of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; and related

. implementing. guidance .In the review, the staff considered the NRC regional emergency preparedness inspections and the NRC staff's evaluations.of NHY's emergency preparedness exercises. The staff found that onsite emergency preparedness continues to be acceptable and is adequate for full-power opera-tion. The staff has also reviewed the reported findings of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the adequacy of offsite emerr.ency preparedness for the New !!ampshire and Massachusetts portions of 1

  • Emergency Planning. Zone'(EPZ). On the basis of the submitted FEMA reviews c. 'norts ,

the staff has concluded that the state of offsite emergency prepareonen for Seabrook Station will be adequate for full-power operation once FEMA verifies that the alert and notification systems for the EPZ are complete.

13.3.2 Background Prior staff reviews of the adequacy of onsite emergency preparedness are documented in Section 13.3 of NUREG-0896, " Safety Evaluation Report [SER]

Related to the Operation of Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2," and the following Supplements (SSERs): SSER 1 dated April 1983, SSER 4 dated May 1986, and SSER S .I I

dated May 1969.

SSER 8 addresses the nonparticipation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the emergency preparedness program for the Seabrook Statit,n, as well as the NRC

. staff findings related to emergency planning requirements for fuel loading and ,

low-power operations in accordance with the amended emerge %:y preparedness regulations. In SSER 8, the NRC staff concluded that the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan (SSREP), the onsite plan, provides an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness and 1 meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E thereto fer issuarce of i a license authorizing low-power testing and operation up to 5 percent of rated j z

power. Conclusions on offsite emergency preparedness were not provided in 4 I

SSER 8, since the staff had not yet reviewed the findings and determinations of FEMA in regard to State, local, and utility-prepared offsite emergency response ,

plans and preparedness.

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This SSER presents the results of the staff's continued review of Seabrook station onsite emergency preparedness, and the reported FEMA findings on -

offsite emergency preparedness. This SSER also epdates and supplements preceding reports, and reports the status of Licensing Board and Appeal Board actions on emergency preparedness issues before those Boards.

The NRC staff has reviewed the SSREP through Revision 3 (Janutry 1989). FEMA has reviewed offsite plans and revisions through Revision 2 (November 1988 update) of the State of New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Seabrook Station (NHRERP), Amendment 6 (August 1988) of the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC), and the State of Maine Ingestion Pathway Plan (MIPP) for Seabrook Station (October 12,1988), and has documented its review of the Seabrook emergency preparedness exercise held on June 28-29, 1988. The SPMC is a utility-prepared offsite emergency response plan prepared by the utility that was developed as a result of the nonparticipation of the Common-wealth of Massachusetts in the planning process for Seabrook. FEMA is currently reviewing revisions of the NHRERP and SPMC. The FEMA review is discussed further in Section 13.3.4.

13.3.3 Onsite Emergency Preparedness Evaluation On the basis of technical reviews, inspections, and exercise evaluations, the staff continues to find the SSREP meets NRC requirements, guidelines, and staff positions and is acceptable for full-power licensing and operati s The results of the emergency plan reviews by the NRC staff are reported in SSERs 1, 4 and 8. Hearings on onsite emergency preparedness issues were completed on October 3, 1986, and a Licensing Board decision was issued on March 25, 1987 (LBP-87-10). A license for fuel loading and precriticality testing was issued on October 17, 1986, and a license for low-power testing and operation not to exceed 5 percent was issued on May 26, 1989.  !

The staff conducted an onsite (2 week) emergency preparedness appraisal in December 1985 and followup appraisals in March ard June 1986. Additionally, i Region I Inspectors have and will continue to conduct routine mspections I in the area of emergency preparedness. NRC headquarters and regional nersonnel evaluated the onsite portions of the Seabrook emergency preparedness (EP) exercise conducted on June 28-29, 1968 (in conjunction with the off, site EP exercise to be adequate. of the 5tates The staffof Newalso Hampshire evalusted the and DecemberMaine and 16,the 1937 SP'iC),(and founti them licensee caly)

' exercise and the February 26, 19.86 exercise (in (.onjunction with the offsite EP exercise for the State of New Hampshire). The results of these inspectim s and j observations of exercises, which are docenented ih pertinent inspection tcports,  !

verify the continued adequacy of the Seabrook onsite emergent.y preparedness j program.

Because of the nonparticipation in the Seabrook emergency preparedness omgram j by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the local Massachusetts communities i

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-3 within the EPZ, and their active intervention in disallowing the continued use of pole-mounted siren alerting systems in these local communities, the appli- '

cants revised their original Public Alert Notification System (PANS) which is discussed in SSER 4. The applicants have provided an acceptable alternative system involving the use of a Vehicular Alert Notification System (VANS) in the Massachusetts communities in the EPZ. This is discussed in Section 13.3.4.2 under the heading " Vehicular Alert and Notification System (VANS)."

13.3.4 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Evaluation On the basis of its review of the FEMA findings, including FEMA's review of the offsite plans and the assessments of offsite exercise performance, the staff concludes that the Seabrook offsite emergency preparedness program, once the alert and notification systems are installed and operational, will be adequate to support full-powcr operations.

arious aspects of the December 30, 1988, Partial Initial Decision (PID) by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) (LBP-88-32) on the NHRERP have been appealed by Interveners and are before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. In addition, notices of appeals have been filed on the VANS issues, which were decided in the applicants' favor by the ASLB. Litigation of SPMC and exercise issues concluded before the Licensing Board on June 30, 1989, and a decision on those issues is expected in November 1989. Licensing and Appeal Board decisions to date have found no fundamental flaws in the Setbrook offsite plans, and those areas for which litigation has been completed have been found to be adequate. Pending Board findings and the results of the various appeals could impact certain staff positions. Any such impacts will be evaluated and reported in a future SSER.

Since FEMA's final findings for Seabrook are still pending, the staff's evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness in this SSER is based on FEMA's findings of adequacy, as reported by FEMA to the NRC. A further staff evalua-tion will be provided in a future SSER upon receipt (projected for November 1989) of the FEMA verification of the completion of the alert and notification systems for the EP2.

13 3.4.1 FEMA Findings The applicants have submitted offsite plans for New Hampshire (NHRERP), Maine (MIPP), and their own utility-prepared offsite emergency plans for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ (SPMC). In accordance with an NRC/ FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, the NRC staff provided these plans to FEMA and requested FEMA review them and provide findings and determinations. FEMA's review and evaluation of NHY's offsite plans and preparedness were performed using the criteria of NUREG-C654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the standards and

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assumptions of Supplement 1* to that document. The assumptions in Supplement 1, which apply to the utility-prepared SPMC, are that in an actual radiological '

emergency, State and local officials who have declined to participate in emergency planning will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public, will cooperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan, and have sufficient resources to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary. These assumptions are discussed further in Section 13.3.6.

By letter dated December 14, 1988 (Appendix A), FEMA provided a consolidated report of its findin FEMA found that (1)the gsState on Seabrook of Maine offsite cmergency Ingestion planning Pathway Plans are and preparedness.

adequate; (2) the plans for the State of New Hampshire will be adequate when certain enhancements to the Public Alert and Notification System (PANS) are installed and operable, at which time FEMA states it will be able to approve the plans; (3) the plans for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ will be adequate when the Vehicular Alert and Notification System (VANS) is installed and operable, at which time FEMA states it will be able to make a positive finding. FEMA has based its findings on plan reviews, the 1988 joint exercise, and the recom- i mendation of the FEMA Region 1 Regional Director.

By letter dated September 2, 1988 (included with Appendix A), FEMA also provided its assessment report of Seabrook's June 1988 exercise of offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans. This report was also considered by FEMA in its assessment of the aforementioned offsite plans. On the basis of performance of the exercise as documented by FEMA, this exercise sufficiently demonstrated the emergency response capabilities of the States of Maine and New Hampshire and of the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization (NHYOR0), the organization responsible for implementing the SPMC. No defi-ciencies were identified during the 1988 exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective l

Action (ARCA's) were identified, ed a schedule of corrective actions was l established with the States and NHYORD.

1 The completion of these corrective actions as well as completion of the alert and notification systems for New Hampshire and Massachusetts will be reflected in FEMA's final findings. According to the schedules proposed by the applicants and FEMA, the final FEMA finding is expected in October 1989, when it will be reviewed by the staff.

  • Supplement I to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, issued September 1988, contains criteria for the review of utility-prepared offsite emergency lans developed in response to NRC's amended " realism" rule, 10 CFR 50.47(c)(p), 1 effective December 3,1987.

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l 13.3.4.2 Status of Litigation Activities New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP)

FEMA has reviewed the NHRERP and fcund that the NHRERP will be adequate when certain enhancements to the PANS for the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPZ are completed. The FEMA review of the PANS and recommended enhancements  !

are documented in FEMA-A-REP-10 " Design Report for the Seabrook Station Public d Alert and Notification System," and Addendum 1 to that report. On the basis of the reported FEMA findings, the staff concludes that the NHRERP is adequate to assure that appropriate protective measures car. be implemented; it will be i

acceptable for full-power operation at Seabrook Station once the PANS enhance-l ments are completed. Applicant status reports indicate these actions are l nearly complete, and full completion is planned before full-power licensing.

The NRC staff will document completion of the PANS enhancewnts in a future SSFR. The NRC staff will also verify that the enhanced FANS for New Hampshire is installed and operational.

l The NHRERP has been subject to extensive litigation before the Licensing Board.

FEMA provided extensive testimony on the offsite issues raised by Interveners' contentions. The ASLB, in a Partial Initial Decision (PID) on the NHRERP (LBP-88-32,datedDecember 30,1988), resolved all outstanding offsite New Hampshire emergency planning issues in the applicants' favor. The Board retained jurisdiction over a limited issue related to the effect on the l evacuation time estimates of trips home by certain returning commuters. The l Board concluded that, subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions, the l NHRERP meets the emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken within the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook plume exposure pathway EPZ.

The conditions imposed by the Board require that the Director of HRR verify, in conjunction with FEMA, that (a) the State of New Hampshire has provided personnel resters and call lists of compensatory plan and reception center emergency workers, (b) revisions to the NHRERP by the State of New Hampshire have been made as committed, (c) NHRERP revisions related to the operation of the Manchester ser Mary reception center and identification of additional spe:ial-facilitiet m nitors for the Manchester and Dover host communities have been made, and (d) ine applicants have provided the State of New Hampshire with revised evacuation time estimates (ETEs). The NRC staff will verify these conditions are met before full-power operation.

NHY is assisting the State of New Hamp' shire in complying with the Board directives. FEMA will verify that the first three of these items have been satisfactorily completed and will report its findings to the NRC. The NRC staff will review the revised ETEs and the FEMA findings to ensure satisfactory compliance with these Board conditions.

The Interveners have filed appeals from the PID, challenging numerous aspects of the decision. Oral arguments on these appeals are scheduled for July 27, -

1989, and a decision is expected later in 1989.

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I Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE)

The Licensing Board resolved numerous ETE issues in its PID of December 30, 1988, and retained jurisdiction over only a narrow issue related to certain returning commuters. In ALAB-917 (June 16, 1989), the Appeal Board determined that the impact of all returning commuters on ETEs was not yet appealable; further litigation of this issue was conducted before the Licensing Board in the spring of 1989. The staff will consider the Board's further findings on ETEs when they are provided in a PID on the SPMC; the PID is expected to be g

issued in November 1989.

The NRC staff has examined the ETE issues in the course of its normal review of l the Seabrook emergency plans and nas provided testimony on the litigated portions of the issues. The staff concludes that on compliance with the Licensing Board's December 1988 PID, the ETEs provide reasonable estimates of evacuation times, appropriate methods are used in their development, and they comply with all applica)1e NRC regulations and guidance.

SeabrooK Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC)

The evidentiary record for litigation related to the SPMC and exercise contentions was closed on June 30, 1989. A Licensing Board decision is pending, and appeals are expected. Any impacts of these events on staff positions will be addressed in a future SSER.

FEMA provided extensive testimony derived from its December 14, 1988, report to the NRC in support of its interim findings of adequacy for the SPMC. The NRC staff provided testimony on a contention related to protective action decision-making and on the ETEs. FEMA found the SPMC will be adequate when the VANS is installed and operable. The staff concurs with FEMA's interim findings, based on the FEMA submittals, reviews of related testimony, and the applicants' progress in installing and operating the VANS. The staff concludes that the SPMC will be adequate to support full-power operation once the VANS is com-pleted. The NRC staff will review the final FEMA findings on the SPMC to verify this conclusion.

VehicularAlertandNotificationSystem(VANS)

The applicants have developed an alternative that is equivalent to the public alert notification system usually used at nuclear power stations for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ.

Because certain local Massachusetts communities within the EPZ would not allow fixed, pole-mounted sirens to remain in place in their communities, the applicants were not able to keep in place their original system (the PAHS).

The original PANS was typical of the system at many currently licensed nuclear power stations and had been found acceptable in an earlier staff review. In its place, the applicants have developed a system of emergency alerting sirens to be mounted on hydraulic telescoping booms on trucks. The trucks, which will be parked in staging areas and staffed on a 24-hour basis, will be driven to -

predesignated positions and the sirens will be raised and sounded in the event

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of an emergency of the appropriate class. The VANS will provide area and .'

sound-pressure coverage similar to that of fixed, pole-mounted systems.

Drivers will be prestaged at VANS staging sites on round-the-clock shifts.

Vehicles will be routinely maintained, and spare vehicles and drivers will be available. Provisions have been made for different weather conditions, such as rain, snow, and cold. VANS personnel are to be trained in operation and deployment of their vehicles and the VANS. Communications and remote and manual alert activitation provisions are included in the overall sy. stem.

The applicants have selected predesignated staging sites and transit routes and have conducted field tests with a prototype. The applicants' field tests show that all alert sites can be reached and an appropriate siren alert sounded throughout the EPZ in about 15 minutes. Final procurement and assembly of the systems are under way and will be completed and verified before a full-power license is issued. Similarly, on-shift staffing of the system will be in effect at that time. FEMA has reviewed the VANS and found it acceptable in a preliminary finding; a final FEMA finding will be issued when the VANS is made operational.

VANS contentions were litigated during hearings before the ASLB. The Board, in a Final Initial Decision (LBP-89-17) dated June 23, 1989, determined that the VANS adequately complies with emergency planning regulations.

The staff has reviewed the applicants' plan for implementation of the VANS, inspected a vehicle and selected alert sites, reviewed the FEMA findings, and reviewed interrogatory responses related to the procurement, implementation, and operation of the VANS. As a result of its review, the staff finds the VANS meets public alert notification requirements, is an acceptable alternative to the fixed-pole system, and, upon completion, will be adequate to support full-power operations. The staff will verify the installation and operability of the VANS through review of the final FEMA report and an NRC staff inspection before a full-power operating license is issued.

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13.3.5 Conformance With Emergency Planning Rule 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1)

The emergency planning regulations werc 3 mended (52 FR 42078, November 3,1987) to provide criteria for the evaluation, at the operating license review stage, of utility-prepared emergency plans in situations in which State and/or local governments decline to participate in emergency planning.

10CFR50.47(c)(1) states,inpart:

"Where an applicant for an operating license asserts that its inability to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of

[10 CFR 50.47(b)] results wholly or substantially from the decision of state and/or local govenments not to participate further in emergency planning, an operating license may be issued if the applicant demonstrates to the Commission's satisfaction that:

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(i) The' applicant's inability to comply .with...[NRC emergency planning] requirements...is wholly or substantially the result '

of the non.. participation of state and/or local governments.

(ii)Theapplicanthasmadeasustained,goodfaitheffortto_ secure and retain the participation of the pertinent state and/or local governmental authorities, including the furnishing of copies of' its emergency plan.

(iii)The applicant's emergency plan provides reasonable assurance

- that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of l the facility concerned. To make that finding, the applicant must demonstrate that, as outlined below, adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event.of an emergency. A utility plan will be evaluated against the same planning-standards applicable to a state or local plan...with due allowance made both for--

(A) Those elements for which state and/or local non-participation makes compliance infeasible and (B) The utility's measures designed to compensate for any deficiencies resulting from state and/or local non-participation.

In making its determination on the adequacy of a utility plan, the NRC will recognize the reality.that in an actual emergency, state and local-government officials will' exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC will determine the adequacy of that expected response, in combination with the utility's compensating' measures, on a case-by-case basis, subject to the following guidance. In addressing the circumstance where appli-cant's inability to comply with the requirements of [10 CFR 50.47(b)]

...is wholly or substantially the result of non-participation of '

state and/or local governments, it may be presumed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency, state and local officials would generally follow the utility plan. However, this presumption may be rebutted by, for example, a good faith and timely proffer of an adequate and feasible state and/or local radiological emergency plan that would in fact be relied upon in a radiological emergency".

.Through public announcements made by the Governor of Massachusetts on September 30, 1986, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (and similarly, the six Massachusetts local communities within the EPZ) declared their intentions to not participate in emergency planning for Seabrook. These parties actively intervened in the licensing process to oppose the licensing of the Seabrook Station. This opposition and nonparticipation clearly established the basis  ;

- for the applicants' development of an offsite emergency response plan and i organization to perform State and local functions. The pertinent compensatory plans and procedures for the Massachusetts EPZ were submitted to the NRC by the '

applicants on September 18, 1987. I

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The Seabrook Plan for the Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) contains measures intended to compensate for the fact that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and '

local governments have refused to participate in emergency planning for .

Seabrook Station. The plan provides that upon being notified of an emergency by Seabrook Station, the State will either have adequate capabilities to respond, in which case the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Respnnse Organization (NHYORO) will standby and monitor the State and local response (Standby Mode);

the Statewill the State and local governments authorize the NHYOROmay request the to implement NHYORO resources SPMC (Mode only)(Mode 2 . Under the 1); or plan, the State will determine which mode is to be implemented in the event of  ;

a radiological emergency at Seabrook. _

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Massachusetts, through the Massachusetts Attorney General, challenged the premise that the delegation of certain powers from the Governor to the HHYORO is lawful. The Board, in LBP-89-8 (February 16,1989), found that the Governor of Massachusetts, or his designee, pursuant to the provisions of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Act, may delegate to the NHYOR0 sufficient powers to implement pertinent provisions of the SPMC.

On the basis of the actions of Massachusetts and local governments and the results of FEMA's review of the SPMC and the NHYOR0, the staff concludes that the applicants had adequate bases for developing and implementing their offsite plan and organization for Mat cschusetts communities and have demonstrated con-formance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1).

13.3.6 Review Assumptions for Utility-Prepared Offsite Emergency Plans FEMA's evaluations of the 1988 exercise and the offsite plans (SPMC, NHRERP, MIPP) reflected three assumptions provided by the NRC staff. These assumptions are that in an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials who have declined to participate in emergency planning will:

1) exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public,
2) cooperate with the utility and follow the utility plan, and
3) have sufficient resources to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary.

The first two assumptions derive from 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(B) as shown above. Regarding the first assumption, the NRC accepts the reality that in an actual emergency, State and local governments will exercise their "best efforts" to protect the health and safety of the public. This presumption has been upheld by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, following a court challenge to the regulations filed by Massachusetts. The second assumption concerns the rebuttable presumption that State and local officials in an actual emergency Mill generally follow the utility plan; this presumption has not been rebutted ie ii. litigation before the Boards by a showing of any other way State and local . ,

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d officials will use their "best efforts" to protect the health and safety of the public, nor does the staff believe that Massachusetts has rebutted this presump- '-

tion in any other manner.

The third assumption, concerning the sufficiency of resources, was provided to FEMA by the hRC to facilitate the FEMA review of utility-prepared offsite emer-gency plans. Interrogatory answers provided by Massachusetts to the NRC staff in litigation before the Licensing Boards demonstrate the Commonwealth's ample L resources to respond to an emergency at Seabrook. Further, the NRC staff recognizes that even though the NHYORO has been developed with the capability and resources to function without State and local support, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has State plans, including substantial identified resources, for 1 use in radiological emergencies (e.g., in support of the Vermont Yankee Plant, l the Pilgrim Plant, and the Yankee-Rowe Plant). Additionally, the NHYORO is able to interface with various State agencies to identify and use existing State resources. Accordingly,, the staff concludes that State and local resources are sufficient to support the implementation of the Seabrook Plan for

. Massachusetts Communities.

13.3.7 Offsite Emergency Pinn Changes Directed by the Licensing Board In certain respects, the Licensing Board has qualified its decision with conditions that are required to be satisfied before full-power operation (Section 13.3.4.2, above). The Director of NRR has been directed to verify the satisfactory completion of these conditions in conjunction with FEMA. This is projected for November 1989, on the basis of current FEMA and applicant schedules. The satisfactory completion of these conditions will be reported in a future SSER, before final authorization of full-power operation.

13.3.8 Conclusions On the basis of its review of the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan (SSREP) for conformance with the criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, onsite inspections, and its evaluation of performance under the SSREP during exer-cises, the. staff concludes that the Seabrook onsite emergency plan continues to provide an ader,uate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness and meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E, thereto.

FEMA has provided its interim findings and determinations on the adequacy of offsite emergency planing and preparedness, based on plan reviews, exercise observations and analyses, and the States' and applicants' responses to the recommendations for improving the offsite plans. On the basis of its review of these findings, the staff concludes that the Seabrook offsite emergency plans will, upon completion of these changes and satisfaction of Board-imposed conditions, provide an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of offsite emergency preparedness and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E, thereto.

The NRC staff therefore concludes that the overall state of onsite and offsite .

emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective l

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4 measures can and will he taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station, and will be adequate to support full-power operations, '

once FEMA verifies the adequacy of the offsite alert and notification capabilities.

FEMA will provide its final findings and determinations to the NRC staff once the required actions are completed and verified. The staff will review the remaining and final Licensing and Appeal Board decisions for Board conditions and impacts on current staff postions. The final FEMA findings and the results of future Board decisions will be reported in a future SSER.

Attachment:

Appendix A i

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Appendix A q ,

Federal Emergency Management Agency f Washington, D.C. 20472 DEC 1 4 l988 t

Mr. Victor J. Stello Executive Director for Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Stello:

This is in further response to the September 9,1988 memorandum from .

Frank J. Congel of the Nuclear- Regulatory Commission (NRC) to Richard W.

Krimm of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) confirming the schedule for the issuance of FEMA's findings and detenninations on the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. This also represents FEMA action in response to requests received from the States of New Hampshire and Maine for FEMA approval of their offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness for Seabrook under the provisions of 44 CFR 350.7. These requests were published in the Federal Register on October 28, 1988, in accordance with 44 CFR 350.8.

Finally, this further carries out certain agreements reached with the NRC and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) on the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC). In the August 3-4, 1988, pre-hearing conference on the upcoming litigation on the SPMC, FEMA agreed to provide a review of the SPMC by October 14, 1988, in order to accommodate the scheduling needs of the ASLB hearing. That commitment was met. FEMA had also agreed to provide a consolidated finding for the offsite plans of the States of Maine and New Hampshire and the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization in Ifovember. Unfortunately, the discovery demands on the FEMA Region I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chainnan for Seabrook prevented us frun meeting this deadline. .

We have completed our integrated review and evaluation of the offsite plans and preparedness for Seabrook. The enclosed documents, all of which are dated December 1988, represent the results of that review. Due to their large combined v.olume, we have bound them as six separate documents. The documents are:

1. Review and Evaluation of the State of Maine Ingestion Pathway Plan for Seabrook Station.
2. Review and Evaluation of the State of New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Seabrook Station. .

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3. Review and Evaluation of the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities.

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4. Status of Corrective Actions for the 1988 FEMA Graded Exercise. I
5. Report of the Public Meeting for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. i
6. Findings and Determinations Document for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.

The exercise report was provided to you on September 2,1988, but should be considered part of this submittal.

The plans for the States of New Hampshire and Maine were reviewed ag.tinst the standards of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.

The Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities was reviewed against the standards and assumptions of NUREG-0654/

FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Suppl ement 1. Those assumptions are that in an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have ceclined to participate in emergency planning will: -

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public;
b. Cooperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan; and
c. Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility of 7 site plan where State and local response is necessary.

In accordance with an agreement between NRC and FEMA, we expect that the NRC will defend any legal challenges to these assumptions.

We muld like to note the following events and actions which support and document the findings to follow:

1. A joint exercise was held on June 28 - 29, 1988, in accordance with 44 CFR 350.9 (a).
2. A briefing of exercise participants and a public meeting were held on July 2,1988, in accordance with 44 CFR 350.9 (a) and 44 CFR 350.10.
3. Requests for corrective actions (and implementation schedules) for inadequacies resulting from the June 1988 exercise were made to the appropriate organizations.
4. Responses to those requests were received and evaluated.
5. Integrated reviews and evaluations of the offsite plans for the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were made, including review by the FEMA Region I RAC.

Based on the results of the above mentioned plan reviews, exercise and analyses, and the recommendation of the FEMA Region I Regional Director, we make the following findings for the three jurisdictional areas in the Seabrook EPZ:

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' "It is FEMA's position that Maine's ingestion pathway plan and preparedness are adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the Maine portion of the ingestion pathway of Seabrook by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures lcan be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency l

and are capable of being implemented. In response to the State of ,

Maine request, FEMA has initiated the process for granting approval under 44 CFR 350 for its ingestion pathway plan for the Seabrook -

Nuclear Power Station. We are distributing the FEMA Region I review of the Maine ingestion plan and preparedness to the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee for their review, prior to granting fonnal approval .

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  • Concerning the plans and preparedness for the State of New Hampshire, the Seabrook alert and notification system design for the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPZ has met the design requirements of F EMA-REP-10. When the proposed enhancements to the alert and .

notification system for the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPZ are installed and operable, it is FEMA's position that the plans and preparedness will be adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPZ, by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency and are capable of being implemented. At that time, w2 will be able to make a FEMA approval under 44 CFR 350.

" Concerning the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, developed by New Hampshire Yankee, the Seabrook alert and notification system design for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ has also met the design requirements of FEMA-REP-10. When the vehicular alert and notification system is installed and operable, it is FEMA's position that plans and preparedness will be adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event a radiological emergency and are capable of being implemented. At that time, a positive finding can be made.

In conclusion, I believe that this evaluation of plans and preparedness for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station represents a thorough evaluation of the plans and preparedness as they exist today. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at 646-3692.

Sincer y, JD j M Grant C. Peterson Associate Director State and Local Programs and Support Enclosures ,

As Stated h

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(. 1 h e . < r' $.. +7 } Federal Emergency Management ' Agency 3 Washington, D.C. 20472 SEP 2 IIBB MDORANDUM FOR: Frank'J. Congel Director ~

Division of Radiation Protection and Dnergency. Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

' U. ' laa ulatory Canmission 1 FROM: a imm-Assis. tant Associate Director Office-of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs ,

SUaTECT: Exercise Report for the June 28-29, 1988, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Dnergency Preparedness Plans for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station t'

Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report'of the June 28-29,1988, joint exercise of the offsite radiological ernergency preparedness plans for the Seabrook' Nuclear Power Station. The report dated September 1,1988, .

was prepared by Region I of the Federal Bnergency Management Agency (FD%)'.

As indicated in your memorandum of June 23, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Otanission (NRC) agreed that the proposed-Seabrook exercise objectives as transmitted to you with my memorandum of June 22, 1988, were suffi-cient tot 1) demonstrate the capabilities of the States of New Hampshire and Maine 'and the New Hangshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization in a full-participation exercise; and, 2) constitute a " qualifying"

. exercise under NRC's Rule 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1.

The State of Maine participated in the' exercise. 1he State of New Hangshire and eleven local costunities within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) also participated in the exercise. New Hanpshire, in accordance with its plan, implemented State carpensatory actions for the six communities within the pitzne EPZ which chose not to participate in the exercise. In addition, the Carsnonwealth of Massachusetts and six l Massachusetts catu.nities within the plume EPZ did not participate in  !

the exercise. The Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) developed by New Hmmahire Yankee (NHY), was exercised by the NHY Offsite Response Organization. 1he SPMC was developed by !GiY because the Ccunmonwealth and local Massachusetts constunities are not partici-pating in offsite radiological emergency preparedness for Seabrook.

gym; e,, 4, 90 3

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, a*' 1 Be review and evaluation of the utility's offsite plans and preparedness were performed usirr; the criteria of NURDG-0654/FD%-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1 and the imC assumptions upon wnich it is based. Etse assmptions are that in an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in emergency planning wills

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public; ,
b. Cooperate with the utility ard follow the utility offsite plan; and,
c. Have the resources suff aient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan wt.re State and local response is necessary.

Bere were no deficiencies idenali;ad during the exercise;' however, ,

areas requiring corrective cetion were identified. D e States of New Hampshire ard Maine, and New Hampshire Yankee have provided a sc..edale of corrective actions, which are reflected in the report.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871. .

Attactnent As Stated 6

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