ML20217G672

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Insp Rept 70-7002/98-04 on 980302-06.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Maintenance & Surveillance,Plant Support,Training Program,Transportation Program & self-assessment Program
ML20217G672
Person / Time
Site: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date: 03/27/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217G652 List:
References
70-7002-98-04, 70-7002-98-4, NUDOCS 9804020490
Download: ML20217G672 (14)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket No: 70-7002 Certificate No: GDP-2 Report No: 70-7002/98004(DNMS)

Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 Dates: March 2 - 6,1998 Inspector: R. G. Krsek Fuel Cycle Safety inspector Approved By: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 9904020490 9430327 PDR- ADOCK 07007002 C PDR

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/98004(DNMS)

Maintenance and Surveillance

. The inspector observed maintenance activities associated with the calibration of the calciner high-high temperature shutdown system in Building X-705. The inspector identified a violation, in that maintenance work was not stopped when the action steps of the In-Hand procedure could not be performed as written. (Section M1.1)

. The inspector conducted a random sampling of fume hoods in Building X-710 and determined that the fume hoods reviewed had the proper fume hood classifications.

(Section M8.1)

. The inspector noted that some fume hoods in Building X-710 did not have the required quarterly fume hood face velocity measurement performed. Laboratory staff were knowledgeable of the quarterly requirement, but were not aware that problem reports were required to be written when the quarte,-ly measurements were not performed. The as found condition of the fume hoods confirmed no immediate safety issues as a result of not performing the last quarterly measurement. However, the failure to initiate a problem report regarding the non-compliances upon initial discovery by plant staff was identified as an example of a violation. (Section M8.1)

Plant Sunpod Itaining Prnpram

. The inspector concluded that the transportation training program at Portsmouth met the applicable NRC and Department of Transportation requirements. The inspector also noted that the records reviewed for the transportation specialists and uranium material handlers were current. (Section 15.1)

Transportation Proaram

. The inspector observed that radiological surveys for radioactive material shipments received at and shipped from Portsmouth were in accordance with 10 CFR 20 and 49 CFR 173. Selected records reviewed for the shipment of radioactive materials were in accordance with both the NRC and Department of Transportation regulations.

(Section A1.1)

. The inspector noted that the certificant's procedures for the performance of transportation activities were adequate and provided plant staff with the appropriate information to receive and ship materials in accordance with NRC and Department of Transportation regulations. (Section A1.1)

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Self-Ameacement Procram

. The inspector concluded that the plant procedures and policies for problem reporting were understood and implemented by members of the Engineering Organization.

(Section A8.1)  !

. The inspector identified three examples of a violation involving the failure to initiate and enter problem reports for minor transportation violations associated with radioactive material shipments originating from Portsmouth. Although corrective actions were taken for the individual violations, plant staff did not collectively assess and determine if corrective actions were necessary or warranted for the issue of recurring violations in the transportation program at Portsmouth. (Section A8.1) 3

. g.:

4 Report Details EL Maintenance and Surveillance M1.0 Conduct c'l Maintenance and Surveillance .

M1.1 Ruildino X-705 calcinar Hiah-High Tamnarature Probe calihrmtian

a. In=^ action Senna (AAnM The inspector observed the semiannual Technical Safety Requirement ]

Surveillance 2.6.3.1.2 for the calibration of the high-high temperature shutoff system for the Number 1 (No.1) Calciner in Building X-705. The inspector reviewed the corresponding maintenance work package, attended the pre-job briefing, interviewed the Instrument and Control (l&C) staff, and observed the work performed.

b. Oh=arvatians and Findinos The inspector reviewed work package Number P9808869-02 for the semiannual Technical Safety Requirement 2.6.3.1.2 surveillance of the No.1 calciner. The work scheduled to be performed was documented in the work instructions of the maintenance work package, and the action steps for the work were prescribed in Procedure XP4-CU-IM6100,"X-705 Test and Calibration of Calciners High-High Temperature Shutdown,"

Revision 3, dated February 24,1997 The pre-job briefing held on March 5 included the front line managers (FLM) and staff from uranium recovery operations, l&C, and health physics. The briefing addressed the scope of the work to be performed, verified staff performing the work activities met the appropriate training and qualification requirements, ensured the required documentation and instrumentation was available to perform the job, and reviewed the applicable work instructions and procedure. In addition, the health physics staff reviewed lessons leamed from the previous completion of this task including recommendations for improved performance, a review of the most current radiological work permit, and special radiological concems for this particular work evolution.

Prior to the start of work, the inspector noted that the appropriate prerequisites as required by Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100 were implemented. The prerequisites included:

verification of lockout /tagout work permits for the closure of feed isolation valves to the No.1 calciner; verification that the measuring and test equipment were in calibration and working order; and, an independent verification of valve positionings performed by operations.

. The inspector observed the three l&C mechanics perform the action steps in Section 8.0 of Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100. Step 8.3.12 required the I&C mechanics to verify that a volt / ohm-milliammeter (VOM) reading was between 80 to 120-volts AC, The inspector noted that when one of the l&C mechanics (reading the VOM) verified to another l&C mechanic (completing a required form in the in-hand procedure) that the VOM indicated between GO to 120-volts AC, the VOM actually read 124-volts AC. The l&C mechanics continued to progress through the action steps of the procedure. When the I&C mechanics reached a point in the procedure where there was little activity, the inspector questioned the l&C mechanics regarding the voltage reading of the VOM during the

- performance of Step 8.3.12. The l&C mechanics acknowledged that the VOM indicated 4

124-volts AC during the performance of Step 8.3.12. The inspector asked the l&C mechanics what actions staff were required when a procedure step cannot be completed as written. The l&C mechanics stated that when a step in the procedure was highlighted with a "TSR" or "NCSA" and a problem occurred, that work was required to

' be stopped. The I&C mechanics also noted, they assumed that a tolerance was allowed for the voltage reading in Step 8.3.12.

The l&C FLM retumed to the work site, and the l&C mechanics explained what had occurred so far in the completion of work, and that the VOM read 124-volts AC at Step 8.3.12. The l&C FLM also stated that when a step in the procedure was highlighted with a "TSR" or "NCSA" and a problem occurred, that work was stopped, but that voltage transients in the power supply do occur and are expected. The I&C FLM also believed that a prior version of the procedure specified an additional tolerance for voltage. The I&C mechanics then asked the l&C FLM whether work could continue, and the FLM stated that work could continue. Shortly thereafter, the l&C FLM discussed the issue with the uranium recovery operations FLM. The uranium recovery operations FLM recognized that the work was required to be stopped, and the l&C FLM subsequently stopped work and notified the maintenance planner. A systems engineer was consulted and the certificant determined that a procedural change, and possibly an analysis were required prior to continuing work. Therefore, work on the No.1 calciner was stopped and the No.1 calciner remained out-of-service.

The inspector reviewed Procedure UE2-PS-PS1034,"Use of Procedures," and Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100,"X-705 Test and Calibration of Calciners High-High Temperature Shutdown," Revision 3. The inspector noted that both procedures required the I&C mechanics to stop work and notify the FLM if the action steps of the procedure could not be completed as written. The inspector discussed the plant policy and procedures regarding work stops with the I&C mechanics and FLM. The l&C mechanics and FLM acknowledged the inspector's conclusion that the work was required to be stopped when the action step of the procedure could not be completed as written.

As a follow-up, the inspector reviewed the maintenance work order packages for the last three surveillances for the calibration of the high-high temperature shutoff system for the No.1 and 2 calciners in Building X-705. The inspector noted that the maintenance work packages were complete, and that neither the completed forms of Procedure XP4-CU-IM6100, nor the work history forms of the maintenance work packages identified any discrepancies with voltage measurements for Step 8.3.12 of Procedure XP4-CU-IM6100.

Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be implemented for activities described in Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.11.4.1, and listed in Appendix A, to Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.11. Appendix A, to Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.11 requires, in part, that procedure management activities shall be covered by written procedures. Procedure UE2-PS-PS1034,"Use of Procedures," Revision 1, Change B, Section 6.2 requires, in part, that each procedure step in an in-Hand procedure is performed as written. If the activity cannot be performed as described, the following actions must be performed: stop the work activity; place the system in a safe condition; mark procedure step last performed; notify the appropriate manager for direction; and, if necessary, request or initiate procedure '

change or revision according to UE2-PS-PS1031. On March 5,1998, during the performance of in-Hand Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100, "X-705 Test and Calibration of Calciners High-High Temperature Shutdown," the work group did not stop work when 5

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Section 8.3.12 of Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100 could not be performed as written.

Specifically, Section 8.3.12 of Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100 required the work group to verify the volt / ohm-milliammeter indicated 80 to 120-volts AC. The volt / ohm-milliammeter indicated 124-volts AC during the completion of SecCon 8.3.12 of Procedure XP4-CU-lM6100, and the work group did not stop work and continued to progress through the action steps of the procedure. The failure to stop work when the action steps in an In-Hand procedure cannot be performed as written, is a Violation of Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1 (VIO 70-7002/98004-01).

c. Conci"= Inns The inspector observed maintenance activities associated with the calibration of the calciner high-high temperature shutdown system in Building X-705. The inspector identified a violation, in that maintenance work was not stopped when the action steps of the in-Hand procedure could not be performed as written.

M8.0 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 Rnilding X-710 Fume Hood Face Velncity Survaillances

a. Inanaction snnne (88025)

The inspector reviewed a random sampling of fume hoods in the Building X-710 laboratories to ensure the fume hoods were properly maintained in accordance with the fume hood requirements contained in Safety Analysis Report Section 5.7.3.5 and the Portsmouth (PORTS) Chemical Hygiene Plan. In addition, the inspector interviewed laboratory staff to determine if the radiological fume hood classifications were properly designated, based on the current activities performed in the fume hoods.

b. Observations and Findings The inspector performed a random inspection of fume hoods in Building X-710 laboratory rooms 111,114,115,124,128,285,212,213,214, and 243. The fume hoods in these rooms represented approximately 30 percent of the fume hoods in Building X-710. The inspector discussed, with laboratory staff, the particular uses of the fume hoods in these rooms and compared those uses with the current fume hood classification. The inspector noted that the fume hoods reviewed had the appropriate classification for the work performed in the fume hood (either Radiological, Class I, Class ll, or Class ill).

The inspector also discussed the operating history of the fume hoods with laboratory staff and noted that during adverse weather conditions (heavy rains), rain water leaked into the fume hoods in laboratories on the second floor. The Building X-710 maintenance manager discussed the physical construction of the fume hoods with the inspector and explained that rain water had leaked into the fume hoods when the force of rains overcame the fume hood exhaust ventilation system. Laboratory staff working in rooms where this had occurred, indicated that problem reports were written documenting these issues. Staff also noted that prior to re-use, representatives from both the industrial hygiene and health physics departments performed surveys of the fume hoods.

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As part of the walkdown, the inspector also reviewed the quarterly fume hood face velocity measurements. The Safety Analysis Report and Portsmouth Laboratory Chemical Hygiene Plan required that fume hood face velocity measurements were performed quarterly, per the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1450, Appendix A. The inspector noted that in Room 111, the quarterly measurements for ten fume hoods used for radiological operations, were last made on either October 10 or 17,1997.

Laboratory staff indicated that the fume hoods were currently used for radiological operations and noted that they were aware of the quarterly requirement for fume hood face velocity measurements. The inspector also asked if problem reports had been written for the ten fume hoods. Laboratory staff indicated the issue was discussed with maintenance staff. Laboratory staff were not aware that problem reports were required to be written upon discovery that the quarterly measurements were not performed.

The inspector informed Building X-710 management that ten fume hoods in Room 111 were beyond the quarterly measurement requirement. Use of the fume hoods was discontinued, an investigation of the other fume hoods in Building X-710 was initiated, and a problem report was issued. The laboratory staff investigation identified four additional radiological fume hoods and four Class lil fume hoods (fume hoods strictly for chemical hazards) which were not in compliance with the quarterly measurement requirement. Work in the eight fume hoods was discontinued, and problem reports were issued. Maintenance personnel later performed the fume hood face velocity measurements on the 18 fume hoods, and all fume hoods passed the as found measurement. No worker safety issues resulted as a consequence of not performing the quarterly fume hood face velocity measurements because the as found condition of all 18 fume hoods was in compliance with the requirements for minimum face velocity.

Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be implemented for activities described in Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.11.4.1.

Section 6.11.4.1 of the Safety Analysis Report states, in pad, that: "As a minimum, a l

procedure is required for any task that is described in, or implements a commitment that is described in, the Safety Analysis Report..." Section 6.8.2.4 of the Safety Analysis Report, " Problem Reporting," states, in part, that: "All piant employees have the responsibility to write problem reports on safety, operating, and noncompliance items... Corrective actions are tracked through the plant's corrective action program."

Procedure UE2-HR-Cl1030," Problem Reporting," Revision 0, Change E, dated April 1, 1996, states, in part that problem reports are required for violations of, or deviations from, programs, policies, and procedures or deficiencies which could cause safety, operability, or reportability concerns. Step 6.1.3.A of Procedure UE2-HR-C11030 requires that the problem report form be delivered to the Plant Shift Superintendent as soon as practical, but always prior to the end of the shift. Contrary to the above, plant staff did not initiate and deliver problem reports to the plant shift superintendent by the end of the shift, upon initial discovery of deviations from the required quarterly face velocity measurement tests for laboratory fume hoods. Problem reports were filed after the issue was identified by the NRC inspector. The failure to file problem reports for policy and procedural violations, in order to promptly identify and correct as soon as practical, conditions which were adverse to quality, is a Violation of Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1 (VIO 70-7002/98004-02a). ]

c. Conclusions The inspector conducted a random sampling of fume hoods in Building X-710 and  :

determined that the fume hoods reviewed had the proper fume hood classifications.

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The inspector noted that some fume hoods in Building X-710 did not have the required quarterly fume hood face velocity measurement performed. Laboratory staff were knowledgeable of the quarterly requirement, but were not aware that problem reports were required to be written when the quarterly measurements were not performed. The as found condition of the fume hoods confirmed no immediate safety issues as a result of not performing the last quarterly measurement. However, the failure to initiate a problem report regarding the non-compliances upon initial discovery by plant staff was identified as an example of a violation.

V. Plant Runnart 15.0 Staff Training and Qualification 15.1 Tran=nnrtatinn of Radinactive Material Training

a. In=nadian knaa (88010)

The inspector reviewed the training program for plant staff involved in the transportation of radioactive materials at PORTS to ensure the program addressed the applicable NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for training. The inspector also reviewed training and qualification data for the uranium material handlers (UMH) and transportation specialists.

b. Oh=arvations and Findings The inspector reviewed training module number TST91.01.36.03, " Radioactive Materials Transportation for Shipping / Receiving," which was developed to satisfy training required by 49 CFR 172, Subpart H and 49 CFR 173, Subpart I for PORTS hazardous materials workers involved with the shipping and receiving of radioactive materials. The majority of radioactive material transportation work at PORTS was performed by the UMHs who prepared and received radioactive material shipments. In addition, two transportation specialists were responsible for the review, final inspection and signing of shipping papers for all radioactive material shipments at PORTS. The inspector reviewed the training module, discussed training with UMHs and compared the transportation activities observed (see Section A1.0). The training module covered the NRC and DOT transportation requirements specifically applicable to the functions the UMHs performed for the receipt and shipment of radioactive materials. The inspector also reviewed the training slides and noted the instructor slides enhanced the discussion points within the training module.

A select number of UMH training records were reviewed, in addition to the transportation specialists, and the inspector noted that the training for the plant staff was current.

c. Con += inns The inspector concluded the transportation training program at PORTS met the applicable NRC and DOT requirements. The inspector also noted that the transportation specialists and UMHs training records reviewed were current.

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A1.0 Conduct of Transportation Activities

' A1.1 Ohaarvatian of Radinantive Matarial Racaints and Shinments

a. Inanantian kana (M740)

The inspector review.9d selected records for the shipment of radioactive materials, including surveys of packages for radioactive contamination, internal process documentation, and shipping papers. In addition, the inspector observed receipt shipments of radioactive material, and preparations for shipments of both uranium hexafluoride (UF.) cylinders and cylinders containing residual UF.,

b. Oh=arvatinns and Findinos The certificant routinely made shipments of radioactive materials which included cylinders containing UF enriched to five-percent or less, and residual UF.. -The inspection and observation of shipments of both enriched and residual UF., showed that the appropriate radiological surveys and inspections of packagings were performed prior to shipment, and removable contamination and radiological surveys were below the limits specified in 49 CFR 173.443. A review of shipping papers verified that the information required by both 49 CFR 172 and 10 CFR 20 was available in the shipping documentation. In addition, the shipments were appropriately labeled, placarded and marked in accordance with 49 CFR 172.

The inspector observed and discussed the shipment of radioactive material from PORTS with the UMHs and a packaging and transportation specialist. In addition, the inspector reviewed the certificant's procedures for the shipment of radioactive material.

The inspector noted the plant staff were knowledgeable of the applicable transportation requirements and that Procedures XP4-TE-UH2088," Labeling, Placarding, and Marking Uranium Shipments," and XP4-TE-FD2400," Shipping and Receiving Large UF6 cylinders at X-343," contained adequate information for the preparation and shipment of radioactive materials from PORTS.

The receipt of UF, cylinders filled with uranium enriched to five-percent or less from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant was also observed. The inspector noted that required surveys were performed in accordance with Procedure XP2-HP-HO2030, " Shipment and Receipt Surveys of Radioactive Material Packages," and that the procedure addressed the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 20.1906 for the receipt of packages,

c. connineinns The certificant conducted radiological surveys for radioactive material shipments received at and shipped from PORTS in accordance with 10 CFR 20 and 49 CFR 173.

Selected records reviewed for the shipment of radioactive materials were in accordance '

with both the Department of Transportation and NRC regulations; however, minor violations were noted for previous radioactive material shipments (see Section C1.1). l The inspector concluded that the certificant's procedures for the performance of transportation activities were adequate and provided plant staff with the appropriate information to receive and ship materialt. In accordance with the Department of Transportation and NRC regulations.

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C1.0; Conduct of Self-Assessment ActMtles C1.1 Problem Reporting Program

a. inspadion Scope (86740)

The inspector reviewed the engineering and packaging and transportation staff's use and knowledge of the problem reporting system. The review consisted of random interviews with plant staff, review of problem reporting documentation, including plant procedures, and the follow-up of issues required to be entered into the problem reporting system.

b. Ohaarvations and Findinas The inspector discussed the plant problem reporting system with staff from the Engineering Organization. In conversations with managers and supervisors, the inspector noted that PORTS management expected that if an individual identified an issue, meeting the criteria for the issuance of a problem report, that the individual would ensure the problem report was written and delivered to the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), as required by Procedure UE2-HR-Cl1030," Problem Reporting." The inspector randomly selected and discussed problem reporting with several engineers from the Design Engineering, Systems Engineering, Nuclear Safety, and Construction and Project Management Groups, within the Engineering Organization. The inspector noted that the engineers were familiar with the procedures and requirements for problem reporting, and that the engineers frequently wrote problem reports for identified deficiencies. A review of problem reports from the Engineering Organization confirmed that engineers were knowledgeable and implemented the requirements of the PORTS problem reporting system, and revealed that problem reports had been clearly documented on a variety of plant issues identified by engineers.

The inspector also reviewed the implementation of the problem reporting system with staff from the Packaging and Transportation group, in discussions with the manager of the Packaging and Transportation group, the inspector noted that the PORTS Packaging and Transportation group did not write problem reports for transportation violations, regarding PORTS shipments that were initially identified at PGDP. Plant staff reviewed the problem reporting system at PORTS and verified that problem reports were not written.

Shipments of radioactive material originating from PORTS and going to PGDP, were inspected upon arrival at the PGDP. When transportation violations were identified, the PGDP transportation specialist issued a problem report at PGDP. Copies of the PGDP problem reports were then faxed to either the PORTS Packaging and Transportation group or the PORTS PSS. The problem report at PGDP was closed due to the fact that the problem was applicable to PORTS. The inspector identified three recent transportation violations recorded by PGDP for shipments originating from PORTS, that were not entered into the PORTS problem reporting system:

= On September 9,1997 a PGDP transportation specialist identified a shipment of cylinders, with residual Uranium Hexafluoride originating from PORTS, was

~ marked with the incorrect hazardcus material identification number. Problem Report number PR-MM-97-4920 was written and closed at PGDP.

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. On December 16,1997, a PGDP transportation specialist identified that a shipment of cylinders, marked " excepted package - empty packaging," originating from PORTS exceeded the DOT radiation limits specified in 49 CFR 173.421(a)(2),

for excepted packages. Problem Report number PR-MM-97-7451 was written and closed at PGDP.

. On January 23,1998, a PGDP transportation specialist identified that a shipment of cylinders, with residual Uranium Hexafluoride originating from PORTS, has the incorrect activity of material written on the package labels. Problem Report PR-MM-980426 was written and closed at PGDP.

1 The manager of Packaging and Transportation was knowledgeable of the violations listed above, and indicated that some type of corrective action was taken for each violation. The manager stated that for all the issues, discussions were held among Packaging and Transportation staff, and for the second violation listed above crew briefings for the uranium material handlers were held. The three transportation violations, individually constitute violations of minor significance, and are being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 70-7002/98004-03).

The inspectors noted that the PORTS Packaging and Transportation manager and staff had taken some corrective actions for the individual minor violations listed above.

However, problem reports were not written and entered into the PORTS problem reporting system for these minor violations, as required by plant procedure. Plant policy and procedures required these transportation violations to be entered into the PORTS problem reporting system, not only to track and trend deficiencies in the transportation program, but a!so to ensure that corrective actions taken to resolve the deficiencies were of sufficient depth and breadth to correct and prevent recurrence of transportation violations. Although corrective actions were taken for the individual violations, plant staff did not collectively assess and determine if corrective actions were necessary or warranted for the issue of recurring violations in the transportation program at PORTS.

Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be implemented for activities described in Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.11.4.1.

Section 6.11.4.1 of the Safety Analysis Report states,in part, that: "As a minimum, a procedure is required for any task that is described in, or implements a commitment that is described in, the Safety Analysis Report. . . ." Section 6.8.2.4 of the Safety Analysis Report, " Problem Reporting," states, in part, that: "All plant employees have the responsibility to write problem reports on safety, operating, and noncompliance items. . . Corrective actions are tracked through the plant's corrective action program." ,

Procedure UE2-HR-Cl1030," Problem Reporting," Revision 0, Change E, dated April 1, 1996, states, in part, that problem reports shall be initiated for violations of, or deviations from programs, policies, and procedures or deficiencies which could cause safety, operability, or reportability concerns. Step 6.1.3.A requires that the problem report form be delivered to the Plant Shift Superintendent as soon as practical, but always prior to the end of the shift. The failure to initiate and deliver problem report forms to the plant shift superintendent by the end of the shift, for the three examples of transportation violations identified above is a Violation of Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1 (VIO 70-7002/98004-02b,c,d).

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c. Conclusions The inspector concluded that the plant procedures and policies for problem reporting were well understood and implemented by members of the Engineering Organization.

' However, the inspector did identify three examples of the failure to initiate and enter problem reports for transportation violations regarding radioactive material shipments from PORTS. Although corrective actions were taken for the individual violations, plant staff did not collectively assess and determine if corrective actions were necessary or warranted for the issue of recurring violations in the transportation program at PORTS.

. IV. Management Meetings

'X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff and management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 6,1998. Plant staff acknowledged the findings presented at the meeting. The inspector asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified, c_

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O PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS)

  • T. Boss, Maintenance Program Manager
  • L. Calvert, Materials Management Organization Manager
  • S. Casto, Work Control Manager
  • M. Conkel, Mechanical Cascade Maintenance Manager
  • D. Couser, Training Manager
  • M. Hasty, Erigineering Organization Manager
  • R. Lipfert, Training and Procedures Organization Manager
  • T. Matchett, Safety, Safeguards and Quality
  • D. McCarty, Packaging and Transportation Manager
  • R. McDermott, Operations Organization Manager
  • J. Oppy, Feed and Transfer Manager
  • R. Smith, Health Physics Manager
  • T, Taulbee, Health Physics Operations Supervisor
  • J. Thompson, Health Physics UnitedEtates Enrichment Corocration (USEC)
  • L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards and Quality Manager
  • R. W. Gaston, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager
  • S. Martin, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Specialist Nuclear 3egulatorv Commission (NRC)
  • D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector
  • Denotes those present at the March 6,1998, exit meeting.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88005: Management Organization and Controls IP 88025: Maintenance and Surveillance Activities IP 88010: Operator Training and Retraining IP 86740: Transportation Inspection Effort 13

4 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED ODBDed 70-7002/98004-01 ViO Failure to stop work during an l&C maintenance activity when procedural steps could not be adhered to 70-7002/98004-02 VIO Failure to initiate problem reports for safety, operating, and regulatory noncompliance issues to ensure corrective actions are tracked and implemented for the issues 70-7002/98004-03 NCV Three minor transportation violations for radioactive material shipments originating at PORTS received at Paducah Discussed None Closed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations DNMS Division of Nuclear Material Safety DOE Department of Energy DOT Department of Transportation FLM Front Line Manager l&C Instrumentation and Control LMUS Lockheed Martin Utility Services NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR Public Document Room PGDP Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant PORTS Portsmouth PR Problem Repod-PSS Plant Shift Superintendent UF6 Uranium Hexafluoride UMH Uranium Material Handler USEC United States Enrichment Corporation VIO Violation VOM Volt / Ohm-Milllammeter 14 l

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