Text

Amend 218 to License DPR-65,changing TS by Modifying Low Temp Overpressure Protection Requirements
	ML20236K340
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/01/1998
From:	Mckee P; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
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ML20236K335	List: ML20236K330; ML20236K340; ML20236K353;
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a y & UNITED STATES .

l g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J WASHINGTON, D.C. 30ssH001 l %*****+

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY 1 i

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 l AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 218 License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

l l- ' A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al.

(the licensee) dated November 13,1997, as supplemented on December 29, 1997, and April 8,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules

! and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

{ B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the

Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

! C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the l Commission's regulations; i

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and l

security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating Ucense No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 218, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.- - This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l ,

Phillip F. Mc e Deputy Director for Licensing Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: July 01,.1998 l-r L

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o ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 218 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 I l

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached l pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticallines !

indicating the areas of change. I Remove Insert !

I 3/4 1-8 3/41-8 I 3/41-10 through -15 3/41-10 through -15 !

3/4 1-19 3/4 1-19 3/4 4-1b 3/4 41b i 3/4 4 3 3/44-3 ,

3/4 4-17 and -18 3/4 417 and -18 I 3/4 4-19 3/4 4-19,-19a, and 19b 3/4 4-21, -21a, and -21b 3/4 4 21, -21a, and -21b 3/4 5-7 and -7a 3/4 5-7 and -7a 3/4 10-3 3/4 10-3 B 3/41-2, -3, and -3a B 3/41-2, -3, and -3a B 3/4 4-1 and -2 B 3/4 4-1, -1a, -2, and -2a B 3/4 4 5 and -6 8 3/4 4 5, -6, -6a, and -6b B 3/4 4-7 8 3/4 4-7, -7a, -7b, and -7c B 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5 2 B 3/4 5 2a l

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.:q REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEN$

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - SHLITDOWN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a. A flow path with a piping temperature of greater than 55'F from the boric acid storage tank via ei.er a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE, or b..

The pumpflow path to the fromCoolant Reactor the refueling System water storage if only the tank refueling via a charging l water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILTIY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:-

i With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involv-ing CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

L SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demon- l strated OPERABLE- !

a. At least once per 7 days by exercising all testable power operat- I l ed valves in the flow path required for boron injection through at least one complete cycle,

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying the correct position of l all manually operated valves in the boron injection flow path not l l

locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position. )

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! c. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that the boric acid

l. piping temperature is greater than 55'F. This'may be accom.-

plished by verifying that the ambient temperature in the vicinity of the boric acid piping on elevations (-)5'-0" and (-)25'-6" is greater than 55'F.

1 NILLSTONE -. UNIT 2 3/41-8 Amendment No. JJJ, JJJ 218 0324 L

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t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.1.2.2 The above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

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a. At least once per 7 days by exercising all testabic power operated valves in each flow path through at least one complete cycle,

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying the correct position of all manually cperated valves in the boron injection flow path not locked, scaled or otherwise secured in position, and

c. At least once per 10 months, during shutdown, by exercising all l 1 power operated valves in each flow path through at least one complete cycle.

d. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that the boric acid piping temperature is greater than 55'F. This may be accom-plished by verifying that the ambient temperature in the vicinity of the boric acid piping on elevations (-)5'-0" and

(-)25-6" is greater than 55'F.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 Amendment No. pp, 177 177,218 0324

j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS CHARGING PUNP - SHUTDOWN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE. A maximum of two

. charging pumps shall be capable of injecting into the RCS.

APPLICABILITY: . MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

a. With'no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump is restored to OPERABLE status,

b. With more than two charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS take immediate action to comply with 3.1.2.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

l 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ;

at'least once per 31 days by:

a. Starting (unless already operating) the pump from the control l room, and l

b. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes.

4.1.2.3.2 One charging pump shall be demonstrated not capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that the motor circuit breaker is in the open position.

l NILLSTONE - U'n a f 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. Jp), 197,218 0324

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/41-12 Amendment No. Jp) 218

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i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I CHARGING PUNPS - OPERATING l

l LINITING COMITION FOR OPERATION i l

l 3.1.2.4 At least two** charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4*. )

ACTION: ;

a. With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to l l i

OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT'STA"DBY within the next 4 I hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within.the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

b. With more than two charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS and the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs < 300*F, take immediate '

L action to comply with 3.1.2.4.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

! 4.1.2.4.1 Two charging pumps shall be demonstrated CPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

a. Starting (unless already operating) each pump from the control i room, and l l

b. Verifying that each pump operates for at least 15 minutes.

4.1.2.4.2 One charging pump shall be demonstrated not capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is < 300*F by verifying that the motor circuit breaker is in the

, open position.

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The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 for the charging pump that is inoperable pursuant to Specification l l

3.4.9.3 provided the charging pump is restored to OPERABLE status within at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or. prior to entering MODE 3, whichever comes first.

- A maximum of two charging pumps shall be capable of injecting into the RCS l whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than 300*F.

i NI'jlSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4?.~13 Amendment No. Jpp, 177, 218 l

MACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS j

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l 191LQ ACID PUNPS - SHUTDOWN I LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 At least one boric acid pump shall be OPERABLE if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.la is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

1 With no boric acid pump OPERABLE as required to completed the flow path l of Specification 3.1.2.la, sus)end all operations involving CORE ALTERA- l l TIONS or positive reactivity c1anges until at least one boric acid pump i is~ restored to OPERABLE status.

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[ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , 4.1.2.5 One boric acid pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least i once per 7 days by:

l l a. Starting (unless already operating) the pump from the control !

l Toom,

b. Verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge l pressure of 2 98 psig, and l !

c. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes. l l :I l- j NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 218 ;

3/4 1-14 0324

d REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I

B0RIC ACID PUNPS - OPERATING LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 The boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required l OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2.a shall be OPERABLE if the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.2.a is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:.

l With the boric acid pump (s) required for the boron injection flow path (s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2.a inoperable, restore the boric acid pump (s) to OPERABLE STATUS within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 The boric acid pump (s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by

a. Starting (unless already o'perating) the pump from the control room,

b. Verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge 4 pressure of 1 98 psig, and

! c. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. pp, 177.2218 0324

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration in each water source, and

2. Verifying the water level in each water source.

b. When in MODES 3 and 4, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature is 235'F when the RWST ambient air temper-ature is <35'F.

c. When in Modes 1 and 2, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature is 250*F when the RWST ambient air temper-ature is <50*F.

d. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying that the boric acid storage tank temperatures are greater than 55'F. This may be accomplished by verifying that the ambient air temperature in the vicinity of the boric acid storage tanks is greater than 55'F.

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i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-19 Amendment No. J77, 218 1 0325 l

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REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEN C00LANT LOOPS AND C0OLANT CIRCULATION SHUTDOWN iturrima enuntrinu rna nornartnu 3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,

2. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,

3. Shutdown Cooling Loop A#,

4. Shutdown Cooling Loop B#,

b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation *.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4** and 5**.

ACTION: a. With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE, initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loops to OPERABLE status within one hour; be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

b. With no coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation within one hour.

SURVEILLANT REQUIREMENTS 4.4.1.3.1 The required shutdown cooling loop (s), if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker align-ment and indicated power availability for pump and shutdown cooling loop valves.

The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.

All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be deenergized for up to I hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10*F below saturation temperature.

- The following restrictions apply when starting the first reactor coolant pump and any RCS cold leg temperature is 1275'F. The first reactor coolant pump shall not be started unless: (1) pressurizer water level is

< 43.7%; (2) pressurizer pressure is < 340 psia; and (3) secondary water temperature in each steam generator is < 50*F above each RCS cold leg temperature.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-lb Amendment No. 218 0326

9 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES LINITING C00GITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 Both power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block

-valves shall be OPERABLE.~

APPLICABILITY: NODES 1, 2, and 3. ,

ACTION:

a. With one or both PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within I hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close~the associated block valve (s) with power maintained to the i block valve (s)*; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the l l next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . '

b'. With one PORV ino)erable and not capable of being manually cycled, within I hour eit1er restore the PORV to OPERABLE status er close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; '

restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or ;

be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and.in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

i c. With both PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, L within I hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or i close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and.in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With one or both block valves inoperable, within I hour restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or prevent its associated PORV(s) from opening automatically. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The block' valve (s) may be stroked, as necessary, during plant cooldown to prevent 6 thermal binding..

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-3 Amendment No. (), JJ JJ, JJJ, JJJ, 21P 0327-

REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEN 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMIT.i REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.1 Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature, pressure, and heatup and cooldown rates shall be limited in accordance with the limits specified in Table 3.4-2 and shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.* l ACTION:

a. With any of the above limits exceeded in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, perform the following:

1. Restore the temperature and/or pressure to within limit within 30 minutes.

A.ND

! 2. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out of limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Otherwise, be in at least MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 with RCS pressure less than 300 psia within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With any of the above limits exceeded in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, perform the following:

1. Immediately initiate action to restore the temperature and/or pressure to within limit.

l AND

2. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out of limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and determine that the Reactor Coolant System is l

acceptable for continued operation prior to entering MODE 4.

l l *See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-17 Amendment No. JJ JJ, JJJ. JJJ,218 me

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEN I

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I 1

4.4.9.1

a. The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes l during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and l hydrostatic testing operations.

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b. The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens l l

shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, at the intervals shown in Table 4.4-3. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Table 3.4-2 and Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b.

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/44-18 Amendment No. 218 0328

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TABLE 3.4-2 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM HEATUP AND C00LDOWN LINITS i

Cooldown Heatup Indicated cold Leg Limit Indicated Cold Limit Temperature Leg Temperature

$ 100*F 1 5'F/ hour if RCS not 1 220*F 1 30*F/ hour

! vented.

100*F < T s 230*F $ 30*F/ hour 220*F < T 1 275'F if RCS not 1 50*F/ hour vented.

< 190*F s 50*F/ hour if RCS vent 1 > 275'F s 100'F/ hour

2.2 square inches.

1 230'F 1 50*F/ hour during unanticipated temperature excursions.

> 230*F $ 80*F/ hour Inservice

! Hydrostatic and

( ,

Leak Testing Indicated Cold 1 5'F/ hour for Leg Temperature 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months prior to and during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup limit curve.

r MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/44-19 Amendment No. 218 03N

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Millstone Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations for Up to 20 EFPY Figure 3.4-2a i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/44-19a Amendment No.218 1 0328 f

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i.

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i:

i i

I

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-...4...

i Unacceptable ..

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i . . I. * .... C . t ..

8 l

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i

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a ... ....: . . ...: ... ...a.... .. : .... . ici l m

.g i Operation i.- ! !. !

i 1

1500 to

: }. i :

. . . . . . . . .....;.. g: ... . ..;! . . .. i... ; ...7..

g.. . ; .. ...:...... .... :

.g : : : : : : :

. . :. :. :. t. :. :. .w :

.....t... o.op o.

.oug\ o

.u -~; on. .....:'*"* a

?***=' " * * " " ' "**?*"" "*" " ~ ~

t"*a l

I I

r.. . . . . . .

...9..... ........... ....

g ...:.....

i'

....4.....

.... >. . . . .g

... .. > . . . . . . . -g.. . .

4.

...p. .. ..4.....

.. 6..... .. .. ).

1

I

: :* g: -

i.

m - *

i. ! :. :. :. :.

. . . . . . ns .. 4 ... .... .... 4* .....:..... ..a..... ..4...

....4... ..=4..

30'F/hr

i !' i i i i i j

....a........4.....

...4..... .. J..

. ... a: ... . 4.. . ...a!: ..... ..4..... .....:...... .........

j.

- j :

- j

.......... ..a..... ....J.. . .. ..a .. ..n...

Mggggf g

! ! : i i .........

Maxu.num i

... .. .!.... . . .! . !. . . Cold Leg No. of RCP's ...!..... :

50'F/hr ,

t i

1 Temperature operating 500 ' *

i*

j ;

7g' j T> 500'F 4 l

...q..... >.. . . . .. > . . . . . . .3.....

... 8

.....).....

. i l 200'F < Ts 500*F 3 j M: :

~

. ... 4...n

.4..... -

4.. -

. ..l.: . .

.4

.i i i 150*F s T s 200'F 2 i

.....i....

.... 4... .

Min. Bolt-up a-..

-.4-t

. .....i.. .... . . .i. ... ..Temp = 70*F !.

T< 150*F 0 .....!. .....

0 . l l l l .

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 l Indicated Cold Leg Temperature (*F)

Millstone Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations for Up to 20 EFPY Figure 3.4-2b l NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/44-19b ons Amendment No*218 i

L_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . - _ _ _

REACTOR.000LANL. SYSTEM l PRESSURIZER LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to: I

a. A maximum heatup of 100*F in any one hour period,

b. A maximum cooldown of 200*F in any one hour period, and l

c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 350*F.

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, perform the following:

a. Restore the temperature to within limit within 30 minutes.

AND

b. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out of limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer and determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Otherwise, be in at least MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psia within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

I 4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature and spray water temperature differen-tial shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. l l

i 1

i NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/44-21 Amendment No. 218

-0328

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 A Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System, as specified below, shall be OPERABLE.

a. MODE 4, and MODE 5 with all RCS cold leg temperature > 190*F:

1

1. Maximum of two charging pumps and one HPSI pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS; and

2. Two OPERABLE PORVs with a lift setpoint of 1415 psia.

b. MODE 5 with any RCS cold leg temperature 1 190 'F, and MODE 6 either:

i

1. Maximum of one charging pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS; and

2. Two OPERABLE PORVs with a lift setpoint of 1415 psia.

OR

3. Maximum of two charging pumps and one HPSI pump may be capable of injecting into the RCS; and

4. The RCS is depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 2.2 sq. inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 275'F, MODE 5, and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

a. With one required PORV inoperable in MODE 4, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 2 2.2 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ,

b. With one required PORY inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either restore inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 2 2.2 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

c. With both required PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 2 2.2 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

d. With more than the maximum allowed pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, take immediate action to comply with 3.4.9.3.

i e. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21a Amendment No. pp, Jpf, Jpp,218 0328

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEN' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.h.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days l prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE.

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c. Verifying the PORY block valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the FORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.2 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of charging pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

This is accomplished by verifying the motor circuit breakers for the charging pumps not intended to be capable of injecting into the RCS are in the open position.

4.4.9.3.3 Verify no more than the maximum allowed number of high pressure safety injection pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . This is accomplished for the high pressure safety injection pumps not intended to-be capable of injecting into the RCS by verifying that either the motor circuit breakers have been disconnected from their power supply circuits, or by shutting and tagging the discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel (2-SI-654 or 2-SI-656).

4.4.9.3.4 Verify the required RCS vent is open at least once per 31 days when the vent pathway is provided by vent valve (s) that is(are) locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, otherwise, verify the vent pathway at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-21b Amendment No. pp #7, #5,218 l 0328

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS _I,y < 300*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.5.3 One ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE: l

a. One OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump **, and l

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refuel-ing water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump 1 on a sump recirculation actuation signal.***

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUIDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 for the high pressure safety injection pump that is inoperable pursuant to Specification 3.4.9.3 provided the high pressure safety injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status within I hour after entering MODE 4.

In MODE 4, the requirement for OPERABLE safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signals is satisfied by use of the safety injection and sump recirculation trip pushbuttons.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 77, Jpp. 7JJ, 218 0394

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY DELETED NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7a Amendment No. 77 J77,218 0329

0 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LINITATION - REACTOR CRITICALITY LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.3 The minimum temperature and pressure conditions for reactor criticality of Specificat'ons 3.1.1.5 and 3.4.9.1 may be suspended during low temperature PHYSICS TESTS provided: l l

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5 percent of RATED THERMAL i POWER, ;

b. The reactor trip setpoints on the OPERABLE power range neutron flux monitoring channels are set at 120% of RATED 1HERMAL l POWER, and i

c. The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure relationship is maintained within the acceptable region of operation shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b. l APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

i a. With the THERMAL POWER >5 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER,

(. immediately open the reactor trip breakers.

b. With the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure l relationship within the unacceptable region of operation on l Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b, immediately open the reactor trip l breakers and restore the temperature-pressure relationship to within its limit; perform the analysis required by Specification 3.4.9.1 prior to the next reactor criticality.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

l 4.10.3.1 The Reactor Coolant System shall be verified to be within the i acceptable region for operation of Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b at least once per 30 minutes.

! 4.10.3.2 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be s 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour.

4.10.3.3 Each wide range logarithmic and power level channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating low temperature PHYSICS TESTS.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-3 Amendment No.218 0330-

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES-3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY The MTC is expected to be slightly. negative at operating conditions.

However, at the beginning of the fuel cycle, the MTC may be slightly

-positive at operating conditions and since it will become more positive at lower temperatures,'this specification is provided to restrict reactor I I operation when T is significantly below the normal operating tempera-ture.

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS l The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200*F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection flowpaths are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure of a pump or valve renders one of the flowpaths inoperable. Redundant flow paths from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks are achieved through Boric Acid Pumps, gravity feed lines and Charging Pumps. Redundant flow paths from the Refueling Water Storage Tank are acnieved through Charging Pump flow path guaranteed by Technical Specification 3.1.2.2 and the HPSI flow path guaranteed by Technical Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. ' Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The minimum boration capability is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at l

I all temperatures above 200*F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires an equivalent of 4900 gallons of 3.5% boric acid solution from the boric acid

. tanks-plus 15,000 gallons of'1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water l ;

storage tank. The refueling water storage tank can also be used alone by i feed-and-bleed using Well under the'370,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated l water required.

The requirements for a minimum contained volume of 370,000 gallons of ,

borated water in the refueling water storage tank ensures the capability l for borating the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification !

3.5.4. .Therefore, the. larger volume of borated water is specified here '

'too.

MILLSTONE'- UNIT 2 0331 83/41-2 Amendment No. 77, 77, J77. JJJ.218 '

l BASES 3/4.'.2l BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The analysis to determine the boration requirements assumed that the Reactor Coolant System is borated concurrently with cooldown. In the limiting situation when letdown is not available, the cooldown is assumed to be initiated within 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months and cooldown to 220*F, is completed in the next 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months .

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200'F is based upon providing a SHUTDOWN MARGIN within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at 140*F after xenon decay. This condition requires either 3750 gallons of 2.5% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 57,300 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The maximum boron concentration requirement (3.5%) and the minimum temperature requirement (55'F) for the Boric Acid Storage Tank ensures that boron does not precipitate in the Boric Acid System. The daily surveillance requirement provides sufficient assurance that the temperature of the tank will be maintained higher than 55'F at all times.

A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm is required in the RWST at all '

times in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions for baron dilution incidents and other transients using the RWST as a borated water source as well as the analysis assumption to determine the boration requirement to ensure adequate shutdown margin.

A maximum of two charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS when l RCS temperature is less than 300*F, ensures that the maximum inadvertent dilution flow rate as assumed in the boron dilution analysis is 88 gallons per minute.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 77 JJ 77, 117, om 11,179,199,199, 177, 218

l BASES l

3/4.1.2 BORATI0ft SYSTEMS (Continued)

The provision in Specification 3.1.2.4 that Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 is provided to allow for closing the motor circuit bru ker and subsequent testing of the inoperable charging pump.

Specification 3.4.9.3, which is applicable to MODES 5 and 6, requires that one charging pump be capable of injecting into the RCS at or below 190*F.

Specification 3.1.2.4 requires that at least two charging pumps be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The exception from Specification 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 will i allow Millstone Unit No. 2 to enter into MODE 4 and test the inoperable charging pump and declare it OPERABLE. l 3/4.1.3 MOVEABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power ,

distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is l l maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are l limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to an immovable or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment (120 steps) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either l

l l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3a Amendment No. JJ, JJJ. JJJ, JJJ. 218 0331

l 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES I l

3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associatecl reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.17 during all normal operations and anticipated transients.

l A single reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above 10% )

of the span provides sufficient heat removal capability for core cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however, single failure considerations require plant cooldown if component repairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time, i In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop l

provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but .

single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. l l Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification l requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron I reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump in MODE 4 with one or more RCS cold legs 1 275'F and in MODE 5 are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary syste;n, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by:

1. Restricting pressurizer water volume to ensure sufficient steam volume is available to accommodate the insurge;

2. Restricting pressurizer pressure to establish an initial pressure that will ensure system pressure does not exceed the limit; and

3. Restricting primary to secondary system delta-T to reduce the energy addition from the secondary system.

If these restrictions are met, the steam bubble in the pressurizer is sufficient to ensure the Appendix G limits will not be exceeded. No credit has been taken for PORV actuation to limit RCS pressure in the analysis of the energy addition transient.

The limitations on pressurizer water level, pressurizer pressure, and primary to secondary delta-T are necessary to ensure the validity of the analysis of the energy addition due to starting an RCP. The values for pressurizer water level and pressura can be obtained from control room indications. The primary to secondary system delta-T can be obtained from Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System outlet temperature and the saturation temperature for indicated steam l

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. Jp, 77, 79 177, 218 0332

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY The MTC is expected to be slightly negative.at operating conditions.

However, at the beginning of the fuel cycle, the MTC may be slightly positive at operating conditions and since it will become more positive at -

lower temperatures, this specification is provided to restrict reactor operation when T, is significantly below the normal operating tempera-

. ture.

l 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS l

-The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required ;

to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging i pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diese1' generators.

l With the RCS average temperature above 200*F, -a minimum of two ,

separate and redundant baron injection flowpaths are provided to ensure i single functional capability in the event an assumed failure of a rump or valve renders one of the flowpaths inoperable. Redundant flow paths from

. the Boric Acid Storage Tanks are achieved through Boric Acid Pumps, gravity I feed lines and Charging Pumps. Redundant flow paths from the Refueling Water Storage Tank are achieved through Charging Pump flow path guaranteed by Technical Specification 3.1.2.2 and the HPSI flow path guaranteed by Technical Specification 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. Allowable out-of-scrvice periods j ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed-

without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system l

failures during the repair period.

The minimum boration capability is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at all' temperatures above 200*F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full' power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires an equivalent of 4900 gallons of 3.5% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks.plus 15,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water l storage tank. The refueling water storage tank can also be used alone by feed-and-bleed using well under the 370,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water required.

The requirements for a minimum contained volume of 370,000 gallons of

. borated water in the refueling water storage tank ensures the capability for-borating the RCS.to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4. Therefore, the larger volume of borated water is specified here too.

4 g!jLSTONE-UNIT 2 B3/41-2 Amendment No. 77, 77. J77, Jpp.218

. l BASES l 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The analysis to determine the boration requirements assumed that the Reactor Coolant System is borated concurrently with cooldown. In the limiting '

situation when letdown is not available, the cooldown is assumed to be initiated within 26-hours and cooldown to 220*F, is completed in the next 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months .

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable l without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200'F is based upon providing a SHUTDOWN MARGIN within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at 140*F after xenon decay. This condition requires either 3750 gallons of 2.5% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 57,300 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The maximum boron concentration requirement (3.5%) and the minimum temperature requirement (55'F) for the Boric Acid Storage Tank ensures that boron does not precipitate in the Boric Acid System. The daily surveillance requirement provides sufficient assurance that the temperature of the tank will be maintained higher than 55'F at all times.

A minimum boron concentrationlof 1720 ppm is required in the RWST at all i times in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions for boron dilution incidents and other transients using the RWST as a borated water source as well as the analysis assumption to determine the boration requirement to ensure adequate shutdown margin.

l A maximum of two charging pumps capable of injecting into the RCS when l l RCS temperature is less than 300*F, ensures that the maximum inadvertent dilution flow rate as assumed in the boron dilution analysis is 88 gallons per l minute.

1 1

l I

L l

MILLSTONE - UKfT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 77, FJ, 77 JJ7, own 11,179, life 195, 177, 218

l BASES a

i 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The provision in Specification 3.1.2.4 that Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 is provided to allow for closing the !

motor circuit breaker and subsequent testing of the inoperable charging pump.

S) edification 3.4.9.3, which is applicable to MODES 5 and 6, requires that one c1arging pump be capable of injecting into the RCS at or below 190*F.

~! Specification 3.1.2.4 requires that at least two charging pumps be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The exception from Specification 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 will I allow Millstone Unit No. 2 to enter into MODE 4 and test the inoperable charging pump and declare it OPERABLE.

3/4.1.3 MOVEABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

! The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power l distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is i maintained, and (3) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are j l

limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic ~ 1 requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the j original criteria are met, i The ACTION statements applicable to an immovable or untrippable CEA and to a large misalignment (120 steps) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt i shutdown of the reactor since either l

l l

1 I

gLSTONE-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3a Amendment No. pf, JJJ 17), J77, 218

3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM t BASES i l

l 3/4.4.1 C001, ANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and l associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 3.17 during all normal operations and anticipated transients.

A single reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above 10%

of the span provides sufficient heat removal capability for core cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however, single failure considerations require plant cooldown if component repairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time. l t

I In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop I l provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but i single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE.

Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE.

, The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump in MODE 4 with one or l more RCS cold legs 1 275'F and in MODE 5 are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed'the limits of Appendix G by:

1. Restricting pressurizer water volume to ensure sufficient steam volume is available to accommodate the insurge;

2. Restricting pressurizer pressure to establish an initial pressure that will ensure system pressure does not exceed the limit; and

3. Restricting primary to secondary system delta-T to reduce the energy addition from the secondary system.

If these restrictions are met, the steam bubble in the pressurizer is sufficient to ensure the Appendix G limits will not be exceeded. No credit has been taken for PORV actuation to limit RCS pressure in the analysis of the energy addition transient.

The limitations on pressurizer water level, pressurizer pressure, and primary to secondary delta-T are necessary to ensure the validity of the analysis of the energy addition due to starting an RCP. The values for pressurizer water level and pressure can be obtained from control room indications. The primary to secondary system delta-T can be obtained from Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System outlet temperature and the saturation temperature for indicated steam MIjLSTONE-UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. pp, JJ, J7, 177, 218

O

, 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l BASES l

l -

1 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION fcontinued) generator pressure. If there is no indicated steam generator pressure, the steam generator shell temperature indicators can be used. If these indications are not available, other appropriate instrumentation can be used.

The RCP starting criteria values for pressurizer water level, pressurizer pressure, and primary to secondary delta-T contained in Technical Specification 3.4.1.3 have not been adjusted for instrument uncertainty. The values for these parameters contained in the procedures that will be used to i l start an RCP have been adjusted to compensate for instrument uncertainty. j 1

The value of RCS cold leg temperature B 275 'F) used to determine if the RCP l start criteria applies, will be obtained from SDC return temperature if SDC is in service. If SDC is not in service, or natural circulation is occurring, RCS cold leg temperature will be used.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being 4

_pressur i zed above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is I designed to relieve 296,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event I that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating shutdown cooling loop, l connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2. B3/44-la Amendment No. pp, M. JJ, M , 218 0332

3#,4 REACTOR COOLANT. SYSTEM BASES _

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be CPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia.

The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turb.ae generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pre'ssurizer power operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. The electrical power for both the relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from an emer-gency power source to ensure the ability to seal this possible RCS leakage path.

The PORVs are also used for low temperature overpressure protection when the RCS is cooled down to or - below 275'F. This is covered by Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 and discussed in the respective Bases ;ection. The discussion below only addresses the PORVs in MODES 1, 2 and 3.

With the PORV inoperable and capable of being iranually cycled, either the PORV must be restored, or the flow path isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The block valve should be closed, but the power must be maintained to the associated block valve, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. Although the PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed and in this manner can be used to perform its ' function. PORV inoper-ability may oe due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. Operation of the plant may continue with the PORY in this inoperable condition for a limited period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage,-so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the degraded condition. The PORVs should normally be available for automatic miti_ cation of overpressure events when the plant is at power. l Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve.

If one block valve is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status,

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or the associated- PORV prevented from opening automatically. The prime importance for the capability to maintain closed the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , the required action is to prevent the associated PORV from automatically opeMng for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential for a i

gIgLSTONE-UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. 77 JJ. JJ JJ7, 218 j

_ _ - _ _ _ = _ - _ - - _ - _ - - -

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. 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES stuck open PORY at a time that the block valve is inoperable. This may be accomplished by various methods. These methods include, but are not limited to, placing the NCRMAL/ ISOLATE switch at the associated Bottle Up Panel in the

" ISOLATE" position or pulling the control power fuses for the associated PORV l control circuit.

Although the block valve may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed and in this manner can be used to perform its func-tion. Block valve inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. This condition is only intended to permit operation of the plant for a limited period of time. The block valve should normally be available to allow PORY operation fer automatic mitigation of overpressure events. The block valves must be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering MODE 3 after a refueling outage.

If more than one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it is necessary to either restore at least one valve within the completion time of I hour or isolate the flow path by closing and removing the power to the associ-ated block valve and cooldown the RCS to MODE 4. l 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER An OPERAB.LE pressurizer provides pressure control for the reactor coolant system during operations with both forced reactor wolant flow and with natural circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control, remain covered with water to prevent failure, which occurs if the heaters are energized uncovered. The maximum water level in the pressurizer ensures that this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in the safety analysis. The maximum water level also ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will be pro-vided to accommodate pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve against water relief. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coclant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation.

The requirement that 130 kW of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of off-site power condition to maintain natural circulation at HOT STANDBY.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is MILLSTONE-UNIT.2 B 3/4 4-2a Amendment No. 77,77,77,##,77, m2 77#, 218

. REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM BASES Reducing T o to < 515'F prevents the release of activity should a

steam generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the

primary ccalant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam l relief valves. The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance l that. excessive specific activity levels in the primary coolant will be deteci.ed it. sufficient time to take corrective action. Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with iodine spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

l 1/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS I All components in the Reactor Coolant System are designed to with-stand -the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure .

changes. These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, j reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations. The various categories '

of load cycles used for design purposes are provided in Section 4.0 of the FSAR. During startup and shutdown, the rates of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that the maximuin specified heatup and cooldown rates are consistent with the design assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic tperation. In addition, during heatup and

! cooldown evolutions, the RCS tarritic materials transition between ductile and brittle (non-ductile) behavior. To provide adequate protection, the pressure / temperature limits were developed in accoN 2nce with the 10CFR50 Appendix G requirements to ensure the margins of safety against non-ductile failure are maintained during all normal and anticipated operational occurrences. These pressure / temperature limits are provided in Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b and the heatup and cooldown rates are contained in Table 3.4-2.

During heatup, the thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall produce thermal stresses which vary from compressive at the inner wall to tensile at the outer wall. These thermally induced compressive stresses at the inside wall tend to alleviate the tensile stresses induced by the internal pressure. Therefore, a pressure- temperature curve based on steady state conditions (i.e., no thermal stresses) represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the inner wall of the vessel is treated as the governing location.

The.heatup analysis also covers the determination of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the controlling location. The thermal gradients estab-lished during heatup produce tensile stresses at the outer wall of the vessel. These stresses are additive to the pressure induced tensile stresses which are already present. The thermally induced stresses at the l outer wall of the vessel are tensile and are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time along the heatup ramp; therefore, a lower bound curve similar to that described for the heatup of the inner wall cannot be defined. Subsequently, for the cases in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the stress controlling location, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-5 Amendment No. 218 0333

. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l l

BASES The heatup and cooldown limit curves (Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b) are l composite curves which were prepared by determining the most conservative case, with either the inside or outside wall controlling, for any heatup or cooldown rates of up to the maximums described in Technical Specification 3.4.9.1, Table 3.4-2. The heatup and cooldown surves were prepared based upon the most limiting value of the predicted adjusted reference temperature at the end of the service period indicated on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b. l Verification that RCS pressure and temperature conditions are within the l limits of Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4 2b and Table 3.4-2, at least once per 30 minutes, is required when undergoing planned changes of 210'F or 2100 psi.

This frequency is considered reasonable since the location of interest during l cooldown is over two inches (i.e. 1/4 t location) from the interface with the i reactor coolant. During heatup the location of interest is over six inches i from the interface with the reactor coolant. This combined with the relatively large heat retention capability of the reactor vessel ensures that small temperature fluctuations such as those expected during normal heatup and l cooldown evolutiNs do not challenge the structural integrity of the reactor vessel when monitored on a 30 minute frequency. The 30 minute time interval permits assessment and correction for minor deviations within a reasonable time.

During RCS heatup and cooldown the magnitude of the stresses across the reactor vessel wall are controlled by restricting the rate of temperature change and the system pressure. The RCS pressure / temperature limits are provided in Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b, and the heatup and cooldown rates are contained in Table 3.4-2. The following guidelines should be used to ensure compliance with the Technical Specification limi s.

1. When changing RCS temperature, with any reactor coolant pumps in operation, the rate of temperature change is calculated by using RCS loop cold leg temperature indications.

This also applies during parallel reactor coolant pump and shutdown cooling (SDC) pump operation because the RCS loop cold leg temperature is the best indication of the temperature of the fluid in contact with the reactor vessel wall. Even though SDC return temperature may be below RCS cold leg temperature, the mixing of a large quantity of RCS cold leg l water and a small quantity of SDC return water will result in the

! temperature of the water reaching the reactor vessel wall being very close to RCS cold leg temperature.

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2. When changing RCS temperature via natural circulation, the rate of temperature change is calculated by using RCS loop cold leg temperature

-indications.-

3. When changing RCS temperature with only SDC in service, the rate of temperature change is calculated by using SDC return temperature indication.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-6 Amendment No. # , JJJ, J79, 218 osss l

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. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEh BASES.

4. During the transition from natural circulation flow, to forced flow with SDC pumps, the rate of temperature change is calculated by using RCS loop cold leg temperature indications. SDC return temperature should be used to calculate the rate of temperature change after SDC is in service, RBCCW flow has been established to the SDC heat exchanger (s), and SDC return temperature has decreased below RCS cold leg temperature.

5. During the transition from parallel reactor coolant pump and SDC pump operation, the rate of temperature change is calculated by using RCS loop cold leg temperature indications until all reactor coolant pumps are secured. SDC return temperature should be used to calculate the rate of temperature change after all reactor coolant pumps have been secured.

6. The temperature change limits are for a continuous one hour period.

Verification of operation within the limit must compare the current RCS water temperature to the value that existed one hour before the current time. If the maximum temperature increase or decrease, during this one hour period, exceeds the Technical Specification limit, appropriate action should be taken.

7. When a new, more restrictive temperature change limit is approached, it will be necessary to adjust the current temperature change rate such that as soon as the new rate applies, the total temperature change for the previous one hour does not exceed the new more restrictive rate.

The same principle applies when moving from one temperature change limit curve to another. If the new curve is above the current curve (higher RCS pressure for a given RCS temperature), the new curve will reduce the temperature change limit. It will be necessary to first ensure the new more restrictive temperature change limit will not be exceeded by looking at the period, total

. If theRCS temperature magnitude change one of the previous for the previous hour temperature one change hour time will exceed the new limit, RCS temperature should be stabilized to allow the thermal stresses to dissipate. This may require up to a one hour soak before RCS pressure may be raised within the limits of the new r.urve.

If the new curve is below the current curve (lower RCS pretsure for a given RCS temperature), the new curve will allow a higher temperature change limit. All that is necessary is to lower RCS pressure, and then apply the new higher temperature chne 11Mt.

8. When performing evolutions that may result in rapid ano synificant temperature swings (e.g. placing SDC in service or shifting SDC heat exchangers), the total temperature change limit for the previous one hour period must not be exceeded. If a significant temperature change is anticipated, and an RCS heatup or ecoldown is in progress, the plant should be stabilized for up to ow hour, before performing this type of evolution. Stabilizing the plant for up to one hour will allow the thermal stresses, from any previous RCS temperature change, to dissipate.

This will allow rapid RCS temperature changes up to the applicable Technical Specification temperature change limit.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-6a Amendment No. 218 0333

, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l l I l BASES

9. Additional margin, to prevent exceeding the Appendix G limits when RCS temperature is at or below 230*F, can be obtained by maintaining RCS pressure below the pressure allowed by the 50*F/hr cooldown curve provided on Figure 3.4-2b. This will ensure that if a greater than anticipated temperature excursion occurs during short duration evolutions, the margins of safety required by Appendix G will not be exceeded. Examples of plant evolutions that may result in unanticipated temperature excursions include placing SDC in service without parallel RCP operation, securing RCPs when SDC is already in service, shifting SDC heat exchangers, and switching SDC pumps. Establishing a lower RCS pressure, will minimize the probability of exceeding Appendix-G limits. l If the 50*F/hr cooldown curve is used to evaluate unanticipated temperature excursions while limited to a cooldown rate of 30*F/hr, the RCS cooldown rate must be restored to within the 30*F/hr limit as soon as practical. This may require a soak period to allow the thermal stresses, from the previous RCS ten'perature change, to dissipate.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial RTwor; the results of these tests are shown in Table 4.6-1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron irradiation will cause an increase in the RTuor. Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence, can be predicted using the methods described in Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.99. .

The heatup and cooldown limit curves shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b include predicted adjustments for this shift in RTwor at the end of the applicable service period, as well as adjustments for possible uncertainties in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments. The adjustments include the pressure and temperature instrument and loop uncertainties associated with the main control board displays, the pressure drop across the core (RCP operation), and the elevation differences between the location of the pressure transmitters and the vessel beltline region. In addition to these curve adjustments, the LTOP evaluation includes adjustments due to valve stroke times, PORY circuitry reaction times, and valve discharge backpressure.

The actual shift in RTuor of the vessel material is established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating, in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix H, reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. Since the neutron spectra at the irradiation samples and vessel inside radius are similar, the measured transition shift for a sample can be correlated to the l

adjacent section of the reactor vessel. The hertup and cooldown curves must

- be recalculated when the ARTuor determined from the surveillance capsule exceeds the calculated ARTuor for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure. l The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b for reactor criticality and for ins &fice leak and hydrostatic testing have l been'provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-6b Amendment No. 218

0333

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. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The maximum RTwor for all reactor coolant system pressure-retaining i materials, with the exception of the reactor pressure vessel, has been determined to be 50*F. The Lowest Service Tem)erature limit.is based upon l

this RTuor since Article NB-2332 (Summer Addenca of 1972) of Section III of l the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the Lowest Service l

Temperature to be RTuor + 100'F for piping, pumps and valves. Below this l temperature, the system pressure must be limited to a maximum of 20% of the system's hydrostatic test pressure of 3125 psia. Operation of the RCS within the limits of the heatup and cooldown curves will ensure compliance with this requirement.

Included in this evaluation is consideration of flange protection in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. The requirement makes the minimum I temperature RTuor plus 90*F for hydrostatic test and RTuor plus 120*F for I normal-operation when the pressure exceeds 20 percent of the preservice system hydrostatic test pressure. Since the flange region RTuor has been l

calculated to be 30*F, the minimum flange pressurization temperature during normal operation is 15J'F (161*F with instrument uncertainty) when the pressure exceeds 20% of the preservice hydrostatic pressure. Operation of the RCS within the limits of the heatup and cooldown curves will ensure compliance with this requirement.

To establish the minimum boltup temperature, ASME Code Section XI,

. Appendix G, requires the temper.ture of the flange and adjacent shell and head )

regions shall be above the limiting RTuor temperature for the most limiting.

material of these regions. The RTwor temperature for that material is 30*F.

Adding 10.5'F, for temperature measurement uncertainty, results in a minimum boltup temperature of 40.5'F. For additional conservatism, a minimum boltup temperature of 70*F is specified on the heatup and cooldown curves. The head and vessel flange region temperature must be greater than 70*F, whenever any reactor vessel stud is tensioned.

l l The number of reactor vessel-irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-3 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Removal of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens does not constitute a CORE ALTERATION per Specification 1.12. >

l l The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer

, .is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements. Verification that pressurizer temperature conditions are within the limits of LC0 3.4.9.2, at least once per 30

minutes, is required when undergoing planned changes of 210*F, The 30 minute l time interval permits assessment and correction for temperature deviations within i a reasonable time.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-7 Amendment No. pp. 79, M , 218 l 0333 !

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES

~The Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System provides a physical barrier against exceeding the 10CFR50 Appendix G pressure / temperature limits during low temperature RCS operation either with a steam bubble in the pressurizer or during water solid conditions. This system consists of either two PORVs (each PORY is equivalent to a vent of approximately 1.4 square inches) with a pressure setpoint s 415 psia, or an RCS vent of sufficient size.

Analysis has confirmed that the design basis mass addition transient discussed below will be mitigated by operation of the PORVs or by establishing an RCS vent of sufficient size.

The LTOP System is required to be OPERABLE when RCS cold leg temperature is at or below 275'F (Technical Specification 3.4.9.3). However, if the RCS is in MODE 6 and the reactor vessel head has been removed, a vent of sufficient size has been established such that RCS pressurization is not possible. Therefore, an LTOP System is not required (Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 is not applicable).

The LTOP System is armed at a temperature which exceeds the limiting 1/4t RTuor plus 90*F as required by NUREG-0800 (i.e., SRP), Branch Technical Po'ition RSB 5-2. For the operating period up to 20~ EFPY, the limiting 1/4t RTuor is 145'F which results in a minimum LTOP System enable temperature of at least 263'F when corrected for instrument uncertainty. The current value of 275'F will be retained.

The mass input analysis performed to ensure the LTOP System is capable of protecting the reactor vessel assumes that all pug s capable of injecting into the RCS start, and then one PORV fails to actuate (single active failure). Since the PORVs have limited relief capability, certain administrative restrictions have been implemented to ensure that the mass input transient will not exceed the relief capacity of a PORV. The analysis has determined two PORVs (assuming one PORY fails) are sufficient if the mass addition transient is limited to the inadvertent start of one high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump and two charging pumps when RCS temperature is at or below 275'F and above 190'F, and the inadvertent start of one charging pump when RCS temperature is at or below 190*F.

The assumed active failure of one PORV results in an equivalent RCS vent size of approximately 1.4 square inches when the one remaining PORV opens.

Therefore, a passive vent of at least 1.4 square inches can be substituted for

.the PORVs. However, a vent size of at least 2.2 square inches will be required when venting the RCS. If the RCS is depressurized and vented through at least a 2.2 square inch vent, the peak RCS pressure, resulting from the maximum mass input transient allowed by Technical Specification 3.4.9.3, will not exceed 300 psig (SDC System suction side design pressure).

When the RCS is at or below 190*F, additional pumping capacity can be made capable of injecting into the RCS by establishing an RCS vent of at least 2.2 square inches.. Removing a pressurizer PORV or the pressurizer manway will result in a passive vent of at least 2.2 square inches. Additional m9thods to establish the required RC3 vent are acceptable, provided the proposed vent has bec evaluated to ensure the flow characteristics are equivalent to one of'these.

Establishing a pressurizer steam bubble of sufficient size will be sufficient to protect the reactor vessel frem the energy addition transient associated with the start of an RCP, provided the restrictions contained in Technical Specification 3.4.1.3 are met. These restrictions limit the heat MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 83/44-7a Amendment No.218 0333

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM a

BASES input from the secondary system. They also ensure sufficient steam volume exists in the pressurizer to accommodate the insurge. No credit for PORV actuation was assumed in the LTOP analysis of the energy addition transient.

l The restrictions apply only to the start of the first RCP. Once at least one RCP is running, equilibrium is achieved between the primary and secondary temperatures, eliminating any significant energy addition associated with the start of the second RCP.

The LTOP restrictions are based on RCS cold leg temperature. This temperature will be determinod by using RCS cold leg temperature indication when RCPs are running, or natural circulation if it is occurring. Otherwise, SDC return temperature indication will be used.

Restrictions on RCS makeup pumping capacity are included in Technical Specification 3.4.9.3. These restrictions are based on balancing the requirements for LTOP and shutdown risk. For shutdown risk reduction, it is desirable to have maximum makeup capacity and to maintain the RCS full (not vented). However, for LTOP it is desirable to minimize makeup capacity and vent the RCS. To satisfy these competing requirements, makeup pumps can be made not capable of injecting, but available at short notice. A pump can be considered to be not capable of injecting into the RCS if the pump breaker is racked out under administrative control. An alternate method is to maintain the pump discharge valve closed under administrative control. These methods prevent inadvertent pump injections while allowing manual actions to rapidly restore the makeup capability if conditions require the use of additional charging or HPSI pumps for mckeup in the event of a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin.

If a loss of RCS inventory or reduction in shutdown margin event occurs, the appropriate response will be to correct the situation by starting RCS makeup pumps. If the loss of inventory or shutdown margin is significant, this may necessitate the use of additional RCS uakeup pumps that are being maintained not capable of injecting into the RCS in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3. The use of these additional pumps to restore RCS inventory or shutdown margin will require entry into the associated action statement. The action statement requires immediate action to comply with the specification. The restoration of RCS inventory or shutdown margin can be considered to be part of the immediate action to restore the additional RCS makeup pumps to a not capable of injecting status. While recovering RCS inventory or shutdown margin, RCS pressure will be maintained below the Appendix G limits. After RCS inventory or shutdown margin has been restored, the additional pumps should be immediately made not capable of injecting and the action statement exited.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3 3/4 4-7b Amendment No. 218 0333

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES l

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' An exception to Technical Specification 3.0.4 is specified for Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 to allow a plant cooldown to MODE 5 if one or both PORVs are inoperable. MODE 5 conditions may be necessary to repair the PORV(s).

l 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

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l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-7c Amendment No. 218 0333

, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in I accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

Verification of the correct position for the mechanical and/or electrical valve stops can be performed by either of the following methods:

1. Visual 11y verify the valve opens to the designated throttled position; or l 2. Manually position the valve to the designated throttled position and verify that the valve does not move when the applicable valve control switch is placed to "0 PEN."

l In MODE 4 the automatic safety injection signal generated by low pressurizer l pressure and high containment pressure and the automatic sump recirculation l actuation signal generation by low refueling water storage tank level are not

! required to be OPERABLE. Automatic actuation in MODE 4 is not required because adequate time is available for plant operators to evaluate plant

-canditions and respond by manually operating engineered safety features components. Since the manual actuation (trip pushbuttons) portion of the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation signal generation is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, the plant operators can use the manual trip pushbuttons to rapidly position all components to the required accident l

position. Therefore, the safety injection and sump recirculation actuation

trip pushbuttons satisfy the requirement for generation of safety injection

.and sump recirculation actuation signals in MODE 4. l

! Only on(. HPSI pump may be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than l or equal to 275'F due to the restricted relief capacity with Low-Temperature

! Overpressure Protection System. To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel, r

The provision in Specification 3.5.3 that Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 is provided to allow for connecting the HPSI pump breaker to the respective power supply or to remove the tag and open the discharge valve, and perform the subsequent testing necessary to declare the inoperable HPSI pump OPERABLE. Specification - 3.4.9.3 requires all HPSI pumps to be not capable of injecting into the RCS when RCS temperature is at or below 190*F. Once RCS temperature is above 190*F one HPSI pump can be capable of injecting into the RCS. However, sufficient time may not be available to ensure one HPSI pump is OPERABLE prior to entering MODE 4 as required by Specification 3.5.3. Since Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 l

i -MILLSTONE - UNIT P B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. (J, JJp, Jp), JJ), 218 I esos 1Jf, t

i l- EMERGENCY CORE COOLING. SYSTEMS BASES i

prohibit a MODE change in this situation, this exemption will allow Millstone Unit No. 2 to enter MODE 4, take the steps necessary to make the HPSI pump i capable of injecting into the RCS, and then declare the pump OPERABLE. If it !

is necessary to use this exemption during plant heatus, the appropriate action statement of Specification 3.5.3 should be enterec as soon as MODE 4 is .l i

reached. ]

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) l The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of l a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation

. cooling flow to the core, and 2) ' the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

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