ML20236P644
| ML20236P644 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1998 |
| From: | Goodin D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236P639 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-98-S01, LER-98-S1, NUDOCS 9807170069 | |
| Download: ML20236P644 (5) | |
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NRC FORM 386 ~ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSloN APPROVED SY OMS NO. 3150-0104 (4-96)
EXPIRES 04/30/98
!.'Afa%'20L"a."!'oi?!Nio!?.ca"E s';"J"'
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT. (LER) Ec7E'M NEes'?"" Iw'o""e'8 s*AE YE su"oM Eo'fwIn"o' EEEEo'n5YAn'AoeMe"wPen'AEYels'37 uYEeE (See reverse for required number of . "o' y$Of"En0E'E* den'"TET"iSIo'oYo*ISic$
digits / characters for each block) **"^omeer Amo suootT, wAss GTON. DC 203.
DOCKET NURABER 63) PAeE (3) l- SIquoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) 05000327 1OF5 IFACILfrY IsAAAE (1)
F ilure of a safeguard system for which compensatory measures were not employed.
l ITerLEies l
, EVEllT DATF fRI l TEA MA- ~~ 181 EsminT DATF f71 GTMSA FAr'M iii s AfVoiVED lBl l MONTH DAY I YEAR I YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACluTY NAME DOCKET NuMeER NUMBER NUMOER e
! l 06' 10 l1998l 1998 - SO1 --
00 07 10 1998 '^CTv NAMe oocnET wuMeen l 'l l l ,
NA NA
- 88" *"***' n '"-na=T m w asm--- TR Or so esa s. m - m a s _i l.OPERATW6G l NA. I f,si l- I. Mode 1 l 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) l POWER 100 I So "a* ' 'o "a*" nf a so vmusifin sn v m ir9ifvi i
Level 20.2203(n)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73h'(On X 73.71 20 2202falf21fii) .,_,,, 20 2202falfM __M */,,2 ggfivl OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 60.36(c)(1) R4 8 r Q (v) g g6gAbsv g tow t
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 60.36(c)(2) 50 <.M .it)(vii)
I armamans ranarTAc7 BOR THAR LER f $2n TELEPHONE NuMeen (include Area codel D V,' Goodin, Licensing Project Manager (423) 843-7734 i INAME - - - - - - - - - ~
_ COMP [ETE OhlE LARE FO .ACARED Bf THRE REPORT 12)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAU SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
-N/A- N/A Ruppi saaENTA1 REPORT Ems n m f1 Al EXPECTED unwrw nAY YFAR I YES X NO
- _ (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
l ASSTRACT (Umst to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single spaced typewritten lines) 116)
At 1143 Eastern Daylight Savings Time (EDST) on June 10, 1998, maintenance work'on an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)'resulted in a loss of power to security. systems within the Central Alarm Station.(CAS) and the perimeter intrusion detection systems. Electrical power was restored to the s=ecurity )
systems-at 1217 EDST. The temporary loss of power to the security systems !
resulted in-a security emergency; however, compensatory measures were not l satisfied within the procedurally required time period of 10 minutes. This
~
event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(d) and paragraph I(c) of Appendix G to Part 73- Reportable Safeguards Events. The root cause l
of'the failure to post within 10 minutes was an inadequate security procedure entitled Memorandum of Instruction (MI)134. The procedure did not provide a posting' requirement for a security door at the ERCW station (PS-5),: which resulted in delays in posting a security officer at the PS-5 t
location within the 10-minute requirement. MI-134 was revised to properly identify PS-5 as a security door required to be posted.
- m. .
9907170069 990708 PDR ADOCK OS000327a S PDR , ,
e________________ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .__ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION i
i FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SQN Unit 1 05000327 2 of 5 l 1998-- Sol --
00 TEXT Uf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
-A. Event At.1143 EDST on June 10, 1998, preventative maintenance work was in progress on the SON security uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The UPS output breaker was inadvertently tripped which resulted in a loss of power to SON security systems. Site Security immediately determined that security systems had been lost and declared a security emergency. Electrical power was restored to the security systems at 1220. A compensatory security requirement for posting a security officer within 10 minutes at ERCW building door PS-5 (a site perimeter door) was not met. I B. Date and Time of Event The event (i.e., failure to provide compensatory security measures at the ERCW door PS-5 within 10 minutes) occurred at 1153 on June 10, 1998. The time of the event is based on 10 minutes from declaring a security emergency that took place at 1143 on June 10, 1998.
C. Location The location of the event occurred at the ERCW building at security door PS-5.
D. Operating Phase Units 1 and 2 were in power operation at 100 percent power.
i NRC FORM 366A (4 95)
i I
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- ' TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBEft SQN Unit 1 05000327 3 of 5 1998-- Sol --
00 )
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
E. Safety Systems Affected or Threatened The security event affected the intrusion detection system i on the perimeter. In addition, security door PS-5, located at the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) building was affected. The ERCW building houses equipment that provides cooling water from the Tennessee River to the plant. Failure to post a security officer at PS-5 within the 10-minute requirement did not affect the ERCW system.
The small period of time associated with the delay in posting did not pose a significant threat to the ERCW l system. I F. Type of Security Force Onsite i
The security force at SQN is managed by TVA and consists )
of TVA employees and contract employees under Borg-Warner Protective Services.
G. Number and Type of Personnel Involved The number of security personnel involved was 16. These personnel include Borg-Warner security officers and supervisors.
H. Method of Discovery The security personnel responding to secondary alarm station alarms determined that security door PS-5 had not been posted. A subsequent review of the MI-134 checklist for vital area doors and alarm readings at the secondary i alarm station determined that the PS-5 door was not listed i on the correct checklist within the procedure.
I. Procedural Errors Involved MI-134 controls the security response to a loss of protected and vital area alarm systems. This procedure l
NRC FORM 366A (4 951
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
, . LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
! YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SQN Unit 1 05000327 4 of 5 l
1998-- Sol --
00 TEXT Uf more space es required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
L failed to list security door PS-5 on a checklist of areas to be posted for loss of the perimeter intrusion detection system.
l- J. Inunediate Actions Taken in Response to the Event Interim instructions =(directives) were issued to the SON security personnel-for posting security door PS-5 upon the loss'of protected area alarm systems. In addition, a technical review of MI-134 was performed. It was determined that MI-134 contained an error regarding PS-5.
MI-134 incorrectly listed PS-5 on a checklist for loss of vital area doors rather than a checklist for perimeter -
doors.
i K. Corrective Actions Taken or Planned The following corrective actions were taken:
- 1) MI-134 was revised to properly identify PS-5 as a security door required to be posted.
- 2) MI-134 was revised to dispatch one additional officer-to the secondary alarm station upon the loss of the r central alarm station. The additional officer would assist in assessing alarms.
- 3) The alarms received during the event were reviewed to verify proper disposition of the alarms. 4 In addition, the following corrective actions' are planned:
- 1) Conduct a briefing with security personnel on the event and the lessons learned.
i
- TVA does not consider these corrective actions a regulatory commitment. TVA's l corrective action program will track completion of these actions. i
)
I i' NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SON Unit 1 05000327 5 of 5 1998-- S01 --
00 TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) '
- 2) Conduct technical and administrative reviews to verify that security contingency drills have a related written drill scenario.
- 3) Conduct a review of contingency plans for technical and administrative adequacy.
- 4) Transfer security instructions under the administrative controls associated with plant procedures to ensure periodic review and approval.
- 5) Conduct retraining for alarm station operators and supervisors for operation and functions associated i with security equipment. '
L. Local, State, or Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Contacted l
No local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies were contacted. The nature of the event did not require notification of these agencies.
M. Description of Media Interest and Press Release TVA did not issue a press release on this event.
N. Indication of Previous Similar Events On June 27, 1996, SON experienced a similar event that resulted in failure of a primary computer that affected alarm capability. The nature of the 1996 event was different in that there was no loss of power to the l intrusion detection system on the perimeter. The 1996 event is documented in TVA's corrective action document (SQ961848PER) and NRC Inspection Report 97-07 dated July 24, 1997.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
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