ML20245H500

Town of Newbury Proposed Findings of Fact Re Spmc.* Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20245H500
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	08/14/1989
From:	Hillwhilton R LAGOULIS, HILL-WHILTON & ROTONDI (FORMERLY LAGOULIS, NEWBURY, MA
To:
References
CON-#389-9044 OL, NUDOCS 8908170132
Download: ML20245H500 (27)

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, NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION.. "W C-before the:

89 E 15. P317L ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD G F D C +-< . t iAr s August 14,-'19/09EI E A . ^! Fviti; '

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In.the Matter of: )

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1~

NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. .) .

50-444-OL-l'-

) Offsite Emergency.

(Seabrook' Station . Units 1-and 2 ) Planning. Issues

)

TOWN OF'NEWBURY'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF. FACT-WITH RESPECT TO THE SPMC The Town of~Newbury (TON) f11es the following proposed findings concerning the SPMC. These address sections 3 (Traffic.-

Management Plans',.4.(Evacuation ) of Transit Dependent Persons).

and-10.'1.13L(Coordination of Government Resources and. Response) of ~ Appl.tcants ' Proposed Findings (Applicants' P.F.). Pursuant to the. Board's instructions, TON will follow the order of the Applicants? proposed finding. A' proposed finding adding letter designations, e.g. 3.1.18(a)., etc. to Applicants' numbering system is a separate proposed finding which TON believes is related to the topic in Applicants' proposed finding of that number. Where no express agreoment is set forth in connection with any finding, ruling or conclusion proposed by Applicants, and there is no finding, ruling or conclusion substituted or-bearing TON's additional designation, TON disagrees with  !

Applicants' -proposal. To the extent that any other Intervenor h has submitted a substitute or additional proposed finding (s), TON l 1

A cD y

L - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

d

L i adopts'the proposed finding (s) submitted by other Interveners.

L TON provided detailed testimony relating to issues 3.1417.

presented in JI-4. The testimony was presented by its police chief, Roger Merry, and the chairman of its Board of Selectmen, Angelo Machiros. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801, p_Asaim. The TON panel explained in detail'in their direct examination and during the cros.-examination of them why they justifiably have concluded that implementation of the SPMC would result in an evacuation of 1 the Town of Newbury which would be no more rapid or efficient than an uncontrolled evacuation.

3'.1.18. The Applicants have attempted to minimise the negative impact of the TON panel's testimony during this proceeding (Applicants' PF 3.1.18). The efforts of the

-Applicants to minimise Chief Merry's testimony, for example, is not based on a full and complete review of the TON panel's testimony as a whole but, rather, on isolated segments of testimony taken out of context. The TON panel's testimony as a whole is logical, persuasive and compelling. The Board makes this finding based upon the detailed review of their testimony as appears in the following subparagraphs.

3.1.18(a). The Board finds that both members of TON's panel are competent to testify on the subjects they addressed. Chief Merry has been a full-time police officer since 1976 and was a party-time officer before then. He has graduated from the Massachusetts Police Academy and holds a degree in criminal f

justice. He is familiar with the road conditions in TON under {

all types of weather, the types of weather patterns which arise 2

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i 3 on Plum Island and through TON, tae effect. adverse weather has on f

traffic and road passability in' TON, and the conduct-of drivers under normal and adverse weather conditions in TON, Chief 1 Merry's personal knowledge and observations of these events and factors is vastly superior to that possessed by'any witness or panel of witnesses presented by the Applicants or the staff.

Indeed, no evidence was presented to this' Board that any witness

. presented by the Applicants or the staff had ever observed.large numbers of people leaving Plum Zsland or Newbury at approximately the same time or that any of those witnesses had visited the island or the town during periods of inclement weather.

Observations of these conditions, on the other hand, are common if not daily experiences of Chief Merry. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 2-6. Perhaps even more compelling testimony of the conditions relating to Plum Island were presented by Chairman Machiros. The chairman has'been a selectman for nine years and lives at the intersection where all traffic evacuating Plum Island will converge in order to gain access to the one westbound lane of roadway leading from the island. Id., Tr. 17340-41.

3.1.18(b). Access to and from Plum Island is via the Plum Island Turnpike, a typical two lane road. The road is established in a floodplain, crosses approximately two miles of

- title marsh and crosses a drawbridge which spans the Plum Island River and which is approximately one-quarter mile in length. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 3, Tr. 17407. While the App 3icants' Rebuttal Panel No. 9 professed to have visited Plum Island a cuebined total of thirty or so times, Tr. 17409, the Board 3s 3

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-troubled by the~1ack of meaningful knowledge they acquired thereby. For example, Applicants' panel had noticed, when driving'over the bridge leading to the island, an enclosure j commonly associated with drawbridges on the bridge, Tr. 17352-

.353, .but it did.not' register on any of that panel's members'until Lthey testified that the bridge indeed was a drawbridge. Tr. 1 l

17407, 3.1.18(c). Portions of plum Island Turnpike and roads on

. Plum. Island itself.become impassable at times of high water levels. In addition, ice cakes and other debris float onto these roads during high tidos and remain after the tide' recedes. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 3. Plum Island Turnpike becomes impossible due to flood waters as many as fifteen times per year, Tr. 17892, normally in the winter, fall and spring but this

. condition has also occurred in the summer with as many as 15,000 people on the island. Tr. 37884, 17894. Flood waters alone at times render Plum Island Turnpike impassable for up to seven hours. Tr. 17895. But the cause of the impassability of the Plum Island evacuation routes is not limited solely to flood or tide waters. Large amounts of debris (tree trunks, huge ice cakes, even furniture and appliances) are deposited on the roads and remain after flood or tide water recedes. This debris must ther..

.be removed and the roads remain impassable for as many as ten hours while this work is being done. Tr. 17899. Mere accidents on the sole road leading to the island cause it to be sealed off to travel for up to five hours. Tr. 17854-17855. Simple festivals at an airport abutting Plum Island Turnpike causes 4

traffic to back up.for miles down Ocean Boulevard /Rolfe's Lane as far as Route 1A and beyond. Tr. 17823. The flooding and tide problems of Plum Island Turnpike are also present on Sunset Boulevard and Old Point Road on the island itself, both of which wculd be used leaving in the event of an evacuation.

3.1.18(d). TON's panel members have seen traffic leaving ,

l Plun Island under a variety of weather conditions during all times of the year. During the' summer, when the popular beaches on the island are crowded, traffic jams frequently occur during summer afternoons when people visiting the bea :hes leave. It frequently takes hours before traffic flows normally once these traf fic j ams begin to occur. Plum. Island Turnpike typically contains a very congested line of extremely slow moving cars during normal, late-afternoon conditions. Id. at 4. Accidents wl.iah occur at the entrance to the island seal it off to traffic for up to five hours. Tr. 17854-17855.

3.1.18(e). TON's panel members have also personally observed what happens, for example, a sudden rainstonn causes many beach visitors to leave at approximately the sane time -- at these times, cars are backed up all over the island. Bottleneck traffic jams occur at multiple intersections on the island where vehicles attempt to merge into the westbound lane of Plum Island Turnpike. During normal conditions this traffic becomes very snarled; during rainstorms the traffic becomes extremely 3ammed and gridlock results at times. TON does not attempt to control such traffic under normal conditions since it has insufficient personnel on duty to do so. Id. ,

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4 3.1.18 ( f ) .. Despite these problems, the SPMC traffic management plan merely calls for one traffic guide to control all of the' traffic leaving the island. Id at 5. But even that one traffic. control point will not be staffed until almost three or-four hours have passed from the time the evacuation begins. Tr.

17347. If an emergency occurs at Seabrook Station.which requires evacuation of the island, it is plain that the traffic control provided in the SPMC would do'nothing more to facilitate evacuation of the island than would occur in the event of an uncontrolled evacuation. That is, evacuation of the island will occur no more quickly or orderly under the SPMC than would occur without that control. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 5. Under normal conditions, traffic converging at the one intersection where all traffic meets to leave the island barely moves; under an emergency evacuation with all residents and visitors on the

. island leaving at once, traffic from the island would become hopelessly jammed. Id. Frustration of the drivers at being unable to merge onto Plum Island Turnpike would naturally lead to frustration at not being able to evacuate using the one-bound lane and this naturally would result in drivers using both lanes of Plum Island Turnpike in order to evacuate. This would occur quickly, before any traffic control was in place. Control of evacuation from the island would accordingly be lost quickly and L it would be impossible to gain control once it is lost. Id at 6-

7. The Board accordingly' rejects the assertion of staff witness 1

Urbanik to the effect that he sees no difficulty in the concept 1.

of traffic guides establishing control after they arrive at an 6

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.t assigned congested intersection. Tr. 26443. The plain fact is

that the sole traffic guide.provided in the

SpMC for plum Island will not be'able to arrive at the assigned post at all during an evacuation.

3.1.18(g). Moreover, even if vehicles'could get to Plum Island Turnpike, the EpMC provides for no traffic control after leaving the island until vehicles arrive at the intersection of plum Island. Turnpike and Ocean Boulevard /Rolfe's Lane. It is i unrealistic and unreasonable to assume, as the SpMC does, that drivers will.merely utilice the one egress lane of plum Island Turnpike or any other road leading to the major evacuation routes TON  !

for this area, namely, Interstate 95, Route 1 and Route 1A.

I Dir...ff. Tr. 17801 at 4-6, 10-13.

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L 3.1.24. The primary objective of traffic management is'to facilitate the movement of people away from the area of concern.

The ultimate goal is that of dose reduction. To meet that goal, l a traffic management plan should seek to facilitate the movement of people away from Seabrook Station and not merely to move people out of the ten mile radius around the facility. Thus, the L

l L Applicants' efforts here, which are simply directed on reducing 1

1 overall evacuation time estimates, merely addresses nam of the goals of evacuation traffic management. The Applicant agrees that additional traffic control points in TON would assist to facilitate traffic movement. Tr. 17355, 17357-17358. Indeed, the Applicant's panel believes that additional traffic control points would assist in traffic movement at any intersection where 7

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there is.significant competing traffic' flow. Id. But while the Applicants' witnesses recognice'that such control would

' facilitate movement further from Seabrook Station, the plan fails to provide those additional controls and, instead, merely provides for control at areas where tremendous volumes of traffic would be expected which'merely has as a goal the lowering of the overall evacuation time estimates. In other words, the overall goal of traffic management as provided in the SPMC is merely to reduce E.T.E.'s although, with additional controls, people could J

still be moved further from Seabrook Station even if E.T.E.'s are' -l not reduced. The Board rejects the Applicants' approach to evacuation planning as being fundamentally misguided in its philosophy.

3.1.26. TCp's should be designed to facilitate evacuating traffic movement away from Seabrook Station in a safe and orderly  !

i manner. When additional TCP's can accomplish these goals, and here the Applicants acknowledge that' additional TCp's.would assist'in moving traffic, Tr. 17357, they should be provided in order to maximize dose reductions. Within TON, maintaining j traffic flow will be virtually impossible unless all controls are in place before the evacuation commences. TON Dir., ff. Tr.

17801 at 10. This is particularly true with regard to the narrow two lane roads leading to and on Plum Island. The following

. controls must be present within TON before the goal of j J

facilitating and maximizing traffic movements and dose reduction l are met (but the SPMC provides none of them).

l 3.1.26(a). In order to maintain two-way traffic on Old i I

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. j Point Road, Northern Boulevard, Plum Island Turnpike', Rolfe's 1

Lane and Hanover Street traffic guides should be located along the length of each road at a distance close enough to one another so that when a driver passes one guide another guide will be readily visible to the driver. Id. This is'the route which will be driven by every vehicle leaving Plum Islar,d. TON Dir.,

ff. Tr. 17801 at attached Zoning Map. By the applicant's testimony, more than 3,000 vehicles will utilize this route during an evacuation. Tr. 17337. The SPMC's. goal of merely providing one traffic guide for Plum Island, and then not until three or four hours after the evacuation has commenced, Tr.

17347, is inadequate. The Board rejects the SPMC's method of facilitating traffic movement'from the island as being wholly inadequate.

3.1.26(b). At least one traffic guide should be present at the intersection of Central Street and Route 1A to facilitate the evacuation of residences and the Governor Dummer Academy and i

Triton Regional High School which both are located near this intersection. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 10-11.

3.1.26(c). A minimum of two guides should be located at the 1

! two entrances to Triton Regional liigh School in order to facilitate movement of traffic to the school by parents and l buses. Id.

l 3.1.26(d). Traffic guides should also be located at the bridge which spans the Parker River on Route 1A. Route 1A is a major evacuation route from Newbury as well as from Newburyport.

Tr. 17363-17364. Route 1A is a relatively wide two-lane road 9

which would easily accommodate two lanes of evacuating traffic i

while nevertheless permitting.one lane of roadway to be open for ingress by, for example, returning commuters. But the Parker i

River Bridge,.which is approximately one-quarter mile long, L consists merely of two lanes and has no shoulders. Tr. 17394-17395. Thus, as it is probable that Route 1A will contain two lanes of evacuating vehicles when approaching the bridge, no-1 l

controls are present to facilitate the' merging of those lanes into one outbound lane and it is most improbable that drivers of evacuating vehicles.will merge on their own. Thus, as the plan provides for no control at this site, the bridge will likely be used entirely by evacuating vehicles thus. completely blocking inbound travel by returning commuters, tow trucks, evacuation buses and any other inbound traffic. Similarly, Old Point Road on Plum Island is merely seventeen feet wide. Tr. 17384. It l

will not accommodate two outbound and one inbound lane. It is natural that, given the fact that the residential portion of Plum Island is densely populated with many of the lots there being less than 500 square feet in size, Tr. 17386, drivers will naturally utilize both lanee of Old Point Road and render inbound traffic impossible. Moreover, none of the streets which comprise the evacuation route from Plum Island, i.e., Plum Island Turnpike, Ocean Boulevard /Rolfe's Lane and Hanover Street, will accommodate two outbound and one inbound lane of traffic. Yet it 1

is probable that drivers will form two lanes of outbound traffic.

Inbound traffic by returning commuters, evacuation buses and the 1

i like will accordingly be impossible. Tr. 17387. The SPMC is 10 l

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x inadequate.in failing to recognize-and provide for a means of facilitating' travel along these routes. This is true even though the Applicants' panel acknowledges that additional traffic guides "will-be able to assist traffic in many locations in Newbury."

Tr. 17376. For example, Applicants' panel acknuviedc9s that additional guards would assist traffic movement if they wculd be located along Route.1A, glong Hanover Street. along Route 1 and along Plum Island Turnpike. Tr. 17377. In addition, the Board finds that additional guards are necessary along Bush Boulevard /Rolfe's Lane as that road necessarily must be taken to evacuate from the island. Thus, Applicants' panel agrees with TON's assertion that. traffic control must be provided along the l

Plum Island evacuation route and the Board so finds. Id. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 10.

3.1.33. The Applicants assert that it is not necessary to provide for additional TCP's so long as those additional TCP's would not reduce the overall ETE. That philosophy permeates the applicants traffic management plan as set forth in the SPMC.

This Board rejects that philosophy and the Applicants' approach. The goal of emergency planning is to move people away from the area of danger. This Board has consistently ruled that the goal of the SPMC should be to maximize dose reduction. Tr.

17538. In the case of this plant, the Applicants should strive to move people away from Seabrook Station and not merely out of the ten mile radius around the facility. Since Applicants acknowledge that additional TCPs could be added which would facilitate movement of traffic away from the facility, TR 17355-11

. 17376, the SPl1C is-inadequate in that it faile to manimize dose reduction by failing to provide for additional TCP's which the Applicants concede.would facilitate movement away from Seabrook Station. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that it would be unreasonable or impractical to provide the additional TCP's the Applicants acknowledge would assist in facilitating traffic movement.

3.1.38. Applicants appear almost to assert that the SpMC is in reality the result of the combined input of the police chiefs in the affected municipalities. The Board declines to find that the SpMC is adequate simply because five police officers at some point in the past provided input to the Applicants. Indeed, in the case of TON. municipal officials as well as the-former police chief cooperated for years with the Applicants in attempting to devise evacuation plans which would facilitate the timely and efficient evacuation of people. In fact, witness Machiros was the chairman of TON's evacuation committee. Tr. 17856. It was only after TON made a sincere effort to assist in developing a plan that it became apparent to its officials that one could not be devised. TON Dir, ff. Tr. 17801, 5-6. that the former Newbury chief of police may have attempted to assist in in developing TCPs is not taken by this board to mean that TON's panel is incorrect in concludine that the proposed TCPs are inadequate. The Applicants provided no evidence whatsoever concerning that former Newbury official's background or experience and acknowledged that he had frequently brought to the 12 L.

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attention of the Applicants the resource limitations that exist in TON. Tr. 17368.

3.1.42. While TON will exert its best effort to respond to an' emergency at Seabrook Station, its resources are inadequate to provide necessary traffic and access control. TON merely has eight full-time police officers'and seventeen reserve patrol l-officers. Its fire fighting personnel consists merely of two full-time individuals and approximately fifty volunteers. It is unlikely that more than half of these workers will be able to be contacted and will respond in a emergency. TON Dir. ff. 18601 at 16-17. It is plain that reserve officers and volunteer fire fighters normally hold regular jobs and that to simply contact each of those potential responders could require significant numbers of hours and the services of one or more persons who are on. duty'to contact them. The actual number of people within TON who realistically would be available to respond in the event of an emergency probably total no more than twenty-five to thirty.

This number is inadequate to establish the type of traffic  !

control which this Board has found to be necessary. This Board also rejects Applicants' assertion that other agencies or the state police would facilitate the response of local municipalities for the obvious reason that their numbers are likewise limited and will likely be deployed at the major evacuation routes of Interstate 95, Route 1 and Route 1A and not on local roads such as plum Island Turnpike and roads on plum Island. Finally, the equipmer' available to TON is insufficient in number and type to establish the traffic control which is 13

necessary in order to facilitate the evacuation of the town or even to remove impediments, such as ice cakes and other debris which frequently become deposited on Plum Island Turnpike', in order that the' roads'in TON can be used in a timely fashion. J4 at 17.

3.1.46. The sole TCP on Plum Island will not be staffed until approximately.three to four hours after the order to evacuate. Tr.'17347. Of course, this assumes that inbound travel on Plum ' Island Turnpike and Rolfe's Lane in TON is even possible at that time, Tr. 17351, a proposition which this Board rejects. Even accepting the Applicants' assertion that merely 3,000 vehicles have been observed by it to be on Plum Island, Tr. 17337, that easily could translate into more than 10,000 evacuees easily. Given this fact and the existence of the single lanes of travel available to those evacuees, this TCP should be one of the first traffic posts manned and not one of the last.

Otherwise, travel'to the island by, for example, evacuation buses and returning commuters would ta impossible as evacuees will naturally use both outbound lanes and thereby block inbound traffic.

u.1.49. Activating the sole TCP provided from Plum Island will be impossible as planned. While it may be common for police i

to establish control during congested conditions, such as at the l

scene of an accident, that is an isolated incident spatially and i

( does not involve the mass exodus of vehicles using very limited roadways. The Board finds that the Applicants will be unable to 14 w-___ ___

staff.the;TCP's planned-for Plum Island, the intersection of Plum s

. Island Turnpike and Ocean Blvd./Ro.lfe's Lane for the reason that inbound travelLto those locations will be impossible where. as is the case here, the evacuation will already have been under way-lfor hours before the attempt to establish those controls is made.

TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17680 at 4-10.

'3.1.82. As pointed out by the Applicants in their proposed findings. TON indeed take the position that the SpMC is deficient because, in the event of a flood, it would be impossible to leave the island. TON's concern about that

' deficiency in the SpMC is justified in taking into account that Plum Island Turnpike not only may become impassable but that it in fact regularly dpqeg become impassable. Typically, impassability results at times of high water levels and when ice cakes and debris flost onto that road. TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17801 at 3, Tr. 17899. For example, on January 2, 1987, approximately one mile of Plum . Island Turnpiko became impassable for hancs when it was under about two feet of flowing tide waters. Id. at 8. This not an extremely isolated or.unlikely event. Indeed, that road is. subject to flooding on a routine basis, as frequently as fifteen times per year. Tr. 17892. Applicants recognize that such an event at the time of an emergency at Seabrook Station make the evacuation of Plum Island impossible. Tr. 17382-17383.

To deal with + hat insoluble problem, the Applicants simply state that such an impediment would be a fact which would be considered in making the appropriate protective action i- 15 l

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.14., Applicants' PF 3.1.82. Undoubtedly, the recommendation.

Board can take the Applice.nts at their word when they say they will consider this problem if and when it arises in generating j'

their-PAR recommendation. The promise to consider this problem, however, cannot lead the Board to conclude that a reasonable J

I assurance of adequate protection will result. First, the simple f act is that there is no alternative method of evacuation or route of evacuation proposed or possible for Plum Island. Tr.

17382-17383. Thus, the only alternative PAR would be sheltering.

The Applicants have provided no information to this Board of the sheltering capacity of plum Island from which a finding of 1

adequacy could be made. And a significant portion of Plum Island, six or seven miles of its length, is made'up of the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge. In that refuge, only one shelter was identified by the App 3icants as being available for sheltering but was characterized as being nothing more than "a six foot by six' foot shack" Tr. 17383-1784. Assuming that this Board should accept the Applicant's testimony that almost two L

thousand vehicles were observed on Plum Island South, which includes the refuge, Tr. 17337, that means that hundreds and potentially thousands of people could be trapped in the refuge with no means of shelter and no means of evacuation. While Applicants argue that it is unlikely for large numbers of people to be in the refuge during storms and that such an event is accordingly unlikely, it is apparent that flooding does not always occur simultaneously with a storm. Indeed, higher than l normal tid.eg are the chief cause of the flooding of Plum Island l

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I Turnpike and such tides could be caused many, many hours after a storm passes if the storm is in fact the direct cause of the final result of flooding. TON Dir, ff Tr. 17001 at 3. But even if the 1 1

number of. trapped people in the refuge were hundreds and not thousands, - though they plainly could be thousands - there is no assurance that the SPMC provides them with _any protection in the least. Nor does the SPMC c; ovide for any method of dealing with ice cakes and other debris which float on to roads such as Plum Island Turnpike and render them impassable. TON Dir. ff.

Tr. 17801, at 3, Tr. 17899. While flood waters recede, debris which renders roads impassable must be physically remove i nr.d the SPMC makes no provision for accomplishing this.

6. EVACUATION OF TRANSIT DEPENDENT PERSONS 4.1.2. While FEMA has found the procedures for the evacuation of the transit dependent adequate, FEMA has not evaluated the evacuation routes, whether the number of buses to be used on individual routes are adequate ,given the characteristics of the individual routes and numbers of transit dependent persons to be picked up r.c whether the roads to be r

driven by the buses are adequate for the intended purpose.

4.1.5. TON's panel of witnesses testified to serious difficulties which will be encountered in attempting t- i"plement the bus evacuation plan. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 13-16.

4.1.5(a). It is planned that Newbury bus route #1 will leave the transfer point, travel on ths same roads being used by all Plum Island evacuees and, after picking up their riders, 17

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= return-to the transfer point. However, the Board finds that this bus will'be unable to travel on Hanover-Street, Ocean blvd./Rolfe's Lane, Plum Island Turnpike, Old Point Road and Sunset Boulevard since evac,ees, who will have commenced evacuation prior to the but runs and before TCP's in Newbury are manned, will be utilloa.g all inbound travel lanes. Id. The Boards findings with regard to these issues Eupra, are incorporated herein. Once on Piam Island, the buses will be unable to-travel to the northern portion of the island on Old Point Road or Northern Blvd. as planned because j evacuating vehicles will block inbound travel on those roads, ld.

4.1.5(b). A portion Newbury bus route #2 has become  ;

impassable when one of its roads, Ocean Street, has washed out

.when a stream overflowed its banks. The SPMC provides no alternative route should a similar occurrence take place during an evacuation. The buses which drive route #2 are to cross Route 1 at its intersection with Boston Road but the SPMC fails to provide any traffic control at that intersection and the Los will be seriously delayed in crossing Route 1, if it can at all, because of the utilization of Route 1 as a major evacuation route. Id. at 14. The buses of route #2 are planned to again cross Route 1 in returning to the transfer point (at the intersection of Route 1 and Hanover Street) but evacuation traffic will seriously delay crossing Route 1 if the bus is able to cross that evacuating traffic at all.

4.1.5(c). Newbury bus route #3 calls for the bus to travel 18

north on Route 1A across'the Parker River. A two-lane bridge spans the river at that point and, for the reasons set forth above (Route 1A is a major evacuation route, two lanes of south-bound traffic will undoubtedly occur at this bridge, no' traffic controls exist at this location), the bridge.will not be accessible to.the bus which will be north bound at this location.

'4.1.5(d). Newbury bu- route #4 provides that the bus vill travel on Scotland Road for a significant distance. Scotland Road is a major route .hich large numbers evacuees from the City of Newburyport will use to gain 9ccess to Interstate 95.

Accordingly, .it will likely be jammed with evacuees and it is unlikely that the buses will be able to drive on this portion of the route as planned. Id at 15.

4.1.5(e). The Newbury transfer point is located on Highfield Road, a road that is recognized by the Applicants' panel to be' narrow and winding. Id. at 15 Tr. 17403. Any degree of traffic on that road make bus' traveling impossible, particularly north from the transfer point to Scotland Road.

Very little room exists to enable the bus to turn into or around within the transfer point and, if Highfield Road is used by evacuees, backing onto it by the bus will be extremely difficult if not impossible. The transfer point consists of nothing more than an electric substation area with a seventy-five foot drive-way which is no wider than fifteen feet leading to it.

Tr. 17399-17400. No shelter is provided at the transfer point for transit dependent evacuees. Moreover, Highfield Road is j 1

merely sixteen feet wide at its narrowest point. Tr. 17397.

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LThat.' point'is locat.ed south of the transfer point and three of

.the four Newbury bus routes leave from and return to the transfer

-point in that direction. Since.at lease seventeen feet of road width is needed for two buses to pass each other, Applicant's pF 4.1.12, it will be _ impossible for these three. routes to be driven as planned, j 4.1.5(fT. It is planned that full buses, once they complete their routes, will drive straight.to the reception center in.

Deverly. Tr. 17401. If the buses are not full when they complete their routes, h0 wever, it is planned that the buses will return to the transfer point where they will discharge their passengers. The passengers will wait in a bus at the transfer point until that bus becomes full of evacuees. That bus will then transport them to the reception center. Tr. 17401-403.

However, merely one bus is being provided which will wait at the reception' center for evacuees who will be. dropped off there for transportation to the reception center. TR 17/,04. In addition, only two buses are planned for each of the four routes (a total of eight buses) and it is estimated that each bus will merely drive its route once. There is no reasonable insurance that the the number of buses which are being provided f or TON are a .' equate to meet the transportation needs of the transit dependent. It is apparent that the Applicants do not know whether the number of buses to be utilized in TON are adequate: Applicants' panel testified that they will know whether to have the buses drive I

their routes more than once onlf if the buses are full after they complete a route. Tr. 17404. But since full buses will travel l 20 l

directly 1x1 the reception center in Beverly, Tr. 17401, it is plain that there simply will be no additional buses to drive routes.more than once if that becomes necessary. Moreover, the Applicants acknowledge that they have no way of knowing whether or how many transit dependent persons have gone to bus routes in order to' ride the evacuation bus after the bus has driven the route. Tr. 17405. The fact that buses will not start driving the routes until sometime after the evacuation commences does nothing to solve this problem; buses will be impeded as set forth above and transit dependents may simply miss the first bus or two because they are waiting in their homes and not outside where they have no protection. Finally, nothing is provided in the

-SpMC for transit dependents in the Refuge.

4.1.5(g). The SpMC leaves it to individual bus drivers to decide how to travel from the Newbury transfer point to the Beverly reception center. Tr. 17402-17403. The Board finds this to be inadequate. The drivers of the buses will be provided with no information concerning which of the possible routes to the receptio' center is the best at any particular time. In addition, the bus drivers will be unable to acquire information on their own as to which route to choose. Id.

4.1.10. The Board finds that the Applicants' testimony concerning transit dependents are competent to serve as witnesses on the subjects they address. The Board likewise finds that roN's panel was competent to testify on the subjects they addressed with regard to transit dependents. TON Dir., ff. Tr.

21 1

2-_---. _ _ . ._ __ __ -

.17801 at 13-16. With regard to the Applicants' panel, however, the Board'does not find that the.information they provided was persuasive. Much of the testimony of the Applicants' panel, which also is addressed.below in finding 4.1.12, was based cn1 information provided to the panel which the panel colored and interpreted in the light most favorable to the Applicants. For

. example, the panel glossed over the fact that Boston Road, used in bus routes, in merely sixteen feet wide. Tr. 17390. In addition, the panel incorrectly claimed that a dump truck was observed to pass a bus on' Boston Road. Tr. 17390-17392. It was

. developed in examinationLthat the panel relied on page 120 of Attachment I to their testimony in making that claim and that they possessed no information of any truck passing any bus other than the incident described in Attachment I. But Attachment I plainly states that a bus and dump truck passed one another on Orchard Street and in wholly silent of any description of a bus passing a dump truck on Boston Road. Id. In fact, it was even developed in examination of Applicants' panel that the school bus was stopped on the shoulder of the road (undoubtedly Orchard Street) when the dump truck passed it and the panel had absolutely no information concerning how far onto the shoulder i

'the bus was when the truck passed. Moreover, Applicants' panel claimed that Old Rowley Road, which is utilized by Newbury Pus

j. Rou'.e 3,.is fifteen feet wide with " additional shoulders." Tr.

l.

173'#6. It was developed through cross-examination that the

! ad Jitional shoulders, when combined, added merely eight inches to i

the portion of that road which can be driven upon. Finally, 22 L _ _ _ -

l 2.

while' Applicants' panel testified that two busee'were observed to l:

pass on'Highfield Road, the panel did not know where that had occurred but, in any event, one bus was pulled.over and stopped at the side of the road at the time the incident was observed.

Tr. 17398. Based on these factors, the Board puts little weight on the testimony of the Applicants' panel with regard to the bus.

routes'in TON or how well those routes will accommodate evacuation of transit dependent persons.

L 6.1'11.

. 'While evacuation bus routes may initially have been l

developed under the direction of Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency:or local municipalities,-it is a simple truism that those agencies and municipalities, after attempting to devise a plan L which would provide a reasonable assurance of protection, l.

l concluded that they were unable to accomplish that objective.

i While Applicants argue that the fact of state or local municipal l

input equates with state or local municipal beliefs of adequacy, the reverse is more likely: the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and municipalities within the emergency planning zone sincerely attempted to devise a plan which would provide protection for their inhabitants but, with ample justification, concluded that local conditions made such planning impossible.

4.1.38. This Board does not find persuasive the contention of the Applicants that, TON roadways within a floodplain are all a 100-year floodplain, and that there is thus only a probability l

of 0.10 that major floeding would occur on these roadways in any given year or that it is highly unlikely that these roadways will be rendered impassable by flooding at the time of an emergency at 23

__________E____._____-___. l

s .

L Y Seabrook Station. First, flooding within TON has simply occurred in' fact much more often than Applicants' predictions would 1

indicate. Second, Applicants plainly do not fully understand TON's concerns with regard to flooding: it is not merely flood watens which renders roads impassable, debris which those waters deposit and leave on the roads continue to render the roads impassable after the water recedes. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at l 3. Finally, the evidence Applicants rely on to make that assertion does not support that claim; the roads plainly could be in a 25, 50 or 75 year floodplain. Thus, while it may not be probable that these roadways will be rendered impassable due to flooding during an emergency evacuation, neither can it be said that such an event is highly unlikely. Indeed, as noted supra, such floods occur as frequently as fifteen times per year.

4.1.19. When bus evacuation routes bet ome impassable to local flooding or other impediments, alternate routes to Plum Island do not exist. Tr. 17382-17383. While the SpMC provides for procedures to be followed if rerouting is necessary, no amount of rerouting will result in evacuees from Plum Island, conceivably numbering in the thousands, from being able to leave the island. Id.

10. COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL PESOURCES AND RESPONSE 10.1.13. TON plainly does not heve sufficient personnel and equipment to promptly implement the extensive traffic controls which TON officials believe would be necessary and which Applicants' witnesses concede would help to facilitate traffic movement along many critical evacuation routes. TON Dir., ff.

24

la

f. s t: .

i-* Tr. 17803 at 10-13, 16-17; Tr. 17355-17358; Tr. 17376-17377. Nor k' does TON possess equipment suf'icient to enable it to remove impediments to travel such as ice cakes and other debris which become deposited'on Plum Island Turnpike and other roads during flooding or storms. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 17. Thus, TON could-not implement the SPMC traffic management pla.1.

l Respectfully submitted, R. Scott Hill-whilton Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton & Rotondi 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 (508) 462-9393 Counsel for Town of Newbury 25 J

b. :.

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atp a- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ~nf We, R. Scott - Hill-Whilton and Judith H. Mizner, Counsel' for the Towns of Newbury and West Newbury in the above-entit1ES AUG 15 P3 :1Il action, hereby certify that we have caused copies of the enclosed i I

documents by be served upon the persons at the addresses listed below, by first class, postage prepaid, mail and by Feder(13h i , .

Express, postage prepaid, mail to those names which have been ! -X l marked with an asterisk.

• Admin. Judge Ivan W.. Smith *Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Chairman, Atomic Safety and Atomic Safety and Licensing Licensing Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn 1107 West Knapp Street j Washington, D.C. 20555 Stillwater, OK 74075

• Dr. Richard F. Cole

• Docketing and Service Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Wasizington, D.C. 20555 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

• Thomas G., Dignan, Jr., Esq. A.S.L.A.B. Panel Ropes & Gray U.S. Nuclear Regulatory One International Place Commission Boston, MA 02110-2624 Washington, D.C. 20555 Diane Curran, Esq. Stephen B. Merrill, Esq.

Harmon, Curran & Tousley Attorney General 2001 S. Street N.W. Office of the Attorney Suite 430 General Washington, D.C. 20009-1125 Concord, NH 03301 p Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Office of General Counsel 116 Lowell Street Nuclect Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 516 Washington, D.C. 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 Philip Ahrtns, Esq. Paul McEachern, Esq.

Asst. Attorney General Shaines & McEachern Office of the Attorney General 25 Maplewood Avenue Augusta, ME 04333 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis The Honorable Gordon J.

Chairman Humphrey i Board of Selectmen United States Senate Kensington, NH 03827 Washington, D.C. 20510 1

1

Mr. Thomas Powers H. Joseph Flynn, Esq.

Town Manager Office of General Counsel Town of Exeter. Federal Emergency Exeter, NH 03833 Management Agency Washingto:1, D.C. 20472 Gary Holmes, Esq. Stephen Jonas, Esq.

Holmes & Ells Assistant Attorney General 27 Winnacunnet Road Office of the Attorney Hampton, NH 03841 General coston, MA 02108 ,

Mr. Calvin A. Cannea Charles P. Graham, Esq. j City Manager Murphy & Graham d City Hall 33 Low Street Portsmouth, NH 03801 Newburyport, MA 01950 4 l

Barbara Saint Andre, Esq. Mr. William Lord Kopleman & Paige Selectman 77-Franklin Street Board of Selectmen Boston, MA 02110 Amesbury, MA 01913 4

Brentwood Board of Selectmen Richard A. Hampe, Esq.

RFD Dalton Road Hampe & McNicholas Brentwood, NH 03833 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Mr. Robert Carrigg, Cheirman Robert R. Pierce, Esq.

Board of Selectmen Atomic Safety and Licensing Town Office Board Panel North Hampton, NH 03862 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D.C. 20555 Mr. Richard R. Donovan Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.

Federal Emergency Management 145 South Main Street Agency P.O. Box 38 Federal Regional Center Bradford, MA 01835 130 228th Street, S.W.

Bothell, Washingtor 98021-9796 Signed under seal this 14th day of August, 1989.

R. Scott Hill-Whilton

/A Y &

'" Judith H. Mizner 2

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