ML20247R775

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Proposed Tech Specs 3/4 4-27 for Unit 1 & 3/4 4-34 for Unit 2 Re Surveillance Requirement to Lock Manual Isolation Valves
ML20247R775
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/02/1989
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20247R771 List:
References
TVA-SQN-TS-89-3, NUDOCS 8908080102
Download: ML20247R775 (8)


Text

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ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-38)

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 4-27 Unit 2 3/4 4-34 1

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3/4.4.1_1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS '

k LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (

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Two Reactor Coolant System ~ bVent ".. . (RCSV). ;.b ..

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With only one RCSV path OPERABLE, STARTUP and ,

continue provided the inoperable path is maintained ~

clR O power removed from the valve actuators; osed restore yith th to OPERABLE status within 30 days; or be in HOT STe inop e

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hours 4: and HOT SHUTDOWN within the ours. AND8Y following within 6 6h. .

.;&3 lith SHUTOOWN no RCSV within thepath followingOPERABLE, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> path to OPERABLE restore .,,

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  • i S R EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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Amendment No. $,,116 .

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1989 q4 -

i ca., st u tre s1s 'NE" 'f {-) 311swie 31 S

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. .. . j ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE  !

SEQUOYAH NdCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 l

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 1

(TVA-SQN-TS-89-38)

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR SCHEDULE CHANGE TO SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.11.a i

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ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 technical specifications (TSs) to revise.the schedule for surveillance requirement (SR) 4.4.ll.a to defer the requirement to L lock the manual isolation valves until the next Mode 5 outage to allow access to the valves.

Reason for Change The TS change is required to resolve-a scheduling problem caused by issuance of the TS change in mid-cycle.

Justification for Change The head vent manual isolation valves on Unit 1 were verified open during performance of System Operating Instruction (501) 68.1 on August 5, 1988.

This verification was documented by a two-party signoff in the SOI data package. On August 26, 1988, flow was verified through the system during performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI) 166.41, " Reactor Head Vent Valve Stroke Test During Refueling Outage." Performance of the SI indicates again that the manual isolation valves are open.

Following the performance of SI-166.41, access to the manual isolation valves was restricted by remo' val of scaffolding from lower containment and placing of the missile shield in preparation for Mode 4 entry. The missile shleid was set in place on September 24, 1988, and the Unit entered Mode 4 on September 27, 1988.

The head vent manual isolation valves on Unit 2 were verified open during performance of 50I-68.1 on March 10, 1989. This verification was documented by a two-party signoff in the SOI data package.. On-March 26, 1989, flow was verified through the system during performance of SI-166.41. Performance of the SI indicates again that the manual isolation valves are open.

Following the performance of SI-166.41, access to the manual isolation valves was restricted by removal of scaffolding from lower containment and placing of the missile shield in preparation for Mode 4 entry. The missile shield was set in place on March 26, 1989. The missile shield was removed to facilitate leakage repair work and reset on March 30,-1989,'and the unit entered Mode 4 on April 5, 1989.

As described above, the head vent manual isolation valves on each unit have been verified open, and the head vent system ,is available to perform its intended function. Access to the area inside the polar crane wall ~is prohibited during power operation because of high radiation levels. The valves cannot be repositioned during power operation because of the access restrictions. Therefore, TVA submits that locking the manual isolation valves is not required to meet the underlying purpose of TS 3.4.11 prior to the next refueling catage.

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Environmental Impact Evaluation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental ,

question because operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this >

change would not:

1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the Staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or in any decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.

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ENCLOSURE 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-89-38)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 1

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ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a sign'ficant increase in'the probability or consequences of an accident eviously evaluated.

The head . at manual isolation valves are open, and the head vent system is available to perform its intended function. -The emergency TS change is required to resolve a scheduling problem caused by issuance of the TS change in mid-cycle. Access to the area inside.

the polar trane wall is prohibited during power operation. The manual isolation valves are located in this area and cannot be accessed to lock them in accordance with SR 4.4.11.a. The position of the manual valves is known from the configuration logs. The valves cannot be repositioned during power because of the access restrictions. The probability or consequences of an accident

' previously evaluated is not affected because the head vent system is known to be available to perform its intended function.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

The head vent manual-isolation valves are open, and the head vent system is available to perform its intended function. The emergency TS change is required to resolve a scheduling problem caused by issuance of the TS change in mid-cycle. Access to-the area inside the polar crane wall is prohibited during power operation. The manual isolation valves are located in this area and.cannot be.

accessed to lock them in accordance with SR 4.4.11.a. The position of the manual valves is known from the configuration logs. The valves cannot be repositioned during power because of the access restrictions. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is.not affected because the head vent system is known to be available to perform its intended function. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

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(3)- I'nvolve a significant reduction in-a margin of safety.

The head vent manual isciation valves.are open, and the head vent system is available to~ perform its intended function. The emergency TS change is required to resolve a scheduling problem caused by issuance of the TS change in mid-cycle. Access to'the area inside the polar crane wall is prohibited during power operation. . The manual isolation valves are located in-this area and cannot be accessed to lock them in accordance with SR 4.4.11.a. The position c' the manual valves.ls known from the configuration logs. The valves cannot be repositioned during pover because of the access

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restrictions. The probability or. consequences of an accident previously evaluated is not affected because the' head. vent system is known to be available to perform its intended function. This. change-does not cause a reduction in any margin of safety.

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