05000266/FIN-2013002-07
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Operability Evaluation Process for a Degraded Containment Liner |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors when the licensee failed to perform a prompt operability evaluation as required by station procedures. Specifically, procedure PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action, required that a prompt operability evaluation be performed when equipment was determined to be operable but degraded. Had this evaluation been performed, the licensee would have recognized that information did not exist to support operability of the containment liner. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as AR01851688 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of reactor coolant system (RCS) equipment and barrier performance, and adversely affected the Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, which indicated that a Phase 2 analysis was required per Appendix H. The inspectors and the RIII SRA performed a Phase 2 evaluation using IMC 0609, Appendix H, Table 6.2, and concluded, based on the small size of the hole in the SW piping, that leakage from the containment to the environment would not be greater than 100 percent containment volume per day; therefore, the issue screened as being of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, low threshold, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the breach in the SW system (P.1(a)). Specifically, the lack of a CR that completely and accurately evaluated the hole in the SW system resulted in an unrecognized and unevaluated breach in a system that was considered an extension of the containment. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
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| Report | IR 05000266/2013002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Cameron M Jones M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno P Smagacz R Winter S Burton V Myers |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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