ML20212R109
| ML20212R109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1987 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212R105 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8704240285 | |
| Download: ML20212R109 (12) | |
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ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327, -323 (TVA SQN TS 87-07)
Correction of Seismic Monitor Information List of Affected Pages UNIT 1 3/4 3-45 3/4 3-46 B 3/4 3-2 B 3/4 3-3 l
l UNIT 2 3/4 3-46 3/4 3-47 B 3/4 3-2 1
1 hDj4240285870437 p ADOCK 05000327 '
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APR 131987 TABLE 3.3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION A42mh v ^^ MINIMUM MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS RANGE OPERABLE
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs
- a. 0-XT-52-75A, ContainmentyElev. 734 0-1.0g i
- b. 0-XT-52-758, Annulus,Elev 680 0-1.0g 1*
- c. 0-XR-52-77, Diesel Building,Elev. 722 0-1.0g 1 l 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs ca. rah ne r, S:p P.'p r ,
- a. 0-XR-52-82, Auxi4iary-Bui4 ding-E4ee.
9 c.,% ,m ., , v4I P;, e ,
- b. 0-XR-52-83, Auxfitary-Butiding-Elev.
zJ L e c 736 7c6 0-5.0g 1
, suce, neel c ,a- $,
; c. 0-XR-52-84, Control Building Elev.
.j,1 v/ v 4.J32 7 3 y /
0-5.0g ,
1 .
- 3. Blaxial Seismic Switches R16
- a. 0-XS-52-79, Annulus.Elev. 680 0.025-0.25g 1*
- b. 0-XS-52-80, Annulus,Elev. 680 0.025-0.25g 1*
- c. 0-XS-52-81, Annulus,Elev. 680 0.025-0.25g 1*
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- 4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders 32
- a. 0-XR-52-86, Annulus,Elev. 680 2-25.4 Hz, 0.003-90g la
- b. 0-XR-52-87, Reactor Containment 32 2-25.4 Hz, 0.003-90g 1 Bldg..Elev. 734 1:
- c. 0-XR-52-88, Aux. CR,Elev. 734 2-25.4 Hz, 0.003-90g 1
'D:n vi kild;a. 71% ;r 1.
d, 0-XR-52-89, OB-Bldge-2A Elev. 713- 2-25.4 Hz, 0.003-90g 1 1
"With reactor control room indication m
- 2 *r MAR 454982 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-45 Amendment No. 12
APR 131987 TABLE 4.3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHECK CALIBRATION TEST INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs ,
- a. 0-XT-52-75A, Containment,Elev. 734 M* RWy SA
- c. 0-XR-52-77, Diesel Building,Elev. 722 M* Rne SA
- 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs ~
c..e,;we. t , ) M F.p. 7 e_
- a. 0-XR-52-82, Auxiliary-Building,Elev. 689 NA R NA ca.,,.e < a , U M Pre u.
R NA b 0-XR-52-83, Auxi.11ary-Building,Elev. 73fr NA
> xe, 6,,i c u =.
NA R NA
- c. 0-XR-52-84, Control Building ^Elev. 732- M .
Y '^
- 3. Biaxial Seismic Switches
- 4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders s*A
- a. 0-XR-52-86** , Annulus, Elev. 680 M R M
- b. 0-XR-52-87, Reactor Containment NA R NA Bldg.,Elev. 734
- c. 0-XR-52-88, Aux. CR Elev. 734 NA R NA
, .n;ms M J;st, y, :,
- d. 0-XR-52-89, DB-Bldg.-2A.Elev. 713 NA R NA --
"Except seismic trigger
- With reactor control room indications, tc, t .&. .A . , * ;a m i c. Te;)y e -
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MAR 25482 :1 3/4 3-46 Amendment No. 12 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1
APR 1319M INSTRUMENTATION . --
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BASES The measurement of rerponse time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each -
channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times ,
indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the .
total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or . .
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- 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
- 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual' channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation (;Q level trip setpoint is exceeded. ~
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3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.
ForthepurposeofmeasuringF(Z)orFhafullincorefluxmapisused.
9 Quarter core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibrati6n of the excore neutron flux detection system, and full incore '
flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range Channel is inoperable.
3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient
. capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the (D:p e'
SECUOYAH - UNIT I B 3/4 3-2
. APR 131987 :
INSTRUMENTATION ,,
BASES _
disfi gn basis for_ the facility _to_de.termine_[f plant shutdown is required hursuanttoAppendFA"of10CFRPart100.1Thisinstrumentationis I consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, " Instrumentation.
( for Earthquakes," April 1974.
.s t s sp.<,neJ .u vun.u ne < ny n nf r<s.n e- tk m n;~ n a nj e .s & ne i<s e m a+s.
3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the publ.ic as a result of. routine or accidental release of radica.ctive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need-
- ~ ~ for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.
. 3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT
. . ,3 STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This 4F capability is~ required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the chlorine detection system ensures that sufficient capibility is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chlorine release. This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Roos Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.
3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that E'
_ sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor ,
and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent l with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975.
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3p SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 -SEP-1-7-980 -
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- APR 131987 TABLE 3.3.7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTAT!ON Atw rav,w MINIMUM MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS RANGE OPERABLE INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs
- a. 0-XT-52-75A, Containment,Elev. 734 0-1.0g 1
- b. 0-XT-52-75B, Annulus,Elev. 680 -
0-1.0g 1*
- c. 0-XR-52-77, Diesel Building,Elev. 722 0-1.0g 1
- 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs C, .+.: es, a s .s P:e<
- a. 0-XR-52-82, Auxi+iar-y,-BuMo+ng, Elev.
6 8 9 v o 2. 0-5.0g I c..,m;a,n a e. vn :. Pp,
- b. 0-XR-52-83, Aux 4+tary-SuMoing Elev.
736 vu, 0-5.0g 1
, AncR, Pnei a#M-16 >
- c. 0-XR-52-84, Control Building'gElev. .
932 '7 f 0-5.0g 1 m) s
- 3. Biaxial Seismic Switches
- a. 0-XS-52-79, Annulus,Elev. 630 0.025-0.25g 1*
b 0-XS-52-80, Annulus,Elev. 680 0.025-0.25g 1* <
- c. 0-XS-52-81, Annulus Elev. 680 0.025-0.25g la
- 4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders 3L
- a. 0-XR-52-86, Annulus,Elev. 680 2-25.4 Hz, 0.003-40g la
- b. 0-XR-52-87, Reactor Containment 2-25.4Hz,0.003-96g 1 Bldg.,Elev. 734 71
- c. 0-XR-52-88, Aux. CR Elev. 734 2-25.4 Hx, 0.003-90g I hw 0,JJut, sn n -
- d. 0-XR-52-89, DB-Bidg:--2A Elev. 713 2-25.4 H:, 0.003-90g 1 awitn reactor control room indication
(:.,r" SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-46
APR 131987 TABLE 4.3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS CHECK CALIBRATION TEST
- 1. Triaxial Time-History Acceleregrapns
- a. 0-XT-52-75A, Containment,Elev. 734 Ma R tw SA f
- 2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs c...u;u. .,5:5 n?*> >c i a. 0-XR-52-82, Auxi4tary-BuHding Elev. 689- NA R NA i G., v , -
- b. 0-XR-52-83, AuxiM,,a.4r'Bui44tng,Elev.
w:. cu m 736 NA i ry- R NA j ,.wa.g. ,a..,-u, l
- c. 0-XR-52-84, Control Building,Elev. -7 NA R NA :
- 3. Biaxial Seismic Switches ;
l
- a. 0-XR-52-S6*", Annulus,Elev. 680 M R WA l
i b. 0-XR-52-87, Reactor Containment NA R NA J
Bldg, Elev. 734
- c. 0-XR-52-88, Aux. CR,Elev. 734 NA R NA l 3
- .s.i 9,:lJ la.? . 7 *.1
- d. 0-XR-52-89, DB-Bldgr-2A Elev. 713 NA R NA 1 .
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i j "Except seismic trigger l .
""With reactor control room indications j j. -t h T e1.J., h , m; <. Y, ,
i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-47 4
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APR 131987
. ',~ q,7 INSTRUMENTATION .
,~g R-BASES
} REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM
- . .; . IN5INUMENTMION (Continuto) . . . ..
- . . ,
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides -
assurance that the protective and the engineered safety feature actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the '
accident analyses. No credit was taken.in the analyses for those channels
- with response times indicated as not applicable. .
l Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping ,
i or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the '
, total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may j be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or
- 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times. !
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION f ,
3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
! The OP$RABILITY'of the radiation monit'oring channels ensures that 1) the l radiation levels are continually measured in .the areas served by the individual '
channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation '
i level trip setpoint is exceeded. a!
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i 3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS j The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum j complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of 1 4 this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the i reactor core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating ;
j aach detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.
N l For the purpose of measuring F Quarter-core flux maps, as defined 9n(Z) or FWCAP-8ba , June 1976, may full incore be usedflux in map is used.
recalibration of the excore neutron flux detection system, and full incore i flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT '
POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range Channel is inoperable. '
- 3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the
] d.esi.gn_ basis for the facility ~to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant
~
i i (to Appendix ~"A"~or10 CFR~ Par't 10'07 The instrumentation is consistent with the t I
recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, " Instrumentation for Earthquakes," g 1 l. April 1974 i
) A a y a 6i ..I , , , a a e.< . . . e mfa ~<r es W V" 4 "" ~y ' * & m' h t ""'**R .
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1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-2 7 i
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l ENCLOSURE 2
! PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 -328 4 (TVA SQN TS 87-07)
- Description and Justification for Proposed Correction of 4
Seismic Monitor Information i
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ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change Correct and update information in Tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4 of technical specification 3.3.3.3.
Reason for Change As a result of typographical errors, an incorrectly specified maintenance schedule of seismic monitors, and an incorrectly specified measurement range of four seismic monitors, the information given in tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4 of technical specification 3.3.3.3 is incorrect. The proposed change will correct these errors.
Justification for Change The elevations given in technical specification 3.3.3.3, tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4, for seismic monitors 0-XE-52-82, 0-XR-52-83, and 0-XR-52-84 are in error. They are inconsistent with the as-built configurations and with other design drawings, which give the correct values. The proposed amendeent would carrect the erroneous values and put them in agreement with the actual elevation values and the values found in those design drawings.
Also, table 4.3-4 of technical specification 3.3.3.3 states that a channel functional test lu not necessary for monitor 0-XR-52-86. However, American Nuclear Society Standard 2.2 requires that a channel functional test be performed on all active instruments (instruments that require an outside power source) in six-month intervals (page B-10. Table 1). According to contract 76K6-820172, instrument 0-XR-52-86 was requisitioned with an uninterruptible power supply. Also, cognizant plant personnel have given confirmation that instrument 0-XR-52-86 does contain a switch and is in fact an active instrument, in agreement with the contract. Therefore, table 4.3-4 of technical specification 3.3.3.3 is amended to read SA (semiannual) for the channel functional test.
Another amendment that needs to be made to table 4.3-4 is the inclusion of a seismic trigger in the channel es11brations of instruments 0-XT-52-75A, 0-XT-52-75B. and 0-XR-52-77. As the table identifies, these instruments are time-history acceles.crophs. In the definition of a time-history accelerograph in Am <ican Nuclear Society Standard 2.2, paso B-5, a trigger is included as a component of the instrument. This necessitates the inclusion of the trigger under the channel calibration heading of table 4.3-4 for these instruments.
Finally, the measurement range of instruments 0-XR-52-86 88, and -89 is incorrectly specified. In paragraph four of the recommendation for -
award, memorandum number 1. of contecct 76K6-820172, the contractor identified that the uppor measure 3.ont range of recordor 0-XR-52-86 is 32g, in disagreement with the value of 904 given in table 3.3-7. This was apparently an oversight in the original technical specifications. In addition, all replacement reeds for all four monitors render the upper measurement value at 328 because of present vendor specifications. To
- facilitate the inevitable incorporation of replacement reeds and/or replacement instruments (the upper value of which is also 328 ), Table 3.3-7 should be corrected to read 328 . This value is still many timos greater than the maximum expected seismic activity for Sequoyah. The proposed change would entor the correct value in Tablo 3.3-7 of technical specification 3.3.3.3.
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ENCLOSURE 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANCES SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 j DOCKET NOS. 50-327 -328 l
'l l Determination of No Significant Hazards Considerations i
for Proposed Correction of Seismic Monitor Information i
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1a ENCLOSURE 3 i
i SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION i
f 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the i probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
I i No. The proposed corrections do not result in a change in current
} plant configuration. Rather, they correct table entries in a
! technical specification for hardware currently installed in the Plant. Therefore, the proposed corrections entail no increase in the
'l probability or consequences of an accidont that has been previously i evaluated.
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l 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or j different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
No. The proposed changes do not affect normal operating procedures j or emergency operating instructions for the plant. The one change in operating limits that results from the corrections is the lowering of the upper limit on the measurement range of response-spectrum i a recorders to 32g. As stated in paragraph four of the recommendation ;
i for award, memorandum number 1 of contract 76K6-820172, this limit
- is still many times greater than the maximum expected g level for Sequoyah. Therefore, the proposed technical specification change '
j does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of ;
- accident from any accident previously evaluated. '
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! 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in margin i of safety?
No. The proposed corrections actually increase the overall safety of !
i the plant by correcting typographical errors, establishing a stricter :
maintenance schedule for the monitors, and giving the true !
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j measurement range of seismic instrumentation. Therefore, the [
proposed corrections do not involve a significant reduction in a L margin of safety. ;
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