ML20204G308
| ML20204G308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1988 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204G289 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-88-091, EA-88-91, NUDOCS 8810240089 | |
| Download: ML20204G308 (12) | |
Text
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k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s In the Matter of Docket No. 50-456 Connonwealth Edison License No. NPF-72 Braidwood Station, Unit 1 EA 88-91 ORDER IMPOSING civil MONETARY PENALTY l 1 i Commonwealth Edison Company (licensee) is the holder of Operating License [
No. NPF-72 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Consission (NRC/Connission) on July 2,1987. The license authorizes the licensee to operate the l Braidwood Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the conditions specified i
therein, i
f An inspection of the licersee's activities w. conducted during the l period March 1-17, 1988. The results of this irspection indicated that ,
the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with [
l NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty was served up;n the licensee by letter dated Hey 6,1988. l 1
The Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's !
requirements that the licensee had violated, and the ancunt of the civil -
penalty proposed for the violations.
The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition [
[
of Civil Penalty by letter datee: June 20, 1988. In its response, the ;
licensee denies Violations B, C.1, and part of C.2 and admits Violation A.
In addition, the licensee takes issue with the proposed imposition of a [
Severity Level !!! violation and the civil penalty. l 88102400s9 sagog9 gDR i ADOCK 050004Q6pdc '
2 After reviewing the licensee's ies9onse, the NRC staff concludes that with regard to Violation B the licensee was correct in arguing that the violation was incorrect as stated in that testing performed on March 4 and 11, 1987 could not have detected a problem in a design change that was not fully implemented until a few weeks after the testing. In a letter dated September 7, 1988 the HRC staff informed the licensee of that conclusion and provided the licensee with a modification of Violation 2 which properly identified the time period of testing which, by the j
licensee's admission, was inadequate to identify the heater interlock i logic switch deficiency. The licensee responded to the September 7, 1988
) letter in a letter dated October 6, 1988. In that response the licensee.
l did not take exception to the modified violation but rather provided additional information relative to system operability.
i
) !!!
] After consideration of the licensee's responses and the statements of fact, explanation, and argument for mitigation contained therein, the Deputy
. ExecuMye Director for Regional Operations has determined, as set forth
! in the Appendix to this Order, that Violations A and C occurred as stated, that Violation B as amended in the NRC staff's letter of September 7, 1988 occurred as stated, that the violations are properly categorized at Severity Level !!!, and that the penalty proposed for the violations oesignated in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Impositioen of Civil Penalty should be imposed. <
,__ .- y bs. d g~ -
? p IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, anc 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS ;
HEREBY Or.DEREO THAT:
p i
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Fifty Thousand Po11ars ($50,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the i
United States and mailed to the Director of Enforcement, -[
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. ATTN: Docuent Control .
l Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.
The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order. A request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as a "Request j for an Enforcement Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission ATTN: Document Control i Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, i Region !!!, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois, 60137, and a copy f
I to the NRC Resident inspector, Braidwood Station.
t If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Orde; designating l the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this !
i Order shall be effective without further proceedings. If payment has not !
been made at that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney _
General for collection, t
I I
4 In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the is, e to be considered at such hearing shall be:
(d) whether the licensee was in violation of the Comission's requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty as amended referenced in Section II above, and (b)_whether,onthebasisofsuchviolatioas,thisOrdershouldbe sustained.
FOR THE flVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- / .
a h
s' M. Tayl #, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations Dated at Rockville, Maryland
! this / '/U-day of October 1988 l
l l
1 l
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t . ..
i l APPCNDIX ,
On May 6,1988, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty I (Notice) was issued for violations identified during an NRC inspection.
Comonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) responded to the Notice on June 20, 1988, i i In its initial response, the licensee admits that Violation A occurred as l l stated, but denies that Violations B, C.1, and part of C.2 occurred as stated ;
j in the Notice. In additios, the licensee takes issue with the proposed i d
imposition of the Severity Level !!! violation and the civil penalty. The !
NRC staff's evaluation and conclusions regarding the licenste's arguments l follows. J
, Restatement of Violation B I
]
) B. 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," requires in I part, that a test program be established to demonstrate that systems and j
]
components will perform satisfactorily in service. i a i
! Commonwealth Edison Company Quality Procedure No.11-2, "Development, !
l performance, Documentation, and Evaluation of Preoperational and Start-Up t i Tests," in part implements 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. l
- Section 3.2 of Quality Procedure No. 11-2 defines preoperational tests as i tests to demonstrate the satisfactory mechanical and electrical operation i
! of the systems involved including interlocks between systems. j Contrary to the above, the licensee's test program did not demonstrate !
- that the Control Room Ventilation System would perform satisfactorily in i f that preoperational testing of the Control Rocm Ventilation Systems which [
] was performed on March 4 and 11, 1987 on trains B and A respectively did '
j
' not identify that heater interlock logic switches were wired incorrectly,
) that specified switch setpoints had not been adjusted, and that the i
- Control Room Ventilation Systems were inoperable,
[
j Sumary of Licensee's Response to Violation B (
l i The licensee denies the violation because the design error could not have been p
{
j detected by initial preoperational testing of the Control Room Ventilation !
j Systems (CRVS) performed on March 4 and 11, 1987. The design change was not j
- completed until May 21, 1987. However, the licensee admits that testing
- required subsequent to the installation of the design change was incorrectly 1
selected. It also points out that the Notice transmittal letter characterized i the CRVS as a degraded sysum rather than an inoperabl6 system as stated in -
I Violation B.
l
- NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Response i
i j The NRC staff agrees that the design change occurred after the initial !
i preoperational testing of the CRVS on March 4 and 11, 1987, and, therefore, the initial preoperational tests could not have detected the design error. [
However, the licensee admits that testing required subsequent to the instal- l lation of the design change was incorrectly selected. This testing is J considered part of the required areoperational testing program and should ;
have been adequate to identify tie design error before the CRVS were declared !
I operable at the time of initial criticality for linit 1 on May 29,1987; however, (
l the design crror was not identified by the licensee until November 6,1987, i i during a review of CRVS startup test rssults. The NRC staff agrees with the !
l licensee's staterent that, for consistency, the Notice transmittal letter l i i
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W 4
Appendix characterization of the CRVS as a degraded system rather than an inoperable system is also appropriate for Violation B. In consideration of these comments, Violation B was amended in a September 7, 1988 letter to the licensee to read as follows:
- B. 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Centrol." requires in
- part, that a test program be established to demonstrate that systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service.
Corrnonwealth Edison Company Quality Procedure No.11-2, "Development, Performance, Documentation, and Evaluation of Preoperational and Start-up Tests," in part implements 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI.
Section 3.2 of Quality Procedure No. 11-2 defines preoperational tests as i tests to demonstrate the satisfactory mechanical and electrical operation of the systems involved including interlocks between systems.
Contrary to the above, the licensee's test program did not demonstrate that the Control Room Ventilation Systems (CRYS) would perform satisfactorily in that CRVS preoperational testing, which was completed before the CRVS were declared operab'.e at the time of Unit 1 initial i criticality on flay 29, 1987, did not identify that heater interlock logic switches were wired incorrectly, that specified switch setpoints had not been adjusted, and that the CRVS were in a degraded condition. .
The violation, as mod .'ied, focuses on the licensee's failure to adequately implement the CRYS preoperational test program, including tests required following system design changes but before the systems were declered operational, rather than the inability of the initial preoperational tests to identify the design error. The licensee responded to the September 7, 1988 letter. However, that response dated October 6,1988 only provided further information relative to system operability and did not take exception to the rodified violation. Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that the violation, as rewritten for clarification, occurred.
Restatement of Violation C.1 C. 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires that activities effecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the at,0ve, as of November 6,1987, it was identified that activities affecting quality bad not been accomplished in accordance with prescribed instructions or drawings, in thst:
- 1. The Architect Engineer did not perform the interdisciplinary review of ECN 344*6, to verify or check the adecuacy of the design information, as required by procedures. .
Sumary of t.icensee's Response to Violation C.1 The licensee denies the violation and contends that it is a restatement of Violation A.
Appendix URC Evaluation of Licensee's Response The NRC staff maintains that Violations C.1 and A are different. Violation A states that the licensee did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III because measures for coordination among design organizations were inadequate in that the measures failed to er.sure that ECN No. 34272 was correctly incorporated into ECN No. 34446. The root cause of Violation A was ambiguous nomenclature used in the logic diagrams of ECN No. 34272. Violation C.1 states that the licensee did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V in that activities affecting quality had not been acconplished in accordance with prescribed procedural instructions. Specifically, the architect engineer did not follow ,
the procedural requirement to )erform tha interdisciplinary review of ECN No. 34446 to verify or check t1e adequacy of the design information. The root cause of Violation C.1 was an individual's error which resulted in a procedural instruction being improperly implemented. Sargent & Lundy General Quality Assurance Procedure No. GQ 4.13. "Engineering Change Notices," stdtes that the preparer shall forward the ECN for internal interfacing coments and if no interfacing comments are required, the ECN shall be forwarded directly to the reviewer. By incorrectly concluding that no internal interfacing coments were necessary, the preparer precluded the interdisciplinary review of ECN No. 34446 that could have caught the error that was made. This violation occurred independently of and in addition to Violation A. .
Restatement of Violation C.2 ,
C. 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions Procedures, and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, precedures, or drawings anc be accomplished in ,
accordance wit 5 these instructions, procedures, or drawings. ,
1 4
Contrary to the above, as of November 6,1987, it was identified that activities affecting quality had not been accomplished in accordance with ,
prescribed instructions or drawings, in that: t
- 2. The heater interlock logic switches for the Control Room Ventilation l
Systems had not been rnodified in accordance with the instructions or drawings of ECN No. 34272 which was issued Decerrber 16, 1986 or in accordance with the differential pressure switch setpoint specifications l i for Switches OPDS-VC059 (Sheet No. PS631) and OPDS-VCC60 (Sheet No. !
PS633) which were promulgated on February 9, 1987.
l Sumary of Licensee's Response to Violation C.2 l The licensee denies the first part of the violation because it contends that the '
I heater interlock logic switches for the Control Room Ventilation Systems (CRYS) had been modified in accordance with the instructions and drawings of ECN i No. 34272 on itay 20 and 21,1987. The li:ensee admits that the differential ;
pressure switch setpoints specifications had not been implemented in a timely fashion, per the Station Review Program, because of a work backlog. ;
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Response The NRC staff maintains its position that the CRVS had not been modified f
A g Appendix ,
in accordance with the instructions or drawings of ECN No. 34272. The modifications which occurred in May 1987 were in accordance with ECN No. 34446, not ECN No. 34272. The instructions and drawings of ECN No. 34272 correctly specified the modifications to the CRVS heater interlock logic switches. Due, in part, to the licensee's failure to follow design control procedures, ECN No. 34272 specificctions were incorrectly incorporated into ECN Ho. 34446.
Summary of Licensee's Arguments Regarding Severity Level The licensee acknowleJges that there were specific defic'tacies which required corrective action, but believes that no programmatic defects exist warranting
, the imposition of a Severity Level III 'iolation and civil penalty. The licen".ee presents the following 'cumcnts to support this assertion.
- 1. The failure to ccord) 'hanical and electrical design requirements was an isolated occurrence i ~4 ting from one individual's misinterpretation l of nomenclature.
- 2. A 100% review of safety-related differential pressure switch applications at the four Byron and Braidwood units revealed no similar discrepancies, thus demonstrating that adeqcate measures were established to controi design interfaces.
3.
The failure resulted to an from conduct a prop individual (er than rather test of the cFinge general) failure intoheater judgedesign accurately the complexity of the change.
1
- 4. A review of 2,176 preoperational testing "deficiencies," resulting from changes in d sign af ter completion of preoperational testing but before the systems were released to plant operations, showed that the proper tests had been conducted in all but five case. (only three in addition to CRVS tests for which licensae was cited). The licensee asserts this demonstrates that the test control program was, in general, fundamentally sound and properly implemented.
- 5. A citew of violations identified during the last SALP period indic3ted thdt those items should not be considered symptomatic of the items presented in the Notice.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Response lhe NRC staff maintains that the violations should be categorized collectively as a Severity Level !!! problem in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Supplement I.C.2, in that the violations resulted in systems (CRYS) designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform their intended function under .
certain conditions. In Attachment C to its June 20, 1988 response, the licensee responds to NRC conce as regarding its safety significance assessments. The licensee provides additional information in its October 6, 1998 letter. The licensee concludes that while thyroid dose in ar 2ccident could be increased due to the degraded CRVS, that dose would remain below the design criterion of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendi> A, GDC-19 (23.7 rem versus 30 rem). The NRC staff review of the licensee's submittals indicates that although some of the NRC concerns have been resolved, the licensee assessment remains speculative, especially the filter efficiency assumption for 100% relative humidity
Appendix conditions. Moreover, although the staff and the licensee disagree on some assessment assumptions, there is agreement that the Control Room Ventilation Systems were in a degraded condition and the accident thyroid dose would be i increased due to the degraded conditions. NRC's concerns are based not only
! on the degraded systems but also, and more importantly, on the underlying design control and testing problems which permitted a safety system to be operated for sestral months in a modified condition without appropriate verification to assure it met design requirements. Although the design and test control problems appear to be primarily due to personnel errors, the failure to reset the heater interlock switch setpoints was due to a prograrratic backlog problem which caused significant delays in making setpoint adjustments. The series of problems represented by the violations exacerbated the initial design error by delaying its discovery. As a result of this delay, the Control Room Ventilation Systems (C' VS) were degraded from May 29, 1987 until November 21, 1987.
The NRC staff has reviewed the specific arguments made by the licensee and concludes that an argument may be made that no programmatic deficiencies existed. However, the fact remains that in this case a series of errors resulted in a safety related system being in a degraded mode and, as such, the violations most appropriately fit example C.2 of Supplement I of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.
Sunnary of Request for Hitigation of Civil Penalty .
The licensee cc.itends that an adequate basis exists for mitigation of the proposed Civil Penalty. In support of this position, it presents the following arguments which address the five civil penalty adjustment factors contained in Section V(B)of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C:
- 1. Prompt Identification and Reporting Summary of Licensee's Argument Under the circumstances, the length of time to discover the design error was not unreasonably long and, as such, should not be the basis to discount the licensee's prompt reporting.
NRC Evaluation ,
Under the NRC Enforcement Policy, the reasonableness of the length of time to discovery depends on the opportunities for discovery and ease of discovery. In this case, from the time ECN No. 34446 was prepared on December 16, 1986 until the design error was discovered, during a review of CRVS startup test results on November 6, 1987, the licensee missed numerous discovery opportunities, including: (1) interfacing comment -
reviews of ECN No. 34446, if the ECN preparer had properly followed the ,
procedure; (2) the required review of the ECN by the reviewer and the approver; (3) the testing of the heater switch design change in May 1987, if the correct test type had been chosen; (4) switch setpoint verifica-tiens, if the tetpoint had been adjusted as required before the CRVS were
- declared oper#91e on May 29, 1987; (5) various CRVS surveillance and startup tests between May 29 and November 6, 1987, if the setpoints had been adjusted as required; and (6) the CRVS startup test on October 2, i
1987, if startup test personnel had been fully cognizant of the system
Appendix o)erability implications of the zero heater current measurements. It is tie NRC staff's position that it is reasonable to have expected the licensee to have discovered the design error earlier and, therefore, mitigation of the proposed civil penalty for prompt identification and reporting of the event is not warranted.
- 2. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence Sununary of Licensee's Arguments The licensee contends that prompt and comprehensive corrective actions have been taken.
HRC Evaluation Although the design changes were quickly corrected after the errors were identified, it was 15 days before the heater interlock switch setpoints were corrected. Furthermore, although the licensee conducted a review to verify no other safety-related errors were associated with design changes which occurnd after completion of system preoperational testing but before the systems were released to the Operations Department, the review was conducted after concerns were raised by the NRC during the enforcement conference. It is the NRC staff's position that the licensee's corrective actions were not sufficiently prompt to warrant mitigation of the proposed civil penalty for corrective action to prevent recurrence.
- 3. Past Performance Sunmary of Licensce's Arguments The licensee believes that this incident is distinct from other issues addressed in the last Braidwood SALP. The licensee maintains that, although prior violations have occurred in the Braidwood Startup Test Program, and that this program is significant to the safe operation of Braidwood Station, the remedial review done of the results of the program, as they relate to detection of design errors, has identified no prior occurrence for which prior corrective action was either inadequate or ineffective.
NRC Evaluation The NRC maintains that the design control problems are indicative of the previous performance problems identified during the SALP 7 assessment pet 'd. The SALP 7 Inspection Report (No. 50-456/88001(DRP);
- i. ')-457/88001(DRP)) findings are symptomatic of the items presented in t .. 9 in that they are indicative of a need to reduce personnel or , creasing personnel alertness and sensitivity to plant co. A. o and requirements and to improve design control, test control, and hdherence to procedures.
. .- , l O' ,
Appendix '
- 4. Prior Notice of Similar Events Sunnary of Licensee's Arguments The licensee contends that there was no prior notice of similar events.
NRC Evaluation The NRC staff agrees that the licensee had no prior notice. However, because a lack of prior notice daes not serve as a basis for mitigation under the Enforceent Policy, the base civil penalty is unaffected by this factor.
- 5. Multiple Occurrences Sunnary of Licensee's Arguments The licensee contends that comprehensive reviews of design changes did not identify multiple occurrences of the problems identified in the Notice.
NRC Evaluation The NRC staff agrees that there were no multiple occurrences. However, .
because a lack of multiple occurrences does not serve as a basis for mitigation under the Enforcement Policy, the base civil penalty is unaffected by this factor.
NRC Conclusion The NRC staff concludes that the violations, as amended with respect to Violation B, occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. Moreover, the NRC concludes that the violations are appropriately classified as a Severity Level III problem.
Further, the NRC staff has also concluded that a sufficient basis has r.ot '
been provided by the licensee for the reduction of the Severity Level, or remission, or mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, the civil penalty in the arnount of Fif ty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) should be imposed.
< q Commorwealth Edison Company Distribution
-E. Chan, OGC G. ' Berry, OGC Stephen P. Sands, NRR The Honorable A. Dixon Callihan, ASLB The Honorable Richard F. Cole, ASLB The Honorable Ivan W. Smith, ASLB
-The Honorable Gary J. Edles, ASLAP The Honorable Dr. W. Reed Johnson, ASLAP The Honorable Christine N. Kohl, ASLAP SECY CA OGPA ,
. DCD/DCB(RIDS)
J. M. Taylor, DEDR0 '
J. Lieberman, OE L. Chandler, OGC '
T. Murley, NRR J. Luchman, OE A. B. Davis, RIII PAO:RIII
~ SLO:RIII-M. Stahulak, RIII Enforcement Coordinatcc;,
RI, RII, RIII, RIV, and RV F. Ingram, PA
> E. Jordan, AE00 B. Hayes, JI
T OE W RII C LChandle i erran
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