ML20205F512
| ML20205F512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1988 |
| From: | Earle T, Howard R, Reich R GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205F510 | List: |
| References | |
| NEDC-31322, NEDC-31322-S01, NEDC-31322-S1, NUDOCS 8810280080 | |
| Download: ML20205F512 (38) | |
Text
8 TTAC/d Mc" Y /
Seec % tat ' lfo Y NEOC 31322 DRFEI2 0 00 75 '
Class I 1 July 1988 l
BWR Owners' Group Report On the Operational Design Basis Of Selected Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves R. W. Howard 1
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GE Nuclear Energy
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 ORFoE12-00100-75 Class 1 July 1988 BWR OWNERS' GROUP REPORT ON THE OPERATIONAL DESIGN BASIS OF SELECTED SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES BWR HIGH PRESSURE REACTOR INVENTORY MAKEUP SYSTEMS SELECTED VALVES OPERATING DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES DURING THE RESPOSITIONING OF AN INADVERTENTLY CLOSED OR OPEN VALVE Prepared by: / d me/ __
R.W. Howard, Principal Engineer Reviewed by: S \- E cut _f-=_ -
R.T. Earle, Principal Engineer '
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R.T.ReichIseniorEngineer Aoproved by:
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R.S. Vij, Manager b GENuclearEnergy 115 Cumer A,eur 1 SeJose. CA 95125 l
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 ll IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT
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l PLEASE READ CAREFULLY t
f The only undertakings of the General Electric Company (GE) respecting i information in this document are contained in the applicable contracts between GE and the BWR Owners' Group utilities as specified in GE Proposal 355-1951, Rev. 1, accepted by the respective participating utilities' Standing Purchase Order for the performance of the work described herein, and nothing contained l in this document shall be construed as changing those individual contracts. .
The use of this information except as defined by said contracts, or for any [
purpose other than that for which it is intended, is not authorized; and with i respect to any such unauthorized use, neither GE any of the contributors to '
i this document makes any representation or warranty (express or implied) as '.o i l
the completeness, accuracy or usefulness of the information contained in this document or that such use of such information may not infringe privately owned !
l rights; nor do they assumo any responsibility for liability or damage of any i kind which may result from such use of such information. I 4
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I
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- 1. INTRODUCTION 1 l i
1.1 Background 1 1.2 Objective 1 1.3 Scope 2
- 2. VALVE REPOSITIONING DI*FERENTIAL PRESSURES 3 2.1 General Assumptions 3 2.2 Determination of Differential Pressures 4 2.2.1 HPCS System MOVs 4 2.2.2 HPCI System MOVs 5 2.2.3 RCIC System MOVs 'A
- 3. REFERENCES 15 l
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 LIST OF TABLES 11hlt 11112 Elit 1 HPCS System Valves 16 2 HPCI System Valves 17 3 RCIC System Valves 18 4 Definition of Terms Used in Tables 1, 2 and 3 '. 9 l 1
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L C OF ILLUSTRATIONS Fiaure Iitig Eggg 1 HPCS System Motor-Operated Valves 20 2 Typical HPCI System Pump Suction and Discharge Motor-Operated Valves 21 l
3 HPCI System Steam Line Motor-Operated Valves 22 4 Typical RCIC System Pump Suction and Discharge Line Motor-0perated Valves 23 5 RCIC System Steam Line Motor Operated Valves 24 6
Illustration for Definition of Terms and Notes Used in Tables 1, 2 ar,d 3 25 l
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1
- 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The original submittal of NEDC-31322 (Reference 2) was the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) response to the Reference 1 NRC IE Bulletin. 'leference 4 (Supplement I to the Ret'erence 1 Bulletin) further requested BWR owners to consider inadvertent valve mispositioning when determining maximum differen-tial pressure. While BWR high pressure reactor inventory makeup systems are not required to regain operability following an operator error that results in inadvertent valve mispositioning, the BWROG has agreed with the NRC to evalu-ate selected valves considering inadvertent valve mispositioning. This Supplement 1 to NEDC-31322 is the BWROG response to Reference 4 and the fulfillment of a BWROG commitment expressed in Reference 3.
This BWROG response is limited to nine (9) selected safety-related motor operated valves based on the following:
(1) Discussions with the Staff which clarified NRC concerns on inadvertent mispositioning of BWR valves.
(2) The elimination of valves from consideration for inadvertent valve mispositioning where such valves caused no differential pressure impact due to "multiple valves in-series' configuration (e.g., motor-operated valves (MOVs) 5 and 6 of Figure 1).
1.2 OBJECTIVE The objective of this BWROG program was to review the spectrum of BWR/3, BWR/4, BWR/5 and BWR/6 high pressure reactor inventory makeup systems and develop a generic methodology for BWR participating utilities to use in determining their maximum (worst case) differential pressures that are required to be overcome in order to reposition selected inadvertently closed or opened valves back to their proper position.
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 1.3 SCOPE The valves selected for consideration of repositioning operating differential pressure resulting from inadvertent closing or opening are as follows:
(1) High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Condensate Storage Tank (CST) l Suction Valve (valve number 3 in Figure 1).
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(2) HPCS System Suppression Pool Test Return Isolation Valve (valve i number 7 in Figure 1).
(3) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System CST Suction Valve l
(valve number 3 in Figure 2).
(4) HPCI System Injection Yalve Test Valve (valve number 8 in Figure 2).
(5) HPCI Turbine Exhaust Isolation Valve (valve number VI in Figure 3).
(6) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System CST Suction Valve (valve number 3 in Figure 4).
(7) RCIC System Injection Valve Test Valve (valve number 8 in Figure 4).
(8) RCIC System Turbine Exhaust Isolation Valve (valve number VI in Figure 5).
(9) RCIC System Trip and Throttle Valve (valve number X in Figure 5).
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1
- 2. VALVE REPOSITIONING DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES This section of the report identifies the assumptions and methods to be used to determine valve differential pressures that must be overcome in order to reposition an inadvertently closed or opened valve back to its proper position.
2.1 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS The following assumptions are utilized to determine valve maximum operat-ing differential pressure that occurs during the repositioning of an inadvertently closed or opened valve:
(1) A valve may be mispositioned prior to system initiation, or a valve may be mispositioned after system initiation *,
(2) Operating personnel in the main control room inadvertently signal a valve to an incorrect position and the valve strokes fully to the incorrect position.
(3) The operator then signals the valve back to the correct position without actuating any other valves or components.
l (4) The only other system valves or components that change their operat-l ing state during th( .. advertent actuation and subsequent valve repositioning are those that occur automatically as a result of the inadvertent valve actuation and/or repositioning.
(5) No component failures or other operator errors are assumed to occur during the inadvertent valve a',:tuation and repositioning.
The differential pressure methodology provided for each valve ph tents the bounding case of the conditions described in 2.l(1).
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 2.2 DETERMINATION OF DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES This section presents the methods to be used to determine the maximum differential pressure that must be overcome in order to reposition an inadver-tently closed or opened valve back to its correct position. Method: are presented for each of the nine (9) selected valves listed in Section 1.3. The associated system operating assumptions for each v11ve are also identified.
2.2.1 HPCS System MOVs 2.2.1.1 HPCS CST Suction Valve Valve number 3 in Figure 1 functions as the system CST suction shutoff valve. The active safety action of this valve is to close during abnormal events when system sucticn is transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. Closure of the valve is required to ensure system operation when system suction is transferred to the suppression pool.
The maximum expected pressure during repositioning of thu valve occurs upstream of the valve.
The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning is presented in Table 1. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) The system is operating to provide makeup water to the reactor (2) The system suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(3) The operator inadvertently signals the CST suction valve to close l and the valve goes fully closed.
l (4) The HPCS pump continues to operate and maintains a low pressure i downstream of the valve, j (5) The operator then signals the valve to reposition.
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jplement 1 2.2.1.2 HPCS Suppression Pool Test Return Isolation Valve Valve number 7 in Figure 1 is normally closed and functions as the suppression pool test return isolation valve. During an abnormal event, the valve is required to remain closed in order to (a) provide containment isola- (
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tion, and (b) ensure that all system flow is directed to the reactor vessel.
It is intended to be opened for system surveillance flow testing when the plant is in a normal shutdown condition.
The maximum expected pressure during repositioning of the valve occurs upstream of the valve.
The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve recositioning is presented in Table 1. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) The system is operating on minimum flow bypass.
(2) The system suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(3) The operator inadvertently signals the suppressioq pool test return isolation valve to open and the valve goes fully open.
(4) The operator then signals the valve to reposition /close and the valve goes fully closed.
1 i 2.2.2 HPCI System MOVs 2.2.2.1 HPCI CST Suction Valve Valve number 3 in Figure 2 is normally open and functions as the system CST suction shutoff valve. The active safety action of this valve is to close during abnormal events when system suction is transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. Closure of the valve is required to ensure system operatic, when system suction is from the suppression pool.
l NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs upstream of the valve.
The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning is presented in Table 2. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) The system is operating to provide makeup water to the reactor.
(2) The system suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(3) The operator inadvertently signals the CST suction valve to close and the valve goes fully closed.
5 (4) While the valve is closing, the turbine trips due to low pump suction pressure.
(5) The pressure downstream of the CST suction valve is equal to vapor pressure of the fluid in the suction pipe because the CST suction valve is dssumed to be located at an elevation significantly above the low suction pressure trip switch.
(6) The operator then signals the valve to reposition.
2.2.2.2 HPCI Injection Valve Test Valve Valve number 8 in Figure 2 is normally open and functions as the system injection valve test valve.
It is only closed to perform operability testing j of the system injection valve (i.e., valve number 1). During an abnormal event, it is required to remain open to ensure that system flow is directed to the reactor vessel.
The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs upstrean of the valve.
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 The maximum expected repositioning differential pretsure across the valve occurs during abnormal events when the system is required to provide inventory makeup to the reactor vessel. The magnitude of the maximum expected repost-tioning differential pressure is dependent on whether or not the HPCI turbine startup transient reduction modifications (such as the HPCI turbine hydraulic bypass modification) have been implemented. Therefore, two methodologies are presented herein (i.e., one methodology for systems that have startup trans-ient redur. tion modifications, and a second methodology for those systems without the modifications).
2.2.2.2.1 Systems With Startuo Transient Reduction Modifications. The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning for systems with startup transient reduction modifications is presented in Table 2. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) Suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(2) The system is operating to provide makeup water to the reactor.
(3) The reactor pressure is equal to the system's steam supply pressure low isolation setpoint.
(4) The operator inadvertently signals the injection valve test valve to close and the valve goes fully closed.
(5) The system minimum flow bypass isolat'.an valve (i.e., Valve number 2) automatically starts to open as the injection valve test valve reaches its fully closed position.
(6) The turbine speed increases to its maximum normal turbine speed.
(7) The operator then signals the valve to reposition.
l NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 2.2.2.2.2 Systems Without Start-Up Transient Reduction Modifications. The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning for systems that have not implemented startup transient reduction modifications is presented in Table 2. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) Suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(2) The system is not running / operating.
(3) The reactor pressure is equal to the system's steam supply low pressure isolation setpoint, j (4) The operator inadvertently closes the injection valve test valve.
l (5) The system receives an initiation signal and the injection valve test valve is automatically signaled to open.
1 (6) During opening of the valve, (1) the turbine reaches its maximum normal speed before the injection valve test valve starts to open, (2) the injection valve starts opening before the injection valve test valve, and (3) the injection valve test valve starts opening before the minimum flow bypass isolation valve opens.
2.2.2.3 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Isolation Valve Valve number VI in Figure 3 is normally open and functions as the turbine exhaust containment isolation valve. The safety related function of the valve is to close when isolation is required.
The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs downstream of the valve.
NEDC 31322 Supplement 1 The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning is presented in Table 2. The following issumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) The reactor is operating at the maximum allowable power output.
(2) The operator inadvertently closes the turbine exhaust isolation valve.
(3) A small break LOCA occurs and results in the system receiving an initiation signal. However, the system does not start because the turbine exhaust isolation valve is closed.
(4) The operator determines that the system did not start due to the closed turbine exhaust isolation valve and signals the valve to open.
2.2.3 RCIC System M0Vs 2.2.3.1 RCIC CST Suction Valve Valve number 3 in figure 4 functions as the system CST suction shutoff valve. The active safety action of this valve is to close during abnormal events when system suction is transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. Closure of the valve is required to ensure system operation when system suction is from the suppression pool.
The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs upstream of the valve.
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning is presented in Table 3. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) The system is operating to provide makeup water to the reactor.
(2) The system suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(3) The operator inadvertently signals the CST suction valve to close and the valve goes fully closed.
(4) While the valve is closing, the turbine trips on low pump suction pressure.
(5) The pressure downstream of the valve is equal to the vapor pressure of the fluid in the uction pipe, since the CST suction valve is assumed to be located at an elevation significantly above the low suction pressure trip switch.
(6) The operator then signals the valve to reposition.
2.2.3.2 RCIC Injection Valve Test Valve Valve number 8 in Figure 4 is normally open and functions as the system injection valve test valve. It is only closed to perform operability testing of the system injection valve (i.e., valve number 1). During an abnormal event, it is required to remain open to ensure that system flow is directed to the reactor vessel.
The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs upstream of the valve.
The maximum expected repositioning differential pressure across the valve occurs during abnormal events when the system is required to provide inventory makeup to the reactor vessel. The magnitude of the maximum expected reposi-tioning differential pressure is dependent on whether or not the RCIC turbine NEDC-31322 Supplement I startup transient reduction modifications (such as bypass start) have been implemented. Therefore, two methodologies are presented herein (i.e., one methodology for systems that have startup transient reduction modifications and a second methodology for those systems without the modifications).
2.2.3.2.1 Systems With Startuo Transient Reduction Modifications. The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning for systems with startup transient reduction modification is presented in Table 3. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) Suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
(2) The system is operating to provide makeup water to the reactor.
(3) The reactor pressure is equal to the system's steam supply pressure low isolation setpoint.
(4) The operator inadvertently signals the injection valve test valve to close and the valve goes fully closed.
(5) The system minimum flow isolation bypass valve fi.e., valve number 2) automatically starts to open at the inject.'on "alve test valve reaches its fully closed position.
(6) The turbine speed increases to its maximum normal turbine speed.
(7) The oW rator then signals the valve to reposition.
2.2.3.2.2 Syste's Withgyt Startuo Transient Reduction Modifications. The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure I during valve repositioning for systems that have not implemented startup transient reduction modifications is presented in Table 3. The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) Suction is from the CST and the CST is full.
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 (2) The system is not running / operating.
(3) The reactor pressure is equal to the system's steam supply pressure low suction isolation setpoint.
(4) The operator inadvertently closes the injection valve est valve.
(5) The system receives an initiation signal and the injection valve test valve is automatically signaled to open.
(6) During opening of the valve, (1) the turbine reaches its maximum normal speed before the injection valve test valve starts to open, (2) the injection valve starts opening before the injection valve test valve, and (3) the injection valve test valve starts opening before the minimum flow bypass isolation valve opens.
2.2.3.3 RCIC Turbine Exhaust Isolation Valve Valve number VI in Figure 5 is normally open and functions as the turbine exhaust containment isolation valve. The safety related function of the valve is to close when isolation is required.
The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs downstream of the valve.
The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential l pressure during valve repositioning is presented in Table 3. The following l
assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
(1) The reactor is operating at the maximum allowable power output.
(2) The operator inadvertently closes the turbine exhaust isolation valve.
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 (3) A small break LOCA occurs and results in the system receiving an initiation signal. However, the system does not start because the turbine exhaust isolation valve is closed.
(4) The operator determines that the system did not start due to the closed turbine exhaust isolation valve and signals the valve to open.
2.2.3.4 RCIC Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve Valve number X in Figure 5 is normally open and functions as the RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve. The function and active safety action of the RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve is to trip closed when required to protect the turbine and pump. The closure of the valve, when tripped, is spring actuated. The motor operator on this valve is only used to reset the valve to the open position following a turbine trip.
The maximum expected pressure during valve repositioning occurs upstream of the valve.
The method to be utilized to calculate the maximum expected differential pressure during valve repositioning is presented in Table 3*, The following assumptions apply in determining this differential pressure:
The differential pressure across the RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve during opening of the valve in compliance with norual operating procedures is negligible. The basis for this is that, prior to resetting the RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve, the RCIC system steam admission valve located upstream of the trip and throttle valve would first be closed. This action I resets the RCIC system startup logic (i.e., the ramp generator for the RCIC turbine). The RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve above seat drain upstream of the valve will vent steam that is trapped between the closed steam admis-ston valve and the trip and throttle valve to the turbine exhaust line drain pot. This will reduce the differential pressure across the turbine trip and throttle valve to a negligible value prior to valve opening.
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 (1) The system is operating to provide makeup water to the reactor.
(2) The reactor is isolated with the reactor pressure equal to the spring setpoint of the reactor safety / relief valve with the lowest nominal spring setpoint.
(3) The operator inadvertently trips the RCIC turbine trip and throttle valve and the valve is spring actuated to the fully closed position.
(4) The operator then initiates the actions required to reposition /open the valve.
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NEOC 31322 Supplement 1
- 3. REFERENCES
- 1. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement, !E Bulletin No. 85 03 Titled ' Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transient Due to leproper Switch Settings,"
dated November 15, 1985,
- 2. GE Document No. NEOC 31322, September 1986, "BWR Owners' Group Report on the Operational Design Basis of Selected Safety R31ated Motor Operated Valves."
- 4. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Bulletin No. 85-03, Supplement 1, "Hotor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to improper Switch Settings,' Dated April 27, 1988.
NEDC 31322 Supplement 1 Table 1 HPCS SYSTEM VALVES Maximum Expected Method to Determine the Maximum Pressure Excected Differential Pressure Occurs Valve Normal Recosition Action Up- Down-Number Functiqn Position geenino Closina Strean Stream 3 CST Open X Suction AP PEL3+PATM Valve 7 Suppres- Close X AP Pgp+PELM+PVEL Pool Test Return Isolation Valve l
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NEOC-31322 Supplement 1 Table 2 HPCI SYSTEM YALVES Haximum Expected Method to Determine the Maximum Pressure Excected Differential Pressure Occurs Valve Normal Recosition Action Up- Down-Nu-ber Function P_osition Ocenino Closino Stream 11tg13 3 CST Open X Suction AP PEL3+PATP' Valve 8 Injection Open AP=Pgp PISO PEL(a) X Valve Test AP PSOH PISO PEL+Pgp(b)
Valve VI Turbine Open AP=P X LO Exhaust Isola-tien Valve l
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NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 Table 3 RCIC SYSTEM VALVES Haximum Expected Method to Determine the Maximum Pressure Excected Differential Pressure Occurs Valve Normal Recosition Action Up- Down-Nurber Function Position Doenino Closina Stream Stream 3 CST Open X Suction AP PEL3+ PATH Valve 8 Injection Open X Valve AP=PMF PISO-PEL(a) t AP=PSOH PISO PEL+Pgp(b)
VI Turbine Open AP=P X Exhaust LO Isola-tion Valve X Trip and Open AP=P g33
- X Throttle Valve 9 his is the mixirum differential pressure; actual differential pressure is expected to be negligible (see footnote on Page 13).
NEDC 31322 Supplement 1 Table 4 Di.NNITION OF TERMS AND NOTES USED IN TABLES 1, 2, AND 3 DEFINITION OF TERMS (Refer to Figure 6 for Illustration of Terms)
AP Valve maximum expected operating differential pressure.
P MF Differential pressure developed sy the system main pump (s) at a flow rate equal to the required mirimum bypass flow rate. For steam turbine driven pumps, assume uaximum normal turbine speed.
P EL Hinimum hydrostatic pressure difference between suction source and discharge due to elevation (assumes discharge elevation is higher than suction).
P
!SO Low reactor pressure at which steam supply lines automatically isolate.
P ELM Maximum hydrostatic pressure difference between the suction source and discharge due to elevation.
P RSS Reactor pressure corresponding to the spring setpoint of the reactor safety / relief valve with the lowest nominal spring setpoint.
P EL3 Hydrostatic pressure difference between CST and location of valve when the CST is full.
P ATM Atmospheric pressure.
P gt Differential pressure associated with valve closure due to fluid velocity changes (i.e., water hammer type of pressure increase) inside the pipe as defined in Appendix B, NEDC 31322.
P SCH Differential pressure deveinped by system main pump (s) at zero 'l ow rate. For steam turbin( iven purps, assume maximum normal turbine speed.
P gp The maximum discharge pressure of the pump that maintains the discharge line full by taking suction upstream of the check valve in the CST suction line and discharging downstream of the check valve in and upstream of the suction of the system pump. This applies only to syst.as that have a line fill system as described.
P LO LOCA wetwell pressure when the valve is opened.
NOTES (a) Systems with startup transient reduction modifications.
(b) Syste9s without startup transient reduction modifications.
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NEDC 31322 Supplemnt 1 i
To mt ACTOM - '
La F '
VtsstL CON 0tNSAft STCR AGE TANK (CST)
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-X r NomuaLLV Of tN V ALVE Figure 1. HPCS System Motor Operated Valves 20 -
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1
- s CONDENSATE 1 STORAGE TANK (CST)
( (FROM RCIC MOV 5 TO CORE _ & 2 SPRAY UNE ~ r' MOV1a TO FEEDWATER :
UNE
)i X MOV1 MOV 8 BOO TER PUMP PUMP
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4 I SUPPRE $$10N POOL MOV 4 MOV da UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM FLOW OIRECT10N a yq r NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE X r NORMALLY OPEN VALVE Figure 2. Typical HPCI System Pump Suction and Dischargb Motor-Operated Valves
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 uov iv Movv w, r%/ w2 r, r PROM MAIN X
MOv 1: MOv lit s%s U
>4 MovI
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HPCl TUR BIN E v A Mov vill
[ Mov vn x
Mov vi
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SUPPR ESSION Pool Figure 3. HPCI System Steam Line Motor-Operated Valves
' NEDC-31322 Supplement I s ~
CONOENSATE g g STOR AGE TANK (CST?
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b b A
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1 P J { MOV 5 NJECTION POINT h MOV3 MOVt MOV8 RC C p
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V3 MOV 2 SUPPRESSION POOL LJ L2 V3 V3 MOV4 MOVda i
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l UPSTR E A M OOWNSTR E A M F t.OW OIR ECTION r h = NORMAL,LY CLOSEO VALVE NORMAL LY OPEN VALVE Figure 4. Typical RCIC System Pump Suction and Discharge Line Motor-Operated Valves
I NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 s%s MOV 11 MOV lli FROM MAIN i STEAM UNE L
>4 >4 Mov Iv , Mov v MOV IX X >4 MOV X MOVi NI N
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RCtC TURBINE eN, #
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$UPPRESSION POOL 1
Figure 5. RCIC System Steam line Motor 0perated Valves
NEDC-31322 Supplement 1 l
REACTOR PRESSURE PRSS, Pi so
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.4 d N. _._._ __ . _._. .A MAXIMUM d WATER LEVEL WETWELL PRESSURE U
%OC, PC MINIM O M WATER LEVEL pg u [__-_e_-______
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g g 2 PEL3 Xc MAIN PUMP (S) olFFERENTIAL
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- PRESSURE ALLOWABLE PsoH, Pyp, U
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% MINIMUM p ALLOWABLE 3 l WATER LEVEL I
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WETWELL
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1 FILL PUMP flFFERENTIAL PRESSURE Pxp Figure 6. Illustration for Definition of Terms in Tables 1, 2, and 3
i GE Nuclear Energy II6 [crlvt A,rrte S n J:<?. CA 95125
SNRC-1504 Attachment 2 Page 1 Action Item
- a. Review and document the design basis for the operation of each valve. This documentation should include the maximum differential pressure expected during both opening and closing of the valve foc both normal and abnormal events to the extent that the events are included in the existing, approved design basis (i.e., the design basis documented in pertinent licensee submittals such as FSAR analyses and fully approved operating and emergency procedures, etc.). In addition, when determining the maximum differential pressure for valves that can be inadvertently mispositioned, the fact that the valve must be able to recover from such mispositioning should be included.
1 Response provides the BWROG design basis for the operation of each valve and contains the methodology used to calculate the maximum differential pressure, due to valve mispositioning, that will be used to comply with the testing requirements of item (c) of Reference 3. Note that all valves are normally open valves and the methodology provides the maximum differential pressures required to re-open the valves.
Table 1 (hncioned) lists the valves installed at Shoreham that were requ:. red to be re-evaluated for maximum dif ferential pressure considering inadvertent valve operation. This table includes the original design differential pressures used to size the valve operators, along with the calculated maximum expected differential pressure using the methodology contained in .
Of the seven valves listed in Table 1 only one was not part of ,
LILCO's original action plan to addrass this bulletin. This valve, (1E51*MOV44) the RCIC trip and throttle valve is normally ;
open and its active safety function is to close. The closure of this valve is spring actuated. Since its active safety function ;
is accomplished via spring actuation the concerns of the original bulletin did not apply hence it was not included in the program.
Based on Supplement 1 of this bulletin and the clarification of l the requirement to consider inadvertent mispositioning, this valve (1U51*MOV044) is now in LILCO's program to address Bulletin 85-03.
Also enclosed, as Attachment 3, is an updated version of Table 1A which includes maximum differential pressure considering inadvertent valve operation for the seven valves listed in Table 1.
SNRC-1504 Attachment- 2' Page 2 Suppleent 1 I. E. Bulletin 85-03 Table 1 BWROG AINOFMAL EVENTS Limitorque Design INCIIDING INADVERIET OPERATION Valve Differential MAXIMM DIFFEMNTIAL PRESSURE Valve ID Operator Vavle Functions Pressure OPENING CIOSING M7fES 1E41*MDV031 SMB-0-25 IIPCI Pump Suct 35 43 ,
16*-1506 Gate Cond W IE41*MOV034 SMB-2-60 IIPCI Punp Disch 1140 1233 14*-900fGate IE41*KN044 St4H)-15 Turb. Bth to 52 34 18"-150tGate Supp Pool IE51*MOV031 Ste-00-5 RCIC Ptmp Suct 130 43 6"-1509 Gate Cond E lE51*KNO34 SMB-00-10 RCIC Pump Disch 1300 1211 4"-9006 Gate IE51*MOV045 SPe-000-5 Turb Exh to 10 34 8"-150$ Gate Supp Pool lE51*MOV044 Spe-000-2 RCIC Trip and 1115
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Attarhtznt 3 to SNIL-1504 I. E. Bulletin 85-03 Table 1A BhWG l AsmmL EvmrS Iinitorque Design INCWDDJG INADVERTmT OPERATION Valve Differential MAXIMM Dmu(1LTIAL nedduur.;
Operator Valve Functions Pree m OPENING (3) CIDSING FUTES VAINE ID i
SMB-3-100 HPCI PP DISCH 1140 1161 1164 2 1E41*m/035 14"-900i Gate SMB-00-10 Min Flow Bypass 1200 1400 1385 2 1E41*MNO36 4"-900f Globe To Supp Pool SMB-0-25 HPCI Pu:p Suct 35 43(6) 2 IE41*MNO31 16"-150# Cate Cord TK SMB-0-25 HPCI Pump Suct 3d 98 35 2 IE41*MOV032 16"-150i Gate Supp Pool SMB-1-25 HPCI Pu::p Dirch 1475 1385 4 IE41*MOV037 8"-900# Globe Cond TK IE41*MNO38 SMB-1-40 HPCI Disch 1475 1385 4 10"-9005 Gate Cond TK SMB-2-60 HPCI Turp Disch 1140 1233(6) 2 IE41*MOV034 14"-900# Gate SMB-000-5 HPCI Inbe Oil 850 42 43 IE41*MNO39 2*-1500i Globe Cooler 1E41*MN043 SMB-1-60 HPCI Steau 1135 1115 10"-900i Gate To Turb SMB-3-80 HPCI Stean 1135 1115 1115 1 IE41*MN041 10"-900 Gate To Turb 1 of 4
I Attach::ent 3 to SNRC-1504 Y. E. Bulletia 85-03 Table 1A BhK)G ABNOPMAL EVENTS Limitorque Design INCIllDDC INWVERTENT OPERATIQ1 Valve Differential FAXDDi Dmu<tL*fIAL n<t5 dure Valve Ibnctions Preawre OPENING (3) CIOSDC NUTES VALVE ID Operator SMB-1-60 HICI Steam 1135 1115 3115 1 1E41*F W O42 10"-9005 Cate 'Ib 'Ibrb 1E41*F0V041 1050 1115 2 IE41*MOV047 SMD-000-2 1"-15005 G1 tie Bypass SMB-000-2 1E41*F0v042 1140 1115 1E41*F0V048 1*-1500$ Globe Bypass SMB-0-15 Ttirb Exh to 52 34(6) 0 lE41*MOV044 18"-1505 Gate Supp Pool SMB-000-2 HPCI 'Ibrb Exh 52 50 1E41*KN049 2"-600i Globe Vac Break SF'B-00-25 FCIC Pump Disch 1300 1211 1225 1E51*Mov035 6"-9005 Cate Min Flow Bypass 1280 1314 1314 2 IE51*MNO36 SMB-000-5 2"-1500f Glche To Supp Pool SMB-00-5 RCIC Pump Suct 130 43(6) 28 1E51*F0V031 6"-150# Gate cond TK RCIC Pump Suct 130 145 35 2 1E51*F0V032 SMB-00-5 6*-150f Gate Supp Pool RCIC Pump Disch 1215 1290 2 1E51*MNO37 SMB-00-10 4"-9005 Gate 'Ib Cond Tk 1E51*MNO34 SMB-00-10 RCIC Pu:rp Disch 1300 1211 4"-9004 Gats 2 of 4
Attachnent 3 to SNRC-1504 I. E. Bulletin 85-03 Table IA BMIOG ABNDRMAL EVENTS Lbnitorgae Design INCIIEING INADVEIUINf OPERATICN Valve Differential MAXIP0M DIFEERINIIAL PRESSURE Valve Ebnctions Pressure OPENING (3) CIDSING NDTES VALVE ID Operator RCIC Iube Oil 1300 1319 39 2
- IE51*MOV038 S:s-000-5 2"-1500# Globe Cooler 9 0-000-2 Vac Punp Disch 60 35 IE51*MWO46 2*-600f G1d;e To Supp Pool SMB-0C-7.5 PCIC Ste m To 1135 1115 1115 1E51*MN043 3"-900f Cate 'Ibrb SPE-00-10 RCIC Stem to 1135 1115 1115 1 !
1E51*MOV041 3"-900 $ Gate Turb SMEH)0-7.5 RCIC Stem to 1135 1115 1115 1 IE51*MOV042 3"-900i Gate Turb SMD-000-2 1E51*MOV041 1050 1115 2 IE51*POV047 1"-1500# Globe Bypass fEB-000-2 1E51*POV042 1140 1115 1E51*MOV048 1"-15004 Globe- Bypass 1
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Attaciment 3 to SNPC-1504 I. E. Bulletin 85-03 Table 1A BWROG AENDIURL EVENTS Limitorque Design INCIJJDING INADVEIEENT OPERATION Valve Differential MAXIMM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE Operator Valve Functions Prenaire OPENING (3) CIOSING NCFIES VALVE ID RCIC Turb 10 34(6) 0 2 1E51*MN045 SMB-000-5 R"-150f Gate Exh SMB-600-2 RCIC Turb Exh 60 50 IE51*MN049 1.5"-6004 Glcbe Vac Break 1E51*MOV044 SMB-000-2 FCIC Trip and 1115(6) (7) N/A
'Ihrottle (1) Doctanentatice was submitted via SNRC-1185 dated 6/28/85 to Mr. H.R. Denton to demonstrate valve would perform isolation function due to line break.
(2) Calculated maxinun differential pressure using BWRX; methodology results in a higher differential pressure than that utilized in the Shoreham design bases.
(3) 'Ibe torque switch is nonfunctimal in the opening direction as it is permanently shorted out of the circuit.
(4) Consistent with the BWROG methodology, these valves have no active safety function because they are nnr= ally closed and open only duri:xy puup testing. 'Ihese valves are presently under engineering review to resolve concerns identified during punp testing.
(5) 'Ihis 1" inboard containment isolation valve is presently under engineering review to determine appropriate torque switch settings.
(6) Fwi== differentia? pressure due to inadertent valve operation.
(7) Additional valve added to progran to address Bulletin 85-03 based on Supplanent 1 of txilletin.
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SNRC-1504 Attachment 2 Page 3 Action Item
- b. Perform action item b of the original bulletin for any additional valves identified above.
The intent is to provide assurance that a program exists f^r selecting and setting valve operator switches to ensure a high reliability of safety system valves. If changing the switch settings is not sufficient to ensure the capability for repositioning a particular mispositioned valve, a justification for continued operation should be provided in the bulletin response if the licensee does not elect to implement additional actions, such as administrative or procedural controls or equipment modifications, to minimize the likelihood of valve malfunction.
- b. (original bulletin) Using the results from item a above, establish he correct switch settings. This shall include a program to review and revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting and setting all switches (i.e., torque, torque bypass, position limit, overload) for each valve operation (opening and closing).
If the licensee determines that a valve is inoperable, the licensee shall also make an appropriate justification for continued operation in accordance with the applicable technical specification.
Response
The additional valve identified above in item (a) has been added to our program to address Bulletin 85-03. LILCO will use the following methodology for confirming the adequacy of the valve and/or operator design. Note that the "open" torque switch for all of the subject valves is bypassed for the entire valve stroke.
LILCO will compare maximum differential pressures from item (a) to the original design values. For those cases where the maximum differential pressure opening exceeds the original design value, LILCO will make a best efforts attempt to verify the adequacy of the valve and/or operator design within 90 days of the date of this letter. If it is determined that the design is not acceptable, the valve will be declared inoperable and the applicable limiting conditions for operation will be enforced, or we will make an appropriate justification for continued operatior I in accordance with the applicable technical specification. i i
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SNRC-1504 Attachment 2 Page 4 Action Item
- c. Perform Action Item (c) of the original bulletin for any additional valves identified above.
- c. (original bulletin) Individual valve settings shall be changed, as appropriate, to those established in item (b),
dbove. Whether the valve setting is changed or not, the valve will be demonstrated to be operable by testing the valve at the maximum differential pressure determined in item a above with the exception that testing motor-operated valves under conditions simulating a break in the line containing the valve is not required. Otherwise, justification should be provided for any cases where testing with the maximum differential pressure cannot practicably be performed. This justification should include the alternative to maximum differential pressure testing which will be used to verify the correct settings.
Note: This bulletin is not intended to establish a requirement for valve testing for the condition simulating a break in the line containing the valve.
However, to the extent that such valve operation is relied upon in the design basis, a break in the line containing the valve should be considered in the analyses prescribed in items a and b above. The resulting switch settings for pipe break conditions
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should be verified, to the extent practical, by the same methods that would be used to verify other settings (if any) that are not tested at the maximum differential pressure.
Each valve shall be stroke tested, to the extent practical, ,
to verify that the setting defined in item b above have been properly implemented even if testing with differential
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pressure can not be performed, i
Response
LILCO will use the results of item (a) to confirm the adequacy of l the subject valves. It is still LILCO's intent to complete the testing requirements of the subject bulletin during Shoreham's power ascension test program. LILCO will perform diagnostic testing of all I.E. Bulletin 85-03 valves listed in Table 1A to confirm the adequacy of valve switch settings; these include torque and limit switches as applicable.
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