ML20207E824
| ML20207E824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1988 |
| From: | Sneider C MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207E449 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8808180160 | |
| Download: ML20207E824 (84) | |
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' 00CKETED UdNHC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 88 AU3 05 P3 '46 -
Before Administrative Judges: O m cc c., g ,, . ,. g Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson 00CK[i m ., M n Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. Od'4tM Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of )
) Docket Nos.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) 50-443-444-OL HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) (Off-site EP)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ) August 15, 1988
)
)
MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW ON SHELTERING CONTENTIONS Carol S. Sneider Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety Unit Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2200 8808180160 880815' PDR ADOCK 05000443 C PDR l
D o-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of )
) Docket Nos.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) 50-443-444-OL HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) (Off-site EP)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ) August 15, 1988
)
)
MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW ON SHELTERING CONTENTIONS Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon files these proposed findings and rulings of law on sheltering issues as a continuation of the findings and rulings of law filed by the Attorney General on May 19, 1988. For conformity with other parties' findings, the paragraphs herein are numbered commencing with the number 10. All references back to other proposed findings are to Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon's Proposed Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law filed on May 19, 1988.
The Massachusetts Attorney General joins in and adopts the Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution and the Town of Hampton.
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10.1 Findings of Fact 10.1.1. Three contentions were admited for litigation in this proceeding to the effect that the NHRERP does not contain adequate provisions for sheltering the beach populations in the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook EPZ, and consequently that the NHRERP does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for the beach populations in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. These contentions are: NECNP-RERP-8, SAPL-16, and TOH-8. ASLB Memorandum and OtdgI (May 18, 1987).
10.1.2. Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon filed expert testimony in support of these contentions. The witnesses who testified for the Massachusetts Attorney General are: Dr. Robert L. Goble, a Doctor of Physics, with considerable experience in emergency planning, who is currently a Research Associate Professor of Environment, Technology, and Society and adjunct Professor of Physics at Clark University, r (Qualifications: Post II. 10963 at 1-2 and Attach. 1; II.
11290-293; II. 11583-584); Dr. Ortwin Renn, a Doctor of Social Psychology, with expertise in emergency planning and, in particular, human behavior and response in emergencies, who is currently an Associate Professor of Environment, Technology and Society and a member of the Hazards Assessment Group of the Center for Technology, Environment and Development at Clark University (Qualifications: Post II. 10963 at 2-3 and Attach.
2); Dr. Robert T. Eckert, Vice President of Salmon Falls Research Associates, Incorporated, and Associate Professor of a
Forest Resources at the University of New Hampshire, who has an expertise in statistical analysis (Qualifications: Post II.
10963 at 3-4 and Attach. 3); Prof. Victor N. Evdokimoff, a certified health physicist and a registered expert in radiation protection with the Commonwealth et Massachusetts, who is currently an adjunct Assistant Professor of Public Health at Boston University School of Medicine and Radiation Safety Officer at Boston University Medical Center (Qualifications:
Post II. 10963 at 4-5 and Attach. 4); and Dr. Thomas Adler, whose qualifications are set forth in detail at Mass AG Proposed Findinas Hos. 6.1.32-6.1.33, supra.
10.1.3. The Board finds all the witnesses sponsored by the Massachusetts Attorney General to be well qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education to give the testimony presented by each.
10.1.4. The Board heard considerable testimony on the issue of sheltering the summer beach population in the New Hampshire portion of the Seabrook Station EPZ. A major area of controversy is whether, and under what circumstances, sheltering should be a preferred protective action for the summer beach populatien.
I 10.1.5. The Board notes at the outset that there are certain factors specific to the Seabrook emergency planning zone ("EPZ"] that must be brought to bear in considering this issue regarding protection of the summer beach population. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has stated with respect to
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its consideration of this issue that:
[F} actors unique at least in magnitude to Seabrook
. . . concerning protection of the Seabrook beach population are the size of the transient ("day tripper") beach population; size of the beach population; number of unwinterized housing /
commercial buildings; volume of corridor type road traffic; complexity of road network; number of local governments involved in the emergency planning process; and large geographic size of the EpZ.
Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963 at Attach. 5, p. 8. Sam also Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963 at 10-12; Findings Nos.
6.1.13-6.1.20.
10.1.6. According to Applicants' testimony, the State of New Hampshire would consider sheltering the summer beach population when: (1) "it would be the most effective option in ach2eving maximum dose reduction," or (2) there exist physical impediments to evacuation, such as "fog, snow, road conditions, bridge situations [and) highway constructions." Applicants and the State of New Hampshire perceive these circumstances to be "very limited." Ann. Dir., post II. 10022 at 19; II. 10721.
10.1.7. The controversy among the parties essentially centers on the circumstances in which sheltering would be the most effective option in achieving maximum dose reduction, and to what extent those circumstances are "very limited."
10.1.8. Dr. Goble testified for the Mass AG, that sheltering would be the preferred protective action for the beach population in a rapidly developing, severe accident.
Goble et al Qir., post II. 10963 at 15; II. 11462; II. 11468; II, 11616; II. 11627-629. Dr. Goble also testified that "[f]or a short duration (a few hours), gaseous release of
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radioactivity . . . sheltering is the only response that would do any good." Eatt It. 10963 at 15; II. 11462. Applicants' and FEMA witnesses agreed with Dr. Goble that sheltering would be the appropriate response for a short duration, gaseous release of radiation. II. 10374; post II. 10377. There is scme controversy, however, as to whether sheltering should be the preferred response in the rapidly developing, severe accident scenario.
10.1.9. In analyzing this issue, the Board looks, first, at whether the rapidly, developing, severe accident is an important consideration with respect to judging the adequacy of the NHRERP.
10.1.10. The parties all agree that rapidly, developing I severe accidents are within the NUREG-0654 planning spectrum, and that the NHRERP should be able to cope with fast-developing accidents involving a large scale release of radioactivity.
II. 10212-213; It. 10224; II. 10399; II. 10402.
10.1.11. There was also no dispute among the parties that accidents involving significant releases of r&dioactivity are the most important ones to consider with respect to off-site protective actions. Egg Nos. 10.1.12-10.1.15. infra.
10.1.12. Dr. Wallace testified on behalf of the Applicants that "the objective of the protective responses in the NHRERP is to control the radiological exposures to which the public may be subjected in the event of a significant release of '
radiation." II. 10224; post II. 10022 at App. 1, p. 3.
t 10.1.13. Similarly, Dr. Goble testified that emergency response planning is primarily aimed at those emergencies which seriously threaten human health and welfare, because it is these accidents where effective emergency planning can make a big difference. . II. 11311; II. 11482. Dr. Goble explained that although small accidents are more likely, it is the accidents which happen relatively quickly, and which involve relatively large releases of radioactivity, for which emergency planning is most needed and for which the planning basis for emergency planning was established. II. 11311.
10.1.14. FEMA's witness Mr. Keller also testified that off-site protective measures should be directed at those serious accidents which can result in early health effects.
II. 14241. As Mr. Keller pointed out, a General Emergency is defined by NUREG-0654 as an accident involving "imminent or actual core damage," and because "you can have in core melt sequences immediate health effects, it's prudent to take the protective action which gives the maximum protection against the biggest problem . . . II. 14255-256.
10.1.15. 'Although Applicants' witness Mr. MacDonald testified that he considered fast-paced, serious accidents to be "near the very end of the planning spectrum," he included in that spectrum of potential "accidents" all unusual events, alerts and site area emergencies. II. 10400-402. The Board notes, however, that by definition, only accidents classified as "General Emergencies" would require the implementation of off-site "protective actions" (as defined in NUREG-0654 at App.
1 l
5, p. 5-5), since it is only these accidents for which "releases can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area." NUREG-0654, App. 1, p. 1-16; see also II. 10225-226; II. 10229; II. 10232. Mr. MacDonald did consider fast-paced serious accidents, defined in this instance as accidents comparable to the PWR-1 through PWR-5 accidents of WASH-1400, the Reactor Safety Study, to be a significant portion of the planning spectrum "in terms of potential consequences." II. 10401.
10.1.16. Based on this essentially undisputed testimony, the Board finds that accidents involving significant releases of radioactivity are important considerations and, indeed, are the most important ones to consider, with respect to judging the appropriateness of off-site protective actions.
10.1.17. With respect to the timing of these serious accident sequences, the parties were all in agreement that these accidents can develop relatively quickly. Egg Nos.
10.1.18-10.1.20. infra.
10.1.18. 'As Applicants' witness Mr. Callendrello testified, according to the guidance of NUREG-0654, the "start of a major release [is) of the order of one half hour to several hours." II. 10224.
10.1.19. Dr. Goble also testified, based on NUREG-0654, that a release may happen as quickly as one-half hour after the onset of accident conditions. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 13-14. Dr. Goble further testified that "the criteria in NUREG-0654 are based on a set of generic analyses of reactor accident conditions and the problems they pose for emergency planning." II. 11312. And one of the assumptions based on that analyses which was built into the NUREG-0654 guidance is that there is "no evidence that you will be able to anticipate with sufficient warning the development of most serious accidents." II. 11312.
10.1.20. Mr. Keller testified that he considers WASH-1400, the Reactor Safety Study, which contains detailed sequences of pressurized water reactor accidents, ranging from PWR-1 through PWR-9, It. 14146, to be the best analyses of time sequences for potential source terms. II. 14155. Mr. MacDonald testified for the Applicants that the PWR-1 through PWR-5 sequences are the most serious of the nine PWR sequences in WASH-1400, and that warning times for the PWR-1 through PWR-5 accidents are "on the order of one to two hours." II. 10322-323.
10.1.21. With respect to release duration, there was testimony from Dr. Goble indicating that for most major life-threatening releases, the bulk of the radioactive material would be released within the first two hours after the start of the release. It. 11651-652.
10.1.22. Mr. Keller testified that, according to NUREG-0654, the major portion of the release could occur within one-half hour to one day after the start of the release, but for those serious accidents that could result in early health effects, the major portion of the release would occur "fairly quickly" after the start of the release. II. 14245-246.
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10.1.23. Based on *.he above testimony and the NUREG-0654 guidance, the Board finds that with respect to protective measures for the summer beach population, the NHRERp must be prepared for serious, fast-developing accidents with warning times from the onset of accident conditions as short as one-half hour and in which the major portion of the release could occur within one-half hour to one day after the onset of the release. Indeed, it appears based on the uncontradicted testimony that the most serious core-melt accidents, pWR-1 through pWR-5, which the Board finds represent a significant portion of the planning spectrum in terms of those accidents requiring off-site protective actions (at least with respect to potential consequences), would likely have warning times of only one to two hours, and that the major portion of the release in these life-threatening accidents could occur very quickly, within one to two hours after the start of the release.
10.1.24. The Board finds these parameters concerning warning time and release duration to be important considerations with respect to assessing the appropriateness of the NHRERp's protective measures for the summer beach population. This is so because: (1) the shorter the warning times, the gravec the consequences to the off-site population if an inappropriate, or ineffective, protective action is recommended; and (2) all the witnesses agree that with sufficient warning time the appropriate protective response for the beach population would be evacuation. E.g., II, 11465-467.
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10.1.25. All the witnesses agreed that the time to release and duration of release would be key factors in determining the appropriate protective response for the summer beach population. Egg Nos. 10.1.26-10.1.29. infra. The Board heard considerable testimony on the effect these parameters would have on the choice of protective action.
10.1.26. The State of New Hampshire witnesses testified that, "sheltering may afford a greater dose savings than evacuation if evacuation cannot be completed prior to release." II. 10374. The New Hampshire witnesses also testified that sheltering "may be the appropriate protective action for a puff release, a gaseous or a gaseous and particulate release, of less than two hours duration." Id.
10.1.27. Applicants' witnesses testified that a scenario i
in which sheltering would provide maximum dose savings in summer months would generally be characterized by the following: (1) no earlier actions had been taken; (2) the release is of short duration and will arrive in the beach area in a short amount of time; and (3) there is a large population, close to peak,' at the beach so that evacuation times would be significantly longer than exposure duration. II. 10719.
10.1.28. Dr. Goble consistently testified throughout the proceedings that sheltering, if it can be implemented, is the preferred protective action for the summer beach population when there is an imminent release of short duration. E22., II-11627-628. Dr, Goble emphasized that his definition of the t e t ... " i mmi r.c n t " is relative to the evacuation time estimates
for the beach area, II. 11614-616, and that the severity of the consequences of a serious accident is very sensitive to evacuation times. II. 11589.
10.1.29. FEMA's witness Mr. Keller testified with respect to the significance of the warning time, that, in general, evacuation must occur before or shortly after the start of a release for it to substantially reduce doses to the public.
II. 1419' 7.
10.1.30. The Board has reviewed at length the evacuation time estimates for the New Hampshire beach population, and has found evacuation times for that population to range from six hours, thirty-five minutes, to over ten hours on a peak summer day, according to Applicants' witnesses; Aco. Dir. No. 7, Post II. 5622 at 42-43; Adler Dir. (ETEs), Post II. 7181 at 12-13; and to range from eight hours, forty minutes,to over twelve hours according to Mass AG witnesses. Adler Dir. (ETEs), Post II. 7181 at 11a-13,52-52a. Testimony of Dr. Adler submitted in the sheltering portion of this case shows that it will take the beach population in a "best case" evacuation, using all the Applicants' own assumptions, six hours just to evacuate to a distance of three miles from Seabrook Station. Adler Dir.,
i Post II. 10911 at 2 and Figure 5. Using the Mass AG estimates of the number of vehicles in the beach area on a peak summer day, it will take the summer beach population seven hours to l
E clear the three-mile ring. Id. at 2 and Figure 1. Dr. Adler maintains that even this latter time estimate of seven hours is l
optimistic, because, except for the number of vehicles in the l
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beach area, he has calculated this time using all the Applicants' own assumptions, many of which, as he testified in the ETE portion of this proceeding, will result in a time estimate that is too low. Id. at 2. Egg Adler Dir. JETEs),
Post II. 7181 at 11a-13,52-52a. All of these beach area ETEs would be longer still, if an evacuation was ordered for the population out to ten miles, and in the event of a large release, the New Hampshire witnesses testified that they would want to issue a decision for the area out to ten miles. II.
10506.
10.1.31. No matter which ETE for the beach population is used, the Board finds that the beach population would not be -
able to evacuate from the beach area in the event of a fast-developi 1, serious accident. The Board has found that warning times tange from one to two hours for a significant portion of the accidents for which off-site protective actions (sheltering or evacuation) would be warranted, and that this time could be as short as one-half hour. Egg Nos. 10.1.18 to 10.1.20; 10.1.23, suora. Considering one of these accidents with relatively short warning times, the testimony is uncontradicted that if the plume is traveling toward the beach the majority of the beachgoers would not be able to clear the beach area prior to plume arrival. II. 10330-333; II. 10345; II. 10409-410. The Board notes that even if the plume were traveling at as slow a speed as one mile per hour, it would reach the beach area, which begins less than two miles from the plant; Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 10, within three to 12 -
l four hours after the onset of accident conditions, assuming the one to two hour warning time. According to Dr. Adler's testimony, almost half the beach population would still be within the three-mile ring after three to four hours. Adler uir., post Dir., 10911 at Figure 1. Indeed, Mr. Keller i
testified that an analysis performed by a FEMA consultant from Argonne National Laboratories, Dr. Baldwin, shows that even at low wind speeds fifty percent of the beach population would still be on the beach (defined as two feet on the sand) when the plume arrives. II, 14166-167; II. 14182. At higher wind speeds even more people would be on the beach. II. 14167, 10.1.32. The Board also heard considerable testimony on the effect the NHRERp's provision for precautionary beach closing could have on evacuation times. New Hampshire officials testified that the State incorporated this provision, allowing for early closure of the beaches within two miles of the plant at a Site-Area, or possibly Alert, level of emergency, in response to FEMA's concern that reliance on a shelter-in-place concept in which the transient beach population would be instructed to evacuate (see No. 10.1 infra.) "could, in fact, result in a hasty evacuation of the transient beach population shortly before, or during, a release." Apo. Dir. No 6, post II. 10022 at App. 1, p. 5.
10.1.33. Mr Bondr, Assistant Director for planning for New Hampshire DpHS, further explained on behalf of the Applicants, that the reason for adopting the precautionary beach closing was that, if the State relied on protective measures, alone, it 13 -
could find itself in a situation in which it wanted to evacuate the beach population, but would find that the population was 1
"far more substantial that you have a reasonable time or reasonable expectation to evacuate in a reasonable period of time. It's overly large." II. 10235. The precautionary measures were therefore intended to afford "additional time,"
to reduce the size of the population that might be subject to later protective actions. Id.
10.1.34. There was no evidence presented, however, which demonstrates that this precautionary measure would provide any significant additional time to evacuate the beach population in the event of the fast-developing, serious accident. The State of New Hampshire has not performed any analyses or made any assumptions as to the amount of additional time these crecautionary measures might afford, II. 10244, and indeed has testified that these measures may provide no additional time.
II. 10296.
10.1.35. Applicants' witnesses testified that a plant condition that triggers an "Alert," or even an "Unusual Event,"
classification could proceed to a release in as little time as one-half hour. II. 10308-311.
.10.1.36. In addition, both FEMA and Applicgnts' witnesses testified that an accident might well start off classified as a "General Emergency," in which case precautionary measures would not be employed, and therefore, could provide no additional i
time to evacuate. II. 10333; It. 14194.
10.1.37. Moreover, it is clear from the testimony that the warning times assumed by NUREG-0654, as well as NASH-1400, are indications of the time available from the onset of accident conditions until the time of release. Gable et al Dir., East II. 10963 at 14; II. 10308-309; II. 10311-312; Lt. 103321.
Since, as Applicants' witness testified, "an upset condition has to occur in order to classify into one of the four (emergency] categories," II. 10408, New Hampshire's precautionary measures could not provide any additional time to the one-half hour to two hour warning times which the testimony establishes is associated with the fast-developing, serious accident. At best, assuming an accident does not start off classified as a "General Emergency," the precautionary measures will allow for some portion of that one-half to two hours warning time that would not otherwise have been used for evacueting the beach population to instead be used to evacuate the population. But no witness could say exactly how much of that warning time could, with precautionary measures, be used to commence the evacuation of the population. Ene e g. II.
10234; II. 102'36; II. 10298.
10.1.38. Some of that warning time, Applicants' witnesses l
testified, would necessarily be taken up by the utility recognizing and classifying the accident and notifying the off-site authorities. II. 10411. And, according to the
- testimony, the State of New Hampshire t.ould then need to confirm the utility's protective action recommendations prior to notifying the beach population. II. 10435. The New 15 -
Hampshire witnesses testified that this would involve: the State Police notifying the DpHS emergency response initiator, who would then contact the control room and receive further information regarding plant status and the utility's protective action recommendation; the DpHS response initiator then calling the Director of DpHS to provide him with his assessment of the situation; the Director then calling the Director of Emergency Management to discuss the recommendation, and then the Directors calling the Governor who would ultimately make the decision regarding the protective or precautionary measures, and then initiate the notification process. II. 10439-441.
There is no indication in the testimony as to how long this process would take, but it would obviously take up some portion of the allotted warning time.
10.1.39. Based on the above testimony, the Board finds no basis for assuming that precautionary beach closing could be effectuated in time to provide any meaningful amount of additional time to evacuate the beach population in the event of a rapidly-developing accident. Moreover, the Board finds that some significant portion of the warning time for such accidents would be used up by utility and State officials evaluating the accident, making their recommendation and notifying the appropriate officials in the decision chain, and, finally, notifying the off-site public. Egg No. 10.1.38 Eunta. Based on this, the Board finds no evidence that the evacuation of any significant portion of the summer beach population could begin before or shortly after the start of the release, and therefore, based on FEMA's testimony, no evidence that evacuation of the beach population could substantially reduce doses for the beach population. Egg No. 10.1.29, augra; II. 14196. Indeed, Mr. Keller testified that he has "no calculations or analyses for the fast-breaking accident at Seabrook that demonstrates any particular level of dose reduction associated with an immediate evacuation strategy.
II. 14192. With these findings in mind, the Board proceeds to evaluate the bases for Applicants' and FEMA's position that evacuation is the preferred protective response for the summer beach population at Seabrook.
10.1.40. The only clearly articulated statement of the basis for Applicants' position, that evacuation is the preferred response, was expressed by the New Hampshire witnesses on Applicants' panel. In essence, the State officials agreed with the Applicants' witnesses that sheltering of the beach population might provide "maximum dose savings" in the event of a fast-breaking accident of short duration on a peak summer day, assuming no earlier actions had been taken.
Een No. 10.1.27, EURIA; II. 10719-720. However, the State would add one caveat to that position, which is, that there be "no particulates in the release." II. 10720. The Board notes that while this caveat is entirely consistent with other testimony of the New Hampshire witnesses, age n,.2., II. 10735, there is other contradictory testin.Jny f rom the State witnesses in which they testified that sheltering may be the appropriate response for a short duration (less than two hours) release of gases and particulates. San No. 10.1.26. suora; II. 10374; post It. 10377. There does not appear to be any explanation for this inconsistency in the record. The Board finds this inconsistency especially troubling in light of the impact it could have on decision-making at the time of an accident. (Een Nos. 10.1. infra.) Nevertheless, the predominant position of the State appears to be that sheltering would not usually be recommended in the event of an accident involving a particulate release.
10.1.41. The basis for this New Hampshite position that it would not shelter in the event of a particulate release, can be found in the "New Hampshire Response to FEMA Supplemental Testimony," dated February 11, 1988. Agg.. Dir. No. 6, post II.
10022 at App. 1, p. 5. There, New Hampshire states that in a shelter / evacuation strategy, the beach population vould get some dose while seeking shelter, more dose while in shelter, and even mere dose while evacuating. The State concludes from this that it is disuaded from moving large numbers of people to shelter, since "evacuation is seen as providing dose savings in nearly all accident scenarios." Id. The State has not performed, or provided in their testimony, any further analysis to support its conclusion that evacuetion would provic greater dose savings than sheltering. II. 11492. Although the State does suggest that, in part, this conclusion is premised on the assumption that precautionary measures would remove a large portion of the beach population before there is a need to take protective actions; App. Dir. No 6, Post II. 10022 at App. 1,
- p. 8; ZI. 10235; the State maintains that evacuation would be the preferced response even fat that fast-developing accident that startu off classified as a General Emergency. II.
10335-326, See also, 10555-556, 10.1,42- When croco-examined on the conclusion that, "evacuation is seen as providing dose savings in nearly all accident scona rios , Mr. Strome, the Director of the New Hampshire Emergency Management Agency, explained that he would define a situation in which only one person was able to evacuate the beach area as providing "dose savings." The State officials were otherwise unable to quantify or further define i
what they meant by the statement "evacuation is seen as providing dose savings in nearly all circumstances." II.
10351. They were unable to testify that such "dose savings" would be "metningful" or that a "significant" portion of the populat4on nous.. be afforded such "dose savings." II. 10353; 10361.
10.1.43. Based on this lack of analysis and inability to l explain the basis for its position, the Board gives little
! weight to the' State's testimony that evacration would be the preferred response in a fast-developing accident involving a i
particulate release.
10.1.4% FEMA's witness, Mr. Keller espoused a similar position to that of New Hampshire. Mr. Keller was nevertheless
- able to provide some tasis for his conclusion that evacuation 1
is the preferred response for the summer beach population within the area two to three miles from the plant.
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l 10.1.45. FEMA's position is based on a generic dose coasequence analysis, II. 14250, from which Mi. Keller concludes that "in severe accident sequences, the groundshine component is most likely to be the major contributor to total dose if no protective actions are taken; FEMA Dir., Post II.
13968 at 9; II. 14230; and that "avoidance of the groundshine dose . . . is the way to most efficiently save dose." II.
14230.
10.1.46, According to Mr. Keller, the immediate evacuation strategy is preferable to a shelter / evacuation strategy because in most severe accidents the dose savings from the groundshine component, and thus the net overali dose savings, would be greater from evacuation than from sheltering, and t'en n evai:.uating. FEMA Dir., Post II. 13968 at 9; Tr. 14230-231.
. Mr. Keller explained that "shelter reduces dose primarily from the plume immersion and inhalation components (of dose)," and that the reduction would not be significant in the type of unwinterized shelters prevalent in the New Hampshire beach area. EEli&_J111.. , P_qs.t II. 13968 at 10. For evacuation, he testified, you accept "the possibility that the cloudshine immersion and/or inhalation dose will be delivered to the 1
l individual, but you are avoiding a larger dose component from the groundshine". II. 14230-2313. This is the case, according to his testimony, because generally dose reduction from groundshine "can be obtained by moving the population l
relatively short distances." FEMA Dir., Post II. 13968 at
! 10-11.
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I 10.1.47. When cross-examined on this position, Mr. Keller affirmed that the FEMA testimony was based on a generic dose consequence analysis; It. 14250; and that the conclusions in t.is testimony "rely in no way on data, assumptions or evaluations specific to the Seabrook site." II. 14192.
Indeed, the only portion of the current NHRERP which Mr. Keller has even read is the version of Appendix F, "Protective Action Decision Criteria," that was attached to the New Hampshire February lith Response to FEMA, and which has since been amended. II. 14212; II. 10184. Compare App. Dir No. 6. Post II. 10022 at Appendix 1, pp. 13-47 with Id. at Attach. 1.
10.1.48. Ultimately, according to Mr. Keller, "[his]
belief that there will be some dose savings afforded the beach population for fast-breaking accidents is based on [his) opinion that some undetermined number of people will be able to move off the beaches before they're exposed to the plume." II.
14194-195. But Mr. Keller acknowledged that he did not know how many people could move off the beaches, or how far they would get before plume arrival. II. 14195. His conclusion also does not'take into account the ETEs for the New Hampshire beach area or even consider "the fact that (evacuating] cars could be in the beach area ir mobile for many hears during plume 1
l travel. II. 14233. Indeed, Mr. Keller testified that hc had l no evidence that, assuming a fast-breaking accident at Seabrook, the majority of beachgoers would not be immobile in l cars in the beach area during the entire duration of plume l
passage. II. 14249-250.
l
10.1.49. The Board is disturbed by FEMA's failure to consider in its testimony any factors specific to the Seabrook site, especially when it considers that there has been a great deal of testimony in this case suggesting that the size of the transient beach population in close proximity to the Seabrook plant, together with the long evacuation times at this site, poses unique emergency planning problems. E.c., Goble, et al.
Eir., Post II. 10963 at 9-12; Tr. 11328; II.11466-467; II.
11479; II. 11486; II. 11590-591. Indeed, when the Board considers the fact that FEMA's previous position on this beach sheltering issue, in which FEMA was unable to find that the NHRERP provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for the summer beach population, was founded on these site-specific problems associated with the Seabrook EPZ beach population; gag Goble et al Dir., Post II.
10963 at Attachment 5-7; it finds FEMA's failure to consider these factors in its current analysis almost incomprehensible and at the very least irresponsible.
10.1.50. When Mr. Keller was pressed on cross-examination with specific examples of site-specific, as well as generic, factors that might affect the conclusion in his testimony, he quite readily conceded that he could conceive of a numoer of accident scenarios, even those involving a groundshine component, for which sheltering would be a preferred protective response for the summer beach population. II, 14231; II.
14239-241. Included among the examples of situations in which i Mr. Keller acknowledged that sheltering might be the preferred i
protective response were ones in which the beach population was instructed to shelter pending plume passage, and thereafter instructed to evacuate in a direction that would avoid the radioactive "hot spots," areas with large amounts of groundshine contamination. II. 14238-240.
10.1.51. Despite Mr. Keller's acknowledgment that there are a number of scenarios in which a sheltering-evacuation strategy would be the preferred response, he would not concede that such a strategy should ever be adopted by New Hampshire because, he stated, there are too many uncertainties involved and it is unlikely that one would be able to predict ahead of time which strategy (shelter or evacuation) would provide maximum dose savings. II. 14240-241; II. 14243-244. These uncertainties, according to Mr. Keller, include the direction and spend of plume travel, the duration of the release, and the time of-the start of the release. In light of these uncertainties, Mr. Keller testified, one should choose Fhe protective action which "gives the maximum protection against the biggest problem." II. 14255-256. Mr. Keller does not adequately explain why, in light of the Seabrook-specific factors, including evacuation times, and the several examples where he agreed sheltering would be preferred, he views the immediate evacuation strategey as providing maximum totection. His testimony speaks only in generalities that are
.ae result of a generic analysis and he does not provide any specific examples of fast-breaking accident scenarios at the Seabrook site in which immediate evacuation would be preferred. Sgg FEMA Dir., post II. 13968 at 8-11; II. 14192' II. 14230-231; II. 14249-250.
10.1.52. Mr. Kellet does suggest that given the poor quality of the shelters in the beach area that the uncertainties over which protective strategy to use would outweigh any benefits that could be derived from sheltering.
II. 14243. This reasoning makes some sense to the Board, except that in balancing these factors Mr. Keller only considers the ten percent reduction from cloudshine that the shelters would afford and fails to consider the greater reduction from inhalation and groundshine dose that could be obtained from the shelters. Id.; Eng also 10.1. infra. In addition, Mr. Keller does not explain why these uncertainties over release parameters would not just as well weigh against the immediate evacuation strategy with its inherent uncertainty over the number of people who would be unable to evacuate any significant distance prior to plume arrival. E29 II.
14249-250.
10.1.53. The Board would note with respect to these uncertainties'over release parameters that Applicants' witness l Mr. MacDonald testified that the utility "would have pretty j good insight as to what the possibility was for containment I
failure" and "when containment failure could occur." II.
l l 10502-503.
l l 10.1.54. Dr. Goble agreed with Mr. Keller that it would be difficult to reliably predict the size or the duration of the l
release, but stated there could be some indications. II.
11481; II. 11485. However, Dr. Goble testified that there's "a real concern if you have entered into a core melt and a release has begun, or has not begun,. . .that there might be a large, relatively short duration release" and the anticipation of that situation, even if you can't be certain that it will occur, "may be appropriate to direct your choice of emergency strategies." The difficulty of reliably predicting the duration or size of the release in advance, Dr. Goble explained, should not exclude those situations from emergency planning. Rather, the planners "should figure out the most effective way of dealing with the situation with its attendant unknowns." II. 11485. Dr. Goble would recommend that a detailed analysis be made of potential accident characteristics for this reactor at this site and that an evaluation be made of what can and cannot be predicted and a determination made as to what the most effective response is likely to be in these situations of uncertainty. To his knowledge, this analysis has not been done; II. 11486, II. 11491-492, II. 11614-616, cf.
11588-589; and the Board finds nothing in the record to suggest that such an analysis has been performed.
10.1.55. The Board finds this analysis of Dr. Goble's similar to Mr. Keller's in that, for both of them, the serious accident with the greatest potential for health effects drives their choice of an emergency response strategy. Dr. Goble, however, is unwilling to accede, without a good deal more analysis than has yet been done by either New Hampshire, Applicants or FEMA, that an immediate evacuation strategy,
a a
which could leave thousands of people in the beach area in cars virtually unprotected from the plume, would be the preferred response. Ee_e , L_g2, II. 11479; II. 11474-475. Moreover, the Board' notes that if one is to assume for decision-making purposes, as Mr. Keller suggests, that the accident with the greatest potential for health consequences may occur, to be consistent, one should then also assume that the release would be a fast-developing one of short duration, as these are the releases which Mr. Keller has testified can result in serious, early health effects. II. 11246.
10.1.56. Moreover, Dr. Goble explained, in what the Board finds to be the most considered treatment of this issue regarding the uncertainties of a release, that there are certain timing considerations which serve to eliminate some of the element of uncertainty insofar as it relates to the selection of an appropriate protective response. Dr. Goble testified that you can anticipate that "a release is imminent if you have entered into core melt or severe core degradation leading to melt." The issue then becomes "whether or not the containment wi11 hold." According to Dr. Goble, there is, then, "a relatively early crisis point" when the reactor vessel melts through the core, when the containment will either hold or not hold. If the containment holds at that point it will likely hold for "a relatively long period of time." Therefore, what one can predict when core melt is imminent, is that "there l might be a release relatively soon and you will know about it l
relatively soon, or there might be a substantial delay in l
I
release" -- but you will not know which one of these two events will happen. II. 11662-663.
10.1.57. Dr. Goble advised that, given this situation of a potential imminent release in which if the containment does not hold there would not be sufficient time to evacuate the beach population, it would be prudent to shelter the population and if it turns out that the containment does hold there is then likely to be a substantial amount of time in which to evacuate the population. II. 11663-664.
10.1.58. Dr. Goble testified that, if sheltering of the beach population can be implemented, given the evacuation times at this site which would preclude at least a significant portion of the population from evacuating prior to plume arrival, it would be better to shelter the population than to allow them to remain in their cars in the beach area. This is because, Dr. Goble explained, a shelter provides some protection from all three forms of exposure, while a car will provide very little protection. II. 11664.
10.1.59. With respect to the cloud shine component of dose, both Dr. Goble and Mr. Keller agree that a person in a shelter would receive less dose than a person remaining in a car in the beach area during plume passage, since a car provides virtually no protection from cloudshine and the only time-frame of concern for cloudshine exposure is the time-frame Curing plume passage because doses from cloudshine cease to accumulate once the plume has passed. II. 11226-227. So, i
unless the car is able to move out of the plume, the persons in the car would be better off in shelter. II. 11222-224.
10.1.60. Since the accident scenarios of concern are short duration releases, the Board finds (age No 10.1.23. supra) that vehicles in the beach area would be unable to evacuate the beach area prior to plume passage; Hns. 10.1.30, 10.1.31, 10.1.34, 10.1.39, suora; and therefore with respect to the cloud shine component of dose, age 10.1.59. EuRIa, maximum dose savings would be achieved through sheltering. The Board would add that with respect to an evacuating vehicle that is only able to leave the area during th'e time of plume passage, there is a possibility that the vehicle will evacuate in the same direction as the plume, agg gig. FEMA Dir., Post II. 13968 at 10, and, therefore, that the people in the vehicle could incur even greater doses than if they had remained in the beach area.
10.1.61. With respecs to the inhalation component of dose, Dr. Goble has testified that inhalation of particulates could be a major contributor to total dose. II. 11665; II.
11634-624. Again, both Dr. Goble and Mr. Keller are in agreement that a shelter would provide greater protection from inhalation than would an automobile. II, 11665; II.
11225-226. Even though a shelter's ability to protect from inhalation degenerates with time, FEMA Dir., Post II. 13968 at 10, in the rapidly, developing accidents of short duration the testimony is essentially uncontradicted that a shelter with an air exchange rate of two changes per hour (the air exchange rate assumed by the NHRERP for the beach area shelters, II.
J 10553) would provide considerably more protection from inhalation exposure than would a car that remains in the beach area during plume passage. II. 11665; II. 11225-227.
10.1.62. The Board therefore finds with respect to the inhalation compcaent of dose that, in the event of a fast-developing accident of short duration, maximum dose savings for the beach population would be achieved by sheltering rather than evacuation.
10.1.63. The ground shine component of dose is somewhat more problematic. Although Mr. MacDonald testified for the Applicants that ne could "not conceive of an accident at Seabrook that would not be dominated by noble gases," II.
10484, there was general agreement among the other witnesses that dose from groundshine would generally be the major contributor to total dose. EEMA Dir., Etat II. 13968 at 10; II. 11575.
10.1.64. When comparing groundshines doses one would receive in a shelter in the beach to the groundshine doses one would receive while in a stationary car in the same location as the shelter, it is apparent that a shelter would provide greater dose savings than a car. II. 11664-668. According to the Table for groundshine dose reduction factors in Burson &
Profio; Apo. Exh. 34, at Table 8, p. 26; (an authority recognized by all the witnesses), a wood-frame shelter without a basement would reduce groundshine exposure by approximately sixty percent while a car would reduce exposure by approximately fifty percent. (If a person was able to shelter
1
=
l l
1 in a basement, or masonry home, or a larger building with three or four stories, the groundshine exposure could be reduced by eighty to ninety-five percent. ApD. Exh. 34, p. 26) The exposure inside a car is in fact likely to be significantly greater than the .5 attributed to Burson & Profio, since the witnesses all concede that it is quite unlikely that people could sit in their cars in the beach area for two hours on a hot summer day with the windows closed. In this event, the witnesses agreed, the person inside the car would be apt to get particles on his/her skin; II. 229-230; II. 11665; II. 10467; and the exposure from these particles would continue until.the person is decontaminated. II. 10467-471. This dose, which the Board finds could be considerable, was not considered by Mr.
Keller or by the New Hampshire witnesses in their analyses of evacuation dose. II. 11476-477; II. 14231.
10.1.65. The Board finds that at least with respect to those vehicles which remain stationary, or do not make any significant evacuation movement, during the period of plume release, that exposure from groundshine would be greater for a person in one'of those vehicles than for a person in a shelter.
10.1.66. It has been suggested, however, that since ground I deposition particles accumulate over the period of release, that it would be better to evacuate people out of the area immediately so as to avoid the accumulation of that dose, than to shelter the population and then evacuate. II. 11624-625.
But this possibility assumes that an immediate evacuation is possible, which the testimony evidences would not be the case for the majority of beachgoers in the event of a short duration release. See Eqa. 10.1.31; 10.1.39. As Dr. Goble testified, since the duration of serious accidents is expected to be relatively short (less than two hours) compared to evacuation times for the beach population, most of the groundshine material would have already accumulated before most people could evacuate from the beach area. II. 11667. He further explained that with the accumulation of material there would be more radiation for the shelter to protect against, and therefore greater dose savings to be achieved from sheltering.
II. 11667-668.
10.1.67. It has also been suggested by Mr. Keller that greater dose reduction from groundshine could be achieved from evacuation than from sheltering, because due to dispersion and dilution of the plume, the dose rate generally decreases with distance, and, thus, movement of the population only a short distance downwind from the plume would reduce the dose from groundshine enough to offset the benefits from sheltering.
FEMA Dir., post II. 13968 at 10. This proposition assumes, however, that'through evacuation the population, or at least some significant portion of the population, will be able to move at least some distance further away from the reactor prior to plume passage. Id., II. 14194-195. But the evidence in the ETE portion of this proceeding demonstrates that most of the evacuation time in the beach area is actually "waiting time,"
that is, cars queued up in parking lots waiting to evacuate.
Moreover, the evidence shows that even those cars that are able f
to move out of the parking lots will not make any progress away from the reactor as they move along the evacuation routes until they actually leave the beach area, and that, with the possible exception of the first cars out of the area, the vast portion of the total evacuation time for each car will be spent in the beach area. II. 5715-16; II, 6714-715; II. 11489; Adler Dir.,
Post II. 10911 at Figure 1. Indeed, at some points the evacuation routes in the beach area will even bring the cars closer to the reactor. II. 5715-5716.
10.1.68. Similarly, the Board finds that Mr. Keller's proposition that immediate evacuation is preferred because movement of people even small distances, even if the movement does not bring them further away from the reactor, may still serve to move them out of the path of the plume entirely, ignores the fact that the majority of the vehicles in the beach area uill be sitting in parking lots, not moving at all, during the entire period of plume passage (assuming a serious, short duration release). Egg No. 10.1.31. suora. Moreover, Mr.
Keller conceded that this movement might just as well move cars l into the plume'as move them out of it. II. 14239. Indeed, the Board finds it only logical that a person in a moving vehicle would have more chance of encountering the plume at some point along its path than would a person who, by sheltering, remains
! in one location.
10.1.69. Mr. Keller has further suggested that if may be somewhat irrelevant to compare dose reduction factors from sheltering to dose reduction factors from evacuation since, in j
the final analysis, the groundshine dose received from post-sheltering evacuation would at least be equivalent to (and possibly more than) the groundshine dose received from an immediate evacuation strategy, and, therefore, since one can assume that in the immediate evacuation strategy at least some people would get out of the beach area before plume passage, aggregate doses to the population would be less for the immediate evacuation strategy than for a shelter / evacuation strategy. FEMA Dir., Eq1t II. 13968 at 10; II. 14242. This ignores the possibility, testified to by Dr. Goble, that for post-sheltering evacuation, which could take place after monitoring for radioactive hotspots, the population could be directed to evacuate in the opposite direction of plume travel, and away from areas known to be heavily contaminated. II.
11670-671. Mr. Keller, in fact, agreed on cross-examination that this was a plausible strategy that could result in lower dose. It. 14243. Mr. Keller's reluctance in adopting this strategy was due to the fact that he considered the "ten percent reduction" in dose that one could obtain in a beach i
l area shelter to be "trivial;" II. 14243; compared to all the I
uncertainties, over weather conditions, source term, nuclide mix, etc., that could affect the choice of a protective response. Id.
10.1.70. While the Board has no quarrel with Mr. Keller's characterizing as "trivial" the .9 dose reduction factor
("DRF"] of the beach area shelters, it finds Mr. Keller's analysis in this regard to be flawed. As Mr. Keller l
acknowledges, the .9 DRF refers only to cloudshine dose reduction, and if the ten percent reduction from sheltering is "trivial," the zero reduction from cloudshine dose that one would obtain in a car is more than just "trivial," it is nonexistent. Moreover, the Board finds that to characterize the beach area shelters by only their cloudshine DRF of .9, ignores the greater reduction from the inhalation and groundshine components of dose that can be obtained in these shelters. While the shelter reduction factors for inhalation and groundshine might well also be deemed "trivial" when considering a significant release, the Board has not heard any testimony or been shown any other evidence that convincingly demonstrates that overall doses to the beach population would be any less from evacuation than from sheltering. The Board agrees with Dr. Gobel that considerably more analysis is needed before any determination can be made that evacuation should be the preferred protective response.
10.1.71. Although testimony of Applicants and the State of New Hampshire indicates that sheltering will not be a preferred
~
protective action for the summer beach population, II. 10721, the record shows that the State does intend to recommend sheltering of the beach population in certain limited circumstances. Aco. Dir. No. 6, Post II. 10022 at 2, 19; II.
10058-61; II. 10183; II. 10715-716; II. 10744.
- 34 -
. 10.1.72. After careful review of the record, including the provisions of the NHRERP, Rev. 2, concerning sheltering, the Board finds that although New Hampshire may recommend sheltering as a protective action to the transient summer beach population, there are no provisions in the NHRERP to implement that response.
10.1.73. For the protective action of sheltering, the State of New Hampshire relies on a shelter-in-place concept which by definition, Dr. Wallace, the Director of the Division of Public Health Services, testified does not include the transient beach population. II. 10146-47. Dr. Wallace testified that according to the NHRERP, Rev. 2, definition of sheltering (Vol. 1, 2.6-6), transients on the beaches, or without access to suitable shelter, would be advised not to shelter but "to evacuate as quickly as possible in their own vehicles." II. 147. The Board finds this provision of the NHRERP confusing in light of other testimony from the State that it does consider sheltering a protective action option .for the transient beach population, and one indication, taken with others discussed below, that the NHRERP, Rev. 2, does not in fact provide for sheltering of the summer beach population and if that protective option were to be recommended it would be nothing more than an ad hac response.
10.1.74. The above finding is corroborated by the fact that there are no emergency broadcast messages in the NHRERP instructing the beach population to shelter. II. 10165.
Emergency broadcast messages are contained in Appendix G to the NHRERP. A wholesale amendment to Appendix G, dated 2/88, was
served on the parties approximately May 2, 1988, the first day of hearings on the sheltering contentions. The EBS messages in the unamended version of Rev. 2, dated 8/86, included a Message E titled "General Emergency (Sheltering)." II. 10159. The Board finds no provisions in that message for instructing the beach population to shelter. In fact, as Applicants' witness testified, according to that message, people in the beach areas of Seabrook and Hampton would be advised to evacuate even in those situations when people living or working in other parts of Hampton and Seabrook would be advised to shelter. II.
10160-61.
10.1.75. The Board finds that the new emergency broadcast messages also contain no instructions for sheltering the summer beach population. Tr. 10165. The State has deleted Message E, the 8/86 General Emergency (Sheltering) message, from Revision 2 and replaced it with a Message F, entitled "General Emergency
-- Evacuation and Sheltering -- Release of Radioactive Material." According to that message there are certain instances in which people in the Towns of Seabrook and Hampton may be advised.that it "will be safer if they shelter-in-place." II. 10162-63. Nevertheless, that same message provides that "all persons working in or visiting beaches and parks in Seabrook and Hampton will be advised to evacuate those areas immediately." App. G-30; II. 10162. Applicants' witness i
l agreed that, except for the transit-dependent beach population, there is no EBS message now included in the NHRERP which l
l specifically addresses sheltering of the beach population, II.
10165, and, according to Message E, in all circumstances during 4
. the summer months, from May 15 through September 15, people in the beach area in Seabrook and Hampton would be advised to evacuate. II. 10163.
10.1.76. Other means, besides EBS messages, for instructing the beach population in the event of an emergency would be through the beach area public address system and signs and public information material. The NHRRERP, Rev. 2, however, contains no public address message advising the beach population to shelter, II. 10071, and there are no signs or public information material which address sheltering of the summer beach population. II. 10195.
10.1.77. The Board finds, therefore, that the NHRERp contains no provisions for instructing the beach population to shelter, and any sheltering instructions to be gisen the beach population would thus need to be devised on s1 ad han basis at the time of an emergency.
10.1.78. The Board is especially disturbed by this lack of any planned sheltering instructions to the beach population for several reasons: First, the Applicants and NH testified that one of the very few circumstances (if not the only circumstance) in which they could foresee advising the beach population to shelter would be characterized by a situation which included, among other factors, an expectation that the plume would arrive in the beach area in a short amount of time, II. 10719.
10.1.79. Applicants' own witness, Dr. Mileti, testified that in general it would be better to have an EBS shelter message instructing the beach population to shelter drafted in l
l l
~*
advance of an emergency. Tr. 10064. The Board finds it especially unreasonable for the State to rely on ad han sheltering messages, in light of thc elicit <:d testimony that sheltering would most likely be advised in situations where time is very short.
10.1.80. In addition, the Board finds i' unacceptable to rely on ad han sheltering instruction to the beach population in light of other uncontradicted testimony indicating special concerns in regard to instructing the beach population to shelter. Mass. AG's witnesses, Drs. Renn and Goble, testified that the beach population poses special problems, because the transient population, unlike the general population, will typically have little or no pre-emergency education or information regarding what it is they are supposed to do in an emergency. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 11; II. 11303.
Thus, the EBS message, which will be the one chance of communicating with and instructing population, becomes especially critical. Id.
10.1.81. In addition, Applicants panel testified that problems specific to beach area shelter may give rise to the need for additional instructions to the beach population. For example, it became apparent on cross-examination of Mr. Bell, I
l author of the Stone & Webster Shelter Study, Aco. Exh. 2, that l
l certain portions of some buildings in the beach were not l
l included in the list of potential shelter space, because those portions were not deemed suitable for shelter. II.
l 10653-01654. In response to a question whether people in the i
beach area would know that they were supposed to shelter only l
. in certain portions of buildings, the State witnesses responded that they could not answer the question because there are no EBS sheltering messages for the beach population. II. 10654.
10.1.82. In a similar vein, Applicants' witness, Mr.
MacDonald, testified that problems with shelters having openings to the outdoors, such as from louver windows (which, as one of the State witnesses agreed, can be difficult to close, II. 10675), could be addressed by EBS messages instructing the population to block out any openings in buildings. II. 10672. There are no such messages now in the NHRERP and the Board finds that such messages are not likely to be appropriately drafted to meet these special concerns on an ad hqq basis.
10.1.83. Although Applicants' Panel testified that the State would rely on "the mechanisms now in place, or to be put in place, in the NHRERp" to implement sheltering for the beach population; Apo. Dir. No. 6, Post II. 10022 at 20; those "mechanisms" include only: (1) the protective action decision-making procedures; (2) the public alert system; and (3) the EBS system. II. 10180-181; II. 10193-194. And, while the protective action decision-making criteria could result in a decision to shelter the entire beach population; II. 10190; apo. Dir. No. 6, Post II. 10022 at Attach. 1; the public alert system and EBS system, the Board has found, do not address sheltering for the beach population. Egg No. 10.1.77 aunta.
There are no other provisions in the NHRERp that address sheltering of the beach population; II. 10165-166; and the State of New Hampshire has no present intention to amend the
}
l NHRERP to provide "mechanisms", or any other provisions regarding sheltering of the summer beach population. II.
10193-194; II. 10210.
10.1.84. The NHRERP contains no explanation of where people on the beaches would shelter; II. 10177; II. 10182; or provide even one sentence explaining "what [New Hampshire decision-makers] would do with a beach population in a sheltering situation." II. 10180.
10.1.85. The State has not identified any shelters for the beach population; II. 10153; II. 10573; II. 10694; II. 10699; II. 10756. The State does not have letters of agreements with any of the owners of the buildings where it is anticipated that the transient beach population may shelter; II. 10578; 10702; nor has the State even talked with any of the owners of the potential beach area shelters to inform them of their possible roles and the possible use of their buildings in the event of a radiological emergency. II. 10574-575; II. 10578; II.
10710-711.
10.1.86. The State has not assessed the suitability of any of the buildings in the beach area for sheltering the beach population in a radiological emergency; II. 10589; II.
l 10698-10700; does not know whether there is adequate shelter i
space available to shelter the entire beach population; II.
10699; II. 13708; II. 10573; and has not performed any empirical studies to assess the quantity of actually available suitable shelter space. II. 10573; II. 10698.
j 10.1.87. The State has no plans to get the beach l population into shelter in an orderly manner; II. 10180; no e
- messages or signs instructing the population where to go; II.
10063; II. 10071; no plans to label any of the buildings as designated shelters; II. 10756-757; II. 10578; II. 10114; no plans to designate or train personnel to assist the beach population into shelter; II. 10568; and no plans to get the pe>alation out of shelter in any orderly manner. II. 10589-590.
10.1.88. Although the NHRERp provides, and the New Hampshire witnesses testified, that the entire transient beach population may well be instructed to shelter; "[t]he intent of the planning document obviously is not to shelter the transient population. . . . II. 10202-203. Even for those beaches in Hampton, Norh Hampton, and Rye that are situated two to ten miles from the plant and for which the NHRERp has no plans for precautionary beach closings or evacuation, the NHRERp hac no plans to shelter the transient beachgoers. II. 10195-198.
10.1.89. Based on the above findings, Nos.
10.1.73-10.1.88, the Board finds that there are no plans in place to implement sheltering for the transient beach population in the New Hampshire EpZ, and if sheltering of that population were recommended it would be a completely ad hoc response.
10.1.90. FEMA has also found that the NHRERp contains no measures to implement sheltering for the beach population. To date, FEMA has taken only the position that the NHRERp is "adequate in concept." Before FEMA issues its final finding on the NHRERp "it expects implementing detail" for sheltering the entire transient beach pcpulation. II. 14220. FEMA's witness, Mr. Cumming, found this approach of the agency, basing r
- its finding on the "concept" of the plan only, to be "somewhat unusual." Id.
10.1.91. Some of the implementing detail that FEMA finds necessary in the NHRERP are specifically designed messages to direct people to shelter and the identification of specific shelters. II. 14073.
10.1.92. FEMA testified that implementing detail is "important" because in planning "you want to reduce, to the extent possible, ad hac responses." II. 14074.
10.1.93. Witnesses testifying on behalf of the Massachusetts Attorney General gave extensive testimony as to why they view the NHRERP's ad han sheltering response to be inadequate; and, further, why, in their view, it would require an extensive planning effort to correct this inadequacy. Goble et al Dit., Post II. 10963 passim.
10.1.94. Dr. Goble and Dr. Renn listed a set of conditions that are essential for the successful implementation of a sheltering response for the beach population. Goble et al D_ir., Post II. 10963, at 20-21. Dr Goble testified that the
- criteria were derived from a series of long discussions with
{ many experts in emergency planning, including one of the Applicants' witnesses, Dr. Mileti. II. 11327-328. The l
essential criteria are:
- 1. decision criteria which recommend sheltering only when it will be the most effective protective response to the particular accident conditions at hand;
- 2. adequate amounts of sheltering space for the population, including a substantial margin to l provide for non-uniform distributions of people; l
l
- 3. good shielding factors for this sheltering space;
- 4. the space must be readily accessible, it must be easy to find, clearly labeled, and the access route must not create bottlenecks;
- 5. previous arrangements with the owners or managers of the spaces so that there will not be time-consuming ambiguity about its use during an emergency;
- 6. plans and facilities for communicating simple repeated instructions, telling people to take shelter and how to do it; it may be necessary for there to be emergency personnel providing direction;
- 7. plans for coping with confusion and panic in the most sensitive locations;
- 8. plans and resources for communicating with people in shelters and, in particular, providing information and assistance on decontamination and on preparation for leaving the shelter; and
- 9. plans and resources for helping people leave shelters expeditiously, including preparation for conditions with significant radiation contamination.
Goble et al Dir., post Ir1 10963, at 20-21.
10.1.95. Dr. Goble testified that these conditions are required in order to ensure that people get in and out of shelter at the appropriate time, and without the confusion that could cause undue delay and result in greater exposure. II. ,
11629.
10.1.96. It has been suggested that the conditions the Mass AG witnesses would impose on a sheltering plan go beyond what has been required at any other nuclear plant sites.
However, Dr. Goble testified that at other sites emergency planning poses so much less of a challenge in the area within close range of the plant, that close to all the conditions
essential for successful implementation of sheltering are easily met. II. 11328, 10.1.97. The Board finds it only reasonable that if the State intends to recommend sheltering to the transient beach population that appropriate measures be in place to ensure that the beach population will be timely notified and appropriately instructed as to what they are to do and where they are to shelter, that measures be in place to ensure the beach population has access to sufficient, suitable shelter space; and that the means are in place to ensure that they are instructed to leave the shelter at an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner so as not to result in undue chaos or confusion or increased exposure.
10.1.98. With respect to the issue of notifying and instructing the beach population to take shelter, the Board has already found that there are no public alert messages, EBS messages or signs in the beach area instructing the beach population to take shelter and where they are to shelter. Sac No. 10.1.77. supra.
10.1.99. The Board has also found that the NHRERp makes no 1
provision for personnel to assist the beach population with sheltering. Egg No. 10.1.87. suora. It appears that the only personnel who could possibly be enlisted on an ad hac basis to assist with sheltering are the lifeguards at the State beach, a lifeguard supervisor, and, possibly, several other park personnel. II. 10569. These personnel work only at the State beach in Hampton, which comprises only a portion of the total beach ares in Hampton and Seabrook. The lifeguards, who
comprise the vast majority of the potential personnel, are mostly young people hired only for the summer months. II.
10570. The State witnesses could not say if the lifeguards would be informed that it is part of their job to assist people in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
Without e clear pre-emergency understanding of their potential roles in an emergency, the Board is un6ble to find, based on the testimony of Dr. Mileti, Sag, gig. Apo. Dir. No. 6, post II. 5622 at 117, that these personnel would be available to assist the beach population in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
10.1.100. The Board also heard extensive testimony concerning the availability of suitable shelter space in the beach area.
10.1.101. Applicants' Exhibit 2 is a study performed by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation in August, 1987, to identify potential public shelter space for the beach population. The Study used information from Tax Assessor cards to identify a total of 249 buildings in the New Hampshire beach area that coul.d potentially serve as beach area shelter. The Study listed 205 buildings in Hampton; 17 in Seabrook; 4 in North Hampton; and 23 in Rye. 622 Exh. 2.
10.1.102. The Stone & Webster Study was not intended to provide a listing of actually available and usable suitable shelter space, but only to identify potential space to be used by New Hampshire Yankee as a preliminary first step in the planning process of identifying actual, usable sheltering space. II. 10605. The only criteria for including a building
o on this list of potential shelters was that it be the type of building that normally provides access to the public, such as a commercial establishment (e.g., hotels, motels, restaurants, retail storeri, church or municipal building, and that the building Tcov?de an estimated dose reduction factor for cloudshine of .9 (ten per cent reduction) or better. App. Exhm 2; IL 11608.
10.1.103. Residences and summer cottages in the Seabrook and Hampton beach areas were also identified as providing potential shelter space for people residing in them. App. Exh.
2 10.1.104. Three major issues were raised concerning the use of these beach area buildings as shelter: (1) whether the buildings are suitable for shelter in a radiological emergency; (2) whether sufficient shelter space exists in the beach area to shelter the entire beach population; and (3) whether the identified potential shelter space would actually be available to shelter the beach population in an emergency. Other issues, discussed infra at nos. 10.1.168 to 10.1.183, concerned whether the beach population would actually shelter in these buildings; whether they would be able to easily locate and access suitable shelter space; and the amount of time it would take to get the beach population into shelter.
10.1.105. professor Evdokimoff, a certified health physicic' with excellent credentials, whom the Board finds to
! be eminently qualified to testify with respect to shielding l
l characteristics of buildings, testified on behalf of the Massachusetts Attorney General regarding the suitability of the l
l :
k-
. summer cottages for shelter. Goble 31 al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 22-33, and Attach _,__4 10.1.106. professor Evdokimoff formally surveyed 459 cottages, approximately fifty percent of the summer cottages in Hampton Beach by walking down streets where Lummer residences predominated and listing every private residence on the street and identifying, for each, the building characteristics pettinent to shielding (i.e., construction materials, number of stories; basement or no basement, etc.). Dr. Evdokimoff testified that prior to conducting this formal survey he drove down nearly every st?.eet in the Hampton Beach area and that this fifty percent sample, wbich is statistically considered to be an "unusually high J evel of sampling It. 11644, was entirely representative of the cottages in the beach area. Of these 459 cottages, Professor Evdokimoff viewed the interior of 50 to 60 cottages by looking in the windows. Through realtors, Professors Evdofimoff was also able to enter and inspect l
another twelve cottages in the beach area, which he testified, represented the spectrum of the typea of rental cotta;u available in the beach area. *ne interiors of the twelve cottages were entirely representative of the interiors of the fifty tc c .-Hy cottages Professor Evd.kimoff had viewed.
G_o b l e , n ,e.1 _Rin , Post Tr. 10963, at 24-28, and At_t. 8; In 11332-342; II. 11645-647.
l 10.1.107. Of the 459 cottages surveyed 99.8% were l
I wood-frame construction; 99.6% did not have basements; 61.4%
l were one-s' "" buildings . and 38.6% were two-story buildings.
! Mo .* ' of tt 9 ta: 2 dings were 70-100 years old, and all were quite r
l l
l
~ . . ~
small, with a typical one-story cottage measuring 10' by 20';
and had many windows (10 to 20 in a one-story cottage). A few cottages had storm windows and insulation. Many of the cottages, especially the one-story cottages, had broken windows and were in severe disrepair. Goble, et al. Dir., Post Tr.
10963 at ?7-28.
10.1.108. The 12 cottages Professor Evdokimoff inspected from the inside fit the same general profile as the 459, and displayed a range of both deterioration and improvement. Four of the twelve cottages had no ceilings and daylight could be seen through openings in their roofs. Three of the cottages had broken windows and four had storm windows. Id. at 28-29.
10.1.109. Based on this survey, Professor Evdokimoff concludes that the cottages in the beach area provide significantly less protection than the average wood-frame house without a basement. This is because:
(1) the cottages are smaller with less interior wall space; (2) construction materials tend to be lighter; (3) windows occupy a large percentage of the exterior wall space and tend to be poorly sealed; and (4) in many cases, there are openings directly to the outdoors. Id. at 30-31.
10.1.110. Professor Evdokimoff further testified that eight of the twelve cottages he inspected from the interior would, based on the density of their construction materials in comparison to the density of materials assumed by Burson &
Profio as the basis for a .9 cloudshine dose reduction factor, have a -E)udshine dose reduction factor much greater than .9 a nd a ;.. o : aching 1.0 (no protection). II. 11570-571; App. Exhm En 34, p. 32. These cottages, because they have less mass and
, density, would also have less protection from groundshine than the typical wood-frame house. II 11571. Air exchange rates in these cottages with openings to the outside could also be considerably higher than the two changes per hour assumed in the NHRERP. L 11348; L 11338-339. Sag also, L 10667-10675.
10.1.111. The Board finds the survey of cottages performed by Professor Evdokimoff to have been conducted in a reliable manner. There is no evidence of any bias in the selection of cottages surveyed or in the reporting of the results. There was no other testimony in this proceeding that comprehensively analyzed the shielding characteristics of the beach area cottages, age gig., Aco. Exh. 2, and we find Professor Evdokimoff's testimony and conclusions regarding these cottages to be essentially undisputed.
10.1.112. Based on Professor Evdokimoff's testimony, the Board finds that a large percentage of the cottages are constructed of such light density material, have such little mass, and have so many windows and openings to the outdoors, that their shielding potential would be worse than the .9 dose reduction factor for cloudshine assumed for a typical wood-frame house. Similarly the Board finds that the reduction factors for groundshine and inhalation exposure, would be less in these cottages than that assumed for a typical wood-frame residence.
10.1.113. The Board finds essentially no dispute among the witnesses that buildings with cloudshine dose reduction factors worse than .9 would not be suitable for sheltering. II. 11457; II. 14243; II. 10618. Based on this the Board finds that a large percentage of csttages in the beach area would not be suitable for sheltering in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
10.1.114. With respect to the public buildings that may serve as "potential" beach area shelters, there is no dispute that the vast majority of that space has a cloudshine dose reduction factor in the vicinity of .9. Stone & Webster performed an earlier study of potential shelter space in the New Hamshire beach area, dated August, 1986, ["Stone & Webster I"] in which it identified all the potential shelter space with shielding characteristics better than .9. Egg Goble et al Rii., Post II. 10963, Attach. 10; II. 10769. The total amount of potential beach area shelter space in Hampton and Seabrook with better than .9 shielding factors is 310,130 square feet.
Id. Thus, of the 1,446,780 square feet of potential shelter space listed in Stone & Webster's August, 1987, Study ("Stone &
Webster"), approximately eighty percent, or 1,136,650 square feet, would have a cloud shielding dose rediction factor in the vicinity of .9. Id.,
10.1.115. With respect to the amount of publicly accessible space in the beach area with better shielding than
.9, Salmon Falls Research Associates, under the direction of Hass. AG's witness Dr. Eckert, conducted a study to verify the l
l accuracy of Stone & Webster's first study ("Stone & Webster i
I"). Dr. Eckert re-surveyed twenty percent of the buildings listed in Stone & Webster I. He selected 23 establishments from the Stone & Webster Study "using a stratified random i
l
sample according to within-town square footage class, and took field measurements, with extensive documentation, of the shelter capacity of each. Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963, at 40-46; and Attachment 11. Dr. Eckert's measurements indicate that Stone & Webster I overestimates by forty percent the amount of potential beach area shelter space with a dose reduction factor better than .9. In addition, Dr. Eckert has documented considerable problems with access to a large portion of this shelter space. Id.; II. 11609-610.
10.1.116. The Board finds Dr. Eckert's re-survey of Stone
& Webster's work to be exceptionally well-documented, and there is no evidence of any bias in either the selection of shelters to be surveyed or the reporting of the results. Egg, Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963 at 40-48; and Attachment 11. From a statistical perspective, the percentage of shelters re-surveyed was sufficiently high enough to indicate considerable error in Stone & Webster's listing of available square footage. Indeed, the results of Dr. Eckert's re-survey were virtually unchallenged by any of the other parties. Egg, II. 11407-416.
10.1.117. Based on this evidence, the Board finds that the amount of potential shelte'r space in Hampton and Seabrook having a cloudshine dose reduction factor better than .9 would l
be considerably less than 310,130 square feet, and of the space that is available with better than .9 shielding, not all of it could be readily accessed by the public, i
10.1.118. Dr. Eckert also evaluated the accuracy of Stone
& Webster's August 1987 Study of potential beach area shelter l space. For this evaluation, Dr. Eckert tried to repeat Stone &
t
- Webster's work by reviewing the tax assessor cards on which Stone &_ Webster based their calculations for every shelter in Seabrook and Hampton and then calculating the amount of potentially available shelter space from the cards. The exteriors of each of the potential shelters was then visually inspected, in separate visits, by a former real estate appraiser and the Salmon Falls field supervisor, Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 52.
10.1.119. Dr. Eckert found numerous errors in Stone &
Webster's calculation of potential shelter space. Dr. Eckert documented the inclusion of 82 private apartments in Stone &
Webster's calculation of publicly-accessible space. Based on personal knowledge, information obtained from long-time residents of Hamptor, and informed speculation on the part of Salmon Falls, Dr. Eckert believes there are likely to be another 70 private apartments included in Stone & Webster's calculation of space. Goble et al Dir., post II2 10963, at 53-54. In addition, Dr. Eckert found 7 cases in which private homes were included on Stone & Webster's list and 22 instances in which square footage that does not exist was included by Stone & Webster. Dr. Eckert found numerous other problems, including the inclusion of sections of buildings (such as screened areas and parking garages) with large openings to the outdoors, and a failure by Stone & Webster to follow its own guidelines in reducing by availability factors the total listed square footage to potentially available square footage. Id. at 55-57.
'{
A-10.1.120. According to Stone & Webster II, the total adjusted square footage (total square footage reduced by "availability factors" depending on the type of establishment) if potentially available shelter space in Hampton and Seabrook is 896,800 square feet. Salmon Falls has documented errors that would reduce that total to 710,866 square feet. This 710,866 square feet includes the approximately 70 private apartments that Salmon Falls believes, based on informed speculation, comprise part of the total public shelter area listed in Stone & Webster II. If all the speculated square footage errors are deducted from Stone & Webster's calculation of space, there is only 571,800 square feet of potentially available shelter space. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 57-58; Tr. 11593; II. 11609.
10.1.121. In addition to trying to repeat Stone &
Webster's work from the tax assessor cards, Salmon Falls also closely scrutinized the tax assessor cards for 50% of the shelters in Hampton for which tax assessor information was available and 100*5 of the shelters in Seabrook to determine whether the cards provided an accurate basis for calculating potential shelter space. Dr. Eckert found numerous j discrepencies and errors in the cards resulting in a significant overstatement of square footage. In addition, Dr.
i Eckert found the tax assessor information to be out-of-date, i
l These errors be. sed on tax assessor information would result in an additional significant reduction of available shelter space. Goble et al Dir, Post II. 10963, at 58-60 II. 10617-621.
10.1.122. The amount of potentially available shelter space would be even further reduced from the 571,800 square feet if one eliminated space that is inaccessible to the public or elimiated space counted for whose owners will not, for whatever reason, allow access to the transient population. II.
11610-613; II. 11621, 10.1.123. The Board finds Dr. Eckert to be a highly cretlible witness. His testimony concerning Stone & Webster's errors in calculating potential shelter space was highly detailed and was virtually unchallenged, except for a few minor points to which Dr. Eckert was able to easily respond. II.
11047-416; II. 11509-514; II. 11632-637. No witnesses, not even Mr. Bell, who directed the Stone & Webster study and testified on Applicants' Panel, even attempted to rebut any of Dr. Eckert's allegations of error. Moreover, Mr. Bell had no explanation when he was confronted on cross-examination with several representative samples of the errors Dr. Eckert had found in the Stone & Webster study. II. 10618-631.
10.1.124. Dr. Eckert testified that the purpose of his ow<
study of shelter space was not to make final estimates of the actual available space in the beach area, but to determine the accuracy of Stone & Webster's study. In this regard, the Board would note that the State of New Hampshire has not adopted the Stone & Webster Study of potential beach area shelter space and "has no opinion as to its accuracy."
10.1.125. The Board is also unable to find that the Stone
& Webster study provides an accurate estimate of the amount of available public shelter space in the beach area. The Board 54 -
A
. finds that the amount of potentially available space in Seabrook and Hampton is likely to be less, and possibly considerably less, than 571,800 square feet. With the beach population estimated to range from 45,000 to 70,000 people, Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963 at 49; Aco. Dir. No. 6, post II. 5622 at 38, the board is unable to determine, based on this uncertain analysis of potentially available shelter space whether, even assuming that all the potential space is actually available and suitable, there is sufficient space available to shelter the entire transient beach population in Seabrook and Hampson. For the towns of North Hampton and Rye, there is no question that not enough. space would be available to shelter the entire beach populations of these towns, even using Stone &
Webster's calculation of total space. Goble et al Dir., post Tr. 10963 at 49; Apa. Exh. 2.
10.1.126. Another issue that has been raised concerns the suitability of the beach area buildings for shelter.
10.1.127. FEMA takes the position that shelters with .9 dose reduction factors for cloudshine are "not enough," that a ten percent reduction is "trivial." II. 14243. As Dr.
Wallace, Director of New Hampshire Department of public Health i
l and Services, agreed, with respect to cloudshine, 60 minutes of i
exposure in a .9 shelter is equivalen to 54 minutes of exposure I
(
outside. Therefore, a person would save only six minutes of exposure per hour by sheltering in a .9 shelter. II. .
10614-615. Egg also, Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963 at 68.
For some of the beachgoers even this small savings might be
a lost due to the greater dose they could receive by moving from the beach to shelters that are situated 200 to 300 yards closer to the plant. Id.; II. 10615-17.
10.1.128. Dr. Goble testified that "[s] pace with only a .9 shielding factor is not suitable for protecting a population exposed to substantial amounts of radiation . . . . He points out that it is "pretty much a consensus view within the expert community" that a .9 reduction factor is insufficient.
Suitable shelters would have a dose reduction factor of .4 to
.6 II. 11326; San also II.14243. Dr. Goble notes that the protection provided by structures with .9 shielding, "is even less than Aldrich, at al., have assumed would be provided the average person at other sites in the country even if an protective action was recommended." (Aldrich, D.C., et al.
Public Protection Stratecies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Shelterina Concepts with Existina Public and Private Structures, Sandia Lab Report, SAND 77-1725 (February 1978) Goble et al. Dir., Post II. 10963, at 67; nem also Id. at
- 68. This means, Dr. Goble explained, that the averge person spends, on the average , more of his time in better sheltering than .9. II. 11455-457.
10.1.129. Stone & Webster noted in its first shelter study produced for Applicants, dated March, 1986, that it did not include in that study wood-frame buildings without basements because "this type of structure usually does not provide adequate shielding." Goble et al Dir., Eqat II. 10963 at Attach. 10, p. 3.
o
. '10.1.130. The Board has heard considerable testimony suggesting-that a large number of the buildings in the New Hampshire beach area would provide even less shiolding than one would. expect in a .9 shelter.
10.1.131. Dc. Goble testified that, in addition to the beach cottages which have dose reductions facters worse than
.9, there are a number of larger buildings, or areas in larger buildings, that offer very little shielding due to substantial expanses of glass, and openings to the outdoors. II. 11569.
10.1.132. The evidence indeed indicates that a number of buildings in the beach have substantial expanses of glass, areas enclosed only by screens, or other openings to the outdoors. Goble et al Dir. post II. 10963 at 47-48; 56;57; Mass AG Exh. 18; Eckert Dir., post II. 11685, at 6-7; Mass AG Exh 21; II. 10645-679.
10.1.133. Dr. Wallace testified that it would not be advisable for people to shelter next to glass. II, 10647.
professor Evdokimoff also testified that glass would not provide sufficient shielding. II. 11372.
10.1.134. The Board also heard testimony on the effect that openings in buildings would have on shelter. The air exchange rate assumed by the NHRERp for buildings in the EpZ is two exchanges per hour. II. 10553. Applicants witness Mr.
Callendrello testified that two air exchanges per hour is the boundary of what's acceptable. II. 10767. This is consistent with testimony from Dr. Goble in which he states that only one hour after the arrival of a cloud of radioactive gases the air inside a building with an air exchange rate of two per hour 57 -
a
, will be approximately 85% as radioactive as the air outside, and after two hours it will be 95% as radioactive. Goble et a.l. Dir., post Ir. 10963, at 34. Ssg . alan FEMA Dir., RQfd II.
13968, at 10. The Board would agree that an exchange rate worse than this would not be suitable.
10.1.135. There is no dispute that openings in buildings would increase a building's air exchange rate, especially on windy days. It is also generally conceded that conditions in the beach area can certainly be windy, and a "problem" with respect to air exchange rates. II. 10673-674. In addition, small buildings, such as the motel cottages that are prevalent in this beach area; II. g g. 10657-659; II. 10667; would also tend to have higher exchange rates, assuming openings to the outdoors. It. 10675.
10.1.136. Professor Evdokimoff has testified that the air exchange rate in drafty buildings could be as high as 6 to 9 per hour on windy days. It. 11338-339. Both Mr. Keller and Dr. Goble also suggested that air exchange rates in the beach areas's unwinterized buildings are apt to be higher than two exchanges per hour. Goble et al Dir., Post Tr. 10963 at 34; FEMA Dir., post II. 13968 at 10.
10.1.137. Based on this testimony, the Board finds that at least some percentage of the public buildings in the beach area would provide less shielding than that provided by a .9 shelter and that some percentage of the buildings would also have air exchange rates that tend to be higher than 2 exchanges per hour. The Board is not able to determine from the evidence how many buildings this would be, but finds that the percentage of 4
o buildings with reduction factors worse than .9 and/or air exchange rates greater than two per hour could be relatively high.
10.1.138. Applicants' witnesses take the position that the suitability of a shelter is of little importance, because in their opinion "you do the best with what you have." II.
10687. According to the Applicants' witnesses, "If a building is there and it's used, then it's the best you can do and it's adequate. II. 10687; 10692. Indeed, Applicants' witness testified that even if no sheltering were available the population would be provided adequate protection because "you're doing the best you can." II. 10758.
10.1.139. The State of New Hampshire, however, does not accept Applicants' proposition "that you make do with what you have." II. 10698. According to the New Hampshire officials, if the State determines based on its own study that buildings it deems unsuitable are included in the Stone & Webster Shelter Study then the State would not use those buildings for shelter. II, 10700. Since the State has not yet performed its own study; II. 10698; or even established the criteria it would use Cor acceptance of a building as suitable shelter; II.
10206; the Board has no idea how many buildings the State might deem acceptable and therefore whether, based on New Hampshire's own assessment, there would be sufficient space to shelter the entire beach population.
10.1.140. Like the State, the Board cannot agree that any available building would be suitable for shelter. The Board finds that, at the very least, those buildings with less than
[
a a .9 shielding or greater than 2 air exchanges per hour would not be suitable shelters.
10.1.141. FEMA and the Mass AG witnesses agree that buildings with .9 dose reduction factors would not be suitable for sheltering under many accident scenarios. Nevertheless,
-the Board agrees with Dr. Goble that the solution of "a six-hour traffic jam (is] not . . . a very satisfactory answer" to this problem. Egg II. 11479.
10.1.142. Dr. Goble has testified that considering the emergency problems at this site extensive analysis should be done by the Stnte and Applicants to determine precisely under what scenarios, considering varying population sizes, weather conditions, accident conditions, etc., sheltering would provide maximum dose savings. II. 11310; II. 11474-475; II. 11486; II.
11492. In addition, a comprehensive evaluation has not been performed, as suggested by Dr. Goble, to determine what percentage of actually available and usable sheltering space provides greater than .9 shielding; what percentage of the space provides less than .9 shielding; or what would be required to upgrade the shielding characteristics of the buildings in the beach area. II. 11492, II. 11486; II. 11630.
Until such evaluations are fully performed, the Board cannot find that the State of New Hampshire has given "full consideration" to the protective action of sheltering. Egg l FEMA Dir., Post II. 13968 at 7.
l 10.1.143. A question has been raised as to whether owners of the buildings identified on Stone & Webster's list of public j
l s
, shelters would make their buildings available to the beach population for shelter.
10.1.144. Neither the State of New Hampshire nor Applicants have contacted any of the owners of these buildings regarding the use of their buildings in an emergency. II.
10574-575; II. 10578; II. 10710-711.
10.1.145. The only evidence or testimony proferred in support of Applicants' position that the owners will make their buildings available to the beach population is a sole sentence in Applicants' Direct Testimony sponsored by Dr. Mileti, a sociologist testifying for Applicants on behavioral issues.
Dr. Mileti testified:
It is expected that people will comply with EBS announcements to take shelter and that owners / operators of public access facilities will make their facilities available for this very limited purpose.
Apo. Dir. No. 6, Post T.I. 10022, at 20; II. 10027. Dr. r.ileti was unable to provide any empirical support for this statement. He testified on cross-examination that he is aware of no studies involving technological hazards in which people were asked an masse to engage in pre-emergency sheltering. He also testified that he knows of "no specific studies to cite to empirically document this phenomenon (that people would never be locked out]. Tr. 11055.
10.1.146. On the other hand, considerable evidence and testimony was received in support of the proposition that not all owners of beach area buildings will make their facilities available to the beachgoers in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook. Egg Nos. 10.1.47-10.1.64 infra.
10.1.147. Dr. Eckert conducted a survey by mail of all the owners of buildings on the Stone & Webster August, 1987, list of potential shelters. Goble et al. Dir., Post Tr. 10963, at 61-64; Mass AG Exh. 19. The survey asked the owners four questions, the most important one being whether the owners would let beach-goers shelter in their buildings (for a period of 3 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook. After three waves of mailings, a response rate of 70*5 was achieved. Two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they would not let people into their establishments. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963, at 61-63.
10.1.148. Another survey of owners of potential beach area shelters was conducted by Citizens Within The Ten Mile Radius (C-10), a non-profit corporation organized in 1985 as a citizens' organization "to address safety concerns involving the Seabrook nuclear power plant . . . Thomas F. Moughan, the Coordinator and Field Director for C-10 and Jean Gregg Lincoln, a representative of C-10, submitted testimony on behalf of the Town of Hampton on the results of the C-10 survey. Mouchan et l
al. Dir., Post Tr. 10857; TOH Exh. No. 18.
10.1.149. C-10 conducted its survey by assigning each potential shelter listed in the Stone & Webster Shelter Study l to one of twenty-five C-10 volunteers who then attempted to l
contact the owner to determine if he/she was willing to have his/her building used as a public shelter in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. C-10 made available a Statement for signature to any owner who did not wish to have his property used as a shelter. The Statement
! l i - - _ -
F asks New Hampshire Yankee to remove the building from any potential shelter list. The C-10 survey was conducted entirely independently of Dr. Eckert's survey, and, for the most part, was conducted after Dr. Eckert's survey was substantially complete. Liouchan et al. Dir., Post II. 10857 at 2; II. 10869-870.
10.1.150. In its survey, C-10 was able to contact 65% of the potential shelter owners. Of these, 77% signed the statement requesting that their building be removed from any list of potential shelters, 6 % expressed a willingness to allow the use of their buildings as shelters; and 17% did not respond. Mouchan et al.. Dir., Post II. 10857 at 5.
10.1.151. Representative Beverly Hollingworth also submitted testimony which bears on this issue on behalf of the Town of Hampton. Representative Hollingsworth has served for eight years as the New Hampshire State Representative for the Towns of Hampton and Hampton Falls, and also owns a motel in Hampton Beach. Hollingworth Dir., Post II. 10832 at 1.
10.1.152. Representative Hollingworth testified that during the fall of 1987 over two hundred owners of potential Hampton beach shelters contacted her, as their state representative, after learning as a result of Dr. Eckert's survey, that their buildings had been designated as potential shelters by New Hampshire Yankee. With only one exception, Representative Hollingworth testified, all of those who contacted her requested that their buildings be removed from the list of potential shelters. Hollinaworth Dir., Eq1t II.
10832 at 2.
10.1.153. Dr. Renn, a social psychologist, whom the Board finds to be exceptionally well-qualified in the field of human behavior and emergency response, testified on behalf of the Massachusetts Attorney General on behavioral issues that could affect the efficacy of a sheltering response. Dr. Renn testified extensively regarding the issue of owner's allowing the use of their buildings as shelters in 'he c event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Stction, including the issue concerning what can be reliably predicted from the surveys of potential shelter owners. Goble et al. Dr., post II. 10963 at 80-84; II. 11049-11105; II. 11111-11112.
10.1.154. Dr. Renn testified that it ir difficult to predict what the owners of shelters will actually do in an emergency. He agreed with Dr. Mileti that pre-emergency intentions are generally not a good predictor of actual response in an emergency and that a survey response indicating an unwillingness to shelter people may in fact be a symbol for expressing opposition to the Seabrook plant. Id. at 80-81.
Dr. Renn also agreed that generally people tend to act altruistically in an emergency. Id.
10.1.155. Nevertheless, Dr. Renn testified that the Salmon Falls Survey does provide some indication of owner response in an emergency and that in the case of Seabrook a number of factors may come together to over-ride the "general notion that people may voice a negative opinion in an opinion poll but still not refuse to give shelter to other individuals if a real disaster occurs." Id. at 80.
t l
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10.1.156. First, Dr. Renn testified that more than fifty percent of those surveyed expressed an unwillingness to shelter beachgoers. This is a surprisingly high number according to Dr. Renn. Although the responses may be more an indication of ;
an attitude toward nuclear power or the Seabrook plant than an indication of what people will do in an actual emergency, the behavior literature demonstrates that ten to thirty percent of people with a strong opinion or attitude may actually act in accordance with that attitude. More importantly, Dr. Renn stressed that if people can find a moral way to act in accordance with their attitude, that is, not let beachgoers shelter in their buildings, they will do so. The stronger the attitude, such as opposition to the nuclear plant, the greater will be their compulsion to find some way, without feeling guilty, to act in accordance with that attitude. It. 11061-64; II. 11111-11112; II, 11560-562.
10.1.157. Dr. Renn testified that with respect to the Seabrook situation, shelter owners have lots of moral reasons that could be used to over-ride their obligation to shelter the beachgoers. F.irst, and most importantly, many owners know that their buildings provide only a ten percent reduction in exposure, or otherwise believe, based on their own perception of what adequate shelter from radiation should be that their buildings would not provide adequate protection. This, combined with their knowledge of the long evacuation times from the beach area, may cause them to believe that they are better off evacuating than sheltering ("first one to leave is the first one out") and also advise patrous of their establishment, t
. and others who may come to the door, that they would also be better off evacuating. Goble et al Dir., post II. 10963 at 81-83; II. 11065-67; II. 11073-77; II. 11088; II.
11111-11112. Added to this is the fact that these owners may have a lack of trust in the authorities who are advising them to shelter, since these are the same people who told them earlier that "a serious accident will never happen" and who also told them that these shelters, in which people receive 90'5 of the dose that they would receive if they were outdoors, are suitable protection. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 81; II. 11076; II. 11066-67; Hollingworth Dir., Post II. 10832 at 2-3. Owners advising people to leave based on their own perception of how people will be best protected will, in their own perception, be acting altruistically and will therefore feel little moral obligation to shelter people. Tr. 11074.
The fact that the utility or State has not informed the owners of their expected role in an emergency or made any arrangements with the owners ahead of time to provide shelter will make it much easier for these owners to evacuate the beach area and lessen any counterbalancing moral obligation they may have to shelter people. Goble et al. Dr., post II. 10963 at 33; II.
11074; II. 11076; II. 11112.
10.1.158. Dr. Renn testified that fear of radiation contamination may also cause people to refuse to shelter others, even if it is not clear that the others have been contaminated. The fact that radiation cannot be seen cr otherwise sensed increases, and even triggers, people's fear of it. The incident last year in Goiana, Brazil in which people
- refused shelter even to their own relatives, Dr. Renn testified, is one example of how greatly people fear radiation. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 82-85; II.
11085-86. In addition, the behavioral literature indicates that the-degree of familiarity with another person strongly influences a person's willingness to help another person.
Goble et al Dir., Eqat II. 10963 at 80-81. The only studies concerning sheltering response apply to natural disasters and indicate a willingness of residents to offer shelter to their disaster-stricken neighbors. Id. In the Seabrook case, the beachgoers are not known to the shelter owner and the anonymity of the mass of people may prevent the compassion that is normally seen in emergency situations. Id. Added to this is the fact that the shelter owners' first responsibility will be to their own families, employees, and guests of their establishment. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 82; II.
11074-75. If they view any conflict between helping the unknown transient beachgoers and their own guests (such as fear that beachgoers may contaminate them) they will refuse to help the transients. Goble et al. Dir., East II. 10963 at 82, 10.1.159. Dr. Mileti also testified that he could imagine people not wanting to open doors to let other people in if they were concerned that in doing so they would let radiation in.
l He further testified that he could imagine an emergency in which people did not offer help to strangers, that when people l are the risk, such as has been seen with plague or i
AIDS-stricken people, then the collective altruistic response should not be expected to occur. II, 10131-31.
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o 10.1.160. There has been some question raised as to whether undue bias may have influenced the result of the Salmon Falls survey of shelter owners. San II. 11049-11063; II.
11090-11100. While Dr. Renn agreed that mentioning the Massachusetts Attorney General as the source of the survey would introduce some element of bias, that bias would go in both directions. It would influence those owners in favor of the nuclear plant, as well as those with attitudes against the plant, to express their views through their responses to the survey. In addition, Dr. Renn testified, many owners would not be influenced at all by the source attribution: many of the New Hampshire shelter owners would not have been aware at the ,
time the survey w6s conducted of the position of the Massachusetts Attorney General, and many others, although opposed to the plant, would still not be willing to indicate in writing that they would not shelter others if they deemed it to be a non-altruistic response. In addition, Dr. Renn testified, regardless of the bias, the survey responses indicate an attitude toward the plant that is prevalent among the owners which may grea.tly influence their perceptions and thus their actual behavior in an emergency. II. 11060-64. Dr. Renn could find no other evidence of bias in the survey, and no evidence of bias in any of the survey questions. II. 11058-60; II.
11089-100; II. 11114, 10.1.161. The Board has received evidence from three sources which in fact confirms that many people do not believe their buildings would provide adequate protection in an emergency, and that owners would, rather than shelter, seek to L
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l evacuate immediately. Mouchan et al. Dir., Post II. 10857 at 5: Hollinaworth Dir., Post II. 10832 at 2-3; Mass AG Exh. 19, passim. There was also evidence indicating that people would first seek to help their own families, employees, and guests and that some of them indeed perceived a conflict, for whatever reason, between doing that and sheltering the beach transients. Mass AG._EZb 19 at 10, 23, 31, 50, 74; Mouchan et
- 31. Dir.; Post IL 10857 at 5.
10.1.162. Dr. Renn testified that the fact that sixty to seventy percent of those who responded to the shelter-owner surveys indicated an unwillingness to shelter beachgoers would not mean that, in fact, sixty to seventy percent of the owners will refuse to do so in an actual emergency. II. 11062. What it does indicate, however, ':. that some percentage of the owners, if not a majority then at least a substantial minority of them, will in fact not offer the beachgoers shelter. II.
11063-64.
10.1.163. In has also been suggested that many of the hotel and motel owners, in the beach area, even if they were willing to shelter beachgoers in the common public areas of their establishments, would not be willing to shelter people in the hotel and motel rooms of their paying guests. This is a significant issue since it is undisputed that hotel and motel rooms comprise the vast majority of the potential shelter space in the beach area, and without these rooms, it is unlikely that sufficient space could be available to shelter the transient beach population. Goble et al. Dir., Post II. 10963 at 65; Ene ann. EKh. No. 2.
a 10.1.164. To gain understanding on this issue Dr. Eckert sent a second survey to the nineteen motel and hotel owners who responded to his first survey that they would be willing to shelter transient beachgoers. The survey asked the owners the single question who has the right to determine who is admitted to rooms rented by customers. Of the ten responses he received, only three indicated that the hotel / motel owner had the right to determine who could be admitted to the rooms of paying guests; six answered that the right belonged to the guest; and one owner requested that his building be removed from the list of potential shelters. Goble et al. Dr., post II. 10963 at 65-66. i 10.1.165. Although the State of New Hampshire has taken the position that it need not make arrangements in advance with shelter owners because the State is not asking them to do cnything more than they normally do by allowing the public access to their buildings, the Board finds that it is clearly not the practice of hotel and motel owners to allow other people into the rooms of their paying guests. II, 11587-589.
It is also not,the practice to crowd eight to twelve people into a room that normally holds only two to four. And that is the number of people (8-12) that could be allotted to one motel room according to Stone & Webster's calculation of potential shelter spaces. II. 11638.
10.1.166. New Hampshire officials could not even testify as to whether the hotel / motel owners had the legal right to l
l open up their guests' rooms to other people. II. 11587-588.
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9 10.1.167. The Board finds based on the evidence and testimony presented that some portion of the shelter owners may not make their buildings, or at least a major portion of their buildings available to others for sheltering. Enough uncertainty has been raised by the evidence over the owners' actual response in an-emergency, that the Board is unwilling to rely on mere allegations that it is "inconceivable" that the owners would not shelter people as a basis for its reasonable assurance finding. It makes no sense to wait until an actual emergency may occur to determine what it is the owners will do; if at that time the Intervenors' allegations prove to be true, the consequences to the beach population could bo disastrous. If the State of New Hampshire is to rely on the owners of commercial establishments for sheltering the beach population, then the State should make arrangements with the owners in advance of any possibility of an emergency, through Letters of Agreement.
10.1.168. An issue has been raised concerning the time it would take people on the beaches to access shelter. This is an important i.ssue, because sheltering is most likely to be recommended in a fast-developing accident situation and for shelter to serve as an effective protective action it should be able to be implemented prior to plume arrival. II. 11614; II.
11629.
10.1.169. Applicants state that the shelters in the beach area can be accessed by beachgoers in anywhere from minutes to one-half hour. The only support for this proposition is a map of the Seabrook and southern portion of Hampton boach areas
showing the distribution of public shelters with respect to distribution of people actually on the beaches. Apo. Dir. No.
6, Enst) Tr. 10022 at attanh. 3, p. 2.
10.1.170. The State of New Hampshire has not done any analysis of the time it would take people on the beaches to locate shelter and get inside. II. 10553. The State just assumes that sheltering "can be done almost immediately," II.
10465; that people on the beach can just cross the street and "go indoors."
10.1.171. Nevertheless, the State in its Response to FEMA's Supplemental Testimony stated that if it were to recommend sheltering for the beach population in summer months, some beach transients would not be able to shelter in place, but would need to leave the beach or move to public shelter, and sheltering beachgoers in public shelters:
"would require forming family groups or social units prior to moving, deciding whether to seek shelters or evacuate spontaneously, choosing a mode of transportation (i.e., walk or ride), seeking a destination (i.e., home or shelter), and undertaken the physical movements.
600. Dir. No. 6, II. 10022 at App. 1, pp. 4-5. This action, the State recognized, would take some time and might require some people taking shelter "three blocks . . . or a half-mile down the road." II. 10550-552, resulting in increased exposure ;
time. Id. Although the State witnesses testified that this t-shelter implementation time would only be a problem if the State had designated large public buildings as shelters the beach population, the witnesses do not explain why implementing time is still not a problem for the transient beach population, l
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, since the State acknowledges that some of the beach transients would not be able to shelter-in-place but would have to move to "public shelter," and some of these shelters may well be several blocks or a half mile away. II. 11008. It should make no difference to the implementing time whether these "public shelters" are large, designated shelters or a number of small, undesignated shelters. Indeed, it would seem that with so many people on the beaches that the latter situation would take longer to implement.
10.1.172. Dr. Renn has performed an extensive analysis of the time it would take people on the beaches to get into shelter. For his analysis he used a behavioral model that divides the response into separate phases of response. This is the accepted approach for modeling behavior response times and similar to the approach used by KLD in modeling evacuation times. Goble et al Dir., Post II, 10963, at 76.
10.1.173. Using this six-phase time model, Dr. Renn calculated that it would take between one hour and forty minutes and four hours and thirty-five minutes for ninety percent of the beach population to get into shelters. The most probable time that it would take is two hours thirty-eight minutes. Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 78; II. 11113.
These times assume a peak beach population (between 60,000 to 100,000 people in the entire beach area EpZ, Massachusetts and New Hampshire beaches); that the beach population is effectively notified to take shelter; that twenty-five percent of the population spontaneously evacuates; that there is adequate accessible sheltering capacity for ninety percent of
the remaining population; and weather conditions are favorable for locating shelters. Goble et al Dir.., Post II. 10961 at 78-79, 10.1.174. When questioned as to why these times were so long, Dr. Renn explained that many people would bet into shelters fairly quickly, but that his analysis of implementation times reflect the amount of time it would take for'the ninetieth percentile person to complete the sheltering response. Id. Dr. Renn roughly estimated that it would take r
l between forty to forty-five minutes and one and one-half hours for the median person to get into shelter, with the most probable time being fifty-five to sixty minutes. II. 11107-108; ,
II. 11115.
10.1.175. Dr. Renn testified that the main reason that is would take so long for the population to get into shelters is that the shelters closest to the beach will be filled by the people who arrive first, and the people who are furthest from the shelters (as much as thirty minutes away in Hampton Beach according to Dr. Renn who actually walked the distances several times with a s. top watch. II. 11007-8; aga Alan App. Dir. No. 6 Post II. 10022 at Attach. 3) will first seek shelter in these buildings closest to the beach only to find them fi41ed. These people will then, through a process of trial and error, need to continue seeka+, shelter until they find a building that is not yet filled. Assuming that the best available shelters will be filled first, Dr. Renn esti, nates, based on his field work ir.
the beach area examining shelters and their distribution with respect to the beach population, that the average person has a 1 ~
crance of only one in ten of findisc shelter on his or her first try after fifty perccat of the beach population has .
already been place din one of the shelters. And, since a reasonable person will :eek shelter closest to the beach and in the buildings that most conform to his or her perception of what constitutes suitable shelter, ges, e..g , II. 10952 at 73; 10 10981; the probability of find 1ng available space in a shelter will only gradually improva for each trial. Gobel et ,
al_Dir., FRS.t XI. 10963 at 73.
10.1.176. Another factor that will affect sheltering imolementation times will be the time to takes family groups who may be spread out at different locations in the beach aree, to find each other befors they attempt to seek shelter II.
10987; 11018, 10.1.177. Ir, addition, because people have no experience in dealing with radiological emergencies people will spend a certain amount of time orienting themselves to the situation, ,
asking their r; :.ghbors what to do, and deciding where to go and whether they wou4d not, in fact, be better off evacuating.
Cto.blR_e t al Dir., post II. 19963. at 7)-72; 75-78; II. <1032-33<
10.1.178. The non-clarity cf 'che beach closing message may also contribute greatly to the st.uiter implementation times; Goble et .a1 Dir., Post II. 10962 at 72; age alsn, II. 10076-77; Tr. 10084-65; especially if the only instruction is for peoplo to turn on their radios and wait, possibly as long as fifteen minutes, Apo. Dit. No. 6, East II, 10022 at 15, for an EBS message to tell them what te da. II. 10077-85.
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t 10.1.179. Dr. Renn testified that the fact that most I buildings in the beach area do not conform to most people's perception of what a shelter from radiation ought to be, may contribute to confusion, and possibly even panic, when people attempt to locate suitable sheltering space. Goble et al Dir.,
East II. 10963 at 69; 73-74; 84-55. Egg also Eckert Dir., Post II. 11689, passim; and Mass AG Exh. 21. Labelling of shelters would help to reduce some of this confusion, as well as sheltering implementation times by assuring people that they had found an appropriately designated shelter. Goble et al Rit., Post II. 10963 at 72, 74-75.
10.1.180. Dr. Renn also testified to a number of other factors pertinent to the Seabrook site that could promote panic and/or confusion on the part of the beach population, if a shelter protective action is recommended without careful and appropr'iate plans in place to implement that response. Goble et al Dir., Etat II. 10963 at 75-76; 83-87; 68-69.
10.1.181. The Board finds Dr. Renn to be a highly credible witness, who is well-qualified in his field and has obviously spent consider.able time analyzing this beach sheltering problem based on a comprehensive' review of the disaster behavior response literature including a review of all the available literature concerning sheltering behavior, including pre-emergency sheltering response, II. 11112-113, and considerable field work in the beach area, II. 11007; II.
11010; Goble et al Dir., Post II. 10963 at 75-86.
10.1.182. The only other testimony offered on this issue of sheltering behavior was the sole unsupported sentence of Dr.
c Mileti. Egg No. 10.1.145 Supra. Certainly no other witness has done a site-specific analysis of this sheltering behavior issue or performed the field work that Dr. Renn has in analyzing this issue. San Uns. 7.1.7 .8; 7.1.22 .23; II.
10042-44; II. 10051.
10.1.183. The Board is persuaded by Dr. Renn's analysis of the behavioral problems that may be incurred in sheltering the beach population in the Seabrook EPZ in the absence of an appropriate plan to implement that response. The Board finds that without a plan to implement sheltering that takes into account factors unique to Seabrook which would lenghen implementation times, such as, the size and special characeristics of the transient beach population and the number, location and characteristics of the Peach area shelters, sheltering as a protection option for the beach population could result in confusion, panic and, at the very least, increased exposure, and would not be an adequate protective measure for that population. Sag Goble et al Dir.,
Post II. 10963 at 83-87, 10.1.184. An issue has also been raised concerning the adequacy of the NHRERp's protective action decision-making provisions. The Board heard considerable testimony on this issue which demonstrates considerable flaws in the decision-making. After careful review of this testimony, the Board finds that the protection action decision-making criteria do not adequately account for exposure from ground-shine contamination; the criteria do not account for the groundshine l dose the population may receive prior to implementing a l
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sheltering response; II. 10464; II. 10486; does not account for the groundshine dose the population may continue to accumulate after leaving the EPZ until they are monitored and decontaminated; II. 10476-477; II. 10485; does not account for the groundshine dose people may receive from radioactive particles that may be deposited on people's skin or automobiles; II. 10476-477; II. 10467-468; II. 10534; and does in any way take into account the shielding from groundshine that may be obtained by cheltering. II. 10542-543. The decision criteria also do not account for the time it may take people in the beach area to get into shelter, a factor that Applicants' witnesses agree is very important. II. 10543-544; II. 10726; II. 10734. As a result of these failures to account for appropriate factors in the decisionmaking criteria, the Board is unable to find with reasonable assurance that appropriate protection action recommendations will be made by the State of New Hampshire in the event of a radiological emergency.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In order to make a finding that the NHRERP provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented, the Board must find reasonable assurance that the NHRERP's protective measures can and will provide some
! meaningful level of dose savings to the public.
Insofar as evacuation alone is preferred because of the l unavailability or lack of effectiveness of sheltering rather 1
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d than because of an ability to protect the at risk population, an evacuation strategy cannot support an adequacy finding.
CONCLUSION The Board does not have sufficient evidentary basis on the record to support a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for the summer beach population in the Seabrook EPZ.
Respectfully submitted, JAMES M. SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL COMMONWEAL 7.d OF MASSACHUSETTS By: 6 i kSU Carol Sneider Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety Unit Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2200 DATED: August 15, 1988 T
/
UC(,KEi EO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U9WC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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00CKEllMi ER A NU4
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- .In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket No.(s)
NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-443/444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site EP)
)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Pamela Talbot, hereby certify that on August 15, 1988, I made service of the within MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M.
SHANNON'S MOTION TO FILE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW ON SHELTERING CONTENTIONS LATE; and MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW ON SHELTERING CONTENTIONS, by first class mail, or by Federal Express as indicated by (*], or by hand delivery as indicated by [**], to:
Ivan Smith, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bechesda, MD 20814 Dr. Jerry Harbour Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of General Counsel Commission 15th Floor East West Towers Building 11555 Rockville Pike 4350 East West Highway Rockville, MD 20852 Bethesda, MD 20814 l
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H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Stephen E. Merrill
-Aasistant General Counsel Attorney General Office of General Counsel George Dana Bisbee Federal Emergency Management Assistant Attorney General
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Agency Office of the Attorney General 500 C Street, S.W. 25 Capitol, Street Washington, DC 20472 Concord, NH 03301
- Docketing and Service Paul A. Fritzsche, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Public Advocate Commission State House Station 112 Washington, DC. 20555 Augusta, ME 04333 Roberta C. Pevear Diana P. Randall State Representative 70 Collins Street Town of Hampton Falls Seabrook, NH 03874 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety & Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esq.
Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O. Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03106 Atomic Safety & Licensing Jane Doughty Board Panel Seacoast Anti-Pollution League U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 5 Market Street Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Matthew T. Brock. Esq. J. P. Nadeau Shaines & McEachern Board of Selectmen 25 Maplewood Avenue 10 Central Road P.O. Box 360 Rye, NH 03870 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Sandra Gavutis, Chairperson Calvin A. Canney Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1, Box 1134 City Hall Rte. 107 126 Daniel Street E. Kingston, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Angelo Machiros, Chairman U.S. Senate Board of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 25 High Road (Attn: Tom Burack) Newbury, MA 10950 l
l Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Edward G. Molin l
1 Eagle Square, Suite 507 Mayor Concord, NH 03301 City Hall
, (Attn: Herb Boynton) Newburyport, MA 01950 1
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Donald E. Chick William Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall 10 Front Street Friend Street Exeter, NH 03-833 Amesbury, MA 01913 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
RFD Dalton Road Holmes & Sllis Brentwood, NH 03833 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03841 philip Ahrens, Esq. Ellyn Weiss, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Harmon & Weiss Department of the Attorney Suite 430 General 2001 S Street, N.W.
State House Station #6 Washington, DC 20009 Augusta, ME 04333 Thomas G. Dignan, Esq. Richard A. Hampe, Esq.
Ropes & Gray Hampe & McNicholas 225 Frarklin Street 35 Pleasant Street Boston, MA 02110 Concord, NH 03301 Beverly Hollingworth Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
209 Winnacunnet Road 376 Main Street Hampton, NH 03842 Haverhill, MA 01830 William Armstrong Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Civil Defense Director Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Jewell Street, RFD 2 10 Front Street South Hampton, NH 03827 j Exeter, NH 03833 Robert Carrigg, Chairman Anne E. Goodman, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen Town Office 13-15 Newmarket Road Atlantic Avenue Durham, NH 03824 North Hampton, NH 03862 Allen Lampert Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairperson Civil Defense Director Atomic Safety and Licensing Town of Brentwood Board Panel l
20 Franklin Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Exeter, NJ 03833 Commission Washington, DC 20555 I
Charles P. Graham, Esq. Barbara St. Andre, Esq.
McKay, Murphy & Graham Kopelman & Paige, P.C.
Old Post Office Square 77 Franklin Street 100 Main Street Boston, MA 02110 Amesbury, MA 01913
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. Judith H. Mizner, Esq. R. Scott Hill-Whilton, .Esq.
'Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton
& McGuireL & McGuire
- 79. State Street . 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Newburyport, MA 01950 f& f .. .. (PT)
). 4 V . Tu icLCr Carol Sneider Assistant Attorney General-Nuclear Safety. Unit
. Department of the Attorney General' One Ashburton Place Boston, MA- 02108-1698 (617) 727-2200 DATED: . August 15, 1988 l
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