Information Notice 1994-13, Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment

Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment

ML031070002
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	06/28/1994
Revision:	0
From:	Grimes B K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-94-013, Suppl 1, NUDOCS 9406220075
Download: ML031070002 (20)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 28, 1994NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT 1: UNANTICIPATED AND UNINTENDEDMOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES ANDOTHER COMPONENTS DUE TO IMPROPEROPERATION OF REFUELING EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice supplement to alert addressees to an event involving unauthorizedmovement of a defective spent fuel rod. It is expected that recipients willreview the information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestionscontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, nospecific action or written response is required.BackgroundThe NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 94-13, "Unanticipated and UnintendedMovement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation ofRefueling Equipment," to alert addressees to problems that could result frominadequate oversight of refueling operations and inadequate performance on thepart of refueling personnel. IN 94-13 described various refueling events thatoccurred at Vermont Yankee, Peach BE'ttom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point.These events demonstrate the importince of proper controls over, and operationof, refueling equipment during use. A recent event at the Waterford SteamElectric Station (Waterford) demonstrates the potential for fuel damage orpersonnel hazards which could result from fuel-handling equipment that is notproperly stored and not secured from unauthorized use.DescriDtion of CircumstancesOn February 18, 1994, the Waterford plant was operating at 100-percent powerwhen a senior reactor operator found an unknown object hanging from thefuel-handling machine in the fuel-handling building. Health physicstechnicians measured radiation levels in the spent fuel pool area and foundthem to be normal. Licensee personnel remotely secured the object with visegrips and determined that underwater radiation levels were .2 to .7 Sv/hr[20 to 70 R/hr] at 15 centimeters [6 inches] from the object. A CombustionEngineering employee identified the object as a fuel rod encapsulation tube.No visual damage was apparent on the tube. The licensee posted a securityguard in the spent fuel pool area and reported the event to the NRC.9406220075 PD9 XIT 9t q ./ ,- A 94-13, Supplement 1-June 28, 1994 'The licensee reviewed fuel storage records and determined that the tube.contained 'a defective fuel rod that had been removed from an irradiated fuelassembly several years earlier. At that time, the tube had been placed in acenter guide tube in a grid cage stored in the spent fuel racks. The licenseereviewed computer access records for the fuel-handling area and interviewedrelevant personnel about the event. Personnel who may have had access to thefuel-handling machine completed questionnaires regarding the event.- Thelicensee determined that the refueling director had used the fuel-handlingmachine the day before the object was discovered and had parked thefuel-handling machine at a location directly over the fuel rod encapsulationtube. However, the refueling director had not used the hoist and was not surethat he would have noticed if the encapsulation tube was hanging from thehoist at the time he used the machine. Surveillance records indicated thatthe fuel rod encapsulation tube must have become attached to the fuel-handlingtool sometime between February 11 and 18, 1994.Design drawings of the cap of the fuel rod encapsulation tube showed that theouter diameter of the cap was about equal to the inner diameter of the end ofthe fuel-handling tool. Apparently, the cap had become bound in thefuel-handling tool when the hoist was lowered to the top of the spent fuelrack and, when the hoist was raised, the tube was completely removed from thegrid cage.Although contractors had performed the fuel-handling operations for previousrefueling outages, Waterford personnel were scheduled to perform the fuelhandling for the March 1994 refueling outage. The licensee speculated thatone of the people assigned to fuel-handling activities for the March outagemay have inadvertently lifted the encapsulation tube while practicing the useof the hoist. Personnel were required to notify health physics staff beforeaccessing the refueling machine; however, health physics records showed thatno one had made such a notification during this time. No keys or specialknowledge was needed to access the controls of the fuel-handling machine.Electrical power could be obtained by closing two electrical breakers andpushing one switch that were located on the machine. The licensee questionedseveral employees, but no one admitted to unauthorized use of thefuel-handling machine.As an interim corrective action, the licensee deenergized the computer thatcontrols the fuel-handling machine by opening a breaker in a locked powercontrol center. The licensee planned to (1) develop a means to prevent thefuel rod encapsulation tube from being inadvertently lifted by thefuel-handling tool, (2) add a precaution to the operating procedure warningoperators not to lower the fuel-handling tool over the storage location, and(3) add hoist manipulations to the lesson plans for proficiency training.DiscussionProcedures governing the use of equipment for handling fuel and corecomponents may not prevent unauthorized or unintended operation of thatequipment. Precautions such as locking out breakers that energize thefuel-handling equipment and the placement of placards in highly visible areasdeclaring that unauthorized operation of fuel-handling equipment is forbidden

• ~ 94-13, Supplement 1June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment is not used without-proper authorization.Additionally, storing the fuel-handling'machine in an area where accidentalmovement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or othercomponents may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement ordamage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and corecomponent handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and corecomponents are protected'from damage or unauthorized movement and that plantpersonnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director'Division of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV(817) 860-8195

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices D kachmentIN 94-13, Supp. *1June 28, 1994 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to94-4794-4694-4594-4494-43Accuracy of InformationProvided to NRC duringthe Licensing ProcessNonConservative ReactorCoolant System LeakageCalculationPotential Common-ModeFailure Mechanism forLarge Vertical PumpsMain Steam IsolationValve Failure to Closeon Demand because ofInadequate Maintenanceand TestingDetermination of Primary-to-Secondary SteamGenerator Leak RateCracking in the LowerRegion of the CoreShroud in Boiling-WaterReactorsProblems with GeneralElectric Type CR124Overload Relay AmbientCompensationFailure of a Rod ControlCluster Assembly to FullyInsert Following a ReactorTrip at Braidwood Unit 2Identified Problems inGamma StereotacticRadiosurgery06/21/9406/20/9406/17/9406/16/9406/10/9406/07/9406/07/9405/26/9405/31/94All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission MaterialLicensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling-water reactors(BWRs).All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized-waterreactors (PWRs).All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission TeletherapyMedical Licensees.94-4294-4194-4094-39OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit SIN 94-13, Supplement 1June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment is not used without proper authorization.Additionally, storing the fuel-handling machine in an area where accidentalmovement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or othercomponents may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement ordamage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and corecomponent handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and corecomponents are protected from damage or unauthorized movement and that plantpersonnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact:Dale A. Powers, RIV(817) 860-8195

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices* See Previous ConcurrenceOFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRRNAME RSanders* DDesaulniers* MMSlosson* BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 06/01/94 06/01/94 [06/02/94OFFICE _ C/MB:DRS:RIV OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR l D/Dji;RRNAME DPowers* JLBirmingham* RJKiessel* BKGfm'es IDATE 06/03/94 06/03/94 06/07/94 06/IA3/94Document Name: 94-13SP1.IN In 94-XXJune xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV(817) 860-8195

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices* See Previous ConcurrenceOFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRRNAME RSanders* DDesaulniers* MMSlosson* BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 I06/01/94 [06/01/94 106/02/94OFFICE C/MB:DRS:RIV OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR ,D/DORS:NRRNAME DPowers* JLBirmingham RJKiessel BKGrimesDATE 06/03/94 I06/03/94 06/y /94 06/ /94nM .-__ -__. ...... rWv-or .w4x)uocument name: U:\WIKWKU.JLb In 94-XXJune xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV(817) 860-8195

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices* c-- D -----------_^.__u. W1.4- C ri ev iuub %oUncUFrrene e--rOFFICE DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRRNAME RSanderF .X d MMSlosso'^Oi.DATE 05/26/94 06// /94 06/ //94 06_Z__494OFFICE C/MB:9RS<<R V OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME DPoWersZ;~ -J JLBirmingham BKGrimesDATE 06/os/94 06/d)/94 06/ /94 06/ /94Document Name: G:\WTRFRD.JLB