ML20155J753

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Documents Results of Joint Ofc of Investigations/Nrr Interview W/Ms Coleman Re Conflict W/De Olson 841115 Statements.Olson Not Truthful Re 841214 Memo.Summaries of Interview & Leak Rate Surveillance Tests Encl
ML20155J753
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/04/1985
From: Russell W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151L202 List:
References
NUDOCS 8605270189
Download: ML20155J753 (4)
v • d • e


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/s .e uano, Enclosure 14

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UNITED STATES -

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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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.- .. s MEMORANDIJM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director Division of Human Factors Safety - '

THRU: Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Human Factors Safety [

FROM: William T. Russell, Deputy Director Division of Human Factors Safety

SUBJECT:

RESULTS OF JOINT OI/NRR INTERVIEW WITH MARK S. COLEMAN

Reference:

1. Memorandum from S. J. Chilk (SECY) to B. B. Hayes (OI) and W. J. Dircks (EDO) dated April 2, 1984,

Subject:

Staff Requirements-Discussion of Pending Investigation-TMI

2. Memorandum frcm H. R. Denton (NRR) to B. B. Hayes (OI) dated May 3, 1984,

Subject:

NRR Review of 01 Investigation Materials Concerning Hartman Allegations of Falsification of Leak Rate Data at TMI, Unit 2 0 3.

Memorandum from W. T. Russell (DHFS) to H. R. Denton (NRR) dated December 14, 1984,

Subject:

Results of Joint OI/NRR Investigation and Evaluation of Dennis I. Olson

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The purpese of this memorandum is to document the results of the joint OI/NRR intervia with Ar. Mark S. Coleman. The interview with Mr. Coleman was to confirm info,mation provided earlier by Mr. Coleman that was in conflict with statements made by Mr, Dennis I. Olson during his November 15, 1984 interview with 01/NRR. Tne interviews of both individuals dealt with the subject of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate surveillance testing irregularities at TMI-2 during the period September 30, 1978 through the date of the accident, March 28, 1979. During that time frame, Mr. Olson and Mr. Coleman were licensed Control Room Operators (CR0s) at THI-2 assigned to the same shift.

NOTE: This memorandum and enclosure discuss information which is the '

subfect of an ongoing OI investigation. This memorandum and enclosure may not be disseminated outside the NRC without coordination with ~NRR and the permission ef the EDO or the Director, basis.Internal access and distribution should be on a "need to know" 01."

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Harold R. Denton January 4, 1985

Background

As a rescit of a Comission meeting on March 23, 1984, NRR was directed by -

Reference 1 to review 01 investigation materials concerning falsification of RCS leak' rate surveillance tests at TMI-2 and refer back to OI those matters which required further investigation. The results of NRR's review was ~

provided in Reference 2. The review detennined that follow-up investigation by 01 and further evaluation by NRR was needed in the case of seven licensed opera tors. Mr. D. I. Olson, currently a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at Waterford 3, was one of the seven individuals identified as needing additional investigation and evaluation. Mr. Olson was interviewed under oath in New Orleans, Louisiana by OI/NRR on November 15, 1984. During the interview, many of the statements made by Mr. Olson did not appear credible in light of the technical evaluation of Mr. 01 son's leak rate surveillance tests and statements.made by Mr. Coleman on April 10, 1980. The results of the joint 01/NRR investigation and evaluation of Mr. Olson is documented in Reference 3. Because of Mr. Coleman's candid admission in April 1980 that he was involved in leak rate falsification at TMI-2, when first questioned about his involvement, it was recommended in Reference 2 that no follow-up investigation of Mr. Coleman was required. .

'Past involvement in TMI-2 Leak Rate Testing Irregularities On December 14, 1984, a joint OI/NRR interview with Mr. Coleman was held in p]

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the Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I. The interview was conducted under oath and in the presence of Mr. Coleman's personal attorneys:

Mr. Bart Gephart and Ms. Jane Penny of the law firm Xillian and Gephart. ' The interview was conducted by Mr. Keith Christopher, Director, Office of Investigations, Region I and Mr. Robert Capra, Technical Assistant, Division of Systems Integration, NRR.

A complete sumary of Mr. Coleman's interview is provided as an enclosure to this memorandum. The enclosure also includes a Report of Interview of Mr. Coleman's April 10, 1980 in'terview with IE and CIA and a summary of leak rate surveillance tests involving both Mr. Olson and Mr. Coleman during the period under investigation. The following key points were discussed during the interview:

1.

Mr. Coleman had little faith in RCS leak rate test calculations which were performed to show compliance with the Technical Specifications.

2. Leak rate test results were erratic. Acceptable leak-rate test results were more difficult to obtain as the date of the accident approached.

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3. The operators on his shift, including Mr. Olson, were concerned about opera 11ng the plant with high identified leakage caused by valve leakage from the top of the pressurizer. Mr. Coleman stated at one point Mr. Olson recomended to his Shift Supervisor that the plant should be shut gown to repair the leakage.

4 It was common practice to run leak. rate tests several times per shift v) until an acceptable result was obtained. The acceptable tests were retained and the unacceptable tests were thrown away.

Harold R. Denton -

3- January 4, 1985 t

5. Mr..-Coleman believed that unacceptable test results were thrown away so '

they would not be seen by the NRC. These tests were thrown away at the-diriction of or with the knowledge and consent of Mr. Coleman's Shift ForeTnan and Shift Supervisor. .-_ e

6. According to Mr. Coleman, no changes were made in leak rate test practices following the October 18, 1978 incident that resulted in the generation of LER 78-62/1T.
7. Contrary to the consnitment contained in the narrative of LER 78-62/IT, Mr. Coleman was not instructed to enter the Action Statement of the Technical Specification when leak rate test results exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation.
8. Mr. Coleman believes it was consnon knowledge among operators, including the operators on his shift, that hydrogen additions to the MUT would influence MUT level indication and consequently leak rate test results.
9. Mr. Coleman used hydrogen additions to the MUT to assist in obtaining leak rate test results that were within the acceptance criteria of the Technical Specifications.
10. While Mr. Coleman could not confirm whether Mr. Olson had ever made O hydrogen additions to the MUT to alter leak rate test results, he mentioned adding hydrogen for this purpose to Mr. Olson on at least one occasion. Mr. Coleman stated that Mr. Olson acted like he did not want

, to hear about it. Consequently, Mr. Coleman did not recall discussing the subject with him again.

11. Mr. Coleman stated that he was aware that adding water to the MUT during the last few minutes of a leak rate test could produce the same effect on leak rate test results as adding hydrogen to the MUT. Mr. Coleman stated that he use this method to manipulate leak rate test results during the last two months before the accident since hydrogen could no longer be added to the MUT remotely from the Control Room.
12. Mr. Coleman could not state whether Mr. Olson ever manipulated leak rate tests by the addition of water to the MUT during the last few minutes of the test. However, after reviewing the leak rate test data, he confirmed it would be hard to believe that Mr. Olson did not use this method.

Conclusions During the period, Mr. Coleman served as a CR0 at TMI-2 on the same shift as Mr. Olson, Mr. Coleman was involved in activities associated with leak rate test falsification. While Mr. Coleman could neither confirm nor deny that Mr. 01 son was also involved in these same actions, it is difficult to believe that Mr. Olson either did not participate in leak rate test manipulation or O have direct knowledge that this activity was going on around him.

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Harold R. Denton January 4, 1985 Mr. Olson stated that following the October 18, 1978 incident, he was advised

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of the- proper interpretation of Technical Specifications and that he never threw away unacceptable leak rate tests following that incident. He stated-he would staple the bad leak rate test results to the good test and turn them -

into h~is Shift Foreman.

There is no indication that the Action Statement of the Technical Specifications was entered by any of the operators on their ~~

shift, either before or after the October 18, 1978 incident. Had Mr. Olson properly applied the requirerents of the Technical Specifications, the Action Statement 1 gpm. would have been invoked whenever unidentified leakage exceeded Mr. 01 son's claim that he did not throw away bad leak rate test results and turned them into his Shift Foreman conflicts with Mr. Colem bad test results." statements that his Shift Foreman and Shift Supervisor "did not want Mr. 01 son's statement that he was not aware that hydrogen additions to the make-up tank could alter make-up tank level and consequently influence leak rate test results phenomenon is also was common in conflict knowledge with among CR0s. Mr. Coleman's statement that this Mr. Olson's statement that he was not aware hydrogen additions were being made for that purpose is in conflict with Mr. Coleman's statement that he mentioned using this technique to Mr. Olson on at least one occasion.

Mr. 01 son's statement that he never added water to the O a leak rate test also does not appear credible in light of the technical data and Mr. Coleman's manipulate admission that Mr. Coleman used this technique to test results.

only two tests that exhibited this pattern.Mr. Coleman and Mr. Olson were invohe in five tests with Mr. Wright (the other CR0 on their shift) and one testHowev where Mr. Olson alone was involved where water was added to the MUT during the last few minutes of a leak rate test.

MUT level increase than was recorded in the CRO's Log or compensated f the leak rate test calculation.

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In surrnary, based upon Mr. Coleman's testimony, coupled with the technical evaluation of the leak rate tests involving Mr. Olson, I believe the conclusions reached in Reference 3 remain valid and that Mr. Olson w truthful in answering questions regarding his role in leak rate test manipulation. -

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William T.J Deputy Russell, A Director Division of Human Factors Safety Office of Nucl, ear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated t

cc: B. Hay ~s N K. Christopher, RI .

i J. Lieberman

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