ML20155J713

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Partially Withheld Results of Joint Ofc of Investigations/ NRR Interview W/Jj Blessing Re Conflict of Statements W/ RR Booher (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)).Firsthand Knowledge of Booher Involvement Unavailable
ML20155J713
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/04/1985
From: Russell W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151L202 List:
References
NUDOCS 8605270174
Download: ML20155J713 (5)
v • d • e


Text

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director Division of Human Factors Safety .

THRU: Hugh L. Thompson, Jr. , Director Division of Human Factors Safety FROM: William T. Russell, Deputy Director Division of Human Factors Safety

SUBJECT:

RESULTS OF JOINT OI/NRR INTERVIEW WITH JOHN J. BLESSING

Reference:

1. Memorandum from S. J. Chilk (SECY) to B. B. Hayes (01) and W. J. Dircks (EDO) dated April 2, 1984,

Subject:

Staff Requirements-Discussion of Pending Investigation-TMI

2. Memorandurt from H. R. Denton (NRR) to B. B. Hayes (OI) dated May 3, 1984,

Subject:

NRR Review of OI Investigation Materials Concerning Hartman Allegations of Falsification of Leak Rate Data at THI, Unit 2

3. Memorandum from W. T. Russell (DHFS) to H. R. Denton Q (NRR) dated December 14, 1984,

Subject:

Results of Joint NRR/0I Investigation and Evaluation of Raymond R. Bocher

  • The purpose of this memorandum is to document the results of the joint 01/NRR interview with Mr. John J. Blessing. The interview with Mr. Blessing was to confim information provided earlier by Mr. Blessing that was in conflict with statements made by Mr. Raymond R. Bocher during his November 15, 1984 interview with OI/NRR. The interviews of both individuals dealt with the subjects of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate surveillance testing irregularities at THI-2 during the period September 30, 1978 through the date of the accident, March 28, 1979 and a breach of security incident that took place at TMI-2 on July 13, 1979. During that time frame, Mr. Bocher and Mr. Blessing were Control Room Operators (CR0s) at TMI-2 assigned to the same ' ,

shift. '

NOTE: This memorandum and enclosure discuss information which is the subject of ongoing O! investigations. This memorandum and enclosure may not be disseminated outside the NRC without coordination with NRR and the pemission of the EDO or the Director

- OJ. Internal access and distribution should be on a 'need to know" basis.

9 0605270174 860516 0 PDR ADOCK 0500 p

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Harold R. Denton .2 - January 4, 1985

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Background

As a result of a Comission meeting on March 23, 1984 NRR was directed by -

' Reference 1 to review OI investigation materials concerning falsification of RCS leak which _ ratefurther required surveillance tests at TMI-2 and refer back to OI those matters .

investigation. ~

provided in Reference 2. The review determined The results of NRR's review was that follow-up investigation by 01 and further evaluation by NRR was needed in the case of seven licensed operators. Mr. R. R. Bocher, currently a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at Waterford 3, was one of the seven individuals identified as needing additional investigation and evaluation. Mr. Booher was interviewed under oath in New Orleans, Louisiana by OI/NRR on November 15, 1984. During the interview, some of the statements made by Mr. Booher did not appear credible in light of the technical evaluation of Mr. Booher's leak rate surveillance tests and earlier statements made by both Mr. Hartman and Mr. Blessing. The results of the joint O!/NRR investigation and evaluation of Mr. Sooher is i documented in Reference 3. Because of Mr. Blessing's candid admission in April 1980 that he was involved in leak rate falsification at TMI-2, when first questioned about his involvement, it was recommended in Reference 2 that no follow-up investigation of Mr. Blessing was required.

Past-Involvement in TMI-2 Leak Rate Testing Irregularities and Knowledge of the July 13, 1979 Breach of Security Incident On December 14, 1984, a joint OI/NRR interview with Mr. Blessing was held in the Office of Investigations Field Office, Regiori I. The interview was conducted by Mr. Keith Christopher, Director Office of Investigations, Region I and Mr. Robert Capra, Technical Assistant, Division of Systems Integration, NRR. Prior to comencement of the interview, Mr. Christopher.

was informed by Mr. Bart Gephart of the law firm of Killian and Gephart, that while he had represented Mr. Blessing in previous interviews and investigations by the NRC and the Department of Justice, he no longer represented Mr. Blessing and would not be present at the time of the interview. At the outset of the interview, Mr. Blessing was questioned concerning his desire to have legal counsel present during the interview. ,

j 1 Mr. Blessing confirmed that he had dismissed the law firm of Killian and Gephart as his counsel on the previous afternoon and stated that he wished to proceed with the interview without the benefit of legal counsel.

A complete sumary of Mr. Ble:; sing's interview is attached as an enclosure to this memorandum. This enclosure also includes: a sumary of leak rate test data involving Mr. Blessing and Mr. Booher; a copy of the Report of Interview of Mr. Blessing's April 10, 1980. interview with IE and OIA; and a sworn statement signed by Mr. Blessing regarding a breach of security incident at TMI-2 Mr. Blessing:on July 13, 1979. The following key points were discussed by A. Leak Rate Testing 1.' Er. Blessing had little faith in RCS leak rate test calculations i

which were performed by the computer to show compliance with the

Technical Specifications, i

Harold R. Denton O January 4, 1985 U 7.

Leak rate test results that were generated by the plant computer '

. -~ were not consistent with calculations done by hand and were not

. _consistent with the amount of water that was pumped from the reactor building sump.

3.

Leak rate test results were erratic and had to be run several per shift.

the date of the accident approached. Leak rate test results were mo 4

It was comon practice to run leak rate tests until an acceptable result was obtained. The acceptable tests were retained and the unacceptable results were thrown away.

5.

, While Mr. Blessing did not start standing watch in the TMI-2 Control Room until approximately one month after the October 18, 1978 incident, that resulted in the generation of LER 78-62/1T, it was Mr. Blessing's understanding that bad leak rate test results were to be thrown away to assure they would not be seen by the NRC.

6.

Contrary to the comitment contained in the narrative of LER 78-62/1T, Mr. Blessing was not instructed to enter the Action Statement of the Technical Specification when leak rate test results exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation.

O 7.

Mr. Blessingbad.

particularly stated that comunications on his shift were from his Shift Foreman ar.d his Shift Supervisor.There was very had a good working relationship with Mr. Booher.he an

8.  ;

As a result of his poor relationship with Mr. Booher, almost all his activities on watch as a C t0 trainee were supervised by Mr. Hartman and not Mr. Bocher. g 9 g.

Mr. Blessing believes it was comon knowledge among operators =

including the operators on his shift that hydrogen additions to the MUT results. were being made for the purpose of altering leak rate test Mr. Blessing could not confinn, however, from firsthand knowledge whether Mr. Booher was knowledgeable of this activity.

10. Mr. Blessing stated that he personally added hydrogen for the believe it had any effect most of the time. purpose of altering l
11. Mr_. Blessing stated that he did not intentionally add water to the make-up tank in order to alter leak rate test results.

,that purpose. state whether Mr. Booher or any other operators had added wa O .

. 1

Harold R. Denton January 4,1985 i

[2. Mr. Blessing believes that because of the poor communications '

"between operators on his shift it was possible that water may have'

- been added during a leak rate test and not been recorded in the

~ CR0's Log or compensated for in the leak rate calculation. __

13. Mr. Blessing also indicated that because of the large amount of water that was being added prior to the accident, it was possible that water could have been added inadvertently during leak rate tests.

B. Breach of Security Incident O

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i Conclusions During the period Mr. Blessing served as a CR0 trainee at TMI-2 on the same shift as Mr. Booher, he was involved in activities associated with leak rate test falsification. However, Mr. Blessing was not able to confirm or deny that Mr. Bocher was involved in these same activities. While Mr. 81essing stated that it would be hard to believe that Mr. Bocher was not at least knowledgeable of these practices, he had no firsthand knowledge that Mr. Bocher was aware of leak rate falsification occurring.

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l Harc1d R. Denton January 4, 1985 k

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) In s'unnary, it appears because of Mr. 81essing's status as a CR0 trainee and-i' his poor working relationship with Mr. Booher during the period under investigation, Mr. Blessing is not in a position to provide proof from firsthand knowledge that Would either confinn or deny that Mr. Booher was j involved in leak rate falsification at TMI-2.

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William T. Russell, Deputy Director .

Division of Human Factors Safety '

i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Enclosure:

As stated cc: 8. Hayes i K. Christopher, RI j '

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