ML20155J770
| ML20155J770 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1985 |
| From: | Capra R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Russell W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151L202 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605270193 | |
| Download: ML20155J770 (7) | |
Text
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4 E[ h 1 DISTRIBUTION O M- Docket Files 55-06404 l
Docket Files 55-06121 JAN 01 1835 TMurley, RI
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WRussell MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell. Deputy Director HThompson -
Division of Human Factors Safety. NRR
" Robert A. Capra. Technical Assistant FROM:
Division of Systems Integration. NRR
SUBJECT:
SUPNARY OF JOINT O!/NRR INTERVIEW WITH MARK S. COLEMAN The purpose of this memorandum is to document the results of the joint d!/NRR interview with Mr. Mark S. Coleman. The purpose of the interview with Mr. Coleman was to either confirm or refute statements made by Mr. Dennis I.
Olson during his November 15, 1984 interview with O!/NRR. The interview of both individuals dealt with the subject of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate surveillance testing irregularities at TMI-2 during the period Septenter 30, 1978 through the date of the accident. March 28. 1979. During that time frame Operators (CR0s} at Mr.
TMI-2 Olson and Mr.
assigned to theColeman same shift. were Itcensed Control Room The interview with Mr. Coleman was held in the Office of Investigations Field Office. Region I. The interview was conducted under oath in the presence of Mr. Coleman's personal attorneys: Mr. Bart Gephart and Ms. Jane penny of the .
law fim Killian and Gephart. The interview was conducted by Mr. Keith Christopher. Director. Office of Investigations. Region I and me. Throughout the interview Mr. Coleman was very cooperative and appeared to answer all
~
quest 1ons in a straightforward manner. Mr. Coleman confirmed that pre-accident leak rate testing irregularities took place at TMI-2. Mr. Coleman
, admitted his involvement in activities that were in violation of approved N plant procedures and TMI-2 Technical Specification requirements. A complete J4 surrnary of his interview is provided below.
After being placed under oath. Mr. Coleman was asked to describe his employ-ment history prior to the accident at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979. Mr. Coleman *
. stated that he served six years in the U. S. Navy's nuclear power program j prior to joining Met-Ed in January 1974. He was hired as an Auxiliary M Operator on TMI-1 and served in that capacity until he went over to TMI-2 as a CR0 trainee in 1976. He received his Reactor Operator's license in October
., 1977. During the majority of the period under investigation. Mr. Coleman stated he was assigned to Shift 'D." Shift "D" consisted of the following licensed individuals:
NOTE: This memorandum and enclosures discuss information which is the subject of an ongoing 01 investigation. This memorandum and w nclosures may not be disseminated outside the NRC without coordination with NRR and the permission of the EDO or the Director, vi. Au6=,na. au.au anu u s u.rivu u an ans uiu er on -acco w nogw -
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? $ h 5 k Mr. Russell JAN 0 41385 SHIFT "O"
) .i Shift Supervisor: ' Gregory Hitz -
' Shift Foreman: Adam Miller CR0: Dennis Olson
- .; CRO
- Lynn Wright
- a. CR0: Mark Coleman Mr. Coleman was shown a copy of the " Report of Interview" of Mr. Coleman's April 10. 1980 interview with IE and CIA on this same sub,1ect. Mr. Coleman confirmed that the information contained in the Report of Interview was'true and correct to the best of his knowledge (see Enclosure 1).
Mr. Coleman was provided a copy of TMI-2 Surveillance Procedure 2301-3D1
" Reactor Coolant S Specification (TS)ystem Inventory" and a copy of TMI-2 Technical 3.4.6.2.
Limiting Condition for Operation." After reviewing the documents.
3 Mr. Coleman stated that leak rate tests were routinely done by using the
' plant computer. The test duration was usually one hour. At the end of the
' test the operator would need to provide information to the computer to account for operator-induced changes to the RCS such as water additions to s the make-up tank (MUT). Mr. Coleman confirmed that the Technical Specification required that a leak rate test be run at least once every .
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. However it was operating policy to try and obtain a satisfactory -
leakrate(i.e..unidentifiedleakagewithintheTechnicalSpecification limit of 1 gpm) once per shift if the plant was in steady state and the computer was available. Mr. Coleman stated that only good leak rate tests were retained and logged in the CR0 Log. Leak rate tests showing unidentified leakage'that did not meet the acceptance criteria of the .
Technical Specifications (i.e., greater than 1 gpm) were thrown away and were not logged in the CR0 Log. He stated that bad leak rate tests were thrown
'.i' away at the direction of or with the knowledge lnd consent of his Shift Foreman and Shift Supervisor.
Mr. Coleman was asked how he interpreted the requirements of the Technical i
. Specification with respect to when the Action Statement was required to be j entered. Mr. Coleman said that since the leak rate test was required only once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, he and the other operators interpreted that to mean that once a good leak rate test result was obtained, they had the full 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to
.j get another good leak rate result before they had to enter the Action 4
Statement. Coleman stated that re'gardless of how many bad leak rate tests were received during the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, they would not enter the Action Statement.
NOTE: Surveillance Procedures 2301-301 states that if unidenti-fled leakage exceeds 1 gpm. proceed with Action Statement 3.4.6.2.b.
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Action Statement 3.4.6.2.b reads: "With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above Itmits, excluding PRESSURE 800NDARY LEAXAGE, reduce the - -
- leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD
]'g SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."
j Mr. Coleman stated that when a ba'd result was obtained, they would rerun the test until an acceptable result would be obtained. In addition, when actual leakage was suspected, operators would be tasked with looking for leaks in the plant. Mr. Coleman could not recall ever entering the Action Statement of TechnicaliSpecification 3.4.6.2.
A copy of LER 78-62/1T along with an attached routing sheet with the type-
. written names and handwritten initials of control room personnel was provided 1
to Mr. Coleman for his review. The routing sheet was used to indicate which individuals had seen the LER. Mr. Coleman confirmed that he had seen the LER
- before and that the initials on the routing sheet beside his typewritten name
- - were his. Mr. Coleman st1ted that while he had seen the LER and initialed y the routing sheet, it was .just one of many documents that he may have looked '
H at and initialed during o. of his watches. At that time, the document did
. not stand out as being significant in his mind.
NOTE: During a routine inspection of TMI-2 operations on -
October 18, 1978, an NRC inspector discovered several p bad leak rate tests lying in the control room and that s THI-2 had been operating for two or three days with
.i unidentif ted leakage exceeding the Technical Specift-
, cations. The incident resulted in the submittal of LicenseeEventReport(LER)78-62/1T.
1 The LER states in part: 'This event was caused by misinterpretation of the requirements of the technical specifications. The appropriate personnel will be
-1 instructed on the requirements of applicable sections of the T.S. and the requirement to ismediately invoke j applicable action statements when the provisions of the
.) LCOs [ limiting condition for operation] are not met."
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, Mr. Coleman was asked if his understanding of the requirements of Technical
,, Specification 3.4.6.2 was changed in any way following this incident.
Mr. Coleman stated that his understanding had not changed. He could not recall receiving any directions from his supervision to perform leak rate tests differently following the incident. He stated that leak rate tests 1 3, that did not meet the requirements of the Technical Specifications continued 1 7 to be thrown away and, as best he could recall, he never entered the Action
' Statement of the Technical Specification. Mr. Coleman stated that it was his understanding that leak rate test results that did not meet the requirements
- of the Technical Specifications were to be thrown away so the NRC would not
- m. He stated this was not told to him d' rectly, but i t was implied,
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JAN 0 41985 '
TE: Mr. Coleman's testimony that hd was not instructed in
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u _ the proper interpretation of'the Technical
- Specifications and that he was still directed to throw . _ ,
away bad leak rate' test results after the October 18 .
i] 1978 incident conflicts with testimony given to 01 by Mr. Olson.
I Mr. Coleman stated that good leak rate tests results were harder to get as a the date of the accident approached. He stated pressure was exerted on operators to get good leak rates. The pressure increased the closer they came to the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit they believed was required by the Technical Specificatioqs. Mr. Coleman stated that he could recall one instance where he was told he had no other duties during that watch except to keep running leak rate tests until he received one that was within the acceptance criteria of the Technical Specifications. In spite of the pressure. Mr. Coleman a stated that he was never directed by his supervisors to intentionally 1 manipulate the test results. Mr. Coleman stated the pressure steased from i not wanting to have to shutdown the plant. With the plant off-line, they y were not generating electricity and consequently the company was no.t making any money. He stated that he and the other operators owned stock in the
.1 company and they felt it was their job to generate electricity.
Mr. Coleman was questioned about the high amount of identified leakage they were experiencing from the pressurizer prior to the accident. Mr. Coleman i
believed the high leak rates were csused by leakage from the PORY and not one of the two code safety valves. He thought that a lot of the problems they were experiencing with obtaining good leak rate test results for unidentified leakage were a result of the high value of identified leakage. In spite of
! - ttA high leakage it was his belief that the PORY block valve was not shut for
< two reasons. First Mr. Coleman stated they wanted the PORY to be available 1 to relieve pressure to keep the reactor from tripping on high pressure in the j event of a transient. Second, he believed that there was a concern, if they shut the block valve, they might not be able to reopen it as a result of the high differential pressure that would be present across the valve seat. He ,
said the high leakage was a conc'ern to operators. While he stated that he I never made a reconnendation to shutdown the plant to repair the leakage, he F stated that Mr. Olson made connents to that effect during one of their routine, on-shift meetings with their Shift Supervisor Greg Hitz.
".i Mr. Coleman said the general attitude at the plant at that time was to wait i until the plant casa down for some other reason and they would make the
- . t repairs at that time rather than' shutdown the plant specifically to repair the leaking valve.
Mr. Coleman also attributed problems with obtaining good leak rate test
- - results to errors in the computer program for calculating leak rates. He a felt, based upon discussions with Mr. William Falls, the computer prograrmer, that Mr. Fells was working ora trying to resolve some of the problems. ,
Mr. Coleman was then questioned about the effect of hydrogen additions to the nus on seen rase tes1. nts u i ss. rw. s.o s ema n sta ;ea snat ne nrst learned taat
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hydrogen additions could influence the outcome of a leak rate test from
, Mr. Harold Hartman. He said his shift normally relieved Mr. Martman's shift and that Mr. Hartman had told him about it during one of their shift ._.-
turnovers. Mr. Coleman said for a period of time, hydrogen could be added l directly to the MJT from the control room. Mr. Coleman stated that he personally had observed the rise in MUT level indication when hydrogen was l 1 added. He stated that this level rise could be accomplished with a normal, :
4 contro11ed addition of hydrogen. It was not necessary to make only a short .I duration addition (i.e., one or two seconds). He said while " chemical l
.. additions" during leak rate testing were to be avoided according to the
. procedure, he did not consider a hydrogen addition to the make-up tank to be a chemical addition. He also stated, the rise in MUT level indication produced a transitory effect lasting only a few minutes. Therefore, if an operator was going to use hydrogen to influence the leak rate test, hydrogen would need to be added very near the end of the test.
i Mr. Coleman believed it was coseen knowledge by CR0s, Shift Foremen and Shift i Supervisors that hydrogen additions could alter MUT 1evel indication and, d therefore, influence leak rate test results. However, he could not twcall d ever discussing this with anyone except Mr. Hartman. Mr. Coleman was asked q if he ever discussed this subject with Mr. Olson. Mr. Coleman stated that 4
one time he recalled mentioning to Mr. 01 son, during the performance of a leak rate test, that they could use hydrogen to increase the MUT 1evel to help them get a good leak rate test result. According to Mr. Coleman, Mr. Olson covered his ears" and " acted like he didn't want to hear anything about it.* Mr. Coleman said he did not ever recall discussing that matter with Mr. Glson after that.
NOTE: Mr. Olson testified that he never added hydrogen to the MUT for the purpose of altering a leak rate test. He stated that he was not aware of any operator adding j,, hydrogen for that purpose. Mr. Olson stated that he
, did not have an understanding at that time that hydrogen additions could affect leak rate test results or that he had ever heard from anyone that hydrogen could alter the results.
9 Mr. Coleman could not recall ever seeing Mr. 01 son add' hydrogen to the MUT
. for the purpose of altering a leak rate test. He noted, however, that it was
, hard for him to believe that any of the operators did not know that this was
,' occurring.
Mr. Coleman was then questioned on the use of water additions to influence leak rate tests. Mr. Coleman was shown a listing of leak rate test results
! involving the operators on his shift. A copy of these susunary sheets is 0; provided as Enclosure 2 to this memorandum. It was pointed out that every test performed on their shift between December 24, 1978 and the date of the accitient (16 tests total) involved either a hydrogen addition (1 test), a water addition that was not included in.the computer calculation (3 tests) or a water aco m on wnere tne amount included in tie com
.........pu te r ca lculation was
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lessth$ntheamountindicatedontheMUTstripchart(12 tests). Out of the 12 tists involving under-recorded water additions,10 tests show that water i
- was added during the last 10 minutes of the test. After reviewing the data, ,
l Mr. Coleman was asked if his shift had discovered that by adding water to the- '
! WT during the last few minutes of the test (thus compressing the hydrogen gas blanket and increasing the pressure in the MUT) they could produce the !
..~~ same effect on MUT level indication as was possible by the addition of i hydrogen. Mr. Coleman confirmed that he was aware that by adding water
- during the last few minutes of the test, he was able to get the WT level !
indicator to read a higher value than the actual amount of water added to the tank. Thus, Mr. Coleman confirmed that he was able to add for example,150 gallons of water to the tank and have the MUT level indicator, show an apparent increase of 180 or 200 gallons. He would log the 150 gallons in the CR0's Log and include the 150 ga'lons as an " operator-caused change" in the computer. However, since the computer would read the final level in the MUT 4
as 30 to 50 gallons higher than actual level, the leak rate caleviated by the h computer would be .5 to .8 gpm lower than the trve leak rate. Mr. Coleman a did not recall if he had ' discovered this Wwnomenon himself or whether he had i been told about it by another operator. Mr. Coleman was then asked if this
...' method was used in Iteu of hydrogen additions because it was not possible to 1 add hydrogen from the control room during the last few months before the ci accident. Mr. Coleman stated that was the reason. He said since you needed
, to add hydrogen very close to the end of the test, it was not very practical to try and have the Auxiliary Operator (AO) add hydrogen locally and be able to insure it would be added to the MUT at just the right time.
It was pointed out to Mr. Coleman, that 2 of these tests involved both
. Mr. Olsen and himself. Two other tests involved Mr. Coleman by himself and .
Mr. Coleman and Mr. Wright. However. 5 tests involved Mr. Olson and a Mr. Wright and 1 involved Mr. Olson alone. Based upon the fact all three
{ operators on the shift were involved in these types of additions. It appeared that all three operators used this method of adding water to manipulate leak rate test results. While Mr. Coleman confirmed that he was involved in this activity, he could not confirm or deny whether Mr. Olson intentionally added water in this manner to manipulate leak rate test results. He stated. l however, that based upon the data he could see where it would be hard not to conclude that Mr. Olson was aware of and used this method to alter leak rate test results. Mr. Coleman was asked if water additions needed to be made )
close to the end of the test for legitimate operational reasons such as to ;
. move control rods. Mr. Coleman stated that more and more water needed to be added as the date of the accident approached due to the increased valve leakage from the top of the pressurizer. However, he did not believe water would have to be added close to the end of the test on a routine basis for any legitimate reason. He stated that because of tha increased leakage, boron would concentrate in the pressurizer. In order to make-up the water lost due to leakage and to equalize the boron concentratien, domineralized (DI) water would be added to the make-up tank and pressurizer spray valve would ha placed in manual.
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~ IOTE: Mr. Olson stated that he could not explain why his ..
shift needed to add water to the makeup tank so close to the end of the test on a routine basis. He stated
, that the only possible explanation he could think of -
- was to change boron concentration in order to move
. control rods if they were right at the edge of the band
- they were supposed to maintain.
s In addition to adding water to the MUT during the last few minutes of the test, Mr. Coleman was asked about other methods by which water additions could be used to alter leak rate test results. Mr. Coleman stated it was possible to add water to the MUT and not include the addition in the computer calculation. He was~also asked if it was possible to add saml1 amounts of water to the MUT over the course of the test such that this " jogged' water addition would be difficult to detect on the MUT level strip chart.
Mr. Coleman stated that both of these methods could be used; however, he had no direct knowledge of any operator making these types of additions to alter leak rate test results. Mr. Coleman also stated that while the operator who
- ran the leak rate test was not nomally the individual who had the panel,
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kept the CR0 Log and made water additions. it was possible for either to make !
~'._' a water addition without the other operator being aware that the addition i was made. '
Mr. Coleman reiterated that he could not recall discussing methods by which l 1eak rate tests could be manipulated with any6ne but Harold Hartman and Mr. Olson on one occasion and denied that he had direct knowledge of anyone beside himself actually perfoming actions that would alter leak rate test l
. results.
ungs.nal signa 4 g I i
Robert A. Capra, Technical Assistant Division of Systems Integration
Enclosures:
- 1. Report of Interview with ,
Mr. Coleman l
- 2. Sumary of Leak Rate Test l Data i i
cc: K. Christopher (RI) 1 i
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