ML20155J792

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Documents Results of Joint Ofc of Investigations/Nrr Interview W/Lp Germer Re RCS Leak Rate Surveillance Testing During 780930-790328.Germer Unaware of Manipulating. Transcript of Interview & Leak Rate Evaluation Encl.W/O Encl
ML20155J792
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/12/1985
From: Capra R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Russell W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151L202 List:
References
NUDOCS 8605270202
Download: ML20155J792 (6)


Text

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Enclosure 15 1

  • /3 k, UNITED STATES a NUCLEAR REGULATO,RY COMMISSION WASMNGTON, D. C. 20555 g j September 12, 1985

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' MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Acting Director -

' Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR  ;

FROM: Robert A. Capra, Technical Assistant Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR i

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF JOINT 01/NRR INTERVIEW WITH LEONARD P. GERMER The purpose of this memorandum is to document the results of the joint 01/NRR interview with Mr. Leonard P. Gemer. Mr. Gemer was interviewed in order to obtain additional background information on the subject of reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate surveillance testing at TMI-2 during the period September 30, 1978 to March 28, 1979. During this period. Mr. Germer was assigned to two different shifts at TMI-2. Three of the individuals with whom Mr. Germer stood watch are currently licensed operators and are the l

l subject of a joint 01/NRR investigation and evaluation (Messrs. R. R. Booher, i H. A. McGovern and C. L. Gu'thrie).

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! The interview with Mr. Gemer was held in the law offices of Killian &

Gephart in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The interview was conducted under oath i

l O in the presence of Mr. Gemer's personal attorneys: Mr. Smith B. Gephart of the law firm Killian & Gephart and Mr. James W. Moeller of the law firm LeBoeuf. Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, Washington, D.C. The interview was conducted i by Mr. R. Keith Christopher, Director, Office of Investigations, Region I and i me. A copy of the transcript of the interview is attached as Enclosure 1.

The page references cited in this summary refer to the pages of Enclosure 1 from which the information was extracted. Enclosure 2 contains a copy of the NRR Evaluation of TMI-2 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Tests Performed Between September 30, 1978 and March 28,1979(UpdatedJuly 30,1985).

After being placed under oath, Mr. Germer was asked to describe his employment history. Prior to joining Metropolitan-Edison Company (Met-Ed) in 1977, Mr. Germer spent six years in the U. S. Navy and approximately eight years employed by three different companies unrelated to the nuclear l industry. Mr. Germer was originally hired by Met-Ed as an Auxiliary Operator

' (AO) at TMI-2. He served in. that capacity until the Fall of 1978 at which

time he entered the Control Room Operator (CRO) training program. Mr.

j Gemer's duties as a CRO-in-training included standing watch in the control room on a regular basis with an assigned shift. Mr. Germer remained in that position until the accident on March 28, 1979. He was then transferred to

' the TMI-2 accident recovery team. In August 1979, Mr. Germer left Met-Ed' 1

NOTE: This memorandum and enclosures dtscuss information which is the subject of an ongoing investigation. This memorandum and enclosures may not be disseminated outside the NRC without coordination with NRR and the permission of the EDO or the Director of 01. Internal access '

and distribution should be on a "need to know basis.

f 8605270202 860516 p PDR P

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. William T. Russell September 12, 1985 i

i to accept his present position as an A0 at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant.

! Mr. Gemer did not receive his Reactor Operator's (RO) License at TMI-2 and is not licensed at Maine Yankee. See pages 3-6.

  • s From October.1978 to December 31, 1978, Mr. Germer as assigned to Shift "E."- ,

When a sixth shift (Shift "F") was created on January 1,1979 Mr. Gemer was assigned to that shift. He remained with Shift "F" until the accident at e TMI-2. During these periods, the other members of these shifts included: i

' POSITION SHIFT "E" SHIFT "F" 10/78 - 12/78 01/79 - 03/79 .

4 Shift Supervisor: Bernie Smith Ken Bryan ,

Shift Foreman: Ken Hoyt Carl Guthrie  !

CR0 Harold Hartman Hugh McGovern i CR0 Ray Bocher Earl Hamila l CRO-in-trafning John Blessing See pages 7 & 8.

Mr. Gemer stated that as a CRO-in-training, he spent a large portion of his

, time on shift studying material for his R0 license; however, when plant a

maneuvers or unusual surveillance tests were scheduled for his shift, he i would physically manipulate the controls or perform the surveillance test under the supervision and direction of a licensed CRO. In perfoming his j duties on shift, he did not work with any one particular CRO. Rather, he j would normally work with the individual who was assigned as the panel operator on that particular day. See pages 9-11.

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} In describing his interactions with members of supervision and management,

! Mr. Gemer said that he would interface quite frequently with his Shift

Foreman on matters associated with shift routine and plant operations. He did not nomally have much interaction with his Shift Supervisor or the TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations (Mr. James Floyd). He essentially had no dealings with higher level management such as the TMI-2 Plant Manager (Mr. Joe Logan) or the Station Manager (Mr. Gary Miller). See pages 11-13. i RCS leak rate surveillance tests were nomally run on the plant computer.

During the six months Mr. Gemer was on shift, he said that he perfomed numerous leak ra'te tests; however, he said they were all conducted under the auspices of one of the licensed CR0s. According to Genner, the CR0 " stood ,

right over my shoulder and looked when I punched them in, because a couple of times I hit the wrong key." During the time he was on shift, he could not l recall any specific meetings with his supervisors or management to discuss  !

problems with obtaining satisfactory leak rate tests. See pages 13-15. l l

After rev4 ewing Surveillance Procedure 2301-3D1, " Reactor Coolant System Inventory," Mr. Germer was asked if he was given any guidance or particular instructions regarding precautions and limitations associated with running .

, the tests Mr. Gemer recalled that tests were to be conducted only with the plant in a steady state condition (i.e., no transients or plant maneuvers

! taking place.)" Mr. Gemer also noted that the first item under " Limits and Precautions" directed the operator to avoid the addition or removal of water from the reactor coolant and makeup systems during the test. See pages j 15-17. ,

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. William T. Russell Septemb:r 12, 1985 I

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Mr. Germer was also asked to review TMI-2 Technical Specification 3/4.4.6.2 l

" Reactor Coolant System Operatienal Leakage," It was pointed out that l Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.b limited " unidentified leakage" to 1 gpm.

In order to demonstrate compliance with this limit, Surveillance Requirement s 4.4.6.2;d. required the performance of a reactor coolant system water --

inventory-balance (leak rate test) at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during steady 4 state operations. It was also pointed out that the action statement of this -~

l Technical Specification stated:

With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the t above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage

to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within l the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

See pages 17-19.

Hr. Genner stated that they tried to run a leak rate test at least once per shift. Because the technical specifications recuired a satisfactory leak rate test only once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, they ignorec all unsatisfactory test results as long as they received a satisfactory test within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> window. All unsatisfactory tests were thrown away and all good tests were retained and used as a basis for resetting the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock. Mr. Germer did not recall it being too difficult to obtain test results less than 1 gpm. He said he was usually able to get a good test on his second or third try. When a bad result was obtained he would infonn one of the CR0s or his Shift 4

Foreman and perform the test again. See pages 19-23.

j According to Mr. Genner, the practice of discarding leak rate test results i that exceeded the limits of the technical specifications was comon knowledge l among the CR0s, Shift Foremen and Shift Supervisors. He said that he did not feel pressured to get a good leak rate test because he did not recall the l tests being a big problem. He may have had to run two or three per shift but, overall he did not perceive it as a major problem. He did not recall it being more difficult to get good results as the date of the accident approached. See pages 23-25.

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Mr. Genner was asked if he was ever told the reason leak rate tests were l to be thrown away was so the NRC inspectors wculd not see them. He vaguely recilled being told to ensure bad test results were discarded because "an NRC
guy found them laying out one time." He believed that his Shift Foreman was j the individual who made this statement. He also thought that this direction

! was given to the entire shift. Mr. Germer could not positive, but he believed Mr. Ken Hoyt may have been the Shift Foreman who made that statement. See pages 25-30.

A copy of LER 78-62/1T along with an attached routing sheet with the typewritten names and handwritten initials of control room personnel was .

l provided to Mr. Germer for his review. The routing sheet was used to indicate which individuals had seen the LER. Mr. Germer confinned that the 1 initial-s an the routing sheet were hir, however, he did not have a i preaccident recall of the incident. See pages 30-32.

I NOTE: During a routine inspection of TMI-2 operations on October 18, 1978 an NRC inspector discovered several bad leak rate tests lying in the (

control room and that TMI-2 had been operating f.or an extended period I

. William T. Russell September 12, 1985

! of time with unidentified leakage exceeding the technical l specification limit. The incident resulted in the submittal of

! Eicensee Event Report (LER) 78-62/1T.

s The LER states in part: "This event was caused by a misinterpretation -

6f'the requirements of the technical specifications....The appropriate-

personnel will be instructed on the requirements of applicable ,

sections of the T.S. and the requirement to immediately invoke

! applicable action statements when the provisions of the LCOs [ limiting conditionforoperation]arenotmet."

While Mr. Germer could not recall the specific incident, he did not believe 3

he was given any instruction or guidance on a revised interpretation of the requirements of the technical specifications following the October 1978 j incident. Mr. Genner believed that the instructions he received about j

ensuring that bad leak rate tests were discarded, must have been associated l with this incident.- See pages 30-37. . I I

j Mr. Genner stated that there were several things that would cause him to 1 consider a leak. rate test invalid. These included such as actions as typing  ;

! in the wrong numbers, hitting the wrong key, or forgetting to include in the  !

I calculation the amount of water added to the makeup tank (MUT) during a test. i When this situation occurred, he would throw the test away and start over.

j At times, however, he would do everything correctly and still come out with

results greater than 1 gpm. On those occasions, no action was taken because i they were within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> window. Mr. Germer could not provide a rational
basis for why good test were accepted as valid and bad tests were considered invalid and thus discarded. While the results were variable, Mr. Genner believed at the time that th'e surveillance test results basically reflected true plant leakage. See pages 37-42. .

Mr. Genner was asked if he was aware that operators may have been

! manipulating test results by adding water to the MUT tank during the test and l 3

either not including the water addition in the leak rate calculation or not l including the full amount of water added in the calculation. Mr. stated  !

that he personally never added water with the intent of influencing the '

outcome of a leak rate test and to the best of his recollection he was not aware of any other operator trying to manipulate test results in this manner.

. He did not believe anyone ever told him how to get a " good" leak rate. Mr.

Germer stated that if he had wanted to influence the outcome of a test, he i

could figure out how to*do it on his own. Mr. Germer said:

Nobody ever told me how to do it. I never,even bothered. This is all hindsight. I never bothered to even look at how to get it to come out. I didn't really care. All I cared was

. getting the stupid thing done, hand it to the foreman, so I could go back and study, or learn something, because I had

pressure on me to make sure I got marks to pass to get a license, okay? I was more concerned at the time to getting a license than I was worried about getting leak rates. It was part of the job l

tolo the leak rate, and whatever else I had to do.

See pages 44-47.

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, William T. Russell - 5- September 12, 1985 I Mr. Germer stated that he was not aware at the time that adding hydrogen to 4 the MUT could possibly influence MUT level indication and thus affect leak rate test results. Mr. Germir said that he did not believe the phenomenon was true.until the day before his interview, when it was explained to him by .,

his attorney. While the procedure prohibited chemical additions during a - -

leak rhte test, Germer did not believe operators considered adding hydrogen 4 to the MUT to be a chemical addition. He did not recall there being any ,

prohibition against it, because technically it was not supposed to make any -

difference. Mr. Germer could not recall observing any fluctuations, changes

- or erratic movement in MUT level indication when adding hydrogen to the MUT.

! Mr. Germer also stated that he had no personal knowledge of or reason to believe that operators were using hydrogen additions to assist them in getting good leak rate test results. See pages 50-56.

!- The next portion of the interview concentrated on MUT level transmitter 3 problems. It was explained to Mr. Genner that during the months of December j 1978 and January 1979, one of the two level transmitters (LT-1) providing MUT ,

level indication was providing a very erratic and unreliable output. Yet, )

i' during this period many operators, including Mr. Genner, used LT-1 to provide l MUT level indication to the computer during leak rate tests. Since there was j a level transmitter selector switch in the control room, operators could have  ;

easily used LT-2 (the stable transmitter) to provide reliable MUT level '

indication to the computer during the test. After reviewing some copies  :

i of MUT strip chart recordings which exhibited these characteristics, Mr. j Germer said he could not specifically remember level transmitters being a problem at the time. He also did not remember if he was given any particular 2

O guidance or direction associated with switching level transmitters for leak rate tests. See pages 59-64.

l i It was explained to Mr. Germer that one of the allegations made by Mr. l

. Hartman was that operators would start a leak rate test using the MUT level transmitter with the lower reading and at the end of the test, switch level ,

. transmitters such that the higher reading level transmitter would be read by l the computer. Mr. Germer stated that he did not recall anybody manipulating i leak rate tests in that manner. See pages 64 & 65.

i The last part of the interview centered on a review of the leak rate tests

) involving Mr. Genner. During the period under investigation, Mr. Germer was involved in 14 leak rate tests, either as the individual perfonning the test i and signing the surveillance test sheet or as the operator on the panel who

]; signed the CR0's Log.

The following table shows a breakdown of Mr. Germer's 14 tests by evaluation category:

Evaluation Category Number of Tests

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Tests witT no apparent problems..................................... 5 Tests involving the use of an unstable MUT level transmitter

to provide input to.the plant computer............................ 5

! Hydrog'en additions to the MUT during test........................... 2 i .

Water addition during test that was not included in calculation..... 1 l Test conducted during unstable plant conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,1 1

l NOTE: While Mr. Genner may have been involved in many more leak rate tests

! than the 14 indicated above, only 14 were retained and the remainder were discarded.

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, Wil.liam T. Russell September 12, 1985 After reviewing the tests, Mr. Germer again stated that he did not personally O attempt to manipulate the outcome of these tests. Mr. Germer was asked if he had any_ knowledge or information as a result of conversations, observations, or anything else in his possession or within his memory that would indicate '

tt him thit other operators on his shift, specifically Messrs. Bocher, McGovern er Hemila, were manipulating leak rates during the time he was at ~

TM1-2. Mrr Germer stated that as far as he knew, they were performing the tests properly. He did not recall anybody ever discussing with him ways to ___ .-

influence the outcome of a leak rate test. See pages 66-73.

Mr. Germer stated his personal opinion that leak rate tests may not have been manipulated and that Mr. Hartman "was blowing off steam, becatse he was upset with somebody at the company." Mr. Germer was informed that four other individuals beside Mr. Hartman have admitted manipulating leak rate test results. Mr. Germer stated he was not aware of that, but it still did not alter his testimony. According to Germer:

I was never aware of people manipulating, and it is possibly due to the fact that I was just an R0 trainee at the time, and really -

didn't get into that, and spent a lot more time studying and didn't spend a lot of time on the board talking to the guys how they were doing it, because I considered the more important thing at the time to do was study.

53 pages 74-77.

Y f Robert A. Capra, Technical Assistant Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR

Enclosures:

1. Transcript of Interview
2. NRR Leak Rate Evaluation cc:

B. Hayes K. Christopher J. Lieberman J. Goldberg m

  • b a

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