ML20155J825

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Documents Results of Joint Ofc of Investigations/Nrr Interview W/Lo Wright Re RCS Leak Rate Surveillance Testing Practices During 780930-790328.Olson & Wright Not Forthright.Summary of Interview Encl
ML20155J825
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/27/1985
From: Russell W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151L202 List:
References
NUDOCS 8605270211
Download: ML20155J825 (5)
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  • aeg%, UNITED STATES Enclosure 17 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l E j casenwaroN, C. C. 30858 i

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(*.,...,/ August 27, 1985 s

MEMORANDUM _FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director ~ ~

_ Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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FROM: William T. Russell, Acting Director Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR ,

SUBJECT:

RESULTS OF JOINT OI/NRR INTERVIEW WITH LYNN 0. WRIGHT

Reference:

1. Memorandum from S. J. Chilk (SECY) to 8. B. Hayes (01) and W. J. Dircks (EDO) dated April 2,1984

Subject:

Staff Requirements-Discussion of Pending Investigation-

, TMI

2. Memorandum from H. R. Denton (NRR) to B. 8. Hayes (01) dated May 3, 1984

Subject:

NRR Review of 01 ,,

Investigative Materials Concerning Hartman Allegations of Falsification of Leak Rate Data at TMI, Unit 2

3. Memorandum from W. T. Russell (DHFS) to H. R. Denton (NRR) dated December 14, 1984,

Subject:

Results of Joint DI/NRR Investigation and Evaluation of Dennis I. Olson O 4. Memorandum from W. T. Russell (DHFS) to H. R. Denton (NRR) dated January 4, 1985.

Subject:

Results of Joint 01/NRR Interview with Mark S. Coleman 5.MemorandumfromW.T. Russell (DHFS)toH.R.Denton (NRR)datedJanuary 24, 1965

Subject:

Follow-up Action on Additional TMI-2 Operators The purpose of this memorandum is to document the results of the March 27, .,

1985 joint 01/NRR interview with Mr. Lynn 0. Wright. The interview with Mr. j Wright was conducted in order to obtain additional background information on ,

reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate surveillance testing practices at l TMI-2 during the period September 30, 1978 through the date of the accident. 1 March 28, 1979. During that time frame, Mr. Wright was a licensed Control l Room Operator (CRO) at TMI-2 assigned to Shift "D." Mr. Wright is currently self-employed and is no longer in the nuclear industry.

NOTE: This memorandum and enclosure discuss information which is the subject of an ongoing 01 investigation. This memorandum and enclosure may not be disseminated outside the NRC without coordination with NRR and the permission of the EDO or the Director 01. Internal access and distr 7bution should be on a "need to know" basis.

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B605270211 860516 gff PDR P

ADOCK 05000320

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i Harold R. Denton August 27, 1985 1 l-I

. Background i As a resul.t of a Comission meeting on March 23, 1984, NRR was directed by Reference 1 to review OI investigative materials concerning falsification of

{ RCS leak Pate surveillance tests at TMI-2 and refer back to 01 those matters s j which required further investigation. The results of NRR's review was - '

4 provided 10. Reference 2. The review determined that follow-up investigation j by 01 and further evaluation by NRR was needed in the case of seven licensed

'i operators. Mr. Dennis I. Olson, currently a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at -.

Waterford 3, was one of the seven individuals identified as needing i additional investigation and evaluation. Mr. Olson was interviewed under l oath in New Orleans, Louisiana by OI/NRR on November 15, 1984. During the

interview, many of the statements made by Mr. Olson did not appear credible in light of the technical evaluation of Mr. 01 son's leak rate surveillance tests and statements made in 1980 by his former shiftmate Mr. Mark S. Coleman i

Mr. Coleman was interviewed again on the subject by OI/NRR on December 14, 1984 in order to gain additional evidence that would either support of refute

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the statements made by Mr. Olson. The results of the investigation and evaluation of Mr. Olson and the results of the interview with Mr. Coleman were provided as References 3 and 4. respectively.

4 i Because of information learned during the on-going investigation, Reference 5

! expanded the list of former operators to be investigated and evaluated from seven to ten. One of the individuals added was the former Shift Foreman of Shift "D," Mr. Adam W. Miller. Mr. Miller is currently the Manager, Plant j Operations THI-2.

t Because of the conflicting testimony presented by Messrs. Olson and Coleman l and because of the need to investigate and evaluate Mr. Miller, 01/NRR 1 determined that interviewing Mr. Wright would provide additional background j information on the leak rate surveillance testing practices of Shift "D."

Past Involvement in TMI-2 Leak Rate Testing Irregularities ~

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l On March 27, 1985, a joint 01/NRR interview with Mr. Wright was held in the

! law offices of Killian and Gephart, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The interview l was conducted under oath and in the presence of Mr. Wright's personal

! attorneys. The interview was conducted by Mr. Keith Christopher, Director, j Office of Investigations, Region I and Mr. Robert Capra, currently on detail i to DHFS/NRR.

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A complete sumary of Mr. Wright's interview is contained in the enclosed 3 memorandum from R. Capra to me dated August 27, 1985

Subject:

Sumary of l Jo. int OI/NRR Interview with Lynn 0. Wright. Capra's memorandum also contains

a copy of the transcript of Mr. Wright's interview and a copy of NRR's
evaluation of TMI-2 leak rate tests performed during the period September 30, 1978 through March 28, 1979. The following key points were brought out by

{ Mr. Wright during his interview:

j . 1.. Mr. Wright had little faith in the RCS leak rate test calculations which wer.e ILerformed to show compliance with the technical specifications. He believed the leak rate test results were erratic and provided results that were meaningless and did not reflect true plant leakage.

! 2. While the TMI-2 Technical Specifications required a leak rate j surveillance test to be perfomed at least on'ce every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, it was common practice to run leak rate tests several times per shift until an j '

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Harold R. Denton August 27, 1985

! acceptable result was obtained. The acceptable tests were retained to show compliance with the technical specifications and the unacceptable 1 tetts'were thrown away. Tests were thrown away with the knowledge and/or

! consent of his Shift Foreman and Shift Supervisor. -

1 l 3. Acdording to Mr. Wright, no changes were made in leak rate testing

! practfces following the October 18, 1978 incident that resulted in the _.

! generation of LER 78-62/1T. Mr. Wright stated that at some point

operators were told to retain all leak rate tests; however, that policy

! was discontinued after a short period of time and he did not know if that

! guidance was associated with the October 1978 incident.

l 4. Contrary to the commitment contained in the narrative of LER 78-62/1T, Mr. Wright was not instructed to enter the action statement of the

technical specification when leak rate test results exceeded the limiting l condition for operation.

l S. Mr. Wright stated that prior to the accident, he was not aware that i hydrogen additions to the makeup tank (HUT) during the Tast few minutes  !

! bf the test could influence MUT level indication and and consequently leak rate test results.

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6. Mr. Wright stated that on occasion he did add hydrogen to the MUT near the end of a leak rate test; however, the purpose of these additions was to establish the same overpressure in the MUT at the end of the test as j was present at the start of the test. Mr. Wright said he believed this i

' would minimize instrumentation errors. He stated that he did not add

hydrogen in order to improperly manipulate leak rate test results.

1 1 7. Mr. Wright stated that prior to the accident, he was not aware that adding water to the RCS during the last few minutes oT'a leak rate test j could produce the same effect on leak rate test results as adding j hydrogen to the MUT.

> 8. Mr. Wright stated that on occasion he did add water to the RCS during the l last few minutes of a leak rate test; however, the purpose of these l additions was to establish the same level.in the MUT at the end of the j test as was present at the start of the test. Mr. Wright said he i believed this would minimize instrumentation errors. He stated that he ,

j did not make these water additions in crder to improperly manipulate leak i rate test results. Note: While Mr. Wright provided a reason for the water j additions, he could not' provide a reason why the amount of water included i

in the calculation was less than the amount indicated on the MUT strip

! chart recorder.

i 9. Mr. Wright stated operators felt pressure to get good leak rate test results in order to keep the plant operating and that the pressure  !

increased the closer they came to the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit. Despite the l pressure, Mr. Wright stated that he was never directed by his supervisors

= to.in}_entionallymanipulateleakratetestresults.  ;

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10. Mr. Wright stated that he had no knowledge of any operators.. including ,

either Olson or Coleman, falsifying leak rate tests by any means I including: unrecorded or underrecorded water additions to the RCS, j i hydrogen additions to the MUT or taking advantage of MUT level ,

transmitter instrumentation errors. Except for the unreliability of the '

test, Mr. Wright believed that all leak rate tests were performed l

properly. l

Harold R. Denton August 27, 1985 l Conclusions All three CRO's on Shift "D" (Olson, Coleman and Wright) have been

. interviewed by 01/NRR. While their testimony is consistent regarding certain ,

. aspects ~of leak rate test practices on their shift, they are significantly

{ differentwith regarding to their personal knowledge of or participation in .. .

leak rate test manipulation.

During Mr. 01 son's testimony, he stated that following the October 18, 1978 incident, he was advised of the proper interpretation of the technical specifications and that he never threw away unacceptable leak rate tests following that incident. He stated he would staple the bad leak rate test sheets to the good test and turn the package into his Shift Foreman. Mr.

Olson's testimony regarding technical specification interpretation and the

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discarding of test results greater than 1 gpm conflicts with the testimony provided by Messrs. Coleman and Wright, both of whom agree that no revised j interpretation of the technical specifications was given to the operators on j their shift and that leak rate surveillance tests exceeding the limits of the technical specifications continued to be discarded up through the date of the accident.

The testimony of Messrs. Olson and Wright regarding hydrogen additions j conflict with that of Mr. Coleman. Both Olson and Wright stated that they i were not aware prior to the accident that hydrogen additions to the MUT could ,

! sffect MUT level indication and consequently leak rate test results. Mr.

] t'oleman stated that it was consnon knowledge among CRO's that hydrogen

! additions could alter MUT level and that he had mentioned the phenomenon to

! Mr. Olson on at least one occasion. Mr. Coleman testified that he personally added hydrogen for the purpose of altering leak rate test results and that while he could not recall ever seeing Mr. Olson add hydrogen for that purpose, he found-it hard to believe that any of the operators did not know j; that this was occurring. Mr. Wright testified that he had intentionally 1 added hydrogen during leak rate tests; however, he stated his purpose was to j try and establish the same hydrogen overpressure in the MUT at the beginning

and end of the test in order to minimize inaccuracies caused by

, instrumentation errors. The NRR evaluation of leak rate tests which were

! conducted during the period under investigation identified only one test, j performed by Shift "D" personnel, during which hydrogen was added. Based

! upon the admissions of Coleman and Wright that they did add hydrogen during

! leak rate tests, several additional tests should have been identified; r however, because of the unpredictability of MUT level response to a hydrogen 4 addition and the fact that the majority of leak rate tests were not retained, -

the evaluation can not provide additional evidence to resolve these i conflicts.

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{ The testimony of Messrs. Olson and Wright regarding underrecorded water additions to the RCS during the last few minutes of a leak rate tests were

also in conflict with that of Mr. Coleman. Mr. Coleman stated that he was i aware that adding water to the RCS during the last few minutes of a leak rate

] test could produce the same effect on leak rate test results as adding c hydrogen to the MUT. Mr. Coleman stated that he used this method to j manipulate leak rate test results during the last two months before the .

j accident since hydrogen could no longer be added to the MUT remotely from the

control room. Both Olson and Wright stated that they were not aware of this j phenomenon.

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{ Harold R. Denton August 27, 1985 The NRR evaluation of the TNI-2 leak rate tests shows that during 12 of the j i last 13 tests performed by Shift "D" personnel, water additions were made -

i very close to the end of the one hour test period. In each case the amount i

! of wateT logged in the CRO's Log and manually input into the computer for the j

{ calculation was less than the amount indicated on the MUT strip chart '  !

< recorder.. Assuming the response of MUT level transmitter feeding the strip ~ l l chart recorder and the level transmitter providing input to the plant i computer were the same, the unidentified leak rate calculated by the computer.__ - '

j was less than it would have been had the MUT strip chart value of the

! addition been used. If an operator were aware of this phenomenon, as in the

case of Mr. Coleman, he could take advantage of the phenomenon to increase his chances of obtaining a satisfactory result. The surveillance procedure <

governing leak rate testing directed the operators to avoid water additions 3 unless absolutely required. Thus, in order to detennine whether an operator i j was taking advantage of this phenomenon, it is necessary to determine why the water additions were made.

As stated above, Coleman testified these water additions were made with the intent of altering leak rate test results. Wright stated that the water ,

additions were not required for operational reasons, instead he added water l near the end of the test in an attempt to establish MUT level at the same .,, i value for the beginning and end of the test in order to minimize instrumentation errors. However, since Wright stated he used the MUT strip chart to determine the amount of water added, he could not explain why the

" total number of gallons added" that was inserted into the computer was i

maller than the amount indicated on the MUT strip chart. Mr. Olson  :

explained that the water additions near the end of the tests were necessary )

O for one of two reasons, either MUT level was approaching the lower end of the operating band or to reduce boron concentration in order to move control rods from their outer limit. Neither of Olson's explanations appears credible.

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First, a low level in the MUT would not have occurred prior to the end of these tests. In most cases water was added during the last five minutes of the test. Second, none of the other five shifts, which were operating the plant in the same manner and with the same control rod limits as Shift "D."

required water additions during the last few minutes of their tests. .

In sumary, based upon Mr.Coleman's testimony and the NRR evaluation of tests '

involving Coleman, Wright and Olson that shows every test performed between ,

January 11, 1979 and the date of the accident contains either an underrecordedwateradditionduringthelastfewminutesofthetest(12 l tests) or an unaccounted for feed and bleed operation (1 test), the weigh.t of j the evidence supports a conclusion that both Messrs. Olson and Wright were i not forthright and candid in their testimony regarding their knowledge of or participation in leak rate falsification at TMI-2. My conclusions and recommendations contained in Reference 3 regarding Mr. Dennis I. Olson are unchanged.

&c sd William T. Russell Acting Director Division of Human Factors Safety NRR i

Enclosure:

As stated .

. 1 cc: B. Hayes K. Christopher i J. Liebennan J. Goldberg 1

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