ML20198N347

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Proposed ITS Tables 3.3.1-1 & 3.3.2-1,revising Twelve Allowable Values
ML20198N347
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/29/1998
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20198N339 List:
References
NUDOCS 9901060104
Download: ML20198N347 (30)
v • d • e


Text

, ,. . _ _ . . . _ _ _ - _ _

ATTA HMENT B-1 MARKED-UP PAGES FOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (ITS)

BYRON STATION UNITS 1 & 2 REVISION TO RTS AND ESFAS J ALLOWABLE VALUES REVISED ITS PAGES:

RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-14 RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-15 RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-16 RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-18 RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-19 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3.3.2-9 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3.3.2-12 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3.3.2-14 REVISED ITS BASES PAGES: l RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Page B 3.3.1-5 I RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Page B 3.3.1-60 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 Page B 3.3.2-4 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 Page B 3.3.2-57 I

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l 9901060104 981229 '

PDR 4

ADOCK 05000454 P pmj Page 1 of 13 Attact ment B Byron Station ITS/ITS Bases Marked-up Pages

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  • RTS' Instrumentation i-111  ;

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! TaS e 3.3 1-1 ::a;e . c+ 6; i React: Tri: Syste? Instr ee tatic-l l

1

, APPLICABLE MODES OR -

OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURtEILLAN:: A.;GdEa

'. FUNCTION . CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMEMS hi 1 Manual Eea:ter lei; 1.2 2 5 SE 3.3.1.13 Lt.

l

[ 'l. 3(al fa) g(a)  ;  ; 3; ,3,; :: .,

i 2.' Power' Range Neutron -

l Flux.

l a Hign - 1.2 4 .D SR 3.3.1.1 s 11!.36' SR 3.3.1.2 ;T:

SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11

. l. - SR 3.3.1.15 l t. Low IID3.2 '4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 27 36t SR 3.3.1.8 RTF .

SR 3.3.1.11 l SR 3.3.1.15 s n oXnre -

R f [. sT 8I8 l- .'a. High Positive Rate 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 m 6 31 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 . mitime

' constant s C. 2 YATP c 2 sec L l t.. Hign Negative Rate 1.2 A5RTI) 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 witn time

~l SR 3.3.1.15 constant a 2 sec

6. 0 0. 0 /TP l 4. Inte mediate Range 1(b) 2 IC) 2 F.G SR 3.',.1.1 s 31.5% RTP Neutro*) Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 l S. Source Range Neutron 2(d) 2 H.1 SR 3.3.1.1 s 1 42 E5 cps Flux SR 3.3.1.8 CR 3.3.1.11 l SR 3.3.1.15 l 3(a), 4(a) 5(a) 2 1.J SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.42 E5 cps SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 l SR 3.3.1.15 (continued) l'(a) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.

(b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) Interlock.

(c) Above tne P-6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.

(d). Below the P.6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.

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! -BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 14 7/9/98 Revision E

. . . . . , - . . _ . .m.~ . , _ - ~ . - . . . ~ . . _ _ . . - . - . _ . _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . - . . _ _ . . _=

.. t t

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 l

l ,

(

T cle 3.3,* 1 (Cape 2 0' 6?

Rea:to- Tele Systee lest ume tati:e i.

i I APPLICAELE MODES.OR '

OTHER OPECIFIED REOUIRED SURVEltttA:E A.L;.AE.i

' FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CDCITIONS FEQUIREMEN'S va. J

. l' 6 .- Overtemperature AT 2.2 4 E '5R 3 3.1.. We* :

SR 3.3,1.3 Nr:e w

'l SR 3.3.l H  : 3 . .:

SR 3.3..

SR 3.3.1.10 L ,l SR 3.3.1.15 l

1 1

' l .. 7 Overpower LT 1.2 .4 -E SR 3 3.1.1 Refer -  !

SR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 F ace  !

SR 3.3.1.10 3.3.1 19i .

SR 3.3.1.15

)

S Fressurizer Pressure

> /$ 7 5 PS/G

-)

'l a. Lo= 1('I 4- .K SR 3.3.1.1 = 1869 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10

'l SR 3.3.1.15 l b. H19h 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 2393 pstg SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 l SR 3.3.1.15

9. Feessurizer Water 1('I 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 s 93.5% of Level - High SR 3.3.1.7 instrument SR 3.3.1.10 span 10.. Reactor Coolant 1(') 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 a 89.3% of Flow - Low (per loop) SR 3.3.1.7 loop minimum SR 3.3.1.10 measured flow SR 3.3.1.15
l. 11. - Rea: ton Coolant Pumo 1(') 4 K SR 3.3.1.13 NA (RCP) Breater Position (per train)  ;

(continued)

(e). Above the F 7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) Interlock.

i 1

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l-BYRON - UNITS 1 &-2 3.3.1 - 15 10/5/98 Revision P

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a- , .

RTS. Instrumentation 3.3.1 l Ta':le : : 11 i:a;r : c+ f;

'Rea:,c Tn g Syst e Instrumentstica l

APPLICABLE MODES OR~

[ OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANE A;0.AS.,

. FUNCTION . CONDITIONS CHANNELS " CONDITIONS REQUIREMEhiS t A .:

l L cl1 12.. Un w voltage- kNI 4. A SR 3 3.1.9 2 .:::: l R Ps. u er train) 5: : 3.. .* I

, l .'

, SR :.3.. .- .q

4

- l . l 13.. Uncerfrecuency ;

R:Ps (per train) l l ') :4 K SR 3 3.1.9- e i.s 05 -: ~,

, SR 3.3.1.10 t

'i SR 3.3.1.15

14. Steam Generator (SG)

Water Level - Low -

Low (per SG) '

a. Unit 1 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 = 16.1% of SR 3.3.1.7 rarro. range SR 3.3.1.10 -instrument i

SR 3.3.1.15 span

b. Unit 2 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 = 34.8% of SR 3.3.1.7 narrow rance SR 3.3.1.10 instrumeni.

SR 3.3.1.15 span

.; l

15. aurbine Trip 2 ?/ O AT/C -

4

a. Emergency Trip- III) 3 L SR 3.3.1.10 e 815 psig

' .'l Heacer Pressure

- (per train)

SR 3.3.1.14 m

b. Turbine Throttle 1(f) 4 L SR 3.3.1.10 = It open

-l Valve Closure SR 3.3.1.14

=(per train)

~ l- 16. . Safety In1ection (SI) 1.2 2 trains M SR 3.3.1.13 NA Input from Engineered Safety Festure Actuation System (ESFAS)

(cor.tinued)  !

1 (e) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

- (f) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) Interlock.

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BYRON.- UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 16 7/9/98 Revision E

" 1 RTS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 6)

Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overtemnerature AT The Overtemperature AT Functinn Allowable Value shall not exceed the follo,vina Trip Setpoint by a re than AT span.

f gy g 1

s A To ' K - K (1+ r,s) 1 A T (1+r s) 3 T - T' + K3 (P -P')- f ( A I) '

(1+r 2s) 1+rs3 1

2 (1+73 s) (1+r es) 3 Where: AT is measured Reactor Coolant System (RCS) AT. F.

ATo is the indicated AT at RTP. F.

s is the Laplace transform operator, sec'!

T,is the measured RCS average temperature. F.

T is the nominal T. , at RTP s 588.4 F.

P,is the measured pressurizer pressure, psig.

l P is the nominal RCS operating pressure. - 2235 psig.

K = 1.325 3 K - 0.0297/ F 2 K3 - 0.00181/psig 7 - 8 sec 2 7 - 3 sec 73 s 2 sec 7, - 33 sec rs - 4 sec 76 s 2 sec f (AI) - -3.35{24+(qt - qn)) when qt - q3 < - 24% RTP 3

0% of RTP when -24% RTP s qt - q3 s 10% RTP 4.11{(qt - q3) - 10} when qt - q3 > 10% RTP Where q. and q3 are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core, respectively, and qt + q3 is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.

BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 18 9/28/98 Pevision P

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 h

i Tabie 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 6) ,

Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 2: Overoower AT The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following Trip 4 Setpoint by more than AT span. y gg g SAT'o 'K,- K'1

  • I s f1 1 T5 1 A T (1+ T s) 3 7 T - K, T - T" - f (A I) '

(1+T25) 1*I 35 7 1+T5 6 1+I 63 Where: AT is measured RCS AT *F.

ATo is the indicated AT at RTP, F.

s is the Laplace transform operator, sec-2 .

T,,is the measured RCS average temperature, F.

T is the nominal T,y at RTP. s 588.4 F.

K4 = 1.072 Ks = 0.02/*F for increasing T,y K6 = 0.00245/ F when T > T" 0/*F for decreasing T,y 0/ F when T s T" 7 - 8 sec 3 77 - 3 sec T3 s 2 sec T6 s 2 sec r, = 10 sec f (AI) = 0 for all AI.

2 BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 19 7/9/98 Revision A

ESFAS Instrumentation .

3.3.2:  ;

i Tacle 3.3,I . (page 1 016' Engineere: Satety Featu e A:tsatir System Instratentatic*

j APPLICABLE MCDES OR

'. OTHER SPECIFIED REOUIRED.. .

SURVE!LLANCE A,.LO ABf FUNCTION CONDITIONS CMANNEL5' CONDITIONS REQUIREMENT 5 VALUE i 1 Safety injection I

a: c.c frivenen  :.:.1.4  : e 5; 3:.23 u I

b. Automatic . ~

1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Log 10 SR 3.3 2.5 and Actuat1on

-Relays I

_l c. Containment. 1. 2.3 l3 D SR 3.3.2.1 s 4 6 ps1; 1 Pressure - Hign 1 SR 3.3.2.6 1 U L$ 5 l0 t / / / 7 r s m l

'l- d.- Pressurizer -1.2.3(a) 4 D ' SR 3.3.2.1 a 1613 esig l Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.6 -1 SR 3.3.2.10 i SR 3.3.2.12 l= .e. Steam Line 1.2.3(a) - 3 per st om- 0 SR 3.3.2.1 = 614 psig(b)

Pressure - Low line SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12

2. Containment Spray a ' Manual Initiation 1.2.3.4 2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA bc ' Automatit 1.2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actua:1on SR 3.3.2.7 Relays l c. Containment 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 = 21.2 pstg  !

Pressure High - 3 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 (continued)

(al At'ove the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock.

(b) -Time constants used in the lead / lag controller are t ei 50 seconds and t s 5 seconds

. BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 9 7/9/98 Revision E

  • ~*'

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Taoie 3.3.3-1 (ca;e 4 cf C En;1reere: Safety Feature Actuattee Syster Instrumertat!cr APFtICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!; LANCE A,.;CJ E E LFUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS -COCITIONS REQUIREMENTS vu:

'5 Turbine Trip arc.

Feed. ate- ! sol ettM i

'l - 6. - Autom6 tic ~1.2 ih3 3(h) ,2 tem ' G SR 3.3 1 4 N' Actuatio't Leg 1C SR 3,3.2.5 and Actuat!on' SR 3.3.2.7 Relays .

-D Steam Generator (SG) Water l Level - High High (P-14)

-1) Unit 1 1.2(hl.3(h) 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1. s 89.9% ef SR 3.3.2.4 narrow rarge SR 3.3.2.5 instrument SR 3.3.2.6 span SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12

2) Unit 2 1.2(hk.3(h) 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1- s 82 8t of SR 3.3,2.4 riarrum range SR 3.3.2.5 instrumert SR .3.3.2.6' span SR 3.3.2.7 5R 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 5 f/, f ,
c. Safety Infection Refer to Function 1 (Safety In.jection) for all initiation functions and requirements.' ,

f (continued)

~

l '(h) . Except when all Feeawater Isolation Valves are closed or isolated by a closed manual valve.

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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 12 10/5/98 Revision P I

l

..- . . A

ESFAS. Instrumentation  ;

3 . v' . .?

i Table 3.3.2-1 (;a;e i Of f:

En;1neerec Safety Feature Actua!1er Syste? Instreertatier i

APPLICABLE MODES OR CTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SUR'.EI;tANCE A 0*AE.E FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS RE0dIREMENTS VAai S..E! ras Irte 1cu s I i

a Rea !ce Tr10, ?-4 i

'1,2.3 2 pe trair F Sc -3.3 2 9 v.

OL P essurizer Pressure, ,

1.2,3 2 L SR 3.3.2.6 3 1933 estg

~ P il SR 3.3.2.10 I .

c. T,,, - Lo. Low. P-12 1.2.3 3 .L .SR 3.3.2.6 a 546 9'F SR 3.3.2.1C r 592. 0 *f l

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,'t-BYRON + UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 14 7/9/98 Revision E i

RTS Instrumentation ,

B 3.3.1 1

BASES '

BACKGROUND (continued)

Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables l or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Alloxable Value to l account for char.ges in normal measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example of such a change in measurement error is attributable to calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for l CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the measured value of a bistable exceeds the Trip Setpoint but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated RTS Function is j considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints are specified in the l Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5).

{

de Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a methodology which incorporates all of the known  :

uncertainties ap;' cable for each instrument channel.  !

l l wr m . ' a detailed description of the

" metnooology useo to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, for all instruments listed in Table 3.3.1-1 except the Turbine Trip Functions. The Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints for the Turbine Trip Functions are based on specific Comed setpoint {

methodology '

Solid State Protection System l (Ref.11). l l i

The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables.

To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS.

each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip and/or i ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of )

service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence l requirements. The system has been designed to initiate a reactor trip in the event of a loss of power, directing the j unit to a safe shutdown condition.

l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 5 5/30/98 Revision E 1

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

As appropriate each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the l final actuation devices is included in the testing.

i ResDonse times cannot be determined during unit operation because equipment operation is requirea to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

j SR 3.3.1.15 is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 7.

2. UFSAR. Chapter 6.
3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
4. IEEE-279-1971.
5. Technical Requirements Manual.

l 6. WCAP-12523. RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodology Study."

October 1990.

7. WCAP-10271-P-A. Supplement 2. Rev. 1. June 1990.
8. WCAP-13632. Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor l Response Time Testing Requirements," August 1995.  !

l 9. UFSAR. Section 7.2. ,

t r- ,

l

10. WCAP-12583," Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems, Byron / Braidwood Stations, dated May 1990.
11. Comed NES-ElC-20.04," Analysis of Instrument Channel Setpoint Error i and instrument Loop Accuracy," Revision 0, dated October 14,1997.

l l

l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 60 5/30/98 Revision E

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables l or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value tc

account for changes in measurement errors cete;taDie Dy a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example of such a changa in measurement error is attributable to calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the measured value of a bistable is less conservative than the Trip Setpoint, but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated ESFAS Function is considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5).

Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a methodology which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each instrument channel. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints. includina their explicit uncertainties, is provided in n - y I I Solid State protection System l References 6 and 10. l l The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing l of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. l To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will ]rovide ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are ta(en out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged I in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to i satisfy separation and independence requirements.

The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation: generates the electrical output signals that l initiate the required actuation: and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room.

\

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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 4 5/30/98 Revision E l

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Chapter 6.

2. UFSAR. Chapter 7.
3. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
4. IEEE-279-1971.
5. Technical Regtrirements Manual .

l 6. WCAP-12523. "RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodtlogy Study."

October 1990.

7. WCAP-10271-P-A. Supplement 2. Rev. 1. Jun3 1990.
8. WCAP-13632 Revision 2. " Elimination of Pretsure Sensor Response Time Testirig Requirements." August 1995.

l 9. USFAR. Section 7.2.

L r-- -

10. WCAP-12583," Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems, Byron / Braidwood Stations," dated May 1990.

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BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 57 5/30/98 Revision E l

l

, . l 1

I ATTACHMENT B-2 MARKED-UP PAGES FOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (ITS) l BRAIDWOOD STATION UNITS 1 & 2 l

l REVISION TO RTS AND ESFAS I ALLOWABLE VALUES I

i REVISED ITS PAGES: l RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-14 l

RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-15 l RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-16 l RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-18 I RTS Instrumentation Table 3.3.1-1 Page 3.3.1-19 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3.3.2-9 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3.3.2-12 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 Page 3.3.2-14 i

REVISED ITS BASES PAGES:

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Page B 3.3.1-5 ,

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 Page B 3.3.1-60 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 Page B 3.3.2-4 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 Page B 3.3.2-57 I

i Page 1 of 13 Attachment B Braidwood Station

! ITS/ITS Bases Marked-up Pages

. P. .

l l

I "

RTS Instrumentation  ;

3.3.1 ,

L Tatie 3.3 1 1 tea;e 1 ef 6:

Rea: tor Tric System Instrueertatio*

==

AFPLICABLE MODES OR i OTHER SPECIFIED REOUIRED SURVEILLANCE Auc. AE a FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS J

CONDITIONS REQUIREMENT 5 VA u:

f )

~

' l' 1 Mansai P+a: tor irte. .,2 2 'E. S4 '.3 . 12 M 1l' 3(a; gia: y a' 2  : SR o .3. . R u

~

l' l 2. Power Range Neutron S //0. f WA TP l Flux I

1

a. Hign 1.2 4 C SR 3.3.1.1 s 111.36 l l

' SR 3.3.1.2 RTF l SR 3.3.1.7 l SR 3.3.1.11

-l' SR 3.3.1.15

]

D. Low 1(b) 2' 4 l .. 'E SR 3.3.1.1 s 27 361 l SR 3.3.1.8 RTP i

SR 3.3.1.11

.l SR 3.3.1 s 2 7 O W.15 ATP 1

3. Power Range Neutron
i. Flux Rate $ g. 2 8Y l' a. High Positive Rate 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3,1,11

[sA31cTe ,'

witn time constant  ;

8 $. k k ?f

  • I 5

l -l b .. High Negat'n 09 te 1.2 4 E' SR 3.3.1.7 l- SR 3.2 1.11 w an ume- 1 l .SR 3.3.1.15 constant a 2 sec s 30. 0%ATP

-l 4 .' Intermediate Range IIDI. 2ICI 2 F.G SR 3.3.1.1 s 31.51 RTP i Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 i SR 3.3.1.11 l

! .l, 5. Source Range Neutron 2(d) 2 H.1 SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.42 E5 cps Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 ll l SR 3.3.1.15 l 3(a) 4(a) 5(a) 2 1.J SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.42 E5 cps SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1 11 l SR 3.3.1.15 L (continued) j.(a) With P.cd Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted, j

, (b) _ Below the P 10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. I (c) Above. the P 6 (Source Range Block Permissive) interlock.

(d) 'Below the P 6 (Source Range Block Permissive) Interlock.

l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 14 7/9/98 Revision E J

I t

RTS Instrumentation 3.'3.1

'able 2.3 4 . i:ag+ 2 :< 6:

, Reactor Trt; Syste- in;trcentan or APPLICABLE M3 DES OR

,. OTHER SPECIFIED ~REQUIREC- SURVEILLANCE . ALLO W .' .;

FUNCTION lCSNDITIONS CHANNELS . CONDITIONS RECUIREM%TS 44 a 4 l-i 'j 6 Overtfeceratureai 1.2 4 E- St 3 3.: . cete t- -;

e W;g... 'u^ .p

.l.- [q gy . ~~ '

SR 3.3.1.10 l SR 3 3.1.1E l 7 Overpower AT 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refe- te

. SR 3.3.1 7- Note : P age SR 3.3.1.10 3 3 1 19.'

SR 3.3.1.15 '

6: Oressurtzer Pressure E l$75 f.5/G

.l! a. Low 1(') '4 K SR 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1,7 a 1869 psig SR 3.3.1.10 l SR 3.3.1.15

'l- b; Hign 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 s 2393 pstg SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 ll- SR 3.3.1.15

9. Pressurizerbiater 1(e) 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 s 93.5% of Level - High SR 3.3.1.7 Instrument SR 3.3.1.10 span
10. Reactor Cociant . 1(*) 3 K SR 3.3.1.1 = 69.3% of Flow - Low (r* loop) SR 3.3.1.7 1 cop minimum SR 3.3.1.10 measured flo.

SR 3.3.1.15 l" 11. Reartor Coolant Pump 1(') 4 K SR 3.3.1.13 NA (RCP) Ereaker Position (per train)

(Continued)

.(e) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trtos Block) interlock.

I i

i 3.3.1 - 15 BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 10/5/98 Revision P n-

. . _ .--~ .- . - .

RTS Instrumentation l

'3.3.1

(?

o I;

~ tad1 e 3.3 1 1 (pace 3 ef 61 Rea:ter Trte Syster Instrumee.tetten 1

I' e

APPLICABLE MODES OR-i - OTHER SPECIFIED

' REQUIRE Sc4 EI LAN:E- A.;.CeL; FUNCTION CONDITION 5 CHANNELS CONDITIONS RE3g!RE*ENTS i A.' ;

d 12 - Uncervoltage . 1(') 4 t SR 2.3...; -4 :::: i

. R:ss be* train: S: 33' I SR 3. 3 . B .

l l 13 Dr.cerfrecuency e l ') 4 K SR 3.3.1.9- a is ce n:

RCPs (per train) SR 3.3 1.10 j SR 3.3.1.15 l

i 14 Steam Generator (SG) i Water Level -- Low Low (per SG) ai Unit 1 i

1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 = 16.1% of l, SR 3.3.1.7 narrow range SR 3.3.1.10 tr.strument SR 3.3.1.15 span

(. h. Unit 2 1.2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 a 34.8% of t

SR 3.3.1.7 narrow range L SR 3.3.1,10 instrument SR 3.3.1.15 span 15; . Turbine Trip #T-t

a. Emergency Trie. -1(f) 3 L SR 3.3.1.10 m SIS ps19 l

l' header Pressure (per train)

SR 3.3.1.14

  • III
b. Turbine Throttle 'I 4- L SR 3.3.1.10 = lt open l- Valve Closure SR 3,3.1.14-
- (per tratn) i l

l 26. -Safety injection (SI) 1.2 2 trains M SR 3.3.1.13 NA Inout from Engineered Safety Feature l-' -Actuation System I (ESFAS)

(continued)

(e) . Above the P-7 .(Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.

(f) . Above the P 8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) Interlock.

f.

l-.

f-BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 &'2- 3.3.1 - 16 7/9/98 Revision E l

l' I

a . . _ . - - _ . . - , ,- _._ - - __ , _ .. _

i RTS Instrumentation  !

3.3.1 l

, Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 6)

Reactor Trip System Instrumentation i

Note 1- Overtemoerature AT The Overtemperature AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed tne following i y*

~

Trip Setpoint by more than 1.33% of AT span. '

J '

1 A T(1+ri s) SAT'3 K - K (1+r,s) T 1

- T' + K3 (P -P')- f ( A I) '

(14r,s) 1+rs3 1

2 (1+rs s) (1+r es) 1 Where: AT is measured Reactor Coolant System (RCS) AT. F.

ATc, is the indicated AT at RTP. F.

s is the Laplace transform operator. sec-l T,is the measured RCS average temperature. F.

1 T is the nominal T m at RTP, s 588.4 F. )

l P,13 the measured pressurizer pressure, psig. l l P is the nominal RCS operating pressure. = 2235 psig.

Ki = 1.325 K2 - 0.0297/ F K3 - 0.00181/psig 7 - 8 sec 1 T2 - 3 sec 73 s 2 sec 1 7 - 33 sec 4 rs = 4 sec re s 2 sec f (AI) = -3.35{24+(qt - q,)} when qt - 4e < - 24% RTP 1

0% of RTP when -24% RTP s qt - q, s 10% RTP 4.11((qt - q,) - 10} when qt - q, > 10% RTP Where qt and go are percent RTP in the upper and lower halves of the core, respectively, and qt + go is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RTP.

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BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 18 9/28/98 Revision P i

f

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.:

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 6)

Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 2: Overoower AT The Overpower AT Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the followin:: Trip 5etpoint by more than

~

f oT spa y go g 1 r, s 1 1 A T (1+7 s)3 SAT' o K,- K T-K6 T - T" - f,(A I)

(1+T2 s) 1+T3s 1+T7 s 1+T6 s 1+T6 5 Where: 6T is measured RCS AT. F.

ATc is the indicated AT at RTP. F.

s is the Laplace transform operator, sec'!

T,,is the measured RCS average temperature. F.

T is the nominal T ,, at RTP. s 588.4*F.

K - 1.072 4 Ks = 0.02/ F for increasing T ,, K6 - 0.00245/ F when T > T" 0/ F for decreasing T,,, 0/ F when T s T" r - 8 sec 3 r2 = 3 sec 7 s 2 sec 3

7 s 2 sec 3

r, = 10 sec f 2(61) = 0 for all 61.

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BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 - 19 7/9/98 Revision A l

l

-. i. .'

ESFAS Instrumentation 1 3.3. c .n 1

\

~

Taole 3.3.2 . (ca?s 1 cf 6 Engineerec Safety Feature A:tuatica Syste- Irstreerta:1er APPLICABLE MODES OR CTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE M 0aAE E ftE TION CONDITIONS CHANNELS . CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VAa E

1. Safety injection a- Mr# Ir tt et cr. ..23'  : 9 3; 3.3.23 u
o. Automatic 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 ana Actuation . SR 3.3.2.'

Felays i l c Containment .

1.2.3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 s .t.6 est; l Pressure - High 1 SR 3.3.2.6 I

. R 3:3 : 2 E lll?hT/G j' d .. Fressurizer' 1.2.3(a) 4 0. SR 3.3.2.1 = 1813 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 1

-l 'e. Steam Line 1.2.3(a) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 = 614 psig(b)

Pressure - Low line SR 3.3.2.6 SP 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 i

, 2. - Containment Soray I

a. Manual Initiation - 1.2.3.4 2 B SR 3.3.2.9 NA ,
b. Automatic 1.2.3.4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.4 NA
Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.5 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 Relays l

l c. . Cortainment 1.2.3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 s 21.2 psig l Pressure High - 3 SR 3.3.2,6 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 (continued)

(a) Above the P-1] (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock.

j (b) Time constants used in the lead / lag controller are t, a 50 seconds and t, s 5 seconds.

i l'

l' l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 9 7/9/98 Revision E L

i.

ESFAS Instrumentation-

3. 3.- ? :

Table'3.3.2 1 (Cage 4 # O

- E*ginee e Safety Feature Actua:1ce Syste- Ir.strutentatier AoPLICABLE MODES OR ,

CinER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE AL 0*A5.E I FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REOLIREMENTS VAwE I

sc Ta v nr. irte er: i feec. ate Isciattor l l a. AJtortat10 1Yr, ytt) 2 trains' G SR 3 3. 4 ta A:tuation Logie Sr. 3.3.2.5 .

and Actuation SR 3.3.2.7 l Relays'  !

1 1

b Steam Generator <

(SG) Water' .

Level - High High- I (P-14)  ;

1) Unit 1 1.2(h) 3(h)

, 4 per SG D SR 3.3M s 69.9% M SR 3.3.2.4 narrow range l SR 3.3.2.5 instrument i SR 3.3.2.6 span i SR 3.3.2.7 I SR 3.3.2.10 1 SR 3.3.2.12 1

2) Unit 2 1,2(h} 3. IhI 4 pe' SG D SR 3.3.2.1 s 8? 8' of SR 3.3.2 4 r.arro. range SR 3.3.2.5 instrument SR 3.3.2.6 span SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.10 SR 3.3.2.12 f [/, f ,
c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation fun:tions and requiremer:ts.

(continued)

' [(h)' ~ Except wnen all Feedwater Isolation Valves are closed or isolated by a closed manual valve. l a

I l

1.

8 l BRAIDWOOD . UNITS;I & 2. 3.3.2 - 12 10/5/98 Revision P t.

I 4

.. . ~ _ _ _._.._ , _ . . . . . . . . - _ , _ . . . . . . _ , . . _ _ . .- . _ - . _ . . . _. . . _ - . . .

[

ESFAS Instrumentation. i 3.1.9-

.i

)

Taele'3 3. -! trage 6 c' E --

Engmeere: Safety Fea v e A:tvetten System Ins: v erta :e-APPLICABLE MODES OR l OTHER SPECIFIED. REQUIRED .SURVELLAN:!. A.LO.A5.. i o rVNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS COTITIONS RE0u1REMENTS u.t E

- l ' ! L (3C irte*iceri

{- 6'E.eatteriets.P4' .I.2.3 ~2 pe'* Train i 5 3. .9 Y,

'o'. Pressurtre* Pressure; ' 1.2. 3 - 2 L SR 3.3.2.6 s 1936 est; >

P-li SR 3.3.2.10 j

c. T,.. Low Low, P-12 1.2.3 3 L SR 3.3.2.6 = 546.9'r .1

> SR 3.3.2.10 ,

E SY$,0 t

5 e

i i

I t

i f

h BRAIDWOOD ' UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2 - 14 7/9/98 Revision E

-~ si-- , . , , . , ., .- w y

- . 3r

l RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 2

BASES I l

BACKGROUND (continued) l l Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables l

' l or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to

' account for chances in normal measurement errors astectable by a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example l of such a change in measurement error is attributable to l calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly l adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for l l CHANNEL CALIBRATION tolerance. If the measured value of a l bistable exceeds the Trip Setpoint but is within the l Allowable Value, then the associated RTS Function is  !

considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints are specified in the '

Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5).

de Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a I methodology which incorporates all of the known uncertainties aoplicable for each instrument channel.

l a:__ .~:3a detailed description of the

^

methocology usea to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip i

! Setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, for all instruments listed in Table 3.3.1-1 except the Turbine Trip l Functions. The Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints for the  ;

Turbine Trip Functions are based on specific Comed setpoint methodology &

Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables.

To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS.

each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test Jurposes, the second train will 3rovide reactor trip and/or ESF actuation for the unit. If aoth trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence l requirements. The system has been designed to initiate a reactor trip in the event of a loss of power, directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition.

l l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 5 5/30/98 Revision E

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l As appropriate, each channel's response must be verified every 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the final actuation devices is included in the testing.

Response times cannot be determined during unit operation l because equipment operation is requirec to measure response times. Experience has shown tnat tnese components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. j l SR 3.3.1.15 is modified by a Note stating that neutron  ;

detectors are excluded from R'S RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because .of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector in3ut signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because t1e principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.

1 REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Chapter 7.

2. UFSAR Chapter 6.
3. UFSAR. Chapter 15.
4. IEEE-279-1971.
5. Technical Requirements Manual.

l 6. WCAP-12523. "RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodology Study "

October 1990.

7. WCAP-10271-P-A. Supplement 2. Rev. 1. June 1990.
8. WCAP-13632. Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor  !

Response Time Testing Requirements." August 1995. l l 9. UFSAR. Section 7.2.

L C

l I l

10. WCAP-12533," Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems, Byron / Braidwood Stations," dated May 1990.
11. Comed NES-EIC-20.04, " Analysis of Instrument Channel Setpoint Error

, and Instrument Loop Accuracy," Revision 0, dated October 14,1997.

t BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1 - 60 5/30/98 Revision E i

, .o l ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 1

l BASES 1

BACKGROUND (continued) l Trip Setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables j or setpoint comparators are set. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the bistable /comparator is more conservative than that specified by the Allcwable Value to  !

l at:ount for changes in measurement errors aetectable Dy a  !

CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T). One example of such a change in measurement error is attributable to calculated normal uncertainties during the surveillance interval. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as ,

left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION l l

tolerance. If the measured value of a bistable is less conservative than the Trip Setpoint, but is within the Allowable Value, then the associated ESFAS Function is considered OPERABLE. Trip Setpoints are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5).

Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints are based on a methodology which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each instrument channel. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the Allowable Values and Trip Setpoints. includina their explicit uncertainties, is provided ir,"-- -

l I

' Solid State Protection System l References 6 and 10. l The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables.

To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS.

each performing the same functions, are provided. If one .

train is taken out of service for maintenance or test i purposes, the second train will provide ESF actuation for j the unit. If both trains are tacen out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.

The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation: generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status,  !

permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main l I

control room. I l

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 -4 5/30/98 Revision E

, .c ESFAS Instrumentation i B 3.3.2 !

1 BASES REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Chapter 6.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 7.
3. UFSAR. Chapter 15. 1
4. IEEE-279-1971.  !
5. Technical Requirements Manual.

l 6. WCAP-12523. "RTS/ESFAS Setpoint Methodology Study."

October 1990. l 1

7. WCAP-10271-P-A Supplement 2. Rev. 1 June 1990. '
8. WCAP-13632 Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." August 1995.  !

l l 9. USFAR. Section 7.2.

L l

10. WCAP 12583," Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems, Byron / Braidwood Stations," dated May 1990.

I

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l l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.2 - 57 5/30/98 Revision E

ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION We have evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. According to 10 CFR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would net:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously  ;

evaluated; or '

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

We propose to amend Appendix A, Technical Specifications, of Facility Operating License Nos.

NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72 and NPF-77. The proposed changes to Byron Station and Braidwood Station improved Technical Specifications (ITS) Table 3.3.1-1, " Reactor Trip System instrumentation," and Table 3.3.2-1, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation," revise the Allowable Values (AVs) of twelve instrumentation functions. These changes reduce the difference between each AV and the respective trip setpoint, while maintaining the existing trip setpoint, making the AVs more restrictive.

The determination that the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 are met for this amendment request is provided below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

These changes to the twelve AVs do not involve an increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The AVs provide the basis for determining instrument channel operability and do not change the system function, or channel operation or calibration. Operation within the AV ensures the instrument channel's ability to provide the required reactor trip or engineered safety feature actuation signal during plant operation. In all cases, the proposed changes only make the twelve AVs more restrictive with respect to the current AVs, and do not effect the response characteristics of the instrumentation because actual trip setpoints are unchanged. There is no change being made to the approved design, nor is there any operational change being made which would increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated.

The RTS and ESFAS systems which are actuated by the corresponding instrumentation setpoints will operate in the same manner as before and within their design limits.

l These changes to the twelve AVs do not involve an increase in the consequences of an l accident previously evaluated. These changes have no effect on plant operation. There l is no physical or operational change being made which would alter the sequence of events, plant response, or assumptions or conclusions of the affected analyses. The Page 1 of 3 Attachment C - Significant Hazards Consideration

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! use of the AVs as a basis for determining instrument or channel operability does not change system operation or channel function. The proposed changes do not change the established trip setpoints for these functions. No design analyses have changed or will be affected. The twelve revised AVs are more restrictive than the current AVs and continue to ensure that the safety limits are not violated during anticipated transients, and that the consequences of design basis accidents remain acceptable. The change

, to the AVs does not degrade or prevent any actions from taking place in response to an l accident. The use of NRC approved or endorsed methodology in developing the l proposed AVs ensures that the present analytical limits for all accidents will be maintained. These proposed changes to the AVs for RTS and ESFAS instrumentation will continue to ensure that the associated RTS trip or ESFAS actuation signals will be j generated when required within the bounds of the plant safety analyses. There is no

change in the type or amount of any effluents released, and no change in either the l onsite or offsite dose consequences as a result of this change. i Therefore, based on this evaluation, this proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from l any accident previously evaluated?

These proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes to the twelve AVs for RTS and ESFAS instrumentation will not affect the trip setpoints at which a reactor trip or engineered safety feature actuation is initiated. The trip setpoints contained in the Technical Requirements Manual are not being changed and will continue to be maintained. The only changes being made are to the AVs used as a basis for determining instrument channel operability. Because the trip setpointt e unchanged, RTS or ESFAS setpoint actuation is not affected by the revised AW.

l An RTS trip or ESFAS actuation signal that may initiate between its trip setpoint and the l associated AV is acceptable because an allowance has been made in the affected instrument uncertainty calculation to accommodate this deviation. It allows for potential drift while ensuring plant operation in a safe manner. Using this methodology provides plant operational flexibility and yet remains within the allowances accounted for in the various accident analyses. No new equipment is being installed, and no installed

! equipment is being operated in a new or different manner with these twelve AV l changes. The revised AVs do not alter the intended design or operation of systems or instrument channels. As no physical plant equipment changes are being made, no new equipment failure modes are being introduced as a result of these proposed changes.

There is no change in plant operation that affects previously evaluated failure modes and no change in plant response to a transient condition. These changes do not represent a new failure mode over what has been previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

l Page 2 of 3 Attachment C - Significant Hazards

( Consideration

l

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

There is no significant reduction in the margin of safety from these proposed changes.

These proposed changes move twelve AVs closer to the trip setpoints compared to the existing AVs, which increases the margin of safety. An RTS trip or ESFAS actuation signal that may initiate between its trip setpoint and the associated AV is acceptable because an allowance has been made in the affected instrument uncertainty calculation to accommodate this deviation. The revised AVs have been calculated using NRC approved or endorsed methodology, which is consistent with existing safety analyses that define the margin of safety. Safety analyses assumptions and results are not affected.

Therefore, these changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based upon the above evaluation, we have concluded that the proposed changes involve no significant hazards consideration.

Page 3 of 3 Attachment C - Significant Hazards Consideration

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l ATTACHMENT D l

ENVIRONMENTAL AS. ISSMENT '

l l

We have evaluated this proposed operating license amendment request against the criteria )

for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in  !

accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. We have determined that this proposed license l

amendment request meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion set forth in l 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and as such, has determined that no irreversible consequences exist in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(b). This determination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed as an amendment to a license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 50 which i changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located j within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or which changes an inspection or a surveillance requirement, and the amendment meets the following specific cnteria: l l

(i) The amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. i As demonstrated in Attachment C, this proposed amendment does not involve any l significant hazards consideration.

l (ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

As documented in Attachment C, there will be no change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational l radiation exposure.

The proposed changes will not result in changes in the operation or configuration of the facility. There will be no change in the level of controls or methodology used for l processing of radioactive effluents or handling of solid radioactive waste, nor will the proposal result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant.

l Therefore, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation j exposure resulting from this change.

l l

Therefore, based upon the above evaluation, we have concluded that no irreversible consequences exist with the proposed changes.

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Page 1 of 1 Attachment D - Environmental Assessment i

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