ML20202A827

Insp Rept 70-7002/98-02 on 980106-16.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Surveillance IP 88025,mgt Organization & Controls IP 88005,operator Training & Retraining IP 88010 & RP IP 83822

ML20202A827
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	02/06/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202A802	List: ML20202A798 ML20202A820 ML20202A827
References
70-7002-98-02, 70-7002-98-2, NUDOCS 9802100180
Download: ML20202A827 (15)

Text

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) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111' Docket No: 70 7002 Certificate Nc. GDP Report No: 70-7002/98002(DNMS)

Applicant: United States Enrichment Corporation. -;

.- ;. 7 Facility Name: = Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant '

Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 -

Dates:- January 6 through January 16,1998 Inspector:- C. A. Blanchard, Fuel Cycle inspector I- -

Approved By: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 9802100180 9E0206 PDR ADOCK 07007002

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant - 4 NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/98002(DNMS) .

Maintenance and Surveillance Insaa% Pr==dere (Ban 25)

.e' -. The inspector noted that the autoclave cylinder thermocouple on Autoclave No. 2 in Building X-342 installation appeared adequate except the electrical terminal block that -

_ had only one foundation mounting screw. An instrument first line manager demonstrated detailed knowledge of how the autoclave temperature instrumentation operated, (Section M1.1)_

e The inspector identified an inconsistent use of tagging out-of service equipment in 4 Buildings X-342, X-343, and X 344. Additionally, through discussions with the Work L Control Manager, the inspector ooteemined that out-of-service equipment tagging was inconsistent throughout the site. The inspector will monitor the certificatee's conective actions to ensure consistent use of " Control" tagging for out-of service equipment :

inspection followup item (IFl 070-7002/98002 02). (Section M1.2) e The inspector identified that instrument mechanics had not performed the required -

l independent verification for the restoration of leads on safety systems categorized as "Q" l . Items. This is a violation (VIO 070 7002/98002-01), in addition, the inspector noted that b the certificatee's conective action for Problem Report PR-PTS-97-05905 issued on

- June 26,19g7, was ineffective in ensuring thet electricians, electronic and instrument -

mechanics understood the requirements of performing an independent verification for the n - restoration ~of leads when required by a maintenance work package.- (Section M1.3):

h4anaaement Oraanization and Controls InsMian Pre = dure (IP 88nns)

-* The inspector verified that documentary evidence included the appropriate authority to -

, disposition the new style thermocouple. (Section E6.1) =

Operator Trainina and Retrainina Insaaa*jan Preadure (88010) e The inspector determined that the initial operator training program meets the requirements of the certification. The actions imposed by the qualification standard book demonstrated that the operatom in training had a good working knowledge of prncess operations; (Section 05.1)-

.e-' The inspector noted that work control training for planners and system engineers was not a required training course. The certificatw acted promptly in adding work control training to the planners' required training matrix and to train planners that they had not previously trained. (Section M5.1)-

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Radiation Protection Inspection Procedure (IP 83822) e The inspector concluded that the review of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable program met, and was conducted, in accordance with the requirements of Safety Analysis Report Section 5.3, " Radiation Protection." (Section R1.1)

• The inspector noted no d'acrepancies in the posting and labeling of areas. The certificatee tcok appropriate corrective actions to ensure employees were aware of the NRC Form 3, and required activities if a cylinder survey exceeded 100 milli-roentgen equivalent man at 30 centimeters. (Section R1.6) 3

Report Details

l. Operations 05 ~ Operator Training and Qualification l

. 05,1 - ? It'itial Process Operator Trainina

- a.- Inspection Scope (88010)

The inspector reviewed the initial operator training program for compliance with Safety ]

Analysis Report (SAR) Section 6.6, " Training," requirements.

b. - Observations and Findinas t

The inspector reviewed select training records for a process operator. in discussion with the inspector, the training manager explained that each process building has a building L

trainer that has expertise in cognizant building operations. The building trainer's

responsibilities included mentoring operators in training and ensuring that existing.

ope'ators remained current with training requirements. Initial process operator training included successfully completing five qualification standard books that addressed each

_ cognizant building process. The inspector reviewed the five qualification standard books for effectiveness in teaching initial operator training course objectives. The contents of

each qualification standard book included

-*- Administrative section discussed why and how the book was developed.

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.e. Classroom training section listed the required training classes,

e. Procedure review section listed the pertinent procedures required for the cognizant building processes.

o Operation review section attested that the operator in training had observed cognizant building processes with a qualified operator.-

-e  : Operator training section evaluated the operator in training on controlling one process system under the direct supervision of a qualified operator. :

e- . Integrated instruction and proficiency watch section evaluated the operator in training's ability to make process adjustments for more than one process system under the direct supervision of a qualified operator.

e - Emergency and casualty section evaluated the operator in training's ability to correctly react to changing process conditions and problems.

e Final evaluation section evaluated the operator in training's ability to proficiently

- operate cognizant building processes.

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Each section had an operator in training and a building tralner sign off to certify that the operator in training understood the material presented in the section. In addition, the operator in training was required to successfully complete three written comprehensive examinations,

c. Conclusions The inspector determined that the initlei operator training program meets the requirements of the certification. The actions imposed by the qualification standard book demonstrated that the operators in training had a good working knowledge of process operations.

11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Autoclave Thermocouple Replacement

a. inspection Scope (88025)

The inspector verified the accuracy and guidance of a maintenance work package for troubleshooting and repairing an autoclave cylinder thermocouple, in addition, the inspector discussed failure modes of autoclave cylinder temperature instrumentation with a first line manager (FLM),

b. Observations and Findinos The inspector visually inspected the two autoclave cylinder thermocouple instc!bilons for l

I Autoclave No. 2 in Building X-342. The inspector observed that the thermocouple lead wires from the electrical terminal block to the two autoclave cylinder thermocouples were evenly twisted and secured with wire ties. The inspector noted that the electrical terminal block was secured inside the autoclave with only one screw and was easily rotated on the

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electrical terminal block foundation. However, the inspector observed that the wires leading from the electrical terminal block to the autoclave cylinder thermocouples were secured to the electrical terminal block foundation with a wire tie. In discussions with the i- inspector, the instrument FLM explained that the instrument mechanic installed the wire tie at the electrical terminal block foundation to ensure that operators could not accidentally pull the autoclave cylinder thermocouple wires from the electrical terminal block. The inspector noted that the current Building X-342 Autoclave No. 2 cylinder thermocouple MWP did not require the installation of a wire tie from the electrica terminal foundation to the autoclave cylinder thermocouple wires.

The inspector discussed the failure modes of autoclave temperature instrumentation with an instrument FLM. The instrument FLM explained that the two autoclave mounted thermocouples independently transmit signals to the autoclave temperature recorder.

The instrument FLM explained that two primary failure modes caused incorrect autoclave cylinder temperature readings. The two primary failure modes were a failed autoclave cylinder thermocouple or feed-through (fitting used to protect and seal the thermocouple wires through the autoclave shell). An instrument FLM explained that 95 percent of the thermocouple failures caused a high autoclave cylinder temperature reading and alarm.

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However, the failure mode for an autoclave cylinder thermoccuple feed-through was unpredictable. The failure of an autoclave cylinder thcmoroupk. feed-through results in

- either the grounding of a thermocouple wire to the autoclave shell or the autoclave cylinder thermocouple wires shorting together.

The inspector visually inspected one autoclave in Buildings X-342, X-343, and X-344, to verify that each autoclave cylinder thermocouple had an independent autoclave cylinder thermocouple feed-through for the two autoclave cylinder thermocouples. The inspector -

noted that neither of the autoclaves observed in Buildings X-343 nor X-344 used wire ties ,

to secure the wires leading to the autoclave cylinder thermocouples to the electrical terminal block foundation as noted on Autoclave No. 2 in Building X-342. However, the '-

inspector observed that the electrical thermocouple terminal blocks on autoclaves in Buildings X-343 or X 344 did not rotate. The inspector noted that the maintenance work . ,

package (MWP)s for the observed Building X-343 and X-344 autoclave cylinder i thermocouples did not address the use of wire ties for securing the autoclave cylinder thermocouple leads to the electrical terminal foundation,

c. Conclusions

- The inspector noted that the thermocouple installation was adequate except the electrical' terminel block on Autoclave No. 2 in Building X-342, which had only one foundation mounting screw. The autoclave cylinder thermocouple replacement MWPs lacked

[

' ' technical guidance for securing the autoclave cylinder thermocouple leads to the.

electrical terminal block foundation. In discussion with the inspector, an instrument FLM demonstrated a detailed and comprehensive knowledge of how the autoclave

- temperature instrumentation worked.

M1.2 - Taanina of Out-of-Service Eeuioment

a. Inspection ScopeISB025)

The inspector performed a walk down of Buildings X 342, X-343, and X-344 and observed severalinconsistencies regarding tagging out-of-service equipment.

b; Qhagrvations and Figlinga  !

Tcchnical Safety Requirement Section 3.0, " Administrative Controls," and SAR Sections 6.4, " Maintenance," and 6.5, " Operations," addressed the requirements for controlling inoperable or out-of-service equipment. The certificatee developed and used Procedure XP2-SH-IS1034, " Accident Prevention / Equipment Control Tags," Revision 0, to establish a uniform method of integrating accident prevention and equipment control-information through the use of a tagging program. Procedure XP2-SH-IS1034, " Accident Prevention / Equipment Control Tags," Revision 0, addressed, in part, the use of a

" Caution Tag" for special instructions that concemed the operatica, condition, status, etc.,

for pormanently installed systems / equipment. Section 5.5 of Procedure XP2-SH-IS1034, Accident Prevention / Equipment Control Tags," Revision 0, required that the facility

- custodian determine appropriate tag (s) for equipment that was out-of-service.

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The inspector noted that " Caution" tags used to identify autoclaves that were out-of-service were used inconsistently between Buildings X-342, X-343, and X-344. In

- discussions with the inspector, the Building X-344 FLM explained that equipment that wts out-of-service in Building X-344 was not tagged with a " Caution" tag. The Building X-344 FLM explained that the operator control log and a status board were used to control the start-up of out-of service equipment.- The inspector verified that the Building X-344 operator log and status board accurately identified the status of each autoclave in .

- Building X 344. - The Building X-343 FLM explained to the inspector that operators hung

" Caution" tags on Building X-343 equipment that was out-of-service. The mspector noted Building X-343 out-of-service autoclaves had " Caution" tags hung on the autoclave control panel with written information that described the reason for the " Caution" tag. In addition, the inspector observed that " Caution" tags were used to identify out-of-service equipment in Building X-342. On January 8, the Autoclave Building Manager issued a problem report (PR-PTS-98-00177) identifying inconsistent use of " Caution" tags On'-

January g, the inspector verifled that operators had placed " Caution" tags on all -

out-of-service equipment in Building X-344. In addition, the Work Control Manager -

explained to the inspector that the certificatee would change Procedure XP2-SH-IS1034,- R

" Accident Prevention / Equipment Control Tags," Revision 0, to ensure consistent use of '

, " Control" tagging (including ." Caution" tags) throughout the site.

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c. Conclusions The inspector identified an inconsistent use of tagging out-of-service equipment in -

Buildings X-342, X 343, and X-344. Additionally, through discussions with the Work 1 Control Manager, the inspector determined that out-of-service equipment tagging was inconsistent throughout the site. The inspector will monitor the certificatee's corrective i actions to ensure consistent use of " Control" tagging f6r out-of-service equipment (IFl 070 7002/98002-02).

M1.3 Imolementation of an Independent Verir,c.d;c,ri for Restoration of Leeds on Safety Systems Catenorized as "Q" items - .'

- a. Insoection Scoce (88025F The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding Problem Report PR-PTS 00162, submitted on January 8. . The problem report indicated that an instrument mechanic had found a defective autoclave cylinder thermocouple that had recently been replaced while performing an operational post maintenance test (PMT).-

b.- Observations and Findinas On January 7, instrument mechanics replaced the autoclave cylinder thermocouple for Autoclave No. 3 in Building X-343 using the guidance of MWP No. 9800662-01. The inspector reviewed MWP No. 9800662-01 and noted that the work in progress log

- identified that the instrument mechanic had switched the thermocouple leads on January 7. In discussion with the inspector, an instrument FLM explained that the recently replaced thermocouple leads were switched after the autoclave cylinder temperature instrumentation failed an operational PMT The instrument mechanic stated that the recently replaced thermocouple failed an operational PMT again, after the wires were switched. The inspector observed that the work in progress log for MWP 7

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' No. 9800662-01 identified that the autoclave cylinder temperature instrumentation did not pass an operational PMT until the recently replaced thermocouple was replaced with

- another thermocouple on January 8.

The inspector noted that MWP No. 9800662-01, " Autoclave Cylinder Temperature System," invoked Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumpers," which

_ required an independent verification to ensure that leads lifted, were properly re-landed.

= The inspector noted that the lifted lead and Jumper log, which documents that the .

Instrument mechanics had performed an independent verification of the lifted thermocouple leads, was not completed for MWP No. 9800662-01. The inspector

- reviewed several MWPs and discovered that most of the MWPS reviewed did not adequately complete the lifted lead and jumper log as required in the referenced -

Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumpers."_ The inspector noted the

following two MWPs where instrument inochanics did not complete the lifted lead and jumper logs when leads were lifted and re-landed; e On October 28,1997, MWP 9756547-01, " Autoclave Parent Cylinder Pressury analyzed a circuit, replaced wiring, and installed two circuit boards for Autocla x

< No. 3 in Building X-344.

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On September 10,1997, MWP 9748928-02, " Technetium Trap Replacement," ,

l replaced a transducer for Autoclave No. 3 in Building X-344. J

> The inspector reviewed several MWPs, and identified that the MWPs appropriately referenced Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumpers."

The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the certificatee concoming

Problem Report PR-PTS-97-05905 issued in July of 1997. Problem Report PR-PTS 05905 identified an electrician that lifted the wrong leads while troubleshooting a fan -

problem that resulted in a tripped cell. The inspector not'.J that the certificatee's corrective actions in response to the lifted lead error (Problem Report PR-PTS-97-05905) primarily addressed assurances that troubleshooting MWPs invoked the requirements of -

Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumpers."

Technical Safety Requirement 3.9,1 requires, in part, that procedures shall be implemented for activities described in Safety Analysis Report. Section 6.11, Appendix A -

of the Safety Analysis Report requires maintenance to be performed in accordance with .

approved procedures.

Approved Procedure XP2-GP-GP1030 , " Work Control Process," Revision 3, requires, in '

part, that troubleshooting work packages implement Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumpers," when leads are lifted during maintenance activities.

Section 7 of Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumpers," requires, in part, an independent verification for the restoration of leads on safety systems categorized as

• Q" items and that these maintenance activities be recorded on an Appendix A, Lifted Lead and Jumper Log Sheet.

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4-On September 10,1997, October 28,1997, and January 1,1998, the certificatee did not perform independent verifications for the restoration of leads on a safety system categorized as a *Q" item nor were these maintenance activities recorded on an Appendix A, Lifted Lead and Jumper Log Sheet. This a Violation (VIO 70-7002/98002-01).

c. Conclusions The inspector identified that instrument mechanics had not performed the required -

independent verification for the restoration of leads on safety systems categorized as "Q" items. This is a violation in addition, the inspector noted that ths certificatee's corrective action for Problem Report PR-PTS-97-05905 issued on June 26,1997, was ineffective in ensuring that electricians, electronic and instrument mechanic understood the requirements of performing an independent verification for the restoration of leads when required by MWPs.

M5 Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification M5.1 Trainina and Retrainina for Planners and System Enaineers

a. inspection Scope (88010)

The inspector reviewed the planners and system engineers work control training program.

b. Observation: end Findinas The inspector reviewed the training records for planners, and systems engineers. The inspector noted that work control training was not a required training course for planners and that records indicated that five planners had not received work control training. :n discussions with the inspector, the Work Control Manager explained that on January 15, 1998, work control training became a required training course for planners. The inspector verified this training course was now included as a required training course for planners and ieamed that on January 15,1998, the five planners who previously had not received the work control training course had completed the course. The certificatee requires system engineers to read a work control procedure training module. The inspector noted that planners and system engineers had no requirement for refresher work control training,

c. Conclusions The inspector noted that work control training for planners and system engineers was not a required training course. The certificatee acted promptly in adding work control training to tne planners' required training matrix and to train planners that had not previously been trained.

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111. Enaineerina E6 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities E6.1 Manaaement Oraanization and Controls

a. Inspection Scope (88005)

The inspector reviewed the autoclave cylinder thermocouple acceptance criteria with an electrical engineering supervisor,

b. Observation and Findinas The inspector noted a change in the type of autoclave cylinder thermocouple. In 3 discussions with the inspector, an electrical engineering supervisor explained that the new style of thermocouple was a magnetic mount type that met the requirements of Engineering Specification IS-0156-Z, Revision O. Engineering Specification IS-0156-Z, Revision 0, requires, in part, the completion of a safety system quality control inspection criteria form during acceptance inspection by the certificatee for safety systems categorized as " Quality" ("Q') or aucmented quality-nuclear criticality safety (AQ NCS) items. The inspector verified that the appropriate authority completed the safety system-quality control inspection criteria form for the new style thermocouples. The inspector ,

noted that the certificatee's recolving inspector issued a Disposition of Nonconforming item Report DR-QA-97-0396, on September 18,1997, which identified that the new thermocouples were ordered referencing a "Q" specification but not as a "Q" item. On September 22,1997, an electrical engineering supervisor technicallyjustified the use of the new style thermocouples based on the imposed inspection criteria used (Engineering Specification IS-0156-Z). In addition, the inspector verified that the new style thermocouple procurement criteria included Engineering Specification IS-0156-Z.

c. Conclusions T he inspector verified that documentary evidence included the appropriate authority to disposition the new style thermocouple.

Ill. Plant Support R1 Radiation Protection R1.1 As Low As Reasonably Achievable Procram

a. Inspection Scope (83822)

The inspector reviewed the certificatee's ALARA program through persennelinterviews and ALARA committee documentation,

b. Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the ALARA Committee meeting minutes for 1997, and discussed committee findings with the radiation project manager (RPM) and a health physics 10

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technician. The ALARA Committee meeting minutes documented signifmant' issues -

related to extemal and intomal employee doses, extemal and intamal dosimetry, .

personnel skin and clothing contaminations, environmental program reviews and subcommittee investigations of higher dose rates in specific plant areas. The inspector -

note that no certificatee employees received 100 milli-roentgens equivalent man (mrom) deep dose (administrative control limit) for any quarter in 1997, in discussions with the

- inspector, the RPM explained that the cylinder yard workers receive approximately 90 percent of the site _ exposure.'The inspector noted that the health physic records for the 113 cylinder yard workers Indicated an average of approximately 100 mrom dose for 1997. In addition, the inspector loamed that the process operators received only 5-10 mrom for 1997.

The inspector reviewed the status of the seven 1997, Portsmouth ALARA goals

highlighted in the Memorandum POEF-X338300-96-256, "1997, Portsmouth ALARA goal's Memo." The inspector noted that the 1997. ALARA goals proposed by the

_ subcommittee were relevant and addressed radiological protection issues.- The actions taken in response to the 1997, ALARA goals included work activity changes to reduce .

doses to uranium material handlers (UMH); th6 levelopment of emergency responder ,

l training that addressed reducing radiation exposure; and changing the personel protective '

L equipment (PPF) requirement:; for some work activities to reduce radiation exposure.

The inspector nded that the certificatee documented the completed goals.

The RPM discussed with the inspector the 1998,- ALARA goals. The RPM explaine J that L the 1998, ALARA goals focus on modifying maintenance activities and implementing the additional use of engineering controls to reduce radiation exposure.

c.: Conclusions The inspector concluded that the ALARA program reviewed met, and was conducted, in accordance with the requirements of SAR Section 5.3, R1.6 Postino and Labelina

a. Ing action Scope (83822)

The inspectcr observed posting and labeling in Buildings X-342, X-343, and X-344,-

where radioactive materiel was used. The inspector reviewed the certificatee's corrective action to ensure employees were knowledgeable on information contained in NRC Form 3.

b. Observations During facility tours, the inspector observed that radioactive material areas, airbome radioactive areas, and radiation areas were property maintained and posted as required by 10 CFR 20. Additionally, the inspector conducted interviews with various personnel about posting requirements. Responses demonstrated that personnel were knowledgeable of posting requirements and what actions were required to comply with

. the posted requirements. Labeling of radioactive materials and containers was consistent with 10 CFR Part 20, and the exemptions allowed by Section 5.3.1.7, " Posting and Labeling," of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).

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The RPM reviewed the certificatee's actions to ensure that a cylinder was correctly labeled and handled. NRC Inspection Report 97005, issued on September 10,1997, Identified a concem that an empty cylmdsr could exhibit a dose rate greater than 100 mrom/ hour at 30 centimeters (cm), until residual materials radioactively decay. The RPM explained to the inspector that Procedure XP4-HP-HO2104, " Radiological Work Permit,"

Revision 2 was issued on September 9,1997, to clarify the actions required if a cylinder survey exceeded 100 mrem at 30 cm. The inspector reviewed Procedure XP4-HP-HO2104,

• Radiological Work Permit," Revision 2 and verified the following:

e Section 6.9 changed to include radiation work permit (RWP) instructions if a cylinder survey exceeded 100 mrem at 30 cm.

• Section 6.11 changed to require HP coverage at all times if a cylinder survey .

exceeded 100 mrem at 30 cm.

M The inspector reviewed with the health physics manager (HPM) the corrective a -vn to ensure that the employees were aware of ti.e NRC Form 3, and the contents cor.alned within the document. NRC Inspection Report 97005, issued on September 10,1997, identified that employees had limited knowledge of the NRC Form 3. The HPM presented the inspector with a copy of the correspondence issued to every employee that included a NRC Form 3, and explained the purpose of the form, in addition, the inspector noted that the certificatee's weekly newsletter had addressed the purpose of the NRC Form 3, twice since September 10,1997,

c. - Conclusions The inspector noted no discrepancies,in the posting and labeling of areas. The certificatee took appropriate corrective actions to ensure employees were aware of the NRC Form 3, and required activities if a cylinder survey exceeded 100 mrem at 30 cm.

V. Mananement Meetinas X1 Exit Meetino Summary

'* The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the facility management on January 16,1998. The facility staff acknowledged the findings presented.

The certificatee did not identify any of the information discussed at the meet ,1g as proprietary.

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PARTIAL UST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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. Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS) 5

- *J. B. Morgan, Acting General Manager, Enrichment Plant Manager.

'M. Hasty, Engineering Manager

• S. M. Casto, Work Control Manager

' 'D. Rogers, Work Control Supervisor

• T. Boss, Work Control Specialist -

• R. Lipfert, Training and Procedure Manager

• D. Couser, Training Manager

• R. W. Gaston, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager

• D. Rockhold, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Specialist '

• R. Smith, Health Physics Manager

• C. Martin,' Health Physics Specialist

• C.- W. Sheward, Maintenance Manager I .* R. D. McDermott, Operations Manager -

United States Enrichment Corporation

• S. Martin, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Specialist

• L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager i Nuclear Renulatory Commission (NRC)

• D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector -

• Denotes those present at the January 16,1998, exit meeting. 1

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4 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88005 Management Organization and coetrols IP 83010 Operator Training / Retraining IP 88025 Maintenance and Surveillance Testing IP 83822 Radiation Protection Pros.am ITEMS OPENCD, CLOSID, AND DISCUSSED Opened 70 7002/98002 01 VIO Fallure to implement Procedure XP2-GP GP1033, " Lifted Leads and Jumperv," for *Q' Items 70 7002/98002 02 IFl Inconsiste.a tagging of out-of service equipment 910.Etd None Discussed None 14

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! LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable AQ NCS Augmented Quality Nucioar Criticality Safety CFR Code of Federal 8tegulations om centimeters DNMS Division of Nuclear Material and Safeguards FLM First Line Manager l HPM Health Physics Manager IFl inspection Followup item LMUS Lockheed Martin Utility Ser. ices mrom milli rcatgens equivalent man

, MWP Maintenance Wo* Pe.mit i- NOV Notice of Violation l NRC Nucisar Regulatory Commission

! POR- Public Document Room

! PMT Post Maintenance Test RPM Radiation Protection Manager RWP Radiation Work Permit SAR Safety Analysis Report TSR Technical Safety Requirement UF. Uranium Hexafluoride UMH Uranium Material Handler VIO Violation

• Q"

• Quality" 15 1

m