ML20116H677

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.2,Emergency Core Cooling Sys - ECCS Subsystems - T,Ts Bases 3/4.5.2 & 3/4.5.3,Emergency Core Cooling Sys -ECCS Subsystems

ML20116H677
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/09/1992
From:	CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML20116H642	List: ML20116H641 ML20116H653 ML20116H677
References
NUDOCS 9211130233
Download: ML20116H677 (20)

Text

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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 l Serial Number 2084 Attachment Page 7 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

, ECCS SUBSYSTEMS . T ,

'280'F v

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.S.2 Two inoependent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE iith each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump,

b. One OPERABLE low pressure injet. tion (LPI) pung,

c. One OPERABLE decay heat cooler, and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) on a safety injection signal and manually transferring suction to the cantainment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICASILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,

b. In the event the ECCS ;s actuated and irjects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report sha11 be prepared and submitted to the Coninission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 witnin 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the tctal accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated CPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve,(manugl, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwite secured in position, is in its correct position.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5 3 AmendmentNo.M 9211130233 921109 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P PDR

Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2084 l Attachment Page 8 5URVEILLANCE REOUIREMEh*TS (Continued)  ;

b. At least once per 18 months, or orier to operation af ter ECCS piping nas been drained by verifying that tne ECCS piping is full of water by venting tne ECCS pumo casings and cischarge piping hign points.

c. By a visual inspection wnich verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash clothing, etc.) is present in the contaiment which could be transported to the containment emergency sump and cause restriction of tne pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection sna'.1 be perfomed:

1. For all 4 cessible areas of the contaiment prior to establish-ing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. and

2. Of the areas effected within containment at the completion of each contaiment entry wnen CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the interlocks:

a) Close DH-11 and DH-12 and oeenergize the pressurizer neaters, if either OH-11 or DH-12 is open and a simulated reactor .

coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied. The interlock to close DH-il and/or DH-12 is not required if the valve is closed and 480 V AC power is disconnected from its motor operators, b) Prevent the opening of DH-11 and DH-12 when a simulated or actual reactor coolant systen pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied.

2. a) A visual inspection of the contaiment emergency sumo wnich verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restr1cted by debris and that the sumo components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

b) Verifying that on La Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Low-Low I

Level interlock tr17. the BWST Dutlet Valve HV-DH7A (HV-DH7B) automatically close in <75 seconds after the operator manually pushes the control switch to open the Containment Emergency ,

Sump Valve HV-DH9A (HV-DH9B) which should be verified to open in 175 seconds.

3. Verifying a total leak rate 1 20 gallons per hour for the LPI system at:

a) Normal operating pressure or hydrostatic test pressure of vl50 psig for those parts of the syste downstream of tne

. pump suction isolation valve, and b)' >45 psig for the piping from the contaiment emergency sump Tsolation valve to the pump suction isolation valve.

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/45-4 heendment No. J 25.12.H.77 /M

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Docket Nurber.50-346 Licensa Number NPF-3 Seria,1 Number-2084-

' Attachment Page 9 Insert to TS 4.5.2.d.2.b with the motor operators for-the BVST outlet isolation valves and the containment emergency sump recirculation valves energized, 8e 1

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D:cket Numoer 50-346

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• Li~ cense Number NPF-3 Scrial Numoer 2084 C' "" HIS PAGE PROVIDED

] EMEP. GEN:Y CORE 2:0L!N3 SYSTEMS d

! SURYE ILL ANCE :E '.'*REMENT: '" tievedi a

- 4 Verifying that a minimum cf 72 cubic fce: of solid granular trisodium ;her;. ate dode:ahydrate (T5P) is ::ntaines w; thin the

. TSP storage baskets.

5. Verify that a representative sample of TSP frem a TSP storage basket has a density of 1 53 lbs/cu ft.

5. Verifying that when a re;resentative sample of 0.25 0.05 les of T5P from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 5015 gallons of 180 1 10'F berated water from the BWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to 1 6 vithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. .

e. At least once per 18 r:0nths , during nr utdown', by

1. Verifying that ete automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its ce; rect position on a safety injection

. test signal.

2. Verifying that each HP! and LPI pump starts auto-matically upon receipt of a 5FAS test sign,al.

f. By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12 that assures the etetor coerators on valves DH-11 and DH-12 will not be flooded for at l

least 7 days following a LOCA:

1. At least once per 18 months.

2. After each opening of the watertight enclosure.

3. After any maintenance un or modification to the watertight enclosure which could affect its integrity.

9 By verifying the correct position of each machanical position stop for valves OH-14A and DM-14B.

1. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of the opening of the valves to their mechanical position step or following completion cf maintenance on the valve wnen the LPI system is required to be OPERABLE

2. At.least enc'e per 18 months.

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!i it il CAV15-BE55E, UN!T 1 3/4 5-5 Amencment No. ."'. 40

Docket Number 50-346 IU License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 2084 lg N WL h Attatnment y q ,

EMERGENCY CORE C00l!NG SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)

h. By perfoming a flow balance test, during shutdown, following

i. completion of modifications to the HPI or LPI subsyste.s that 1 alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:

HP! System - Single Pump Injection Leg 1-1 1 375 gpm at 400 psig*

Injection Leg 1-2 1 375 gpm at 400 psig*

Injection Leg 2-1 1 375 gpm at 400 psig*

Injection Leg 2-2 1 375 gpm at 400 psig*

LPI System - Single Pump Injection Leg 1 1 2650 gpm at 100 psig**

Injection Leg 2 , 1 2650 gpm at 100 psig** -

l Reactor coolant pressure at the HPI nozzle in the reactor coolant l pump discharge.

• • Reactor coolant pressure at the core flood nozzle on the reactor i vessel.

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 5-Sa Amendment No. 20

'. Docket Nunoer 50-346 l License. Number NPF-3 1 Serial Numoer 2084 a Attacnment Ubfh}* y g y l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTIMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS . 7 < E80*F LIMITING CO2TTION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minir:um, one ECC3 subsystem c:x:: prised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE decay heat (DH) pump,

b. One OPERABLE DH cooler, and

c. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) and manually transferring suction to the

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containnent emergency sump during the recirculation phase e#

operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of the DH pump, the DH cooler or the flow path from the BWST, restore at least one ECCS suosystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or iaaintain the Reactor Coolant System Tavg less than 280'F by use of alternate heat removal methods, b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and {

submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE K!0UIREMENTS

4. 5'. 3 fhe ECCS subsysta=s shall be de::=nstrated OPERAELE per the applicable Surveillance Require:: ants of 4.5.2. ,

I DAVIS-BESSE, tTMIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amenament No.M 57 l

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9 Docket Nurber 50-346

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License Number NPF-3 @ j Serial Number 2084 Attachment h(fQ 5f g h sBU W gg CONTAINP.ENT SYSTEtG

• 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

0NTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM lMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two indepencent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE dith each spray system capable of taking suction from the BWST on a

ontainment spray actuation signal and manually transferring suction to the containment emergency sump during the recirculation pnase of apera tion.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

. ACTION:

Jith one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at lea'st HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inopert.ble spray system

• to OPERABLE status within the next. 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUT 00'4N ditt% the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. .

p SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each con,tainment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, pcrer operated or automati::) in the flow path thst .

is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to it correct position on a containment spray test signal.

2. Veri'ying that each spray pump starts automatically on a SFAS. test signal.

DAYls-BISSE,' UNIT 1 3/4 6-11 Amencment No. 36

Docket 14unber 50-346

License Number flPF-3 l Serial 11umoer 2084 l l ML h g

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[g Attacheent CO.;T Al';*>ENT SYSTEMS SURVEltt ANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)

c. At least once per 18 mr,nths by ve.-itying a total leak rate 1 20 gallons per hour for the fystem at:

1. Normal operating ortisure or a hydrostatic test pressure of i 150 ps4 #c " hose parts of the system downstream of

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the pump sucoan isolation valve, and

2. 1 45 psig for the piping from the centainment emergency sump isolation valve to the pump suction isolation valve.

d. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through 2ach spray he6 der and verifying each spray no!Zie is tnobstructed.

DAylS-BE5SE. UNIT 1 3/4 6-12

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2iBE5!!GP THIS PABE PROVIDE

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FORlWORMl0N QW p .b EP.ERGENCY CORE C00t1!1G SYSTEP.S (ECCS)

BASES 3,/4 . 5.1 CORE FLOODifiG TANKS The OPERABILITY of each core flooding tank ensures that a sufficient volumr af borated water will be imediately forced into the reactor vessel in thc esent the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the tanks.

This initial surge of water into the vessel provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The int..ts on volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that analysis are met. used for core flooding tank injection in the safety the assumptions The tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be "ooerating bypasses" in th? conttat of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function b: removed automatically whenever pemissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is rr.quireti The limits for operotion with a core flooding tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring centurrent with failure of an additional tank which may result in unacceptable pea' cladding temoera-tures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be imediately opened, the full capability of one tank is not available and prompt action is required required. to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 'ECLS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems with RCS average temperature > 280'F ensures that sufficient emergency cor; cooling caoability will be available in the event cf a LOCA assuming the loss of -

one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating .in conjunction with the core flooding *:aks is capable cf supplying. sufficient core cooling to maintain the peak cladding tempera-tures within acceptable limits for all postulated breck si:es ranging from the double ended break of the largest RC!, cold leg pipe downward, in sedition, each ECCS subsystem provides long tem core - ling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period..

davis 3 ESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 b-1 knenement No. 2 0 y n.g +

1 (acket Hu ber 50 146 -

l License Nunber NPF-3 '

' Serial Nunber 2084 Attachment Page 16 ADDill0NAL CHAfG[$ PR[WOUILt PROPOS D BY L[il[R EMERCENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SMill No. IB F7 Date ID 'M9 BASES Vith the RCS temperature belov 280'F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is  !

acceptr.ble without single f ailure consideration on the basis of the

. stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. ,

'..te Lurveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures, that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in he safety analyses are set and that subsystea OPERABILITY is maintained.

The decay heat reeoval system leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system during the recirculation phase of the low pressure injection vill not be exceeded.

Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flov balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flovs vill be main-tained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injectin point is necessary to (1) prevent total pump flov from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flov split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used ir. the 'ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flov to all injection points equal to or above that assua*d in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 BORATED VATER STORAGE TANK

~ - lNSt-g7 The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BVST) as part of the BCCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated vater it available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on BVST minimum volume and baron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient vater is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flov to the core, and 2) the reactot vill remain st.beritical in the cold condition following mixing of the BVST and the RCS vater volumes with all control rods inserted except for the mesi reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyces.

The bottom 4 inches of the borated water storage tank are not available, and the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume. '

The limits on water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pH value of )

batveen 7.0 and 11.0 of the solution sprayed within the containment after a design basis accioent. The pH band minimizes the evolutaon of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and c smponents.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 i m cment No. /p, M $

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Docket thober' $0-346 ';

Licenst. ' Humber NPF-3

. Serial Number 2084 i j Attachment l Page 17 ,

i Insert.to TS E.a.ves 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 Borated Vater Storage Tank (BVST) outlet isolation valves Dil-7A and Dil-7B are d'-energized during H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of'a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BVST.

Re-energizat'on of valves DH-7A and Dd-7B is permitted on an.

Intermittent basis during H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be ,

taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls. j i

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Docket Nu ber 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial ihusber 2084 P e1 s Lu CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE '

' The iimitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the  ;

containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative l pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.5 psi 1 and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure j of 40 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a LOCA event is 37 psig. l The limit of 1 psig for initial positive containment pressure wiil limit the total pressure to 3B psig uhich is less than the design pressure and '

is consistent with the safety analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that t the overall containment everage air temperature does not exceed the '

initial temperature conduion assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA.

3/4.G.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the contain-menc steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 3B psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.1.7 CnNTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM i The limitation on use of the Contairnent Purge and Exhaust System limits the time this system may be in operation with the reactor coolant system tanperature above 200*F. This restriction minimizes the time that a direct open path would exist from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere and consequently reduces the probability that an accident dose would exceed 10 CFR 100 guideline values in the event of a LOCA occurring coincident with purge system operation. The use of this system is therefore restricted to non-routine usage not to exceed 90 I hours in any consecutive 365 day period which is equivalent to approximately 1% of tne total possible yearly unit operating time.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERAB11.!TY of the containment spray systen ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No.135

Docket Number 50-346 Licenn Number NPT-3 Serial Number 2084 Attachment Page 19 i

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed f:r the system during tne recirculation phase will not be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM N IWST~ A and The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintaineo within limits during normal operation, and 2) adeouate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA concitions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outsice environment in the event of a release cf radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressuri:ation of the containment. Containment isolation within the required time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the envirorynent will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA, Containment isolation valves and their required isolation times are addressed in the USAR. The opening of a closed inoperable containment isolation valve o.,

an intermittent basis during plant operation is permitted under administrative control. Operating procedures identify those valves which may be toened under f { ,

administrative control as well as the safety precautions which must be taten when opening valves under such controls, i

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 -Amendment No. J35, ft/

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Docket Number 50-346

, License Number.NPF-3

. Cetlal Number 2084 Attachment Page 20 Insert A to TS Bases 3/4.6.2.1 Dorated Vater Storage Tank (BVST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and Dil-78 are de-energized during H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BVST.

Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-7B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

Insert B to TS-Bases 3/4.6.2.1 Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a fire, which could i result in draining the Borated Vater Storngr Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of this vater source for normal plant shutdown. Re-energization of valves DH-9A and DH-9B is permitted on an intetmittent basis during H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 unuer administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

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Docket Number 50-346'

.Licentie Number NPF-3 Serial Nurober 2084 '

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Attachment u Page 21 1

FORINFORMION DW f 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL 5 si

,,6.2.2 FACILITY STAFF 1

a. Each on duty shif t shall be composed of at least the minimum shif t crew composition shown in Table 5.2-1.

b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control panel area when fuel is in the reactor.

c. At least two licensed Operators, one of which has a Senic,r Reactor Operator license, shall be present in the control room while in MODES 1. 2. 3. or 4.

d. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures sh611 be on site when fuel is in the reactor #.

e. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior React r Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handlir c who has no other concurrent responsi-bilities during this operation.

f. A site Fire Brigade of at least 5 members shall be maintained onsite at all tim 2s#. The Fire Brigade shall not include 3 I members of the minimum shif t crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit and any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency.

g. The Manager-Plant Operations shall either hold or htye held a senior reactor operator's license on a pressurited water reactor, The Operations Superintendent shall hold a senior.

. rear. tor operator license for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Statien. -c ~ - , - - - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ -

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1. The individual qualified in radiation protection procedures and the Fire Crigade Composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accomodate unexpected absence, provided irmediate action is taken to fill the required positic.is.

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 6-la Amendment No. S.JE.98.JJ5.135.737 (next page is 6 2) 142

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Mdas4M g ! Qs @.

Docket Number 50 346 License Number NPF-3 Tlyl l U E!RF"'"' FORINKRE!0N OM i

TAl'.I 6. 2 1 MJXIMtM SHITT CREV C0205fTICWf

. LICENSE APPLICABLE 1900ES CATEGORY 1,2,366 5&o 50L 2 le 1 4

OL 2 1 Non-Licensed 2 1 Shift Technical Advisor 1 None Required

• Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Openter Limited to Tual Bantling supervising CORE ALTI2ATIONS. '

1. 5hif t crew composition may be less than the =M- requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is order to accommodata unaspectW absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shif t crew composttion to within tha minime requirements '

of Table 6.2 1.

l l- DAVIS-RESSE, WIT 1 6-4 Amendment No. 47/ 137 '

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Docket Nunoer 50-346 License Nu2ber HPF-3 f** S2 rial Nu Ler 2M4 Attachsent

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'. Docket Number 50-346

' License Number NPF-3 Serial Nunber 2084 Attachment .

Page 24 Docket Number 50-346 .

License Number HPF-3

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Page 1 FORINFORMATION DNLY .

, 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)_

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BASES .

3/4.5.1 CORE FLOODING TANXS The OPERABILITY of each core flooding tank ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be imediately forced intoL the reactor vessel in the evant the RC5 pressure falls below the pressure of the tanks.

This initial surge of water into the vessel provides the initial co:, ling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on volume, boren concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for core flooding tank injection in the safety analysis are met.

The tank power operated isolatien valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses" in t's context of IEEE Std, 279-1971, which requirvs that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

l The limita for operation with a core floodtng tank inoperable for i

any reason exce.pt an isolation valve closed minimizes the tire exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an-t additional tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera.

tures. If a closed isolation valve cannt be imediately opened, the l full capability of one tank is not available and prompt action is

! recuired to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5;3 'ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent dCS subsystems with RCS average temperature > 280'F ensures that sufficient emergency cora cooling cac4bility will be available in the event of a '.0CA assuming the loss of one subsysteln through sny single failure consideration. Either subsystem l operating in conjunction with the core flooding tanks is capable et l-supplying. sufficient core cooling to maintain the peak cladding temoera-tures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg ripe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling cacability l in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery. period.

DAVIS SESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amenc znt No. 2 3

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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Seria1 Number 2084 Attachment Page 25 Docket Numeer 50-346 License Nuncer NPF.3 TW!S PM "

PMVIDED

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Serial Nunoer 1817 Attacament 1  !

Page 2 iEXERCIMCT COP 1,C00tJNC SYSTEMS BASES Vith the RCS temperature below 280'F. one CFEIARLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on tne basis of the i

stable reacti'nty condition of the reactor and toe Jimited core cooling tequitements.

The surveillance Seguirements provided to ensure OPERL"f.:TT of each component ensuras. that, at a miniaua, the assasptions cod in the -

safety analyses are set and that supeysten 0FER&BILT!T is maintained.

The cecay heat resoul 7ysten laak rate survei* dance requirenents assure that the leakage rates assumed for the systes during the recirculation phase of the low pressure injection vill not be exceeded.

Surveillance renuirements ter thrrttle valu hosition stops and flov balance testtng provide assurance that preoct ZCCS flows vill be main.

tained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenante tef proper flow resistance

i. and pressure drop in the piping systes to aach injection potat is necessary tot (1) prevent total pump flov from exceeding r nout conditions vnen the.syntas is in its minimum resistance config. ration.

(2) provide the proper flov split between injection paints in accordance

<itn tne assumptions used in the ECCC-LOCA analyses. and'(3) provide an t.cceptable level of total ECCS flov to all inf ection points equal to or l assumed in the ECCS.LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.e 50 RATED VATER STORACE TANK The OPERABILITY of the borated vater storage tank (BYST) as part of the l ECCS ansures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for l' injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on BVST minimus volume and boren concentration ensure that 1) sufficient vater is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core. and 2) the ructor vill remain subtritical in the cold condition following mixjng of the SYST and the RCS vater volumes with all control rods inserted except ter the most reactive control assembly.

L These sasuantions are consistent with tha'LOCA analyses.

The -bottos 4 inches of the borated vater storage tank are not available, and the instrumentatica is calibrated to reflect the available volume.

The limits on water volume, and t.Jron concentration ensure a pH value o' between 7.0 and 11.0 of the sclution sprayed within the containment I after a design basis accident. Tne pH band aihisises the evtilution tef '-

1 iodine and minimites the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrostoc crac11er on aeenanical systems and components.

1 DAVIS-BESSE. tNIT 1 B 3/4_5-7 A==aa==nt No. Zh 123 q

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• Docket NJmber 50-346 1,1 cense 14 umber NPF-3 .. p 3 j Uetlal 11 umber 2084 4 Attachment a I.

FOR NFORMATION DNLY Docket Number 50-346

, License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1917 Attacament 1 Page 3 Insert A Concainment Emergency Susp Recirculation Valves DB-9A and DB-98 are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 to preclude postulated Ndvertent I opening of the valves in the event of a control Room fire, which could result in draining the Borated Vater Storage Tank to the Containment Essrgency Susp and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown. Re-energisation of DR-9) and DR-9B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 under .dainistrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautier. '

.ch must be taken when re-energining these valves under such controls.

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