ML20127H051
| ML20127H051 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1985 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127H030 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8506260193 | |
| Download: ML20127H051 (17) | |
Text
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.i e ATTAC M NT 1 Proposed Change to Appendix A Technical Specifications to Operating License DPR-29 Revised Page: 3.5/4.5-8 3.5/4.5-9 3.5/4.5-9a 3.5/4.5-16a
'3.5/4.5-17 3.5/4.5-18 3.5/4.5-19 8506260193 850322 PDR ADOCK 05000254 p, PDR 9884N
ATTAC E NT 2 Proposed Change to Appendix A Technical-Specifications to Operating License DPR-30 Revised Page: 3.5/4.5-8 3.5/4.5-9 3.5/4.5-9a 3.5/4.5-15a 3.5/4.5-16 3.5/4.5-17 3.5/4.5-18
'9884N
, j <
r 1
t ATTACWENT 3 f
Evaluation of Sionificant Hazards Consideration Description of Amendment Request
. . A sump pump was installed in each Rm vault which now controls floor and equipment drainage from each vault. The previous drainage paths were permanently capped. Portions of Sections 3.5 and 4.5 were revised to reflect these modifications.
Basis for Proposed No Sionificant Hazards Consideration Determination '
, . Installation of the sump pumps in the Rm vaults improved on the previous means of collecting floor and equipment leakage inside the vault. i Testing required to insure the vaults can withstand flood conditions was retained. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated nor create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of.
safety. Accordingly, Commonwealth Edison has determined that this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
3 i
9884N
QUAD-CITIES DPR-29
- 2. The discharge pipe pressure for the 2. Following any period where the systems in Specification 3 5.G.1 LPCI mode of the RHR or core i
shall be maintained at greater than spray ECCS have been out of 40 psig and less than 90 psig, if service and drained for mainte-pressure in any of these systems is nance, the discharge piping of less than 40 psig or greater than 90 the Inoperable system shall be psig, this condition shall be alarmed vented from the high point prior In the control room and immediate to the return of the system to corrective action taken. If the dis- service.
f charge pire pressure is not within i
these limits in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the_ 3. Whenever the HPCI or RCIC system occurrence, an orderly shutdown shall is lined up to take suction from be initiated, and the reactor shall the torus, the discharge piping be in a cold shutdown condition with- of the HPCI and RCIC shall be in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s- af ter initiation. vented from the high point of
- the system and water flow observed on a monthly basis.
- 4. The pressure switches which monitor the discharge lines and the discharge of the fill system pump to ensure that they
- are full shall be functionally tested every month and call-brated every 3 months. The pressure switches shall be. set to alarm at a decreasing pres-sure of > 40 psig and an in-creasing pressure of 3,90 psig.
- H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection
- 1. The systems installed to prevent or 1. The following surveillance
- mitigate the consequences of flooding requirements shall be observed to of the condensate pump room shall be assure that the condensate pump operable prior to. startup of the room flood protection is reactor. operable.
i 2. The condenser pit water level switches a. The piping and electrical
[
shall trip the condenser circulating water pumps and alarm in the control penetrations, bulkhead doors, and submarine doors room If water level in the condenser for the vaults -containing pit exceeds a level of 5 feet above the RHR service water pumps the pit floor. If a failure occurs in and diesel generator cooling one of these trip and alarm circuits, pumps shall be checked during the failed circuit shall be immediately each operating cycle by pres-placed in a trip condition and reactor surizing to 15 1 2 psig and operation shall be permissible for the checking for leaks using a following 7 days unless the circuit is soap bubble solution. The sooner made operable. criteria for acceptance shall be no visible leakage through the soap bubble solution.
I Amendment 66 3 5/4.5-8
QUAD-CITIES DPR-29
- 3. If Specification 3.5.H.1 and 2 cannot b. During each operating cycle, be met, reactor startup shall not . the following flood pro-commence or if operating an orderly tection level switches'shall shutdown shall be initiated and the be functionally tested to-reactor shall be in a cold shutdown give the following control condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. room alarms:
1
- 1) turbine building equip- l ment drain sump high level
- 2) vault high level
- c. The RHR service water vault sump pump discharge check valves outside the vault shall be tested for integrity, using clean demineralized water, at least once per operating cycle,
- d. The condenser pit 5-foot trip circuits for each channel shall be checked once a month. A logic system functional test shall be per-formed during each refueling outage,
. During steady-state power operation, the Daily during steady-state opera-average linear heat generation rate tion above 25% rated thermal power, (APLHGR) of all the rods in any fuel the average planar LHGR shall be assembly, as a function of average planar dete rmined.
exposure, at any axial location, shall not exceed the maximum average planar J. Local LHGR LHGR shown in Figure 3.5-1. If at any time during operation it is determined Daily during steady-state power by normal surveillance that the limiting operation above 25% of. rated value for APLHGR is being exceeded, thermal power, the local LHGR action shall be initiated within 15 shall be determined.
minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR is not' returned in within the prescribed limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition with-in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation
~Is within the prescribed limits.
Amendment 61 3 5/4.5-9
. QUAD-CITIES ppg _29
'Ji Local LHGR~
During steady-state power operation, the linear, heat' generation rate (LHGR) of any rod in any fuel assmebly at any axial location shall not exceed the maximum allowable LHGR. If at any time during operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for LHGR is being exceeded, action shall be Initiated within 15 minutes-to restore operation to within the prescribed limits.
,1f the LHGR is not returned to 1
3.5/4.5-9a Amendment
a QUAD-CITIES ,
-The watertight bulkhead and submarine doors and the penetration seals for pipes I and cables penetrating the vault walls and ceilings have been designed to with-stand the maximum flood conditions.. To assure that their installation is adequate for maximum flood conditions, a method of testing each seal has been devised.
l i-In order to test an electrical penetration or pipe seal, compressed air is I supplied to a test connection and the space between the fittings is pressurized to approximately 15 psig. The outer faces are then tested for leaks using a
> soap bubble solution.
L 5
1 Amendment 40 3 5/4.5-16a
o DPR-29 QUAD-CITIES in order to test the submarine doors, a test frame must be installed around each door. The frame is then pumped to a pressure of approximately 15 psig and held to test for leaktightness. The watertight bulkhead doors are tested by pressurizing the volume between the double gasket seals.to approximately 15 psig. The gasket seal area is inspected using a soap bubble solution. Each RHR service water vault contains a sump, which will collect any floor or equipment leakage Inside the vault. A sump pump will automatically start on high level in the sump, and will pump the water out of the vault, via 2 dis-charge check valves outside the vault to the service water discharge pipe.
A composite sampler is located on the sump discharge line. A radiation monitor is also located on the service water discharge. The sump discharge ~ water is not expected to be contaminated, and any in-leakage to the vault is prevented by 2 check valves. Surveillance of these check valves is performed each 1 operating cycle to assure their integrity. The previously installed bed-plate drains to the turbine building equipment drain sump have been capped off pe rmanentl y.
A level switch set at a water level of 6 inches is located inside each vault.
Upon actuation, the switch alarms in the control room to notify the operator of trouble in the vault. The operator will also be aware of problems in the vaults / condensate pump room if the high-level alarm on the equipment drain sump is not terminated in a reasonable amount of time.
A system of level switches has been Installed in the condenser pit to indicate and control flooding of the condenser area. The following switches are installed:
Level Function
- a. I foot (one switch) alarm, low water level
- b. 3 feet (one switch) alarm, high water level
- c. 5 feet (two redundant alarm and circulating water switch pairs) pump trip Level (a) Indicates water in the condenser pit from either the botwell or the circulating water system. Level (b) is above the hotwell capacity and Indicates a probable circulating water failure.
AB011dmont 3 5/4.5-17
QUAD CITIES OPR-29 Snould the switches at levels (a) and (b) fail or the operator fail to trip the circulating water pumps on alarm at level (b), the actuation of either level switch pair at level (c) shall trip the circulating water pumps automatically and alarm in the control room. These redundant level switch pairs at level (c) are designed and installed to IEEE 279, " Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection System". As the circulating water pumps are tripped, either manually or automatically at level (c) of 5 feet, the maximum water level reached in the condenser pit due to pumping will be at elevation 568 feet 6 inches elevation (10 feet above condenser pit floor elevation 558 feet 6 inches; 5 feet plus an additional 5 feet attributed to pump coastdown).
In orcer to prevent the RFil service water pump motors and diesel-generator cooling water pump motors from overheating a vault cooler is supplied for each pump. Each vault cooler is designed to maintain the vault at a maximum of 1050F temperature during operation of its respective pump. For example, if diesel generator cooling water pump 1/2-3903 starts, its cooler also starts and maintains the vault at 1050F by removing heat supplied to the vault by the motor of pump 1/2-3903. If, at the same time that pump 1/2-3903 is in operation, RHR service water pump IC starts, its cooler will also start and compensate for the added heat supplied to the vault by the 1C pump motor keeping the vault at 1050F, Each of the coolers is supplied with cooling water from its respective pump's discharge line. After the water has been passed through the cooler it returns to its respective pump's suction line. The cooling water quantity needed for each cooler is approximately 1% to 5% of the design flow of the pumps so that the recirculation of this small amount of heated water will not affect pump or cooler operation.
Operation of the fans and coolers is required during shutdown and thus additional surveillance is not required.
Verification that access doors to each vault are closed following entrance by personnel is covered by station operating procedures.
The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow and only a few control rods are moved daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.
Average Planar LHGR At cort. thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, operating plant experience and thermal hydraulic analyses indicate that the resulting average planar LHGR is below the maximum average planar LHGR by a considerable margin; therefore, evaluat!on of the average planar LHCR below this power level is not necessary. The daily requirement for calculating average plant LHGR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient, since power distribution shifts are slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes.
3.5/4.5-18 Amendment ib. 61
QUAD CITIES DPR-29 9
se Local LHGR Tne LHGR as a function of core height shall be checked daily during reactor operation at greater than or equal to 25% power to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. A limiting LHCR value is precluded by a considerable margin when employing any permissible control rod pattern below 25%
rated thernal power. .
Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)
At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience and thermal hydraulic analysis indicate that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. With this low void content, any inadvertent core flow increase would only place operation in a more conservative mode relative to MCPR.
The daily requircraent for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient, since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod' changes. In addition, the Kr correction applied to the LCO provides margin for' f'Iow increases from low flows.
3.5/4.5-19 Amendment No. 61 6312N/0114N
QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 e 2. The discharge pipe pressure for the 2. Following any period where the systems in Spectfication 3 5.G.1 LPCI mode of the RHR or core shall be maintained at greater than spray ECCS have been out of 40 psig and less than 90 psig. If service and drained for mainte-
-pressure in any of these systems is nance, the discharge piping of less than 40 psig or greater than 90 the Inoperable system shall be psig, this condition shall be alarmed vented from the high point prior in the control room and immediate to the return of the system to corrective action taken. If the dis- service.
charge pipe pressure is not within
-these limits in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the 3. Whenever the HPCI or RCIC system occurrence, an orderly shutdown shall is lined up to take suction from be initiated, and the reactor shall the torus, the discharge piping be in a cold shutdown condition with- of the HPCI and RCIC shall be in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter initiation. vented from the high point of the system and water flow observed on a monthly basis.
- 4. The pressure switches which monitor the discharge lines and the discharge of the fill system pump to ensure that they are full shall be functionally tested every month and call-brated every 3 months. The pressure switches shall be set to alarm at a decreasing pres-sure of > 40 psig and an in-creasing pressure of < 90 psig.
H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection
- 1. The systems installed to prevent or 1. The following surveillance mitigate the consequences of flooding requirements shall be observed to of the condensate pump room shall be assure that the condensate pump operable prior to, startup of the room flood protection is reactor. operable.
- 2. The condenser pit water level switches a. The piping and electrical shall trip the condenser circulating penetrations, bulkhead water pumps and alarm in the control doors, and submarine doors room if water level in the condenser for the vaults containing pit exceeds a level of 5 feet above the RHR service water pumps the pit floor. If a failure occurs in and diesel generator cooling one of these trip and alarm circuits, pumps shall be checked during the failed circuit shall be immediately each operating cycle by pres-placed in a trip condition and reactor surizing to 15 + 2 prig and operation shall be permissible for the checking for leaks using a following 7 days unless the circuit is soap bubble solution. The sooner made operable. criteria for acceptance shall be no visible leakage through the soap bubble soluttu.
Amendment 60 3 5/4.5-8
QUAD-CITIES DPR-30
- 3. If Specification 3 5.H'.1 and 2 cannot be met, reactor startup shall not b. During each operating cycle, commence or if operating an orderly the following flood pro-shutdown shall be initiated and the tection level switches shall reactor shall be in a cold shutdown be functionally tested to condition withlar24 hours. -# give the following control r room alarms:
1
=
I) turbine building equip-ment drain sump high level
- 2) vault high level
- c. The RHR service water vault sump pump discharge check valves outside the vault shall be tested for integrity, using clean demineralized water, at least once per operating cycle.
l
- d. The condenser pit 5-foot trip circuits for each channel shall be checked once a month. A logic system functional test shall be per-formed during each refueling outage.
.During steady state power operation, the
' average linear heat generation rate Daily during steady state opera-(APLHGR) of all the rods in any fuel tion above 25% rated thermal power.
l assembly, as a function of average planar the average planar LHGR shall be exposure, at any axial location shall determined.
l not exceed the maximum average p,lanar J. Local LHGR LHGR shown in Figure 3.5-1. If at any time during operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting Daily during steady-state power r
value for APLHGR is being exceeded, operation above 25% of rated L thermal power, the local LHGR action shall be initiated within 15 shall be determined.
minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR is
)
not returned in within the prescribed limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition with-in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits.
Amendment e
51 '
T -
DPR-30 QUAD-CITIES f
J. Local LHGR
-During steady-state power operation, the linear heat generation rate (LHGR) of any rod in any fuel assmebly at any axial location shall not exceed the maximum allowable LHGR. If at any time during operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for LHGR is being exceeded, action shall be Initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits.
If the LHGR Is not returned to 3.5/4.5-9a Amendment.
QUAD-CITIES ,
DPR-30 The watertight bulkhead and submarine doors and the penetration seals for pipes l and cables penetrating the vault walls and ceilings have been designed to with-stand the maximum flood conditions. To assure that their installation is adequate for maximum flood conditions, a method of testing each seal has been devised.-
l In order to test an electrical penetration or pipe seal, compressed air is I supplied to a test connection and the space between the fittings is pressurized to approximately 15 psig. The outer faces are then tested for leaks using a soap bubble solution.
Amendment 3.5/4.5-15a
DPR-30 QUAD-CITIES in order to test the submarine doors, a test frame must be installed around each door. The frame is then pumped to a pressure of approximately 15 psig and held to test for leaktightness. The watertight bulkhead doors are tested by pressurizing the volume between the double gasket seals to approximately 15 psig. The gasket seal area is inspected using a soap bubble solution. Each RHR service water vault contains a sump, which will collect any floor or equipment leakage inside the vault. A sump pump will automatically start on high level in the sump, and will pump the water out of the vault, via 2 dis-charge check valves outside the vault to the service water discharge pipe.
A composite sampler is located on the sump discharge line. A radiation monitor is also located on the service water discharge. The sump discharge water is not expected to be contaminated, and any in-leakage to the vault is prevented ,
by 2 check valves. Surveillance of these check valves is performed each '
operating cycle to assure their integrity. The previously installed bed-plate drains to the turbine building equipment drain sump have been capped off pe rmanent ly.
A level switch set at a uater level of 6 inches is located inside each vault.
Upon actuation, the switch alarms in the control room to notify the operator of trouble in the vault. The operator will also be aware of problems in the vaults / condensate pump room if the high-level alarm on the equipment drain sump is not terminated in a reasonable amount of time.
A system of level switches has been installed in the condenser pit to indicate and control flooding of the condenser area. The following switches are i installed: ,
Level Function
- a. I foot (one switch) alarm, low water level
- b. 3 feet (one switch) alarm, high water level
- c. 5 feet (two redundant alarm and circulating water switch pairs) pump trip Level (a) indicates water in the condenser pit from either the hotwell or the circulating water system. Level (b) is above the hotwell capacity and indicates a probable circulating water fallure.
i i
l Amendment 3.5/4.5-16
a QUAD CITIES DPR-30 Should the switches at levels (a) and (b) fall or the operator fall to trip the circulating water pumps on alarm at level (b), the actuation of either level switch pair at level (c) shall trip the circulating water pumps automatically and alarm in the control room. These redundant level switch pairs at level (c) are designed and installed to IEEE 279, " Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection System". As the circulating water pumps are tripped, either manually or automatically at level (c) of 5 feet, the maximum water level reached in the condenser pit due to pumping will be at elevation 568 feet 6 inches elevation (10 feet above condenser pit floor elevation 558 feet 6 inches; 5 feet plus an additional 5 feet attributed to pump coastdown).
In order to prevent the RHR service water pump motors and diesel-generator cooling water pump motors from overheating a vault cooler is supplied for each pump. Each vault cooler is designed to maintain the vault at a maximum of 105 0F temperature during operation of its respective pump. For example, if diesel generator coolin water pump 1/2-3903 starts,itscooleralsostartsandmaintainsthevaultat105gF by removing heat supplied to the vault by the motor of pump 1/2-3903. If, at the same time that pump 1/2-3903 is in operation, RFft service water pump 1C starts, its cooler will also start and compensate for the added heat supplied to the vault by the 1C pump motor keeping the vault at 1050F.
Each of the coolers is supplied with cooling water from its respective pump's discharge line. After the water has been passed through the cooler it returns to its respective pump's suction line. The cooling water quantity needed for each cooler is approximately 1% to 5% of the design flow of the pumps so that the recirculation of this small amount of heated water will not affect pump or cooler operation.
Operation of the fans and coolers is required during shutdown and thus additional surveillance is not required.
Verification that access doors to each vault are closed following entrance by personnel is covered by station operating procedures.
The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow and only a few control rods are moved daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.
! Average Planar LHGR At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, operating plant experience and thermal hydraulic analyses indicate that the resulting average planar LHGR is below the maximum average planar LHGR by a considerable margin; therefore, evaluation of the average planar LHGR below this power level is not necessary. The daily requirement for calculating average plant LHCR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient, since power distribution shifts are slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes.
3.5/4.5-17 Amendment No. 51
QUAD CITIES DPR-30 Local LHGR The LHGR as a function of core height shall be checked daily during reactor operation
.at greater than or equal to 25% power to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. A limiting LHGR value is precluded by a considerable margin when employing any permissible control rod pattern below 25%
rated thermal power.
Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)
At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the moderator void content will be very small.
For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience and thermal hydraulic analysis indicate that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. With this low void content, any inadvertent core flow increase would only place operation in a more conservative made relative to MCPR.
The daily required for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient, since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been siginficant power or control rod changes. In addition, the K provides margin for flow increases from low flows.r correction applied to the LCO 3.5/4.5-18 Amendment No. 51 6312N/Oll4N