ML20133H605

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Staff Requirements Memo Re SECY-96-128, Policy & Key Technical Issues Pertaining to Westinghouse AP600 Standardized Passive Reactor Design
ML20133H605
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 01/15/1997
From: Hoyle J
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To: Cyr K, Thompson H
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO), NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
References
REF-10CFR9.7 FACA, SECY-96-128-C, NUDOCS 9701170229
Download: ML20133H605 (2)


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  1. UNITED ST ATES I

f Onat%,%,. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION j' ';

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January 15, 1997

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MEMORANDUM TO: Hugh L. Thompson, Jr Acting Executive Director for Operationa 9'

Karen D. Cyr Gene 1 , ouyel FROM: Joho . Hoyl , Secretary l

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-96-128 - POLICY AND J

KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE i WESTINGHOUSE AP600 STANDARDIZED PASSIVE 5 REACTOR DESIGN i

l The Commission agrees it is important that the AP600 design include adequate means for accident management and long tenn

! mitigation. however, the Commission does not support the staff's request for the inclusion of additional system (s)- for accident management and long term mitigation following a. severe accident

as presented, not because it may be inappropriate, but because the basic design and performance requirements have not been

' bounded or specified, and the requested additional system (s) do j not appear to be consistent with the concept of a passive design.

j' The Commission is open to reconsideration of this issue if the j

staff :an be more specific in terms of what additional system (s)

are contemplated, including the design and performance .;

i j requirements.

I The Commission believes fission product removal coefficients for j analyzing the consequences of design basis accidents should be based on technical merits, and should not'be linked to the availability of one or more non-safety systems. ,

)

The Commission approved the staff's position that the site be l capable of sustaining design basis events with onsite equipment and supplies for the long term,'with replenishment of consumables (such as diesel fuel oil) from offsite suppliers after seven i days.

00 3 SECY NOTE: TH1S SRM, SECY-96-128, AND THE COMMISSION v0 TING RECORD CONTAINING THE VOTE SHEETS OF ALL h

COMMISSIONERS WILL BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 5 .

f WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS SRM. j) 9701170229 970115 PDR 10CFR PT9.7 PDR ,

_ =. - . -- ___ - _ _ . ._ _. - .. . .- . . . . . . . - . - .

The Commission approved the staff's position that Westinghouse use a balanced approach, involving reliance on in-vessel retention of the core complemented with limited analytical evaluation of ex-vessel phenomena, to address the adequacy of the AP600 design for ex-vessel events.

i cc: Chairman Jackson Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Dia:

Commissioner McGaffigan OCA l OIG Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail) 1 l

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